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Acting Contrary To Departmental Expectation Not Misconduct If It Was A Bonafide Exercise Of Judgment: Allahabad High Court
Upasna Agrawal
6 Oct 2026 11:00 AM IST
The Allahabad High Court has held that an officer who acts in good faith, with no trace of corrupt intent or personal gain, is not guilty of misconduct merely because the stand he took ran contrary to what his department expected of him. Quashing the charge sheet issued to a senior officer who gave his “no objection” to a C.B.I. closure report before the Special (CBI) Court, Kolkata,...
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The Allahabad High Court has held that an officer who acts in good faith, with no trace of corrupt intent or personal gain, is not guilty of misconduct merely because the stand he took ran contrary to what his department expected of him.
Quashing the charge sheet issued to a senior officer who gave his “no objection” to a C.B.I. closure report before the Special (CBI) Court, Kolkata, the Court held that a bonafide exercise of judgment does not become a disciplinary delinquency.
The bench of Justice Alok Mathur and Justice Amitabh Kumar Rai held,
“an officer acting bona fide without any trace of corrupt intent, ill-motive, or personal gain, cannot be said to have committed “misconduct”. The mere fact that his statement ran contrary to the departmental expectation encapsulated in the D.O. letter dated 20.08.2018 does not transform a bonafide exercise of judgment into a disciplinary delinquency.”
The petitioner, then Joint Secretary and Chief Vigilance Officer in the Department of Heavy Industry, was directed to lodge a First Information Report with the Central Bureau of Investigation against Shri M. K. Singh, the then Chairman-cum-Managing Director of M/s Bridge and Roof Co. (India) Ltd., Kolkata, alleged to have siphoned off the funds of the Government company. The case was registered under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Section 120B read with Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.
Petitioner was transferred out of the Department on 04.10.2016 and returned to his parent cadre in Uttar Pradesh on 23.10.2017.
The C.B.I. eventually filed a closure report and the petitioner, being the complainant, was summoned by the Special (CBI) Court. The Department's attempt to substitute his successor as complainant was rejected on 19.07.2018, and by letter dated 20.08.2018 the petitioner was asked to appear on 01.09.2018 and place the Department's views as set out in a demi-official letter to the Joint Director, C.B.I., Kolkata. On the advice of the prosecuting officer, he gave his no objection, and the closure report was accepted.
Nearly five years later, a memorandum dated 27.04.2023 carried a single article of charge, that by giving his no objection the petitioner had acted in contravention of the Department's written directions, failed to defend the interests of the Government of India and acted in a manner unbecoming of a public servant, in violation of Rule 3(1) of the All India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1968. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Lucknow rejected his original application on 19.12.2025.
Before the High Court, the petitioner argued that he had never been instructed to oppose the closure report, the Department's own letter having recorded that it was yet to receive the detailed investigation report and could not form a view. The charge was said to be vague, founded on surmises, issued more than four years after his deposition, and void ab initio under Rule 7 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969. It was further contended that neither the Cr.P.C. nor the B.N.S.S. allows a complainant to furnish a no-objection certificate to a closure report, the only course being a protest petition, which the Department never filed.
For the Union of India it was submitted that the C.B.I. had itself proposed departmental action against four officers, and that giving a no objection contrary to the directions of the Department was in itself misconduct.
The Court examined the two letters of 20.08.2018 on which the charge rested: one from the Joint Secretary to the Joint Director, C.B.I., Kolkata, the other from the Director, endorsed to the petitioner. It held that neither contained any direction to oppose the closure report. The Department had not seen the closure report at all, and in its absence, the Court held, no reasonable person could have decided to oppose it.
“Zealousness cannot override the legal requirements necessary for a challenge to be made to a closure report submitted by the Investigating Agency.”
It held that the only course open to the Department was a protest petition, and the respondents admitted that none was filed and that the order accepting the closure report was never challenged. The Court held that under Section 109 of the Cr.P.C., the court must apply its own mind before accepting a final report, and there is no provision for the complainant's consent or for recording his statement. The petitioner's no objection therefore had no bearing on the outcome, and no mala fides or collusion were alleged against him, observed the Court.
The Court noted that the Supreme Court has held in State of Punjab v. Ram Singh, Ex-Constable, U.O.I. v. J. Ahmed, Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. Collector and Bank of India v. Mohd. Nizamuddin that misconduct is a transgression of a definite rule of action, wilful in character and arising from ill motive, and that a mere error of judgment, negligence or want of efficiency is not misconduct.
The two letters, the Court found, contained no clear direction to the petitioner to make any statement at all, and the court's query had taken him by surprise. On the scope of review, it held,
“Though we are conscious of the fact that a charge sheet may be assailed on very limited grounds, mainly that of jurisdiction, certainly, if the bare reading of the charge itself does not make out a case of misconduct, then the charge sheet can be judicially reviewed and interfered with.”
Holding that the entire disciplinary exercise stood vitiated from the start, having been launched in ignorance of what misconduct means, the Court observed,
“Officers cannot be penalized for losses suffered by the organization, where they have acted in the best interests of the organization, and as per their best judgment, untainted by malafide, ulterior motives, or corrupt considerations. Else, the proverbial sword would forever be hanging over the heads of these officers, thereby inhibiting them from acting on the basis of their best judgment, or analysis, of the situation - a position which no civilized legal system can tolerate.”
Accordingly, the writ petition was allowed. The charge sheet, the disciplinary proceedings and all consequential penalty orders and proceedings were quashed and set aside, and the respondents were directed to restore all service benefits, including promotional and monetary entitlements, within twelve weeks.


