Whether Magistrate's Order Directing FIR Registration Is Revisable? J&K High Court Refers Legal Question To Larger Bench

  • Whether Magistrates Order Directing FIR Registration Is Revisable? J&K High Court Refers Legal Question To Larger Bench
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    The Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court has referred to a larger Bench the question whether an order passed by a Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC, directing registration of an FIR and police investigation, is an interlocutory order barred from revision or an intermediate order amenable to revisional jurisdiction.

    Justice Sanjay Parihar, while considering two petitions arising from orders directing registration of FIRs, observed that the issue has generated divergent judicial opinions. The Court noted that while the Allahabad High Court has held that such orders are interlocutory and not revisable at the instance of a prospective accused, a different line of decisions from the Bombay High Court recognises revisional jurisdiction in such matters.

    The Court was examining the scope of Sections 397(2) CrPC and 438(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), which bar revision against interlocutory orders. It observed,

    “...the mere fact that an order does not determine guilt or innocence cannot by itself conclusively establish that it is interlocutory.”

    Background

    The reference arose from two petitions that raised a question as to whether a person against whom allegations have been made can challenge, by way of criminal revision, a Magistrate's direction to register an FIR and investigate the complaint.

    In one of the petitions, the petitioners included the then Senior Superintendent of Police, Jammu, Shridhar Patil, the then Deputy Superintendent of Police, Cyber Crime Police Station, Parupkar Singh, and the then SHO, Janipur Police Station, Naresh Kumar. They challenged proceedings arising from a Magistrate's direction for registration of an FIR on a complaint filed by Neha Chawla. Their case included a challenge to the Magistrate's jurisdiction and the alleged failure to consider statutory safeguards applicable to proceedings involving public servants.

    In the connected petition, Bharat Bhushan and Anuj Sajgotra challenged an order passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bishnah, directing the SHO, Police Station Bishnah, to register an FIR on an application filed by Neelam Gorkha under Section 156(3) CrPC.

    The dispute arose out of possession of a shop operating as M/s National Medical Hall near Sub-District Hospital, Bishnah. The petitioners claimed to have been running the establishment since 1993 and alleged that the respondent and her sons had threatened to dispossess them. They had instituted a civil suit, in which an interim restraint against forcible dispossession was granted. They further alleged that the respondent and her sons subsequently entered the shop, abused them and assaulted one of the petitioners, leading to registration of an FIR in March 2024.

    The respondent thereafter approached the Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC, and the Magistrate directed registration of an FIR. The petitioners challenged that direction before the Additional Sessions Judge, Jammu. However, their revision petition was dismissed on the ground that an order directing registration of an FIR was interlocutory and, therefore, not revisable.

    Both sets of petitioners approached the High Court against the dismissal of their revision petitions.

    Court's Observations

    Justice Parihar examined the distinction between interlocutory, intermediate and final orders, particularly in the context of the statutory bar under Section 397(2) CrPC.

    Referring to the Supreme Court decisions in Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra and Girish Kumar Suneja v. Central Bureau of Investigation, the Court noted that the expression “interlocutory order” cannot be applied mechanically to every order passed before the conclusion of criminal proceedings.

    It observed that an order may not terminate the entire criminal proceeding but may nevertheless possess sufficient finality in relation to a particular issue to qualify as an intermediate order.

    The Court explained that the nature of an order has to be determined by examining the jurisdiction exercised, the issue decided, its effect and the legal consequences flowing from it. It added that the mere disposal of an application does not automatically make every order passed on it revisable.

    The Court also considered the Full Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Father Thomas v. State of U.P., which held that an order under Section 156(3) CrPC directing registration of an FIR and investigation is interlocutory and that a prospective accused cannot maintain a revision against it.

    On the other hand, the Court examined the Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Arun P. Gidh v. Chandraprakash Singh & Ors. It clarified that the Bombay Full Bench had not undertaken a fresh and conclusive determination of the larger question whether every order under Section 156(3) CrPC is revisable. Rather, it had recognised the existing line of Bombay High Court precedents treating such orders as revisable and considered the consequences of revisional interference at different stages of investigation and prosecution.

    The Court then turned to the position within Jammu and Kashmir. It noted that a Full Bench of the High Court in Manohar Nath Sher v. State of J&K had explained the meaning and scope of an interlocutory order. Subsequently, in Satpal Sharma v. Pawan Singh Rathore, a Single Judge had specifically held that an order directing registration of an FIR under Section 156(3) CrPC was interlocutory and not amenable to criminal revision.

    Justice Parihar observed that the decision in Satpal Sharma was a precedent of a coordinate Bench and could not simply be disregarded because another interpretation appeared preferable. Judicial discipline, the Court said, required that the earlier view be followed unless it was distinguishable, displaced by a binding decision of a superior court, or referred for reconsideration by a larger Bench.

    The Court also considered the Supreme Court's decision in Anurag Bhatnagar & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr., 2025 INSC 895, which reiterated that a Magistrate exercising jurisdiction under Section 156(3) CrPC must apply an independent judicial mind to the material placed before the Court. However, it clarified that the Supreme Court had not directly decided whether a criminal revision under Section 397 CrPC was maintainable against such an order at the instance of a prospective accused.

    Emphasising the distinction between the disposal of an application and the termination of the larger criminal proceeding, the Court observed,

    “An order may finally dispose of an application and yet be interlocutory in relation to the larger proceeding of which it forms a part. Conversely, an order which does not finally determine criminal liability may nevertheless decide an important question of jurisdiction or a substantial legal right and thereby acquire the character of an intermediate order.”

    The Court further noted that registration of an FIR may have serious consequences for a person named in a complaint, including exposure to investigation, examination, search and seizure. However, it cautioned that registration of an FIR does not, by itself, authorise arrest in every case, as the power of arrest remains subject to statutory conditions and safeguards.

    It added that an order directing investigation does not amount to a judicial determination that the person named in the complaint has committed an offence. The investigating agency is required to examine the allegations objectively and collect evidence both supporting and contradicting the accusation.

    At the same time, the Court stressed that the seriousness of the consequences reinforces the need for a Magistrate to exercise jurisdiction lawfully and apply judicial mind before directing an investigation. Referring to Priyanka Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anil Kumar v. M.K. Aiyappa, it reiterated that a Magistrate cannot act merely as a forwarding authority while considering an application under Section 156(3) CrPC.

    The Court also observed that where allegations are directed against public servants, the Magistrate must examine whether any special statutory provision, prior approval, sanction or other legal restriction applies. However, it clarified that the existence of a jurisdictional defect and the maintainability of a particular remedy are separate legal questions.

    After analysing the conflicting judicial approaches and the existing precedent of its own Court, Justice Parihar concluded that the issue required authoritative consideration by a larger Bench.

    The High Court accordingly formulated six questions for consideration by an appropriate larger Bench. These include whether an order under Section 156(3) CrPC directing registration of an FIR is necessarily interlocutory or may constitute an intermediate order; whether the final disposal of the application seeking investigation is relevant or determinative of its revisability; and whether the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Amar Nath, Madhu Limaye and Girish Kumar Suneja were not considered by the High Court in Satpal Sharma.

    The proposed reference also seeks clarification on whether an order alleged to suffer from lack of jurisdiction, non-application of judicial mind or violation of mandatory statutory safeguards can be examined in revision, or whether the aggrieved person must instead invoke the inherent or extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court.

    The larger Bench has also been asked to determine the permissible scope of revisional interference at different stages of the criminal process and the extent to which the additional safeguards introduced by Section 175(3) BNSS affect the character and revisability of orders passed under that provision.

    The Court directed the Registry to place the records of both petitions before the Chief Justice for appropriate orders regarding constitution of a larger Bench.



    Case Title :  Sr. Superintendent of Police, Jammu (the then) Shridhar Patil & Ors. v. Neha Chawla; Bharat Bhushan & Anr. v. Neelam GorkhaCITATION :  2026 LiveLaw (JKL)
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