The Court further held that a policy contemplating the grant of employment to landowners merely in lieu of the acquisition of their land, without providing for any open selection or competitive process, is inconsistent with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, as it carves out a separate avenue for entry into public employment divorced from the prescribed recruitment mechanism.

The Court thus dismissed a writ petition seeking a mandamus for appointment under the erstwhile land-loser quota.

The petition was heard by Justice Wasim Sadiq Nargal, who observed,

“The petitioners having already failed to establish their right to employment before competent authorities when the policy was in vogue are now just flogging a dead horse by filing the instant petition seeking employment, which can't be allowed.”

Background

The case set up by the petitioners was that the respondents had acquired approximately four kanals of land belonging to the family of petitioner No. 1 for the construction of a railway yard and workshop. The petitioners contended that the respondents, in addition to paying compensation, had been providing employment to eligible members of families whose land had been acquired.

Insofar as petitioner No. 1 was concerned, it was pleaded that her brother was considered for appointment under the land-loser quota and was initially found suitable for the post of Trackman. However, he was declared medically unfit for all categories. A fresh medical board was constituted pursuant to a court order, which again declared him unfit.

The petitioners claimed that the respondents had advised the father of petitioner No. 1 that another ward of the family could be considered for appointment, and accordingly, the name of petitioner No. 1 was forwarded.

With respect to petitioner No. 2, it was pleaded that the land belonging to his father was acquired in the year 1999-2000 and that his father's name figured in a selection list published in a newspaper. The petitioners contended that his father could not join service on account of being illiterate and overage, whereafter the documents of petitioner No. 2 were submitted for consideration.

The petitioners alleged arbitrary and discriminatory treatment, particularly when similarly situated persons had been provided employment.

Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the writ petition was misconceived, as the policy under which such appointments were earlier considered was withdrawn by the Railway Board in 2019, and the subsequent policy provided for a lump-sum payment to the affected family.

It was contended that petitioner No. 1's brother was declared medically unfit twice, and her case was received only in 2023. Regarding petitioner No. 2, it was submitted that his case was received in 2023, nearly 23 years after the acquisition of the land.

The respondents denied the allegations of arbitrariness and submitted that the mere fact that other persons may have been appointed under the earlier policy did not confer upon the petitioners an indefeasible right to appointment.

Court's Observation

The Court observed at the outset that the acquisition of land by the State or its instrumentalities, by itself, does not confer upon the landowner or any member of the affected family an indefeasible right to public employment. The Court held,

“The entitlement to appointment, if any, must be traced to the governing policy or statutory framework and is subject to the conditions stipulated therein. A writ of mandamus can be issued only where the petitioner establishes a subsisting legal right corresponding to a public duty enforceable against the respondent.”

The Court noted that the petitioners had not demonstrated that the governing instructions conferred upon them a vested right to appointment which had crystallised before the policy was withdrawn in 2019. The Court held that the mere submission of a representation, forwarding of a name, or pendency of a claim does not create an indefeasible right to appointment under a policy that has subsequently ceased to operate.

Regarding petitioner No. 1, the Court observed that her brother was declared medically unfit for all categories, and the communication advising the father to nominate another ward could not be construed as conferring an automatic right to engagement, in the absence of proof that it constituted an unconditional and binding assurance of appointment.

Regarding petitioner No. 2, the Court noted that the reliance placed upon a newspaper publication allegedly containing the name of his father did not establish that a final appointment order had been issued in his favour or that petitioner No. 2 subsequently became entitled to appointment as his substitute.

The Court further addressed the constitutional validity of the land-loser policy itself. The Court held,

“Even if it is assumed, for the sake of argument, that the petitioners fulfilled the eligibility criteria prescribed under the withdrawn policy, the same would not, by itself, vest in them any right to claim appointment thereunder because the withdrawn policy was not consistent with Articles 14 and 16.”

The Court observed that the policy contemplated the grant of employment to landowners merely in lieu of the acquisition of their land, without providing for any open selection or competitive process, effectively carving out a separate avenue for entry into public employment. The Court held,

“The acquisition of land, howsoever genuine the claim for compensation may be, cannot furnish an independent basis for appointment to a public post in disregard of the constitutional requirements governing public employment.”

The Court relied on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (2) (2006) and State of Orissa v. Mamata Mohanty (2011) to reiterate that public employment must be governed by the rule of law, merit, and fairness, and that appointments made without inviting applications through an appropriate public advertisement violate Articles 14 and 16.

Holding that the erstwhile policy itself was inconsistent with Articles 14 and 16, as it bypassed the constitutional requirement of fair and open competition for public posts, the bench Found no merit in the petition.

Accordingly, the petition was dismissed.