S.27 Evidence Act | Joint Statement By Different Accused Admissible Only If They Lead To Distinct Discoveries: Supreme Court

S.27 Evidence Act | Joint Statements By Different Accused Admissible If They Lead To Distinct Discoveries: Supreme Court

The Supreme Court has held that joint or simultaneous disclosure statements made by different accused persons are admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, provided such statements lead to the discovery of distinct and relevant facts connected with the crime.

A Bench comprising Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice KV Viswanathan delivered the ruling while deciding criminal appeals filed by two convicts challenging their conviction in a murder case arising from Karnataka. The Court ultimately acquitted the appellants, but clarified the legal position on the evidentiary value of joint disclosure statements under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872

Background

The case arose from the disappearance and murder of a woman in Karnataka in March 2013. The victim went missing on March 23, and her charred skeletal remains were discovered four days later in a forest area.

According to the prosecution, her brother had borrowed a large sum of money and gold from her and, to avoid repayment, conspired with the three other accused. It was alleged that the accused abducted her, murdered her, and later burnt the body to destroy evidence.

The trial court convicted all four accused. The High Court upheld the conviction. However, only two appellants approached the Supreme Court.

The issue was whether multiple accused pointing to the same place or object, already discovered through one accused, could be treated as valid discovery under Section 27.

According to the prosecution, all four accused gave a joint statement regarding the place where the woman was killed and the dead body was burnt. The police took all of them in a vehicle. One of them got down from the vehicle, and showed the spot where the victim was killed. Later, the other three were also brought one by one, and they also showed the same spot, and said the body was burnt there.

The Court noted that the panch witness has not deposed about the specific statement given by the appellants.

Joint statements not per se inadmissible; but there must be specificity and distinctiveness

The Court, referring to State NCT Of Delhi v. Navjot Sandhu (2005) 11 SCC 600, noted that joint disclosures or simultaneous disclosures, per se, are not inadmissible under Section 27. The said precedent also acknowledged the practical difficulties in ascertaining who exactly said what in such joint statements. Reference was also made to the 2025 judgment in Nagamma @ Nagarathna & Ors. Versus The State of Karnataka that greater care must be exercised while evaluating joint disclosures.

The Court observed that the High Court committed an error in accepting the joint statement. Firstly, the panch witness did not specify the exact statements given by each accused. There was nothing to even remotely indicate that there was discovery of any fact at the instance of the appellants admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.

Information should relate to distinct facts

The Court stated that the information should directly and distinctly relate to the facts discovered. In essence, the Court stressed that a fact can be “discovered” only once and cannot be repeatedly relied upon against multiple accused.

“Where, therefore, a fact has already been discovered any information given in that behalf afterwards cannot be said to lead to the discovery of the fact. There cannot be a rediscovery. Where the information as to the fact said to have been discovered is already in the possession of the police, the information given over again does not actually lead to any discovery so that its discovery over again in consequence of the information given by the accused is rightly inadmissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act."

The Court agreed that there could be situations where multiple accused give the same information to the police in quick succession. However, even in such a case, "unless the guarantee of the truth and voluntary nature of such statements is obtained by the discovery of a distinct fact, the provisions of Section 27 would not, in any manner, help the prosecution. "

"Take for instance, two or three accused persons make statements in quick succession giving an information of some or similar nature, and then proceed to discover different facts from different places. In such a case even though the statements made by them is treated as “joint” yet the discovery is not joint because it is the discovery of different facts from different places. Such discoveries guarantee the protection contemplated by Section 27 and therefore can be of good use to the prosecution."

The Court said that in precedents such as Lachhman Singh v. State (1952) 1 SCC 362 and State v. Chhotelal Mohanlal AIR 1955 Nag 71, the joint statements were accepted "only because it could be said that the statement made by each accused related to the facts thereby discovered “distinctly”."

Regarding the present case, the Court said :

“…the evidence is purely of a joint discovery of the same mental fact said to have been made by all the four accused simultaneously with the result that it is not possible to say which statement of a particular accused relates distinctly to the discovery of a particular mental fact. Thus, in the present case, the safeguards contemplated by Section 27 are not evident, and in the absence of these safeguards, the discovery evidence of two particular places i.e., the place where the deceased was killed and the place where her dead body was burnt cannot be utilized against the appellants.”

The Court noted that discoveries made based on the disclosure statements of multiple accused persons cannot be used against another accused person when such disclosure statements fail to discover different facts from different places.

The Court also found that the primary circumstance relied upon by the prosecution was that the accused were last seen with the deceased shortly before her disappearance. However, the Court emphasised that this circumstance alone cannot sustain a conviction.

The Court held that it would be “too risky” to conclude guilt solely on the basis of the last seen evidence without additional incriminating material linking the appellants to the crime.

In view of the gaps in the chain of evidence and the absence of corroboration beyond the last seen circumstance, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the conviction of the appellants.

Cause Title: ANAND JAKKAPPA PUJARI @GADDADAR VERSUS THE STATE OF KARNATAKA (with connected case)

Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 426

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Appearance:

For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Charudatta Vijayrao Mahindrakar, AOR

For Respondent(s) :Mr. Aman Panwar, A.A.G. Mr. Sanchit Garga, AOR Mr. Kunal Rana, Adv. Mr. Shashwat Jaiswal, Adv. Mr. Bhanu Pratap Singh, Adv.