Karnataka High Court Denies Bail To PFI Member Booked For 'Conspiring' To Radicalize Muslim Youth To Commit Terrorist Acts

The Karnataka High Court refused to grant bail to a man accused of being a member of banned organization Popular Front of India (PFI) of allegedly conspiring to radicalise Muslim youth to carry out terrorist acts, as well as raising funds for the commission of terrorist activities.

The court was hearing an appeal by Shahid Khan, one of nineteen accused, challenging dismissal of his bail plea by NIA court. The nineteen accused have been booked for offences under Sections 153A and 120B (criminal conspiracy) IPC. They have been further booked under Sections 13(Punishment for unlawful activities), 17(Punishment for raising funds for terrorist act), 18(Punishment for conspiracy, etc.), 18A(Punishment for organising of terrorist camps), 18B (Punishment for recruiting of any person or persons for terrorist act) and 22B (Offences by societies or trusts) UAPA.

A division bench of Justice HP Sandesh and Justice Venkatesh Naik T in its order noted that the appellant had taken several grounds and some grounds were urged in his earlier bail applications. It noted that there were three new contentions made–non-compliance by the Investigating Officer with the procedure during seizure; absence of sanction under Section 18 UAPA and delay in commencement of trial.

The appellant's counsel contended that Section 18 UAPA has been invoked against the appellant while the Government has not accorded sanction for prosecution; hence trial court cannot frame charge or proceed against the appellant for offence under Section 18. It was contended that the appellant is charge-sheeted for being a PFI member and his alleged acts do not attract the definition of terrorists act. It was further contended that there are no allegations against the appellant of committing murder, or any offence punishable with death or life imprisonment as contemplated under Section 17.

Referring to Section 45 the court said that the provision makes it clear that the bar against taking cognizance applies to offences covered under Chapter IV (Punishment for terrorist activities) and VI (terrorist organization) UAPA, unless prior sanction is obtained from the appropriate Government.

The court said, "term 'cognizance' refers that, it has to be taken in respect of offences and not against an individual. Thus, Section 45 of UAP Act mandates that sanction is pre-condition for the Court to take cognizance of an offence and not necessarily tied to a particular accused. Thus, the absence of sanction in respect to particular accused specifically does not by itself preclude the framing of charges or continuation of the proceedings, if cognizance has been taken for the offences alleged".

As per the prosecution, the nineteen accused are office bearers, members and cadres of the Popular Front of India (PFI). It was alleged that they were enraged by laws like Citizens Amendment Act 2019, National Register of Citizens Laws (NRC), Hijab and Babri Masjid judgment, and laws passed by the Government of India.

They have been accused of conspiring to radicalise Muslim youth towards terrorist acts with intention to create enmity between various sections of the society on the line of religious disharmony and to create unrest in the nation by indulging into terrorist activities.

Amongst various allegations, it was alleged that, through PFI the accused planned to radicalise Muslim youth by indoctrination, form service teams of such youths, train them in handling arms and indulge in violent acts like murder, bomb blast, etc.

It was alleged that the petitioner (accused no. 14) was working as District President of Davanagere Zone from 2019. It was alleged that the accused persons were participating in various capacities for functioning, organising and recruiting Muslim youth for the purpose of activities of unlawful association– PFI.

The appellant was arrested on 22.09.2022 and the trial Court rejected the bail application holding that there are reasonable grounds to believe that he has committed the offences alleged against him. The trial Court further held that having regard to the material available on record with regard to prima-facie proof of commission of offences under UAPA, the Court is barred from granting bail in view of Section 43D UAPA.

The appellant's counsel further contended that during the course of investigation, cash was seized from the residence of the appellant, but the Investigating Officer has not followed the procedure under Section 25 UAPA regarding forfeiture and seizure of property, including cash and therefore, the offence under Section 17 is not attracted.

The court however said:

"In the present case, the Investigating Officer did not strictly comply with the procedure prescribed under Section 25 of UAP Act at the time of seizure. However, the failure to follow this procedural formality does not, by itself, constitute a sufficient ground for granting bail to the appellant, particularly, when there is material on record connecting him to the offence under Section 17 of UAP Act. Any procedural lapse in the seizure of cash may, at best, be treated as an irregularity and does not go to the root of the case of the prosecution. There are specific allegations and supporting material to show that the appellant has been involved in raising funds for the commission of terrorist activities. The ingredients of Sections 17 and 18 of UAP Act are complied or not is a matter of trial. Hence, at this juncture, the Court cannot conduct a mini-trial".

On the appellant's contention to summon the case diary in order to aid the appeal as IO's material is vague the court said, while a Court can send for the case-diary of a case under trial to use it not as evidence, but to aid inquiry, or trial; however, the appellant is not entitled to call for the case-diary to examine it.

"More importantly, the appellant has no locus to file the said application. In similar appeals filed by the co-accused, summoning case-diary was not done and this Court having considered the material collected by the Investigating Officer and evaluating the credibility of the case of the prosecution, disposed off said appeals. Whereas, the appellant has filed I.A. No.2 of 2025 to summon the case diary, which is not permissible and it cannot be summoned at the instance of the appellant and it is only for the purpose of reference of the Court and if the Court requires, it can be called for and look into the same, and the same cannot be made available to the accused...," the court said.

After considering the material available on record and the fact that the trial Court has dealt with all aspects of the material in its order and has rightly rejected the bail application of the appellant, the bench said that trial court order requires no interference.

The court dismissed the appeal.

Case title: SHAHID KHAN v/s STATE OF KARNATAKA

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1475 OF 2025 [21(NIA)]

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