S.156(3) CrPC/S.175(3) BNSS | Magistrate's Order For Investigation Can't Be Quashed By Relying On Accused's Defence : Supreme Court

The Supreme Court has observed that High Courts, while exercising their inherent discretionary powers, cannot derail a police investigation directed by a Magistrate when the complaint prima facie discloses a cognizable offence. It held that at this stage, the Court must remain confined to the allegations in the complaint and the material placed by the complainant and cannot go beyond them to examine the defences put forward by the accused. “…the High Court, while exercising its inherent jurisdiction, should not travel beyond the allegations contained in the complaint and the material placed by the complainant by delving into the defences sought to be projected by the accused-respondents.”, observed a bench of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta while setting aside the Karnataka High Court's decision interfering with the ongoing investigation upon examining the defences put forth by the accused. The case arose out of a civil transaction between the parties, which took the criminal colour, after the complainant made an allegation against the accused of theft, criminal breach of trust, cheating, forgery, preparation and use of forged documents, and criminal conspiracy. The magistrate ordered a police investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., recording that the complaint prima facie makes out an ingredient of a cognizable offence. The High Court, however, travelled beyond the materials placed in the complaint to examine the defences made out by the accused, which included a detailed examination of the documents. Aggrieved by the High Court's decision, the complainant moved to the Supreme Court, arguing that the High Court's interference was bad in law. Allowing the plea, the judgment authored by Justice Mehta noted that the High Court erred in interfering with the investigation by doing a detailed examination of the evidence put forth by the accused, pointing out that at the stage of investigation, defences made by the accused need not be considered, nor materials beyond the scope of the complaint be entertained, otherwise it would amount to holding of a mini-trial at a pre-trial stage. “The High Court proceeded to examine documents relied upon by the accused-respondents, including the sale deeds executed in their favour, and treated the same as determinative of the dispute and observed that the sale deeds must be cancelled and delivered up first, before the criminal law could be set into motion. Such an exercise was clearly beyond the permissible scope of scrutiny in a petition for quashing under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. Consideration of defence material, including sale deeds or other title documents would necessarily involve adjudication on disputed questions of fact, which fall squarely within the domain of investigation and, if necessary, trial. Any such exercise at the stage of Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. would amount to conducting a mini-trial and would be wholly impermissible. Permitting such defence material to be weighed at the threshold would frustrate and defeat the very purpose of directing an investigation by the police.”, the court observed. “It is well settled that the mere existence of a civil remedy does not by itself bar criminal proceedings where the allegations prima facie disclose commission of a cognizable offence. By entering into an evaluation of the dispute on merits and proceeding to quash the order directing investigation, the High Court effectively stifled the investigative process at its inception. Such an approach runs contrary to the principles consistently laid down by this Court.”, the court observed. Resultantly, the appeal was allowed, upon setting aside the impugned order, and reviving the investigation from the stage at which it was interfered. “…we are of the considered opinion that the High Court clearly fell into error while quashing the proceedings at a stage when the Magistrate had merely directed registration of FIR and investigation under Section 156(3) of CrPC (Corresponding to Section 175(3) of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023).”, the court held.HeadnoteCriminal Procedure – Quashing of FIR – Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Interference at the Stage of Investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC – The Supreme Court set aside a High Court judgment that quashed an FIR at the inception stage - The High Court had reasoned that the dispute was primarily civil and required the cancellation of sale deeds under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act before criminal proceedings could be sustained - The Supreme Court held that the existence of a civil remedy does not bar criminal proceedings if the allegations prima facie disclose a cognizable offence - At the stage of Section 156(3) CrPC, a Magistrate is only required to determine if a cognizable offence is disclosed, not to conduct a "mini-trial" or evaluate defense material - High Courts must exercise restraint and only intervene under Section 156(3) if the order lacks...

S.156(3) CrPC/S.175(3) BNSS | Magistrate's Order For Investigation Can't Be Quashed By Relying On Accused's Defence : Supreme Court

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S.156(3) CrPC/S.175(3) BNSS | Magistrate's Order For Investigation Can't Be Quashed By Relying On Accused's Defence : Supreme Court

Yash Mittal

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