The Karnataka High Court has held that a part-heard criminal trial which has not crossed stage of examination of accused, final arguments nor has been reserved for judgment can be transferred to another court and in such circumstances accused cannot insist upon the same presiding officer to continue hearing his case.

Referring to judgments, Justice M. Nagaprasanna said that in the present criminal trial, the evidentiary exercise was yet to be concluded and noted that it was not under the exceptions mentioned in the notification, whereby certain cases were allowed to be retained and continued by the same Judge.

“When the re-allocation took effect, the proceeding was at the stage of securing the presence of PW-20, the Investigating Officer, and recording his evidence. The evidentiary exercise itself was yet to conclude. The case had not reached the stage of examination of the accused under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C.; it had not travelled to final arguments; and, a fortiori, it had not been reserved for judgment or order.

The petitioner's case, therefore, falls outside every one of the three protective exceptions expressly carved out by the Notification. What the petitioner seeks, in substance, is the creation of a fourth exception—that every part-heard matter must continue before the same Presiding Officer. Such an exception is neither found in the Notification nor borne out by the statutory scheme, and this Court cannot judicially engraft into an administrative Notification that which its author has consciously chosen not to incorporate,” the Court said.

It reiterated that an accused has a right to a fair trial before a competent and impartial Court; he does not possess a vested right to insist upon trial before a particular Judge.

The court found that the administrative decision to transfer the trial was not shown to be "shrouded" in "vices" of either arbitrariness, caprice, mala fides, manifest unreasonableness or demonstrable prejudice forbidden by law.

Noting the legislative intent behind Section 365 (Conviction or commitment on evidence partly recorded by one Magistrate and partly by another) of the BNSS, the Court said, “If every transfer after commencement of trial were impermissible, the Legislature would scarcely have found it necessary to enact Section 365 of the BNSS or its statutory predecessor – Section 326 of the Cr.P.C. and expressly declare the consequence of a transfer from one Judge to another.”

It added, “Section 365 of the BNSS is the legislative bridge between the Court which begins the trial and the Court which, upon a lawful transfer, may be called upon to carry it forward. The change of forum does not wipe the slate clean; nor does it compel the criminal process to retrace every step already lawfully taken, which is subject, of course, to the limitations engrafted in the statute. The successor Court inherits the proceeding at the stage at which its predecessor leaves it.”

The High Court said that Section 326 CrPC was engrafted to meet situations where a Magistrate or a Sessions Judge, after recording the whole or part of the evidence, is transferred or otherwise ceases to exercise jurisdiction over the proceeding.

“The statute thus preserves the continuity of the trial notwithstanding discontinuity in the person presiding over the Court,” the Court said.

Justice Nagaprasanna observed that the core argument of the petitioner— he who hears must decide— has its roots into administrative law and it cannot be “bodily transplanted” into criminal adjudication.

“A principle of administrative law cannot be employed to defeat an express command of criminal procedure. When the statute itself contemplates that one Judge may record evidence and another may, upon lawful succession or transfer, proceed with the case, the maxim must necessarily yield to the legislative mandate. To hold otherwise would be to permit a general principle to devour a specific statutory provision,” the Court said.

Calling the notification an administrative exercise to reallocate the police stations amongst the Sessions courts in Bengaluru, the High Court said that its constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked “merely because one litigant would prefer that his proceeding continue before a particular Presiding Officer.”

The Court accordingly dismissed the petition.

Background

The petitioner, R. Krishna Murthy @ Murthy, was facing trial for murder under Section 302 IPC before the LXI Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru City.

On May 20, 2026, the Principal City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru, issued a notification re-allocating police stations and sub-divisions among trial courts. Under this notification, the petitioner's case was transferred to another Judge.

The notification permitted courts to retain and dispose of cases where— recording of the statement of the accused under Section 313 CrPC / Section 351 BNSS had begun; proceedings had reached final arguments; or judgment had been reserved.

The petitioner filed a plea seeking quashing of the transfer notification and re-transfer the case back to the original court.

The petitioner argued that because the judge who recorded the evidence of the witnesses was best positioned to observe their demeanour, that judge alone should decide the case. He argued that transferring a trial near the stage of recording the statement under Section 313 of the CrPC would cause serious prejudice to the petitioner. He contended that the mandates of Sections 326, 408, and 409 of the CrPC were not taken into consideration, adding that under Section 409(2) of the CrPC, a Sessions Judge has no authority to withdraw a case from an Additional Sessions Judge.

Counsel for the State and the High Court administration submitted that the transfer would not cause prejudice to the accused. The counsel argued that the accused cannot choose a particular court for the trial.

Case: Krishna Murthy @ Murthy v. State of Karnataka & Others

Writ Petition No. 21332 of 2026 (GM - RES)

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