The Telangana High Court has set aside land acquisition proceedings for road widening at Liberty Cross Roads, Hyderabad, after finding that the authorities omitted the names of admittedly known co-owners from the acquisition proceedings and invoked the urgency provision under Land Acquisition Act without demonstrating genuine urgency to dispense with their right to object.

For context, Section 4(1) provides for a preliminary notification expressing the Government's intention to acquire land for a public purpose. Section 5-A gives interested persons the right to object and be heard.Section 17 deals with urgent acquisitions: Section 17(1) permits possession before an award in cases of urgency, while Section 17(4) separately empowers the Government to dispense with the Section 5-A enquiry where the urgency provisions apply.

Justice Vakiti Ramakrishna Reddy held that the authorities failed to strictly comply with the mandatory safeguards under the 1894 Act. The Court said that omission of known owners from the Section 4(1) notification could not be treated as a mere procedural irregularity. It further held that the extraordinary power under Section 17 could not be invoked without material establishing genuine urgency warranting deprivation of the Section 5-A enquiry.

It said:

“Tested on the aforesaid principles, this Court finds that the respondents have failed to demonstrate strict compliance with the mandatory safeguards prescribed under the Act, 1894. The omission to disclose the petitioners' names despite their admitted ownership and the unjustified invocation of Section 17 dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A render the impugned acquisition proceedings legally unsustainable.”

The petitioners were co-owners of property situated at Liberty Cross Roads, Himayatnagar. While granting them building permission in 2003, the Municipal Corporation had required them to surrender around 221 square yards falling within the proposed road-widening and junction-improvement alignment under the Master Plan.

The petitioners claimed that the surrender was made without seeking compensation on the assurance that they would receive developmental concessions, including additional permissible floor space. They alleged that these benefits were never extended.

Subsequently, the authorities sought the remaining portion of the property for road widening. A notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6 of the 1894 Act were issued on the same day in November 2007. The authorities also invoked Section 17(1) and dispensed with the Section 5-A enquiry.

The petitioners challenged the acquisition, pointing out that although they admittedly held an undivided 50% share in the property, their names did not appear in the Section 4(1) notification, Section 6 declaration or subsequent notices under Sections 9(3) and 10.

The Municipal Corporation defended the acquisition on the ground that Liberty Junction had become a major traffic-congestion point and immediate road widening and junction improvement were required. It also argued that one of the co-owners had participated in the award enquiry and, therefore, no prejudice had been caused.

Rejecting this contention, the High Court noted that the authorities were fully aware of the petitioners' identity and ownership much before the acquisition proceedings began, since the earlier building permission itself had been granted to them after requiring surrender of part of their property.

The Court said the omission of their names was “not a matter of mere form”. The statutory scheme proceeds on the premise that every person interested in the land must receive effective notice so that they can exercise the rights available under the Act.

“Failure to identify and notify admittedly known owners undermines the fairness of the acquisition process itself,” the Court said.

It also rejected the argument that subsequent participation by a co-owner could cure the defect. The Court said the relevant question was whether the proceedings were initiated in conformity with the statute. A defect in the foundational notification could not be cured by subsequent participation unless the statute itself provided for it.

On the urgency provision, the Court reiterated that the Section 5-A right to object is a “valuable and substantive safeguard”. The burden therefore lies heavily on the acquiring authority to demonstrate genuine urgency before depriving a landowner of that right.

The Court found that apart from a general reference to traffic congestion and junction improvement, the authorities had placed no contemporaneous material showing an exceptional urgency on the date of the notification which justified dispensing with the enquiry.

It also noted the petitioners' contention that no immediate or irreversible steps followed even after the urgency provision was invoked. This was relevant to determining whether the decision was based on objective material or merely reflected “administrative expediency”.

The Court, however, did not decide whether the petitioners were ultimately entitled to compensation or other benefits for the surrendered land. It held only that their claim could not be rejected solely on the ground that the land had vested in the Corporation.

Accordingly, the Court set aside the acquisition proceedings. It left it open to the authorities to initiate fresh acquisition proceedings if the property continues to be required for the public purpose.

Case Title: Surinder Singh Makhija & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.

Case No.: W.P. No. 28538 of 2007

Date: July 28, 2026

Appearance: T.S. Praveen Kumar for the petitioners; G. Madhusudhan Reddy, Standing Counsel for Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation, for the respondents.

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