Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 / Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Supreme Court Half Yearly Digest Jan - Jun, 2026

Evidence Act (now Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam) is not strictly applicable to Consumer Forums, the Principles of Natural Justice must be followed - If a party seeks to cross-examine a witness or expert whose affidavit is on record, the Commission should evolve a procedure to permit such cross-examination—via written questions, video conferencing, or a court-appointed Commission to ensure fair play. ITC Limited v. Aashna Roy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 129 : 2026 INSC 135 : AIR 2026 SC 860

Evidence Act, 1872 — Appreciation of Evidence — Canon of Common Sense — The dictum of common sense and common wisdom serves as a vital canon for evaluating evidence and judging human conduct in criminal trials - Applying the yardstick of common sense to day-to-day affairs and natural human activities helps the court look past technical assumptions and arrive closer to the truth. [Para 7-9] Mohammad Hanif Jainum Khalifa v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 552 : 2026 INSC 565

Section 2(1)(e) - “evidence”

Evidentiary Value of Affidavits – Indian Evidence Act, 1872; Section 3 – Civil Procedure Code, 1908; Order XIX– Whether an affidavit constitutes 'evidence' – An affidavit does not fall within the definition of "evidence" under Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - It can only be treated as evidence if the Court passes a specific order for sufficient reasons under Order XIX of the CPC - In the absence of an opportunity for cross-examination, or where the circumstances surrounding the filing of such affidavits appear suspicious or self-created prior to the submission of pleadings, they cannot be relied upon to determine factual situations or invalidate a proved document - It is a settled proposition of law that mutation entries in revenue records do not confer, create, or extinguish title over immovable property. Such entries are effected purely for fiscal purposes to enable the State to realize land revenue from the person recorded therein. [Relied on Meena Pradhan and Others v. Kamla Pradhan and Another, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1198; H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma and Others, 1958 SCC OnLine SC 31; Balwant Singh and Another v. Daulat Singh (Dead) By LRs. and Others, (1997) 7 SCC 137; Rabindra Nath Mukherjee and Another v. Panchanan Banerjee (Dead) by LRs and Others, (1995) 4 SCC 459; Ram Piari v. Bhagwant and Ors., (1990) 3 SCC 364; Para 31-38] Parvathi Nairthi v. Laxmi Nairthy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 528 : 2026 INSC 521

Section 5. Facts which are occasion, cause or effect of facts in issue or relevant facts.

Circumstantial Evidence — Five Golden Principles — For a conviction based solely on circumstantial evidence, the conditions outlined in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 must be fulfilled - These include: (1) circumstances from which guilt is drawn must be fully established; (2) facts must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt; (3) circumstances must be of a conclusive nature; (4) they must exclude every possible hypothesis except guilt; and (5) the chain of evidence must be so complete as to leave no reasonable ground for the conclusion of innocence. Neelu @ Nilesh Koshti v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 179 : 2026 INSC 173 : AIR 2026 SC 1085

Circumstantial Evidence – Last Seen Together Theory – Noted that prosecution's "last seen" theory failed due to significant inconsistencies and interpolations in police records regarding the date and time of the accused's prior arrest for a different matter - noted that the child allegedly went missing while the accused may have already been in police custody - Where the investigation is "botched" and "inept," leaving the chain of circumstances incomplete and failing to eliminate other hypotheses, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt - Conviction set aside. [Relied on Dharam Deo Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2014) 5 SCC 509; Jaffar Hussain Dastagir v. State of Maharashtra (1969) 2 SCC 872; Ramkishan Mithanlal Sharma v. State of Bombay (1954) 2 SCC 516; Paras 10-20] Rohit Jangde v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 164 : 2026 INSC 162 : AIR 2026 SC 1095

Section 6 - Motive, preparation and previous or subsequent conduct

Criminal Conspiracy – Demand and Acceptance of Bribe – Individual Liability vs. Collective Culpability – The Supreme Court held that even if a charge of criminal conspiracy (Section 120B IPC) fails due to lack of evidence regarding a prior meeting of minds or demand by one of the accused, the other accused can still be independently convicted for demand and acceptance under Section 7 of the PC Act if the evidence specifically establishes their individual role - The conduct of an accused person—such as turning pale, remaining "mum," or attempting to escape/dispose of the bribe money when challenged by the Trap Laying Officer—is admissible as relevant conduct under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. Central Bureau of Investigation v. Baljeet Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 228 : 2026 INSC 221

Distinction between "Preparation" and "Attempt" – Section 376 r/w Section 511 of the IPC and Section 18 of the POCSO Act – The Supreme Court set aside an Allahabad High Court order that had downgraded a summons from "attempt to commit rape" to a lesser charge of Section 354B IPC - held that when accused persons act with pre-determined intent, execute mens rea through overt acts (such as dragging a victim toward a culvert), and are only stopped by the intervention of third parties, the stage of "preparation" has concluded and an "attempt" has commenced. In Re: Order Dated 17.03.2025 Passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 168 : 2026 INSC 165

Motive in Circumstantial Evidence — While motive is significant in cases of circumstantial evidence, it is not an absolute necessity when the chain of circumstances is otherwise complete - Failure to prove motive is not fatal to the prosecution's case if the facts clearly point to the accused's guilt - A delay of three days in lodging a missing person report is neither excessive nor unusual, as family members often conduct their own search before approaching the police; such delay does not, by itself, vitiate the prosecution's case – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on: Mulakh Raj and Others vs. Satish Kumar and Others (1992) 3 SCC 43; Paras 13-17, 20-29] Neelu @ Nilesh Koshti v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 179 : 2026 INSC 173 : AIR 2026 SC 1085

Section 8 IEA – Admissibility as Conduct – Even if a recovery is not admissible under Section 27 due to a lack of formal custody, the fact that the accused led the police to a location where incriminating items were found can be admitted as "conduct" under Section 8 - such evidence is considered "weak" and can only offer corroboration; it cannot, by itself, result in a conviction without other proven links in the chain of circumstances. Rohit Jangde v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 164 : 2026 INSC 162 : AIR 2026 SC 1095

Section 16 - Admission by party to proceeding or his agent

Evidence Act, 1872 — Admission by Parties — Substantive Evidence Substantive admissions made by a party or their witnesses substitute the root-matter of the case. When consistent and unambiguous recitals are present in a primary document text (such as a foundation deed), they cannot be lightly brushed aside or disregarded on the mere ground that the contemporaneous person lacked personal knowledge. [Paras 26, 27] A.P. State Wakf Board v. Janaki Busappa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 423 : 2026 INSC 413

No Admission of Guilt - rejected the respondent's argument that an "evasive" reply constituted an admission under the Evidence Act - A departmental charge-sheet is not a plaint, and the burden of proof lies strictly on the department unless the charge is categorically admitted; ii. Mandatory Oral Enquiry - Relying on Chamoli District Co-operative Bank Limited, Supreme Court held that under Regulation 85 of the 1975 Regulations (and Rule 84 of the 1980 Service Rules), it is mandatory to hold an oral enquiry when charges are refuted; iii. Order of Evidence - The department must lead evidence first to prove the charges before asking the delinquent for a defense. In this case, no witnesses were produced to prove the documents or the charges, rendering the enquiry "vitiated" - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the dismissal and recovery orders - The Federation was granted liberty to conduct a de novo enquiry within six months - If no such enquiry is held, the appellant is entitled to reinstatement with full benefits and arrears of salary. Jai Prakash Saini v. Managing Director U.P. Cooperative Federation Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 315 : 2026 INSC 305

Section 22. Confession caused by inducement, threat, coercion or promise, when irrelevant in criminal proceeding.

Smuggling of foreign wrist watches – Admissibility of Section 108 statements – Sentencing – Reduction of sentence to period already undergone – The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the appellants for the illegal import and handling of 777 foreign-made wrist watches and 879 straps - upheld the High Court's finding that statements recorded by Customs Officers under Section 108 are substantive pieces of evidence and are not barred by Sections 24, 30, or 34 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, provided they are voluntary. Amad Noormamad Bakali v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 190 : 2026 INSC 180

Section 23 - Confession to police officer

Confessional statements or explanation memos made before the police are prima facie self-incriminating and strictly hit by the exclusionary rule of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - In the absence of any conscious possession or recovery of contraband/cash from the person or premises of the appellant, continuing indefinite detention solely based on the seriousness of the allegations is unconscionable, particularly when juxtaposed with abysmal conviction rates under the UAPA - High Court's order denying bail set aside; Appellant directed to be released on bail. [Relied on Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713; Paras 21-53] Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v. National Investigation Agency, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 512 : 2026 INSC 503: 2026 (2) Crimes SC 298

Criminal Jurisprudence — Circumstantial Evidence — Last Seen Together Theory — Multi-Accused Case — Distance between "May be" and "Must be" — The circumstance of "last seen together" does not by itself necessarily lead to an inference of guilt without further corroborative evidence establishing connectivity to the crime - Where the evidence under Section 27 of the Evidence Act fails to link the accomplice appellants to any discovery, the prosecution is left solely with the "last seen together" circumstance - It is hazardous and unsafe to sustain a conviction for a serious offence like murder under Section 302 IPC exclusively on the basis of a singular, uncorroborated "last seen" circumstance - While the prosecution case "may be true", it falls short of the legal threshold that it "must be true" to justify a conviction. [Relied on State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600; Nagamma v. State of Karnataka, 2025 SCC OnLine; Lachhman Singh v. State, (1952) 1 SCC 362; Murli v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 9 SCC 417; Paras 43, 63 - 69] Anand Jakkappa Pujari @ Gaddadar v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 427 : 2026 INSC 417

Sections 25 & 26 IEA – Crime Scene Re-enactment – Right Against Self-Incrimination - The Supreme Court corrected the High Court's finding that compelling an accused to re-enact a crime scene per se violates the right against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) of the Constitution or constitutes an inadmissible confession under Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act - The core test is whether the exercise compels the disclosure of incriminating information from the personal knowledge of the accused, or merely requires him to mimic a visual sequence or perform physical movements - A directed re-enactment staged by the Investigating Officer to analyze physical attributes does not amount to a personal testimony - While a re-enactment is merely "created evidence" and not substantive proof of the actual crime, expert assessments derived from it—such as gait analysis—are admissible as corroborative evidence of identity. [Paras 86-90] State of Tamil Nadu v. Ponnusamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 519 : 2026 INSC 507

Elastic Time of Death - Extra-Judicial Confession - Exculpatory Statements - Where the postmortem report indicates an elastic timeframe for the time of death (e.g., '24 hours not passed during examination') and the time gap between when the deceased was last seen with the accused and the recovery of the body is large, death cannot be termed as proximate. Consequently, no conviction can be sustained solely based on the last seen together theory - An exculpatory statement made by an accused absolving himself and accusing the co-accused is, by its very nature, unreliable. It cannot be used against co-accused persons as they have no opportunity to cross-examine the maker, nor does it incriminate the maker since it lacks an element of confession. Furthermore, a statement made while being detained by a mob under pressure, undue duress, or threat of violence lacks credibility and is a weak piece of evidence. [Paras 9-11] Papan Sarkar @ Pranab v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 532 : 2026 INSC 528

Evidentiary Value of Confessional Statements – noted that the conviction was not based solely on confessions, but was supported by the discovery of incriminating material (contraband and money) documented via panchnamas - Such discoveries constitute independent and relevant evidence under Sections 6, 10, and 11 of the Evidence Act. Amad Noormamad Bakali v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 190 : 2026 INSC 180

Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 25, 26, 27 & 161 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 161 & 162 – Approver/Accomplice Evidence – Use of Previous Statement for Contradiction - The Supreme Court held that a non-confessional statement of an accused recorded by an Investigating Officer during investigation qualifies as a statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C - If the accused subsequently turns into an approver and steps into the witness box as a prosecution witness, such a statement can be put to him for the purpose of contradiction under Section 162 Cr.P.C - A confessional statement made while in police custody remains strictly barred by Section 25 of the Evidence Act and cannot be used for any purpose other than what is permissible under Section 27. State of Tamil Nadu v. Ponnusamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 519 : 2026 INSC 507

Circumstantial Evidence - Evidentiary value of co-accused confession - In cases based solely on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish an unbroken chain of circumstances that unerringly points to the guilt of the accused and excludes every possible hypothesis consistent with innocence. The confession of a co-accused is of weak evidentiary value and cannot form the sole basis of conviction in the absence of strong and independent corroboration. State of Assam v. Moinul Haque @ Monu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 410 : 2026 INSC 386

Evidence Act - Section 27 - Recovery and Identification of Articles - Delayed Recovery - The recovery of an incriminating article pursuant to a disclosure statement cannot be relied upon unless it is properly sealed and its identity is established through a reliable procedure. Mere calling of family members of the deceased to the police station for identification does not constitute a valid test identification parade. Such proceedings should ordinarily be conducted before a Magistrate after sealing the article to ensure credibility. A significant delay in recovery of the alleged incriminating article (in this case, 14 days) weakens the prosecution's case, particularly when the entire case rests on circumstantial evidence. State of Assam v. Moinul Haque @ Monu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 410 : 2026 INSC 386

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 27 — Joint / Simultaneous Disclosures — Evaluation of Admissibility and Credibility — Joint or simultaneous disclosure statements taken from multiple persons in police custody are not per se inadmissible under Section 27, but they pose inherent practical difficulties regarding credibility and their distinct nexus with the discovery - The contents of a panchanama do not constitute substantive evidence; rather, what is stated by the panch witnesses in the witness box is substantive - Where the independent panch witness fails to depose a single word regarding the exact words or statements made by the specific appellants in his presence, and where the primary discoveries (weapon, vehicle, and ornaments) were exclusively at the instance of the principal accused, the safeguards of Section 27 are completely absent - In a case entirely based on circumstantial evidence, a joint discovery of the same spot/mental fact cannot be utilized against the co-accused appellants when it is impossible to determine which statement of a particular accused relates distinctly to the fact discovered. [Paras 49 - 68] Anand Jakkappa Pujari @ Gaddadar v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 427 : 2026 INSC 417

Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 27 – Recovery of Weapons – Supre,e Court observed that the mere presence of human blood on a seized weapon is insufficient for conviction if the blood group is not determined and no definitive link is made between the weapon and the injuries sustained by the deceased - The recovery was further weakened by the fact that seizure witnesses turned hostile or admitted they did not sign the memos at the time of recovery. [Relied on Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra (1984 INSC 121; Agniraj & Ors. vs. State through Deputy Superintendent of Police, CB-CID (2025 INSC 774); Javed Shaukat Ali Qureshi vs. State of Gujarat (2023 INSC 829); State of Rajasthan vs. Smt. Kalki & Anr. (1981 INSC 94); Paras 15-30] Gautam Satnami v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 345 : 2026 INSC 325

Recoveries under Section 27, Evidence Act — Essential Ingredients - Concealment and its knowledge, revealed from the statement of the accused, are the crucial ingredients of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act - In the absence of a recorded statement showing that the concealment was effected by the accused, a mere recital in the seizure list that objects were recovered "on being shown and certified" by the accused does not qualify as a valid recovery under Section 27 - Assault: Where weapon recoveries lack clarity, are made from open spaces with free access, are not produced or confronted before the witnesses in Court, and are not shown to the medical officer to elicit an opinion on whether they could cause the injuries found on the deceased, such recoveries do not form a clinching incriminating circumstance – Motive - While the absence of motive is not imperative when the chain of circumstances is so complete as to establish only a hypothesis of guilt, its absence raises a reasonable doubt when the individual links in the chain of circumstances are weak, unproven, or not incriminating. [Paras 12 - 19] Papan Sarkar @ Pranab v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 532 : 2026 INSC 528

Section 27 IEA — Criminal Evidence — Circumstantial Evidence — Last Seen Together Theory — Extra-judicial Confession — Recovery under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act — Absence of Motive — Conviction set aside - Last Seen Together Theory — Time Gap & Proximity - What assumes significance in placing reliance on the 'last seen together' theory is the gap between the time the accused and the deceased were seen together and the occurrence of death - The proximity of the death having occurred within a short time after they were last seen together is most relevant for that fact to be taken as an incriminating circumstance - When the time gap is large, intervening circumstances can snap the link and prevent an adverse inference against the accused, even if the accused fails to explain when they parted company. [Relied on State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran and Another, (2007) 3 SCC 755; Para 7-10] Papan Sarkar @ Pranab v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 532 : 2026 INSC 528

Section 27 IEA — Discovery of Fact — Doctrine of Confirmation by Subsequent Events — Section 27 is a proviso to Sections 25 and 26 - The "fact discovered" embraces not merely the object recovered, but the place from which it is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to its existence - The actual discovery of the body from the exact location disclosed by the appellant (a well) serves as a guarantee of the truthfulness of the information supplied. Neelu @ Nilesh Koshti v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 179 : 2026 INSC 173 : AIR 2026 SC 1085

Section 27 IEA – Recovery of remnants of deceased – Requirement of "Custody" – Information leading to a discovery is admissible under Section 27 only if it comes from a person who is in the custody of the police at the time the statement is made - In the present case, the Section 27 memorandum was drawn at 10:30 AM on 13.10.2018, whereas the formal arrest of the accused occurred later that night at 22:00 hrs - As the accused was not in police custody when the statement was made, the recovery cannot be brought under the ambit of Section 27. Rohit Jangde v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 164 : 2026 INSC 162 : AIR 2026 SC 1095

Section 27 IEA [Proviso to Section 23 of BSA, 2023] – Recovery of currency notes and blood-stained shirt – Reliability - Currency Notes: A discrepancy in the amount recovered (Rs. 46,000/- vs Rs. 46,145/- counted in Court) casts a "grave cloud of doubt" on the factum of recovery - Mere recovery of money, without a clear nexus to the crime, is not an incriminating circumstance – Noted that it "highly improbable and unnatural" that an accused, who was at liberty for days, would meticulously conceal a blood-stained shirt in an iron box rather than destroying it or washing it. Pooranmal v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 227 : 2026 INSC 217

Section 27 IEA — Recovery of Weapon and Discovery of Body — Held: Recoveries made from open spaces or crime scenes already searched (like a graveyard) without a recorded disclosure statement are suspect - Since the rope was not linked to the crime through forensic evidence (no blood, skin, or hair detected), it failed as an incriminating circumstance. [Paras 17-19] Bernard Lyngdoh Phawa v. State of Meghalaya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 84 : 2026 INSC 85 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 230

Last Seen Together Theory — Proximity to Death — Held: For the "last seen together" theory to hold weight, it must be proximate to the time of death – Noted that in this case, there was no proof the deceased was with the accused immediately before death, and the identification of the accused by an auto-driver in a police station (without a Test Identification Parade) was unreliable. [Paras 13-15] Bernard Lyngdoh Phawa v. State of Meghalaya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 84 : 2026 INSC 85 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 230

Section 26 - Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant

Evidence Act, 1872; Section 32(1) - Oral Dying Declaration - Reliability and Evidentiary Value – Held - The legal position with regard to dying declarations is well settled by a catena of decisions - A truthful and voluntary dying declaration, if found to be reliable, can by itself form the sole basis of conviction without the necessity of corroboration - Simply because the deceased subsequently became unconscious by the time he reached the hospital or the doctor, it cannot be presumed that he was unconscious even when the witness initially reached the spot and asked him about the incident immediately after the occurrence - the non-mentioning of the name of the assailant in the medical history papers pales into insignificance, as medical history is recorded by doctors primarily to understand how the incident occurred and what type of weapon was involved, rather than investigating who caused the injury. [Relied on P.V. Radhakrishna v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 6 SCC 44; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Sagar Yadav and Others, (1985) 1 SCC 552; Paras 13-15] Mitesh @ T.V. Vaghela v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 486 : 2026 INSC 469

Evidence Law - Dying Declaration — Mental Condition and Procedure — The Appellant's contention that the Magistrate reported the victim was not in a fit mental condition was rejected - A perusal of the Magistrate's testimony and the medical certificate confirmed the deceased was conscious and in a position to give a statement - The lack of a specific note by the Magistrate regarding "sound mind" on the document itself was immaterial since a duty doctor had separately certified her condition. [Relied on Manjunath v. State of Karnataka, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1421; Paras 9-17] Shankar v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 324 : 2026 INSC 315

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 32 (Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 — Section 26) — Dying Declaration — Admissibility and Sanctity — The conviction was primarily based on the dying declaration recorded by a Magistrate in a question-and-answer format - reiterated that a dying declaration rests on the philosophical premise that a person facing imminent death will speak only the truth - If found consistent, believable, and free from tutoring, it can form the sole basis for conviction - In this case, the medical evidence from duty doctors and the certificate of mental fitness provided by the duty doctor on the flip side of the declaration paper affirmed its sanctity. Shankar v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 324 : 2026 INSC 315

Section 32 IEA – Dying Declaration – Credibility and Corroboration – held that a dying declaration, if found to be true and voluntary, can form the sole basis for conviction without any further corroboration – Held that High Court erred in discarding a dying declaration recorded by a Tehsildar (PW-1) after obtaining a medical certificate of fitness - Discrepancies regarding the exact time of the Tehsildar's arrival at the hospital were minor and did not justify discarding a clear and consistent statement by the deceased identifying her husband as the perpetrator. State of Himachal Pradesh v. Chaman Lal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 48 : 2026 INSC 57 : 2026 1 Crimes (SC) 131 : 2026 CriLJ 823

Section 32 IEA - Dying Declaration – Conviction on the sole basis of dying declaration – Requirements and Caution - Held: While a dying declaration is a crucial piece of evidence that can form the sole basis for conviction without corroboration, it must inspire full confidence in the Court – Supreme Court must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind, and the statement was not the result of tutoring, prompting, or imagination - If the declaration is suspicious or the deceased's physical/mental capacity is in doubt, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence - In the present case, multiple inconsistencies, the presence of interested relatives during recording, and the lack of medical certification regarding the victim's fit state of mind rendered the declarations unreliable. Sanjay Kumar Sharma v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 230 : 2026 INSC 223

Section 39 - Opinions of experts

Identification of Decomposed Body — Medical Jurisprudence — Absence of DNA testing does not vitiate identification when credible and consistent testimonies of witnesses who knew the deceased personally are available - Relying on Modi's Textbook of Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, Supreme Court noted that putrefaction in water is slower than in air, especially when the body is protected by clothing - Identification based on clothing and recognizable facial features by familial and close witnesses is legally sustainable. Neelu @ Nilesh Koshti v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 179 : 2026 INSC 173 : AIR 2026 SC 1085

Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) Report – Chain of Custody – Sanctity of Samples. For an FSL report to be reliable, the prosecution must prove an unbroken chain of custody from seizure to laboratory - In this case, contradictions between the Malkhana In-charge and Carrier Constable regarding the dates the samples were sent and returned from the FSL (due to unspecified "defects") breached the chain of custody – Noted that even if blood groups match, this circumstance in isolation cannot link the accused to the crime without other cogent evidence. [Relied on Karandeep Sharma alias Razia alias Raju v. State of Uttarakhand 2025 SCC OnLine SC 773; Paras 41-44] Pooranmal v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 227 : 2026 INSC 217

Expert Evidence – Forensic Science – Gait Analysis – Admissibility and Reliability Standards - The Supreme Court noted that while gait analysis is an evolving scientific technique useful for corroborating a suspect's identity and physical attributes, its validity relies entirely on a comparison between two independently admissible and reliable pieces of visual evidence - Where the original hard disk and DVR of a CCTV system were mishandled, delayed in extraction, and ultimately corrupted or destroyed by the investigating agency, a gait analysis report prepared by a private laboratory using an unverified backup copy cannot be safely relied upon. [Paras 91-93, 95-102] State of Tamil Nadu v. Ponnusamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 519 : 2026 INSC 507

Section 54 - Proof of facts by oral evidence

Evidence and Pleadings – Oral Evidence vs. Pleadings – Supreme Court noted that a party asserting a competing claim to hereditary rights must specifically plead material particulars, such as when they entered possession and when obstruction began - The Appellants' written statement was silent on these aspects – Noted that the settled legal principle that oral evidence cannot serve as a substitute for pleadings, and a case not made out in the pleadings cannot be established through evidence alone. [Para 23] Ogeppa v. Sahebgouda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 198 : 2026 INSC 191

Section 58 - Secondary evidence

Sections 63, 64, and 65 IEA – Admissibility of Secondary Evidence – Photocopy of Power of Attorney – Primary evidence is the "best evidence" rule, and secondary evidence is an exception admissible only upon laying a factual foundation. A photocopy is a mechanical copy and constitutes secondary evidence - It cannot be admitted as evidence unless the party establishes the legal right to lead secondary evidence by proving the original's existence and providing valid reasons for its non-production under the specific exceptions of Section 65 - A photocopy is no evidence unless proved by following the prescribed procedure. [Paras 20 - 23] Tharammel Peethambaran v. T. Ushakrishnan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 128 : 2026 INSC 134 : AIR 2026 SC 938

Section 63 - Admissibility of electronic records

Section 63(4) BSA - Supreme Court upholds constitutional validity of Section 63(4) BSA mandating certificate with hash value and expert certification for admissibility of secondary electronic evidence. Pune Bar Association v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 551

Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 65-B – Call Detail Records (CDRs) – Mode of Proof and Chain of Custody - The Supreme Court upheld the rejection of Call Detail Records (CDRs) filed by a Cyber Unit Police Officer who took printouts of data sent via email by telecom service providers and certified them under Section 65-B - Because the officer was merely a recipient and not the person having lawful control over the computer systems that generated the original records, he was incompetent to prove their contents - The prosecution's failure to examine the concerned Nodal Officers of the telecom companies or to produce the routing emails created a fatal gap in the chain of custody of the electronic data. [Paras 80, 81] State of Tamil Nadu v. Ponnusamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 519 : 2026 INSC 507

Section 65-B IEA [Section 63 of BSA, 2023] – Admissibility of Electronic Evidence (Call Detail Records) – Held that the certificate required under Section 65-B(4) is a condition precedent to the admissibility of electronic records. Oral evidence cannot substitute this mandatory requirement - Since the prosecution failed to prove the Section 65-B certificate, the CDRs indicating frequent contact between the accused were rendered inadmissible. [Relied on Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer (2014) 10 SCC 473; Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal (2020) 7 SCC 1; Paras 49-52] Pooranmal v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 227 : 2026 INSC 217

Section 65-B IEA – Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 302/34 and 201 [Sections 103(1)/3(5) and 238 of BNS, 2023] – Circumstantial Evidence – Recovery of Articles – Call Detail Records (CDR) – Conviction based on circumstantial evidence – Requirements for conviction – Held that the "Panchsheel" principles governing circumstantial evidence - To sustain a conviction, the circumstances must be fully established and form a complete chain that excludes every possible hypothesis except the guilt of the accused - The mental distance between "may be guilty" and "must be guilty" is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. [Relied on harad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116; Paras 27-28] Pooranmal v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 227 : 2026 INSC 217

Section 67 - Proof of execution of document required by law to be attested

Section 68 IEA – Succession Act, 1925; Section 63 – Requirements for proving a Will – The court must evaluate whether the Will was executed by the testator and represents their final testamentary disposition - Proof does not necessitate mathematical accuracy, but must satisfy the conscience of a prudent mind - Compliance with statutory formalities under Section 63 of the Succession Act is mandatory, requiring attestation by at least two witnesses who signed in the presence of the testator - Examination of at least one alive and capable attesting witness satisfies the evidentiary requirement to prove due execution - If suspicious circumstances shroud the execution, the propounder bears a heavier initial onus to dispel them by offering cogent explanations to satisfy the judicial conscience. [Paras 27 – 29] Parvathi Nairthi v. Laxmi Nairthy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 528 : 2026 INSC 521

Section 84 - Presumption as to powers-of-attorney

Section 85 IEA – Registration Act, 1908 – Section 33 – Presumption as to Power of Attorney – The presumption of valid execution and authentication under Section 85 of the Evidence Act or Section 33 of the Registration Act applies only when the original document or legally admitted secondary evidence is produced - In the absence of an original or properly adduced secondary evidence, it is impermissible to apply these sections to conclude the extent of authority granted to an agent. [Para 23] Tharammel Peethambaran v. T. Ushakrishnan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 128 : 2026 INSC 134 : AIR 2026 SC 938

Section 94 - Evidence of terms of contracts, grants and other dispositions of property reduced to form of document

Sections 91 and 92 IEA – Order VI Rule 4 CPC – Pleading Standards – Rule Against "Clever Drafting" – A party alleging that a registered Deed is a sham must satisfy a rigorous standard of pleading by providing clear, cogent, and convincing averments with material particulars - Adopting a test akin to Order VI Rule 4 of the CPC, Supreme Court held that "clever drafting" creating an illusion of a cause of action is impermissible - Mere suspicion or nebulous averments without material particulars are insufficient to dislodge the presumption under Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. [Paras 34, 35] Hemalatha v. Tukaram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 79 : 2026 INSC 82

Sections 91 and 92 IEA – Admissibility of Oral Evidence – Where the terms of a written registered document are clear and unambiguous, extrinsic evidence to ascertain the true intention of the parties is inadmissible - While oral evidence may be admissible to show a document is a "sham," the threshold for such a claim is extremely high and must be supported by strong evidence of surrounding circumstances, not subsequent conduct - Supreme Court suggested an urgent need for the Union and State Governments to digitize land records and registered documents using secure, tamper-proof technologies like Blockchain to minimize forgery and "clever drafting" that clogs the judicial system – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Prem Singh and Ors. vs. Birbal and Ors., (2006) 5 SCC 353; Rattan Singh and Ors. v. Nirmal Gill & Ors., (2021) 15 SCC 300; Gangabai w/o Rambilas Gilda (Smt.) vs. Chhabubai w/o Pukharajji Gandhi (Smt.), (1982) 1 SCC 4; Paras 35, 41-47, 76, 77] Hemalatha v. Tukaram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 79 : 2026 INSC 82

Section 95 - Exclusion of evidence of oral agreement.

Sections 92 and 94 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Supreme Court emphasized that when the language of a contract is plain and applies accurately to existing facts, evidence cannot be given to show it was not meant to apply to such facts - under Section 92, factual context and correspondences between parties can be used to make ambiguous terms certain. [Paras 21-22] WB State Electricity Distribution v. Adhunik Power & Natural Resource, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 213 : 2026 INSC 202 : AIR 2026 SC 1340

Section 104 - Burden of proof

Civil Suit for Declaration of Title and Possession — Burden of Proof — Management vs. Ownership — Shifts of Burden — In a suit for declaration of title and restoration of possession, the burden of proof lies squarely upon the plaintiff to establish a clear and cogent title to the suit property on the strength of their own case, and not on the weakness of the defense - The mere fact that a society exercises certain supervisory or managerial functions over a temple, participates in the appointment of pujaris (priests/caretakers), or maintains periodic control over temple articles does not ipso facto confer proprietary title or ownership of immovable property upon it - The distinction between the management of a religious institution and the ownership of its properties is well-recognized in law, and the two cannot be conflated - Even if the defendant fails to conclusively establish their claim of independent title or hereditary succession, such an infirmity does not enure to the benefit of the plaintiff - The plaintiff must independently discharge the burden under Sections 101, 102, and 110 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 by producing legally admissible documents of title, deeds of dedication, or endowments evidencing ownership - Courts below cannot misdirect themselves in law by shifting the focus from the requirement of proof of title onto the weaknesses of the defense. [Relied on Union of India v. Vasavi Co-op. Housing Society Ltd., (2014) 2 SCC 269; Paras 12 - 19] Kishan Chand v. Gautam Gaur Hitkarak Sabha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 463 : 2026 INSC 448

Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 101 & 102 – Burden of Proof – Allegation of fraud and misuse of fiduciary position – Power of Attorney – Held, the burden of establishing that transactions executed under registered General Powers of Attorney (GPAs) were not genuine sale transactions, but merely security arrangements for loans, rests upon the plaintiff/appellant - Mere allegations of fraud or misuse of fiduciary position are not sufficient unless supported by reliable and cogent evidence - Before the burden can shift onto the beneficiaries/respondents to establish their bona fides, the plaintiff is required to first establish foundational facts constituting fraud or fiduciary misuse - In the absence of documentary material substantiating the alleged loan transactions or repayment/discharge, the initial burden continues to remain upon the plaintiff. [Paras 45, 46] Mallika v. R. Nallathambi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 534 : 2026 INSC 529

Evidence Act, 1872 — Sections 101, 102 — Burden of Proof — Declaratory Relief and Permanent Injunction In a suit seeking a permanent injunction, the burden of proof lies solely upon the plaintiff who asserts the facts. The plaintiff must succeed entirely on the strength of their own case and cannot receive any strength from the weakness or deficiency of the defendant's case. A court cannot shift the onus of proof until the plaintiff has first discharged their legal obligation to establish a clear and sustainable claim. [Paras 32, 33, 34] A.P. State Wakf Board v. Janaki Busappa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 423 : 2026 INSC 413

Section 106. Burden of proof as to particular fact

Evidence Act, 1872 – Sections 103 and 114(g) – Adverse Inference – Non-production of Best Evidence – Where a party in possession of the "best evidence" (in this case, an unregistered sale deed) withholds it from the Court, an adverse inference must be drawn against them - Supreme Court has no responsibility to compel the party to produce such documents. [Relied on Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489; Gurnam Singh v. Surjit Singh, (1975) 4 SCC 404; Ajay Kumar D. Amin v. Air France, (2016) 12 SCC 566; Paras 13-19] Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 372 : 2026 INSC 350

Section 109. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 106 — Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge — Matrimonial Home Death — Circumstantial Evidence — Appeal against the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and High Court convicting the appellant-husband under Sections 302 and 201 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, for the murder of his wife - The deceased died an unnatural death inside her matrimonial home - The prosecution's case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence - The medical reports and autopsy indicated the cause of death as "asphyxia due to strangulation" based on a fractured hyoid bone and trachea, a fresh bruise mark on the cheek, and multiple ligature marks - A critical circumstance relied upon was that the deceased's left earring, right leg anklet, and toe rings were missing—articles unlikely to be displaced in a case of suicide by hanging - The appellant set up a defense of suicide based on a recovered chit (suicide note) - handwriting experts and evidence established that the chit was forcibly written by the accused prior to the strangulation - The appellant also failed to explain why, after being told by the first doctor that the victim was dead, he rushed her to another private clinic instead of a civil hospital – Held that the death occurred under suspicious circumstances inside the matrimonial home where the appellant-husband resided with the deceased - This fact was within the special knowledge of the appellant under Section 106 of the Evidence Act - The appellant utterly failed to provide any justifiable or plausible explanation to discharge this statutory burden - When a case rests on circumstantial evidence, the failure of the accused to offer a reasonable explanation under Section 106 provides an additional link to the chain of circumstances established by the prosecution - The prosecution successfully established a complete, unbroken chain of circumstances pointing unerringly to the guilt of the appellant - No interference is warranted under Article 136 of the Constitution of India against concurrent findings of fact. Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116; Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar, (2021) 10 SCC 725; Mulakh Raj and Others v. Satish Kumar and Others, (1992) 3 SCC 43; Paras 16, 19 - 26] Chetan Dashrath Gade v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 526 : 2026 INSC 522

Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 106 & Section 114 – Burden of Proof & Special Knowledge in Interpersonal Relationships – Applicability of Section 106 to private moments within a romantic relationship – Held: The "especial knowledge" contemplated under Section 106 is not confined strictly to physical spaces (like a domestic house) - It extends to intimate interpersonal relationships where only the accused and the victim are privy to conversations and transactions - Once the foundational fact of a long-term physical relationship is established by the prosecution, the court can draw reasonable inferences under Section 114 regarding human conduct - The burden then shifts to the accused to provide an explanation or an alternate version of facts within his special knowledge - A generalized, studied silence or a stock reply of "false evidence" during Section 313 CrPC examination fails to discharge this burden or create reasonable doubt against an otherwise unimpeached, credible testimony of the prosecutrix. [Relied on Anees v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 15 SCC 48 and Shivaji Chintappa Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 5 SCC 626; Paras 62, 63, 66, 68, & 81] Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 531 : 2026 INSC 525

Section 116 - Birth during marriage, conclusive proof of legitimacy.

Section 116 BSA / Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 112 – Paternity – Presumption of Legitimacy vs. Scientific Proof – DNA Test Report Already on Record and Finalized – Effect of – Held - The statutory presumption of conclusive proof of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Evidence Act must yield to scientific proof where an accurate DNA test report is already available on record and has attained finality - While courts must generally exercise extreme caution and hesitation before ordering DNA tests to protect a child from the stigma of illegitimacy, the position changes when the test has already been conducted with the consent of the mother and remains undisputed - In such cases, the scientific fact overrides the legal presumption, and the alleged father cannot be held liable to pay maintenance to a child proven not to be his biological offspring - Held that when a conflict arises between a conclusive proof envisaged under law and a proof based on scientific advancement accepted by the world community to be correct, the latter must prevail over the former - This squarely covers cases where the DNA test report is already on record and contradicts the statutory presumption - Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, clarifying that since the DNA test had already been completed with the mother's consent and its findings were never disputed, the scientific truth must override the legal presumption under Section 112 of the Evidence Act - Expressing concern for the minor child's future, the Court additionally directed the Secretary of Women and Child Development, GNCTD, to monitor and ensure the child's well-being regarding education, healthcare, and nutrition - appeal dismissed. [Relied On: Nandlal Wasudeo Badwaik v. Lata Nandlal Badwaik, (2014) 2 SCC 576; Paras 7-10] Nikhat Parveen @ Khusboo Khatoon v. Rafique @ Shillu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 406 : 2026 INSC 399

Section 118 - Presumption as to dowry death

Section 118 [Erstwhile Section 113(B) of the Evidence Act] — Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Sections 3 and 4 — Serious Crimes Against Women — Principles governing grant/cancellation of bail - Egregious Error by High Court - The Supreme Court set aside an order of the Allahabad High Court granting bail to a husband accused of murdering his wife for dowry, holding that the High Court committed an egregious error in exercising its discretion in favor of the accused given the serious nature of the crime – i. Presumption as to Dowry Death - The High Court erred by completely ignoring the statutory presumption under Section 118 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) - In cases where a woman dies under suspicious circumstances in her matrimonial home within seven years of marriage and faced continuous dowry harassment soon before death, the Court is mandated to presume that such person caused the dowry death; ii. Misreading of Facts & Evidentiary Value of FIR - The High Court's reliance on an alleged "delay in lodging the FIR" as a primary ground for bail was baseless and factually incorrect - The deceased died on 11.07.2024, and the FIR was promptly lodged the next day on 12.07.2024 - Even if a minor delay exists, it cannot independently justify releasing an accused on bail in a serious offense like dowry death; iii. Duty of Bail Courts: A bail court at any level must remain highly cautious to ensure its orders do not convey a message to society that courts take serious crimes against women lightly. [Relied on In Re: Enforcement and Implementation of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 [2005] INSC 295; Paras 16-31] Mahesh Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 452 : 2026 INSC 440

Section 118 BSA — Parameters for Granting Bail in Serious Offenses — The Supreme Court emphasized that while considering a bail application in cases of dowry death, the High Court must consider: (i) the nature of the crime; (ii) the prescribed punishment; (iii) the relationship between the parties; (iv) the place of incident; (v) the postmortem report; and (vi) the statutory presumption of commission of offense – Held that under Section 118 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, if a woman is subjected to cruelty or harassment for dowry soon before her death, the Court shall presume the person caused the dowry death. [Paras 15-20] Chetram Verma v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 141

Section 119 - Court may presume existence of certain facts.

Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 114(g) – Adverse Inference – Non-examination of a party – Held, where serious allegations of fraud, forgery of receipts, misuse of signed blank papers, and collusive transfers are levelled, and the party possessing special knowledge of facts fails to enter the witness box, an adverse inference may legitimately be drawn against such party. [Paras 48, 49] Mallika v. R. Nallathambi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 534 : 2026 INSC 529

Presumption of Regularity of Existing Entries – Scope of Re-verification – Enrolment in an electoral roll carries a rebuttable evidentiary presumption of validity under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, but it does not impose a blanket embargo on the ECI's power to conduct a systemic, inquisitorial re-verification exercise - A prior entry cannot be used as a shield to obstruct the Commission's constitutional mandate of systemic oversight. [Distinguished: Labu Babu Hussein v. Electoral Registration Officer, (1995) 3 SCC 100 Paras 111-125] Association For Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 549 : 2026 INSC 564

Section 142 - Examination of witnesses

Ocular Evidence vs. Unnatural Conduct – held that the testimony of related witnesses (brother, son, and nephews of the deceased) could not be discarded merely because they failed to intervene or take the victim to the hospital after the shooting - Such "unnatural behavior" does not invalidate their evidence when consistent with other facts, such as the established political rivalry and the forensic evidence of multiple gunshot wounds. [Paras 11 - 15] Dablu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 238 : 2026 INSC 224 : AIR 2026 SC 1319

Evidence Act, 1872 — Witness Testimony — Credibility of Injured Eyewitness vs. Related/Chance Witness - Appreciation of Evidence — Injured Witness Credibility - The credibility of an injured eyewitness is a tad higher than an ordinary eyewitness who has merely seen the incident, as the very fact that the witness suffered an injury in the same transaction adds to its trustworthiness - when the prosecution projects certain individuals as 'injured eyewitnesses' but fails to produce any medical corroboration (such as a wound certificate or hospital intimation) to prove the injuries allegedly sustained during the transaction, their greater credibility is completely lost - Such an unproved assertion reduces them below the status of a chance witness and casts serious doubt on their very presence at the place of occurrence - while related witnesses cannot always be labeled as interested witnesses, their natural presence together on a public road cannot be presumed without explicit, credible evidence. [Paras 13 - 17] Sadek Ali @ Md. Sadek Ali v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 435 : 2026 INSC 421

Section 148 - Cross examination as to previous statements in writing.

Section 145 of Evidence Act – Impeaching Credibility vs. Omissions in FIR – Defense merely cross-examined the prosecutrix by suggesting that the details of the videography threat were not mentioned in her initial complaint/FIR – Held: The FIR is primarily meant to set the criminal investigation into motion and is not an encyclopedia of all relevant facts - An omission in the FIR is not fatal unless it goes to the root of the case - To properly contradict and discredit a witness under the proviso to Section 162 CrPC, the defense must draw the witness's attention to significant omissions or contradictions in their previous statements recorded by the police under Section 161 CrPC during investigation - Suggestions of oral denial and reference only to the FIR do not invoke the statutory mechanism required to shake the veracity of the deposition. [Relied on Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1959 SC 1012 and Balu Sudam Khalde v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 13 SCC 365; Paras 74, 76, & 77, 90-100] Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 531 : 2026 INSC 525

Section 157 - Question by party to his own witness.

Witness Testimony – Hostile Witnesses – The testimony of "hostile" independent witnesses cannot be discarded in toto - Supreme Court must consider parts of the testimony that are creditworthy and corroborated by other evidence, such as the Trap Laying Officer's account and the recovery of marked currency. [Relied on Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731; Prakash Chand v. State (Delhi Administration), (1979) 3 SCC 90; State of Bihar v. Basawan Singh, AIR 1958 SC 500; Himachal Pradesh Administration v. Shri Om Prakash, (1972) 1 SCC 249; Paras 15-30] Central Bureau of Investigation v. Baljeet Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 228 : 2026 INSC 221

Criminal Evidence – Testimony of Hostile Witness – Evidentiary Value for Acquittal – The Supreme Court ruled that just as the dependable part of a hostile witness's testimony can be used to convict an accused if corroborated by reliable evidence, the reverse is also true - The testimony or statement in the deposition of a hostile witness can be properly employed to discredit the prosecution's case and support a conclusion of acquittal, especially when it inspires credibility and aligns with other evidence on record to cast serious doubt on the occurrence of the incident - Held: The evidence of a hostile witness does not get completely washed off the record - If such evidence discredits the very fulcrum and genesis of the prosecution's story (such as the holding of a village panchayat or the presence of eyewitnesses), and is supported by unexplained medical discrepancies and a failure to examine independent public witnesses at a busy crime scene, the benefit of the doubt must go to the accused - The concurrent convictions by the Trial Court and High Court were set aside, and the appellant was acquitted. [Relied on Ghulam Hassan Beigh vs. Mohammad Maqbool Magrey and Others, (2022) 12 SCC 657; Bhaskarrao and Others vs. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 6 SCC 591; Koli Lakhmanbhai Chanabhai vs. State of Gujarat, (1999) 8 SCC 624; Himanshu alias Chintu vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2011) 2 SCC 36; Paras 6-10] Talari Naresh v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 496 : 2026 INSC 486