Extension Of Arbitral Tribunal Under Section 29A Of The Arbitration & Conciliation Act

The Dispute Resolution process through Arbitration has always been appealing due to its efficiency and quick resolution. However, over time, the reality of Arbitral proceedings became similar to Court Proceedings due to the long delays in pronouncing Arbitral Awards. Hence, to resolve this, the Indian Legislature in 2015 introduced Section 29A in the Arbitration & Conciliation Act of 1996 ('1996 Act').

Section 29A of the 1996 Act imposes a deadline on the Arbitral Tribunal by requiring it to pronounce an award within 12 months of the completion of pleadings. The insertion of this provision in the 1996 Act shows the legislative intent to speed the process up; however, the problem arises when this period of 12 months is about to expire, and the tribunal has yet to pronounce the award. In those cases, clause (3) of the 29A grants the party the power to extend the period by 6 months through consent. If the award is not made within this period, the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal terminates unless the court extends the period.

This article deals with two major questions: the first being a procedural issue on whether the Principal Civil Court can extend the Tribunal Mandate when the Tribunal has been appointed by the High Court or the Supreme Court, and the second being a substantive issue on what grounds or causes, the appropriate Court may grant an extension to the Tribunal after the expiry of the extended period.

Emergence of Jurisprudence of Section 29A:

Before 1940, the Indian Litigants' call for the Alternative Dispute Resolution had been settled through several scattered laws and regulations. The Indian Arbitration Act of 1899 ('1899 Act') served as India's first formal law on arbitration. This 1899 Act was a replica and mirror of the English Arbitration Act of 1889. This act emphasised 'party autonomy'; however, the ambit/application of this Act was limited to the presidency towns of Calcutta, Bombay & Madras. Thereafter, the Indian Litigants were gifted with the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ('CPC'), which governed arbitration in areas not covered by the 1899 Act. Section 89 and Second Schedule of the CPC were dedicated to the Arbitration and other Alternative Dispute Resolution, and provide a legal framework for arbitration in suits already pending before a court. However, the Second Schedule of the CPC was repealed by the Arbitration Act of 1940.

2.1. The 1940 Act: The Arbitration Act of 1940 ('The 1940 Act') marked India's first comprehensive enactment, which responded to the criticism of Arbitral Delays, and mandated the timely resolution of Arbitral Proceedings. The 1940 Act under Rule 3 of the First Schedule provides a period of 4 months for an arbitral award to be passed after reference or notice of the dispute to the Arbitral Tribunal. However, section 28 of the 1940 Act provides the court with the power to extend the time for making an Arbitral Award if it thinks fit. This power can be exercised by the court both before and after the expiry of the mandate of the Tribunal. This flexibility led to the rampant extension of time in many instances. This leniency eroded the Arbitration Purpose about the quick and timely resolution of disputes.

2.2. The 1996 Act: The Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996 ('The 1996 Act') tried to resolve the problem of rampant extension of time faced under the 1940 Act by repealing the provision from the 1996 Act. The 1996 Act was modeled on the UNCITRAL model law. The Indian Legislature had prioritized 'Party Autonomy' and 'Limited Judicial Intervention.' The Legislature, therefore, consciously omitted any specific timeline for the pronouncement of an award in the 1996 Act. The only check was under Section 14(1)(a) of the 1996 Act, which provides for 'Termination of Arbitrator's mandate' if the Tribunal fails to act without undue delay. This Legislative silence has backfired the Indian Litigants and the ad-hoc arbitrations have dragged on for years, leading to similar issues as those of the 1940 Act.

2.3. The 2015 Amendment: The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act of 2015 ('The 2015 Amendment Act') introduced Section 29A in the 1996 Act. Section 29A mandated the award to be delivered within 12 months from the date of tribunal entry on reference. The reference for this provision means the date on which the arbitrator received notice of their appointment. This provision further grants the parties the power to extend the arbitrator's mandate by a further 6 months by consent. If the award is not made within this period, the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal terminates unless the court extends the period on being satisfied that there exists a sufficient cause for extension. The 2015 Amendment Act introduced a unique approach under which the court is further empowered to reduce the Arbitrator's fees for the delays attributable to the tribunal.

However, this amendment was criticised for being too rigid, as it was applicable to both domestic and international arbitration. Further, the 2017 Justice B.N. Srikrishna Committee Report on Institutionalisation of Arbitration Mechanism in India highlighted that India's 'one-size-fits-all' approach to cater to both Domestic and International Arbitration through section 29A led India to be seen as an 'arbitration-unfriendly' jurisdiction.^[3]

2.4. The 2019 Amendment: The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act of 2019 ('The 2019 Amendment Act') refined Section 29A by shifting the 12-month period to start from completion of pleadings and not from reference. Further, the proviso of sub-clause (1) excludes International Commercial Arbitrations from the strict timeline. The proviso states that the award should be made “as expeditiously as possible,” with the 12-month period acting as a non-binding. Therefore, the 2019 amendment act has bifurcated the jurisprudence by imposing a strict timeline for Domestic Arbitration and a lenient one for International Arbitration.

2.5. The 2024 Amendment Bill: The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Bill, 2024 ('The 2024 Amendment Bill') proposes further changes to Section 29A. The proposed section 29A empowers the Arbitral Institutions, other than courts, to grant extensions. This proposed amendment aims to reduce the burden on the courts. However, empowering the tribunal to grant an extension to itself could lead to undue delay in the pronouncement of the arbitral award, since the Tribunal could then extend its mandate and would not timely complete the Arbitral Proceedings.

1. Extension of the Arbitrator's Mandate appointed by the High Court:

Extensions under Section 29A require a very specific question about which court has the competent jurisdiction to extend the Tribunal mandate to be answered first. Clause (4) of Section 29A of the 1996 Act vests the power of extension in the 'Court'. However, the provision does not explicitly define the term 'court'. Therefore, time and again, the question of 'competent forum for seeking extension' has been raised before various High Courts. The term 'court' is defined in Section 2(1)(e) of the 1996 Act,^[4] which provides that the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, are the 'court' in case of Domestic Arbitration. As a result of this definition, a conundrum arises as to when the Appointment of the Arbitrator is made by the High Court under section 11, then whether a principal civil court of original jurisdiction can extend the tribunal mandate under Section 29A of the 1996 Act. If the answer to this is in affirmative, then an anomalous situation would arise where an Arbitrator appointed by the Superior Court gets an extension by the District/Lower Court.

There are 2 lines of High Court Judgments answering this anomalous situation, one that interprets the definition of 'court' under section 2(1)(e) in a Literal sense and advocates that the District Court is also empowered to grant extensions, while the other that advocates for Purposive Interpretation and insists that only the High Court is empowered to grant extensions in such situations.

3.1 Literal Interpretation: The literal/strict interpretation of Section 2(1)(e) of the 1996 Act suggests that, unless the High Court has original civil jurisdiction, the application for extension under Section 29A must always lie before the Principal Civil Court, regardless of who appointed the arbitrator. Currently, there are five High Courts in India that enjoy the Original Civil Jurisdiction; these courts are the High Courts of Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, and Himachal Pradesh.

The Telangana High Court in M/s. ESI Corporation v. M/s. Quality Care India Limited,^[5] observed that if the legislature intended for the Appointing Court to always have the power of extension, it would have explicitly drafted Section 29A to mirror Section 11 and held that even if High Court appoints the arbitrator under Section 11, the application for extension must be filed before the Principal Civil Court of the district. Further, in Chief Engineer(NH) PWD (Roads) v. BSC&C JV,^[6] the Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld a decision of the Meghalaya High Court which ruled that the District Court was the competent forum for extension. The Apex Court noted that since the Meghalaya High Court did not possess ordinary original civil jurisdiction, the 'Cour' under Section 2(1)(e) was the Principal Civil Court.

3.2 Purposive Interpretation: The Purposive Interpretation asserts that if the Arbitral Tribunal is constituted by a High Court under Section 11 of the 1996 Act, then the jurisdiction to extend its mandate must remain with that High Court, irrespective of whether it exercises original civil jurisdiction or not. This view is backed by the doctrine of 'judicial hierarchy' and the specific power of arbitrator substitution provided to the court under Section 29A(6) while exercising the power to extend the mandate of the Tribunal.

1. The Doctrine of “Concomitant Power of Substitution”

Section 29A(6) empowers the Court extending the mandate to also substitute the arbitrator or arbitrators (as the case may be). Courts have time and again emphasised that it would be legally impermissible for a subordinate Principal Civil Court to substitute an arbitrator appointed by a Superior Constitutional Court. The Allahabad High Court in M/s Geo Miller & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. UP Jal Nigam^[7] clarified the conflict between two prior coordinate benches' judgments in Lucknow Agencies^[8] and Indian Farmers Fertilizers^[9] and held that where the arbitrator was appointed by the High Court under Section 11, the application for extension is maintainable only before the High Court. Similarly, the Calcutta High Court in Best Eastern Business House Pvt Ltd v. Mina Pradhan^[10] held that the 'Court' for Section 29A must be the same Court that appointed the arbitrator, otherwise giving power to the Principal Civil Court for a High Court-appointed arbitrator would lead to an 'anomalous situation' and 'disharmony'. This view was again reiterated by the Calcutta High Court in Cosmic MAPL JV v. Al-Amin Garments Haat Private Limited,^[11] where the Court rejected the contention that the Chief Engineer mandates all Section 29A applications to go to the District Court on the basis that, in the Chief Engineer, the arbitrator was not appointed by the High Court therefore, not applicable in the present case at hand. This purposive approach is further aligned with the established precedents from the Bombay High Court in Cabra Instalaciones,^[12] Gujarat High Court in Nilesh Ramanbhai Patel,^[13] and Delhi High Court in DDA v. Tara Chand,^[14] all of which hold that the power of substitution under Section 29A(6) is a 'concomitant to the power of appointment'.

3.3 Harmonizing the Conflict: To resolve the deadlock discussed above, the recent judgments like Geo Miller & Best Eastern Business House suggested a harmonized 'Source of Appointment Test' that determines jurisdiction based on the origin of the tribunal's constitution. Under this framework, if an arbitrator is appointed by a High Court or the Supreme Court under Section 11, jurisdiction for extension remains exclusively with that superior court to prevent the 'absurdity'. Conversely, where the appointment is made by mutual consent or an institution without judicial intervention, the strict definition of Section 2(1)(e) applies, providing jurisdiction to the Principal Civil Court as no hierarchical conflict exists.

1. Sufficient Cause under S. 29A:

4.1 Interpreting 'Sufficient Cause' in a way to facilitate effective dispute resolution:

Section 29A(5) of the 1996 Act vests the discretion with the Courts to extend the mandate of an arbitral tribunal on being satisfied that there exists a 'sufficient cause'. However, since there is no precise definition of what constitutes a 'sufficient cause', there was ambiguity regarding whether this term should be interpreted strictly or in a flexible manner.

Before Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Berger Paints India Ltd.,^[15] there was a view that the mandate of a tribunal 'terminates' irrevocably upon the expiry of the Section 29A timeline and any subsequent application for extension becomes non-est. However, the Hon'ble Supreme Court clarified in the Rohan Builders that termination in Section 29A(4) does not imply complete cessation; the mandate remains suspended until revived by the court. The Court held that a narrow interpretation would force the parties to restart proceedings de novo, which would be against the Act's objective of speedy resolution. Therefore, the 'sufficient cause' test is now the sole test for extensions, regardless of whether the application is filed before or after the mandate's expiry. Further, the Supreme Court in M/s Ajay Protech Pvt. Ltd. v. General Manager & Anr.,^[16] while granting the extension due to the pandemic, observed that the 'sufficient cause' must be interpreted in a manner that it facilitates effective dispute resolution and that it takes the colour from the underlying purpose of the arbitration process. While there is no straitjacket definition, recent judgments reveal that courts are more inclined towards exercising the Judicial discretion, recently in Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd v. SPML Infra Limited,^[17] the Delhi High Court held that since the arbitral proceedings had commenced as far back as 2018, it would be 'apposite' to extend the time to allow the tribunal to reach their logical conclusion. However, this power must be used with careful judicial discretion, and the court must ensure that the extension is not a ruse to delay the award.

4.2 No bar on filing/allowing more than one S. 29A application:

Section 29A of the 1996 Act is silent on the number of times a judicial extension can be sought. While the initial provisions of 29A prescribe a strict timeline, clause (4) introduces the judicial power of extension. The absence of express prohibition, coupled with the 'sufficient cause' under clause (5), implies that the Courts are not barred from allowing more than one extension application.

The Madras High Court in M/s. Powergear Limited v. M/s. Anu Consultants,^[18] observed that, while granting the second extension, there is no prohibition on the court from entertaining more than one application. The only criterion is that the applicant needs to show sufficient cause. Further, the Himachal Pradesh High Court recently, in Shyam Chand v. Collector Land Acquisition, NHAI^[, and Sunil Dutt v. NHAI observed while allowing the subsequent extension application that once parties have participated in the proceedings beyond the permissible period without objection, the mandate of the statute must be given a 'meaningful life.' Similarly, the Calcutta High Court in Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Berger Paints India Limited,^[21] entertained a second application for extension because the proceedings were at the stage of evidence for a second witness and the delay was due to the 'voluminous nature of documents'. Therefore, reinforcing that the complexity of the dispute can constitute 'sufficient cause' for multiple extensions.

The jurisprudential evolution of Section 29A represents a pendulum that has swung from the rigid 'guillotine' of the termination of the Arbitral Mandate to the pragmatic approach of suspension of tribunal doctrine established in Rohan Builders. While the 'Source of Appointment Test' offers a necessary solution to the jurisdictional anomaly between High Courts and District Courts, the current judicial trend, which permits the filing of unlimited Section 29A applications, risks creating a 'loop of extensions.' This practice mirrors the 'culture of adjournments' prevalent under the 1940 Act, where excessive flexibility eroded the very sanctity of arbitration as a quick dispute resolution mechanism. If judicial discretion is exercised too liberally, Section 29A may lose its character as a strict regulatory timeline and regress into a mere procedural formality.

Furthermore, the path forward remains challenging, particularly in light of the proposed Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Bill, 2024. The proposed bill empowers the Arbitral Tribunals to extend their own mandates, thereby removing the critical layer of judicial oversight that currently acts as a check. There is an apprehension that this self-regulatory power could be misused, allowing Tribunals to unilaterally delay the pronouncement of awards without accountability. The success of India's Domestic Arbitration depends on striking a delicate balance where the finality of the award is prioritized, but not at the cost of the expeditious nature that defines the very soul of arbitration.

1. Kartikey Bansal, a final year student, Damodaram Sanjivayya National Law University, Visakhapatnam. ↑

2. Abhidarshi, a second-year student, Damodaram Sanjivayya National Law University, Visakhapatnam. ↑

3. 'Report of the High Level Committee to Review the Institutionalisation of Arbitration Mechanism in India' <https://legalaffairs.gov.in/sites/default/files/Report-HLC.pdf> last accessed on January 26, 2026. ↑

4. Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, § 2(1)(e). ↑

5. M/s. ESI Corporation v. M/s. Quality Care India Limited, Civil Revision Petition No. 3701 of 2025 (Telangana HC). ↑

6. Chief Engineer (NH) PWD (Roads) v. BSC&C JV, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 425. ↑

7. M/s Geo Miller & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. UP Jal Nigam, 2024:AHC:89303. ↑

8. Lucknow Agencies v. U.P. Awas Vikas Parishad, 2019:AHC-LKO:28105. ↑

9. Indian Farmers Fertilizers Coop. Ltd. v. Manish Engg. Enterprises, Appl. u/s 11(4) No. 5 of 2022 (Allahabad HC). ↑

10. Best Eastern Business House Pvt Ltd v. Mina Pradhan, AP-COM - 296 of 2025 (Calcutta HC). ↑

11. Cosmic MAPL JV v. Al-Amin Garments Haat Private Limited, CO 4029 of 2025 (Calcutta HC). ↑

12. Cabra Instalaciones Y Servicios v. Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd., Commercial Arbitration Petition (L) NO. 814 of 2019 (Bombay HC). ↑

13. Nilesh Ramanbhai patel v. Bhanubhai Ramanbhai Patel, R/Petn. Under Arbitration Act No. 56 of 2016 (Gujarat HC). ↑

14. DDA v. Tara Chand Sumit Construction Co., O.M.P. (MISC.) (COMM) 236/2019 (Delhi HC). ↑

15. Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Berger Paints India Ltd., 2024 INSC 686; 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 693. ↑

16. M/s Ajay Protech Pvt. Ltd. v. General Manager & Anr, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 915; 2024 INSC 889. ↑

17. Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd v. SPML Infra Limited, OMP (Misc.) (Comm.) No. 564 of 2023 (Delhi HC). ↑

18. M/s. Powergear Limited v. M/s. Anu Consultants, 2025:MHC:332. ↑

19. Shyam Chand v. Collector Land Acquisition, NHAI, 2026:HHC:3289. ↑

20. Sunil Dutt v. NHAI, 2026:HHC:3293. ↑

21. Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Berger Paints India Limited, AP-COM/428/2025 (Calcutta HC). ↑