The Rajasthan High Court has held that introduction of Repealing and Amendment Act 2025 that repealed Amendment Act of 2018 which brought into effect Section 148 in the Negotiable Instruments Act, did not affect the applicability of the provision.

Section 148 NI Act empowers an Appellate Court to order the appellant, convicted for offence of cheque dishonour, to deposit a minimum of 20% of the compensation awarded by the trial court during the pendency of the appeal.

The bench of Justice Anil Kumar Upman held that once incorporated into the principal legislation, the amendment formed an integral part of the same and continued to operate irrespective of the subsequent repeal of the amending legislation.

The Court was hearing an appeal against the order of the appellate court that had ordered the appellant, who was a convict under the NI Act, to deposit 20% of the awarded compensation.

It was the case of the appellant that Section 148, under which the order was made by the appellant court, was introduced in the NI Act by way of the Amendment Act 2018 which was repealed by the Repealing and Amendment Act, 2025. Hence, the provision could not be in force since the instrument that brought it into effect was repealed.

Further, it was argued that Section 148 used the term “may” and in Jamboo Bhandari v MP State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. and Ors., Supreme Court held that where the Appellate Court was satisfied that imposition of such condition would be unjust and amount to deprivation of right to appeal, an exception could be made out against its application.

In this background, the appellant argued that imposition of the condition would subject him to an exceptionally onerous financial burden, and this should be considered as an exceptional situation for not imposing the condition.

After hearing the contentions, the Court referred to the Supreme Court case of Independent Schools' Federation of India v Union of India in which it was held that provision inserted in the parent Act remained on the statute book even after the repeal of the Amending Act.

Further, Court made a mention of Section 6-A of the General Clauses Act, that dealt with repeal of an enactment making amendments in another central Act, as per which repeal shall not affect continuance of any such amendment made by the enactment that got repealed. In this light, the Court held,

“It is a settled principle of statutory interpretation that an amendment once incorporated into the parent Act, the amendment becomes a part thereof and derives its force from the parent legislation. Consequently, repeal of the amending Act merely brings the amending enactment to an end as an independent legislative measure; it does not efface the amendments already incorporated into the parent Act.”

Furthermore, in relation to other arguments of the appellant, it was observed that the contention that imposition of such condition shall lead to financial hardship could not by itself constitute an exceptional circumstance so as to attract the exception contemplated in the Supreme Court judgement.

Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.