The Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that the right to property under Article 300-A of the Constitution cannot be disregarded merely because a small portion of land is being acquired.

It observed that deprivation of property must not only be authorised by law but must also follow the procedure established by law, even where the acquisition serves a larger public interest.

The Court accordingly directed the expeditious consideration of interim relief applications filed by landowners challenging the acquisition of land for the E-3 Seed Access Road project in the Andhra Pradesh Capital Region under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.

The 2013 Act lays down the statutory framework for land acquisition, including the procedures authorities must follow and provisions governing fair compensation, rehabilitation and resettlement.

A Division Bench of Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari and Justice Purushottam Kumar Chintalapudi considered appeals against the Single Judge's refusal to grant interim relief against the acquisition proceedings and dispossession.

The Court observed:

“However, in our view, valuable right of the writ petition is involved. It is not in dispute that their land is the subject matter of the land acquisition notification. It may be that very little part is under acquisition but the right to property as guaranteed under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, is not dependant on the extent of the property or an area. No person can be deprived of the right to property save by authority of law.

Deprivation of even a smaller portion of ones' property has to be in accordance with law. It is no doubt true that in case of conflict between larger public interest and the interest of an individual, it is the larger public interest that should prevail and an individual interest should give way to the larger public interest, but the deprivation however small in the eyes of others cannot be, except in accordance with law.

In accordance with law does not mean only by authority of law but also by following the procedure established by law. The authority may be there under the Act, 2013 for acquisition of the land but in doing so the authority has also to follow the procedure prescribed by law. The contention of the writ appellants' counsel that the mandatory provisions and procedure has not been followed cannot be rejected at this stage as having no substance or worth no-consideration. However, whether the procedure was or was not followed and its effect is the matter for consideration in the pending writ petition and for certain period the interest of the writ appellant(s) in W.A.No.849 of 2026 deserves protection.

To meet both the ends of justice, we deem it appropriate that the writ petitions itself may be decided on an early date, if so, possible on the next date fixed in the writ petitions, or in any case, the interim relief application of the writ petitioners may be decided finally.”

The dispute arose from land acquisition proceedings for the Seed Access Road. The State issued a preliminary notification under Section 11 of the 2013 Act covering land at Penumaka village and invited objections from affected landowners.

After considering the objections, the authorities rejected them and issued a declaration under Section 19(1), identifying the land proposed for acquisition. An award enquiry notice under Section 21 followed.

The landowners challenged the preliminary notification, the rejection of their objections, the Section 19(1) declaration and the award enquiry notice before the Single Judge. They alleged that the authorities had attempted to take possession of their land without following the procedure prescribed under the Act.

They alleged several procedural violations, including the absence of administrative sanction, failure to conduct a prior survey under Section 12, non-revision of market value under Section 26 and non-compliance with rehabilitation and resettlement requirements. They also challenged the rejection of their objections without a reasoned order and sought interim protection against dispossession pending the writ petitions.

Opposing interim relief, the State submitted that the acquisition was necessary to complete the road project, which served a public purpose. It stated that most of the required land had already been obtained through the Land Pooling Scheme and that the acquisition concerned the remaining extent. Maintaining that the prescribed procedures had been followed, the State sought time to file a detailed counter-affidavit.

The Single Judge declined interim relief, observing that the rival submissions required deeper examination and could not be decided at the interlocutory stage without a detailed counter-affidavit.

Having regard to the project's public purpose and the substantial extent of land already obtained through land pooling, the Court declined to interfere with the ongoing acquisition at that stage. However, it made the acquisition proceedings and any consequential award subject to the final outcome of the writ petitions.

Aggrieved by the refusal of interim protection, the landowners approached the Division Bench. After the Single Judge declined interim relief, the Bench initially directed the State to maintain the existing position regarding possession in the appeal where protection against dispossession was sought. This protection continued during the appeal.

The State subsequently informed the Bench that an award had been passed and compensation kept ready, but the landowners had refused to receive it.

The Court noted that possession had already been taken in one appeal, leaving no relief against dispossession to be granted in that matter, while interim protection against dispossession continued in the other.

In the appeal where protection remained in force, the Bench held that the landowners' contention that the mandatory procedure under the 2013 Act had not been followed could not be dismissed as lacking substance at that stage. It clarified that whether the prescribed procedure had been followed, and the legal consequences thereof, would have to be examined in the pending writ petitions.

The Bench directed the State to file its counter-affidavit by the next date, if not already filed, and the Single Judge to decide the interim relief application within one week of its filing. The landowners could file a rejoinder within the same period and were directed to cooperate without seeking adjournments.

Interim protection in that appeal would continue until the application was decided. The Bench also observed that the writ petitions could be finally decided after hearing both sides.

In the other appeal, the Bench declined to interfere with the Single Judge's order. It clarified that the acquisition proceedings and consequential award would remain subject to the writ petition's final outcome and any further orders passed by the Single Judge.

The appeal was dismissed as withdrawn insofar as one appellant was concerned, following her request to withdraw it only in respect of her individual claim.

In view of the pending writ petition and subsequent developments, the Bench found no reasonable or justifiable cause to keep the appeal pending, without prejudice to either side's rights in the writ petition.

The Bench refrained from expressing any opinion on the merits of either side's submissions, leaving the issues for consideration in the pending writ petitions.