Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) – Section 187 – Police Custody and Remand – Extent of Window for Police Custody – Absolute Outer Limit Cannot Be Imposed By Courts – The Supreme Court observed that Section 187(2) and (3) of the BNSS enlarges the window during which police custody (not exceeding 15 days in the aggregate) may be sought, allowing it to be taken in parts during the first 40 or 60 days of detention - This legislative change was specifically intended to address situations where fresh facts or discoveries emerge later in the investigation - imposing an absolute, non-extendable outer limit on custody by courts runs counter to the statutory object of the provision. [Paras 20-24] State of Andhra Pradesh v. Suda Suresh Veera Venkata Naga Raju, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 722 : 2026 INSC 744

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) - Section 187(3) - Non-supply of charge sheet to accused not a ground for default bail - When a charge sheet is filed within the prescribed statutory period, the mere non-supply of its copy to the accused does not entitle the accused to default bail under Section 187(3) of the BNSS. Held, Section 187(3) BNSS provides for default bail only where the investigating agency fails to file the charge sheet within the stipulated time. Non-supply or non-delivery of a copy of the charge sheet to the accused after it has been filed within time does not constitute a ground for granting default bail. The Court upheld the judgment of the High Court rejecting the accused's plea for default bail in a CBI case involving large-scale cyber fraud (approx. ₹3.81 crores) registered under various provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and Information Technology Act, 2000. The appeal was accordingly dismissed. Shaurya Sunil Kumar Singh v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 649 : 2026 INSC 666

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) – Section 38 – Right of Arrested Person to Meet an Advocate During Interrogation – Ongoing Presence of Counsel Not Mandated – The Supreme Court held that a plain reading of Section 38 of the BNSS guarantees the right of an accused to meet an advocate of their choice during interrogation, but it does not contemplate the continuous, ongoing physical presence of the advocate for the entirety of each interrogation session - While the court can regulate the manner and distance of the advocate's presence to prevent interference, an unqualified entitlement to continuous presence travels beyond the scope of Section 38. [Paras 22-24] State of Andhra Pradesh v. Suda Suresh Veera Venkata Naga Raju, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 722 : 2026 INSC 744

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Legislative Intent – Metamorphosis from Old Code (1898) to New Code (1973) – Abolition of Full-Fledged Magisterial Inquiry at Committal Stage – Held - Following the recommendations of the 41st Report of the Law Commission of India, full-fledged committal inquiries were recognized as a waste of time and effort that resulted in inordinate delay - Under the existing Code, the role of the committal Magistrate has been completely metamorphosed and absolutely constricted to a "narrow inspection hole" - The evidence can only be taken after the framing of the charge, which is the exclusive domain of the Court of Session under Section 228 after evaluating the materials under Section 227 - Requiring witnesses to depose about the same set of facts twice (at the pre-committal stage and during the trial) is neither mandated by law nor serves any useful purpose. [Relied on Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 3 SCC 92; State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi (2005) 1 SCC 568; Rattiram v. State of M.P. (2012) 4 SCC 516; Paras 9-15] Neeraj Gupta v. Pardeep Kumar Bansal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 651 : 2026 INSC 660

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 154 — Multiple FIRs — Test of Sameness — Clubbing and Consolidation of FIRs — Cyber Fraud involving similar modus operandi but distinct victims and transactions - Permissibility of Second/Multiple FIRs - Registration of multiple FIRs is impermissible only if they relate to the exact same incident or form part of the "same transaction" - where a subsequent FIR relates to a distinct occurrence, an independent transaction, or a separate offence, its registration is entirely permissible - Triple-Test for 'Same Transaction' - To ascertain whether a series of acts form part of the same transaction, the Supreme Court applied the triple-test: (i) unity of purpose and design; (ii) proximity of time and place; and (iii) continuity of action - If there are several transactions and distinct offences in relation to different victims, separate trials must take place - Application to Cyber Fraud -The mere fact that a part of the defrauded amounts from different victims across multiple states (Maharashtra, Karnataka, Odisha) was transferred into a single bank account belonging to the petitioner's proprietary concern does not establish a live link or mean the incidents form part of the "same transaction" - Although the modus operandi appeared similar, the victims, the amounts involved, the transactions, and the consequences suffered were entirely distinct - the alternative relief for clubbing and composite investigation cannot be granted, especially when the investigation is at a nascent stage requiring intricate digital and forensic analysis. [Relied on T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala (2001) 6 SCC 181; Babubhai v. State of Gujarat (2010) 12 SCC 254; Anju Chaudhary v. State of U.P. (2013) 6 SCC 384; State of Rajasthan v. Surendra Singh Rathore 2025 SCC OnLine SC 358; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Khimji Bhai Jadeja 2026 SCC OnLine SC 19; Paras 14-18] Rutvij Bhagat Singh Wakhare v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 716 : 2026 INSC 740

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 164 - Section 306 – Admissibility and Evidentiary Value of Retracted Confession - Mandatory Compliance with Statutory Safeguards - Resiling Approver / Co-accused Confession - A retracted confession whose voluntariness is seriously disputed and whose authenticity is compromised by repeated recording/repudiation cannot form the primary foundation of a conviction - For a retracted confession to sustain a finding of guilt, it must receive strong, independent, and substantive corroboration in material particulars connecting the accused with the crime - Compliance with statutory warnings under Section 164(2) CrPC is an indispensable prerequisite to ensure the voluntary character of a confession. Any subsequent insertion or procedural variation indicating that warnings were not administered prior to recording diminishes the degree of assurance and invalidates its reliability - Once an approver resiles from a confession made under a grant of pardon and fails to fulfill the conditions under Section 306 CrPC, their statement can at best be treated as a confession of a co-accused under Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act - Such a confession is not substantive evidence and can only be used to lend assurance to a conclusion otherwise arrived at via independent, legally admissible evidence - Held, the conviction of Accused No. 12 (Pappu @ Salim) rested solely on successive, repeated confessional statements which he subsequently disowned in open court, denouncing his approver status. In the complete absence of independent physical, forensic, or circumstantial evidence, the conviction is unsustainable - Evidentiary superstructure cannot stand once the foundation of the confession is discredited - Conviction set aside. [Relied on Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1952) 1 SCC 275; Suresh Budharmal Kalani v. State of Maharashtra, (1998) 7 SCC 337; Paras 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 69] Abdul Hameed v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 700 : 2026 INSC 734

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 190, 465 & 482 – Wrong Section mentioned in Cognizance Order – Curable Defect – Remedial Scope of Chapter XXXV CrPC – Remand - The Magistrate took cognizance of the offence under Section 125A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (RPA), whereas the election was governed by the State legislation (Gujarat Municipalities Act) under which the penal provisions stood omitted, thereby attracting the controlling provisions of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) - The appellant argued this was a jurisdictional error vitiating the proceedings - Held: The error in taking cognizance under a wrong section is a curable defect under Section 465 CrPC, provided the Court has the competence and power to take cognizance under the correct sections - Cognizance is taken of the offence and not of the person - Chapter XXXV of the CrPC aims to prevent technical irregularities which do not go to the root of the matter or occasion a failure of justice from delaying trials at a pre-trial or inquiry stage - Filing a false affidavit in an electoral process is an offence against society at large - Order of the High Court modified; matter remanded to the Magistrate to take cognizance afresh under the appropriate provisions of the IPC and proceed in accordance with law. [Relied on Pruthvirajsinh Nodhubha Jadeja v. Jayeshkumar Chhakaddas Shah, (2019) 9 SCC 533; Pradeep S. Wodeyar v. State of Karnataka, (2021) 19 SCC 62; Paras 11- 14] Chandrikaben Kishor Dafda v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 650 : 2026 INSC 665

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 209 and Section 244 – Committal Proceedings – Requirement of Pre-Charge Evidence in Complaints Involving Offences Exclusively Triable by the Court of Session – Constricted Role of the Magistrate – Held - The High Court erred in holding that a Magistrate must record pre-charge prosecution evidence under Section 244 of the CrPC even when the offence is strictly and exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions - The scheme of the modern CrPC has consciously done away with the lengthy pre-committal inquiry and evidence gathering that existed under the old 1898 Code - The primary mandate of the Magistrate under Section 209 is merely to inspect and see whether the offence is exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions - In performing this administrative act, no evidence needs to be taken, and the Magistrate is forbidden from applying their mind to the merits of the case to determine whether an accused needs to be added or subtracted. [Paras 8 - 13] Neeraj Gupta v. Pardeep Kumar Bansal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 651 : 2026 INSC 660

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 299(1) – Purported legislative intent – Exception to Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Prevention of abuse of process - The clear intent behind Section 299(1) of the CrPC is to ensure that evidence against an accused is preserved when they have deliberately absconded from the trial - The provision cannot be given a restrictive interpretation that would defeat its very purpose or incentivize accused persons to willfully abscond for long periods to await the natural death or unavailability of material witnesses - The prosecuting agency is not required to move an application under this Section in the first trial as a matter of rule anticipating the future unavailability of a witness. [Relied on: Nirmal Singh v. State of Haryana, (2000) 4 SCC 41; CBI v. Abu Salem Ansari, (2011) 4 SCC 426; Paras 14-21] State of West Bengal v. Kader Khan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 692 : 2026 INSC 718

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 299(1) [Corresponding to Section 335 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023] – Record of evidence in absence of accused – Deposition of a deceased witness recorded in an earlier trial – Admissibility in subsequent trial against an absconding accused – Absence of a formal judicial order recording satisfaction of abscondence before recording deposition does not invalidate its admissibility - There is no statutory requirement under Section 299(1) of the CrPC mandating the formal passing of an order by the Magistrate concerned, recording that the accused is absconding and that there is no immediate prospect of arrest, before the witness deposes - What is essential is whether these two foundational facts stood established on the actual date of the deposition of the witness. [Para 14] State of West Bengal v. Kader Khan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 692 : 2026 INSC 718

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 482 vs Section 397 — Maintainability of Quashing Petition vis-à-vis Revisional Remedy — The availability of an alternative remedy of criminal revision under Section 397 of the CrPC does not operate as a threshold bar to the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC - The two provisions operate in distinct spheres - The nomenclature under which a petition is filed is wholly immaterial; to do substantive justice, the High Court can always treat and convert a petition filed under Section 482 CrPC into a revision under Section 397 CrPC, and vice versa, rather than non-suiting a party on a hyper-technical ground of maintainability. [Relied On Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2009) 2 SCC 370; Prabhu Chawla v. State of Rajasthan (2016) 16 SCC 30; Akanksha Arora v. Tanay Maben 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3688; Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (1977) 4 SCC 551; Paras 22 – 24] Standard Chartered Bank v. Enforcement Officer Ministry of Home Affairs, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 701 : 2026 INSC 727

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Sections 227 & 228 — Scope of Examination at the Stage of Charge Framing / Discharge - Held: At the stage of framing charges or considering discharge, the Court is strictly required to look only at the materials collected during the investigation that form part of the police report under Section 173(2) CrPC – Noted that the Court must proceed on the assumption that the prosecution's material is true and evaluate whether it creates a "grave suspicion" of the accused's involvement - A full-scale mini-trial, evaluation of defense materials outside the police report, or application of the standard of proof required for a final conviction is impermissible at this stage. [Paras 20, 21, 31-45] AAA v. Linda Sema, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 659 : 2026 INSC 675

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) – Appellate Jurisdiction Boundaries - Where the court of first instance only forms an opinion on 'wrong statements', the High Court, in an appeal preferred by the aggrieved party against such an order, cannot improve upon the original order by introducing fresh findings of a 'false affidavit' or 'expediency', especially when the opposite party had not challenged the first instance order - A party cannot be placed in a worse position by preferring an appeal - A direction for filing a complaint under Section 340 Cr.P.C. normally ought not to be made during the pendency of the substantive proceedings, but rather upon their conclusion - This ensures that the primary adjudication is not derailed or delayed by peripheral applications used as tools of distraction. [Relied on Iqbal Singh Marwah and another v. Meenakshi Marwah and another, (2005) INSC 129; Santokh Singh v. Izhar Hussain and another, (1973) INSC 96; James Kunjwal v. State of Uttarakhand and another, (2024) INSC 601; Para 13-17] Prabhakar Yeshwant Masram v. Sou Tula Namdeorao Jaipurkar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 703 : 2026 INSC 724

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) – Forming of Opinion on 'Expediency in the Interests of Justice' - Section 340(1) of the Cr.P.C. mandates that a Court must form a specific opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be made into the alleged offence - Prosecution is not ordered in every case or to gratify private vendetta, but in the larger interest of the administration of justice in glaring cases of deliberate falsehood - Ordering a criminal inquiry on the mere recording of a 'wrong statement' without establishing such judicial expediency renders the order bad in law. [Para 12] Prabhakar Yeshwant Masram v. Sou Tula Namdeorao Jaipurkar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 703 : 2026 INSC 724

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) – Section 340 r/w Section 195(1)(b) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 193, 199, and 200 – Scope of Inquiry – Meaning of 'Wrong Statement' vs 'False Statement' – Pre-requisites for initiating prosecution under Section 340 Cr.P.C. - Distinction Between 'Wrong Statement' and 'False Statement' -The threshold for initiating action for an offence punishable under Sections 199 and 200 of the IPC is the making of a 'false statement' and not merely a 'wrong statement' - A 'wrong statement' of fact does not automatically assume the character of a 'false statement' - A 'false statement' carries a deliberate intention to deceive or gain an undue advantage with knowledge, actual or constructive - Inadvertent typographical errors or mistakes do not qualify as deliberate falsehoods - Where the court of first instance recorded a prima facie finding that 'wrong statements' (typographical mistakes) were made, it erred in directing the filing of a complaint under Sections 193, 199, and 200 of the IPC. [Paras 11 – 15] Prabhakar Yeshwant Masram v. Sou Tula Namdeorao Jaipurkar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 703 : 2026 INSC 724

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 125(1) & Section 125(4) — Interim Maintenance — Adultery as a Defense — Adjudication of Application under Section 125(4) as an Interlocutory Stage - Section 125(4) CrPC — Pendency of Section 125(4) application per se does not bar interim maintenance — Ground of adultery raised under Section 125(4) must be decided after interim maintenance order and before final adjudication — Deferring adjudication of adultery to final disposal is unsustainable - Section 125 is oriented towards social justice, secular in character, and summary in nature to prevent vagrancy and destitution - An application for maintenance is stage one of the proceedings, wherein interim maintenance may be awarded under the second proviso to Section 125(1) - An application filed under Section 125(4) constitutes stage two, and its decision determines whether the case reaches final maintenance under Section 125(1) - If a husband files an application under Section 125(4) alleging adultery, the Court cannot defer its determination to the stage of final adjudication - Adultery, if proved, disentitles the wife to maintenance; hence, the Section 125(4) application must be decided in the interregnum after the order granting interim maintenance and before the final adjudication of the main maintenance petition - If the evidence presented along with the Section 125(4) application ex-facie/on first blush establishes adultery or if the fact is admitted, interim maintenance becomes a non-starter or will be stopped, and the main application will be dismissed - Where the evidence requires proof in accordance with law, interim maintenance will continue during the intervening period while the Court undertakes a review of the evidence to conclusively decide the Section 125(4) application. [Paras 15 - 20] Himanshu Chordia v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 748 : 2026 INSC 778

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 173(2), 173(8), 190(1)(b) & 218 – Cognizance and Consolidated/Split Trials – Primacy of the Court – Superior Officer's Intervention - The Superintendent of Police (S.P.) directed a charge sheet to be filed against only two accused who were in custody and ordered further investigation against the remaining fifteen accused despite the initial report finding offences made out against all seventeen - Held: The S.P.'s directive to split the investigation and halt the charge sheet against specific individuals was without authority - an invalid investigation does not nullify the subsequent cognizance or trial unless it results in a miscarriage of justice - The formation of an opinion on whether an accused must be placed on trial is the exclusive prerogative of the Investigating Officer, while the ultimate authority to accept a closure report, reject it, or take independent cognizance on the disclosed material rests solely with the Court. Multiple committal orders or separate final reports can be consolidated into a single trial or adjudicated via split trials at the discretion of the Court, provided no prejudice is caused to the accused. [Paras 10-19] Brajesh Kumar @ Birjesh Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 670 : 2026 INSC 695

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 374 (corresponding to Section 415 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 - BNSS) - Maintainability of Appeal — Reversal of Acquittal by Appellate Court — Conviction Recorded for First Time by Sessions Court in Appeal — Whether Second Appeal Lies to High Court - Held: An appeal under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (corresponding to Section 415 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) is not maintainable before the High Court against a judgment of conviction recorded by a Sessions Court while exercising appellate jurisdiction and reversing an order of acquittal passed by a Trial Court - Right of Appeal is a Creature of Statute - The right of appeal is neither an inherent nor a natural right, but a substantive statutory right - It can exist only where it is expressly conferred by law. Under Section 372 CrPC (Section 413 BNSS), no appeal shall lie except as provided by the Code - In the absence of an express statutory provision, no second appeal can be inferred or judicially created on considerations of equity or perceived hardship - Interpretation of Expression "on a trial held by" - The phrase "on a trial held by" under Section 374 CrPC refers strictly to the court which itself conducted the original trial proceedings commencing from the framing of charges and culminating in the judgment and sentence - A Sessions Court exercising appellate powers under Section 378 CrPC / Section 419 BNSS is exercising appellate jurisdiction, not trial jurisdiction - The doctrine that an appeal is a continuation of original proceedings does not transform an appellate court into a court conducting a trial - The decision of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Arun Sharma v. State of Himachal Pradesh, holding that an appeal lies under Section 374(2) CrPC against a first-time conviction by a Sessions Court in an appeal against acquittal, does not lay down the correct law and is hereby overruled - The only statutory remedy available to an accused convicted for the first time by an appellate court is to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Sections 397 read with 401 CrPC (Sections 438 read with 442 BNSS) - Where a conviction is recorded for the first time by an appellate court reversing an acquittal, the High Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 401(1) CrPC (Section 442(1) BNSS) is expected to adopt a more liberal approach and undertake a searching examination of the correctness, legality, and propriety of the conviction, as the accused has not had the benefit of a statutory appeal against such conviction. [Relied on National Commission for Women v. State of Delhi and Another, (2010) 12 SCC 599; Mallikarjun Kodagali v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 2 SCC 752; Parvinder Kansal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 19 SCC 496; Jamin and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 INSC 330; Paras 27–32, 34–36, 38–39, 53–57, 60–61] Vishnu Kumar Gupta v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 744 : 2026 INSC 770

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Sections 451 & 457 — Interim Custody of Vehicles — Registration Certificate vs. Actual Possession & Financial Undertaking - Interim custody under Sections 451 and 457 CrPC is not an adjudication of title, but a judicial mechanism to prevent decay and misuse of seized property - Registration Certificate (RC) is evidentiary and relevant, but cannot act as an inflexible or sole rule overriding admitted possession, ongoing operational control, and financial obligations borne by another party - The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's order granting interim custody of the subject vehicles to the respondent company instead of the appellant/ostensible owner in whose company's name the vehicles were registered -The Supreme Court observed that while the registration certificates stood in the name of the appellant's company, criminal proceedings alleging misappropriation of company funds to purchase those vehicles were pending against him - the vehicles were seized from the operational site of the respondent company, the loan EMI instalments were paid from the respondent company's accounts, and an undertaking executed by the appellant permitted the respondent company to retain and operate the vehicles. [Paras 27, 30, 32–37] Krishnan Narayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 724 : 2026 INSC 748

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Sections 451 & 457 — Nature and Scope of Judicial Discretion - The power of the Court to order interim custody under Sections 451 and 457 CrPC is a judicial function to be exercised judiciously and expeditiously based on reason and justice - The Supreme Court makes only a prima facie assessment regarding who is best entitled to interim possession and does not adjudicate civil title or ownership. [Relied on N. Madhavan v. State of Kerala, (1979) 4 SCC 1; Paras 27-30, 32-38] Krishnan Narayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 724 : 2026 INSC 748

Constitution of India — Article 21 — Right to a Speedy Trial — Quashing of Delayed Prosecution — The right to a speedy trial is an implicit fundamental right guaranteed under the fair, just, and reasonable procedure of Article 21 of the Constitution, extending to all stages of criminal proceedings including investigation, inquiry, and trial - While systemic delays must be analyzed using a balancing test, a chronicle of persistent, unexplained inaction and lack of ordinary diligence solely attributable to the prosecution violates this right - Keeping an accused in a state of "suspended animation" indefinitely, where 23 years have elapsed since the institution of the complaint and over three decades since the transaction without the trial progressing beyond the stage of service of summons is wholly incompatible with Article 21, warranting the quashing of the criminal proceedings. [Relied On Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225; P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka (2002) 4 SCC 578; Kailash Chandra Kapri v. State of Uttar Pradesh 2026 SCC OnLine SC 858; Paras 25 - 27, 29, 30 – 34] Standard Chartered Bank v. Enforcement Officer Ministry of Home Affairs, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 701 : 2026 INSC 727

Constitution of India – Article 21 – Safegards Against Custodial Torture – The investigating agency is bound by the inherent constitutional safeguards under Article 21 to ensure that the accused is not subjected to any threat, inducement, coercion, physical assault, or third-degree methods during custodial interrogation - Named investigating officials and jail authorities remain jointly and severally responsible for the safety and physical well-being of the accused. [Paras 20-25] State of Andhra Pradesh v. Suda Suresh Veera Venkata Naga Raju, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 722 : 2026 INSC 744

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 161 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 432, 433 and 433-A – Remission Policy – Applicability and Inter-se Hierarchy of Constitutional vs. Statutory Remission Policies – The State of Haryana's 'Policy Regarding Release of Life Convicts 2002' (dated 12.04.2002) is a policy framed under the constitutional powers of the Governor under Article 161 of the Constitution, identical to the 1993 Policy - A subsequent statutory policy framed by the Executive under Sections 432 and 433 of the CrPC, such as the 2008 Premature Release Policy, cannot override or dilute the benefits of a prior constitutional policy under Article 161 - A statutory policy cannot supersede the constitutional power vested in the Governor. [Paras 9-16] Parveen Kumar @ Parveen Chauhan v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 648 : 2026 INSC 667

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 21 and Article 32 – Prisons and Inmates – Incarceration of Elderly and Terminally Ill Prisoners – Right to Live with Dignity - Writ petition filed by NALSA under Article 32 raising systemic concerns over the continued confinement of convicted/undertrial prisoners of advanced age (above 70 years) and those who are terminally ill – i. Suspension of Rights Denied - The Supreme Court observed that prisons are instruments of lawful confinement but not spaces where constitutional values are suspended - The guarantees of dignity, fairness, and humane treatment continue to operate with full force even behind prison walls - Prolonged detention under conditions of severe physical suffering and inadequate medical care results in the erosion of human dignity, converting lawful punishment into cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment – ii. Locus Standi of NALSA - NALSA has the requisite locus standi to maintain public interest/social justice litigation to espouse the collective constitutional rights of vulnerable and marginalized sections under Section 4(d) of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 - iii. Federal Competence vs. Judicial Restraint - While "prisons and persons detained therein" falls exclusively under the legislative domain of States (Schedule VII, List II), the Court holds that constitutional restraint cannot equate to constitutional abdication where persistent or systemic violations of fundamental rights occur. [Relied on National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India & Ors. (2014) 5 SCC 348; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248; Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (1978) 4 SCC 494; Dr. P. Varavara Rao v. National Investigation Agency (2022 SCC OnLine SC 1004); Paras 17-38] National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 684 : 2026 INSC 713

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 32 — Writ Petition seeking quashing or alternative clubbing/consolidation of multiple FIRs registered across different States — Cyber Fraud — Maintainability of Article 32 petition for quashing criminal proceedings — Relegation to alternative statutory remedies - Maintainability & Relegation under Article 32 - While a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution to quash an FIR is maintainable, the Supreme Court reiterated that it is an extraordinary remedy to be exercised sparingly - As a matter of self-imposed discipline and orderly procedure, an aggrieved party must ordinarily first approach the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution or Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Direct invocation of Article 32 is discouraged unless the facts disclose a palpable violation of fundamental rights or other exceptional, exigent circumstances. [Relied On Arnab Ranjan Goswami v. Union of India (2020) 14 SCC 12; Vinod Dua v. Union of India (2023) 14 SCC 286; Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State of U.P. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2265; Paras 8, 9]. Rutvij Bhagat Singh Wakhare v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 716 : 2026 INSC 740

Constitution of India, 1950 - Articles 21 & 22 – Right to a Fair Trial & Effective Legal Representation - Paramount importance of substantive constitutional guarantees in criminal jurisprudence, particularly in cases involving offences that shock the collective conscience of society - The right to a fair trial encompasses a real, meaningful, and impartial opportunity to defend, which includes effective representation by a counsel of choice or competent legal aid at State expense - The constitutional obligation of the Court is to ensure real and meaningful representation rather than a mere ritualistic or illusory physical presence - Facing a complex trial carrying capital punishment without legal assistance fundamentally vitiates the criminal justice process. Abdul Hameed v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 700 : 2026 INSC 734

Constitution of India, 1950 - Denial of Fair Trial vs. Consequence of Acquittal - Denial of legal representation does not invariably operate as an automatic passport to acquittal - Courts must balance the accused's constitutional entitlement to a fair trial against the nature and gravity of the offence, its societal impact, and the overarching demands of public justice - Where a trial stands constitutionally infirmed due to the complete lack of effective legal assistance, a de-novo trial is the only legally permissible remedy to restore procedural fairness while ensuring justice is carried to its logical conclusion - Held, that the Appellant (Accused No. 9), facing charges under Section 302 IPC and explosive offences carrying the death penalty, remained effectively unrepresented throughout the recording of prosecution evidence, cross-examining 81 witnesses on his own without any amicus curiae or legal aid - Such a hasty and stage-managed trial violates the baseline principle of "judicial calm" - In view of the grave nature of the Samleti bus bomb blast (claiming 14 lives), an outright acquittal is inappropriate; hence, the conviction is set aside and a de-novo trial is ordered before a designated Special Court. [Relied on Mohd. Hussain v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2012) 9 SCC 408; Naveen v. State of M.P., (2023) 17 SCC 381; Suk Das v. UT of Arunachal Pradesh, (1986) 2 SCC 401; Paras 23- 36] Abdul Hameed v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 700 : 2026 INSC 734

Criminal Jurisprudence — Circumstantial Evidence — Role and Absence of Motive - The role of motive in a criminal trial based entirely on circumstantial evidence is limited - The absence of a motive does not ipso facto break the chain of evidence or automatically lead to the acquittal of the accused if the remaining evidence on record is sufficient to prove guilt - A complete absence of motive is merely a factor that may be weighed in favour of the accused during the judicial sifting and balancing of favourable and unfavourable circumstances. [Relied On Vaibhav v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 INSC 800; Paras 24, 25] Piyush Shyamdasani v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 699 : 2026 INSC 721

Criminal Jurisprudence – Remission – Liberal Policy Principle – If a more liberal remission policy prevails on the date of consideration of a life convict's case for premature release, or if the short-sentencing policy existing on the date of conviction offers an honest expectation of release, the convict must be given the benefit of the more liberal policy - The appellant, convicted under Section 302 IPC in 2009, is entitled to have his case considered under the beneficial 2002 Policy instead of the more stringent 2008 Policy. [Relied on State of Haryana v. Jagdish (2010) 4 SCC 216; Paras 10 - 16] Parveen Kumar @ Parveen Chauhan v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 648 : 2026 INSC 667

Criminal Jurisprudence & Appellate Powers - Circumstantial Evidence – The Panchsheel Principles - To sustain a conviction based entirely on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish a complete, coherent, and unbroken chain of clinching circumstances that unequivocally points exclusively toward the hypothesis of guilt and excludes every reasonable hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the accused - Section 386(a) CrPC – Interference with Orders of Acquittal - An appellate court possesses full powers to review and reconsider the entire evidence underlying an acquittal - it must respect the double presumption of innocence operating in favour of an acquitted accused ordinary presumption under criminal law reinforced by the judicial finding of acquittal - An acquittal cannot be disturbed unless the findings of the court below are palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous, perverse, or demonstrably unsustainable - If two reasonable views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must prevail - Held, the High Court's view in acquitting Accused Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and 10 was a highly plausible and reasonable view, as the prosecution failed to produce any direct or corroborative evidence linking them specifically to the execution or planning of the Samleti bus blast, apart from generic references in an uncognate confession - Orders of acquittal affirmed. [Relied on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116; Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415; Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat, (1996) 9 SCC 225; Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor, 1934 SCC OnLine PC 42; Paras 54-60, 71-74] Abdul Hameed v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 700 : 2026 INSC 734

Criminal Jurisprudence & Evidence Act, 1872 - Official Witnesses – Reliability of Police Testimony when Independent Witnesses Turn Hostile – The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the testimony of official/police witnesses cannot be generalized as untrustworthy or discarded merely due to their official status or the lack of independent corroboration - If the testimonies of the police officials are consistent, credible, and survive strict cross-examination, a conviction can safely be sustained even if the independent seizure witnesses turn hostile. [Relied on Rizwan Khan v. State of Chhattisgarh (2020) 9 SCC 627; Paras 12-18] Mehboob Shah v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 705 : 2026 INSC 729

Criminal Procedure — Appeal Against Acquittal vs. Appeal Against Conviction — Qualitative Differences in Appellate Review - While the appellate court possesses identical statutory powers to review and reappreciate evidence in both categories of appeals, there are qualitative differences in their execution - Appeal Against Acquittal - A higher threshold is applied for reversal because an acquittal reinforces the presumption of innocence - Under the "two-views theory," if the view favoring acquittal is a plausible one, it must not be disturbed - The presumption of innocence is displaced the moment a conviction is recorded - The prosecution's case is further reinforced when concurrent findings of conviction are rendered by both the Trial Court and the High Court, though the appellate court's power to scrutinize every aspect remains absolute. [Relied on Mallappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, 2024 INSC 104] Piyush Shyamdasani v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 699 : 2026 INSC 721

Criminal Procedure – Custodial Interrogation – Audio-Visual Safeguards and Videography During Transit – While affirming that continuous audio-visual recording and CCTV coverage during actual questioning sessions are salutary safeguards to protect both the accused and the investigating agency, the Supreme Court clarified that an inflexible mandate to continuously videograph every minute of road transit (e.g., over long distances between jail and the interrogation centre) is unworkable in practice due to logistical limitations like signal loss, battery, and security considerations - The requirement stands satisfied by recording actual interrogation sessions and discovery/recovery proceedings. [Paras 20-25] State of Andhra Pradesh v. Suda Suresh Veera Venkata Naga Raju, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 722 : 2026 INSC 744

Criminal Trial – Appreciation of Defence Evidence – Hypothesis of Innocence - Trial courts must bestow equal attention and weight to defence evidence as they do to prosecution evidence - There is no legal baseline to approach evidence led by the accused with inherent distrust or scepticism - If the defence introduces a deeply probable hypothesis of innocence that establishes reasonable doubt, the absolute benefit must inure to the accused - To travel from the realm of "may be true" to "must be true," the prosecution's journey must be strictly paved with legal, reliable, and unimpeachable evidence. [Relied on Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra, 1967 SCC OnLine SC 107; H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi, (1954) 2 SCC 934; Banwari v. State of U.P., 1962 SCC OnLine SC 98; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116; Swaran Singh v. State of Punjab, (1957) 1 SCR 953; Para 34-39] Brajesh Kumar @ Birjesh Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 670 : 2026 INSC 695

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 106 & Section 27 — Appreciation of Technical Evidence — Call Detail Records (CDRs) & Adverse Inference - Where the prosecution successfully establishes a strong incriminating nexus through Call Detail Records (CDRs) and location data proving that the accused persons were in constant communication and present around the crime scene, the burden shifts to the accused to explain these facts - The failure or refusal of the accused to offer a plausible explanation for circumstances uniquely within their exclusive personal knowledge leads to a direct adverse inference against them. Furthermore, utilizing fake SIM cards registered under third-party names to evade surveillance constitutes an additional incriminating circumstance if left unrebutted. [Paras 17- 20, 22-28] Piyush Shyamdasani v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 699 : 2026 INSC 721

Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 27 – Recovery of weapon and incriminating articles – Failure to affix lac seals at the spot – Total absence of blood at the alleged site of crime – Fatal to prosecution case – The prosecution relied on the recovery of a blood-stained grinding stone (alleged murder weapon) and clothes at the behest of Accused No. 1 - Held, the alleged articles were recovered from a public area accessible to anyone and, crucially, were not sealed at the spot - In the absence of link evidence to prove articles were kept in a sealed condition until they reached the Chemical Analyzer, the reports hold no evidentiary value as the possibility of tampering/planting cannot be ruled out - the complete absence of blood on the mattresses or pillows in the house completely contradicts the narrative that the deceased was bludgeoned to death in his bed. [Relied on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116; Tulshiram Bhanudas Kambale v. State of Maharashtra, 1999 SCC OnLine Bom 227; Salim Akhtar alias Mota v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2003) 5 SCC 499; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600; Maghavendra Pratap Singh Alias Pankaj Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2024) 12 SCC 401; Paras 27, 28, 29] State of Maharashtra v. Monika Kiran Suryawanshi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 669 : 2026 INSC 685

Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 27 – Scope and Ambit of Disclosure Statements: The statutory exception carved out under Section 27 IEA is attracted only when the information furnished by an accused distinctly relates to a relevant fact discovered which was previously unknown to the investigating agency - A mere statement expressing a willingness to identify a place or location already within the knowledge of the police, or pointing out a spot without resulting in the recovery of an incriminating fact/article having a direct nexus with the crime, does not constitute a "discovery" - Panchnama / Memorandum Not Substantive Evidence - Recitals in a panchnama or site verification memorandum do not constitute substantive evidence - The substantive evidence is the live testimony of the witness in the witness box proving the precise information furnished and the corresponding discovery - Held, the prosecution's reliance on site verification proceedings and the pointing out of Masjids/premises by Accused Nos. 1 and 10 failed to meet the threshold of Section 27, as no incriminating fact, weapon, or explosive substance linked to the Samleti blast was discovered - Generic references or travel companionship in a co-accused's confession do not substitute proof of a specific conspiracy. [Relied on Pulukuri Kotayya v. King-Emperor, 1946 SCC OnLine PC 47; Murli & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 9 SCC 41; Paras 63, 64, 65, 66] Abdul Hameed v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 700 : 2026 INSC 734

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 65B (Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023) — Electronic Records — Admissibility & Regulation of Private Investigators - Electronic Evidence & Private Investigators — Admissibility subject to Section 65B mandatory certification — Lack of legislative regulatory framework for Private Detective Agencies highlighted - Photographs, audio, or video evidence (including those procured via private investigators) are electronic records - Under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act, 1872, mandatory certification is a condition precedent to admissibility - Oral evidence cannot substitute this statutory requirement -Admissibility requires relevance to the matter in issue, identification of voice/source, and proof of accuracy by ruling out tampering or morphing - The Code of Criminal Procedure does not recognize private investigating agencies. Concerns regarding individual privacy, data protection, authenticity/morphing of evidence, and lack of regulation/grievance redressal mechanisms for private detectives were raised - The Supreme Court directed copies of the judgment to be forwarded to the Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice, and the Chairman, Law Commission of India, to consider framing appropriate rules/regulations. [Relied on Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Meghalaya, (2000) 8 SCC 323; R.M. Malkani v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 1 SCC 471; Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1; Paras 21-24] Himanshu Chordia v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 748 : 2026 INSC 778

Evidentiary Value of Coerced Witness - The testimony of a witness (PW-4) who was threatened at the point of a dagger by the accused to assist in transporting the wrapped body on a bicycle for disposal cannot be discarded as an interested witness or an accomplice - The witness stood firm in cross-examination, and his natural, limited narrative (accompanying the accused only for some distance out of fear) establishes his reliability and credibility - Where a 10-year-old minor child was left in the exclusive custody of the accused by his mother, and the child went missing for 22 days, it was naturally expected of the accused to either report the matter to the police or inform the relatives - The absolute failure of the accused to offer any justifiable or plausible explanation during his Section 313 CrPC examination constitutes a vital additional link in the chain of circumstances to establish his guilt. [Relied on Sevaka Perumal v. State of T.N., (1991) 3 SCC 471; Prithi v. State of Haryana, (2010) 8 SCC 536; Prithipal Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 1 SCC 10; Paras 14-17] Debojit Pankika Charaideo Sonari v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 691 : 2026 INSC 687

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 – Sections 15, 18(3), and 19(1) – Mandate of Section 19(1) for Children's Court upon committal – Held that the word 'may' occurring in Section 19(1) must be read as 'shall' - Passing a reasoned order under Section 19(1) by the Children's Court determining whether a child in conflict with law (CICL) needs to be tried as an adult or as a child is mandatory and not a mere procedural formality - Without such an order, the Children's Court cannot assume jurisdiction to proceed with a Sessions trial. Sagar v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 666 : 2026 INSC 692

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015; Section 2(33) and Section 2(54) — Indian Penal Code, 1860; Section 302 — Classification of Offences — Whether Murder is a "Heinous Offence" or "Serious Offence" for Juveniles - An offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC (now Section 103(1) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023) which prescribes the punishment of "death or imprisonment for life" carries life imprisonment as its minimum statutory punishment - A court convicting an accused under Section 302 IPC has no discretion to impose any lesser sentence than imprisonment for life - The disjunctive word "or" merely confers discretion to choose between death and life imprisonment based on gravity, but does not permit a sentence below life imprisonment - Section 302 IPC qualifies as a "heinous offence" under Section 2(33) of the JJ Act since its minimum punishment is seven years or more. It cannot be classified as a "serious offence" under the fourth category of offences wrapped into Section 2(54)(b) by the 2021 Amendment - The modulation of life imprisonment under Section 21 of the JJ Act (prohibiting life imprisonment without the possibility of release for juveniles) applies only at the stage of sentencing and does not alter the statutory classification of the offence for determining the forum of trial. [Relied on Babasaheb Maruti Kamble v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 13 SCC 631; Distinguished from Shilpa Mittal v. State (NCT) of Delhi, (2020) 2 SCC 787; Paras 31, 32, 33, 36, 39, 40, 41, and 85(i)] X v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 702 : 2026 INSC 728

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015; Section 101(2) vs Section 15(1) Proviso — Nature of Appellate Power — Whether the word “May” is Mandatory or Directory - The expression "may" used in Section 101(2) of the JJ Act, which states that the Sessions Court may take the assistance of experienced psychologists and medical specialists while deciding an appeal against a preliminary assessment order, is directory/permissive and not mandatory - The rule laid down in Barun Chandra Thakur—interpreting "may" as mandatory under the proviso to Section 15(1) when the Juvenile Justice Board lacks an expert member cannot be mechanically transplanted to appellate proceedings under Section 101(2) - The Sessions Court as an appellate court stands on a completely different footing; its object is to examine the legality and correctness of the Board's order based on the existing record (including any expert reports already obtained) - While the Sessions Court has the independent power and discretion to seek fresh expert assistance if the facts and circumstances necessitate it, it is not legally mandated to do so in every single appeal. [Relied On State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 5; Julius v. Lord Bishop of Oxford, (1880) 5 App Cas 214; Official Liquidator v. Dharti Dhan (P) Ltd., (1977) 2 SCC 166; Paras 46-59, and 85(ii)] X v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 702 : 2026 INSC 728

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015; Section 15 — Juvenile Justice Model Rules, 2016; Rules 8(5), 10(5), 10(9), 11(2) — Preliminary Assessment Protocol — Materials to be Considered by the Board - The sole purpose of a preliminary assessment under Section 15 is to evaluate a child above 16 years across four distinct parameters: (i) mental capacity, (ii) physical capacity, (iii) ability to understand consequences, and (iv) the circumstances of the alleged offence - The process is not an adjudication of guilt or innocence - While carrying out this assessment, the Juvenile Justice Board is not bound by the sole opinion or recommendation of the expert psychologist - The Board must apply its mind independently to the totality of the circumstances - The Social Investigation Report (SIR) and the Social Background Report (SBR) are not merely supplementary inputs; they are mandatory statutory considerations that must be evaluated alongside witness statements and expert reports - The Board cannot abdicate its judicial duty by mechanically rubber-stamping the expert's conclusion. [Relied On Pradeep Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2019 SCC OnLine Del 8251; Child in Conflict with Law v. State of Gujarat, 2023 SCC OnLine Guj 3119; Paras 64-79, 82, 84, and 85(iii)] X v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 702 : 2026 INSC 728

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Model Rules, 2016 – Rule 13 – Trial of Juvenile as an Adult without Section 19(1) determination – Effect of Non-compliance – Held: Even if a preliminary assessment under Section 15 is duly conducted by the Juvenile Justice Board, the failure of the Children's Court to independently apply its mind and pass a reasoned order under Section 19(1) strikes at the very root of the protective framework - The distinct statutory differentiation between a Sessions trial (for adults) and a summons inquiry (for children) makes this step substantive - Non-compliance vitiates the entire trial - Since the appellant has crossed 24 years of age and spent over six years in incarceration, a meaningful retrospective assessment is unfeasible; hence, the conviction and sentence are set aside - Direction to Trial Courts – Held that all Children's Courts across the country, upon receipt of records transferred under Section 18(3), must first take cognizance and immediately pass a reasoned order under Section 19(1) after due application of mind before taking any further steps in the trial. [Relied on Ajeet Gurjar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2023) 15 SCC 678; Thirumoorthy v. State rep. by the Inspector of Police, (2024) 12 SCC 307; Paras 10-15] Sagar v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 666 : 2026 INSC 692

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Section 21 (as amended by the Amendment Act of 2001) – Retrospective Applicability of Quantity-Based Sentencing - The Supreme Court held that the benefit of the quantity-based sentencing regime introduced by the 2001 Amendment Act cannot be extended to cases where the trial had already concluded and the appeal was pending as on the date the amendment came into force (02.10.2001) - Section 41 of the 2001 Amendment Act expressly restricts application to cases pending investigation or trial as of the commencement date. [Relied on Basheer v. State of Kerala (2004) 3 SCC 609; Para 18-20] Mehboob Shah v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 705 : 2026 INSC 729

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Section 50 – Applicability of Personal Search Conditions to Objects/Articles Carried - The Supreme Court reiterated that the sacrosanct right of an accused to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate under Section 50 of the NDPS Act is confined strictly to cases where the recovery is sought to be effected from the personal search of the accused - It has no application whatsoever when the contraband is recovered from an article or object being carried by the accused, such as a bag, container, suitcase, or water bottle. [Relied on State of H.P. v. Pawan Kumar (2005) 4 SCC 350; Ranjan Kumar Chadha v. State of H.P. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1262; State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh (1999) 6 SCC 172; Paras 12 - 13] Mehboob Shah v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 705 : 2026 INSC 729

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Section 52A – Drawing of Samples at the Spot of Seizure vs. Presence of Magistrate – The Supreme Court observed that under the NDPS Act (as it stood at the relevant time), drawing representative samples by the Investigating Officer at the spot of seizure rather than in the presence of a Magistrate is a procedural irregularity and not a fatal illegality - Mere non-compliance or delayed compliance with Section 52A does not automatically entitle the accused to an acquittal, provided the search and seizure were conducted in accordance with the mandatory provisions, a proper chain of custody is established, and no serious prejudice is shown to have been caused to the accused - Documents like the panchnama, seizure memo, and arrest memo prepared on the spot constitute valid primary evidence. [Relied on Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif (2024) 11 SCC 372; Bharat Aambale v. State of Chhattisgarh (2025) 8 SCC 452; Paras 14, 15, 16] Mehboob Shah v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 705 : 2026 INSC 729

Penal Code, 1860 - Section 201 read with Section 34 – Causing disappearance of evidence of offence – Accused caught red-handed transporting dead body – Accused Nos. 2 and 3 were intercepted by the police at 5:00 a.m. while riding a motorcycle carrying a bundle from which a human foot was protruding - The bundle contained the dead body of the deceased, and the motorcycle silencer plate had bloodstains matching the blood group of the deceased - Held, the physical reality of the accused transporting the deceased victim's tied body undeniably establishes that they knowingly caused the evidence of the commission of an offence to disappear with the explicit intention of screening the offenders - The conviction and sentence of rigorous imprisonment for one year sustained. [Paras 35 - 40] State of Maharashtra v. Monika Kiran Suryawanshi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 669 : 2026 INSC 685

Penal Code, 1860 — Section 294(b) — Distinction between Obscene and Abusive/Vulgar Words — Swear words or profanity do not automatically amount to obscenity – Held that Legally, obscenity is not synonymous with vulgarity, abuse, or profanity - The use of mere swear words, profanities, and vulgar expletives, however distasteful or uncivil, cannot be equated with obscenity under Section 294(b) IPC - To secure a conviction, the words must be shown to be lascivious, appeal to prurient interests, tend to deprave and corrupt impressionable minds, and cause annoyance to others - Verbal slangs used during altercations (e.g., "Motherfucker", "son of a whore") are, at best, abusive or vulgar but do not satisfy the legal test of obscenity in the absence of a sexual connotation that depraves morals or causes public annoyance. [Relied on Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra, 1964 SCC OnLine SC 52; Chandrakant Kalyandas Kakodkar v. State of Maharashtra, (1969) 2 SCC 687; Aveek Sarkar v. State of W.B., (2014) 4 SCC 257; Madhanagopal v. Lalitha, (2022) 17 SCC 818; Om Prakash Ambadkar v. State of Maharashtra, (2026) 2 SCC 622; Apoorva Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 6 SCC 18; Sivakumar v. State, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 529; Paras 11 - 17]. Mani @ Subramaniyam v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 687 : 2026 INSC 719

Penal Code, 1860 — Section 302 & 201 — Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Section 313 — Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 106 — Conviction on circumstantial evidence and testimony of a material witness upheld despite non-recovery of the dead body - Corpus Delicti in Murder Cases - Corpus delicti means that the offence has been committed and not that the dead body of the murdered person has been recovered - A person can be convicted of murdering another even if the later's body has not been recovered - If recovery of the dead body is treated as an absolute necessity to convict an accused, it would afford complete immunity to the guilty from being punished in cases where the body is destroyed or thrown into a flowing river - What is legally required to base a conviction for murder is reliable and acceptable direct or circumstantial evidence proving the factum of death. [Para 15] Debojit Pankika Charaideo Sonari v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 691 : 2026 INSC 687

Penal Code, 1860 - Section 302 read with Section 34 & Section 120B – Murder and Criminal Conspiracy – Circumstantial Evidence – Golden principles governing circumstantial evidence – Broken chain of events – The prosecution case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence to prove that the wife (Accused No. 1) along with her lover (Accused No. 2) and others conspired to murder the deceased - Held, the prosecution failed to establish a complete and unbroken chain of circumstances - There was no positive legal evidence proving a reciprocal love affair/motive, the "last seen" theory was found weak and unreliable, and the call detail records directly contradicted the prosecution's narrative - Suspicion cannot take the place of legal proof - The acquittal of the accused persons for the charges of murder and criminal conspiracy upheld. [Paras 19-39] State of Maharashtra v. Monika Kiran Suryawanshi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 669 : 2026 INSC 685

Penal Code, 1860 — Section 326 read with Section 320 (Seventhly) — Voluntarily Causing Grievous Hurt by Dangerous Weapons — Nasal bone fracture constitutes Grievous Hurt - A fracture or dislocation of a bone squarely falls under the definition of "grievous hurt" designated under Section 320 (Seventhly) IPC - When a nasal bone fracture is established through medical and corroborative oral evidence, and is proven to have been caused by an object like a billhook (a dangerous weapon), an offence under Section 326 IPC is fully made out - The contention that Section 326 IPC is not attracted because the injuries sustained were not in the form of incised wounds rejected. [Relied on Mathai v. State of Kerala, (2005) 3 SCC 260; Paras 20-22] Mani @ Subramaniyam v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 687 : 2026 INSC 719

Penal Code, 1860 — Section 34 vs. Section 141 — Common Intention vs. Unlawful Assembly — Physical Presence Not Mandatory For Section 34 IPC - The Supreme Court clarified the distinction between active participation under Section 34 IPC and physical participation under Section 141 IPC – The Supreme Court held that to invoke the provisions of an unlawful assembly under Section 141 IPC, it is necessary that five or more persons physically participate in the actual commission of the offence - Section 34 IPC requires mere active participation in furtherance of a common intention which can occur behind the scenes and does not mandate physical presence at the actual spot of execution. [Para 23-26] Piyush Shyamdasani v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 699 : 2026 INSC 721

Penal Code, 1860 — Section 506(ii) — Criminal Intimidation — Mere use of threatening words during an altercation is insufficient - To attract the offence of criminal intimidation under Section 506 IPC, the threat must be intentional and aimed at causing alarm to the person, or forcing them to do/omit any act to avoid the execution of the threat - The mere utterance of threatening words (such as "I will not rest until I hack you") during the course of a sudden altercation, without independent proof of an intention to cause actual alarm or compel action/omission, does not bring the act within the application of Section 506(ii) IPC. [Relied on Naresh Aneja v. State of U.P., (2025) 2 SCC 604; Paras 18, 19] Mani @ Subramaniyam v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 687 : 2026 INSC 719

Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 147, 148, 149 and 302 – Murder – Delay in forwarding FIR to Magistrate – Ante-timed FIR – Post-investigation document - The Supreme Court set aside the concurrent findings of conviction passed by the Trial Court and the High Court, extending the benefit of doubt to the surviving accused appellants - The prosecution failed to establish the time and manner of the occurrence beyond a reasonable doubt - Key Legal Principles Highlighted – i. Delay in Forwarding FIR to the Magistrate - Effect of Unexplained Delay - While a mere delay in transmitting the FIR to the jurisdictional Magistrate under Section 157 CrPC is not automatically fatal in isolation, it assumes immense significance when there are serious allegations of ante-timing, ante-dating, and manipulation - Cumulative Assessment - Where such delay is accompanied by other grave investigative lapses and suspicious attendant circumstances, it ceases to be a mere procedural irregularity - The delay must be assessed cumulatively to test the authenticity and spontaneity of the prosecution's narrative; ii. Investigative Lapses and Unnatural Conduct - Failure to Secure Dead Body - The dead body of the deceased remained lying abandoned at the place of occurrence throughout the intervening night despite the police station being merely miles away and the police having arrived at the spot on the night of the incident - Such inaction, alongside the total lack of interest by family members to guard the body, is entirely inconsistent with ordinary human behavior and standard police procedure - Delayed Inquest and Post-Mortem: Inquest proceedings were postponed to the next morning, and the post-mortem examination was delayed by nearly 48 hours without any plausible justification - Contradictions in Police Records: The complainant (PW-1) explicitly denied that certain relatives accompanied him to the police station - the contemporaneous General Diary entry recorded their arrival, striking at the very genesis of the prosecution case. [Relied on Pala Singh v. State of Punjab (1972) 2 SCC 640; Jafarudheen v. State of Kerala (2022) 8 SCC 440; Paras 44-64] Deo Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 680 : 2026 INSC 707

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 304B & 498A – Dowry Death and Matrimonial Cruelty – Standard of Proof – Evaluation of Exculpatory Dying Declaration and Defence Evidence - Conviction of the husband reversed - The prosecution failed to present independent witnesses from the neighborhood to substantiate the generalized and bland allegations of a continuous ₹50,000 dowry demand - the defence effectively dismantled the prosecution's narrative by producing substantial documentary proof of significant joint financial investments, medical receipts showing immediate specialized treatment provided by the husband, and call records demonstrating prompt notification to the bride's family - The exculpatory dying declaration recorded by an Executive Magistrate, combined with the absolute lack of a post-mortem or medical forensic analysis of the burn patterns, created a compelling probability of an accidental fire rather than homicide or suicide. [Paras 27-35] Brajesh Kumar @ Birjesh Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 670 : 2026 INSC 695

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 45 & 53 [Corresponding to Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) — Sections 2(17) & 4] — Sentence of Imprisonment for Remainder of Natural Life — Validity & Constitutionality - Sentence of imprisonment for the remainder of natural life without remission (special category sentence) in lieu of death penalty is valid and constitutional - Section 53 read with Section 45 IPC explicitly contemplates life imprisonment as imprisonment for the rest of the natural life of the convict (i.e., until their last breath) - The judicial substitution of death penalty with life imprisonment for the remainder of natural life without remission in select "rarest of rare" cases is well-founded and does not violate constitutional or statutory rights. [Paras 9-12] Ramasrey @ Fakkad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 736 : 2026 INSC 764

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Section 19 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 197 – Role of Sanctioning Authority - The sanctioning authority must independently apply its mind to the materials placed before it without acting under external force, coercion, or political dictate - Granting sanction upon reconsideration on identical material especially under political pressure—vitiates the sanction order and amounts to an abuse of process. [Relied on Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat, (1997) 7 SCC 622; State of H.P. v. Nishant Sareen, (2010) 14 SCC 527; Gopikant Choudhary v. State of Bihar, (2000) 9 SCC 53; State of Punjab v. Mohd. Iqbal Bhatti, (2009) 17 SCC 92; Paras 8-13] State of Rajasthan v. Dev Kant Meena, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 738 : 2026 INSC 752

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Section 19 – Grant or Refusal of Sanction – Reconsideration / Review of Order Refusing Sanction – Power of Review – Scope and Standard of Evaluation - No Express Power of Review - Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 does not contain any express provision regarding review or reconsideration of the matter by the sanctioning authority once the power to grant or refuse sanction has already been exercised – i. Review on Same Material Impermissible - A mere change of opinion per se on the exact same material is completely impermissible and cannot form the ground for reviewing an earlier order that refused to grant sanction – ii. When Review is Permissible - A review of an order refusing sanction is permissible only when fresh materials are collected by the investigating agency, which were not available at the earlier instance, provided there is a proper application of mind to such new materials – iii. External Pressure and Extraneous Dictates Vitiates Sanction - Sanction for prosecution is a statutory safeguard designed to protect innocent public servants from frivolous, vexatious, and unsubstantiated allegations - The decision-making process under Section 19 cannot be influenced by political dictates, extraneous considerations, or pressure exerted by higher authorities (such as the Chief Minister's office); iv. Standard of Evaluation by Sanctioning Authority - If the administrative/sanctioning authority itself expresses reasonable doubts and suspicions regarding the demand of bribe, the trap laid, or the recovery of money, sanction ought to be declined - Where two views are reasonably possible on the materials produced, the view exonerating the officer should be taken. [Paras 7 - 12] State of Rajasthan v. Dev Kant Meena, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 738 : 2026 INSC 752

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Sections 19(1) & 21 — Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Section 176 — Failure to Report Offence — Statutory Duty of Institutional Staff — Meaning of "Knowledge" — Discharge At Stage of Framing Charges - Held: The High Court and the Trial Court erred in discharging the alleged Headmistress on the premise that a lack of physical/medical signs of sexual assault gave her a bona fide reason to believe no offence occurred - The phrase "has knowledge that such an offence has been committed" under Section 19(1) of the POCSO Act cannot be restricted to direct sensory knowledge or eye-witnessing of the crime; it statutorily includes awareness derived from credible information - When a child victim directly reports an incident of sexual assault to an authority figure or caregiver - it constitutes "credible information" and satisfies the requirement of "knowledge" under the Act. [Paras 45 - 59] AAA v. Linda Sema, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 659 : 2026 INSC 675

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Sections 19 & 21 — Scope of Institutional Enquiry Prior to Reporting — Mandate of Prompt Reporting - Held: The POCSO Act does not contemplate or permit any parallel institutional investigation or verification exercise by school authorities to determine the veracity of a child's complaint before reporting the matter to the police - Any such independent sifting of facts or questioning with an aim to discard a complaint defeats the statutory objective. Investigation must strictly follow the reporting of the incident, not precede it, as delays or unauthorized physical verifications can cause crucial biological and circumstantial evidence to disappear. Prompt reporting is a sine qua non for the effective implementation of the Act. [Paras 45, 46-56] AAA v. Linda Sema, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 659 : 2026 INSC 675

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Sections 19 & 21(3) — Liability of Co-Accused and Minor Intermediaries — Direct vs. Indirect Information - Held: Criminal liability for the failure to report under Section 21 is confined to those individuals who received the credible information directly from the victim - Other teachers, staff members, or office-bearers who did not receive a direct complaint and acted on a cautionary approach based on the primary authority's assessment cannot be automatically prosecuted for a criminal conspiracy to suppress information or for causing disappearance of evidence under Section 201 IPC in the absence of cogent material - furthermore, by virtue of Section 21(3), minor intermediaries (such as the victim's sister, friend, or the school Head Girl), being "children" under the Act, are expressly exempted from criminal liability for non-reporting. [Paras 60, 61, 63, 64] AAA v. Linda Sema, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 659 : 2026 INSC 675