Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 / Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Supreme Court Half Yearly Digest Jan - Jun, 2026

Section 4 - Punishments

Section 53 & Section 302 IPC — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 433-A — Modification of Life Sentence to Fixed Term — Constitutional courts (the High Courts and the Supreme Court) possess the power to modify a sentence of life imprisonment to a fixed-term sentence or to the period already undergone, provided that the period imposed is not less than 14 years of imprisonment - Such modification of a life sentence to a specific term of incarceration does not amount to an enhancement of the sentence - Held: When a sentence of life imprisonment is imposed, Section 53 read with Section 45 of the IPC conveys the meaning that it is for the rest of the natural life of the prisoner, subject to the right of claiming remission - Modifying a sentence of life imprisonment and imposing a fixed sentence is fully permissible as long as the period imposed exceeds fourteen years of imprisonment - Considering that the appellant was 21 years old at the time of the incident in 1998 and has already undergone 23 years, 6 months, and 3 days of imprisonment without remission, the Supreme Court modified the life sentence to the period already undergone and directed his immediate release. [Relied on Union of India v. V. Sriharan, (2016) 7 SCC 1; Shiva Kumar alias Shiva alias Shivamurthy v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 817; Paras 10-18] Munna Moyuddin Shaikh v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 548 : 2026 INSC 558

Section 61 - Criminal conspiracy

Section 120B IPC — Criminal Conspiracy to Commit Murder — Liability for Foreseeable Crimes - To establish criminal conspiracy under Section 120-A, a meeting of minds to execute an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means is vital - Direct evidence is rarely available, and conspiracy can be inferred from surrounding circumstances and conduct - One who enters into a conspiratorial relationship is jointly liable for every reasonably foreseeable crime committed by other members in furtherance of the common design, irrespective of whether they directly participated in or had specific knowledge of the collateral act - Where a group forcefully separates victims to steal a vehicle using deadly weapons (Gandasa), causing grievous hurt or murder is a foregone, foreseeable conclusion - The conspirator maintaining a vigil while co-participants execute the killings is justifiably liable under Section 302 read with Section 120-B IPC. [Paras 50 – 55] Gopi Chand @ Pappu v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 609 : 2026 INSC 598

Sections 120-B, 284 and 289 IPC — Quashing of Criminal Proceedings — Non-compliance with Mandatory Special Procedure — Power Exercised Without Jurisdiction is Void Ab Initio - Key Legal Propositions held – i. Cognizance Under Special Statutes: Section 55 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 explicitly mandates that no court shall take cognizance of any offence under the Act except on a statutory complaint filed by an authorized officer - A police report or chargesheet under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. (or corresponding provisions of the BNSS) cannot be treated as a statutory complaint - Cognizance taken on the basis of a police chargesheet for offences under the 1972 Act is legally impermissible and unsustainable in law; ii. Definition of Psychotropic Substance - Under Section 2(xxiii) of the NDPS Act, 1985, a substance must be specifically listed in the Schedule of the Act to qualify as a "psychotropic substance" - The conscious omission of the legislature in not including "snake venom" or "antibodies to snake venom" in the NDPS Schedule means these substances cannot be construed as psychotropic substances - the recovery of snake venom antibodies does not warrant the invocation of the NDPS Act – iii. Jurisdictional Nullity and the Ripple Effect - When an initial action or investigation by an agency is undertaken in the complete absence of authority or statutory jurisdiction, the entire subsequent proceeding suffers from a fundamental illegality and is rendered void ab initio - Procedural irregularities can be cured, but an absolute lack of jurisdiction cannot be regularized or saved – iv. Double Jeopardy / Re-litigation on IPC Offences - Ingestion of allegations pertaining to Sections 284 and 289 of the IPC that were already the subject matter of an earlier complaint where a closure report was filed noting no cognizable offence or cruelty was established cannot form the basis of a subsequent criminal proceeding by a different agency lacking jurisdiction. [Relied On: State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan, (1988) 4 SCC 655; Jeewan Kumar Raut & Anr. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2009) 7 SCC 526; Balbir Singh v. State of Haryana, (1987) 1 SCC 533 (as emphasized in Raj Kumar Karwal v. Union of India, (1990) 2 SCC 409); B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay, (2014) 9 SCC 772; Union of India v. Ashok Kumar Sharma, (2021) 12 SCC 674; Paras: 14-40] Elvish Yadav @ Siddharth v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 447 : 2026 INSC 329

Section 120B IPC – Criminal Conspiracy – Demand and Acceptance of Bribe – Individual Liability vs. Collective Culpability – The Supreme Court held that even if a charge of criminal conspiracy (Section 120B IPC) fails due to lack of evidence regarding a prior meeting of minds or demand by one of the accused, the other accused can still be independently convicted for demand and acceptance under Section 7 of the PC Act if the evidence specifically establishes their individual role - The conduct of an accused person—such as turning pale, remaining "mum," or attempting to escape/dispose of the bribe money when challenged by the Trap Laying Officer—is admissible as relevant conduct under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. Central Bureau of Investigation v. Baljeet Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 228 : 2026 INSC 221

Section 63 - Rape definition

Distinction between False Promise and Breach of Promise — held that a breach of promise (where an initially serious intention is later hindered by unforeseen circumstances) is not a "false promise" (where there is no intention to marry from the beginning) - Supreme Court expressed concern over the "disquieting tendency" of giving broken relationships the color of criminality, noting that such misuse of the justice machinery trivializes the offense of rape and burdens the judiciary – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Naim Ahamed vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 15 SCC 38; Mahesh Damu Khare vs. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 11 SCC 39; Prashant vs. State of NCT of Delhi, (2025) 5 SCC 764; Samadhan vs. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2528; Paras 19-27] Pramod Kumar Navratna v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : 2026 INSC 124 : 2026 CriLJ 1016

Section 64 - Punishment for rape

Section 376(2)(n), 377, and 506 IPC – Rape on false promise of marriage – Consent given under misconception of fact versus breach of promise – Prolonged physical relationship with full knowledge of marital status – Held: If a physical relationship is maintained for a prolonged period knowingly by the woman, it cannot be said with certainty that the relationship was purely because of the alleged promise of marriage - Unless it is shown that the physical relationship had a direct nexus with the promise of marriage, without being influenced by any other consideration, there can be no vitiation of consent under a misconception of fact - In the present case, both parties were fully aware that they were married to different spouses - The complainant uploaded her profile on a matrimonial site and established a physical relationship even before her divorce was finalized - The parties happily cohabited and travelled together for over 4 years without any complaint of force - This is a case of a relationship turning sour, rather than a promise of marriage resulting in deception - Criminal proceedings quashed. [Relied on Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra and Anr., (2024) 11 SCC 398; Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 15 SCC 385; M.C. Ravi Kumar v. D.S. Velmurugan & Ors., [2025] SCC Online SC 1498; Superintendent & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs West Bengal v. Mohan Singh and Others, (1975) 3 SCC 706; Paras 18 - 21] Shaileshbhai Govindbhai Makwana v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 459

Section 376(2)(n) IPC — Rape on false pretext of marriage — Consensual relationship vs. Misconception of fact — Quashing of FIR — The Supreme Court quashed the criminal proceedings against an advocate-accused where the complainant, also an advocate, was a married woman with a child and had pending divorce proceedings - held that since the complainant was already married and legally ineligible to enter into a second marriage under Section 5(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, any alleged promise of marriage by the accused was legally unenforceable and could not be termed a "misconception of fact" to vitiate consent. Pramod Kumar Navratna v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : 2026 INSC 124 : 2026 CriLJ 1016

Scope of Section 376(2)(n) IPC — "Repeatedly" — The provision contemplates a series of separate acts of sexual assault committed at different points in time, often under fear, pressure, or continued deceit - Held that a consensual relationship turning acrimonious does not satisfy the ingredients of this section. Pramod Kumar Navratna v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : 2026 INSC 124 : 2026 CriLJ 1016

Section 376(2)(g) IPC - Solitary Testimony of Prosecutrix — Reliability — While conviction can rest on the solitary version of a prosecutrix, it must inspire the confidence of the Court - Supreme Court found material inconsistencies in the statements of the prosecutrix regarding the location of the incident (room vs. plot) and the distance from her house, which weakened the prosecution's case - held that the defense of prior enmity (water dispute) between the parties was not properly considered by the lower courts, which had given undue weightage to the prosecutrix's emotional outbursts - In the absence of immediate reporting, supporting evidence such as a medical report becomes crucial - there was a total lack of medical or corroborative evidence to prove the act – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Vijayan vs. State of Kerala (2008) 14 SCC 763; Paras 13-18] Rajendra v. State of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : 2026 INSC 238 : AIR 2026 SC 1490

Section 376(2)(g) and Section 506 IPC — Rape — Conviction Set Aside — Appreciation of Evidence — Delayed FIR and Solitary Testimony of Prosecutrix — The Supreme Court set aside the conviction of the appellants, holding that the prosecution failed to establish the case beyond reasonable doubt - Supreme Court observed that the FIR was lodged after a significant delay of over three months without a cogent explanation - noted that the prosecutrix's version failing to disclose the incident even to her husband but allegedly disclosing it later to a stranger who was never produced as a witness was contrary to natural human conduct. Rajendra v. State of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : 2026 INSC 238 : AIR 2026 SC 1490

Section 376 IPC - SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — Sexual Offences — Appreciation of Child Witness Testimony — Appeal against acquittal — The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment of acquittal, restoring the conviction of the respondent - held that the High Court erred by prioritizing minor inconsistencies and "mathematical precision" regarding travel time over the credible, unshakeable testimony of the nine-year-old victim - Reiterated that there is no hard and fast rule for testing the competency of a child witness; it depends on the trial judge's satisfaction regarding the child's capacity to distinguish truth from falsehood - Corroboration is a rule of practical wisdom, not a legal necessity, and conviction can be based solely on a child's testimony if it inspires confidence and withstands cross-examination. [Para 7, 8, 10] State of Himachal Pradesh v. Hukum Chand @ Monu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 294 : 2026 INSC 290

Section 74 - Assault or use of criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty

Penal Code, 1860 - Section 354 and 313 – Lack of Evidentiary Support – Senior Citizens and Separate Residence - Allegations of forced miscarriage (Section 313) were dropped by the Investigating Officer due to lack of medical evidence – Allegations against the father-in-law under Section 354 (Outraging modesty) lacked substantive material and specific instances – Bald allegations not supported by material facts are fatal to the prosecution's case - Father-in-law (73) and Mother-in-law (71) are senior citizens – Sister-in-law is a professor living separately from the complainant – Held, it is neither expedient nor in the interest of justice to permit prosecution where allegations are highly improbable and implausible – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Dara Lakshmi Narayana vs. State of Telangana, (2025) 3 SCC 735; State of Punjab vs. Sarwan Singh, (1981) 3 SCC 34; State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Suppl (1) SCC 335; Paras 22- 27] Charul Shukla v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 307 : 2026 INSC 297

Section 80 - Dowry death

Section 80(2) and 85 BNS — Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023; Section 118 — Dowry Death — Grant of Bail — Sustainability of High Court Order — Supreme Court set aside the Allahabad High Court's order granting bail to the husband in a dowry death case where the marriage lasted only three months and the cause of death was asphyxia due to strangulation – Noted that the High Court failed to consider the gravity of the offense and the statutory presumption under Section 118 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (erstwhile Section 113-B of the Evidence Act). Chetram Verma v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 141

Section 82. Marrying again during lifetime of husband or wife

Sections 494 & 34 IPC – Bigamy & Common Intention – Liability of In-laws – To sustain a charge under Section 494 against relatives of the husband, the prosecution must prima facie establish an overt act, omission, or active facilitation in the performance of the second marriage ceremony - Mere inferential knowledge, passive awareness, or familial relationship with the husband does not automatically translate into a shared common intention or criminal liability under Section 494 read with Section 34 - Inherent powers exercised to quash the criminal proceedings against the father-in-law, mother-in-law, and sister-in-law as the uncontroverted allegations in the FIR and charge sheet failed to prima facie disclose specific offenses against them. [Relied on State of Haryana and Others v. Bhajan Lal and Others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; S. Nitheen and Others v. State of Kerala and Another, (2024) 8 SCC 706; Paras 21 - 28] Sivaraman Nair v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 422 : 2026 INSC 412

Section 85 - Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty

Section 498A IPC - Mere refusal by a husband to talk to his wife for 13 days does not, by itself, constitute “cruelty” within the meaning of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. Differences and occasional non-communication are natural parts of marital life and cannot be treated as wilful conduct driving the wife to suicide unless supported by cogent evidence of persistent harassment or cruelty. The Supreme Court set aside the conviction and sentence of the husband under Section 498A IPC, holding that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the alleged non-communication caused the wife's suicide. Jayesh Kanna v. Assistant Commissioner Law and Order (West), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 620 : 2026 INSC 615

Sections 498A & 34 IPC – Cruelty – Generalised and Vague Accusations Against Relatives – The tendency to implicate all family members of the husband in matrimonial disputes without specific allegations of active involvement must be restricted - General statements of presence and encouragement, unsupported by concrete evidence or specific acts of demand, threat, or physical assault on any identifiable occasion, do not satisfy the legal threshold to sustain a criminal prosecution under Section 498A against the in-laws – Noted that allowing such proceedings to continue constitutes an abuse of the judicial process. [Paras 23 - 25] Sivaraman Nair v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 422 : 2026 INSC 412

Section 498A IPC - Vague and Omnibus Allegations – Misuse of Section 498A IPC – Complainant made generalized accusations of dowry demands and harassment without material evidence or specific details of active involvement by the appellants – Held, there is a growing tendency to misuse Section 498A as a tool for personal vendetta against the husband's family – Such generalized and sweeping accusations unsupported by concrete evidence cannot form the basis for criminal prosecution and must be "nipped in the bud". Charul Shukla v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 307 : 2026 INSC 297

Sections 498A and 304B IPC - Delay in Trial – Pendency of Revision Petitions – Judicial Discipline – Rights of Victims - The Supreme Court expressed deep concern over a 23-year delay in the High Court of Rajasthan deciding a Criminal Revision Petition challenging an order of framing charges – Noted that the Revision Petition, filed in 2003 against charges under Sections 498A and 304B IPC, remained pending with an interim stay on trial proceedings until it was finally dismissed by the High Court in 2025 - that if trials for serious offences like murder, dowry death, and rape remain stayed for decades, it results in a "mockery of justice" - Justice must be balanced between the accused and the victim/family members - Noted that "Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere" - The Supreme Court requested the Chief Justices of all High Courts to ensure that petitions involving interim stays on trials, particularly in sensitive and serious matters, are prioritized and heard immediately - The Registrar General of the Rajasthan High Court was directed to provide a detailed breakup of Criminal Revision Petitions filed and disposed of between 2001 and 2026, and the State was questioned on its failure to expedite the hearing during the 23-year interregnum. [Paras 21-23, 26-30] Vijay Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 25

Section 100 - Culpable homicide

Section 299, 300 Clause (3), and 304 Part II IPC — Culpable Homicide vs. Murder — Vicarious Liability under Section 149 IPC — The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment which had toned down the conviction of 19 accused persons from Section 302/149 IPC to Section 304 Part II/149 IPC - held that when an unlawful assembly waylays a victim with premeditation, uses lathis to inflict 29 injuries (including four bone-deep head fractures), and acts out of caste-based retaliation, the intention to cause such bodily injury as is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death is clearly established. Sitaram Kuchhbedia v. Vimal Rana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 189 : 2026 INSC 178

Section 101 - Murder

Section 300 Exception 4, Section 302 and Section 304 Part II IPC — Culpable Homicide Not Amounting to Murder — Free Fight and Private Defence — The appellant was initially convicted under Section 302/149 for the death of the deceased during a group clash - The High Court altered the conviction to Section 304 Part II, holding that in a "free fight" involving two rival groups where both sides sustained injuries, a common object for an unlawful assembly cannot be easily inferred - The Supreme Court upheld this alteration, noting that the appellant acted without premeditation in the midst of a sudden commotion - While the appellant's use of a lathi on the deceased's head established "knowledge" that the injury was likely to cause death, the lack of specific intent to cause death in the context of a group fight justifies the invocation of Section 304 Part II. Shrikrishna v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 35 : 2026 INSC 45 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 242

Section 103 - Punishment for murder

Sections 302, 201 r/w. 34 IPC - Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 106 — Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge — Matrimonial Home Death — Circumstantial Evidence — Appeal against the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and High Court convicting the appellant-husband under Sections 302 and 201 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, for the murder of his wife - The deceased died an unnatural death inside her matrimonial home - The prosecution's case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence - The medical reports and autopsy indicated the cause of death as "asphyxia due to strangulation" based on a fractured hyoid bone and trachea, a fresh bruise mark on the cheek, and multiple ligature marks - A critical circumstance relied upon was that the deceased's left earring, right leg anklet, and toe rings were missing—articles unlikely to be displaced in a case of suicide by hanging - The appellant set up a defense of suicide based on a recovered chit (suicide note) - handwriting experts and evidence established that the chit was forcibly written by the accused prior to the strangulation - The appellant also failed to explain why, after being told by the first doctor that the victim was dead, he rushed her to another private clinic instead of a civil hospital – Held that the death occurred under suspicious circumstances inside the matrimonial home where the appellant-husband resided with the deceased - This fact was within the special knowledge of the appellant under Section 106 of the Evidence Act - The appellant utterly failed to provide any justifiable or plausible explanation to discharge this statutory burden - When a case rests on circumstantial evidence, the failure of the accused to offer a reasonable explanation under Section 106 provides an additional link to the chain of circumstances established by the prosecution - The prosecution successfully established a complete, unbroken chain of circumstances pointing unerringly to the guilt of the appellant - No interference is warranted under Article 136 of the Constitution of India against concurrent findings of fact. Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116; Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar, (2021) 10 SCC 725; Mulakh Raj and Others v. Satish Kumar and Others, (1992) 3 SCC 43; Paras 16, 19 - 26] Chetan Dashrath Gade v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 526 : 2026 INSC 522

Sections 302, 364, 396, 201 r/w. 120B IPC — Evidence Act, 1872; Sections 9, 27, 106, 114 — Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; Section 100(4) — Circumstantial Evidence — Last seen together theory — Recovery of dead body and articles — Reversal of conviction by High Court upheld - The case of the prosecution entirely rested on circumstantial evidence - The High Court reversed the Trial Court's conviction and acquitted the accused persons on finding the chain of circumstances incomplete – Noted the following key points - i. Recovery of Dead Body - The alleged recovery of the dead body at the instance of the accused was rightly doubted. At the time of arrest, the police had only received a missing report, yet the arrest memo pre-recorded offences under Sections 302, 394, and 201 IPC - independent witnesses were withheld, creating a serious dent in the prosecution's story - Suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of legal evidence. ii. Recovery from Accessible Places - The discovery of the vehicle (Bolero Jeep) allegedly at the instance of the accused was from an open road accessible to all and not from the exclusive possession of the accused, making it unreliable; iii. Last Seen Together - Evidence of 'last seen together' is a weak type of evidence. Conviction solely based on 'last seen' without other corroborative evidence is unsustainable - Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not shift the primary burden of proof, which always remains on the prosecution; iv. Test Identification Parade (TIP) of Articles: Recovered articles like a tape recorder and wrist watch were never subjected to a TIP under the applicable police rules. Identification of recovered articles directly in Court without a prior TIP is meaningless in the eyes of law and makes the recovery insignificant; v. Common Household Objects - Recovery of a towel without any connecting material (such as bloodstains) is wholly immaterial as it is a common household object – Held that to convict an accused on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must prove each incriminating circumstance beyond reasonable doubt, forming an unbroken chain that excludes every hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the accused. [Relied on Jaikam Khan v. State of U.P. (2021) 13 SCC 716; Manoj @ Munna v. State of Chhattisgarh (2025 INSC 1466) and Kanhaiya Lal vs. State of Rajasthan (2014) 4 SCC 715; Thammaraya & Anr. v. The State Of Karnataka (2025) 3 SCC 590; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116; Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1952) 2 SCC 71; Paras 29 – 32, 33-43] Pawan Kumar Sharma v. Manoj Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 543 : 2026 INSC 539

Penal Code, 1872; Section 302 - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 134 - Quality vs Quantity of Evidence - Conviction on Solitary Witness – Held - It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that it is the quality and not the quantity of evidence which is determinative - The Indian legal system does not insist on a plurality of witnesses. Neither the Legislature under Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872, nor the judiciary mandates that there must be a particular number of witnesses to record an order of conviction against an accused - The emphasis of Courts is always on the value, weight, and quality of evidence rather than on quantity, multiplicity, or plurality of witnesses. Even the testimony of a solitary witness, if found to be wholly reliable, free from blemish or suspicion, and of a sterling quality, is sufficient to form the sole basis of a conviction without the necessity of corroboration - a court may acquit the accused in spite of the testimony of several witnesses if it is not satisfied with the quality of evidence - the mere fact that a large number of witnesses, including panch witnesses and some of the alleged eyewitnesses, have turned hostile will not entitle the accused to the benefit of doubt if the remaining material witnesses completely establish the case of the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. [Relied on Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 14 SCC 150; Bhimappa Chandappa v. State of Karnataka, (2006) 11 SCC 32; Paras 8-16] Mitesh @ T.V. Vaghela v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 486 : 2026 INSC 469

Section 302 and Section 498A IPC — Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 106 — Murder in the privacy of a house — Custodial death of wife — Burden of proof on inmates — Homicidal vs. Suicidal Hanging — Medical Evidence — Sustained dowry harassment and torture established against the husband – Held - Where an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house, though the initial burden to establish the case rests on the prosecution, Section 106 of the Evidence Act casts a corresponding burden on the inmates to give a cogent explanation as to how the victim succumbed. If the husband does not offer any explanation regarding how his wife received fatal injuries in their shared dwelling home, or offers an explanation found to be false, it serves as a strong circumstance indicating his responsibility for the crime. Inmates cannot escape liability by simply keeping quiet on the premise that the burden lies entirely on the prosecution. [Relied on Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 10 SCC 681; Paras 20 - 31] Gour Acharjee v. State of Tripura, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 538 : 2026 INSC 535

Sections 302 and 376A IPC - Appellate Jurisdiction to Correct Conviction - The case involved the gruesome rape and murder of a school headmistress whose body was found concealed in a bag. The prosecution's case against the respondent rested primarily on the alleged recovery of a black umbrella belonging to the deceased. The Trial Court had convicted the accused under Sections 302 and 376A IPC and awarded the death sentence. The High Court acquitted him of the major offences but convicted him under Section 201 IPC. The Supreme Court found serious lapses in the investigation regarding recovery and identification of evidence and held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal filed by the State and upheld the acquittal of the accused. The Court also set aside the conviction under Section 201 IPC (causing disappearance of evidence) recorded by the High Court, even though the accused had not challenged the same. An appellate court is empowered to set aside an erroneous conviction in the interest of justice even in the absence of an appeal by the accused. State of Assam v. Moinul Haque @ Monu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 410 : 2026 INSC 386

Section 302, Section 307, and Section 149 read with Section 120B IPC — Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 134 — Testimony of a Single Witness / Injured Witness — Conviction based on a solitary eye-witness is entirely permissible if the evidence is of 'sterling quality' - The law of evidence measures testimony by its quality, not quantity - The testimony of an injured witness rests on a higher pedestal because their presence at the scene is indisputable and they have withstood cross-examination - Minor differences between ocular evidence (eyewitness stating the victim was shot in the head) and medical evidence (postmortem showing entry at the back of the skull and exit at the nose) are immaterial as both consistently confirm the fatal injury to the head. [Paras 6 - 11] Adalat Yadav v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 415 : 2026 INSC 403

Section 302 and Section 342 IPC — Conviction for Murder and Dying Declaration - Conviction Upheld — The Appellant was accused of beating his wife, pouring kerosene, and setting her on fire following a dispute over preparing food - The Supreme Court refused to interfere with the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and High Court - Held that interference in concurrent findings is restricted unless there are manifest errors in law or misappreciation of crucial evidence. Shankar v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 324 : 2026 INSC 315

Section 302 IPC – Circumstantial Evidence – Witness Testimony – Related vs. Interested Witnesses - The Supreme Court set aside the conviction of the appellant, holding that the prosecution failed to establish a complete and unbroken chain of evidence pointing solely to the guilt of the accused - noted that suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof - Supreme Court emphasized the distinction between a "related" witness and an "interested" witness - A witness is "interested" only when they derive some benefit from the result of the litigation, such as having a motive to falsely implicate the accused due to prior enmity - The testimony of an interested witness, without independent corroboration, cannot sustain a conviction. [Paras 18, 19] Gautam Satnami v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 345 : 2026 INSC 325

Sections 302, 120-B, 201, 506 r/w 34 IPC – Circumstantial Evidence – Reliability of Sole Eye-Witness – In a case primarily resting on circumstantial evidence and the testimony of a purported eye-witness, Supreme Court found the evidence insufficient to sustain conviction - Noted significant discrepancies: the eye-witness failed to report the incident for 21 days, alleged threats were not substantiated, and the witness was treated as partially hostile - medical evidence regarding the time of death (10 days prior to post-mortem) conflicted with the prosecution's timeline (21 days prior) - held that the prosecution failed to establish a complete and unbroken chain of circumstances - Required – Conspiracy cannot be presumed and requires proof of a meeting of minds, prior agreement, and concerted action - Mere suspicion, association, or the existence of civil disputes cannot substitute for proof of a criminal conspiracy – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 (8) SCC 149; Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471; Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415; Ramesh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2020 (20) SCC 522; Paras 7, 24, 25] Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 59 : 2026 INSC 67 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 121 ; 2026 CriLJ 534

Section 302 r/w Section 34 IPC – Conviction for Murder – Non-recovery of weapons of assault – Effect of – Held, recovery of the weapons of assault is not a sine qua non for convicting an accused if the evidence on record, particularly reliable ocular testimony, establishes the guilt beyond reasonable doubt - Even if the Investigating Officer fails to bring on record the weapons described by eye-witnesses, this omission cannot benefit the accused when the version of eye-witnesses is found to be consistent, reliable, and corroborated by medical evidence. [Para 7, 8] Ghanshyam Mandal v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 201 : 2026 INSC 194 : AIR 2026 SC 1445

Sections 302 and 201 IPC — Evidence Act, 1872; Section 27 — Circumstantial Evidence — Conviction Upheld — The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal against concurrent findings of conviction in a case of abduction, ransom, and murder - held that the prosecution successfully established an unbroken chain of circumstances, including the recovery of the deceased's body and her vehicle at the specific disclosure of the appellant. Neelu @ Nilesh Koshti v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 179 : 2026 INSC 173 : AIR 2026 SC 1085

Section 302 and Section 498A IPC - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 32 - Dying Declaration - Reliability of Dying Declaration in cases of high percentage of burns - Conviction Upheld – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's reversal of an acquittal, affirming the conviction of the appellant for murdering his wife by pouring kerosene and setting her on fire - held that even with 80-90% burn injuries, a dying declaration is reliable if the attending doctors certify the patient was in a fit and conscious state to make a statement - The evidence of the victim's daughter (PW-3), who was an eyewitness to the appellant fetching kerosene and setting the deceased on fire, was found to be "clinchingly" credible - Supreme Court dismissed the defense's argument regarding inconsistencies in witness testimonies (PW-7 and PW-16), noting that the professional medical opinion of the treating doctors (PW-10 and PW-11) carries more weight regarding the deceased's mental capacity than the contradictory statements of other witnesses - noted that a mere discrepancy in the investigation officer's statements would not discredit the dying declaration when the doctor has approved the deceased's fit state of mind to give statements. [Paras 11-23] Subramani v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 255 : 2026 INSC 249

Sections 302/34 and 201 [Sections 103(1)/3(5) and 238 of BNS, 2023] – Circumstantial Evidence – Recovery of Articles – Call Detail Records (CDR) – Conviction based on circumstantial evidence – Requirements for conviction – Held that the "Panchsheel" principles governing circumstantial evidence - To sustain a conviction, the circumstances must be fully established and form a complete chain that excludes every possible hypothesis except the guilt of the accused - The mental distance between "may be guilty" and "must be guilty" is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. [Relied on harad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116; Paras 27-28] Pooranmal v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 227 : 2026 INSC 217

Sections 302/34 and 201 IPC [Sections 103(1)/3(5) and 238 of BNS, 2023] – Conviction based on circumstantial evidence – Requirements for conviction – Held that the "Panchsheel" principles governing circumstantial evidence - To sustain a conviction, the circumstances must be fully established and form a complete chain that excludes every possible hypothesis except the guilt of the accused - The mental distance between "may be guilty" and "must be guilty" is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. [Relied on Harad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116; Paras 27-28] Pooranmal v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 227 : 2026 INSC 217

Section 105 - Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder

Section 304 Part II IPC — Culpable Homicide Not Amounting to Murder — Sentence Reduction — Where an incident arose from a boundary dispute between close relatives, was preceded by an altercation, and the fatal injury was caused by a solitary blow using a log picked up from the spot (not a dangerous weapon) in the heat of the moment, Supreme Court reduced the sentence from five years to three years rigorous imprisonment - Appellant cannot be held liable for culpable homicide with the aid of Section 34 when there is no evidence of exhortation or shared intention to cause death - The mere fact that A-1 initiated an attack (which resulted in non-grievous injuries to a third party) does not establish common intention for the fatal blow delivered independently by another accused (A-2). [Relied on Apoorva Arora & Anr. v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr., (2024) 6 SCC 181; Para 21-27] Sivakumar v. State rep. by the Inspector of Police, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 329 : 2026 INSC 318

Sentencing Policy — Advanced Age of Appellant — While upholding the conviction under Section 304 Part II, the Supreme Court reduced the sentence to the period already undergone (approximately six years and three months) – Held that since the appellant is now over 80 years old, sending him back to prison would be "harsh and inadvisable," emphasizing that courts should not be insensitive to the advanced age of convicts – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Kesar Singh and Another vs. State of Haryana, (2008) 15 SCC 753; Paras 5, 6] Shrikrishna v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 35 : 2026 INSC 45 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 242

Section 106 - Causing death by negligence

Section 304A IPC — Culpable Rashness and Negligence — To attract punishment under Section 304A, the rashness or negligence must be attributable to a state of mind involving a "deliberation in mind" risking the crime and the life of a person, rather than a mere error of judgment or acting bona fide under regulatory operational instructions - Highlighting the concept of "culpable rashness", negligence cannot be presumed merely from an accident but must be inferred from the distinct attendant circumstances. [Relied On Ravi Kapur v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 9 SCC 284; State of Karnataka v. Satish, (1998) 8 SCC 493; Para 7-10] Mohammad Hanif Jainum Khalifa v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 552 : 2026 INSC 565

Section 304A IPC - Criminal Law – Proximate Cause (Causa Causans) – To fasten criminal liability under Section 304-A IPC, there must be a direct and proximate nexus between the alleged negligent act and the death - Where the post-mortem report conclusively establishes that the immediate cause of death was acute coronary insufficiency resulting from an underlying, undisclosed 80% blockage in the coronary artery, the actions of an off-duty anaesthetist are far too remote to attract criminal culpability. [Relied on Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, (2005) 6 SCC 1; Radheyshyam Kejriwal v. State of West Bengal, (2011) 3 SCC 581; Videocon Industries Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., (2016) 12 SCC 315; Prem Raj v. Poonamma Menon, (2024) 6 SCC 143; Para 20-28] Supriya Kumari M.C. v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 540 : 2026 INSC 537

Section 304A IPC – Medical Negligence – Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Exoneration on Merits in Civil/Consumer Proceedings – Effect on Parallel Criminal Prosecution – The appellant, a senior anaesthetist, challenged the criminal prosecution initiated against her under Section 304-A read with Section 34 of the IPC for alleged gross negligence leading to the death of a patient post-surgery - The prosecution alleged that the appellant orally instructed an inexperienced staff nurse to administer a specialized analgesic injection ('sensorcaine') instead of doing it personally, which allegedly did not enter the epidural space, failing to alleviate pain and triggering a fatal cardiac event - Held, allowing the appeal and quashing the criminal proceedings, that for a criminal charge under Section 304-A of the IPC to survive, the negligence or recklessness must be of such a high degree as to be "gross" - An anaesthetist whose duty hours have concluded cannot be held criminally liable for a subsequent procedural error committed by a staff nurse in the mechanical execution of a standard post-operative pain management instruction - the family of the deceased pursued a parallel civil claim before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, which categorically exonerated the appellant on merits, finding that she had not given instructions to the nurse to administer the injection - This exoneration remained unchallenged and attained finality. Once an accused is exonerated on merits in civil proceedings, allowing a criminal prosecution to continue on identical allegations and facts constitutes a gross abuse of the process of law, as the standard of proof required in criminal cases is higher than that in civil cases. [Paras 18, 21-29] Supriya Kumari M.C. v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 540 : 2026 INSC 537

Section 108 - Abetment of suicide

Section 306 IPC - Abetment of Suicide - Debt Recovery – Held a creditor making repeated phone calls or persistent demands for the return of money lent does not, by itself, constitute the offence of abetment of suicide - Such a demand is a lawful act - Supreme Court observed that in the absence of evidence showing the deceased was beaten or physically assaulted, mere demands for dues cannot be inferred as abetment - noted that the deceased might have committed suicide due to depression from being unable to clear the debt rather than due to the actions of the creditors. Dhirubhai Nanjibhai Patel Lotwala v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 270

Sections 306, 307, and 109 IPC — Abetment of Suicide — Suicide Pacts — Culpability of the Surviving Partner - Held: The survivor of a mutual suicide pact is legally culpable for the abetment of the other's suicide under Section 307 of the IPC - A suicide pact involves mutual encouragement and a reciprocal commitment to die together, where the survivor's presence and participation act as a direct catalyst for the deceased's actions - The resolve of each party is reinforced and strengthened by the participation of the other; if not for the active participation of both parties, the act would not occur - The law treats such conduct as abetment because the State has a fundamental interest in preserving life, and any assistance in ending it is a crime against the State. Gudipalli Siddhartha Reddy v. State C.B.I., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 166 : 2026 INSC 160 : AIR 2026 SC 950

Section 109. Attempt to murder

Section 307 IPC – Attempt to Murder – Absence of Firearm Injury - The mere absence of firearm injuries does not negate a charge under Section 307 IPC - The essential ingredient is the act being done with the requisite intent or knowledge that it could cause death; if the victims escape by chance, the offence is complete - The principle of parity is not an inflexible rule and cannot be mechanically applied by courts when the roles attributed to the accused persons are materially different and distinct. [Relied on Ajwar v. Waseem & Anr., (2024) 10 SCC 768; Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508; Sudha Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., (2021) 4 SCC 781; Para 29-32] Mohseen v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 536 : 2026 INSC 526

Section 307 vs Section 325 IPC - Attempt to Murder vs Voluntarily Causing Grievous Hurt - Essential Ingredients - Intention or Knowledge - The essential ingredient of the offence of attempt to murder is the intention or knowledge to cause death, which must be established independently of the act itself - The gravity of the injury by itself cannot be determinative of an offence under Section 307 IPC unless the prosecution establishes the requisite mens rea - The intention to commit murder cannot be presumed merely because the injuries were ultimately opined to be dangerous to life - In the absence of evidence showing prior motive, premeditation, repeated deliberate blows with deadly weapons, or any conduct indicative of a determined effort to cause death, a conviction under Section 307 IPC cannot be sustained - Since the incident occurred suddenly when the injured intervened in an altercation, and the weapons used were ordinary lathis without showing brutal persistence, the conviction was altered from Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC to Section 325 read with Section 34 IPC. [Paras 26, 31-38] Roshan Lal v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 537 : 2026 INSC 524

Section 115 - Voluntarily causing hurt

Sections 323, 341, 506, and 34 IPC — Quashing of Proceedings — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 482 — Where allegations of assault and criminal intimidation rest solely on the statement of the complainant without independent corroboration and are contradicted by other witness statements, the basic foundation for the offences is missing - Held, that continuing such proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law. [Relied on Punjabrao vs. D.P. Meshram 1964 SCC OnLine 76; State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp 1 SCC 335; K.P. Manu vs. Scrutiny Committee forVerification of Community Certificate 2015 4 SCC 1; Paras 40-60] Chinthada Anand v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 288 : 2026 INSC 283

Section 116 - Grievous hurt

Section 320 (Seventhly & Eighthly), 325 IPC - Grievous Hurt - Fracture or dislocation of a bone constitutes grievous hurt within the meaning of Clause Seventhly of Section 320 IPC - Any hurt which endangers life or causes the sufferer to be in severe bodily pain or undergo prolonged treatment attracts Clause Eighthly of Section 320 IPC - Where the medical evidence unequivocally establishes that the victim suffered fractures in both parietal bones near the midline accompanied by neurological complications and prolonged hospitalization, the ingredients necessary to attract Section 325 IPC stand fully satisfied. [Paras 36-38] Roshan Lal v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 537 : 2026 INSC 524

Section 140 - Kidnapping or abducting in order to murder or for ransom, etc.

Section 364A IPC – Demand for Ransom – Proof through Oral Testimony - The defence argued that the absence of Call Detail Records (CDRs) and a Section 65-B certificate under the Evidence Act was fatal to establishing a ransom demand – Held that Unlike cases purely dependent on electronic evidence, the present case features consistent, unshaken, and corroborative oral testimonies from multiple witnesses (PW-1, PW-2, and PW-3) coupled with the Investigating Officer's testimony (PW-7) proving a ransom demand of Rs. 5 Lakhs - The lack of a CDR from a rural telephone exchange in 2003 cannot paralyze the criminal justice system when substantive oral evidence remains cogent and unimpeached. [Paras 23-30] Harjindra Singh v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2026 INSC 569

Section 364A & Section 368 IPC – Kidnapping for Ransom – Ingredients and Proof – Arms Act, 1959 – Section 25 – Conviction Upheld -– Threat to Life or Hurt – Firearm Usage - The appellants challenged their conviction under Section 364A IPC contending that no explicit threat to cause death or hurt was administered to the 8-year-old victim - Held that stopping young, defenceless children on their way to school by brandishing a .315 bore country-made pistol inherently constitutes a severe threat to cause death or hurt - The active use of a lethal weapon satisfies the statutory requirement of a threat under Section 364A IPC. [Paras 21-30] Harjindra Singh v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2026 INSC 569

Section 189 - Unlawful assembly

Sections 147, 341, 326, 307, 323, and 302 read with Section 149 IPC — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Sections 154, 161, 162, and 164 — Appreciation of Evidence — Fatal Investigation Flaws - An inept investigation or a scripted enquiry is fatal to criminal prosecution, having lethal consequences when there is a possibility of totally innocent persons being crucified - In a case involving a brutal homicidal attack on a public road, the Supreme Court noted that despite the police reaching the place of occurrence (P.O) immediately after the incident based on a General Diary (GD) entry, no First Information Report (FIR) was registered for two days - The FIR was eventually registered based on a written complaint by a close relative (PW1) who admittedly did not witness the incident but named 13 specific accused persons after due deliberation – Suprme Court observed that if eyewitnesses were available at the spot when the Investigating Officer (IO) arrived, the IO would have registered an FIR then and there rather than waiting for a delayed complaint - The high-handed and procedural lapses by the investigation department leave the crime unresolved. [Paras 11 - 22] Sadek Ali @ Md. Sadek Ali v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 435 : 2026 INSC 421

Section 190 - Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object

Unlawful Assembly – Individual Role Attribution – Noted that the High Court erred in granting bail on the ground that the individual role or specific injury caused by each accused could not be ascertained - The Supreme Court clarified that where an offence is committed by an unlawful assembly, every member is equally responsible for acts done in furtherance of the common object - Under Section 149 IPC, the prosecution is not obligated to identify the specific weapon or injury attributable to a particular member at the bail stage. [Paras 27 - 30] Shobha Namdev Sonavane v. Samadhan Bajirao Sonvane, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 188 : 2026 INSC 181 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 278

Section 149 IPC – Unlawful Assembly and Vicarious Liability – Murder – The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of four appellants sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of a Watershed Committee Chairman - Noted that to attract Section 149 IPC, two essential elements must be established: an "unlawful assembly" and a "common object" - Even in the absence of a specific overt act attributed to each member, the mere presence of the accused as part of an armed unlawful assembly is sufficient for conviction - noted that all accused alighting together from a bus while armed with firearms clearly established their common motive and participation in the unlawful assembly. [Paras 12, 13] Dablu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 238 : 2026 INSC 224 : AIR 2026 SC 1319

Section 149 IPC — Vicarious Liability - Individual Attribution — Once the existence of an unlawful assembly and a common object to commit murder is established, the individual attribution of the fatal blow becomes inconsequential - Section 149 IPC fastens constructive liability on every member of the assembly, regardless of who delivered the "crucial act" or fatal injury - The High Court's reasoning that all accused could not be convicted under Section 302 because the specific assailant who caused the fatal head injury was unidentified was held to be "perverse" and "self-contradictory" as it ignored the fundamental principle of vicarious liability. Sitaram Kuchhbedia v. Vimal Rana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 189 : 2026 INSC 178

Section 196 - Promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc., and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony.

Sections 153A, 153B, 295A, 298, and 505 IPC - Hate Speech & Preamble – Fundamental Values - Substantive meaning of 'Fraternity' and civilisational ethos of 'Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam' run fundamentally counter to Hate Speech - Supreme Court observed that the field of substantive criminal law addressing hate speech is fully occupied by existing statutory provisions (such as Sections 153A, 153B, 295A, 298, and 505 of the IPC/BNS), which penalise speech threatening communal harmony and public order - Hate speech is fundamentally antithetical to the core constitutional value of "Fraternity" enshrined in the Preamble and the Fundamental Duty cast under Article 51A(e) to promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood - Fraternity mandates a reciprocal obligation among citizens to respect the equal dignity of others - True citizenship cannot be reduced to a tool of exclusion or division based on an "us versus them" binary, which directly corrodes both the secular fabric of the Republic and India's civilisational maxim of vasudhaiva kutumbakam (the world is one family). [Relied on K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1 and Section 6-A of the Citizenship Act, 1955, In Re (2024) 16 SCC 105. (Paragraphs 78, 80, 81, 86, 88, 95] Ashwini Kumar Upadhyaya v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 437 : 2026 INSC 432

Section 281 - Rash driving or riding on a public way

Section 279 & Section 304A IPC — Rash and Negligent Driving — Liability of a Bus Driver — A passenger bus driver cannot be attributed with culpable negligence or rashness if he moves or restarts the vehicle strictly in accordance with the indicative instructions or whistling signals of the bus conductor - The driver is duty-bound to concentrate on driving for safety stakes and naturally relies on the conductor who is the person in charge of regulating passenger movement to monitor when to stop or move the bus - The driver is not expected to turn his head back to personally verify if the passengers have safely alighted - Acting bona fide on the conductor's signals negates the element of criminal negligence or recklessness. [Paras 5, 6] Mohammad Hanif Jainum Khalifa v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 552 : 2026 INSC 565

Section 296 - Obscene acts and songs

Section 294(b) IPC — Obscenity — Use of abusive language — Mere use of the word "bastard" during a heated conversation does not per se amount to obscenity — Supreme Court held that "obscenity" relates to material that has the potential to appeal to the prurient interest or arouse sexual/lustful thoughts - While vulgarity or profanities may be distasteful, unpalatable, or evoke disgust, they do not automatically satisfy the legal threshold of being "obscene" under Section 294 - Given modern contemporary mores, the use of such words in the heat of a moment does not sustain a conviction for obscenity. [Paras 19, 20] Sivakumar v. State rep. by the Inspector of Police, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 329 : 2026 INSC 318

Section 308 - Extortion

Sections 384, 504, 506, and 511 IPC — Extortion & Criminal Intimidation — Vague Allegations - Where the FIR fails to specify the date, place, or exact circumstances of the alleged demand of money, and no property or money was actually delivered pursuant to such a threat, the ingredients of extortion under Section 384 are absent - General observations that the accused "tried" to extort money cannot automatically attract Section 511 of the IPC when the substantive allegations are completely vague - allegations under Sections 504 and 506 fail when the FIR does not disclose the exact words uttered or the surrounding circumstances of intimidation - when substantive offences are not made out, the charge of conspiracy under Section 120-B necessarily fails - Criminal antecedents cannot constitute the sole or even the primary basis to decline the quashing of criminal proceedings under Section 482 of the CrPC - It is the duty of the Court to see whether the essential ingredients of the alleged offences in the impugned FIR are prima facie made out - General observations regarding the "modus operandi" or "proclivity" of the accused cannot replace the requirement of fulfilling the basic ingredients of the offences. Bhikhubhai Govindbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 593 : 2026 INSC 532

Section 316 - Criminal Breach of Trust

Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, and 471 IPC – Civil Dispute given a criminal cloak – Abuse of process of law – The Supreme Court quashed an FIR lodged 11 years after the execution of a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA), holding that the dispute was essentially of a civil nature - While considering a prayer to quash an FIR, allegations are ordinarily taken at face value to assess if a prima facie cognizable offence is made out - where the cause is essentially civil, the Court must assess whether it has been given a "cloak of criminal offence." - In such cases, the Court is not restricted to the FIR's contents but may consider admitted facts and documents recited therein, such as the JVA - A delay of 11 years in lodging the FIR (JVA dated 2010; FIR lodged 2021) indicates the absence of dishonest intention from the inception. If a stark dishonest intention existed, it would have been reported promptly. [Relied on: Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand and others, (2013) 11 SCC 673; Para 15, 25-27] Vandana Jain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 200 : 2026 INSC 192

Section 406 IPC – Criminal Breach of Trust – Non-refundable Security Deposit – The allegation regarding non-refund of security money does not constitute a criminal offence when the JVA stipulates that the deposit is non-refundable and only adjustable against future sale proceeds - Non-fulfillment of such contractual obligations gives rise to a civil cause of action, not a criminal one. [Para 22 - 28] Vandana Jain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 200 : 2026 INSC 192

Section 318 - Cheating

Section 420 IPC — Cheating — Criminal Conspiracy — Forgery of Will — Quashing of Criminal Proceedings against Bona Fide Purchaser — Criminal prosecution against a purchaser of property for valuable consideration cannot be sustained merely because the vendor allegedly used a forged Will to establish ownership and execute the registered sale deed - To attract the offence of cheating under Section 420 IPC, there must be a fraudulent inducement by the accused causing the complainant to deliver property or part with valuable security - Where there is no privity of contract or allegation that the purchaser deceived or fraudulently induced the third-party complainant, no offence of cheating is made out against the purchaser - If a vendor sells a property by creating a false document of ownership, the person defrauded/aggrieved is the purchaser whose title lands in dispute, not a third party who is not a party to the deed - In the absence of any tangible material showing the purchaser's involvement in the fabrication of the Will or knowledge of the forgery, allowing the prosecution to continue against him would amount to a gross abuse of the process of Court - Proceedings qua the appellant-purchaser quashed. [Relied on Mohammed Ibrahim and Others v. State of Bihar and Another, (2009) 8 SCC 751; Paras 20 - 25] S. Anand v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 429 : 2026 INSC 418

Sections 420 and 471 IPC - Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Banking and Commercial Disputes – Approved Compromise Settlement – Impact on Prosecution - A criminal prosecution initiated under Sections 420 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) cannot be allowed to continue after a full and final settlement of the loan account by way of an approved compromise that has received the imprimatur of the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) - Banking transactions arising out of loan facilities are commercial transactions having an overwhelmingly and predominantly civil flavour - Where the dispute has been amicably resolved, the settlement amount has been fully deposited, a "No Dues Certificate" has been issued, and recovery proceedings before the DRT have been consequently withdrawn, the possibility of a conviction becomes remote and bleak - In such circumstances, allowing the belated criminal prosecution to continue would cause grave prejudice, oppression, and injustice to the accused, and would amount to an abuse of the process of the court. Vijay Kumar Kela v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 565 : 2026 INSC 588

Sections 420, 467, 468, and 471 IPC - Criminal Jurisprudence — Sentencing — Principle of Proportionality — Mitigating Circumstances — Reduction of Sentence to Period Already Undergone — Appeal confined strictly to the quantum of sentence - The appellant was convicted under Sections 420, 467, 468, and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, for using a forged revenue document (Bhu Adhikar Rin Pustika) to furnish surety/bail in judicial proceedings, and was sentenced to five years of rigorous imprisonment on each count – Held that while offences involving forgery and the production of fabricated documents before a Court of law strike at the purity of the administration of justice and cannot be treated lightly, the sentencing process must remain central to the principle of proportionality - It cannot be reduced to a purely retributive exercise divorced from the factual matrix of the case and the overall circumstances of the offender - The Supreme Court observed that the occurrence pertained to the year 2014, and the appellant had endured the rigors of criminal proceedings for more than a decade - there were no subsequent criminal antecedents, the appellant was not a habitual offender, and the forgery was detected at the threshold stage during bail scrutiny, avoiding irreversible pecuniary or proprietary losses - Noting that the appellant had already undergone over two years of actual incarceration, the Supreme Court found it fit to modify the substantive sentence to the period already undergone while keeping the fine unaltered. [Relied on Padum Kumar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2020) 3 SCC 35; Paras 13-26] Israfil @ Pappu @ Naimuddin Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 639 : 2026 INSC 654

Section 420 IPC — Cheating — Essential Ingredients - To constitute the offence of cheating, there must exist deception, fraudulent inducement, and consequential delivery of property coupled with dishonest intention at the inception of the transaction - A disputed civil claim pending before a competent civil court cannot automatically be treated as a fraudulent misrepresentation so as to attract Section 420 of the IPC, especially in the absence of any allegation that the complainant delivered any property, money, or valuable security to the accused. Bhikhubhai Govindbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 593 : 2026 INSC 532

Section 420 IPC – Cheating – Ingredients – Essential requirement of dishonest intention from the inception – The Supreme Court held that to constitute an offence of cheating, the intention to deceive must exist at the time the inducement was made - Mere failure to keep a promise subsequently cannot be the sole basis to presume dishonest intention existed from the beginning - Every breach of contract does not give rise to an offence of cheating unless deception was played at the very inception. V. Ganesan v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 269 : 2026 INSC 265 : AIR 2026 SC 1547

Section 420 IPC – Cheating – Absence of False Representation – No offence of cheating was made out as there was no false representation in the JVA - The agreement did not contain a specific statement that "no litigation was pending"; rather, it provided an indemnity to the second party for any loss due to disputes - The representation that no "restraint order" existed was not shown to be false. [Paras 20-26] Vandana Jain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 200 : 2026 INSC 192

Section 336 - Forgery

Sections 463, 464, 465, 467, 468, and 471 IPC — Forgery — Making of a "False Document" — Disputed Claim of Title - The essential ingredient of forgery is the making of a "false document" as defined under Section 464 of the IPC - When a person executes a document (such as a Power of Attorney) claiming a property as their own or asserting a share pursuant to revenue entries, they are not pretending to be someone else, nor is it a case of impersonation or forged signatures - A disputed claim of title, whether ultimately sustainable in law or not, cannot be equated with the making of a false document - If the document is not a false document, there is no forgery, and Sections 467 and 471 of the IPC are not attracted. [Relied on Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751] Bhikhubhai Govindbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 593 : 2026 INSC 532

Section 338 - Forgery of valuable security, will, etc.

Sections 467, 468, 471 IPC – Forgery – Document not traceable in records – Merely because a document (such as a Tehsildar's letter) is not traceable in official records 11 years after its purported issuance, it cannot be deemed "forged" or "false" under Section 464 IPC. Official records are not always maintained in perpetuity. [Para 24] Vandana Jain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 200 : 2026 INSC 192

Section 340 - Forged document or electronic record and using it as genuine

Sections 471, 477-A, and 120-B IPC — Orissa Forest Act, 1972 — Section 27 — Discharge — Vague and General Allegations — Principle of Parity - Held, that the presence of general allegations without any overt act or specific imputations against the accused is insufficient to proceed to trial - While a detailed appreciation of evidence is not warranted at the stage of framing charges, Supreme Court must be satisfied that there exists a sufficient ground or grave suspicion against the accused - Broad and joint accusations cast in a wide net, without defining individual roles or culpability, are impermissible under law - Held, that when similarly situated co-accused persons prominently placed in the administrative chain have already been discharged under similar allegations, the principle of parity requires that the Appellant be treated alike - Continuing proceedings against one accused while discharging others on indistinguishable facts would be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India - Continuation of such vague criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law - The High Court's order dismissing the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is set aside, and the Appellant is discharged. [Relied on Neelu Chopra and another Vs. Bharti, (2009) 10 SCC 184 State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Yogesh v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 10 SCC 394; Paras 15-24] Susanta Kumar Dalei v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 518 : 2026 INSC 510

Section 351 - Criminal intimidation punishment

Section 506 r/w. 34 — Criminal Intimidation — Sine qua non of "intent to cause alarm" — Absence of common intention - The pivotal aspect to establish an offence of criminal intimidation under Section 506 IPC is the "intent to cause alarm" to the complainant. Where allegations do not demonstrate that the threats exerted by the accused were intended to cause such alarm, and there is no evidence of a common intention to commit a criminal act under Section 34 IPC, prosecuting the accused would amount to an abuse of the process of law. [Para 10] Gunjan @ Girija Kumari v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 484 : 2026 INSC 468

Section 506 Part II IPC – Evolving Understanding of "Chastity" and "Unchastity" – Meaning of threatening to "impute unchastity to a woman" in the digital age – Held: Chastity is not to be considered purely from a traditional moral perspective focused on virtue alone; it must be viewed through the prism of an individual woman's dignity, privacy, and sexual autonomy under Article 21 of the Constitution - "Unchastity" encompasses any action or unwarranted interference that disrupts a woman's control over her own sexual choices and dissemination of personal information - The act of secretly video-recording a victim in a naked state in a bathroom, and threatening to publish it online, directly assaults her sexual autonomy, undermines her dignity, and violates her privacy - Such a threat squarely constitutes an act to "impute unchastity" within the meaning of Part II of Section 506 IPC, irrespective of whether the parties were in a long-term consensual physical relationship. [Relied on Joseph Shine v. Union of India, (2019) 3 SCC 39; Pawan Kumar v. State of H.P., (2017) 7 SCC 780; K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1 Paras 31 - 41] Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 531 : 2026 INSC 525

Section 503 & Section 506 Part II IPC – Criminal Intimidation to Impute Unchastity – Appeal against conviction for threatening to upload a video of the prosecutrix bathing on Facebook if she insisted on continuing their relationship – Non-recovery of mobile phone/videography – Held: Law does not mandate that the recovery of an article of crime is sine qua non for conviction if there is other credible evidence to prove its existence - What is relevant is that the threat was issued, and the victim truly believed and felt threatened that such a threat could be carried out - The genuine perception of the prosecutrix that such a video exists and that the appellant threatened to upload it on social media constitutes key ingredients to invoke Section 503 IPC - Non-recovery of the device is not fatal to the prosecution's case. [Relied on Goverdhan v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2025) 3 SCC 378; Paras 46, 53, 54 - 87] Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 531 : 2026 INSC 525

Section 506 IPC – Criminal Intimidation – Mere threats without intention to cause alarm do not constitute an offence – Vague allegations and delayed improvements in statements weaken the prosecution's case - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed proceedings against the appellant (Accused No. 5), a lawyer, who was primarily charged under Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Noted that the prosecutrix's initial statement under Section 161 of the CrPC did not mention any threats from the appellant - after a delay of seven to eight days, she improved her version in a statement recorded under Section 164 of the CrPC, making a vague reference to "an uncle" (the appellant) threatening her - held that for a charge of criminal intimidation to stand, there must be a clear intention to cause alarm, irrespective of whether the victim was actually alarmed - Vague allegations unsupported by prima facie cogent evidence do not satisfy the requirements of Section 506 IPC - noted that a lawyer discharging professional duties, such as giving advice or suggestions, cannot be deemed to be engaging in intimidation – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Naresh Aneja Vs. State of U.P., (2025) 2 SCC 604; Sharif Ahmad Vs. State of U.P., (2024) 14 SCC 122; Paras 6-8] Beri Manoj v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 92