The Calcutta High Court has set aside an interim injunction restraining two defendants from sending emails to third parties containing allegations against the plaintiff concerning the management of a company, holding that courts must apply the “Bonnard Principle” with particular caution while considering interim injunctions in defamation suits.

A Division Bench comprising Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Justice Sandip Kumar De observed that an interim injunction in a defamation action cannot ordinarily be granted unless the Court is satisfied that the defence of justification by truth available to the defendant is certain to fail at trial.

The Bench was hearing an appeal filed by Anil Kaushik and another against an order of the City Civil Court at Calcutta, which had restrained them from sending emails to third parties who were not directly involved with the concerned business, raising allegedly illegal allegations against the plaintiff regarding the management of the business during his tenure.

The Trial Court had, however, clarified that the injunction would not prevent the defendants from making genuine complaints regarding illegal activities of the company before competent statutory authorities.

The Division Bench noted that defamation suits occupy a distinct position insofar as interim injunctions are concerned.

Referring to Bonnard v. Perryman and Fraser v. Evans, the Court observed that the principle has been repeatedly followed by Indian courts.

“Thus, in a suit for defamation, apart from the three cardinal tests of prima facie case, balance of convenience and inconvenience and irreparable injury, the Bonnard Principle is squarely attracted,” the Court held.

Under the principle, the Court ordinarily should not restrain allegedly defamatory statements at the interim stage unless the material before it establishes that the defence of justification by truth is unavailable and is certain to fail at trial.

The Bench observed that until an alleged libel is shown to be untrue, it cannot be conclusively said that any legal right has been infringed.

The Court stressed that protection of free speech constitutes a strong reason for courts to act “most cautiously and warily” when considering interim injunctions in libel or defamation cases. The Division Bench found fault with the Trial Court's reasoning.

The Trial Court had recorded that, at the interlocutory stage, it was not possible to determine whether the allegations contained in the emails were genuine and that their truthfulness would have to be examined at trial.

However, despite this finding, the Trial Court proceeded to restrain the defendants from raising “illegal allegations”.

The High Court held that these findings were contradictory.

“Since the Court itself was unsure while passing the impugned order as to the legality of the allegations raised in the offending e-mails, there was no possibility for the court to come to a conclusion that those allegations were certain to fail,” the Bench observed.

Accordingly, the Trial Court had erred in law by failing to apply the Bonnard Principle before granting the injunction.

The Court also examined the contents and nature of the allegedly defamatory emails.

The emails, dated January 16 and January 31, 2026, contained allegations concerning alleged legal infractions by the plaintiff in relation to CyberCorp Limited and Sundyne Technologies Private Limited.

The Bench noted that the first email referred to legal notices and stated that it was being issued without prejudice to the rights, remedies and proceedings available in law and equity.

The subsequent email referred to and attached an actual legal notice issued on the same date, with its contents substantially reiterated in the email.

The Court acknowledged that certain strong expressions had been used, including allegations concerning alleged misappropriation of proprietary software source codes and confidential technical material.

However, it found that these expressions were used in the specific context of alleged violations of corporate and criminal law.

The Court held that the legality of the plaintiff's actions and the truthfulness of the allegations could ultimately be determined only by competent legal forums.

The Bench noted that proceedings alleging oppression and mismanagement were already pending before the National Company Law Tribunal.

The High Court also found the injunction problematic because of its vagueness.

The Trial Court had restrained the defendants from sending emails to “third parties” who were not “directly involved” with the concerned business.

The Division Bench noted that the plaint and injunction application did not specifically disclose the capacities of the persons allegedly unconnected with CyberCorp Limited, nor did they categorically identify which recipients of the emails fell within that category.

The expressions used by the Trial Court therefore left it to the parties' own perception to determine who could be considered a third party not directly involved with the business.

The High Court held that the resulting injunction was effectively blanket in nature and insufficiently precise.

The Court ultimately held that the Trial Court had misconstrued the parameters governing interim injunctions in defamation suits.

“Until it is clear that an alleged libel is untrue, it is not clear that any right at all has been infringed,” the Bench reiterated.

Since the defendants had raised a defence based on the alleged illegality of the plaintiff's actions and the truthfulness of their allegations could not be determined at the interlocutory stage, the High Court found that the threshold for granting an interim injunction had not been met.

The Division Bench accordingly allowed the appeal and set aside the Trial Court's April 4, 2026 order in the defamation suit.

The Court clarified that its observations were tentative and confined to the determination of the appeal against the temporary injunction. They would not influence the Trial Court while deciding the main suit.

Case: Anil Kaushik and Anr. Vs. Sourabh Khemani

Case No: FMAT 220 of 2026

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