S.469 CrPC | Limitation Period Starts From Date When Offender's Identity Is Known & Not From Receipt Of Complaint : Supreme Court

Yash Mittal

26 Feb 2026 9:45 PM IST

  • S.469 CrPC | Limitation Period Starts From Date When Offenders Identity Is Known & Not From Receipt Of Complaint : Supreme Court
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    The Supreme Court has observed that the period of limitation in criminal prosecutions begins from the date when the identity of all accused persons becomes known to the competent authority, and not from the date of the first complaint.

    A bench of Justices Ahsanuddin Amanullah and SVN Bhatti set aside the Kerala High Court's decision to quash the criminal proceedings under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, on the ground of limitation.

    The case arose from a complaint received in January 2006 alleging discrepancies in the labelling of a vaccine manufactured by Panacea Biotec Ltd. The Drugs Inspector conducted inquiries across the supply chain to identify the persons involved and completed this process in April 2006. A formal complaint was filed before the Magistrate on January 20, 2009.

    The High Court quashed the criminal cases on the ground of limitation, noting that the complaint filed in April 2006 was barred by limitation, as it was filed beyond the stipulated period of three years as per Section 468(2)(c) Cr.P.C.

    Setting aside the impugned order, the judgment authored by Justice Amanullah relying on Section 469(1)(c) CrPC observed that the High Court erred in quashing the complaint, as the complaint was validly filed within the limitation period of three year, when calculated from April 18, 2006, the date on which the identity of accused was first became known to the investigative agency.

    The maximum punishment under Section 27(d) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act attracts a limitation period of three years under Section 468(2)(c) CrPC. The identities of the accused became known to the Drugs Inspector only on April 18, 2006 after investigation into the distribution chain. The complaint filed on January 20, 2009 was therefore within the three-year limitation period, which would expire only on April 17, 2009.

    The Court disagreed with the High Court's approach of linking limitation to the date of the initial complaint or the first indication of an offence. It held that such an interpretation would defeat the purpose of Section 469(1)(c) CrPC, which specifically recognises that in many offences, particularly regulatory and economic offences, the offender's identity may emerge only after investigation.

    “In this context, we find that for the first time only on 18.04.2006, the identity of all the accused persons was before the Competent Authority. Undoubtedly, the Competent Authority was required to file a proper complaint before the Court, which was, however, ultimately done only on 20.01.2009. Though there is an inordinate delay, between the period from 18.04.2006 to 20.01.2009, in making the complaint, where after cognisance was taken and summons issued on 29.01.2009, the said exercise was completed within the 3-year period, as per Section 468(2)(c) read with Section 469(1)(c) of the Code. Therefore, in our view, the limitation bar does not come in the way. The limitation period would run out, in the present case, only on 17.04.2009, i.e., on completion of three years from the date the identity of the accused became known to the Competent Authority.”, the Court observed.

    The High Court had also quashed the proceedings on the ground that the Magistrate failed to conduct an inquiry under Section 202 CrPC before issuing summons to accused residing outside the court's jurisdiction.

    Setting aside this finding, the Supreme Court held that complaints filed by public servants stand on a different footing and must be read together with Section 200 CrPC, which exempts public servants from examination on oath at the stage of cognizance.

    Relying on Cheminova India Limited v State of Punjab, the Court held that omission to conduct a Section 202 inquiry does not automatically invalidate summoning orders in complaints filed by public servants acting in discharge of official duties.

    Accordingly, the appeal was allowed.

    Cause Title: THE STATE OF KERALA & ANR. Vs. M/s. PANACEA BIOTEC LTD. & ANR.

    Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 206

    Click here to download judgment

    Appearance:

    For Petitioner(s) Mr. S. S. Shroff, AOR Mr. Aashish Gupta, Adv. Mr. Aditya Mukherjee, Adv. Mr. Krishna Tangirala, Adv. Mr. Naman Kumar, Adv. Mr. Harshad V. Hameed, AOR Mr. Dileep Poolakkot, Adv. Mrs. Ashly Harshad, Adv. Mr. Mahabir Singh, Adv. Dr. Arunender Thakur, Adv. Mr. Anshul Saharan, Adv.

    For Respondent(s) Mr. K. Rajeev, AOR Mr. Shinoj K. Narayanan, Adv. Ms. Niveditha R. Menon, Adv. Mr. Aditya Verma, Adv. Mr. Tarun Kumar, Adv. Mr. Harshad V. Hameed, AOR Mr. S. S. Shroff, AOR Mr. Aashish Gupta, Adv. Mr. Aditya Mukherjee, Adv. Mr. Krishna Tangirala, Adv. Mr. Naman Kumar, Adv.

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