The Supreme Court on Wednesday (September 16) held that merely establishing that money changed hands between a complainant and an intermediary who invoked the name of a public servant cannot, by itself, prove that the public servant accepted a bribe.

“The prosecution has, at its best, established that money changed hands between a complainant and an intermediary who invoked the appellant's name. But that itself can be said to be a proof of appellant's acceptance of bribe.”, observed a bench of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, while acquitting former Railway Protection Force officer Bharat Raj Meena in a corruption case after the prosecution had failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had demanded or accepted illegal gratification through the intermediary [See Neeraj Dutta v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 1029].

The case arose from a CBI trap in which RPF employee P.P. Nandakumar alleged that ₹10,000 was demanded to secure a posting. The prosecution alleged that accused-Meena demanded the money through Constable Anantha Narayanan, who was subsequently caught accepting the tainted currency.

Aggrieved by the Kerala High Court's judgment affirming the conviction rendered by the trial court under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the accused moved the Supreme Court.

Setting aside the conviction, the judgment authored by Justice Kotiswar Singh held that a mere alleged acceptance of the tainted money by a third person for the accused could not automatically be treated as proof of the accused's acceptance of the bribe.

The Court noted that the prosecution had not established that the money received by the intermediary was ultimately intended to reach, or actually reached, the appellant.

“…a demand and an initial handover to an intermediary are not enough; the chain must be carried through, by cogent evidence, to the point where the money is shown to have actually reached or been intended for the accused failing which the conviction cannot stand.”, the Court said, relying on its 2015 judgment of R.P.S. Yadav v. CBI.

“Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, it cannot be said that the prosecution has proved the case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt and accordingly, conviction of the appellant…cannot be sustained.”, the Court held.

Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal.

“We, therefore, hold that in view of the lingering reasonable doubts, as discussed above, the charge against the appellant could not be said to have been proved with certain element of definitiveness as contemplated under the principle of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the conviction of the appellant in respect of the transaction concerning PW-11 N.P. Gopi Kumar cannot be sustained under Section 7 of the Act, and the appellant is entitled to be acquitted in this transaction as well.”, the Court held.

Headnote

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Sections 7, 13(1)(d), 13(2), and 20 — Illegal gratification — Intermediary/Conduit — Trap operation — Failure to establish complete chain of demand, acceptance, and recovery qua the accused — Non applicability of statutory presumption - Mere recovery of tainted currency notes from an intermediary/conduit who invokes the name of the accused public servant cannot automatically result in criminal liability being fastened on the public servant - Where the investigating agency prematurely aborts the trap operation at the stage of recovery from the intermediary instead of allowing the chain to run its course to verify if the money was actually intended to reach or did reach the public servant, the link remains incomplete - Proof of demand is sine qua non for establishing the offence under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d), and statutory presumption under Section 20 arises only after foundational facts of voluntary acceptance/obtainment are established - Held, conviction cannot be sustained where residual gaps in receipt are bridged by mere speculation. [Relied on C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 779; P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. District Inspector of Police, (2015) 10 SCC 152; Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731; State by Lokayuktha Police v. K. Rangayya, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 963; Paras 44–51, 66–74]

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 133 read with Section 114, Illustration (b) — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 306 — Approver/Accomplice Testimony — Rule of Prudence — Requirement of independent material corroboration connecting the accused with the crime - An accomplice who secures pardon under Section 306 Cr.P.C. possesses a powerful incentive to minimize his own culpability and shift blame onto others - Although an accomplice is a competent witness under Section 133 of the Evidence Act, the rule of prudence under Section 114, Illustration (b) mandates independent corroboration in material particulars connecting the accused with the commission of the offence, and not merely connecting the transaction with the offence - Testimony of one participant in a bribe transaction (the bribe-giver) corroborating another participant (the approver intermediary) does not satisfy the requirement of independent corroboration in the sense required by law. [Relied on Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 637; Paras 52–55, 70-82]

Cause Title: BHARAT RAJ MEENA VERSUS CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 945

Appearance:

For Appellant(s) : Ms. Mukta Gupta, Sr. Adv. Mr. Vaibhav Srivastava, Adv. Ms. Sugandha Anand, AOR Ms. Nitya Gupta, Adv. Mr. Bhargava Ravikumar, Adv.

For Respondent(s) :Mr. Rajkumar Bhaskar Thakare, A.S.G. Mr. Mukesh Kumar Maroria, AOR Mr. Jagdish Chandra Solanki, Adv. Mr. Alankar Gupta, Adv. Ms. Astha Singh, Adv.