[IPC] No Need To Wait For Proof From Accused To Bring His Case Under Purview Of General Exceptions: J&K High Court

“Once it is clearly discernible from the allegations made in the complaint that the act of the accused falls within the General Exceptions, there is no need to wait for submission of proof on behalf of the accused so as to bring his case within the purview of General Exceptions”, held the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh while quashing a FIR against a group of revenue officials.Providing a robust judicial backing to public servants acting in good faith under court orders Justice Sanjay Dhar reiterates that the criminal justice process must not be misused to obstruct statutory duties.In allowing the plea of the officials who were were acting in pursuance of a Division Bench judgment Justice Dhar observed, “The instant case is a classic example where the complainant in his complaint itself has admitted that the petitioners were acting pursuant to the abrogation of ROSHNI Act, which means that they were acting pursuant to the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in S. K. Bhalla's case (supra). Thus, on this ground also no offence is made out against the petitioners”Background of the Case:The case arose out of a criminal complaint lodged by the chairman of a trust, which runs a residential school and hostel for orphan girls in Anantnag. The trust alleged that on March 11, 2022, government officials forcibly entered its premises, harassed the female students, locked dining areas, and even outraged their modesty. These allegations led to the registration of FIR under Sections 447, 354, and 506 IPC on the directions of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class. However, the officials named in the FIR led by the local Tehsildar asserted that their actions were part of a lawful eviction process undertaken to retrieve State land following the abrogation of the ROSHNI Act and pursuant to orders passed by the Division Bench of the High Court in S.K. Bhalla v. State of J&K & Others (PIL No. 119/2011).The petitioners, represented by Advocate Salih Pirzada, argued that the FIR was a result of vendetta by the complainant who was attempting to obstruct eviction proceedings from State land illegally occupied by the trust. Adv Pirzada further submitted that eviction notices had been duly issued and that the trust resisted the proceedings, prompting lawful actions backed by court orders. Furthermore, he contended that the Magistrate had erred in mechanically directing the registration of FIR without verifying compliance with the mandatory procedures under Sections 154(1) and 154(3) CrPC.The State, defending the FIR's registration, submitted that the learned Magistrate had acted within the framework of law and that the matter warranted investigation given the nature of allegations. However, during investigation, revenue records confirmed that the premises in question were indeed State land, undercutting the core of the trespass allegation.Court's Observations: Justice Dhar began by addressing the procedural lapses in the Magistrate's approach. Drawing heavily from Priyanka Shrivastava v. State of U.P. (2015), the Court emphasized that an application under Section 156(3) CrPC must be supported by an affidavit, and it must be clearly demonstrated that the complainant had approached both the SHO and the SSP under Sections 154(1) and 154(3) CrPC. In this case, no such compliance was evident, the court recorded. The Court noted that while the complainant vaguely alleged police inaction, there was neither a specific mention of any date or official approached nor any supporting documents. The application was thus procedurally defective.On the substantive issue, the Court turned its attention to the legal immunity granted under Section 78 of the Indian Penal Code, which states that any act done pursuant to a court judgment even if that court lacked jurisdiction does not amount to an offence. Justice Dhar held that the revenue officials' actions were clearly in execution of the court's orders in the S.K. Bhalla PIL, making the lodging of a criminal complaint legally untenable.Importantly, the Court acknowledged that while General Exceptions fall under Chapter IV of the IPC and are ordinarily matters of defence, when the allegations in the complaint themselves reveal the operation of such exceptions, the protection can be extended at the threshold.To buttress this point, the Court relied on decisions such as Bapu alias Gujraj Singh v. State of Rajasthan (2007) 8 SCC 66 and A.K. Chaudhary v. State of Gujarat [2006 Cri LJ 729], which allow quashing of criminal proceedings where the complaint on its face suggests applicability of General Exceptions.Justice Dhar observed that the vague and omnibus allegations about outraging modesty and threatening students lacked specifics and appeared to be motivated. “In fact, from the material on record , it appears that the complainant has, with a view to obstruct the petitioners from discharging their official functions pursuant to the directions of the Court, resorted to lodging of the...

[IPC] No Need To Wait For Proof From Accused To Bring His Case Under Purview Of General Exceptions: J&K High Court

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[IPC] No Need To Wait For Proof From Accused To Bring His Case Under Purview Of General Exceptions: J&K High Court

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