Gujarat High Court Refuses To Halt Proposal For Partial Demolition Of '400-Year-Old' Mosque For Road Widening Project

The Gujarat High Court on Friday (October 3) declined to interfere with an order refusing to restrain the proposed partial demolition of a mosque stated to be 400-years old, to widen a road leading towards Sabarmati railway station in Ahmedabad. 

The court was hearing an appeal by the Muttawali of Mancha Masjid against rejection of his writ petition challenging action of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC), to set back a part of premises of the mosque, situated at Saraspur and which is believed to be constructed approximately 400 years ago.

The single judge in its September 23 order had found that the procedure prescribed under the provisions of Sections 210 to 213 Gujarat Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 (GPMC) had been followed by issuance of notice to the stakeholders and after taking approval of the Standing Committee as envisaged. The single judge had said that there was no error committed by the authorities. Against this the Muttawali moved an appeal before the division bench. 

After hearing the arguments by the parties, a division bench of Justice AS Supehia and Justice LS Pirzada in its order dictated that the main structure of the mosque was not being demolished. 

"We have noticed that there are a number of properties including commercial properties, residential as well as temple have also been included for demolition due to widening of the road," it said. 

The counsel for the appellant said that the single judge had erred in interpreting the provisions of Section 212 of the Gujarat Provincial Municipal Corporations Act read with Section 91, 51 of Waqf Act.

It was submitted that when notice was issued by estate officer, the appellant had filed a detailed representation however, without dealing with its contentions the respondent Municipal Corporation has rejected the cases of all the persons including the present appellant who had objected to demolition and widening of the road.

The Appellant's counsel submitted that once hearing has been given by the estate officer, the standing committee could not have passed the decision that too without recording any reasons. It was submitted that corporation while widening the road has not observed the legal precedents. 

The counsel appearing for the AMC referred to the show cause notices and provisions of Sections 210, 216 of GPMC Act and submitted that the procedure has been followed by the corporation. 

He said that the appellant should have taken objection when the public notice was issued, but the appellant had taken a belated objection which has been considered by the standing committee of the municipal corporation. 

He pointed out the provisions of the Act and said that the estate officer was empowered to issue show cause notice but ultimately the decision has to be taken by the standing committee which was done in the case of the appellant.

The court thereafter said:

"At the outset we find that the learned single judge has not committed any illegality or infirmity in rejecting the writ petition...Section 212 provides that Commissioner with approval of standing committee has to take decision with regard to pulling down of any building or part thereof which is in the regular line of the street. It is not in dispute that there are numerous properties, including residential areas and commercial as also a religious properties which are included for demolition in the road widening. One of the properties is of the appellant"

"....Thus after overall appreciation of the order passed by the learned single judge, and the provisions of the Act...we are in agreement with the reasoning adopted by the learned single judge in rejecting the writ petition". 

The high court thus dismissed the appeal.

The high court in its order observed Section 68(2) GPMC Act empowers the Commissioner to delegate his power to any Municipal Officer to exercise, perform or discharge any such power, duty or function with the approval of the Standing Committee.

It said that Estate Officer is authorized to undertake necessary exercise under the provisions of Sections 212 and 213 of the GPMC Act. It noted that the appellant did not respond to the public notice, and the representation has been filed before the Estate Officer, and he was also heard.

It observed that all the objections were placed before the Standing Committee, which ultimately rejected the objections.

"Once the objections are noted by the Estate Officer, and are placed before the Standing Committee, it was not necessary for the Standing Committee to again hear the appellant. It was a collective decision of the members of the Standing Committee, and the decision of individual members is not necessitated, and the decision as a whole is required to be recorded in writing...Merely because the decision of the Standing Committee does not contain the reason, that does not mean that there has been no proper consideration of the objections raised by the appellant and all other persons whose properties have been encompassed in the road widening"

The court further observed that the Standing Committee is under "no legal obligation to record reasons" in support of its decision and even natural justice principles do not require the Committee to record reasons dealing with each and every objection taken against the road widening exercise under the statute, in the absence of any statutory requirement mandating the Standing Committee to record reasons.

It said,

"we do find that an illegality is committed in passing the impugned decision...We find that in the instant case, there is sufficient compliance with the principles of natural justice and the Rules, hence we are not inclined to scuttle the exercise of widening the road, which is of immense public interest".

Background

Before the single judge the Mutawalli had argued that the name of the masjid also appears in the Revenue record and the masjid has been reconstructed and renovated multiple times and it has its own importance and significance amongst the Muslim community.

After the enactment of Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, the Masjid and its properties came to be registered as Mancha Masjid Trust vide Registration No. B-655. The main objective of the Trust was to facilitate prayers and therefore also it has its own significance and importance.

Since the Trust is originally a Waqf, upon coming into force of the Waqf Act, 1995 the property in question is controlled and supervised by the Waqf Board. The details and particulars mentioned in the Public Trust Register (PTR) are maintained by the Waqf trust. Thus, registration of the property in PTR under provisions of the Waqf Act is not in dispute, it was submitted. 

The State had argued that the Road Line prescribed by the Municipal Commissioner is of vital importance to regulate traffic— facilitating planned growth, movement of emergency vehicles and it is in the larger public interest. Therefore, individual inconvenience may be ignored as against the larger public interest more particularly, when the statutory powers are exercised by the authority after following due procedure under provisions of law.

Moreover, the road in question leads to Kalupur Railway Station which is also a junction for the Ahmedabad Metro Rail and on account of the increased traffic if the implementation is not carried out, that would cause serious inconvenience to public at large, it was contended.

Case title: MANCHA MASJID THROUGH TRUSTEE/MUTAWALLI  V/S STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.

R/LPA/1130/2025 IN R/SCA/12923/2025

Click Here To Read/Download Order

Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (Guj) 154