The Punjab and Haryana High Court has set aside charges of culpable homicide not amounting to murder and attempt to commit culpable homicide framed against the accused in a 2024 factory fire in Dharuhera that killed several workers, holding that the material on record did not prima facie disclose the intention or knowledge required for graver offences.

Justice Virinder Aggarwal held that the trial court had erred in refusing to consider an expert report of the National Safety Council and CCTV footage merely because they had not been formally proved, observing that such an approach "amounts to an impermissible conflation of the standard applicable at the stage of trial with that governing consideration of charge."

On March 16, 2024, a fire broke out at the Lifelong India factory in Dharuhera, District Rewari, leaving multiple workers with burn injuries. According to the FIR, the injured complainant attributed the incident to a burst in the boiler dust collector and blamed the negligence of the company owners, officers and contractor in maintaining the equipment and keeping the emergency gate closed.

The FIR was initially registered under Sections 287, 337 and 34 IPC. After several injured workers died during investigation, Sections 308 and 304 Part II IPC were added. The police final report stated that the dust collector had burst twice before, that the contractor, owners and officers had been told of the need for repairs, and that no timely remedial steps were taken.\

By order dated March 6, 2026, the Additional Sessions Judge, Rewari, framed charges under Sections 287, 304 Part II and 308 read with Section 34 IPC, and in the alternative under Section 304-A IPC. The petitioners approached the High Court seeking quashing of the FIR, the final report and the order framing charges.

Senior counsel for the petitioners argued that the incident was an unfortunate industrial accident caused by technical factors such as an electrical fault and accumulated combustible dust, and that the National Safety Council's report attributed no culpable act or omission to them. It was contended that the factory was operating with the required permissions, that any safety lapses fell within the special regime of the Factories Act, 1948, and that the trial court had framed charges on omnibus allegations without assessing each accused's individual role.

The State argued that these were matters of evidence for trial, that statements of injured witnesses, medical evidence and the deaths of several workers prima facie showed serious safety lapses, and that statutory permissions did not absolve the accused. It was also argued that the Factories Act did not bar prosecution under the IPC for distinct offences involving loss of human life.

Two expert reports point to a spark, not a boiler burst

The Court noted that the National Safety Council's Safety Audit Team, which inspected the site in April 2024, recorded that no serious lapse or gross negligence was observed. Based on CCTV footage, the team found that the fire originated near a buffing machine, likely from a spark caused by an electrical fault, electrostatic charge or friction, which ignited accumulated fine dust. The footage showed an operator trying to put out the smouldering dust with his foot, which may have aggravated it, leading to an aluminium dust fireball and an explosion in the bag filter.

A separate report by the Deputy Director, Industrial Safety and Health, Gurugram-II, attributed the spark to a foreign metal particle in the buffing wheel. It found that adequate measures to stop sparks entering the dust collector and ducts had not been taken, that special precautions for inflammable dust were lacking, that the ducts and dust collector were not properly maintained, and that workers had not been given the necessary instructions and training.

The Court observed that the police report "substantially rests upon the version" of the complainant, without any independent inquiry to corroborate it, even though two inquiries by competent authorities had independently attributed the fire to a spark in the buffing machine.

Material need not be formally proved at charge stage

Faulting the trial court for discarding the National Safety Council report as unproved, the High Court held that at the stage of framing charge, the material collected during investigation is not to be subjected to formal proof or a detailed evaluation of its evidentiary worth. The Court is only to see whether that material, taken at face value, makes out a prima facie case.

The Court described the National Safety Council as an expert body with specialised expertise in industrial safety, whose findings were substantially corroborated by the CCTV footage. Read together, it said, they "materially undermine the foundational premise" of the prosecution's boiler-blast theory and furnish an alternative explanation for the fire. Whether that material withstands cross-examination and what weight it deserves are questions for trial, but they could not justify discarding it altogether at the charge stage.

No prima facie knowledge likely to cause death

Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Keshub Mahindra v. State of Madhya Pradesh arising from the Bhopal Gas Tragedy, the Court noted that a charge under Section 304 Part II IPC requires material prima facie showing that the accused acted with knowledge that the act was likely to cause death. The Supreme Court had held that "mere act of running a Plant as per the permission granted by the authorities would not be a criminal act," and that structural and operational defects there disclosed, at most, rash or negligent acts not amounting to culpable homicide.

The Court also referred to its own decision in Rajesh Aggarwal v. State of Haryana (2006), where a charge was altered to Section 304-A IPC despite a pharmaceutical unit running without approvals, with a locked emergency exit and defective wiring, leading to the deaths of seven workers.

Applying these principles, the Court held that the material did not prima facie establish the intention or knowledge needed for offences under Sections 304 Part II and 308 IPC, and at the highest warranted consideration of liability under Sections 287 and 304-A IPC.

No double jeopardy bar

The petitioners also argued that, since a complaint under Section 92 of the Factories Act had been filed over the same incident, a parallel IPC prosecution was impermissible, relying on decisions of the Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Bombay High Courts.

Rejecting this, the Court noted that the Factories Act complaint was filed only against the factory's alleged occupier and manager, and the petitioners were not accused in it.

It held that "the protection against double jeopardy necessarily operates in relation to the person who has already been prosecuted and punished for the same offence," and the mere pendency of proceedings against a different accused does not extinguish the petitioners' liability under the IPC. The cited judgments, including the Bombay High Court's ruling where the accused had already been convicted under the Factories Act, were held distinguishable on facts.

Partly allowing the petition, the Court set aside the charges under Sections 304 Part II and 308 IPC. It directed the Additional Sessions Judge to frame fresh charges under Sections 287 and 304-A IPC, specifically setting out the particulars of the injured and deceased workers, since the existing charge did not contain them. The matter will then be sent to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, who may try it or assign it to a competent court.

Case Title: Parmod Kumar Yadav and Others v. State of Haryana

Appearance: Mr. Chetan Mittal, Senior Advocate, Mr. R.S. Rai, Senior Advocate with Mr. Abhilaksh Grover, Mr. Mayank Aggarwal, Mr. Farhad Kohli, Mr. Saksham Khunger and Mr. Tapreet Brar, Advocates for the petitioners.

Mr. Tanuj Sharma, Assistant AG, Haryana.

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