The Jharkhand High Court has quashed the dismissal of a Jharkhand Armed Police constable over an alleged adulterous relationship, observing that adultery is no longer a criminal offence in view of the Supreme Court's decision in Joseph Shine v. Union of India. The Court further held that the disciplinary authority had dismissed the constable on a ground that was never part of the charge-sheet, rendering the order illegal and violative of the principles of natural justice.

A Single Judge Bench of Justice Deepak Roshan was hearing a writ petition challenging the petitioner's dismissal from service and the appellate order affirming the punishment.

The petitioner had joined the Jharkhand Armed Police as a constable in 2007. A complaint was later lodged by a woman alleging that despite both of them being married and having children, the petitioner had married her and maintained a physical relationship with her between October 2019 and April 2023 before refusing to keep her. Following a preliminary enquiry, departmental proceedings were initiated against the petitioner. Separately, an FIR was also registered against him under Sections 417 and 376(2)(n) IPC.

The petitioner was eventually removed from service under Rule 824(b) of the Police Manual. His departmental appeal was also dismissed. Before the High Court, the petitioner contended that the dismissal order was based on a charge that never formed part of the departmental charge-sheet. He further argued that the enquiry report and the orders passed by the disciplinary and appellate authorities were non-speaking, and that adultery could no longer be treated as a criminal offence after the Supreme Court's decision in Joseph Shine.

Upon examining the record, the High Court found that the departmental charge against the petitioner was that, despite being married, he maintained a relationship with a married woman, amounting to indiscipline and bringing disrepute to the police department. However, the Court noted that the dismissal order was ultimately founded on an altogether different ground, namely the registration of an FIR under Section 376(2)(n) IPC.

The Bench observed that both the dismissal order and the consequential order imposed punishment on the basis of a charge that had never been framed against the petitioner, thereby causing serious prejudice and violating the principles of natural justice. The Court held:

“It is a settled proposition under the service jurisprudence that an order of penalty can be passed only on the basis of specific charges which are framed against a delinquent.”

The High Court further found that both the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority had passed non-speaking orders without adequately considering the petitioner's defence. The Court also noted significant deficiencies in the departmental enquiry. It observed that, apart from the complainant's statement, there was no documentary or independent evidence supporting the allegations. The enquiry itself recorded that no material had been produced to establish the alleged marriage, no CCTV footage from the hotels had been examined, and there was no evidence to show that the petitioner had resided in the rented accommodation allegedly shared with the complainant.

Despite these deficiencies, the disciplinary authority imposed the extreme penalty of removal from service. Referring to the Supreme Court's decision in Joseph Shine v. Union of India, the High Court observed that adultery is no longer a criminal offence. The Court noted:

“Further, it is pertinent to note that the offence of adultery has already been struck down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Joseph Shine vs Union of India, reported in (2019) 3 SCC 39, wherein it has been held that the offence of adultery is no more a crime. Such a provision cannot be considered to be a beneficial legislation covered by Article 15(3) of the Constitution.”

The Court further held that the respondents failed to consider that the complaint had been lodged by a disgruntled complainant and that the allegations did not fall within the ambit of “moral turpitude”, which could not be invoked mechanically without judicial application of mind.

Holding that the impugned action was arbitrary, disproportionate and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, the High Court quashed the dismissal order, the consequential order and the appellate order.

Case Title: Bharat Pathak @ Bharat Kumar Pathak v. State of Jharkhand and Ors.

Case Number: W.P.(S) No. 1833 of 2026

Appearance: Mr. Shresth Gautam, Mr. Shailesh Poddar, and Mr. Shashank Shekhar for the Petitioner. Ms. Sonal Tiwary for the Respondent.

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