The Supreme Court has held that where narcotics-related information is received in circumstances requiring the immediate interception of a moving vehicle, the requirements of Section 42 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, have to be assessed in the context of the urgency of the situation. On the facts of the case, the Court found substantial compliance with the statutory safeguards and refused to invalidate the recovery on the basis of procedural deficiencies.

The Court made the observations while dismissing the appeal of a person, who was convicted for possession of 200 kg of poppy husk. The Court upheld his 10-year rigorous imprisonment and ₹1 lakh fine.

One question before the Supreme Court was whether the police had complied with Section 42 of the NDPS Act, which regulates the power of an empowered officer to enter, search and seize narcotic substances without a warrant when acting on information concerning drugs concealed in a building, conveyance or enclosed place.

Section 42 requires information received by an empowered officer to be taken down in writing, and Section 42(2) requires a copy of the information, or the recorded grounds for a warrantless search in certain circumstances, to be sent to the officer's immediate superior within 72 hours.

The bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Augustine George Masih upheld the conviction of a man who was found in conscious possession of ten bags of poppy husk, each of 20 KGs, in a Tata Safari car, which was owned by a different person. Amongst other grounds, the Appellant-convict challenged his conviction primarily on the non-compliance of Section 42 of the NDPS Act. The Appellant-convict argued that the police officer, who conducted the search, failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of formally entering the information received by a police officer into an official register, and to officially communicate the same to the senior officer.

Opposing the Appellant's stand, the Respondent-prosecution supported the conviction stating that there was substantial compliance with Section 42 of the NDPS Act. According to the prosecution, the law doesn't mandate full compliance when the police officer is moving or on patrol. In such a case, substantial compliance of the provision is enough.

Reference was made to the constitution bench judgment of Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana, (2009) 8 SCC 539, to argue that when the Investigating Officer receives the information while not at the Police Station but on the move, it was not necessary that the same be immediately reduced into writing and passed on to the immediate official superior. In Karnail Singh (supra), the Court held that the fact that a police officer informed the Police Station by sending a communication, and that the superior officer had thereafter been informed on telephone and requested to reach the place of recovery, would be substantive compliance.

The Court recalled that the Constitution Bench in Karnail Singh had reconciled the earlier decisions in Abdul Rashid Ibrahim Mansuri v. State of Gujarat and Sajan Abraham v. State of Kerala and settled the law on Section 42 compliance.

Under the rule formulated in Karnail Singh, the normal position is that an officer receiving information under Section 42 must record it in writing and forthwith send a copy to the immediate superior before proceeding with the search or seizure.

But the Constitution Bench carved out an important qualification for situations of urgency. Where the information is received when the officer is not at the police station but is on patrol or otherwise on the move, and the information calls for immediate action because delay could result in the removal or destruction of the contraband or evidence, it may not be feasible or practical to reduce the information into writing before acting.

In such circumstances, Karnail Singh permits the officer to proceed with the search and seizure and record the information and inform the superior officer as soon as practicable thereafter. The Constitution Bench accordingly described the question as one of “urgency and expediency”, while making clear that total non-compliance remains impermissible. Delayed compliance can constitute sufficient compliance if the delay is satisfactorily explained; conversely, where an officer neither re

Finding force in the prosecution's submission, the judgment authored by Justice Masih noted that there had been substantial compliance of Section 42 of the NDPS Act. The Court examined whether the purpose behind Section 42 had been substantially fulfilled. It noted that the investigating officer had acted promptly on the information, prepared the ruqa, caused the information to reach the police station and secured the presence of the Deputy Superintendent of Police at the spot. The Court therefore found no basis to hold that the recovery became illegal merely because every procedural step contemplated by Section 42 had not been followed in its most formal manner.

“…there had been substantial compliance, a wireless message having been sent to the immediate higher officer and a ruqa containing the facts and circumstances of the case having been sent from the spot to the Police Station, upon the basis whereof the FIR came to be registered, and no prejudice having been shown to have been caused to the accused by the non-reduction of the secret information into writing. We do not find that the Special Court erred in applying it, nor that the High Court erred in affirming the conclusion so reached.”, the Court observed.

The Court specifically referred to the Karnail Singh (supra) case to note that since no prejudice caused to the accused was shown, and there had been substantial compliance with Section 42, therefore, a delayed compliance of the mandatory requisite would not vitiate the trial.

“Upon a consideration of the circumstances as a whole, we hold that there was substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 42 of the NDPS Act 1985. The information, received upon a public road and relating to a vehicle then in transit and expected imminently, called for immediate action of the kind contemplated by clause (b) of paragraph 35 of Karnail Singh case (supra); its substance was reduced into writing in the ruqa, Ex. P-1, and dispatched before the search was undertaken; the officer superior in rank was informed of its receipt, was summoned to the spot, and the search was conducted in his presence and under his supervision; and no prejudice of any description has been shown to have been occasioned to the Appellant by the manner in which the officer proceeded. The case is thus not one of a total absence of compliance, and the delayed and imperfect character of what was done stands sufficiently explained by the exigency which the situation presented.”, the Court observed.

The appeal was dismissed. The conviction and sentence under Section 15(c) of the Act to rigorous imprisonment for ten years and a fine of INR 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only) was sustained.

Headnote

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) - Section 42 – Search and Seizure – Secret Information received on the move – Substantial Compliance - Total non-compliance with the requirements of Sections 42(1) and 42(2) is impermissible - where information is received while an empowered officer is on patrol duty/on the move and emergent action is required to intercept a vehicle in transit, immediate recording in writing is not feasible - Where the Investigating Officer scribed a contemporaneously recording the substance of the information before interception and summoned a superior Gazetted Officer who supervised the search, there is substantial compliance with Section 42 - The registration and dispatch of an FIR under the CrPC cannot by itself assume compliance with Section 42, but it is a relevant circumstance that can be weighed alongside other contemporaneous material to determine if the statutory purpose has been served. [Relied on Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana, (2009) 8 SCC 539; Bahadur Singh v. State of Haryana, (2010) 4 SCC 445; Paras 27–35]

Section 50 – Scope of Personal Search vs Search of Conveyance - The safeguard enacted under Section 50 applies exclusively to the search of the person of an individual to prevent unwitnessed personal searches, and does not extend to the search of a bag, container, or conveyance - The search of a vehicle and the incidental personal search of an occupant are two separate and independent steps - Where contraband is recovered solely from the vehicle (beneath a tarpaulin) and nothing is recovered during personal search, Section 50 is not attracted and the entire search is not vitiated - The substantive rank/current duty charge status of the Gazetted Officer overseeing the search is inconsequential when Section 50 is not attracted. [Relied on State of Himachal Pradesh v. Pawan Kumar, (2005) 4 SCC 350; Paras 35–37]

Section 52A & Standing Order 1/88 – Delay in dispatching samples to Chemical Examiner – Procedural Irregularity - The requirement for prompt dispatch (e.g., within 72 hours) is aimed at foreclosing tampering or substitution while samples are outside judicial custody - Where the case property was produced before the Magistrate within 24 hours (who verified seals and drew representative samples) and the Chemical Examiner confirmed seals intact and matching the specimen impressions, the possibility of tampering is independently foreclosed - An interval between seizure and chemical examination constitutes a mere procedural irregularity that does not vitiate the trial in the absence of evidence of tampering.[Relied on Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif, (2024) 11 SCC 372; Paras 38–40]

Section 54 & Section 15 – Presumption from Possession of Illicit Articles – Ownership vs Possession - For an offence under Section 15, what is material is conscious possession and not title or registration of the conveyance - The fact that a vehicle is registered in the name of a third party does not absolve the occupants when commercial quantity contraband is recovered from the vehicle - Once conscious possession is established, the statutory presumption under Section 54 is attracted, casting a reverse onus on the accused to provide a satisfactory account - Bare assertions of false implication unsupported by complaints to higher authorities do not rebut this presumption. [Paras 40-48]

Appreciation of Evidence – Falsus in Uno, Falsus in Omnibus not applicable – Sifting Chaff from Grain - The doctrine falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus has no strict application in Indian criminal jurisprudence - When evidence is separable, the court must sift the chaff from the grain and act on acceptable evidence - Discrepancies on collateral particulars that do not shake the core of the prosecution case or touch the documentary/forensic chain of custody do not warrant acquittal. [Relied on Arvind Kumar alias Nemichand v. State of Rajasthan, (2021) SCC OnLine SC 1099; Ramabora alias Ramaboraiah v. State of Karnataka, (2022) SCC OnLine SC 996; Paras 43–46]

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 136 – Special Leave Appeal – Scope of Interference with Concurrent Findings of Fact: The Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the trial court and the High Court unless the findings are shown to suffer from patent perversity or absurdity. [Relied on Balak Ram v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1975) 3 SCC 219; Paras 24 - 51]

Cause Title: KASHMIR RAM @ PAPPI VERSUS STATE OF PUNJAB

Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 804

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Appearance:

For Appellant(s) : Mr. Gautam Das, AOR Mr. Aban Kant Sahu, Adv. Mr. Kushi Chopra, Adv. Mr. Sanjeev Kumar, Adv. Mr. Vandana Miglani, Adv.

For Respondent(s) :Mr. Karan Sharma, AOR Mr. Chetan Manchanda, Adv.