[DV Act] Woman Can't Insist On Re-Entering Abandoned Matrimonial Home If Alternate Accommodation Exists: Delhi High Court

The Delhi High Court has held that the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 does not confer an indefeasible right upon an aggrieved woman to insist on residence in a particular property which was abandoned by her, when suitable alternate accommodation is available.

Justice Ravinder Dudeja observed that compelling restoration in such a case would disturb the settled possession of the current occupants and convert a protective statute into a rule for re-entry to any past residence and thus, would amount to travelling beyond the legislative intent.

The Court dismissed a petition filed by an 81-year-old woman seeking restoration of possession in her matrimonial home, holding that she had voluntarily shifted to another property owned by her husband and was not rendered roofless.

The woman had challenged trial court orders declining her plea under Sections 19 and 23 of the Domestic Violence Act for a residence order permitting her re-entry into the matrimonial home property.

She claimed that she had resided in the matrimonial home for nearly six decades and had only temporarily shifted to her daughter's residence in April 2023 for medical treatment. Upon attempting to return in July 2023, she alleged that she was denied entry.

Rejecting her plea, Justice Dudeja noted that the woman had shifted from matrimonial home to alternate accommodation, an action which was not shown to be compelled by violence or coercion. The Court noted that the woman herself in her complaint stated that she had shifted there for the purpose of treatment.

“The relief under Section 19is discretionary and equitable. The DV Act balances the rights of the aggrieved woman with the rights of other occupants and owners. Compelling the restoration in the present case would disturb the settled possession of the current occupants and convert a protective statute into a rule for re-entry to any past residence and thus would amount to travelling beyond the legislative intent,” the Court said.

“Therefore, in view of the availability of suitable alternate accommodation of the same standard and the discretionary and protective nature of relief under Section 19, the petitioner is not entitled to a residence order directing restoration or re-entry into the Green Park property,” it added.

Title: X v. Y

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