CBI Investigation - Transfer of Investigation to CBI - Enhancement / Award of Interim Compensation in Public Law - Where state police and jail authorities exhibited blatant indifference, suppressed material facts (such as post-mortem reports before the High Court), and attempted to mislead inquiry via contradictory preliminary jail medical records, the ends of justice require entrusting the investigation to an independent agency - The Supreme Court directed the Director, CBI, to forthwith register a regular criminal case and investigate the custodial death as well as the conduct of state officials who failed to take follow-up action on the Section 176 CrPC inquiry report - High Court had awarded a "pittance" of Rs. 1,00,000/- as compensation under Article 226 for the custodial death of the 34-year-old sole breadwinner - Held: The compensation awarded was completely inadequate and not commensurate with the gravity of the loss - Supreme Court directed the State of Chhattisgarh to pay Rs. 25,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty-Five Lakhs) as an interim measure to the widow/dependents within four weeks, subject to final determination of total compensation. [Paras 16–22] Lahra Bai Tamre v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 794 : 2026 INSC 840

Code of Criminal Procedure — Anticipatory Bail / Pre-arrest Bail — Grant of interim protection while dismissing non-maintainable application — Impermissibility - An interim relief can only be granted in aid of and as ancillary to the main relief - While dismissing an application seeking pre-arrest bail on the ground that it is not maintainable (whatever be the ground therefor), neither the High Court nor the Sessions Court can extend or grant protection against arrest in the nature of interim relief that could otherwise be granted during the pendency of the application. [Relied On State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta, 1951 SCC 1024; Hema Mishra v. State of U.P., (2014) 4 SCC 453; Mangal Rajendra Kamthe v. Tahsildar, Purandhar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 297; Paras 8 - 11] Union of India v. Sunil Biyani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 797 : 2026 INSC 849

Code of Criminal Procedure — Bail to Foreign Nationals — Absence/Abscondence on Fake Sureties — Cancellation of Bail - Where a foreign national accused jumped bail and absconded, and upon subsequent verification, the sureties, PAN card, Aadhaar details, employer declaration, and bank account provided were found to be completely fabricated and non-existent, the appeal against the grant of bail metamorphoses into a proceeding for cancellation of bail due to breach of bail conditions - Impugned bail order set aside and bail cancelled. [Paras 17 - 20.1] Union of India v. Chidiebere Kingsley Nawchara, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 817 : 2026 INSC 870

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Invocation of Section 319 CrPC to Cure Fatal Defect Permissibility - Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 cannot be invoked to arraign a company as an accused at a later stage of the trial to cure a fundamentally defective complaint - Where a complaint suffers from a defect so basic that no valid cognizance could have been taken on it at the threshold, there is no valid institution of proceedings - The trial court/High Court cannot resort to Section 319 CrPC as a device to bypass the period of limitation prescribed under Section 142 of the NI Act or to revive a dead complaint - The High Court erred in directing the Trial Court to suo motu issue notice to the company under Section 319 CrPC - In case of a fatal defect in the initial complaint, the proper course is the filing of a fresh complaint after removing the defect within the prescribed limitation period - If the limitation period under Section 142(1)(b) has expired, the magistrate may only take cognizance under the proviso to Section 142(1)(b) if the complainant satisfies the court regarding sufficient cause for the delay. [Relied on Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels & Tours (P) Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661; N. Harihara Krishnan v. J. Thomas, (2018) 13 SCC 663; Paras 12–16] Manjula Kapoor v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 763 : 2026 INSC 789

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 397 (now Section 438 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) — Revisional Jurisdiction of High Court — Scope & Contours - In the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not act as a court of appeal and cannot embark upon an in-depth, roving re-examination or re-appreciation of oral and documentary evidence to substitute its own conclusions over concurrent findings of conviction passed by the lower courts - Revisional interference is impermissible unless the finding of the lower courts is perverse, grossly erroneous, glaringly unreasonable, untenable in law, or passed by ignoring material evidence. [Relied on Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. v. Galaxy Traders & Agencies Ltd., (2001) 6 SCC 463; Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 INSC 1158; Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Pennar Peterson Securities Ltd., (2000) 2 SCC 745; Para 7] Kuntegowda v. Thurubaiah, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 765 : 2026 INSC 790

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) — Section 227 — Discharge - When the entire prosecution material taken at face value fails to disclose the essential statutory ingredients of abetment under Section 306 IPC or offences under Sections 504 and 506 IPC, the refusal to grant discharge is unsustainable - High Court's dismissal of the revision application and Trial Court's rejection of the discharge application set aside; accused discharged. [Relied on Abhinav Mohan Delkar v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2026) 6 SCC 233; Prakash & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., (2026) 6 SCC 251; Ude Singh & Ors. v. State of Haryana, (2019) 17 SCC 301; Pawan Kumar v. State of H.P., (2017) 7 SCC 780; Paras 26 - 28] Vinod Shivakumar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 814 : 2026 INSC 867

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 125 — Interim Maintenance to Minor Children — Shared Obligation of Parents — Non-Monetary Contribution of Custodial Mother — Purely Arithmetical Division Impermissible - The mere fact that the mother is gainfully employed and earning an independent income is not, by itself, a sufficient ground to mechanically halve or dilute the father's liability to maintain their minor children - While the legal obligation to maintain children is shared by both parents, it cannot be apportioned on the basis of simple arithmetic alone - The custodial parent (mother) who attends to the day-to-day upbringing, personal care, and emotional needs of minor children while juggling professional employment makes a substantial and real contribution that cannot be quantified solely in monetary terms, often constituting the greater contribution. [Para 10-12] Sujata Kumari v. Rahul Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 839 : 2026 INSC 896

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 125 — Interim Maintenance to Minor Daughters — Quantum Assessment — Scope of Revisional Interference - Where the Family Court, after duly considering the income affidavits, lifestyle, socio-economic status of the parties, and the actual educational requirements of two school-going daughters (aged about 9 and 8 years), assessed interim maintenance at Rs. 30,000/- per month for each child (totaling Rs. 60,000/- per month), the High Court committed a manifest error in revisional jurisdiction by halving the award to Rs. 15,000/- per child merely on the footing that the mother is also a practising gynaecologist - Given that the respondent-father is a qualified consultant paediatrician earning at least Rs. 2,00,000/- per month, an interim maintenance sum of Rs. 60,000/- per month for both children cannot be termed excessive or unjust - The High Court's revisional interference was unwarranted, particularly when the main petition under Section 125 CrPC remains pending determination on merits - High Court order set aside; Family Court order restored. [Paras 9-14] Sujata Kumari v. Rahul Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 839 : 2026 INSC 896

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 154 — Delay in Lodging FIR — When Not Fatal - Mere delay in lodging the FIR is not fatal to the prosecution if reasonably and satisfactorily explained in light of the surrounding facts and circumstances - Where a 15–16 year old girl (PW-3) witnessed the gruesome assault and death of her mother late in the evening and lodged the report the following morning upon the arrival of her maternal uncle due to shock, despair, and lack of immediate support, the delay of a few hours stood sufficiently explained. [Relied on Ramdas and Others v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 2 SCC 170; Paras 29-35] Balku Oram v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 802 : 2026 INSC 852

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 154 — Unexplained Delay in Lodging FIR - An inordinate and unexplained delay of five days in lodging the FIR, even after the surviving witness was rescued and had allegedly disclosed the identity of the accused to the investigating officer while bodies were already recovered, casts serious doubt on the prosecution case - Such unjustified delay in setting the criminal law into motion undermines the credibility of the investigation and opens the door to embellishments. [Paras 32-37] Ravi Kumar Singh Malhotra v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 844 : 2026 INSC 899

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 156(3) & Section 154 — Rejection of Section 156(3) Application does not bar subsequent registration of FIR — Doctrine of Res Judicata inapplicable to threshold rejection under Section 156(3) — Statutory duty under Section 154 - The rejection of an application filed under Section 156(3) CrPC by a Magistrate does not operate as res judicata or act as a bar to the subsequent registration of an FIR under Section 154 CrPC on the same or substantially similar allegations - An order passed under Section 156(3) CrPC is merely a judicial direction to the police to exercise plenary powers of investigation under Chapter XII - it does not entail an adjudication on the merits of the allegations nor determine the rights/liabilities of the proposed accused - such threshold rejection does not possess the finality required to attract the doctrine of res judicata in criminal proceedings - the statutory duty of the police under Section 154 CrPC to register an FIR when information disclosing the commission of a cognizable offence is furnished is independent and cannot be extinguished or curtailed by the prior rejection of an application under Section 156(3) CrPC. [Paras 27-43] Pramod Kumar Shukla v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 829 : 2026 INSC 887

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 31(1) & Section 31(2) — Sentencing — Multiple Offences at One Trial — Consecutive vs Concurrent Running of Sentences — Sentence of Life Imprisonment along with Fixed-Term Sentences or Multiple Life Sentences — Imprisonment for life implies imprisonment till the end of the normal life of the convict - a sentence of life imprisonment cannot be directed to run consecutively, either with another life sentence or with a fixed-term sentence - Where an accused is awarded multiple sentences for multiple offences at one trial and one of the sentences awarded is life imprisonment, the sentences must only run concurrently and not consecutively - Directions issued by the Trial Court and High Court ordering consecutive execution of multiple life sentences and fixed-term sentences modified to run concurrently. [Relied on Muthuramalingam and Ors. v. State, Rep. by Inspector of Police, (2016) 8 SCC 313; O.M. Cherian alias Thankachan v. State of Kerala and Ors., (2015) 2 SCC 501; Duryodhan Rout v. State of Orissa, (2015) 2 SCC 783; Paras 20 - 23] Gopi @ Sahaya Puruna v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 820 : 2026 INSC 880

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 354(5) [Corresponding to Section 393(5) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)] — Mode of Execution of Death Sentence by Hanging — Constitutional Validity — Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India — Challenge to Hanging as the Sole Method of Execution - Writ petition under Article 32 seeking declaration of Section 354(5) CrPC / Section 393(5) BNSS as ultra vires Articles 14 and 21 on the ground that execution by hanging is barbaric, cruel, and inhumane, and seeking declaration that the right to die by a dignified procedure is a fundamental right - Dismissing the petition, held - The constitutional validity of Section 354(5) CrPC was conclusively settled by a three-Judge Bench in Deena v. Union of India and subsequently approved by a Constitution Bench in Shashi Nayar (Smt) v. Union of India (1992) 1 SCC 96 - The doctrine of stare decisis mandates that a smaller bench should not depart from the ratio of a larger bench that has stood for over four decades unless it is shown to have lost efficacy due to significant constitutional developments, legislative amendments, or cogent scientific/empirical evidence - The petitioners failed to demonstrate, by any unimpeachable evidence, even a single instance of a botched execution in India under the existing framework - The 187th Report of the Law Commission (2003) is merely recommendatory, and Parliament consciously retained hanging under Section 393(5) of the BNSS, 2023 - No compelling case made out to refer the matter to a larger Bench. [Paras 48–51, 60–63] Rishi Malhotra v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 823 : 2026 INSC 873

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 378 — Appeal against Acquittal — Double Presumption of Innocence — Interference by Appellate Court - An appellate court entertaining an appeal against an acquittal is bound to bear in mind that a double presumption of innocence operates in favor of the accused - first, the foundational presumption available under criminal jurisprudence that every person is presumed innocent until proven guilty; and second, the reinforcement and strengthening of that presumption upon securing an acquittal from the trial court - The appellate court can interfere with an acquittal only if the trial court's view was one that no reasonable court could have taken on the material before it, and not merely because an alternative plausible view exists - If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. [Relied on Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415; Para 22, 23] Ravi Kumar Singh Malhotra v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 844 : 2026 INSC 899

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 386(b), Section 397 & Section 401 — Powers of Appellate Court / Revisional Jurisdiction — Enhancement of Sentence — Scope and limits — Absence of Appeal or Revision for Enhancement — In an appeal against conviction preferred by the accused, the appellate court cannot, while maintaining the conviction, enhance the sentence awarded by the trial court so as to leave the convict in a position worse off than prior to the filing of the appeal - The right to appeal is both a statutory and constitutional right - Where no appeal or revision for enhancement has been filed either by the State, the victim, or the complainant, the High Court cannot invoke or exercise its suo motu revisional jurisdiction to enhance the convict's sentence (herein, life imprisonment enhanced to imprisonment for the remainder of natural life) - Such an order of enhancement is impermissible and illegal. [Relied on Nagarajan v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 INSC 802; Paras 17-23]. Gopi @ Sahaya Puruna v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 820 : 2026 INSC 880

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 437/439 — Bail Application — Evidentiary Value of Admissions - Indian Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 8 — Subsequent Conduct of Accused — Abnormal Conduct not Inculpatory Evidence - Presumptions and alleged admissions raised in bail applications cannot form the basis of sustaining a conviction for murder in a case based on circumstantial evidence - Fleeing from the scene in panic upon witnessing a friend accidentally drown, omitting to call for rescue, lying initially to family members, and subsequently going to watch a movie or returning empty soda bottles though morally reprehensible, foolish, or strange cannot be elevated to an incriminating circumstance establishing premeditated murder - The human mind is fickle, manipulative, and unpredictable in the face of sudden adversity - Where the hypothesis of accidental drowning is far more probable and plausible, the chain of circumstances cannot be held to be complete to exclude the hypothesis of innocence - Dock identification of unknown accused persons by witnesses for the first time in court without a prior Test Identification Parade (TIP) carries no evidentiary value, especially when the allegations are levelled months after the occurrence. [Paras 17 - 23] Taher Vajiyuddin Rangwala v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 810 : 2026 INSC 859

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 439 — Distinction Between Main Assailants Present at Spot and Conspirator Not Present — Circumstantial Evidence — Grant of Bail Affirmed - Where the co-accused (father of the prime accused) was admittedly not present at the spot when the fatal attack occurred and was implicated solely on the basis of circumstantial evidence of conspiracy and providing petrol under Section 109 IPC, his case stands on a materially different footing - Order of the High Court granting him regular bail affirmed. [Relied on Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh & Ors., (2002) 3 SCC 598; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar & Anr., (2020) 2 SCC 118; Ramesh Bhavan Rathod v. Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana & Anr., (2021) 6 SCC 230; Shabeen Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2025) 4 SCC 172; Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129; Paras 26-40] State of Maharashtra v. Pruthviraj Rajendra Shinde, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 856 : 2026 INSC 917

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 439 — Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 302, 307, 323, 109, 504, 506 read with Section 34 — Grant and Cancellation of Regular Bail — Serious and Heinous Offences — Exercise of Discretionary Jurisdiction — Parameters and Duty to Assign Reasons - Discretion to grant bail in serious and non-bailable offences such as murder must be exercised judiciously and not as a matter of course - An order granting bail in grave crimes must reflect proper application of mind to the facts and material on record and must record justifiable, cogent reasons - An unreasoned, superficial, or perverse order of bail warrants interference and reversal by the appellate court - Where a bail order is devoid of reasons or assigns flimsy and untenable grounds, ignoring material circumstances regarding the gravity of the offence, premeditation, concerted action, and the specific role of the accused, the superior court is fully empowered to cancel the bail. [Paras 32–37] State of Maharashtra v. Pruthviraj Rajendra Shinde, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 856 : 2026 INSC 917

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 439 — Premeditated Murder by Setting Victim Ablaze — Common Intention — Bail Erroneously Granted on Flimsy Grounds — Cancellation of Bail - In a case where four accused persons launched a sustained offensive at night upon the complainant's house demanding an apology from his son, arrived together in a four-wheeler carrying a can of petrol, restrained and assaulted the victim, and set him on fire by pouring petrol and throwing a lit matchstick, the High Court and Trial Court erred in granting regular bail to Accused No. 4 (who recorded the incident) and Accused No. 3 (on grounds of parity) - The facts prima facie demonstrated prior preparation, concerted action, and premeditated common intention under Section 34 IPC to inflict grave harm - The reasoning of the High Court that Accused No. 4 merely recorded the incident and had no antecedents was flimsy and untenable in law - regular bail granted to Accused Nos. 3 and 4 cancelled; rejection of bail to Accused No. 2 (who drove the vehicle and acted as lookout) upheld. [Paras 29- 40] State of Maharashtra v. Pruthviraj Rajendra Shinde, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 856 : 2026 INSC 917

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 467, 468, 471, 420, 406, 120B – Quashing based on settlement with the sole victim where dispute has civil flavour – Absence of consent of informant - The complainant/informant alleged that the accused forged a Power of Attorney of the landowner (Respondent No. 2), formed a partnership firm, and unlawfully got the land mutated in the firm's name, thereby depriving the informant of 7.50 acres of eucalyptus plantation allegedly given orally to him by Respondent No. 2 - the actual owner/victim (Respondent No. 2) entered into an amicable settlement with the accused, filed an affidavit admitting the validity of the partnership and mutation, and stated he had no grievances - The High Court declined to quash proceedings under Section 482 CrPC on the ground that the informant was not a party to the compromise and offences under Sections 406 and 420 IPC could not be compounded with a witness - Reversing the High Court's decision, the Supreme Court held: i. The High Court erred in conflating Section 320 compounding with Section 482 quashing; ii. Respondent No. 2 was the real victim of the alleged forgery and breach of trust. As the star witness had settled the dispute and affirmed the transactions, chances of conviction were bleak, and keeping the prosecution alive would be an exercise in futility and an abuse of judicial process; iii. The dispute predominantly bore a private and civil/commercial flavour with no wider repercussions on society; iv. The informant produced no documentary proof of title/interest in the land, nor showed that the accused had knowledge of any oral assignment - The informant could not block the quashing of proceedings when the real victim had settled all grievances. [Relied on Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303; Jagjeet Singh and Others v. Ashish Mishra alias Monu and Another, (2022) 9 SCC 321; Naushey Ali and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr., (2025) 4 SCC 78; Paras 39–49] Anand Kumar @ Sanjay Lalwani v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 874 : 2026 INSC 928

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 482 — Quashing of Criminal Proceedings — Defence Material / Plea of Alibi Based on Unimpeachable Official Records — Distinction from Disputed Questions of Fact - While ordinarily a plea of alibi is a matter of defence to be established by leading evidence at trial and cannot be decided under Section 482 CrPC on the strength of private affidavits, there is no inflexible rule barring the High Court from considering documentary material touching upon the presence or absence of the accused at the threshold where such material consists of official records maintained in the ordinary course of duty by a wing of the Armed Forces of the Union (BSF) whose authenticity is undisputed - Refusing to examine unimpeachable, contemporaneous official records produced from the earliest stage of investigation amounts to elevating procedural formalism over substantial justice and compelling an undeniably absent accused to undergo the ordeal of a full-fledged trial. [Paras 30, 31] Rahul v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 786 : 2026 INSC 825

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 482 — Quashing on the Basis of Defence Material — 4-Step Test - Reiterating the four-step test laid down in Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor, when the defence material is of sterling and impeccable quality, completely rules out the assertions in the charges, is not and cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution, and proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, the inherent power under Section 482 CrPC must be exercised to quash the criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of the process of the court and save judicial time. [Paras 19 - 35] Rahul v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 786 : 2026 INSC 825

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 482 & Section 154 — Scope of Interference at the Threshold — Quashing of FIR - At the stage of considering a plea for quashing an FIR under Section 482 CrPC, the Court is strictly concerned with whether the allegations contained in the FIR, taken at face value and accepted in their entirety, prima facie disclose the commission of a cognizable offence - The Court cannot embark upon a mini-trial or evaluate the veracity, evidentiary value, or defence version regarding the financial transactions, which fall entirely within the domain of investigation and trial. [Relied on Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh and Others (2014) 2 SCC 1; S.C. Garg v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another 2025 SCC OnLine SC 791; SAS Infratech Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Telangana and Another 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4046; Sakiri Vasu v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others (2008) 2 SCC 409; Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya and Others v. State of Gujarat and Another (2019) 17 SCC 1; Paras 40–48] Pramod Kumar Shukla v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 829 : 2026 INSC 887

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 482 r/w Section 320 [Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – Section 528 r/w Section 359] – Quashing of Criminal Proceedings on Compromise/Settlement vs. Compounding of Offences – Locus of Informant vs. Victim to Authorize Settlement - Quashing of criminal proceedings under Section 482 CrPC on the basis of a compromise between an offender and the victim is conceptually distinct from compounding of offences under Section 320 CrPC - Compounding is strictly circumscribed by statutory provisions where power is guided solely by Section 320 CrPC, whereas the High Court's inherent power to quash proceedings is guided by whether the ends of justice warrant such exercise and whether continuing proceedings would amount to an abuse of the legal process - "Victim" [Section 2(wa) CrPC / Section 2(y) BNSS] and "complainant/informant" are two distinct legal connotations - A complainant/informant need not necessarily be the victim, as even a stranger can set criminal law into motion - To seek quashing of criminal proceedings on the ground of an amicable settlement, it is only the real victim (i.e., the person who has suffered loss or injury due to the alleged offence) who can authorize a settlement, and not an informant who has suffered no injury - Disastrous consequences would follow if informants who are not victims are permitted to compromise disputes while the actual victim is left in limbo. [Paras 28–36]. Anand Kumar @ Sanjay Lalwani v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 874 : 2026 INSC 928

Constitution of India — Article 14 — Differential Modes of Execution Under Ordinary Criminal Law vs. Military Law — Army Act, 1950, Air Force Act, 1950, and Navy Act, 1957 - The argument that permitting execution by shooting as an alternative mode under special military enactments amounts to hostile discrimination under Article 14 against civilian convicts executed solely by hanging under CrPC/BNSS was rejected - Military statutes operate in a distinct field governing a separate class of persons subject to military discipline and necessity, and cannot serve as a benchmark to assess the constitutional validity of procedures governing civilian convictions. [Paras 55, 56] Rishi Malhotra v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 823 : 2026 INSC 873

Constitution of India — Article 21 — Death Penalty — Alternative Modes of Execution — Lethal Injection vs. Hanging – noted that contention that intravenous lethal injection is a demonstrably superior, scientific, and painless alternative to hanging was rejected - Referring to Deena v. Union of India, the Supreme Court reiterated that comparative analysis of alternatives (electrocution, lethal gas, shooting, and lethal injection) showed no distinct or demonstrable advantage over hanging - material placed on record revealed that lethal injection in jurisdictions like the United States has been plagued with systemic issues and numerous botched executions - In the absence of unimpeachable empirical evidence establishing that lethal injection or another method is more humane, the statutory prescription cannot be invalidated. [Paras 53 - 62] Rishi Malhotra v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 823 : 2026 INSC 873

Constitution of India — Social Justice & Constitutional Morality — Witch-Hunting — Practice Derogatory to Dignity of Women - Witch-hunting is a deeply rooted social malady driven by superstition, prejudice, and irrational fear, where vulnerable women are targeted as scapegoats and subjected to extreme brutality and ostracization - Such derogatory practices strike at the root of constitutional morality, human dignity, equality, and scientific temperament envisioned by the Constitution of India; reason must prevail as a bulwark against collective irrationality. [Paras 31-38] Balku Oram v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 802 : 2026 INSC 852

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 136 — Scope of Interference with High Court Order of Acquittal - Scope of Appellate Restraint - The Supreme Court will not interfere under Article 136 with a High Court judgment of acquittal unless it is shown to be perverse, manifestly illegal, or productive of a gross miscarriage of justice. If the view taken by the High Court in acquitting the accused is a reasonable and possible view based on material on record, it cannot be substituted merely because another view of the evidence might be possible - While defects in investigation alone do not warrant acquittal if substantive evidence is credible, where substantive ocular testimony is itself infirm and compromised by unsealed/tampered case property and unexplained FIR discrepancies, the benefit of such investigative lapses enures to the accused. [Relied on Himmat Sukhadeo Wahurwagh and Others v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 6 SCC 712; Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar and Another, 2026 INSC 735; Eknath Ganpat Aher and Others v. State of Maharashtra and Others, (2010) 6 SCC 519; Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Others v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149; Paras 23 – 46] Nirmala Bai Devidas Chavhan v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 779 : 2026 INSC 787

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 136 – Special Leave Appeal – Scope of Interference with Concurrent Findings of Fact: The Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the trial court and the High Court unless the findings are shown to suffer from patent perversity or absurdity. [Relied on Balak Ram v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1975) 3 SCC 219; Paras 24 - 51] Kashmir Ram @ Pappi v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 804 : 2026 INSC 854

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 21, Article 32, and Article 226 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 176 and Section 154 — Custodial Death — Failure to register FIR and investigate — Award of interim compensation — Transfer of investigation to Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) - Custodial Violence and Statutory Inaction - Deceased was arrested for an excise offence carrying a maximum sentence of 3 years and subsequently died in judicial/police custody - Judicial Magistrate First Class conducted an inquiry under Section 176 CrPC and reported that the death resulted from complications arising from a blunt-force head injury, with post-mortem showing multiple antemortem injuries - Despite the inquiry report and the High Court holding that the deceased died due to custodial violence, the State authorities (including DGP and Jail Authorities) failed to register an FIR or initiate an investigation, taking the stance that the judicial inquiry report had not been formally received by police officials - Held: that the stance of "blissful ignorance" and inaction taken by the senior State authorities is reprehensible, sacrilegious, and amounts to an attempt to cover up custodial violence. [Paras 5–7, 14–17] Lahra Bai Tamre v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 794 : 2026 INSC 840

Criminal Jurisprudence — Defective Investigation, Unexplained Injuries on Accused & Non-Examination of Independent Witnesses - Unexplained Injuries on the Accused - Non-explanation of injuries sustained by the accused creates serious doubt as to whether the prosecution has presented the true genesis and origin of the incident, particularly when all prosecution witnesses are related/interested - Failure to examine independent witnesses from a residential locality where dozens of neighbours gathered, relying exclusively on related witnesses, warrants an adverse inference against the prosecution. [Paras 36 - 41] Nirmala Bai Devidas Chavhan v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 779 : 2026 INSC 787

Criminal Law — Circumstantial Evidence — Panchsheel Principles — Incomplete Chain of Events — Benefit of Doubt - In a case solely dependent on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish all incriminating circumstances by reliable and clinching evidence, which taken together must form a complete chain of events pointing exclusively to the guilt of the accused and leaving no reasonable ground for any hypothesis consistent with innocence - Suspicion, however grave, cannot substitute for legal proof - An adverse inference or mere suspicion drawn from an accused's explanation regarding his absence or absconding cannot substitute for cogent evidence completing the chain of circumstances - The presence of missing links in the chain of circumstances entitles the accused to the benefit of doubt and acquittal. [Relied on Karakkattu Muhammed Basheer v. State of Kerala, (2024) 10 SCC 813; Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy v. State of A.P., (2006) 10 SCC 172; Anil Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, (2003) 9 SCC 67; Reddy Sampath Kumar v. State of A.P., (2005) 7 SCC 603; State of U.P. v. Satish, (2005) 3 SCC 114; Bodhraj v. State of J&K, (2002) 8 SCC 45; Paras 27- 30] Ravi Kumar Singh Malhotra v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 844 : 2026 INSC 899

Criminal Law — Evidence — Injured Witness vs. Stereotyped/Identical Testimony — Group Assault & Constructive Liability under Section 149 IPC - Reliability of Injured Witness versus Detailed Attribution in Unlawful Assembly - The presence of an injured witness at the crime scene carries an inherent guarantee of presence and reliability regarding the assault upon himself; however, it does not automatically render their testimony a reliable inventory of the specific, minute roles and weapons attributed to each of the multiple members of a large assembly - Parrot-like / Tutored Narration - Where multiple witnesses (both injured and eye-witnesses) present a verbatim, identical, and stereotyped account—assigning distinct overt acts, weapons, and body parts assaulted across 23 accused persons without individual variation—it raises serious doubts of tutoring rather than truthful recollection - In cases involving group rivalries and constructive liability under Section 149 IPC, safe identification is foundational, and convictions cannot safely rest solely on interested and stereotyped testimony. [Paras 27- 35] Nirmala Bai Devidas Chavhan v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 779 : 2026 INSC 787

Criminal Trial — Appreciation of Evidence — Related Witness vs. Interested Witness - A witness can be regarded as an “interested witness” only when it is demonstrated that the witness has a direct motive, personal animosity, or reasons to falsely implicate the accused - A close relative who is a natural witness cannot be equated with an interested witness merely on account of the relationship - Relationship far from being a foundation to discard testimony is often a sure guarantee of truth, as a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprit to falsely implicate an innocent person. [Relied on Shio Shankar Dubey and Others v. State of Bihar, (2019) 6 SCC 501; Kartik Malhar v. State of Bihar, (1996) 1 SCC 614; Dalbir Kaur v. State of Punjab, (1976) 4 SCC 158; Paras 24-35] Balku Oram v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 802 : 2026 INSC 852

Election Law - Seizure of Cash & Assets by Flying Squads (FS) / Static Surveillance Teams (SST) - Seizure of cash or valuables requires a recorded suspicion of crime/inducement - To protect ordinary citizens from unwarranted harassment while maintaining transparency, the seizing authority must mandatorily record written reasons disclosing a prima facie nexus between the seized asset and the suspected electoral offence - Where SST detects cash exceeding ₹10,00,000, information must immediately be transmitted to the Income Tax Department - To prevent the "under-investigation" tag from lingering endlessly and to allow voters to make informed choices before the next election cycle, the Investigating Officer (IO) must make all endeavors to complete the probe within one year - Reasons for delay must be reported to the ECI, and quarterly status reports approved by the SSP/DCP must be furnished to the ECI - High Courts are directed to designate Special Courts for prompt hearings and expeditious disposal of cases involving candidates/sitting MPs/MLAs. [Paras 17 - 18] State of Karnataka v. Prathik Parasrampuria, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 816 : 2026 INSC 868

Election Law - Summary of Directives Issued – 1. Reporting of Seizure within 24 Hours - Written reasons establishing the prima facie nexus to the electoral offence must be submitted to the DM/ADM/Competent Court within 24 hours of seizure; 2. Investigation Timeline - IOs must endeavor to finish the investigation within 1 year; failures must be explained in writing to the ECI; 3. Quarterly Reporting - Quarterly progress reports must be routed to the ECI via the Nodal Officer after approval by the district SSP/DCP; 4. Income Tax Reference - Seizures exceeding ₹10,00,000 must be notified to Income Tax authorities; 5. Special Courts: High Courts are to designate special fast-track courts for cases involving candidates/sitting MPs/MLAs; 6. Mandatory High Court Approval for Withdrawal - No electoral prosecution against candidates may be withdrawn under Section 321 CrPC without High Court sanction; 7. Compliance - Compliance report to be filed by the ECI and State Governments by November 18, 2026. State of Karnataka v. Prathik Parasrampuria, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 816 : 2026 INSC 868

Election Law - Withdrawal of Cases against Candidates / Politicians (Section 321 CrPC / BNSS) - Unilateral withdrawal of electoral offences by State Governments upon political changes is antithetical to an unbiased criminal justice system - Candidates contesting elections stand on the same pedestal as sitting MPs/MLAs regarding prosecution; hence, withdrawal of prosecution against election candidates cannot be done without the prior approval and leave of the concerned High Court. [Relied on: State of Kerala v. K. Ajith, (2021) 17 SCC 318; Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India, (2021) 20 SCC 599; Paras 14 - 18] State of Karnataka v. Prathik Parasrampuria, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 816 : 2026 INSC 868

Election Law & Criminal Jurisprudence — Electoral Offences, Seizure of Black Money, and Withdrawal of Prosecutions — Comprehensive Directions issued to curb money power, streamline investigations, and regulate withdrawal of criminal cases filed during elections - Constitutional Role of Election Commission & Free/Fair Elections - Article 324 of the Constitution vests wide superintendence, direction, and control of elections in the Election Commission of India (ECI), which acts as a reservoir of residuary powers in unoccupied fields to ensure purity and transparency in the electoral process - Purity in elections and the rule of law are indispensable basic features of democracy. [Relied on: Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975 Supp SCC 1; Rameshwar Prasad (6) v. Union of India, (2006) 2 SCC 1; Union of India v. Assn. for Democratic Reforms, (2002) 5 SCC 294; Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr., (1978) 1 SCC 405; A.C. Jose v. Sivan Pillai, (1984) 2 SCC 656; Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India, (2023) 6 SCC 161; Kanwar Lal Gupta v. Amar Nath Chawla, (1975) 3 SCC 646; Ashok Shankarrao Chavan v. Madhavrao Kinhalkar, (2014) 7 SCC 99; Paras 8 - 12] State of Karnataka v. Prathik Parasrampuria, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 816 : 2026 INSC 868

Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 114(e) & Section 114 Illustration (g) – Presumption of Regularity of Official Acts – Non-examination of Material Witness - The statutory presumption of regularity under Section 114(e) extends solely to the regularity of official procedure and does not extend to conclusively proving the bona fides or legality of the underlying private transaction on which the official order is based - an adverse inference under Section 114 Illustration (g) does not follow automatically from the non-examination of an available party/witness (such as the widow) where the acquisition of knowledge of hostile action is independently established through contemporary documentary evidence. [Para 28-30] Jamnabai v. Vasudev, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 843 : 2026 INSC 900

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 118 — Child Witness — Evaluation and Corroboration — Rule of Prudence — Tutoring - While there is no inflexible statutory bar preventing conviction based on the testimony of a competent child witness, seeking independent corroboration is a well-established rule of prudence - A child witness of tender age, lacking maturity of understanding, is an easy prey to tutoring; thus, the evidence must be evaluated with great care and circumspection - Where the child witness (aged 4.5 years at the time of the incident and examined 4 years later) was residing with a police constable and expressly admitted in his cross-examination to having been tutored by the Station House Officer prior to deposing, his testimony cannot form the sole basis of conviction - where the child's account of being strangulated with a rope and burnt with acid is falsified by medical evidence and humanly unnatural conduct is attributed, insisting on corroboration is imperative and the trial court's rejection of such evidence cannot be considered unreasonable. [Relied on Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P., (2003) 3 SCC 21; Panchhi v. State of U.P., (1998) 7 SCC 177; Paras 24, 25, 26] Ravi Kumar Singh Malhotra v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 844 : 2026 INSC 899

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 134 — Quality vs. Quantity of Evidence — Sole Eyewitness - The legal system lays emphasis on the value, weight, and quality of evidence rather than on quantity, multiplicity, or plurality of witnesses - The time-honoured principle is that “evidence has to be weighed and not counted” - There exists no legal impediment to convicting an accused solely on the testimony of a single witness, provided such testimony is wholly reliable and inspires confidence. [Relied on Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras, 1957 SCC OnLine SC 13; Prithipal Singh and Others v. State of Punjab and Another, (2012) 1 SCC 10; Sunil Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2003) 11 SCC 367; Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 14 SCC 150; Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of W.B., (2010) 12 SCC 91; Paras 20-35] Balku Oram v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 802 : 2026 INSC 852

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 27 — Recovery Evidence — Hostile Panch Witnesses and Inordinate Delay - Recovery of incriminating articles (clothes and an empty acid bottle) made six months after the incident from an open/accessible dump site at the instance of the accused loses its evidentiary value when independent seizure witnesses turn hostile and testify that they merely signed blank papers without knowing the contents - The evidentiary integrity of the recovery is further compromised when articles allegedly buried 6 feet deep under rocks for months show no traces of mud, earth, or water residue, raising a serious possibility of planting and creating a fatal breach in the prosecution case. [Paras 30, 31, 32] Ravi Kumar Singh Malhotra v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 844 : 2026 INSC 899

Evidence Law - Appreciation of Evidence – Falsus in Uno, Falsus in Omnibus not applicable – Sifting Chaff from Grain - The doctrine falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus has no strict application in Indian criminal jurisprudence - When evidence is separable, the court must sift the chaff from the grain and act on acceptable evidence - Discrepancies on collateral particulars that do not shake the core of the prosecution case or touch the documentary/forensic chain of custody do not warrant acquittal. [Relied on Arvind Kumar alias Nemichand v. State of Rajasthan, (2021) SCC OnLine SC 1099; Ramabora alias Ramaboraiah v. State of Karnataka, (2022) SCC OnLine SC 996; Paras 43–46] Kashmir Ram @ Pappi v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 804 : 2026 INSC 854

Gangsters Act vs. Preventive Detention Laws (U.P.) – Lack of procedural safeguards – Comparison with MCOCA and GUJCTOC - Unlike the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 (MCOCA) and Gujarat Control of Terrorism and Organised Crime Act, 2015 (GUJCTOC) which specifically define and penalise substantive offences such as "organised crime"— the U.P. Gangsters Act creates no offence - While operating in effect like a preventive detention mechanism by prolonging pre-trial custody up to a year, the U.P. Gangsters Act lacks the constitutional and statutory safeguards inherent to preventive detention (such as Advisory Board review, time-bound representations, and strictly monitored executive satisfaction) - The trial before the Special Court becomes a foregone conclusion based mechanically on the Gang Chart. [Relied on Central Bureau of Investigation v. R.R. Kishore, (2023) 15 SCC 339; Union of India & Anr. v. Ganpati Dealcom Private Limited, (2023) 3 SCC 315; Mahipal Singh v. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr., (2014) 11 SCC 282; S.A. Venkataraman v. Union of India & Anr., (1954) 1 SCC 586; Paras 38-57] Shiv Pratap Singh @ Chinu v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 836 : 2026 INSC 894

Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (Uttar Pradesh) – Sections 2(b), 2(c), 3, 7, 23 – Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Rules, 2021 – Constitution of India, Article 20(1) – General Clauses Act, 1897, Section 3(38) – Absence of substantive offence – Principle of Nulla Poena Sine Lege – Punishment for mere status – Subordinate legislation cannot create an offence - The Supreme Court held that the U.P. Gangsters Act, 1986 is "stillborn" as it completely fails to create a substantive crime or penalise any specific act or omission - The enactment merely provides definitions of 'gang' and 'gangster' under Section 2 and directly prescribes punishment under Section 3 without defining an actionable offence - Indulgence in activities under Section 2(b)(i) to (xxv) is already penalised under independent penal statutes, and the Act impermissibly punishes a person for their executive-determined "status" rather than an actus reus created by the statute - The subordinate Rules of 2021, by prescribing a Gang Chart procedure to determine such status, exceed the rule-making powers under Section 23 of the Act - Creation of an offence is an essential legislative function that cannot be delegated to executive ipse dixit. [Paras 21- 59]. Shiv Pratap Singh @ Chinu v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 836 : 2026 INSC 894

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000; Section 7A, Section 15(1)(g), Section 19, and Section 20 read with Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015; Section 25 — Claim of Juvenility at Appellate Stage — Effect on Conviction and Sentence - A plea of juvenility can be raised at any stage before any court, even after the final disposal of the case - The subsequent declaration of juvenility does not, by itself, erase or annul a finding of guilt recorded on evidence by a regular court - It primarily affects the forum and nature of the permissible disposition and renders the adult sentence legally ineffective - Where a person below eighteen years of age on the date of commission of an offence was tried and sentenced as an adult, the conviction on merits is to be maintained, but the substantive adult sentence, fine, and default stipulations are deemed to have no effect and must be set aside - When the juvenile has already undergone detention well beyond the maximum permissible period of three years under Section 15(1)(g), remanding the matter back to the Juvenile Justice Board is an empty formality; the accused is not required to surrender and is entitled to statutory protection against disqualifications arising from conviction under Section 19. [Paras 12, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33] Dinesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 805 : 2026 INSC 842

Medical Evidence vs. Ocular Evidence — Direct Conflict & Improbability - Mismatch Between Number of Blows/Assailants and Post-Mortem Findings - When the ocular version attributes continuous blows with iron pipes to the victim's head by four separate assailants over 2 to 3 minutes, but the post-mortem report reveals only a single laceration with a frontal bone fracture, and the medical expert testifies that repeated blows by four persons would have crushed the skull, the ocular account is medically improbable - Exaggeration vs. Inconsistency - Exaggeration explains overstatement of ferocity, but it cannot explain how an assault deposed to have been delivered by four assailants with separate weapons registered as a single point of impact - Such a fundamental mismatch creates reasonable doubt that goes to the root of the prosecution case. [Paras 30-33] Nirmala Bai Devidas Chavhan v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 779 : 2026 INSC 787

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Section 31A read with Section 37(2) — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 436A [Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 — Section 479] — Maximum Detention Period for Undertrials — Inapplicability where Capital Punishment is Specified - Where the accused was previously convicted under the NDPS Act and subsequently implicated as a mastermind in trafficking commercial quantities (approx. 5 kg heroin), the enhanced penalty provisions under Section 31A of the NDPS Act (which prescribe death penalty as an alternative punishment) stand attracted - The statutory protection under Section 436A CrPC (or Section 479 BNSS) for release upon undergoing one-half of the maximum sentence is expressly inapplicable to offences for which the punishment of death is specified. [Paras 15, 16] Union of India v. Chidiebere Kingsley Nawchara, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 817 : 2026 INSC 870

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Section 37 — Commercial Quantity — Grant of Bail to Foreign Nationals — Mandatory Twin Conditions — Article 21 & Incarceration - Right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution is not exercised in isolation from statutory rigours; in cases involving commercial quantities under special enactments such as the NDPS Act, the Article 21 right must be exercised within the framework of Section 37 and cannot be pressed into service solely on the ground of delay to override the twin statutory conditions - The High Court erred in granting bail to a foreign national solely on grounds of prolonged incarceration (2.5 years) and reliance on Tofan Singh without recording mandatory satisfaction under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) that there were reasonable grounds to believe he was not guilty and unlikely to commit an offence while on bail. [Paras 11-14] Union of India v. Chidiebere Kingsley Nawchara, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 817 : 2026 INSC 870

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) - Section 42 – Search and Seizure – Secret Information received on the move – Substantial Compliance - Total non-compliance with the requirements of Sections 42(1) and 42(2) is impermissible - where information is received while an empowered officer is on patrol duty/on the move and emergent action is required to intercept a vehicle in transit, immediate recording in writing is not feasible - Where the Investigating Officer scribed a contemporaneously recording the substance of the information before interception and summoned a superior Gazetted Officer who supervised the search, there is substantial compliance with Section 42 - The registration and dispatch of an FIR under the CrPC cannot by itself assume compliance with Section 42, but it is a relevant circumstance that can be weighed alongside other contemporaneous material to determine if the statutory purpose has been served. [Relied on Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana, (2009) 8 SCC 539; Bahadur Singh v. State of Haryana, (2010) 4 SCC 445; Paras 27–35] Kashmir Ram @ Pappi v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 804 : 2026 INSC 854

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) - Section 50 – Scope of Personal Search vs Search of Conveyance - The safeguard enacted under Section 50 applies exclusively to the search of the person of an individual to prevent unwitnessed personal searches, and does not extend to the search of a bag, container, or conveyance - The search of a vehicle and the incidental personal search of an occupant are two separate and independent steps - Where contraband is recovered solely from the vehicle (beneath a tarpaulin) and nothing is recovered during personal search, Section 50 is not attracted and the entire search is not vitiated - The substantive rank/current duty charge status of the Gazetted Officer overseeing the search is inconsequential when Section 50 is not attracted. [Relied on State of Himachal Pradesh v. Pawan Kumar, (2005) 4 SCC 350; Paras 35–37] Kashmir Ram @ Pappi v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 804 : 2026 INSC 854

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) - Section 52A & Standing Order 1/88 – Delay in dispatching samples to Chemical Examiner – Procedural Irregularity - The requirement for prompt dispatch (e.g., within 72 hours) is aimed at foreclosing tampering or substitution while samples are outside judicial custody - Where the case property was produced before the Magistrate within 24 hours (who verified seals and drew representative samples) and the Chemical Examiner confirmed seals intact and matching the specimen impressions, the possibility of tampering is independently foreclosed - An interval between seizure and chemical examination constitutes a mere procedural irregularity that does not vitiate the trial in the absence of evidence of tampering. [Relied on Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif, (2024) 11 SCC 372; Paras 38–40] Kashmir Ram @ Pappi v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 804 : 2026 INSC 854

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) - Section 54 & Section 15 – Presumption from Possession of Illicit Articles – Ownership vs Possession - For an offence under Section 15, what is material is conscious possession and not title or registration of the conveyance - The fact that a vehicle is registered in the name of a third party does not absolve the occupants when commercial quantity contraband is recovered from the vehicle - Once conscious possession is established, the statutory presumption under Section 54 is attracted, casting a reverse onus on the accused to provide a satisfactory account - Bare assertions of false implication unsupported by complaints to higher authorities do not rebut this presumption. [Paras 40-48] Kashmir Ram @ Pappi v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 804 : 2026 INSC 854

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 — Section 138 read with Section 141 — Dishonour of Cheque — Non-Impleadment of Company as Accused — Maintainability of Complaint against Director/Authorised Signatory — Section 319 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Arraignment of Company is Mandatory - For maintaining a prosecution under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, arraigning the company as an accused is an express condition precedent - Where a cheque is drawn on an account maintained by a company, commission of the offence by the company is a prerequisite to attract vicarious liability against its directors or authorised signatories - A complaint filed solely against a director/authorised signatory without impleadment of the company suffers from a fatal, fundamental defect and is non est in law. [Paras 11 - 14] Manjula Kapoor v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 763 : 2026 INSC 789

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 — Section 138, Section 118(a), Section 139 — Presumption in favour of holder & Rebuttal — Financial capacity of complainant & Ex post facto defense - Once the drawer admits their signature on the cheque, mandatory statutory presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 arise in favour of the holder - The onus then shifts to the accused to displace the presumption by leading cogent direct or indirect evidence - A bare denial, plausible theories, or ex post facto creation of evidence (such as sending a legal notice demanding return of cheques after the commencement of prosecution evidence) does not rebut the statutory presumption - where the accused fails to reply to the statutory demand notice under Section 138 to specifically plead lack of financial capacity of the complainant, the complainant cannot be expected to adduce evidence establishing his financial capacity at the initial stage - The financial capacity of the complainant is sufficiently demonstrated where evidence shows mobilization of funds through relatives/friends and investments in chit funds. [Paras 5-7] Kuntegowda v. Thurubaiah, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 765 : 2026 INSC 790

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Circumstantial Evidence — Delayed FIR & Motive as an Afterthought - Gross, unexplained delay of about four months in lodging the First Information Statement (FIS)/FIR alleging motive for murder renders the story of motive a deliberated afterthought - Conduct of the deceased's family members in allowing the deceased to travel with the accused on friendly terms dispels the alleged pre-existing enmity. [Paras 13 - 21] Taher Vajiyuddin Rangwala v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 810 : 2026 INSC 859

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 300 (Exceptions), Section 302 vs. Section 304 Part I/Part II — Determination of Intention to Cause Death - The distinction between murder (Section 302) and culpable homicide not amounting to murder (Section 304) depends on the intention of the accused, to be gathered from totality of circumstances including the nature of the weapon, target area, force employed, premeditation, and whether blows were struck on vital body parts - The infliction of extensive ante-mortem injuries and grievous blows on vital parts (head, neck, chest) reflects clear murderous intention - In the absence of evidence attracting any Exception under Section 300, plea for conversion of conviction to Section 304 Part I/Part II rejected. [Relied on Pulicherla Nagaraju alias Nagaraja Reddy v. State of A.P., (2006) 11 SCC 444; Paras 26-32] Balku Oram v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 802 : 2026 INSC 852

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 302 r/w Section 34 — Murder — Witch-Hunting — Conviction based on Sole Eyewitness Testimony — Upheld - Direct ocular evidence, if found natural, cogent, and trustworthy, constitutes the best form of evidence and ordinarily prevails over all other forms - The testimony of a single reliable eyewitness (PW-3, daughter of the deceased) who witnessed the brutal lathi assault on her mother after being dragged from her house on the accusation of practicing witchcraft, was consistent, unshaken, and duly corroborated by medical evidence. [Paras 17 - 22] Balku Oram v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 802 : 2026 INSC 852

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 306 — Abetment of Suicide in Workplace Setting — Official Reprimands, Administrative Supervision, and Stern Behavior by Superior Officer - Ordinary administrative directions, disciplinary supervision, official reprimands, show cause notices issued in the course of discharge of duty, or stern conduct of a superior officer even if perceived as harsh or unpleasant by a subordinate cannot be elevated to the status of abetment under Section 306 IPC in the absence of material demonstrating a conscious intention (mens rea) to drive the subordinate to suicide - Where the incidents alleged (such as work assignments, encroachment removal, or past departmental interactions) occurred months prior to the incident, there was a complete absence of any proximate act of instigation immediately preceding the suicide - criminal proceedings against the senior officer amounted to an abuse of the process of law, and the appellant was entitled to discharge. [Paras 22 - 26] Vinod Shivakumar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 814 : 2026 INSC 867

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 306 read with Section 107 — Abetment of Suicide — Essential Ingredients — Requirement of Proximate Act, Instigation, and Mens Rea - To attract the offence of abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC read with Section 107 IPC, three essential ingredients must be satisfied - (i) direct or indirect instigation/incitement, (ii) in close proximity to the commission of suicide, along with (iii) a clear mens rea to abet the commission of suicide - Mere allegations of continuous harassment or stern behavior by a superior officer over a period of time do not automatically constitute abetment unless there is a proximate prior act that goaded, incited, or created circumstances leaving the victim with no other option but to take their own life - Mens rea cannot be gleaned merely from what goes on in the mind of the victim or the tragic outcome alone; there must be a conscious, deliberate intention on the part of the accused to drive the deceased to commit suicide. [Paras 14-25] Vinod Shivakumar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 814 : 2026 INSC 867

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 376 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 378 — Appeal against acquittal — Scope of interference by the High Court — Medical Evidence and Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) Report conflicting with ocular testimony — Rape of a 4.5-year-old child alleged - The High Court overturned the trial Court's acquittal without considering the medical report and the FSL report - The informant (PW-2) and the child victim (PW-3) consistently claimed that the victim sustained injuries and that her clothes had bloodstains - the medical examination conducted within 12 hours of the incident revealed no injuries, inflammation, redness, or bruising on the body or private parts of the victim, with the hymen found intact - the State Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report confirmed that even after performing the Benzidine test (a reliable screening test capable of detecting blood up to multiple washings) as well as the Acid Phosphatase test, neither blood nor semen was detected on the clothes of the victim or the seized mat/bedding from the alleged place of occurrence - There were also irreconcilable contradictions regarding the place of occurrence (cot vs. kitchen where no cot existed) - Held, the entire prosecution evidence must be considered in totality - Where oral testimonies alleging bleeding/injury are directly belied by prompt medical examination and negative forensic reports, a grave doubt is cast on the prosecution's case - The High Court erred in reversing the well-reasoned acquittal by ignoring the medical and FSL reports. Conviction set aside; trial court's acquittal restored. [Paras 9–16]. Ram Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 788 : 2026 INSC 830

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 498A — Applicability to Live-In Relationships — "Relationship in the Nature of Marriage" — Purposive Interpretation — Fundamental Rights — Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution of India – i. Applicability of Section 498A IPC to Live-In Relationships - Held, Section 498A IPC applies to "live-in relationships" that qualify as "relationships in the nature of marriage," provided that the intent to marry is established as an intrinsic element - Giving a restrictive or purely literal interpretation to the word "husband" to exclude live-in partners would defeat the social, reformative, and protective legislative objective of the provision – ii. Constitutional Imperative (Article 14) - Creating a distinction between a legally wedded wife and a female partner in a relationship in the nature of marriage for protection against domestic cruelty lacks any rational nexus with the legislative objective of curbing domestic abuse - Differentiating solely on the basis of formal ceremonial marriage violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India – iii. Individual Choice and Autonomy (Article 21) - The right to choose a life partner is an intrinsic facet of individual autonomy and dignity under Article 21, encompassing spatial and associational privacy - The protection of criminal law against household cruelty cannot depend on whether a woman has formally solemnized her union – iv. Distinction between Civil Protection (DV Act) and Criminal Remedy (Section 498A IPC) - Civil protection under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act) is insufficient by itself, as civil/monetary consequences cannot substitute for the deterrent effect of criminal law. [Paras 12-23] Lokesh B.H. v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 753 : 2026 INSC 784

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 302, 120B, 201 read with Section 34 — Circumstantial Evidence — Accidental Death vs. Homicidal Death — Chain of Circumstances - Conviction of the appellants-accused by the Trial Court and the High Court under Sections 302, 120B, and 201 read with Section 34 IPC set aside - The Supreme Court held that the prosecution miserably failed to establish the foundational fact of a homicidal death - Medical evidence established the cause of death as 'Cardio-Respiratory arrest due to Asphyxia due to drowning' - Non-grievous injuries found on the body could have been sustained due to friction with hard or sharp objects in the river flow, corroborating the defence version of accidental drowning rather than a premeditated attack - Alleged use of a broken soda bottle as a weapon was unsupported due to non-confrontation of the object to the medical expert, absence of seizure, and lack of forensic matching. [Paras 10 - 21] Taher Vajiyuddin Rangwala v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 810 : 2026 INSC 859

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 498-A, 304-B — Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 — Sections 3, 4 — Quashing of Proceedings Qua Husband — Effect of Acquittal of Co-Accused Parents on Identical Evidence: Where co-accused parents have already been acquitted after a full-fledged trial on the self-same allegations and evidence, and the solitary additional allegation against the husband regarding telephonic dowry demands is unsubstantiated by any Call Detail Records (CDR) and stands neutralised by unimpeached official proof of his deployment on BSF duty outside the State, continuing criminal proceedings against the husband alone constitutes an abuse of the judicial process whose substratum has collapsed. Continuation of proceedings falls within categories (1), (3), and (6) of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 and warrants quashing. [Relied on Rajiv Thapar and Others v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330; Mahmood Ali and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2023) 15 SCC 488; Prashant Bharti v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 9 SCC 293; Paras 32–37]. Rahul v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 786 : 2026 INSC 825

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 504 and 506 — Intentional Insult and Criminal Intimidation — Official Capacity - Allegations arising out of acts performed in an official capacity as a superior officer such as reprimands regarding official work or threats of suspension which the officer had no independent competence to execute do not constitute an intentional insult likely to provoke a breach of the peace under Section 504 IPC, nor do they amount to criminal intimidation under Section 506 IPC. [Para 27] Vinod Shivakumar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 814 : 2026 INSC 867

Penal Code, 1860; Sections 302/34 and 392/34 — Circumstantial Evidence — Last-Seen Theory & Unexplained Possession of Stolen Property — Indian Evidence Act, 1872; Section 27 and Section 106 - Conviction based on circumstantial evidence upheld where foundational circumstances were firmly established in an unbroken chain - (i) deceased was last seen leaving with the accused persons in his taxi; (ii) deceased went missing and his decomposed body was subsequently found along the route; (iii) accused persons were intercepted within five days in joint, unexplained possession of the deceased's taxi and its original papers while attempting to dispose of it; and (iv) personal belongings (driving licence and tiffin carrier) of the deceased were recovered from a sugarcane field pursuant to disclosure statements under Section 27 of the Evidence Act - Held, failure of the accused to offer any plausible explanation under Section 313 Cr.P.C. regarding recent possession of the taxi supplied an additional link under Section 106 of the Evidence Act - Inability of medical evidence to ascertain the precise cause of death due to advanced decomposition does not override an otherwise complete and consistent chain of circumstantial evidence. [Relied on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116; Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 13 SCC 211; Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2010) 5 SCC 344; Jitendra Singh @ Babboo Singh v. State of U.P., (2013) 11 SCC 193; Paras 14–23] Dinesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 805 : 2026 INSC 842

Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 – Criminal Procedure – Overlapping Offences under PCPNDT Act and Substantive Penal Law (IPC/BNS) – Dual-Track Procedure - The statutory bar against police investigation under the PCPNDT Act applies solely to offences proscribed under the special statute and does not circumscribe or impede the independent statutory power and duty of the police to register an FIR and investigate distinct cognizable offences disclosed under general penal laws (IPC/BNS), even if they arise from the same or a connected transaction. [Paras 10 - 11, per Sanjay Karol, J.] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Brij Pal Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 842 : 2026 INSC 901

Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 – Sections 17, 17(4), 17A, 27, 28, 30; Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Rules, 1996 – Rule 18A(3)(iv); Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 4(2), 5, 154, 173, 190(1); Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – Sections 4, 5, 175, 225 – Interplay between Section 27 and Section 28 of PCPNDT Act – Investigation and Cognizance - Registration of an FIR and independent police investigation into offences exclusively punishable under the PCPNDT Act is legally impermissible - The mere classification of offences as cognizable, non-bailable, and non-compoundable under Section 27 does not authorize the police to investigate them or displace the specialized enforcement machinery established under the Act - The Appropriate Authority (AA) appointed under Section 17 is the sole competent authority statutorily empowered under Section 17(4) and Section 17A to investigate violations and institute criminal complaints - Rule 18A(3)(iv) of the PCPNDT Rules, 1996, which mandates that the police shall not be involved in investigating cases under the Act “as far as possible,” possesses statutory force and vests discretion in the AA to seek police involvement strictly in an ancillary, supplemental, or aiding capacity under its supervision - The police have no independent investigative authority qua PCPNDT Act offences - A competent Magistrate cannot take cognizance of an offence under the PCPNDT Act on the basis of a police report/charge-sheet submitted under Section 173 CrPC - Section 28 contains an absolute, mandatory, and prohibitory jurisdictional bar which restricts taking of cognizance exclusively to a written complaint filed by the Appropriate Authority (or its authorized officer) or by a person/social organization after giving the statutory 15 days' notice. [Paras 10 – 11, per Sanjay Karol, J.] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Brij Pal Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 842 : 2026 INSC 901

Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 – Sections 17(4), 17A, 27, 28, 30; Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques Rules, 1996 – Rule 18A(3)(iv); Indian Penal Code, 1860 / Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 – Interface between Appropriate Authority and Police in Connected Transactions – Guidelines: (Per Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, J, Concurring / Supplementary Opinion) - When offences under both the PCPNDT Act and the IPC/BNS emanate from the same connected transaction, the existence of a common factual transaction does not merge the distinct statutory routes – i. Information Disclosing Only PCPNDT Offence - Where information received at a police station discloses solely an offence under the PCPNDT Act or Rules, police cannot commence an independent investigation; they must make an appropriate station diary entry and transmit the information and material without delay to the notified Appropriate Authority – ii. Mixed Offences (PCPNDT + IPC/BNS) - Where the allegations disclose ingredients of both a PCPNDT violation and an independent cognizable offence under IPC/BNS, the police may register an FIR and investigate the IPC/BNS offence only - The PCPNDT component must simultaneously be communicated to the Appropriate Authority - Overlap of facts, premises, or records does not authorize the police to investigate the PCPNDT offence itself; iii. Discovery During Ongoing Investigation - If police unearth PCPNDT violations while lawfully investigating an IPC/BNS offence, they must promptly notify and place the relevant material before the Appropriate Authority - Police cannot use the general penal offence as a gateway to investigate the PCPNDT component - if the Appropriate Authority uncovers an independent IPC/BNS offence during its inquiry, it must promptly transfer that material to the jurisdictional police without stalling its own PCPNDT proceedings; iv. Supplemental Nature of Police Assistance - Police assistance under Section 30(1) (such as protection, tracing accused, digital or forensic support) can only be rendered upon a specific request by the Appropriate Authority - Such assistance is purely supplemental, must be recorded in the file/diary, and can neither result in an independent police investigation nor culminate in a police charge-sheet for offences under the Act; v. Pith and Substance Test - Neither agency shall assume jurisdiction merely because two offences arise out of the same factual matrix - The controlling question is whether the essential ingredients of the offence fall within the agency's lawful field. [Paras 1–13 of Supplementary Opinion per Kotiswar Singh, J.]. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Brij Pal Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 842 : 2026 INSC 901

Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 – Statutory Interpretation – Harmonious Construction – Special Law Overriding General Law - The PCPNDT Act is a special and socially beneficial statute that overrides general procedural provisions of the CrPC/BNSS - The rule laid down in Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P. mandating registration of an FIR upon receipt of information disclosing a cognizable offence does not confer boundless jurisdiction on the police where a special regulatory statute excludes their role - The preliminary inquiry/hurdle permits ascertaining whether the police possess jurisdiction at the threshold - Where two provisions in the same statute appear discordant such as Section 27 (cognizable nature) and Section 28 (cognizance only upon complaint) they must be harmoniously construed - The classification in Section 27 merely reflects the gravity of the offences and denies police the power to grant bail; it cannot be interpreted to supersede the leading, prohibitory, and jurisdictional command of Section 28 or reduce the specialized complaint machinery to a futility. [Relied on Jeewan Kumar Raut & Anr. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2009) 7 SCC 526; Union of India v. Ashok Kumar Sharma, (2021) 12 SCC 674; Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2265; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay, (2014) 9 SCC 772; Para 10, 11] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Brij Pal Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 842 : 2026 INSC 901

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Appellate Jurisdiction / Criminal Trial — Standard of Proof — Material Contradictions - Variance between the complainant's statements in the corruption trial and earlier depositions in collateral proceedings regarding the demanded amount, coupled with disobedience of the trap-laying instructions given by the Anti-Corruption Bureau, creates serious doubt regarding the foundational fact of demand - the conviction cannot be sustained. [Paras 10–19] Rafikmiya Ahmedmiya Malek v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 830 : 2026 INSC 890

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Section 19(1)(c) — Validity of Sanction — Authority Competent to Remove - Cognizance under Sections 7 and 13 cannot be validly taken without previous sanction from the authority competent to remove the public servant from office - For a substantively appointed Talati-cum-Mantri under the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1961, the competent authority to remove is the District Development Officer (DDO) - Sanction granted by the Deputy District Development Officer (Dy. DDO) is defective and invalid, notwithstanding that the initial ad-hoc appointment was made by the Dy. DDO. [Para 17] Rafikmiya Ahmedmiya Malek v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 830 : 2026 INSC 890

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) — Timing of Payment — Work Already Executed - Payment made after the delivery/issuance of the requested document casts serious doubt on the allegation of bribe demand - Where an income certificate was already prepared and handed over to the complainant before any money was allegedly passed to the peon, it cannot be assumed ipso facto that such payment was made pursuant to an illegal demand - The defence that the amount was handed over on the eve of a festival (Eid) was held to be probable. [Relied On State of Lokayuktha Police, Davanagere v. C.B. Nagaraj, 2025 INSC 736; Paras 16 - 18] Rafikmiya Ahmedmiya Malek v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 830 : 2026 INSC 890

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Sections 7, 13(1)(d), and 20 — Proof of Demand and Acceptance — Statutory Presumption - The statutory presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act comes into play only after the prosecution proves the foundational fact of demand beyond reasonable doubt - Mere recovery of tainted money from an accused, in the absence of proof of demand, cannot sustain a conviction - Where the initial demand by Accused No. 1 (Talati-cum-Mantri) was doubtful due to material contradictions, Accused No. 2 (Peon) made no demand, and both stood acquitted of the charge of criminal conspiracy under Section 120B IPC, mere recovery of ₹20/- from Accused No. 2 cannot resurrect the prosecution's case or attract the presumption under Section 20. [Relied On N. Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2021) 3 SCC 687; Paras 10 – 18] Rafikmiya Ahmedmiya Malek v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 830 : 2026 INSC 890

Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 – Section 12 – Removal of disqualification attaching to conviction – Effect on Public Employment – Termination/Dismissal based on conviction – Scope of non-obstante clause - Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 does not obliterate or wash away a criminal conviction, nor does it preclude the employer from taking disciplinary action or removing a public servant based on the conduct leading to conviction - Release of a convict on probation is primarily intended for reformation and rehabilitation, but does not confer a right to continue in service - The words "shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law" in Section 12 refer to statutory disqualifications under other general or special enactments and do not override constitutional provisions, including the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution - an employee cannot claim reinstatement merely because the criminal court released them on probation or directed that the conviction would not affect their service career. [Paras 17-21] Spo/Constable IRB Satpal Singh v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 845 : 2026 INSC 798

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 – Sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 22 – Quashing of Proceedings – Settlement Agreement and Mutual Consent Divorce – Relinquishment/Waiver of Monetary and Maintenance Claims – Subsequent DV Proceedings Constitute Abuse of Process – Absence of Fresh Cause of Action - Where a wife has voluntarily entered into a Settlement Agreement relinquishing all monetary claims, including maintenance allowance, followed by an affidavit reiterated before the Family Court obtaining a decree of divorce by mutual consent under Section 10A of the Divorce Act, 1869, the initiation or continuation of subsequent proceedings under the DV Act based on alleged acts predating the settlement constitutes an abuse of the process of law - Once monetary claims stand extinguished under a valid compromise, their revival through subsequent proceedings cannot be permitted, especially when no fresh cause of action has arisen post-divorce and no formal legal proceedings have been instituted to declare the settlement void or set aside the divorce decree on grounds of alleged duress or coercion - Mere bald averments of coercion or lack of maintenance consideration cannot invalidate a settlement executed voluntarily by educated parties cognizant of their rights. [Paras 8 – 15]. Reji Baby v. Subi Mary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 854 : 2026 INSC 918

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 – Settlement Agreement – Non-Signatory Major Child – Right of Major Daughter to Claim Monetary Reliefs Independent of Parents' Settlement - A settlement agreement executed solely between husband and wife does not bind a major child who is not a party to the agreement - While quashing the DV proceedings initiated against the husband on the basis of the wife's waiver, the Supreme Court clarified that the daughter (who attained majority prior to the settlement and was not a signatory) cannot be held to have waived her rights to monetary claims and remains at liberty to institute fresh proceedings seeking monetary reliefs against her father in accordance with law. [Relied on Dhananjay Rathi v. Ruchika Rathi, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 587; Gimpex Private Limited v. Manoj Goel, (2022) 11 SCC 705; Paras 14, 15] Reji Baby v. Subi Mary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 854 : 2026 INSC 918

Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987 — Application of Principles in Avtar Singh - The case of a candidate who deliberately suppresses pending criminal cases despite having knowledge falls squarely under paragraph 38.7 of Avtar Singh v. Union of India (2016) 8 SCC 471, empowering the employer to cancel candidature or terminate service - Subsequent acquittal in the criminal proceedings does not wipe out or condone the initial act of deliberate suppression (suppressio veri or suggestio falsi) committed at the time of submitting the verification form - Candidates who suppressed pending criminal proceedings cannot claim parity with candidates who were acquitted prior to filling up the verification form, nor with those reinstated pursuant to specific High Court directions or after an objective case-by-case evaluation of triviality - Distinction drawn from cases where acquittal occurred prior to filling up the attestation form (Pawan Kumar v. Union of India), or cases involving long service and civil suits for damages (SPO/Constable IRB Satpal Singh v. State of Punjab). [Relied on Avtar Singh v. Union of India & Ors., (2016) 8 SCC 471; distinguished from Pawan Kumar v. Union of India & Anr., (2023) 12 SCC 317; Paras 19–29] Bappa Barai v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 826 : 2026 INSC 882

Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987 — Rules 52 and 67 — Suppression of Criminal Antecedents — Deliberate Concealment in Attestation Form — Termination / Discharge from Service — Parity Claim - Non-disclosure and deliberate suppression of pending criminal cases at the recruitment stage warrants discharge from service - Where candidates for the post of Constable in RPF/RPSF deliberately answered "NO" in the verification/attestation form despite pending criminal cases against them, such deliberate suppression by itself assumes significance - The candidate has no unfettered right to continuity in service when the statutory mandate under Rules 52 and 67 of the RPF Rules, 1987, the Employment Notice, and the Attestation Form clearly provide for discharge/termination on grounds of false declaration or suppression of material information. [Paras 13 – 21] Bappa Barai v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 826 : 2026 INSC 882

Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990 (Chhattisgarh) — Section 5(a) & 5(b) — Inapplicability of Grounds — Subjective Satisfaction Must Rest on Objective Material – Held that invocations of Section 5(b) require reasonable grounds to believe that the person is engaged or about to engage in offences involving force or violence, or specified offences under Chapters XII, XVI, or XVII of the IPC (or Sections 506/509 IPC) - Allegations of circulating offensive social media videos affecting religion (corresponding to Chapter XV IPC) do not satisfy the statutory threshold of Section 5(b) - Even under Section 5(a), an order of externment seriously infringes upon fundamental freedoms guaranteed under Article 19(1)(d) of the Constitution and cannot be passed routinely, on mere ipse dixit, or solely because criminal cases are registered - The competent authority must arrive at a bona fide subjective satisfaction based on objective materials disclosing a discernible nexus to the apprehending mischief - An order lacking demonstrable reasons or objective material cannot pass muster. [Relied on Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, (1974) 2 SCC 121; Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v. Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 95; Deepak v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 14 SCC 707; Paras 29 - 34] Vijay Kumar Rajpoot @ Vijju v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 872 : 2026 INSC 926

Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990 (Chhattisgarh) — Section 5(a), Section 5(b), and Section 8 — Scope and Procedure for Externment — Mandatory Requirement of Prior Notice and Hearing — Absence of Review Jurisdiction — Quashing of Externment Order Passed Ex Parte Upon Reopening Closed Proceedings - The District Magistrate had initially closed externment proceedings initiated against the appellant with a warning, taking note of his acquittal in previous cases - upon registration of fresh FIRs (one under the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 and another under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 / SC/ST Act) and a report by the Superintendent of Police, the District Magistrate recalled/reopened the closed proceedings and passed an ex parte order of externment banishing the appellant for one year without issuing a fresh notice or affording an opportunity of hearing while the appellant was in judicial custody – Held under Section 8(1) of the Adhiniyam, informing the proposed externee in writing of the general nature of the material allegations against him and granting a reasonable opportunity of tendering an explanation are indispensable conditions precedent for the exercise of power under Sections 3 to 6 - An order passed in derogation of these mandatory requirements stands vitiated and is void ab initio - Under Section 8(4) read with Section 8(5), an ex parte order can lawfully be passed only when the person fails to execute a security bond for attendance or fails to appear before the District Magistrate during the inquiry - Save and except these express statutory contingencies, the statute does not authorize the District Magistrate to dispense with notice or hearing and proceed ex parte - An administrative authority has no inherent power to review, recall, or reopen its earlier order unless specifically empowered by statute - The District Magistrate possessed no jurisdiction to recall the closure order; any alleged breach of a prior warning or receipt of a fresh police report could not clothe the authority with review jurisdiction, but instead statutorily mandated following the procedure prescribed under Section 8 afresh. [Paras 18 - 25] Vijay Kumar Rajpoot @ Vijju v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 872 : 2026 INSC 926

Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — Section 3(1)(r) and Section 3(1)(s) — Expression "in any place within public view" — Essential ingredients — Offence occurring inside an enclosed room without public presence - To constitute an offence under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, the alleged intentional insult, intimidation, or caste-based abuse must occur at a place "within public view" - The requirement of "public view" depends upon whether the alleged utterance was made in circumstances where members of the public could witness or hear it - If the occurrence takes place within the four corners of a wall where members of the public are not present, it cannot be deemed to have occurred at a place within public view - The mere fact that an incident occurred inside a school premises does not automatically satisfy the statutory requirement of "within public view" when the site plan and material on record demonstrate that the occurrence was confined to an enclosed room having no window or public access, and where witness statements merely establish their presence in the school building but do not place them inside the room or indicate that they heard or witnessed any caste-based utterances - general and vague allegations of caste-based abuse without specific attribution of caste-based slurs or words to the accused do not prima facie make out offences under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) - Proceedings quashed to the extent of offences under the SC/ST Act. [Relied on Karuppudayar v. State represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lalgudi, Trichy & Others, 2025 INSC 132; Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand, (2020) 10 SCC 710; Paras 9 - 19] Ramkrishna Chauhan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 837 : 2026 INSC 895