Adult's Choice Cannot Be Overridden By Societal Expectations: J&K&L High Court Directs Police Protection To Couple
LIVELAW NEWS NETWORK
28 Sept 2026 8:00 PM IST

The Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court has directed the police authorities to provide appropriate protection to an adult woman and the man of her choice, holding that her voluntary decision to lead her life with him cannot be overridden merely on account of parental disagreement or societal expectations.
The Court was hearing a Letters Patent Appeal filed by Nusrat Jan and another against a series of orders passed by the Single Judge. The appellants had sought protection of their life and liberty and contended that petitioner No. 1, having attained majority, was entitled to decide her residence, movement, association and choice of life partner without coercion or interference.
A Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Dr. Pushpendra Singh Bhati and Justice M.A. Chowdhary observed,
“This Court finds itself firmly tied down to the principle of individual autonomy, which cannot be hampered by societal expectations in a vibrant democracy. The State's respect for the individual independent choices has to be held high.”
Background:
The proceedings arose from an write petition in which the petitioners sought, inter alia, a direction restraining the respondents from interfering with their life and matrimonial status and a direction for adequate security and protection in terms of the Supreme Court's judgment in Lata Singh v. State of U.P.
Counsel for the appellants relied upon the Class 10th certificate issued by the Jammu and Kashmir State Board of School Education, which recorded the date of birth of appellant No. 1 as 06.04.2008. It was submitted that the Single Judge had also observed in the order dated 29.07.2026 that she was a major.
The appellants' counsel made a limited submission for protection, contending that, being adults, their wishes were required to be respected and that parental disagreement necessitated protection so that appellant No. 1 could exercise her liberty and live according to her own wishes.
The father of appellant No. 1 was also present before the Court. The judgment records that he was anxious regarding the future of his daughter, which the Court described as a reasonable parental concern. He also submitted that, if his daughter wished to go with appellant No. 2, proper Mahr ought to be paid to her.
The State, through the Senior AAG, acknowledged that the certificate established that appellant No. 1 was a major. The State submitted that, in the interest of justice, her wishes had to be protected and that her liberty and protection had become her right. It was also submitted that, if necessary, the Court itself could ascertain her wishes.
The Court thereafter called appellant No. 1 before it and asked her about her wishes. She stated that she wanted to go with appellant No. 2 and requested protection so that she remained at liberty to exercise her voluntary will. She also stated that she had attempted to persuade her parents to allow her to remain at liberty but had not succeeded.
Court's Observation
The Division Bench began its consideration by recognising the constitutional obligations arising under Article 21 of the Constitution. It relied upon the Rajasthan High Court judgment in Leela and Another v. State of Rajasthan and Others, which had considered the relationship between individual autonomy, personal choice, societal morality and the State's obligation to protect life and liberty.
The Court particularly referred to the Supreme Court's judgment in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, where the principle of individual autonomy and the individual's right to make intimate and personal choices were recognised as facets of privacy and dignity.
The Court noted that autonomy involves the individual's capacity to make independent choices and that constitutional courts are required to be guided by constitutional morality rather than majoritarian or societal perceptions.
The Court observed that scrutiny of the morality of an individual's relationship, particularly where the legality of that relationship is not itself in issue, would intrude upon the individual's right to choice. It held,
“It is well- settled that it is not in the Court's domain to intrude upon an individual's privacy. Any scrutiny or remark upon the so-called morality of an individual's relationship and blanket statements of condemnation especially in matters where it is not called into question, to begin with, would simply bolster an intrusion upon one's right to choice and condone acts of unwarranted moral policing by the society at large.”
The Bench also examined the corresponding obligation of the State to protect the life and liberty of individuals. In this context, it referred to Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration and D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, emphasising that fundamental rights do not disappear merely because an individual is subjected to State action or other proceedings.
The Court further considered the State's constitutional obligation to create an environment in which persons belonging to different faiths, castes and creeds can live together while their life, liberty, dignity and individual worth remain protected. It referred to Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India in this context.
The Bench also made a distinction between deciding the legality or sanctity of a relationship and deciding whether an adult is entitled to constitutional protection against threats or interference. It held that the present proceedings did not require the Court to adjudicate upon the sanctity of the relationship.
“Had there been a question before this Court with regards the morality/ legality of live- in relationships and matters connected thereto, then perhaps the answer would have required more deliberation along those lines. However, in the context of the limited question this Court is posed with pertaining to the application of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and it is clear that the right to claim protection under this Article is a constitutional mandate upon the State and can be availed by all persons alike”, the bench remarked.
Turning to the individual facts, the Court noted that appellant No. 1 had remained in the custody of her parents since 29.07.2026 and had spent sufficient time at her parental home. Despite this, she remained confident in expressing her wish to go with appellant No. 2. The Court also recorded that there was no pressure upon her to depose according to anyone else's will and that the school certificate clearly established that she was a major.
Having considered these circumstances, the Division Bench allowed the Letters Patent Appeal directing the State authorities/police authorities to provide appropriate protection to the petitioners and to ensure that the voluntary will of appellant No. 1 remained protected.
The appeal and the writ petition were accordingly disposed of.
Case Title: Nusrat Jan And Another v. Union Territory of J&K (Home) And Others
Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (JKL) 326
Appearances
Nusrat Jan and another: Mir Umar, Advocate
Union Territory of J&K (Home): Mohsin Qadri, Sr. AAG with Maha Majeed, Assisting Counsel Protection Matter LPA .pdf

