The Delhi High Court has observed that DNA evidence establishes sexual intercourse between an accused and a prosecutrix but does not establish whether the relationship was consensual or non-consensual.

Justice Madhu Jain made the observation while upholding the acquittal of a man accused of repeatedly sexually assaulting a woman, administering an intoxicating substance to her, threatening her and committing unnatural sexual acts.

The Court noted that the DNA report in the case established that the accused was the biological father of the child born to the prosecutrix. However, the Court held that such evidence could not, by itself, determine the circumstances in which the sexual intercourse took place.

“The said evidence is undoubtedly significant as it establishes the fact of sexual intercourse between the parties. However, the DNA report by itself does not establish the circumstances in which such intercourse took place, nor does it determine whether the relationship was consensual or non- consensual,” the Court held.

The Court was hearing an appeal filed by the prosecutrix against the trial court ruling passed in October 2024 acquitting the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 328, 376(2)(n), 377, 506 and 509 of IPC.

The prosecution alleged that the accused, who was known to the family, had allegedly established physical relations with the prosecutrix from 2017 onwards against her wishes by extending threats and inducements.

It was also alleged that on one occasion he administered an intoxicating substance to her before sexually assaulting her. The prosecutrix subsequently became pregnant and gave birth to a child in June 2019.

During investigation, DNA samples of the prosecutrix, accused and child were collected and the forensic report established that the accused was the biological father of the child.

The accused, in his statement under Section 313 of CrPC, admitted that he had physical relations with the prosecutrix but claimed that the relationship was consensual and was within the knowledge of her husband.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court observed that the Trial Court had examined the prosecution evidence not merely with reference to the factum of sexual relationship between the prosecutrix and the accused, but also with reference to the circumstances in which the relationship allegedly took place and whether the prosecution had established the allegations of absence of consent, coercion, intoxication and threats beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court also noted that the Trial Court did not reject the testimony of the woman merely because it was that of the prosecutrix but examined the same in the light of her earlier statements and the other evidence on record, after which it found material inconsistencies and improvements.

Justice Jain noted that there was material discrepancy regarding the state of consciousness of the prosecutrix during the alleged first occurrence where she alleged that she was intoxicated.

“This inconsistency assumes significance since the prosecution itself attributes the alleged absence of consent during the first incident to the administration of an intoxicating substance and the consequent condition of the prosecutrix,” the Court said.

It further noted that the learned Trial Court had also noticed material inconsistencies concerning the pregnancy and the alleged suspicion regarding the paternity of the child.

The Court observed that it is conscious that the conduct of a prosecutrix in a sexual offence cannot be judged on the basis of stereotypical notions of how she ought to behave, nor can delay in reporting a sexual offence, by itself, be treated as sufficient to discard the prosecution case.

However, it added that the conduct of the parties and the surrounding circumstances are not wholly irrelevant when the Court is required to determine the credibility of competing versions and whether the prosecution has established the charges beyond reasonable doubt.

In the present case, the Court held that the Trial Court did not treat any one circumstance as conclusive but rather, it considered the evidence cumulatively.

“The present case is therefore not one where material evidence has been wholly ignored or where the conclusion of acquittal is demonstrably unsustainable. The learned Trial Court has examined the evidence and arrived at a conclusion which is reasonably possible on the material before it,” the Court said.

It concluded that another view may also be possible is not sufficient to justify interference in an appeal against acquittal and that the strengthened presumption of innocence in favour of the accused consequently operates in his favour.

Title: KXXXXX v. THE STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR

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