The Supreme Court on Thursday (August 20) overturned the murder conviction of a man accused of killing his wife and child, after finding that the child witness testimony relied upon by the trial court was suspect to tutoring and unsupported by any corroborating material.

A bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Augustine George Masih set aside the Madhya Pradesh High Court's judgment which had interfered with the trial court's decision to acquit the Appellant.

The prosecution's case was that the Appellant, residing separately with his deceased wife and two kids, had murdered the wife and one kid by strangulation while taking them on the pretext of a trip from Kanpur to Khajuraho. Among other aspects, the child witness, being of a tender age of 4 ½ years, became crucial for the determination of the Appellant's conviction. It was alleged that another kid (PW-28) of the Appellant managed to escape from the crime scene.

However, on the other hand, the child witness's testimony deposed contrary, saying he was present at the crime scene while the incident happened. Moreover, the child witness stated that he was tutored, saying that the Station House Officer had made him read his statement before going to the Court and had told him that the same statement was to be given before the Magistrate.

Even otherwise, the prosecution failed to prove the Appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, as the chain of events remained incomplete to link the Appellant to the crime.

Allowing the appeal, the judgment authored by Justice Masih held that though there is “no inflexible rule requiring the testimony of a child witness to be corroborated before a conviction can be sustained, such corroboration is a rule of prudence which is to be ordinarily followed.”

The Court referred to the judgment of Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P (2003), where the court stated that the child witness of tender age is prone to tutoring; therefore, the court should always look for adequate corroboration from other evidence to his testimony before relying on child witness testimonies.

The Court endorsed the trial court's approach in this regard:

“Tested against this standard, the Trial Court's insistence on independent corroboration of the child witness's account, given the specific and serious doubts as to tutoring as discussed below, cannot be said to be an unreasonable or impermissible approach.”, the Court said.

“…in absence of cogent evidence leading to the sole conclusion of guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, this Court is of the view that the conviction of the appellant cannot be sustained.”, the Court held.

The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was acquitted of the charges, directing his release.

Headnote

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 378 — Appeal against Acquittal — Double Presumption of Innocence — Interference by Appellate Court - An appellate court entertaining an appeal against an acquittal is bound to bear in mind that a double presumption of innocence operates in favor of the accused - first, the foundational presumption available under criminal jurisprudence that every person is presumed innocent until proven guilty; and second, the reinforcement and strengthening of that presumption upon securing an acquittal from the trial court - The appellate court can interfere with an acquittal only if the trial court's view was one that no reasonable court could have taken on the material before it, and not merely because an alternative plausible view exists - If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. [Relied on Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415; Para 22, 23]

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 118 — Child Witness — Evaluation and Corroboration — Rule of Prudence — Tutoring - While there is no inflexible statutory bar preventing conviction based on the testimony of a competent child witness, seeking independent corroboration is a well-established rule of prudence - A child witness of tender age, lacking maturity of understanding, is an easy prey to tutoring; thus, the evidence must be evaluated with great care and circumspection - Where the child witness (aged 4.5 years at the time of the incident and examined 4 years later) was residing with a police constable and expressly admitted in his cross-examination to having been tutored by the Station House Officer prior to deposing, his testimony cannot form the sole basis of conviction - where the child's account of being strangulated with a rope and burnt with acid is falsified by medical evidence and humanly unnatural conduct is attributed, insisting on corroboration is imperative and the trial court's rejection of such evidence cannot be considered unreasonable. [Relied on Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P., (2003) 3 SCC 21; Panchhi v. State of U.P., (1998) 7 SCC 177; Paras 24, 25, 26]

Criminal Law — Circumstantial Evidence — Panchsheel Principles — Incomplete Chain of Events — Benefit of Doubt - In a case solely dependent on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish all incriminating circumstances by reliable and clinching evidence, which taken together must form a complete chain of events pointing exclusively to the guilt of the accused and leaving no reasonable ground for any hypothesis consistent with innocence - Suspicion, however grave, cannot substitute for legal proof - An adverse inference or mere suspicion drawn from an accused's explanation regarding his absence or absconding cannot substitute for cogent evidence completing the chain of circumstances - The presence of missing links in the chain of circumstances entitles the accused to the benefit of doubt and acquittal. [Relied on Karakkattu Muhammed Basheer v. State of Kerala, (2024) 10 SCC 813; Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy v. State of A.P., (2006) 10 SCC 172; Anil Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, (2003) 9 SCC 67; Reddy Sampath Kumar v. State of A.P., (2005) 7 SCC 603; State of U.P. v. Satish, (2005) 3 SCC 114; Bodhraj v. State of J&K, (2002) 8 SCC 45; Paras 27- 30]

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 27 — Recovery Evidence — Hostile Panch Witnesses and Inordinate Delay - Recovery of incriminating articles (clothes and an empty acid bottle) made six months after the incident from an open/accessible dump site at the instance of the accused loses its evidentiary value when independent seizure witnesses turn hostile and testify that they merely signed blank papers without knowing the contents - The evidentiary integrity of the recovery is further compromised when articles allegedly buried 6 feet deep under rocks for months show no traces of mud, earth, or water residue, raising a serious possibility of planting and creating a fatal breach in the prosecution case. [Paras 30, 31, 32]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 154 — Unexplained Delay in Lodging FIR - An inordinate and unexplained delay of five days in lodging the FIR, even after the surviving witness was rescued and had allegedly disclosed the identity of the accused to the investigating officer while bodies were already recovered, casts serious doubt on the prosecution case - Such unjustified delay in setting the criminal law into motion undermines the credibility of the investigation and opens the door to embellishments. [Paras 32-37]

Cause Title: RAVI KUMAR SINGH MALHOTRA VERSUS THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 844

Click here to download judgment

Appearance:

For Appellant(s) : Ms. Vibha Datta Makhija, Sr. Adv. Mr. Raj Kishor Choudhary, AOR Mr. Harsh Sethi, Adv. Mr. Aditya Wadhwa, Adv. Mr. Arunav Sharma, Adv. Ms. Priyanka Kashayap, Adv. Mr. Girish Tripathi, Adv. Ms. Rohini Narayanan, Adv. Mr. Vineet Jindal, Adv. Ms. Gulfeshan Javed, Adv. Mr. Vikram Patralekh, Adv. Mr. Sukhpreet Maan, Adv.

For Respondent(s) :Mr. D. S. Parmar, A.A.G. Ms. Mrinal Gopal Elker, AOR Mr. Abhimanyu Singh, Adv. Mr. Saurbah Singh, Adv.