The Punjab and Haryana High Court has held that the statutory protection for fair criticism of a judicial act under Section 5 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is available only in respect of a case that has been finally decided and cannot be invoked by a litigant to justify scandalous allegations levelled against Judges while his own litigation remains pending before them.

The Court held a 81-year-old litigant guilty of criminal contempt for repeatedly levelling scandalous and uncorroborated allegations of corruption and collusion against multiple sitting and former Judges of the High Court and judicial officers of the Hisar district judiciary, in the course of a decades-old petrol pump partnership dispute, holding that such conduct amounted to a sustained campaign of vilification rather than fair criticism.

Justice Vinod S. Bhardwaj and Justice Sukhvinder Kaur said, "...defence can be availed only once a final judgment is passed. In the present case, notwithstanding that the comments extracted in the present order are vilification and scandalous/scurrilous remarks against the Judge, it is also observed that Section 5 of the Contempt of Courts Act, as a defence, can be invoked only after passing of a final judgment and not at any point prior thereto. Undisputedly, the final judgment had not been passed. Thus, the objection lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed."

The contempt proceedings arose from a decades-old dispute over a Bharat Petroleum dealership at Hansi, in which the respondent-contemnor alleged he was forcibly ousted from a petrol pump partnership in 1987 through a forged "Dissolution Deed."

In the course of prolonged litigation over his private criminal complaint against the alleged perpetrators, the contemnor filed a "Show Cause Notice" dated 22.04.2019, annexed to an application before the trial court, alleging that named sitting and former High Court Judges and district judicial officers had "got involved" with the accused persons and passed "illegal orders" to protect them including an allegation that one Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate's monthly milk bill was being paid by the accused-former MLA.

The trial court forwarded the matter to the High Court, resulting in registration of the present suo motu contempt petition.

The Fair Criticism Defence

The contemnor argued, among other defences, that his allegations constituted fair and bona fide criticism of judicial orders he considered illegal — pointing to specific grievances such as exemption from personal appearance being granted to accused persons without their ever appearing before the trial court, and stay orders being passed without notice to the opposite side.

The Court referred Section 5 of the Contempt of Courts Act, which states:

"5. Fair criticism of judicial act not contempt.— A person shall not be guilty of contempt of Court for publishing any fair comment on the merits of any case which has been heard and finally decided."

Relying on Advocate General v. Abrahim George, 1976, the Court held that to avail this defence, a person must publish fair comment on the merits of a case, and such criticism must be made without casting aspersions on the Judges or Courts and without comments amounting to scandalising the Court and, critically, that "the said Section would come into force only once the matter has been finally decided."

The Court further distinguished, as a matter of principle, fair criticism of a judicial order from personal attacks on the Judge who passed it, holding that a litigant retains an "undiminished right under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution to a fair and bona fide criticism of a judicial order," but that "right does not extend to a scurrilous attack on the Judge before whom the litigant's own matter is pending", relying on the Calcutta High Court's decision in Court on its own motion v. Raju Das, 2026, which held that imputing dishonest or improper motive to a Judge, as opposed to objectively critiquing the reasoning of an order, crosses into criminal contempt.

The Court also rejected the contemnor's limitation defence under Section 20 of the Act, holding that "initiation" of contempt proceedings occurs when the Magistrate forwards a reference to the High Court here done within a month of the impugned application and not when the Division Bench eventually takes cognizance after internal administrative processing.

On the truth-in-public-interest defence under Section 13(b), the Court held the onus lay on the contemnor to substantiate his allegations, and found none of his claims, including allegations of murder, extortion and judicial collusion, were supported by any evidence:

"An uncorroborated belief cannot be perceived either as a truth in fact or in law... A lie hammered and clamoured again and again does not acquire the character of truth."

The Court held the respondent-contemnor guilty of criminal contempt under Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, punishable under Section 12, for publishing scandalising material against the integrity and impartiality of multiple Judges and judicial officers across a sustained, multi-year campaign, without any remorse or bona fide apology.

The matter was listed for hearing on quantum of sentence on October 12, with bailable warrants ordered to secure the contemnor's presence.

Case Title: Court on its own motion v. Ram Niwas Aggarwal

Mr. Gurfateh Singh Khosa, Amicus Curiae.

Mr. Ram Niwas Aggarwal, Contemnor in person

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