BHARATIYA SAKSHYA ADHINIYAM, 2023, (BSA) / INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872, (IEA)

Section 6. Motive, preparation and previous or subsequent conduct

Section 8 IEA - Circumstantial Evidence and Motive - In murder trials relying on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish a complete chain of evidence that eliminates reasonable doubt, but proof of motive is not mandatory. A fact is considered proved when it excludes reasonable doubt based on reason and common sense, not trivial or fanciful doubts. Circumstantial evidence must form a cohesive chain, with each circumstance independently verified, consistently pointing to the accused's guilt and excluding alternative hypotheses. The Supreme Court upheld the accused's conviction for murder based on circumstantial evidence, finding a clear pattern of evidence establishing guilt. The appeal was dismissed, reaffirming that the law requires elimination of reasonable doubt, not proof beyond all doubt. (Para 10) Chetan v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 657 : 2025 INSC 793

Section 8 IEA - Forensic Evidence - Incriminating evidence, including the recovery of the murder weapon (gun and pellets) linked to the deceased's injuries through forensic and ballistic analysis, bolstered the prosecution's case. The accused's silence and failure to explain the recovery of the weapon further strengthened the prosecution's case. (Para 10) Chetan v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 657 : 2025 INSC 793

Section 7. Facts necessary to explain or introduce fact in issue or relevant facts.

Section 9 IEA - Test Identification Parade - Evidentiary Value - Non-examination of Witness in Trial – Held, a Test Identification Parade (TIP) loses its evidentiary value for identification purposes if the witness who identified the accused during the TIP is not examined in court. Without the witness's testimony and cross-examination, the TIP report, which may corroborate or contradict the identification, becomes irrelevant, as there is a risk of the witness being tutored or exposed to the accused before the TIP. In this case, the appellant, convicted of dacoity and Arms Act offences by the trial court and High Court, was acquitted due to the non-examination of the three witnesses who identified him during the TIP. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and granted the appellant the benefit of doubt. (Paras 14, 15) Vinod @ Nasmulla v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 215 : 2025 INSC 220 : AIR 2025 SC 1194 : 2025 Cri LJ 1237 : (2025) 4 SCC 312

Section 9. When facts not otherwise relevant become relevant.

Omission to name some accused in FIR is a relevant fact under Section 11 Evidence Act. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raghuvir Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 158

Section 15. Admission defined

Sections 17, 21, 25, 30 IEA - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 161 - Inadmissibility of Section 161 Cr.P.C. Statements Against Co-Accused at Bail Stage - Whether statements of an accused recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C., implicating a co-accused, can be considered at the stage of regular or anticipatory bail. Held, statements recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. by an accused implicating a co-accused are inadmissible at the stage of regular or anticipatory bail. Such statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, cannot be used against a co-accused. (Para 28, 39, 47, 50, 53) P. Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2025 INSC 725

Sections 17, 21, 25, 30 IEA - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 315 - Exculpatory Statements - Lack credibility and cannot be tested by cross-examination unless the maker testifies under Section 315 of the Cr.P.C. They can only be used to contradict the maker or ascertain their stance, not to implicate a co-accused. (Para 28, 39, 47, 50, 53) P. Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2025 INSC 725

Sections 17, 21, 25, 30 IEA - Inculpatory Statements - If confessional, they are inadmissible under Section 25 of the Evidence Act unless proven during trial under Section 30, and only if the confession implicates both the maker and the co-accused in a joint trial. Admissions are admissible only against the maker per Sections 17 and 21 of the Evidence Act. (Para 28, 39, 47, 50, 53) P. Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2025 INSC 725

Sections 17, 21, 25, 30 IEA - Conditions for using confessions against co-accused - A confession implicating a co-accused can be considered only during trial, subject to: relevance and admissibility under the Evidence Act; being duly proven against the maker; implicating both the maker and the co-accused; both accused undergoing a joint trial for the same offence. (Para 28, 39, 47, 50, 53) P. Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2025 INSC 725

Sections 17, 21, 25, and 26 IEA - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 161 - Criticism of High Court's approach - The Supreme Court criticized the High Court for relying on co-accused statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. to deny anticipatory bail, emphasizing that such statements are barred by Sections 17, 21, 25, and 26 of the Evidence Act at the bail stage. (Para 28, 39, 47, 50, 53) P. Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2025 INSC 725

Sections 17, 21, 25, 30 IEA - Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 409, 420 - Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Political Vendetta in Bail Considerations - The Court clarified that while political bias or vendetta is a relevant factor in bail pleas, it cannot be the sole ground for granting bail. Courts must assess whether allegations are frivolous or baseless, supported by prima facie evidence, before factoring in political motives. The case arose from an Excise Policy scandal in Andhra Pradesh involving allegations of favoritism towards select liquor brands, causing ₹3,000 crore in losses. The accused, charged under Sections 409, 420 of the IPC and the Prevention of Corruption Act, challenged the High Court's denial of anticipatory bail, which relied on co-accused statements. The Supreme Court dismissed the bail plea but clarified the legal position on Section 161 statements. (Para 27) P. Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2025 INSC 725

Section 22. Confession caused by inducement, threat, coercion or promise, when irrelevant in criminal proceeding

Sections 24, 25, 26, 45 IEA – Child Rape and Murder – Death Penalty – DNA Evidence – Held: Trial conducted in a flawed and irregular manner. Trial Judge erroneously permitted the investigating officer to narrate the accused's confessional statements during examination-in-chief and admitted them as evidence, violating admissibility rules. Non-examination of the scientific expert who conducted DNA profiling was fatal to the prosecution's case. Prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody for forensic samples, with unsealed samples and unverified transmission to the Forensic Science Laboratory, raising concerns of tampering. Appeal allowed; conviction and sentence set aside. [Paras 40, 47, 50, 54, 55] Karandeep Sharma @ Razia @ Raju v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 398 : 2025 INSC 444

Section 24 IEA - Penal Code, 1860; Section 302 - Murder - Extra-Judicial Confession - Circumstantial Evidence - Credibility - Extra-judicial confessions are inherently weak evidence and require rigorous scrutiny. They must be voluntary, truthful, and inspire confidence. In cases based on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish a complete and unbroken chain of circumstances. Extra-judicial confessions require corroboration by other evidence. (Para 16 – 19 & 24) Ramu Appa Mahapatar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 155 : 2025 INSC 147 : AIR 2025 SC 961 : 2025 Cri LJ 1471

Section 24 IEA - Extra-Judicial Confession - Credibility and Voluntariness - The credibility of the witnesses testifying to the confession is crucial. Confessions made in a doubtful mental state lack voluntariness and reliability. (Para 19) Ramu Appa Mahapatar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 155 : 2025 INSC 147 : AIR 2025 SC 961 : 2025 Cri LJ 1471

Section 24 IEA - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 161 and 162 - Material Omissions and Contradictions - Significant omissions in statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., that contradict courtroom testimony, undermine credibility. Such omissions can be considered contradictions under the explanation to section 162 of the Cr.P.C. (Para 21 & 22) Ramu Appa Mahapatar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 155 : 2025 INSC 147 : AIR 2025 SC 961 : 2025 Cri LJ 1471

Section 24 IEA - Suspicion, however strong, cannot substitute for credible evidence. Convictions must be based on evidence that proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (Para 24) Ramu Appa Mahapatar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 155 : 2025 INSC 147 : AIR 2025 SC 961 : 2025 Cri LJ 1471

Section 24 IEA - Benefit of Doubt - If the evidence is weak and lacks credibility, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. (Para 24 & 25) Ramu Appa Mahapatar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 155 : 2025 INSC 147 : AIR 2025 SC 961 : 2025 Cri LJ 1471

Section 24 IEA - Penal Code, 1860; Section 302 - The accused was convicted of murdering his livein partner. The conviction was primarily based on extra-judicial confessions to witnesses. The accused's mental state was questioned, and there was a lack of corroborating physical evidence. Material omissions were noted in witness statements. Therefore, the conviction was overturned. (Para 25) Ramu Appa Mahapatar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 155 : 2025 INSC 147 : AIR 2025 SC 961 : 2025 Cri LJ 1471

Section 23. Confession to police officer

Section 27 IEA - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Sections 161, 162 - Admissibility of Investigating Officer's testimony based on statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. - Held, the testimony of an Investigating Officer relying solely on witness statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. is inadmissible as substantive evidence under Section 162 Cr.P.C., as such statements lack evidentiary value and can only be used to contradict witnesses during trial. While police officers may be competent witnesses for recoveries of physical evidence under Section 27, their testimony cannot be used to substantiate witness statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. to prove motive, conspiracy, or preparation for a crime. (Para 26, 48) Renuka Prasad v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 559 : 2025 INSC 657

Section 27 IEA - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Sections 161, 162 - The High Court reversed the trial court's acquittal of the accused, relying on the Investigating Officer's testimony based on statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. to address deficiencies in the prosecution's case. The trial court had rejected this evidence due to the bar under Section 162 Cr.P.C. Held, the prosecution failed to substantiate the allegations, as all witnesses turned hostile, and the Investigating Officer's testimony, based solely on Section 161 statements, was inadmissible. (Para 26, 48) Renuka Prasad v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 559 : 2025 INSC 657

Section 27 IEA - Admissibility of accused's statement under Section 27 when the recovery of evidence is not proved to be based on the accused's disclosure. Held, for a confessional statement to be admissible under Section 27, the discovery of a fact must directly result from the accused's information, demonstrating their knowledge of its existence. In this case, discrepancies in witness testimonies and lack of evidence linking the recovery to the appellant's disclosure rendered the statement inadmissible. The chain of circumstantial evidence, including the "last seen together" circumstance and extrajudicial confessions, was incomplete due to inconsistencies and a significant time gap between the last sighting and the recovery of the body. The absence of motive, supported by evidence of the appellant's relationship with the deceased and assurances of marriage, further weakened the prosecution's case. Non-examination of material witnesses, such as the appellant's mother and brother-in-law, also undermined the prosecution's claims. In cases based on circumstantial evidence, each circumstance must be conclusively proved to sustain a conviction. The appeal was allowed, and the accused were acquitted, as the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. [Para 22 - 50] Md. Bani Alam Mazid @ Dhan v. State of Assam, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 251 : 2025 INSC 260

Section 27 IEA lifts the ban, though partially, to the admissibility of confessions. The removal of the ban is not of such an extent so as to absolutely undo the object of Section 26. As such the statement whether confessional or not is allowed to be given in evidence but that portion only which distinctly relates to discovery of the fact is admissible. A discovery of a fact includes the object found, the place from which it is produced and the knowledge of the Appellant-accused as to its existence. The essential ingredients of Section 27 of the Evidence Act are threefold: i. The information given by the accused must led to the discovery of the fact which is the direct outcome of such information. ii. Only such portion of the information given as is distinctly connected with the said recovery is admissible against the accused. iii. The discovery of the facts must relate to the commission of such offence. If the recovery memos have been prepared in the police station itself or signed by the panch witnesses in the police station, the same would lose their sanctity and cannot be relied upon by the Court to support the conviction. (Para 19, 20, 27) Raja Khan v. State of Chattisgarh, AIR 2025 SC 1254 : 2025 Cri LJ 1295 : (2025) 3 SCC 314

Section 27 IEA - A disclosure statement under Section 27 unaccompanied by the supporting evidence is not sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. The conviction cannot be solely based on the disclosure statement because it is considered a weak piece of evidence. Vinobhai v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 127 : 2025 INSC 119 : AIR 2025 SC 845

Section 27 IEA - Unreliable Witness Testimony - Lack of Corroborative Evidence - Eyewitness testimony must be free from material omissions and contradictions to be relied upon for conviction. The prosecution must examine all material witnesses and provide corroborative evidence to support its case. Vinobhai v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 127 : 2025 INSC 119 : AIR 2025 SC 845

Sections 25, 27, 106 IEA - Penal Code, 1860; Section 302 - Murder - Extra judicial confession - Held, the High Court erred in relying on the extra-judicial confession made to the Village Police Patil even while rightly holding that the same was admissible in evidence as Village Police Patil cannot be said to be a Police Officer. The Court emphasized the need for clear and unambiguous evidence of the confession, which was lacking in this case. Further, the Court found the evidence regarding the discovery of the alleged murder weapon, an iron rod, to be insufficient, as the panch witnesses turned hostile and the Investigating Officer's testimony did not adequately prove the contents of the discovery panchnama. While acknowledging the circumstantial nature of the case and the principle that the accused, especially in domestic murder cases, should offer an explanation, the Court stressed that the initial burden of proof always lies with the prosecution. The prosecution must establish foundational facts before invoking Section 106 of the Evidence Act to shift the burden of proof to the accused. In this case, the Court found that the prosecution failed to establish these foundational facts, rendering the reliance on Section 106 improper. The Court reiterated the importance of evaluating extra-judicial confessions with great care and caution, especially when surrounded by suspicious circumstances. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the prosecution's case rested on weak and unreliable evidence, insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Sadashiv Dhondiram Patil v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 97 : 2025 INSC 93 : (2025) 4 SCC 275

Section 26. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant.

Section 32 IEA - Dying Declaration - Reliability and Corroboration - A dying declaration is a significant piece of evidence in criminal law and can solely form the basis for conviction if its quality is ascertainable and consistent with the case facts. In cases of multiple or inconsistent dying declarations, courts must scrutinize the evidence carefully to determine which declaration is credible, requiring corroborative evidence to resolve contradictions. In the present case, the deceased's initial statements to a doctor and police constable claimed an accidental fire while cooking, but a later statement to a Judicial Magistrate implicated the appellant, alleging he poured kerosene and set her on fire. The inconsistencies, lack of corroborative evidence, and absence of clarification regarding earlier statements render the dying declaration doubtful. Conviction based solely on such a declaration is unsafe without supporting evidence, especially where the deceased's explanation for earlier false statements lacks credibility and contradicts other evidence on record. (Para 12-14) Suresh v. State, AIR 2025 SC 1561 : 2025 INSC 318 : (2025) 4 SCC 794

Section 39. Opinions of experts.

Section 45 IEA - Expert Opinion - Section 45 of the Evidence Act, 1872, provides that opinions of experts skilled in foreign law, science, art, or identification of handwriting or finger impressions are relevant facts. Such expert opinions, while significant, are not binding on the court and are subject to judicial scrutiny. Courts may rely on expert opinions, particularly in scientific matters, but such reliance is contingent upon the opinion being clear, reasoned, and supported by credible data. The credibility of an expert witness depends on the reasons and materials underpinning their conclusions, which must be intelligible, convincing, and testable to assist the court in forming an independent judgment. If an expert report is inadequate, cryptic, or lacks clarity, it is not safe for the court to rely on it wholly. The court must analyze the expert report alongside other evidence to determine its reliability. These principles, though discussed in criminal law contexts, are applicable to other cases involving expert evidence. (Para 56-60) Gastrade International v. Commissioner of Customs, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 366 : 2025 INSC 411

Section 45 IEA - Expert evidence on handwriting is opinion-based and cannot substitute substantive evidence, requiring corroboration by clear direct or circumstantial evidence. A cautious approach to handwriting identification due to its imperfect nature, requiring careful examination of the expert's reasoning and, where appropriate, corroboration, though convincing uncorroborated expert testimony may be accepted if no reliable contrary evidence exists. Relying on a handwriting expert's report without examining the expert in court is improper, as it denies the accused the opportunity to cross-examine, especially when the report's authenticity is not admitted by the accused. (Para 42 - 44) Patel Babubhai Manohardas v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 288 : 2025 INSC 322 : 2025 Cri LJ 1843

Section 63. Admissibility of electronic records

Section 65B IEA - Electronic Evidence - Electronic evidence, such as CCTV footage, must be accompanied by a Section 65-B certificate to be admissible in court. Chandrabhan Sudam Sanap v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 119 : 2025 INSC 116 : AIR 2025 SC 1103

Section 94. Evidence of terms of contracts, grants and other dispositions of property reduced to form of document.

Sections 91 and 92 IEA - Oral evidence contradicting written terms is inadmissible unless exceptions like fraud or mistake apply. (Para 23) Annaya Kocha Shetty v. Laxmibai Narayan Satose, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 411 : 2025 INSC 466 : AIR 2025 SC 2025

Section 108. Burden of proving that case of accused comes within exceptions

Section 105 IEA - Penal Code, 1860; Section 304 Part I and 201 - The appellant, along with friends, encountered the deceased in an inebriated condition beneath a bridge. An altercation ensued, during which the appellant struck the deceased with a cement brick, causing fatal head injuries. The appellant subsequently set the deceased's body on fire to destroy evidence. Both Trial Court and High Court held the appellant guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I IPC, citing grave and sudden provocation under Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC. The appellant was sentenced to 5 years of rigorous imprisonment for Section 304 Part I and 2 years for Section 201 IPC. Held, the Court examined the applicability of Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC, which requires the provocation to be both grave and sudden, depriving the accused of self-control. The Court noted that the incident was not premeditated and occurred in the heat of the moment, with the appellant using a nearby cement brick, not a weapon. However, the Court found that the provocation (a slap and verbal abuse) was not sufficiently grave to fully justify the reduction of the crime from murder to culpable homicide. While upholding the conviction, the Court reduced the sentence to the period already undergone (4 years), considering the appellant's time served and the circumstances of the case. Appeal partly allowed; conviction upheld but sentence reduced to time already served. Vijay @ Vijayakumar v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 94 : 2025 INSC 90

Section 109. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge

Section 106 IEA - Plea of Alibi - Last Seen Theory - Prosecution must disprove accused's plea of alibi before convicting based on 'last seen' theory. Mere fact that the husband and wife were last seen together in their shared home does not, by itself, justify convicting the husband for the alleged murder if he raises a plea of alibi and the prosecution fails to effectively disprove it. The High Court wrongly placed the burden on the accused to prove his alibi, despite his early claim of absence in an intimation to the police and the police's failure to investigate the same. While a husband's failure to explain his wife's death in their shared home can be a strong incriminating circumstance, it cannot alone establish guilt, especially when he has raised a plausible plea of alibi offering an explanation about his absence at the place of incident. (Para 13 & 14) Jagdish Gond v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 409 : 2025 INSC 460 : AIR 2025 SC 2423

Section 106 IEA - Plea of Alibi - Last Seen Theory - If the prosecution establishes that shortly before the crime, they were seen together or the offence takes place in the dwelling home where the husband also resides, then if the accused does not offer any explanation or offers an explanation which is palpably false; that would be a strong circumstance, establishing his culpability in the crime. However, it cannot be the sole circumstance leading to the conclusion of guilt on the part of the accused husband. In the present case, the accused has also offered an explanation that he had gone for duty at the cement factory; which is also mentioned in the first intimation given by the accused. The police ought to have inquired about his presence at the factory to disprove his alibi. Even before the FIR was registered, the intimation recorded clearly indicated this fact. The explanation was not one offered as an after-thought nor can it be termed to be false or even an improbable one. A mere suspicion cannot lead to a finding of guilt, especially when there is not available a chain of circumstances, unequivocally pointing to the guilt of the accused in the alleged crime. (Para 9) Jagdish Gond v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 409 : 2025 INSC 460 : AIR 2025 SC 2423

Section 106 IEA - Murder - Acquittal - Reversal by High Court - Deceased, married for two years, found dead with ligature mark on neck - Trial Court acquitted husband and in-laws, finding death to be suicide - High Court convicted husband under Section 302 IPC, citing failure to explain death under Section 106 and disbelief in alibi. Held, High Court erred in reversing acquittal without evidence of manifest illegality or perversity in Trial Court's findings - Medical evidence inconclusive on homicidal death - Prosecution failed to disprove husband's plausible alibi of being at work, supported by initial police intimation - Section 106 inapplicable absent prima facie evidence of guilt - No chain of circumstances established guilt unequivocally - Allegations under Sections 498A, 306 IPC unsubstantiated - Conviction set aside, Trial Court's acquittal restored - Appeal allowed. (Para 13 & 14) Jagdish Gond v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 409 : 2025 INSC 460 : AIR 2025 SC 2423

Section 106 IEA - Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge - Application in Criminal Cases - Burden of Proof - Prima Facie case requirement - The Supreme Court reiterated that Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which places the burden of proving facts within the special knowledge of a person on that person, must be applied with care and caution in criminal cases. It cannot be invoked to compensate for the prosecution's failure to establish a prima facie case. The prosecution must first prove all elements necessary to establish the offence, and only then does the burden shift to the accused to explain facts within their special knowledge. Failure to provide a reasonable explanation or giving a false one may be considered a circumstance against the accused, but the prosecution retains the burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, the Court found sufficient prima facie evidence, including the accused's presence at the scene, suspicious conduct, and failure to explain incriminating circumstances, justifying the application of Section 106. The Court set aside the accused's acquittal, allowing the State's appeal. (Paras 76, 78, 80, 82, 88) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : 2025 INSC 261

Section 106 IEA - Held, the accused's failure to explain the circumstances of his wife's death, which occurred within their home with only their daughter present, was a significant factor. The Supreme Court overturned the acquittal of a man accused of murdering his wife, relying heavily on the credible testimony of their seven-year-old daughter. (Para 59) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : 2025 INSC 261

Sections 106, 118 IEA - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 302, 201, and 34 - The case involved a man accused of murdering his wife and secretly cremating her body. The Trial Court convicted him under Sections 302, 201, and 34 of the IPC, but the High Court acquitted him, questioning the reliability of his seven-year-old daughter's testimony due to an 18-day delay in recording. The Supreme Court, finding no evidence of tutoring and noting the testimony's consistency and corroboration by circumstantial evidence, set aside the acquittal and restored the conviction. The State's appeal was allowed, reaffirming that a credible child witness's testimony does not require corroboration to sustain a conviction. (Para 59) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : 2025 INSC 261

Section 106 IEA - Initial burden is upon the prosecution to first prima facie establish the guilt of the accused and then only the burden shifts upon the accused to explain the circumstances as contemplated by Section 106 of the Evidence Act. The court should apply Section 106 of the Evidence Act in criminal cases with care and caution. The ordinary rule which applies to criminal trials and places the onus on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused, does not, in any way, stand modified by the provisions contained under Section 106 of the Evidence Act. The said provision cannot be invoked to make up the inability of the prosecution to produce the evidence of circumstances pointing to the guilt of the accused. The said provision cannot be used to support a conviction unless the prosecution has discharged the onus by proving all elements necessary to establish the offence. In other words, the prosecution does not stand absolved from its initial liability to prove the offence and it is only when such an onus is discharged and a prima facie case of guilt is made out that the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act may come into play. Ravi v. State of Punjab, AIR 2025 SC 1215 : 2025 Cri LJ 1382 : (2025) 3 SCC 584

Section 113. Burden of proof as to ownership

Section 113 BSA - The Section embodies the well-recognised principle that possession is prima facie proof of ownership. A person in possession is entitled to remain in possession until another person can disclose a better title under Section 113 of the BSA. Therefore, once the plaintiff proves that he has been in possession of the suit property, the burden of proving that the plaintiff is not the owner is on the defendant who affirms that the plaintiff is not the owner. The Section does not make a distinction between the Government and a private citizen. Section 113 is, therefore, equally applicable where a Government claims to be the owner or challenges the ownership of the plaintiff who is in possession of the property. It is not disputed that before the possession of the Subject Land was taken over, the plaintiffs were in possession of the property for more than twenty years. The onus, therefore, under section 113 of the BSA was on the State to prove that the Government had a subsisting title to the Subject Land. (Para 72) Yerikala Sunkalamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 344 : 2025 INSC 383

Section 116. Birth during marriage, conclusive proof of legitimacy

Section 112 IEA - Presumption of Legitimacy and Paternity - Whether the presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, determines paternity unless rebutted by proof of non-access. Held, legitimacy and paternity are not independent concepts. Under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, a child born during a valid marriage is presumed to be the legitimate child of the husband unless non-access is proven. The presumption of legitimacy is conclusive and cannot be displaced by mere allegations of adultery or requests for DNA tests without strong evidence of non-access. The presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act is conclusive and can only be rebutted by proving non-access. DNA tests should be ordered sparingly, considering the rights to privacy and dignity of the parties involved. Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : 2025 INSC 115 : AIR 2025 SC 1004

Section 112 IEA - Presumption of Legitimacy and Paternity - Res Judicata - The dispute arose from a maintenance petition filed by the respondent claiming that the appellant was his biological father. The respondent and his mother sought to establish paternity through a DNA test, but the courts consistently upheld the presumption of legitimacy, as the respondent's mother failed to prove non-access during the relevant period. The Family Court initially closed the maintenance petition but allowed its revival if the respondent succeeded in challenging the legitimacy presumption in civil proceedings. When the civil courts upheld the presumption, the Family Court nonetheless revived the maintenance petition, leading to the present appeal. Whether the Family Court was entitled to reopen the maintenance petition. Whether the second round of litigation was barred by the principle of res judicata. Held, the principle of res judicata bars the re-agitation of issues that have already been conclusively decided by a court of competent jurisdiction. The second round of litigation was barred by the principle of res judicata, as the issue of legitimacy had already been conclusively decided by the High Court in 2011, and the Family Court erred in reviving the maintenance petition. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment and the Family Court's order reviving the maintenance petition. The proceedings in the maintenance petition were quashed, and the Court reiterated the importance of finality in litigation under the principle of res judicata. Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : 2025 INSC 115 : AIR 2025 SC 1004

Section 112 IEA - DNA Test and Balancing of Interests - The Court emphasized that DNA tests should not be ordered as a matter of course. The right to privacy and dignity of the parties must be balanced against the child's interest in knowing their biological father. In this case, there was no “eminent need” for a DNA test, as the presumption of legitimacy had not been rebutted, and the respondent's claim was based on unsubstantiated allegations. Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : 2025 INSC 115 : AIR 2025 SC 1004

Section 117. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman

Sections 113A and 113B IEA - The deceased allegedly faced harassment from her husband, in-laws, and the appellant (her brother-in-law) due to dowry demands, leading her to commit suicide by self-immolation. The trial court acquitted all accused of dowry death under Section 304B IPC but convicted them for abetment of suicide. The High Court upheld the conviction. Held, Dowry death cannot be presumed without clear evidence of incessant harassment. There was no cogent evidence to establish that the appellant, as the brother-in-law of the deceased, abetted her suicide. Presumptions under Section 113A of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked without evidence of cruelty or harassment. Mere familial relation to the deceased does not justify the presumption of abetment in the absence of direct or circumstantial evidence. The appeal was allowed, and the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant were set aside. Ram Pyarey v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 66 : 2025 INSC 71 : (2025) 6 SCC 820

Section 118. Presumption as to dowry death

Section 113B IEA - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 304B and 498A - Essential ingredients of - The testimonies contained significant omissions and contradictions, particularly regarding dowry demands and acts of cruelty. The prosecution failed to prove any specific instances of cruelty or harassment "soon before the death," which is a crucial requirement under Section 304-B. The belated statements of the witnesses, recorded more than two months after the incident, appeared to be afterthoughts and lacked credibility. The Court quashed the impugned judgments of the lower courts and acquitted the appellant. The judgment reiterates the importance of proving the essential ingredients of Section 304-B, particularly the requirement of cruelty or harassment "soon before death," and highlights the need for credible and consistent evidence in dowry death cases. The Court also emphasized the role of State Judicial Academies in addressing recurring errors in the application of dowry-related laws. Karan Singh v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 135 : 2025 INSC 133

Section 119 - Court may presume existence of certain facts.

Section 114 IEA - Invocation of Section 114 of the Evidence Act is not at all permissible when the prosecution has failed to discharge its initial burden- The weakness in the defence or the accused's failure to substantiate the fact while answering question in his accused statement cannot become the strength of the prosecution. (Para 37) Hiralal Babulal Soni v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 INSC 266 : AIR 2025 SC 1522

Section 120. Presumption as to absence of consent in certain prosecution for rape

Section 114A IEA - Significance of - Presumption of absence of consent in rape cases - Need for evidence establishing that caste identity was one of the grounds for the offense - Conviction under Section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act cannot be sustained as there is no evidence to prove that the offence was committed on the ground that the victim belonged to a Scheduled Caste. The Supreme Court upholds the conviction under Sections 366, 376(2)(g), and 342 IPC, modifies the sentence for 376(2)(g) IPC from life imprisonment to 10 years rigorous imprisonment, and sets aside the conviction under Section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act. (Paras 25 - 44) Raju @ Umakant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 518 : 2025 INSC 615

Section 124. Who may testify

Child Victim - Evaluation of Evidence - Discrepancies in Testimony - The silence of a traumatized child victim cannot be equated with the silence of an adult and should not automatically benefit the accused. The absence of direct testimony from the victim does not preclude conviction when other compelling evidence exists. Courts must be sensitive to the unique vulnerabilities of child victims and avoid placing undue burden on them. Testimony of persons with disabilities must be given full legal weight, and any judicial attitude that stems from bias and stereotypes against persons with disabilities is to be avoided. (Para 17) State of Rajasthan v. Chatra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 323 : 2025 INSC 360 : AIR 2025 SC 1755 : 2025 Cri LJ 1807

Section 118 IEA - Child a Competent Witness - Law on Child Witness Testimony - No Minimum Age for Testimony - Preliminary Examination Mandatory - Appellate Scrutiny - Admissibility of Testimony - Demeanor Recording - No Mandatory Corroboration - Caution with Discrepancies - Ruling Out Tutoring - Handling Tutored Testimony - Partial Reliability - Minor Discrepancies – Summarized. (Para 58) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : 2025 INSC 261

Section 118 IEA - The Supreme Court laid down comprehensive principles governing child witness testimony emphasizing that: (i) A child is a competent witness if they can understand questions and provide rational answers, with no minimum age prescribed. (ii) Trial Courts must conduct a preliminary examination to assess the child's ability to understand the sanctity of giving evidence and record their satisfaction, including the child's demeanor and responses. (iii) Appellate courts may review the Trial Court's assessment of a child's competency by examining the preliminary examination, testimony, or demeanor during deposition and cross-examination. (iv) A child's testimony is admissible if they demonstrate the ability to understand questions and provide coherent, rational answers. (v) Trial Courts must document the child's demeanor during deposition and ensure the testimony is voluntary and not influenced. (vi) Credible and consistent child testimony does not require corroboration and can solely support a conviction if it inspires confidence and explains events without embellishments. (vi) Corroboration may be required if the testimony is tutored or contains material discrepancies, depending on the case's facts. (viii) Courts must carefully scrutinize child testimony to rule out tutoring, relying on confidence-inspiring testimony absent ulterior motives. (ix) Improvised or fabricated testimony must be addressed by confronting the witness with contradictions or proving tutoring through foundational facts and evidence of motive, delay, or discrepancies. (x) Even if parts of a child's testimony are tutored, the untutored portions can be relied upon if they inspire confidence and can be separated. (xi) Minor inconsistencies or coached elements do not discredit a child's testimony if the core account remains credible and withstands cross-examination. (Para 58) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : 2025 INSC 261

Section 128. Communications during marriage.

Section 122 IEA - Communications during marriage - Constitution of India - Article 21 - Right to privacy – Facts - Appellant-husband in a matrimonial dispute relied on recorded conversation with his wife to prove allegations of cruelty, to which respondent-wife alleged breach of her fundamental right to privacy- High Court held that permitting such recordings in evidence would be unjustified, as conversations were recorded per se cruelty by one party – Held, Section 122 is worded in two parts - “compellability” and “permissibility”- when one of the spouse is not willing to disclose communication made to the other, latter cannot be compelled by any court or authority - “permissibility” if any spouse is willing to disclose communication, then it is not court that can give consent / permission to disclosure but only other spouse can give the same - Rationale behind section 122 was to protect sanctity of marriage and not the right to privacy of the individuals involved - Right to privacy is not a relevant consideration in such disputes - A secretly recorded telephonic conversation of the spouse is admissible as evidence in matrimonial proceedings - That spousal privilege under first part of Section 122 has to be construed in light of the exception provided in same provision - Exception under Section 122 has to be construed in light of the right to a fair trial which is also an aspect of Article 21 of the Constitution - Section 122 carves out an exception to right to privacy between spouses and cannot be applied horizontally at all - Section 122 recognizes right to fair trial, right to produce relevant evidence and right to prove one's case against the spouse so as to avail relief - Court rejected argument that permitting such evidence would disturb domestic harmony in matrimonial relationships, defeating objectives of section 122 – Held, if marriage has reached a stage where spouses are actively snooping on each other, it is in itself a sign of a broken relationship and depicts lack of trust between them - that content of a common law right may be similar to that of a fundamental right, but they are distinguished by the incidence of their duties on private entities and State. Appeal allowed. (Para 8, 8.8, 12) Vibhor Garg v. Neha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 694 : 2025 INSC 829

Section 122 IEA - Validity of secretly obtained evidence - three-fold test of relevance, identification and accuracy has to be satisfied before court admits a recorded conversation in evidence - conversation was recorded without consent and knowledge of person speaking is not a prohibition on admissibility of the evidence. (Para 10) Vibhor Garg v. Neha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 694 : 2025 INSC 829

Section 148. Cross-examination as to previous statements in writing

Section 145 IEA - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 161 – Held, Trial Court failed to follow the proper procedure for contradicting prosecution witnesses with their Section 161 CrPC statements. The portions of a witness's prior statement used for contradiction must be formally proved through the investigating officer and marked as evidence by the trial judge. Merely reproducing contradicted portions in brackets without proof is erroneous. Such portions should be marked (e.g., AA, BB) and cannot form part of the deposition unless duly proved. Consequently, the impugned judgments were quashed, and the appellant was acquitted. (Para 11) Vinod Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 203 : 2025 INSC 209 : AIR 2025 SC 943 : 2025 Cri LJ 1268 : (2025) 3 SCC 680

Section 156. Exclusion of evidence to contradict answers to questions testing veracity.

Section 153 IEA - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 401 r/w. 397 & 372 - Penal Code, 1860; Section 302 - Murder - Reversal of Acquittal - The appellants were acquitted by the trial court in a murder case. The High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted the appellants, sentencing them to life imprisonment. The appellants challenged the High Court's decision, arguing that the reversal of acquittal into conviction was in violation of the statutory bar under Section 401(3) CrPC, which prohibits the conversion of an acquittal into a conviction in revisional jurisdiction. Additionally, the appellants contended that they were not given an opportunity to be heard, violating principles of natural justice and their constitutional rights under Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution of India. Whether the High Court erred in reversing the acquittal and convicting the appellants in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 CrPC, despite the statutory bar under Section 401(3) CrPC ? Whether the High Court violated the principles of natural justice by not providing the appellants an opportunity to be heard before reversing the acquittal ? Whether the proviso to Section 372 CrPC, which grants victims the right to appeal against acquittals, is retrospective in operation and applicable to the case ? Whether the appellants are entitled to compensation for unlawful detention and violation of their fundamental rights? Held, the High Court committed a grave error in reversing the acquittal and convicting the appellants in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. Section 401(3) CrPC expressly prohibits the conversion of an acquittal into a conviction in revisional proceedings. The High Court's action was in direct violation of this statutory bar. The Court further held that the High Court violated the principles of natural justice by not providing the appellants an opportunity to be heard before reversing the acquittal. The appellants' constitutional rights under Articles 21 and 22(1) were infringed, as they were not given a fair chance to defend themselves. The proviso to Section 372 CrPC, which grants victims the right to appeal against acquittals, is not retrospective in operation. Since the revision petition was filed in 2006, before the proviso was introduced in 2009, the victim had no statutory right to appeal at the time. The Court awarded compensation of Rs. 5,00,000/- to each of the appellants for the unlawful detention and violation of their fundamental rights. The State Government was directed to pay the compensation within four weeks. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's judgment, and acquitted the appellants. The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to statutory limitations on revisional jurisdiction and upholding the principles of natural justice. The State Government was held responsible for the violation of the appellants' rights and was ordered to pay compensation. Section 401(3) CrPC prohibits the High Court from converting an acquittal into a conviction in revisional jurisdiction. Natural Justice requires that the accused be given an opportunity to be heard before any adverse order is passed. Proviso to Section 372 CrPC is not retrospective and does not apply to cases filed before its introduction in 2009. Compensation can be awarded for unlawful detention and violation of fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The appeals were allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the State Government was directed to pay Rs. 5,00,000/- as compensation to each appellant within four weeks. Mahabir v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 121 : 2025 INSC 120

Section 168. Judge's power to put questions or order production

Section 165 IEA - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 311 - Powers of Court to Summon and Examine Witnesses - Wide Discretion of Courts - Role of the Judge - Section 311 CrPC grants courts broad discretionary powers to summon or recall witnesses at any stage of a trial, including after evidence closure, either suo moto or on application by parties, to ensure the availability of valuable evidence for a just decision. Section 311 CrPC works in tandem with Section 165 of the Evidence Act, empowering courts to actively participate in trials by questioning witnesses to elicit truth, without being limited by Section 162 CrPC restrictions. Courts may allow additional prosecution witnesses not listed in the charge-sheet if their examination is deemed necessary due to oversight or other reasons, following standard procedures of examination-in-chief and cross-examination. Courts can summon witnesses under Section 311 CrPC and Section 165 Evidence Act if neither party calls them but their evidence is essential for justice. Cross-examination of court witnesses is permitted only with court approval and is restricted to their court testimony, not prior statements under Section 161 CrPC. Unlike prosecution witnesses, court witnesses cannot be contradicted with prior statements under Section 161 CrPC, as per the proviso to Section 162(1) CrPC. However, courts retain wide powers under Section 165 Evidence Act to ask any question, relevant or irrelevant, without such restrictions. A judge must actively participate in trials as a truth-seeker, not a mere referee, using Section 165 Evidence Act powers to question witnesses while avoiding prosecutorial bias, ensuring fairness to both prosecution and defense. (Para 48 - 52) K.P. Tamilmaran v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 493 : 2025 INSC 576

Section 165 IEA - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 84 & 302 - Murder - Plea of Insanity - Absence of Motive - The Supreme Court reduced the conviction of a mother, who killed her daughters (aged 3 and 5), from murder under Section 302 IPC to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part II IPC, imposing a maximum sentence of 10 years. The appellant's claim of acting under an "invisible influence," coupled with her behavior—shouting during the act, crying afterward, and not fleeing—suggested an impaired mental state, possibly temporary insanity. Although the insanity defense under Section 84 IPC was not fully accepted due to insufficient medical evidence, the absence of motive in such a grave offense supported the plea, raising doubts about mens rea. Noting the appellant had served 9 years and 10 months, the Court ordered her release. Trial courts were directed to proactively seek truth under Section 165 of the Evidence Act in cases involving bizarre, inexplicable acts or claims of mental instability, especially when temporary unsoundness of mind is suggested. Courts must consider that rural, less-educated individuals may not articulate mental disorders (e.g., schizophrenia, bipolar disorder) precisely, and such pleas should not be dismissed summarily. Lack of motive and erratic behavior may cast reasonable doubt on intent, warranting careful evaluation to ensure justice in grave offenses. (Para 33, 36, 39, 50, 58, 64) Chunni Bai v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 497 : 2025 INSC 577 : AIR 2025 SC 2370

Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972

Rule 2(g) and 17 - Contractual service period of government employees must be included for pensionary benefits once they are regularised. Interpreting Rule 17 of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972, the Court overruled the exclusion of contractual employees under Rule 2(g), stating that the entire service period, including contractual and regular service, counts for pension purposes. The Court directed the Union of India to facilitate the exercise of options under Rule 17 and notify the amounts payable for pension benefits. (Referred: State of Himachal Pradesh v. Sheela Devi, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1272, Para 8 & 9) S.D. Jayaprakash v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 506 : 2025 INSC 594

Central Excise Act, 1944

Section 4(1)(a), 11A(1) and 11AC - Whether the price fixed under the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Oil Marketing Companies (OMCs) was the sole consideration for the sale of petroleum products, as required under Section 4(1)(a) of the Central Excise Act, 1944? Whether the extended period of limitation under Section 11A(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944, could be invoked by the Revenue? Whether the penalty imposed under Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944, was justified? The appellant, Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (BPCL), along with other OMCs (Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (IOCL) and Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (HPCL)), entered into an MOU on March 31, 2002, to ensure the smooth supply and distribution of petroleum products across India. The MOU stipulated that petroleum products would be sold among OMCs at the Import Parity Price (IPP), which was lower than the price at which OMCs sold products to their own dealers. The Revenue issued show-cause notices to BPCL and other OMCs, alleging that the transaction value for excise duty should be based on the price at which OMCs sold products to their own dealers, rather than the IPP. The Revenue invoked the extended period of limitation under Section 11A(1) and imposed penalties under Section 11AC, alleging suppression of facts. Held, the price under the MOU was not the sole consideration for the sale. The MOU was primarily aimed at ensuring uninterrupted supply and distribution of petroleum products across India, and the arrangement was not a commercial sale but a mutual agreement for product sharing. Therefore, the transaction value for excise duty could not be based on the IPP, and Section 4(1)(a) of the Central Excise Act, 1944, was not applicable. The extended period of limitation under Section 11A(1) could not be invoked. The Revenue was aware of the MOU, and there was no suppression of facts by BPCL. The MOU was executed at the behest of the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, and the Revenue had knowledge of its existence through various circulars and tribunal decisions. The penalty under Section 11AC was not justified as there was no evidence of fraud, collusion, or wilful mis-statement by BPCL. The invocation of the extended period of limitation was itself found to be invalid, and thus, the penalty could not be sustained. BPCL's appeal was allowed, and the demand for excise duty, along with the penalty, was set aside. Other appeals involving IOCL and HPCL were remanded to the Tribunal for fresh adjudication in light of the findings in this judgment. The Supreme Court clarified that the MOU between OMCs was not a commercial transaction but a mutual arrangement to ensure the smooth supply of petroleum products. The price under the MOU was not the sole consideration for the sale, and the Revenue could not invoke the extended period of limitation or impose penalties under Section 11AC. The judgment emphasizes the importance of examining the true nature of transactions and the conditions under which the extended period of limitation can be invoked. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise Nashik Commissionerate, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 86

Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985

Central Excise Rules, 1944; Rule 56(2) and 56(4) - Test reports justifying reclassification under the Act must be disclosed to manufacturer. Test reports forming the basis for reclassification of petrochemical products under the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985, leading to higher duty demands, must be disclosed to the manufacturer-taxpayer. The Court set aside a ₹2.15 crore duty demand finding that the revenue authorities violated natural justice by failing to share critical test reports used to reclassify Benzene and Toluene. The non-disclosure breached Rule 56(2) and Rule 56(4) depriving the manufacturer of the right to seek a re-test. Withholding such documents, relied upon for adverse decisions, constitutes a clear breach of natural justice principles. Appeal allowed. (Para 37 & 39) Oswal Petrochemicals Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 500 : 2025 INSC 578

Child

Child Custody - Best Interests of the Child - Mental Capacity - Expert Opinion - When there is uncertainty about the child's ability to make independent decisions, expert opinions confirming a disability should be prioritized over inferences drawn from direct interactions with the child. The Court emphasized the importance of relying on expert medical assessments to determine the capacity of individuals with disabilities to make independent decisions. When a specialist's expert opinion confirms a child's inability to make independent decisions, custody decisions should not be based on the child's implied or express consent, as it could have significant consequences for the child. (Para 22) Sharmila Velamur v. V. Sanjay, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 277 : 2025 INSC 299

Child Custody - Cognitive Capacity - Courts should give due credence to expert opinions on a person's mental capacity, especially when dealing with individuals with cognitive limitations. In child custody matters, the best interests and welfare of the child are paramount, even when considering the wishes of a child with limited capacity. The totality of circumstances must be considered when determining the best interests of the child, including their education, support system, emotional well-being, and familial relationships. (Para 32) Sharmila Velamur v. V. Sanjay, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 277 : 2025 INSC 299

Child Custody - Foreign Orders - Principle of comity of courts and a pre-existing order of a Foreign Court must yield to the best interests of the child, especially when the Court has decided to conduct an elaborate enquiry in this regard. Such cases must be decided on the sole and predominant criterion of 'what would serve the interests and welfare' of the minor. The preexisting order of a Foreign Court is merely one of the circumstances to consider when assessing the best interests and welfare of the person concerned. This doctrine was evolved to protect children who may, unwittingly, become collateral damage in their parents' legal disputes. It has gained significance over the past several years, owing to the frequency and ease of migration. (Para 31) Sharmila Velamur v. V. Sanjay, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 277 : 2025 INSC 299

Child Custody - International Parental Child Abduction - The Appellant (mother) and Respondent No. 4 (father) are US citizens, divorced in the US. Their elder son has mild intellectual developmental disorder and cerebral palsy, resulting in significant cognitive limitations. After the divorce, the father brought the child to India. The mother filed a petition in the High Court alleging illegal detention. The High Court, after a brief interaction with the child, ruled that he was consensually living with his father in India. The Supreme Court, doubting the child's capacity to make independent decisions, ordered a medical assessment at NIMHANS, Bengaluru. The assessment concluded that the child's cognitive abilities were equivalent to an 8–10-year-old, and he lacked the capacity to make complex decisions. Whether the child has the capacity to make independent decisions regarding his place of residence. What course of action would best serve the child's interests and welfare. Held, the Supreme Court relied on the expert opinions from NIMHANS and a previous evaluation by the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, concluding that the child does not possess the capacity to make independent, informed decisions on complex matters like long-term residence. The High Court erred in relying solely 2 on a brief interaction with the child. Applying the doctrine of parens patriae, the Supreme Court determined that the child's best interests lie in returning to the US. This decision considered the child's established life, education, support system, and close relationship with his younger brother, who also has special needs, in the US. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court judgment, and ordered the repatriation of the child to the US under the sole custody of the mother. The father was directed not to impede their return and to maintain contact with his sons. The US Consulate General, Chennai was directed to return the child's passport and facilitate his return. (Para 41) Sharmila Velamur v. V. Sanjay, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 277 : 2025 INSC 299

Hospitals must face immediate licence suspension if found complicit in such heinous acts. Any instance of newborn trafficking from a hospital must trigger not only penal consequences but also regulatory action, including the suspension of the hospital's operational licence. Pinki v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 424 : 2025 INSC 482 : (2025) 7 SCC 314

The Supreme Court directs completion of child trafficking case trials in 6 months; issues directions to states on handling such cases. Pinki v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 424 : 2025 INSC 482 : (2025) 7 SCC 314

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Amendment of Plaint - Continuous Cause of Action - Debarment orders - Limitation Period - The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision allowing the respondent to amend its plaint in a civil suit challenging debarment orders. The Court held that the subsequent debarment orders and related events constituted a continuous cause of action, arising from the original memo dated 08.03.2016, and did not change the nature or character of the suit. Thus, a fresh suit was not required. The Court rejected the appellants' argument that the amendment application was time-barred. It held that the cause of action was continuous, and the limitation period did not expire, especially considering the COVID-19 exclusion and the High Court's order dated 24.01.2020, which kept the issue of the debarment's legality open. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the appellants' challenge to the High Court's order allowing the amendment of the plaint. State of West Bengal v. Pam Developments, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 52 : 2025 INSC 69 : (2025) 3 SCC 356

Execution of Decree - Extension of Time - Limitation - Doctrine of Merger - Executing Court's extension for depositing the advance payment cannot be interfered with. Since the Appellate Court's ruling, which lacked a time limit, superseded the Trial Court's decision under the doctrine of merger, the Executing Court was not bound by the Trial Court's timeline. (Para 10) Raju Naidu v. Chenmouga Sundra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 331 : 2025 INSC 368

Execution Proceedings – Delay in Execution of Decree – Directions - Execution proceedings should not be used to re-litigate issues already decided in the suit. The executing court's role is limited to ensuring the decree is executed, not to question its validity. The judgment underscores the importance of timely execution of decrees and prevents parties from frustrating decrees through collusive claims raised during execution proceedings. It reaffirms the principle that executing courts cannot go behind the decree or re-adjudicate issues already decided in the suit. The Court issued directions to all High Courts to monitor and expedite the disposal of pending execution petitions, emphasizing the need to avoid delays in the execution of decrees. The Court reiterated the need for expeditious disposal of execution proceedings, directing all High Courts to ensure pending execution petitions are decided within six months. (Para 75) Periyammal v. V. Rajamani, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 293 : 2025 INSC 329 : [2025] 3 SCR 540

Injunction Suit – Requirement for Declaration of Title - The appellants (original plaintiffs) filed a Title Suit seeking a permanent injunction against the defendants to restrain them from entering or interfering with the suit land. The Trial Court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiffs, which was affirmed by the First Appellate Court. However, the High Court allowed the Second Appeal filed by the defendants on the ground that the suit for injunction simpliciter was not maintainable without a prayer for declaration of title. Whether a suit for permanent injunction simpliciter is maintainable without a prayer for declaration of title when the defendants do not dispute the plaintiffs' title. Held, A suit for permanent injunction simpliciter is maintainable without a declaration of title when the defendants do not dispute the title of the plaintiffs. The High Court failed to properly consider relevant issues, including the fact that the defendants did not dispute the plaintiffs' title. The matter was remitted back to the High Court for fresh consideration of the Second Appeal in accordance with the law. Krushna Chandra Behera v. Narayan Nayak, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 69

Suit for Injunction Simpliciter - Effect of Non-Challenge to Validity of Documents - The appellants' argument that the respondent did not challenge the validity of the General Power of Attorney (GPA) and agreement to sell dated 04.04.1986 or the registered sale deed dated 01.04.1998 does not alter the legal position of the parties. In a suit for injunction simpliciter, the absence of a specific challenge to the validity of these documents or a separate prayer for declaration of title does not impact the legal standing of the parties when no direct challenge to the instruments' validity is raised. (Para 57) M.S. Ananthamurthy v. J. Manjula, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 257

Moulding of relief - The concept of moulding of relief refers to the ability of a court to modify or shape a relief sought by a party in a legal proceeding based on the circumstances of the case and the facts established after a full-fledged trial. The principle enables the court to grant appropriate remedies even if the relief requested in the pleading is not exact or could not be considered by the court or changed circumstances have rendered the relief obsolete. The court aims that justice is served while taking into account the evolving nature of a case. The above road map is pursued by a court based on the notion of flexibility in relief, equitable jurisdiction, and is tempered by judicial discretion. When moulding the relief, the court considers the issues and circumstances established during the full-fledged trial, looks at shortening the litigation, and then in its perspective, renders complete justice to the issue at hand. The converse of the above is that the moulded relief should not take the aggrieved party by surprise or cause prejudice. The relief is moulded as an exception and not as a matter of course. (Para 20) J. Ganapatha v. N. Selvarajalou Chetty Trust, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 353 : 2025 INSC 395

Moulding of relief - Shortening Litigation - It would not be in the interest of justice to make the executor-HBN Shetty (80 years) to file another suit to oblige the terms of the Will of the testatrix, who was found as a real owner of the property. Therefore, instead of asking him to file another suit, the High Court was justified in moulding the relief in favor of the executor so that the fruits of the Will could be reaped by the beneficiary- Vinayagamurthy and his children. (Para 22 & 24) J. Ganapatha v. N. Selvarajalou Chetty Trust, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 353 : 2025 INSC 395

Section 11 - Res Judicata and Findings on Title in Injunction Suits - In a suit for injunction, where the question of title is directly and substantially in issue and a finding on title is necessary to grant the injunction, with a specific issue on title framed, a separate prayer for declaration of title is not mandatory. A subsequent suit on title will be barred by res judicata if title-related facts were pleaded and adjudicated by the Trial Court, as findings on possession may depend solely on title. However, if a finding on title is not essential for deciding possession or granting an injunction, or no specific issue on title is framed, any observations on title are incidental and do not attract res judicata. Findings on title in an earlier suit will operate as res judicata in a later suit only if title was directly and substantially in issue. (Para 58, 59) M.S. Ananthamurthy v. J. Manjula, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 257

Section 21 - Principles of - Objections regarding the place of suing must be raised at the earliest opportunity in the court of first instance. Punjab National Bank v. Atin Arora, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 27

Section 34 - Denial of Interest - Abuse of Judicial Process - Forum Shopping - Commercial Disputes - Discretionary Relief - Contractual Obligations - In commercial disputes, interest under Section 34 CPC is typically awarded to compensate for the time value of money. However, such discretionary relief may be denied if a party abuses the judicial process. The appellant, found guilty of forum shopping, non-compliance with court orders, and approaching the court with unclean hands, was disentitled to interest despite HUDCO's breach of contractual obligations warranting a refund of the forfeited amount. The Court directed HUDCO to refund the principal sum within three months, with 6% per annum interest applicable only in case of delayed payment. (Paras 58, 59) Tomorrowland v. Housing and Urban Development Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 205 : 2025 INSC 207

Section 34 - Interest on Delayed Payment - Commercial Transaction - Courts have the authority to determine the appropriate rate of interest to be awarded for decree amounts. The Court also have the discretion to decide from which date the interest is payable- whether from the date of the filing of the suit, from any date prior to it, or the date of decree. In the absence of an agreement between the parties regarding the rate of interest on delayed payment of amount in a commercial transaction, the interest may exceed 6% p.a. as per Section 34 CPC after taking into account the totality of facts and circumstances in accordance with law. (Para 13 - 17) I.K. Merchants Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 377

Section 47, Order XXI Rule 97 & 101 - Execution of Decree for Possession - Scope and Applicability - Section 47 of the CPC provides for the determination of questions relating to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of a decree between the parties to the suit. Order XXI Rule 97 r/w 101, addresses specific situations where a decree-holder for possession of immovable property faces resistance or obstruction in obtaining possession. While Section 47 is a general provision applicable to all executions, Order XXI Rules 97 and 101 deal specifically with the execution of decrees for possession. Order XXI Rule 97, empowers the executing court to adjudicate on obstructions by "any person," including judgment-debtors and third parties and Rule 101 mandates the determination of all questions, including those related to right, title, or interest, arising in such proceedings. An application filed under Section 47, if pertaining to resistance or obstruction in obtaining possession, can be treated as an application under Order XXI Rule 97 and adjudicated under Rule 98. The executing court has a duty to consider the substance of the application and apply the relevant rule, even if the application is incorrectly labeled. Dispossession is not a prerequisite for entertaining an application under Order XXI Rule 97. The procedure under order 21 rule 97 and 101 is a specific procedure, and supercedes the general procedure of section 47, when dealing with execution of a decree of possession. (Para 51 - 54) Periyammal v. V. Rajamani, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 293 : 2025 INSC 329 : [2025] 3 SCR 540

Section 47 - Collusion and Delay in Execution - Whether the courts below erred in upholding objections raised by the respondents (claiming possession as cultivating tenants) against the execution of a decree for specific performance and possession. Whether the respondents are entitled to protection under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants' Protection Act, 1955, and whether the executing court could decide the validity of the decree on this ground. The appellants sought specific performance of a 1980 sale agreement for immovable property. The trial court decreed in their favor in 1986, directing the vendors to execute the sale deed and deliver possession. The decree was upheld by the High Court in 2004 and the Supreme Court in 2006. During execution, the respondents (nephews of the vendors) obstructed possession, claiming to be 2 cultivating tenants in possession since 1967. They filed an application under Section 47 of the CPC, which was allowed by the executing court and upheld by the High Court. The appellants challenged the orders, arguing that the respondents' claims were collusive and aimed at frustrating the decree. Held, the respondents' claims of being cultivating tenants were raised belatedly during execution proceedings, despite being aware of the litigation since 1983. The respondents' actions, supported by the vendors, were collusive and aimed at delaying the execution of the decree. The Court rejected the respondents' claim of protection under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants' Protection Act, 1955, as they were only registered as tenants in 2008, long after the decree was passed. The certificate of possession granted in 2008 was based on a “no objection” from the vendors, who no longer held title to the property. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the impugned orders of the High Court and the executing court. The executing court was directed to deliver vacant and peaceful possession of the suit property to the appellants within two months, with police assistance if necessary. (Para 70) Periyammal v. V. Rajamani, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 293 : 2025 INSC 329 : [2025] 3 SCR 540

Section 47 - Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 34 - An arbitral award for claims not included in an approved IBC resolution plan is unenforceable, as such claims are extinguished upon approval under Section 31 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The Court allowed Electrosteel Steels Ltd.'s appeal against the enforcement of an Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council (MSEFC) arbitral award, ruling it non-executable due to the approved resolution plan settling operational creditors' claims at nil. The Court clarified that objections to an award's execution under Section 47 CPC are permissible if the award is a nullity, independent of a challenge under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, and that the MSEFC lacked jurisdiction to pass the award post-approval. (Para 50 - 52) Electrosteel Steel v. Ispat Carrier, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 491 : 2025 INSC 525

Section 80 - Amendments to a plaint are permissible when they pertain to a continuous cause of action, and such amendments do not necessitate a fresh suit or a Section 80 CPC notice to the government. The requirement of issuing a notice under Section 80 of the CPC was irrelevant in this case, as the amendment sought was part of a continuous cause of action and did not alter the suit's nature. State of West Bengal v. Pam Developments, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 52 : 2025 INSC 69 : (2025) 3 SCC 356

Section 80 - Mandatory Notice - State's failure to respond to appellants' notice criticized - Public authorities must address statutory notices seriously to promote justice and avoid litigation – non-response may invite adverse inference - Judgment copies to be circulated to all High Courts and State Chief Secretaries, emphasizing Section 80 CPC compliance. (Para 113 & 129) Yerikala Sunkalamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 344 : 2025 INSC 383

Section 80 - When an application seeking an amendment to plaint is filed due to subsequent developments intrinsically linked to the main cause of action, it constitutes a continuous cause of action, and no notice to the government is required under Section 80 CPC. State of West Bengal v. Pam Developments, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 52 : 2025 INSC 69 : (2025) 3 SCC 356

Section 96, Order XXIII Rule 3 & Order XLIII Rule 1A - Compromise Decree - Held, a party to a compromise decree cannot directly appeal to the Appellate Court under Order XLIII Rule 1A of the CPC without first challenging the compromise's validity before the Trial Court under the proviso to Order XXIII Rule 3. Order XLIII Rule 1A does not create an independent right of appeal but allows challenges to a compromise only within an existing appeal under Section 96(1) CPC, after the Trial Court decides the objection. A party bound by the compromise is barred from appealing under Section 96(3) CPC, and non-parties affected by a consent decree may appeal under Section 96 with leave. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's Larger Bench decision. (Paras 8 & 15) Sakina Sultanali Sunesara v. Shia Imami Ismaili Momin Jamat Samaj, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 489 : 2025 INSC 570

Section 96(2), Order IX Rule 13 - Delay Condonation - Bona Fides Essential - Held, repeating previously rejected grounds for condonation constitutes an abuse of process. Courts must first evaluate the bona fides of the explanation for delay before examining the merits of the case. Substantial justice cannot override the prejudice to the opposing party without reasonable grounds for delay. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order condoning a 1,116-day delay in filing an appeal against an ex-parte decree, emphasizing that condonation cannot be granted merely as an act of generosity. Condonation under Order IX Rule 13 CPC requires a bona fide explanation, such as non-service of summons or sufficient cause for non-appearance. The Respondents' attempt to re-agitate grounds previously rejected under Order IX Rule 13 CPC in an appeal under Section 96(2) CPC was impermissible and an abuse of process. Condonation applications must establish genuine reasons, with merits of the main matter considered only if sufficient cause is shown and balanced against prejudice to the opposing party. Appeal allowed; High Court's order set aside. (Paras 30 - 32) Thirunagalingam v. Lingeswaran, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 560 : 2025 INSC 672 : [2025] 6 SCR 253

Sections 96 and 100 - Right to Appeal - Scope of Leave to Appeal - Aggrieved Person - Lis Pendens Transferee - Principles Governing Third-Party Appeals - Appeal by Lis Pendens Transferee Against Refusal of Leave to Appeal in a Specific Performance Decree. Held, Sections 96 and 100 of the CPC govern appeals from original and appellate decrees, respectively, without specifying eligible appellants. Only an "aggrieved person" may appeal, excluding strangers to the suit suffering only psychological or indirect harm. A third party, including a lis pendens transferee, may seek leave to appeal if the decree directly affects their rights, despite not being a party to the suit. Leave is granted at the court's discretion to non-parties bound by the decree who cannot challenge it in other proceedings. A lis pendens transferee, though not impleaded under Order XXII Rule 10, may seek leave to appeal a final decree against their transferor, subject to judicious exercise of discretion based on case-specific facts. (Paras 43, 58) H. Anjanappa v. A Prabhakar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 123 : 2025 INSC 121

Sections 96 and 100 - Law governing the grant of leave to appeal - Only an aggrieved person, whose rights are prejudicially affected by a judgment or decree, can file an appeal, even if they are not a party to the proceedings, provided they obtain leave from the appellate court. The expression "person aggrieved" was clarified to exclude those suffering from psychological or imaginary injuries, and it was held that leave to appeal should not be granted to those remotely or indirectly affected by a decree. H. Anjanappa v. A Prabhakar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 123 : 2025 INSC 121

Sections 96 and 100 - Whether the High Court erred in condoning a delay of 586 days in filing a regular first appeal and granting leave to appeal. The High Court had allowed the condonation of delay, considering factors such as the appellants' advanced age (75 and 66 years), their residence abroad, and their purchase of 4 acres of land from the suit property, while noting that their vendor had failed to protect their interests. Held, the High Court committed an egregious error in condoning the delay, as the appellants failed to demonstrate sufficient cause for the delay and were not vigilant in pursuing their rights. The Court also addressed the issue of granting leave to appeal, noting that the rejection of the appellants' impleadment application by the Trial Court, which had attained finality, precluded them from seeking leave to appeal against the final decree of specific performance. The findings of the Trial Court in rejecting the impleadment application would operate as res judicata in any appeal filed by the transferee pendente lite. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order. H. Anjanappa v. A Prabhakar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 123 : 2025 INSC 121

Section 100 - Limitation Act, 1963 – Section 3 and Article 59 - The High Court in a second appeal, without adjudicating the substantial question of law, had remanded the matter to the trial court for fresh consideration after 25 years of prolonged litigation just because no specific issue of limitation was framed by the trial court. Held, the High Court's approach erroneous; no error was committed by the trial court and first appellate court in dismissing the suit on grounds of limitation by exercising their powers under Section 3 of the Limitation Act regardless of the fact that no issue of limitation was framed by them. The High Court's judgment was set aside, and the trial court's dismissal restored. (Para 23) R. Nagaraj v. Rajmani, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 416 : 2025 INSC 478

Sections 100 to 103 – High Court's Jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC – Scope of Substantial Question of Law – Re-appreciation of evidence by High Court impermissible unless First Appellate Court's findings are perverse or lack evidentiary support – Section 103 CPC allows High Court to examine facts only when lower courts fail to determine critical facts or when a substantial question of law necessitates fact re-determination – Plausible findings of First Appellate Court, based on thorough analysis of oral and documentary evidence, cannot be disturbed merely because an alternative view is possible – High Court's interference by re-appreciating evidence without framing a substantial question of law held erroneous – Judgment and decree of First Appellate Court restored. (Para 12) Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 494 : 2025 INSC 532

Sections 100 and 151 - High Courts lack the jurisdiction to pass interim orders in a second appeal under Section 100 CPC without first framing a substantial question of law. The Court set aside an interim order of the High Court that directed maintenance of status quo in a second appeal without formulating such a question. The High Court's jurisdiction in a second appeal is invoked only upon framing a substantial question of law as mandated under Section 100 CPC. Inherent powers under Section 151 CPC cannot be exercised to grant interim relief in violation of this mandate. The practice of issuing a Notice of Motion before admitting an appeal does not exempt the requirement to frame a substantial question of law. If no such question arises, the second appeal must be dismissed. The appeal was allowed, and the High Court's interim order was set aside. (Para 10, 11) U. Sudheera v. C. Yashoda, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 79 : 2025 INSC 80 : [2025] 2 SCR 92 : (2025) 4 SCC 215

Section 100 - Legal Principles - Interim Orders - Whether the High Court can grant an interim order (status quo) in a second appeal under Section 100 CPC without first formulating a substantial question of law. The appellants challenged an interim order passed by the High Court in a second appeal which directed the parties to maintain status quo without framing any substantial question of law. The dispute involved a suit for permanent injunction over a property, where the trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, but the first appellate court reversed the decision, holding that the plaintiff could not maintain a suit for injunction without seeking a declaration of title. The High Court granted interim relief (status quo) without formulating a substantial question of law, which was challenged before the Supreme Court. Held, A second appeal lies to the High Court only if a substantial question of law is involved. The High Court must formulate such a question before proceeding with the appeal. The High Court cannot grant interim relief in a second appeal without first framing a substantial question of law, as this violates the mandate of Section 100 CPC. The High Court erred in granting interim relief without formulating a substantial question of law, as required under Section 100 CPC. The interim order was set aside, and the appeal was allowed. U. Sudheera v. C. Yashoda, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 79 : 2025 INSC 80 : [2025] 2 SCR 92 : (2025) 4 SCC 215

Section 114 and Order XLVII - Review of Judgment - A court may consider a document not previously produced, despite due diligence, if it is relevant to the issues decided and has significant intrinsic value that could potentially alter the case's outcome. (Para 35) Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Mahadeo Krishna Naik, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 212 : 2025 INSC 218 : [2025] 3 SCR 100

Order 1 Rule 8 - Maintainability of suits filed without obtaining leave - The absence of prior leave under Order 1 Rule 8 CPC is a procedural defect that can be rectified and does not render a suit non-maintainable or preclude the grant of interim relief. However, obtaining leave is essential for the enforceability of orders in a representative capacity, binding all members of the represented group. Leave may be sought at any stage of the proceedings. Orders passed before granting leave may not bind the entire group. Appeals dismissed where no application under Order 1 Rule 8 was filed or was withdrawn; orders upheld where such an application remains pending. [Referred: Krishnan Vasudevan v. Shareef, (2005) 12 SCC 180] (Paras 62 - 63) Dr. Vimal Sukumar v. D. Lawrence, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 525 : 2025 INSC 622

Order 1 Rule 8 - Synod Meeting Upheld - Election of Moderator Declared Illegal - Constitutional Amendments Restrained - Other Elections Valid - Appointment of Administrators - Prima Facie Findings - The election of Bishop Dharmaraj Rasalam as Moderator of the Church of South India (CSI) in 2020 was declared illegal due to non-compliance with CSI constitutional requirements, as he lacked the mandatory three years of service before retirement at the time of nomination. The amendment extending the retirement age of Bishops to 70 years was deemed unenforceable for want of proper ratification. The Special Synod Meeting held on March 7, 2022, was found to be valid, with due process observed in its convening, notice, and conduct, thereby setting aside the High Court's contrary findings. The Court restrained the implementation of amendments to the CSI Constitution and bye-laws regarding the age of Bishops and tenure of elected members, passed in the March 7, 2022 meeting, pending the final disposal of suits in the High Court. The elections of other office bearers (Deputy Moderator, General Secretary, and Treasurer) were upheld, subject to the outcome of the pending suits. The High Court's direction to appoint two retired High Court judges as administrators to conduct fresh elections for the Moderator was sustained, citing the illegality of the current Moderator's election and the need for proper governance of the CSI's 4.5 million members. The Court's observations were clarified as prima facie, not prejudging the merits of the suits pending in the High Court. Appeals against the High Court orders dated February 27, 2024, and April 12, 2024, were partly allowed, quashing the single judge's findings under Order 1 Rule 8 CPC and setting aside specific Division Bench findings regarding the Synod meeting and amendments. An interim injunction was granted to restrain the implementation of the disputed amendments until the suits are resolved. (Paras 52 - 61) Dr. Vimal Sukumar v. D. Lawrence, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 525 : 2025 INSC 622

Order I Rule 10 & Order XXII Rule 5 - Whether a subsequent application under Order I Rule 10 CPC to delete a party, after rejection of an objection to their impleadment, is barred by res judicata. Held, the principle of res judicata applies to impleadment proceedings under Order I Rule 10 CPC. Once an impleadment order attains finality without objection or challenge, a subsequent application to delete the impleaded party is barred by constructive res judicata. Permitting repeated objections after conclusive determination violates principles of fairness and justice, causing uncertainty. The appellant, having failed to challenge his impleadment as a legal heir under Order XXII Rule 5 at the relevant stage, could not later seek deletion under Order I Rule 10. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the Trial Court and High Court's rejection of the deletion application. (Para 51, 54 & 60) Sulthan Said Ibrahim v. Prakasan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 622 : 2025 INSC 764

Order I Rule 10, Order XXII Rule 10 - Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Section 52 - Transferee Pendente Lite - Discretionary Impleadment - No Automatic Right to Join or Appeal - Binding Effect of Decree - Leave to Appeal - Alternative Remedies - Whether a transferee pendente lite has an automatic right to be impleaded in a suit or to appeal a decree. Held, a transferee pendente lite (purchaser of suit property during litigation) has no automatic right to be impleaded under Order I Rule 10 or Order XXII Rule 10 CPC or to appeal a decree, except in exceptional circumstances where their rights are demonstrably prejudiced. Impleadment is discretionary, based on the suit's nature and evidence, and not a matter of right. Under Section 52 TPA, pendente lite transfers are subject to the suit's outcome, binding transferees to the decree, even if unrepresented. Failure to seek impleadment risks improper suit conduct by the plaintiff, but the decree remains binding. Transferees may seek leave to appeal only if they prove adverse impact as aggrieved parties. Separate legal remedies are available for recovery of consideration if cheated, but this does not confer impleadment rights. Respondents No. 1 and 2, pendente lite transferees, purchased suit property during a specific performance suit but were denied impleadment by the trial court, a decision that attained finality. The High Court erroneously allowed their appeal, citing adverse impact. The Supreme Court reversed this, holding that the transferees, bound by Section 52 TPA and purchasing during an active injunction, had no right to appeal without impleadment. Appeal allowed; High Court's decision set aside. (Paras 57 - 61) H. Anjanappa v. A Prabhakar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 123 : 2025 INSC 121

Order 1 Rule 10 (2) - Whether a subsequent purchaser can be impleaded as a party in a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell. Held, a subsequent purchaser, though not a necessary party, can be impleaded as a proper party in a specific performance suit if their rights are affected by the adjudication. A necessary party is one without whom no effective decree can be passed, while a proper party is one whose presence aids the court in effectively and comprehensively adjudicating all issues in dispute. (Para 32) J.N Real Estate v. Shailendra Pradhan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 519 : 2025 INSC 611

Order 1 Rule 10 (2) - The appellant, a stranger to the suit, sought impleadment in a specific performance suit, claiming rights to the suit property based on a registered sale deed. The plaintiff did not oppose the impleadment, but the High Court, under Article 227, overturned the trial court's order allowing the appellant's inclusion. Held, the genuineness of the transaction involving the appellant was disputed and required determination at trial. Impleading the appellant as a proper party would not prejudice the case and would enable effective adjudication. Relying on Sumtibai v. Paras Finance Co., (2007) 10 SCC 82, the Court affirmed that a third party showing a semblance of title or interest can seek impleadment under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of CPC, subject to the court's discretion. Appeal allowed; trial court's order permitting impleadment of the appellant as a proper party restored. (Para 33) J.N Real Estate v. Shailendra Pradhan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 519 : 2025 INSC 611

Order II Rule 2 - A subsequent suit filed on a different cause of action would not be subject to the bar under Order II Rule 2 CPC. The Court justified the filing of a subsequent suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell, following the institution of an earlier suit seeking a permanent injunction, noting that both suits were based on distinct causes of action. Order II Rule 2 CPC mandates that a plaintiff include the whole claim he is entitled to, arising from the same cause of action, in a single suit. The rule seeks to prevent the splitting of claims and multiplicity of suits based on the same cause of action. However, the Court said that the Rule would not be applicable when the subsequent suit was filed on a different cause of action than that of the cause of action for the first suit. Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd. v. Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 73 : 2025 INSC 73 : [2025] 2 SCR 123 : AIR 2025 SC 849

Order II Rule 2 of the CPC mandates including the entire claim arising from the same cause of action in one suit, it should not be misconstrued to require combining all different causes of action stemming from the same transaction into a single suit. The mandate of Order II Rule 2 is the inclusion of the whole claim arising in respect of one and the same cause of action, in one suit. It must not be misunderstood to mean that all the different causes of action arising from the same transaction must be included in a single suit. In other words, a number of causes of action may arise out of the same transaction and it is not the mandate of Order II Rule 2 that they should all be included in one suit. On the other hand, what is required is that every suit shall include the “whole of the claim” arising out of “one and the same cause of action”. A defendant objecting to a subsequent suit must demonstrate that it was based on the same cause of action and that the plaintiff could have sought the reliefs in the first suit without any impossibility. Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd. v. Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 73 : 2025 INSC 73 : [2025] 2 SCR 123 : AIR 2025 SC 849

Order VII Rule 6 - Limitation Act, 1963; Section 17 - Exemption from Limitation - Fraud - Sale Deed - Knowledge of Right to Sue - To claim exemption from the limitation period under Section 17, a plaintiff must establish that fraud actively concealed their right to sue, not merely that the sale deed was fraudulently executed. The limitation period for suits involving fraud under Article 59 commences upon discovery of the fraud. The plaintiff's claim of fraud in a 2008 sale deed was rejected, as she was present during its execution and failed to demonstrate that fraud prevented her from knowing her legal remedy. The absence of specific pleadings regarding fraud, as required under Order VII Rule 6 CPC, further undermined the claim. The appeal was dismissed, as the suit filed in 2012 was time-barred under the 3-year limitation period prescribed by Article 59.(Para 21) Santosh Devi v. Sunder, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 534 : 2025 INSC 627 : [2025] 6 SCR 156

Order VII Rule 11 - A plaint containing multiple reliefs cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC merely because one relief is barred by law, provided other reliefs are valid and within the civil court's jurisdiction. Partial rejection of a plaint is not permissible, and the court must refrain from making adverse observations on barred reliefs in an Order VII Rule 11 application. (Paras 24, 25) Central Bank of India v. Smt Prabha Jain, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 96 : 2025 INSC 95 : [2025] 2 SCR 263 : (2025) 4 SCC 38

Order VII Rule 11 - Partial Rejection of Plaint - Whether a plaint can be partially rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC if some reliefs are barred by law while others are not. Held, a plaint cannot be partially rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. If even one relief sought in the plaint is maintainable, the entire plaint must proceed to trial. The Court emphasized that civil courts should not make observations on the maintainability of specific reliefs in an Order VII Rule 11 application. Central Bank of India v. Smt Prabha Jain, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 96 : 2025 INSC 95 : [2025] 2 SCR 263 : (2025) 4 SCC 38

Order 7 Rule 11 - Suit filed after 45 Yrs - Limitation - Registered Sale Deeds - Constructive Notice - Property was partitioned orally in 1968 and subsequent registered sale deeds executed in 1978. Predecessors never challenged the partition or sale deeds during their lifetime. Held, party interested in property deemed to know about sale deed from registration date. Registered documents provide constructive notice, and a suit filed decades later without evidence of recent knowledge is barred by limitation. Plaintiffs' failure to address prior knowledge of the sale deeds and the long delay rendered the suit vexatious and meritless. The Trial Court correctly dismissed the suit, and the High Court erred in remanding it, as no triable issues existed. (Para 13 & 17) Uma Devi v. Anand Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 382 : [2025] 4 SCR 521

Order VII Rule 11 - Temporary Injunction in Appeal Against Plaint Rejection - Requirement of Subsisting Plaint - No temporary injunction can be granted in an appeal against the rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11, CPC, as the plaint ceases to exist upon rejection. A subsisting plaint is essential for granting a temporary injunction. An injunction order becomes invalid upon plaint rejection and can only be revived if the plaint is restored. The High Court erred in granting a temporary injunction during the pendency of an appeal against plaint rejection, as the appeal does not constitute a continuation of the suit. Appeal allowed, impugned High Court order granting temporary injunction set aside. (Para 5) Ieee Mumbai Section Welfare Association v. Global Ieee Institute for Engineers, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 658

Order VII Rule 11 – Rejection of Plaint – Multiple Causes of Action – Whether a plaint can be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC solely because one of the reliefs sought is legally untenable, when other reliefs are maintainable and arise from independent causes of action. Held, a plaint cannot be rejected in its entirety under Order VII Rule 11 CPC merely because one relief is barred by law, provided other reliefs are maintainable and supported by distinct causes of action. Selective severance of reliefs is impermissible when multiple causes of action are pleaded, as rejecting the entire plaint would unjustly deny the plaintiff access to justice. The examination under Order VII Rule 11 must be confined to the plaint's averments, without delving into the merits or veracity of the claims. If triable issues arise, the suit cannot be summarily dismissed. The Court set aside the High Court's decision, which erroneously rejected the plaint by treating multiple reliefs as a single claim, and restored the trial court's finding that the issues were triable. (Para 8, 9, 13) Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer Lunia, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 630 : 2025 INSC 722

Order VII Rule 11 – The appellant filed a civil suit seeking a declaration that sale deeds executed by the respondent after the revocation of a power of attorney were void, along with possession and injunction reliefs. The High Court dismissed the suit, finding one relief invalid, without considering the triable issue arising from the other reliefs. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the High Court's approach was contrary to the settled law on Order VII Rule 11 CPC. (Para 8 & 9) Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer Lunia, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 630 : 2025 INSC 722

Order VII Rule 11 – Partial Rejection Impermissible – Partial rejection of a plaint is not permissible, and no adverse observations should be made against any relief in an Order VII Rule 11 application if other reliefs remain valid. (Para 4.8 & 9.6) Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer Lunia, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 630 : 2025 INSC 722

Order VII Rule 11 - Rejection of Plaint - Cancellation of Power of Attorney - Commencement of Limitation - Where a plaintiff seeks to challenge sale deeds executed under a power of attorney, limitation for such a challenge commences from the date of knowledge of the sale deeds, not from the date of cancellation of the power of attorney. Cancellation of a power of attorney does not affect prior conveyances made under the valid power conferred, nor does it create a new cause of action to challenge those conveyances. The High Court erred in holding that limitation commenced from the cancellation of the power of attorney, which was executed long after the sale deeds in question. The Supreme Court affirmed the Trial Court's rejection of the plaint, holding that the suit was barred by limitation. (Para 8 & 9) V. Ravikumar v. S. Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 301 : 2025 INSC 343

Order VII Rule 11 - Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 - Partition Suit - Exception Pleaded - A partition suit seeking division of joint family property cannot be dismissed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC at the preliminary stage when the plaintiff invokes an exception to the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988. Rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) requires the suit to be manifestly barred by law without requiring evidence. However, determining whether properties are benami or joint family assets involves factual inquiries, such as the source of funds and family arrangements, necessitating a trial. When an exception to the Benami Act is pleaded, the plaint cannot be rejected at the pleading stage, as it raises disputed questions of fact requiring evidence-based adjudication. The Supreme Court dismissed the appellants' challenge to the trial court and High Court's refusal to reject the plaint, upholding the continuation of the partition suit for trial to resolve factual disputes regarding the nature of the property. Appeal dismissed; plaint upheld for trial. (Para 28) Shaifali Gupta v. Vidya Devi Gupta, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 604 : 2025 INSC 739

Order VII Rule 11, Section 96 - Constitution of India; Article 227 - Supervisory Jurisdiction - Rejection of Plaint - High Court cannot reject a plaint while exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, as this power is limited to ensuring courts/tribunals act within their jurisdiction - The Court set aside the High Court's decision to reject a plaint as barred by the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, emphasizing that such rejection is a function of the trial court under Order VII Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), appealable under Section 96 - Article 227 cannot be used to usurp the trial court's original jurisdiction or bypass statutory remedies under the CPC - The Court criticized procedural shortcuts by an overburdened judiciary, stating they undermine the rule of law and procedural safeguards. (Paras 8 - 10) K. Valarmathi v. Kumaresan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2025 INSC 606

Order VII Rule 11 - Rejection of plaint - A plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC as time-barred when the issue of limitation involves a mixed question of law and fact, requiring evidence to determine the date of knowledge of the cause of action. The Court set aside the High Court's decision to dismiss a suit at the threshold, emphasizing that disputed facts, such as the plaintiff's claimed discovery of fraud in 2011, must be assumed true at this stage and cannot be summarily decided without evidence. The trial court's order dismissing the application to reject the plaint was restored. (Para 13) P. Kumarakurubaran v. P. Narayanan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 509 : 2025 INSC 598

Order VII Rule 11(d) and 13 - Limitation Act, 1963; Article 113 - Second suit on same cause of action must be filed within 3 years of rejection of earlier plaint. Plaint can be rejected if the suit appears to be barred by any law, including limitation. Article 113 of the Limitation Act provides a three-year limitation period for suits not covered by specific articles, starting from the date the right to sue accrues. Rejection of a plaint does not preclude filing a fresh suit on the same cause of action, provided it is within the limitation period. Once limitation begins to run, it continues unless expressly suspended or interrupted by law. Indian Evangelical Lutheran Church Trust Association v. Sri Bala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 37 : 2025 INSC 42 : [2025] 1 SCR 542 : AIR 2025 SC 522

Order VII Rule 11(d) - Limitation Act, 1963; Article 113 - Whether the plaint in the subsequent suit for specific performance is liable to be rejected on the ground that the suit is barred by the law of limitation. The dispute pertains to a 5.05-acre portion of a 6.48-acre property in Kodaikanal, originally purchased by American missionaries in 1912 and later transferred to the appellant (Indian Evangelical Lutheran Church Trust Association) in 1975. In 1991, the appellant entered into an agreement to sell the property to the respondent (Sri Bala & Co.) for ₹3.02 crores, with an advance payment of ₹10 lakhs. The respondent filed an unnumbered suit in 1993 for specific performance, which was rejected in 1998 due to non-payment of court fees. A second suit was filed in 2007 for the same relief, which the appellant sought to reject under Order VII Rule 11(d), arguing it was barred by limitation and res judicata. The trial court and the High Court dismissed the appellant's application, holding that the issue of limitation was a mixed question of fact and law to be decided after evidence. Held, the second suit was filed beyond the limitation period prescribed under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The cause of action for the second suit arose on the rejection of the plaint in the first suit (12.01.1998), and the limitation period expired on 12.01.2001. The suit filed in 2007 was thus barred by limitation. The reliance on a letter dated 15.07.1991 to extend the limitation period was untenable, as it was not referenced in the first suit and contradicted the respondent's earlier stance. The plaint in 2007 was liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) as the suit was barred by law. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the trial court and the High Court, and rejected the plaint in 2007 as barred by limitation. Indian Evangelical Lutheran Church Trust Association v. Sri Bala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 37 : 2025 INSC 42 : [2025] 1 SCR 542 : AIR 2025 SC 522

Order VII Rule 11 - Locus Standi of Proposed Purchaser under Agreement to Sell in Suit for Permanent Injunction against Third Party - Held, a proposed purchaser under an agreement to sell lacks locus standi to file a suit for a permanent injunction against a third party claiming independent title and possession of the property, as such an agreement does not confer proprietary rights. The rights under an agreement to sell are personal, enforceable only against the vendor or, in limited cases under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, against a subsequent transferee with notice, but not against third parties with no privity of contract. The suit by the respondent (proposed purchaser) was not maintainable due to the absence of the vendor as a party and lack of enforceable rights against the appellant (third party). The Supreme Court set aside the trial court and High Court's dismissal of the appellant's application under Order VII Rule 11, allowed the appeal, and held the suit for permanent injunction unsustainable due to the respondent's lack of locus standi and absence of privity with the appellant. (Paras 15, 16) Correspondence RBANMS Educational Institution v. B. Gunashekar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 429 : 2025 INSC 490 : [2025] 5 SCR 94

Order VII Rule 11(d) - When the primary relief in the suit becomes time-barred then the ancillary relief claimed therein also becomes unenforceable. (Para 28) Nikhila Divyang Mehta v. Hitesh P. Sanghvi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 428 : 2025 INSC 485

Order IX, Rules 2 or 3 - Dismissal of a suit for default does not bar a fresh suit on the same cause of action, as it is neither a decree nor a judgment, and the principle of res judicata does not apply. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision allowing a fresh suit under Rule 4, as the dismissal for default lacks adjudication on merits and is not an appealable order under Order XLIII of the CPC. (Para 26) Amruddin Ansari v. Afajal Ali, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 488 : 2025 INSC 566

Order IX Rule 13 - Setting aside ex-parte decree - Once a defendant is set ex parte, they are not entitled to present evidence in their defence; their only available recourse is to cross-examine the plaintiff's witness in an attempt to disprove the plaintiff's case. If a legal issue is raised in the written statement such as one relating to limitation or jurisdiction, the court may frame and decide that issue based on the pleadings alone, without requiring the defendant to present evidence. However, this exception does not apply when the defendant fails to cross-examine the plaintiff's witness, as the absence of cross-examination undermines the basis for setting aside the ex parte decree. (Para 19 & 20) Kanchhu v. Prakash Chand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 460 : 2025 INSC 542

Order 9 Rule 13, Order 43 Rule 1(d) - Delay Condonation - Courts must not condone delays in filing applications based solely on the merits of the main matter without a sufficient and bona fide explanation for the delay. The court must first verify the genuineness of the explanation provided for condonation. Limitation rules are designed to prevent dilatory tactics, not to extinguish rights, and terms like “liberal approach” or “substantial justice” cannot override the substantive law of limitation. The Court set aside a High Court order condoning an approximately 2200-day (six-year) delay in filing a recall application, criticizing the High Court for disregarding judicial restraint and the prescribed limitation period. Limitation is grounded in public policy and equity, and courts must not permit indefinite delays that prejudice litigants. (Paras 13, 16) H. Guruswamy v. A. Krishnaiah, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : 2025 INSC 53

Order XI Rule 14 - Production of documents - Appellate Court's power to direct document production under Order XI Rule 14 CPC limited to pending suits - An Appellate Court cannot direct the production of documents under Order XI Rule 14 of the CPC in an appeal against the rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11. The power to order document production is confined to the pendency of a suit and does not extend to appeals after dismissal. The Appellate Court's role is limited to reviewing the validity of the rejection order without assessing the case's merits or admitting new evidence not part of the original proceedings. The High Court's decision affirming the First Appellate Court's order to produce a mutation deed was set aside as it exceeded jurisdictional scope. (Para 9) Shrikanth N.S. v. K. Munivenkatappa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 502 : 2025 INSC 557

Order XII Rule 6 - Judgment on Admissions - Under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC, a court may pass a decree in favor of the plaintiff based on the defendant's admissions or dismiss a suit if the plaintiff's admissions negate the claim. The court can exercise this power suo motu at any stage of the proceedings without requiring a formal application. The discretionary power allows dismissal of a suit based on the plaintiff's admissions that reveal no cause of action, independent of Order VII Rule 11 CPC. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the trial court and High Court's findings. (Paras 36, 37) Saroj Salkan v. Huma Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 538 : 2025 INSC 632 : [2025] 6 SCR 210

Order XII Rule 6 - Judgment on admission can be passed by court's by exercising their suo-moto powers. A 'judgment on admission' may be delivered at any stage of the suit, relying on oral or written admissions even those made outside the pleadings and without the need for a separate application to invoke the provision. The Supreme Court directed the Registry to circulate the order to all High Courts for further dissemination to District Judiciaries. (Para 37-48) Rajiv Ghosh v. Satya Naryan Jaiswal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 415 : 2025 INSC 467 : [2025] 5 SCR 458

Order XVIII Rule 17 – Power to recall a witness under Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC vests solely with the court and is limited to seeking clarifications to remove ambiguities or clarify a witness's statement. Parties have no inherent right to recall witnesses for further examination, cross-examination, or re-examination without the court's leave. Such recall cannot be used to fill gaps in a party's case or introduce additional evidence. The court may, in exceptional circumstances, permit recall for examination or cross-examination under its inherent powers under Section 151 CPC. The decision of the High Court, upholding the trial court's dismissal of the appellant's application to recall a witness, was affirmed. (Para 8 - 13) Shubhkaran Singh v. Abhayraj Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 536 : 2025 INSC 628 : [2025] 6 SCR 601

Order XX Rule 1 - Procedural requirements under Order XX Rule 1 CPC do not override the principle of diligence in limitation laws. Parties cannot indefinitely delay appeals by citing non-delivery of judgment copies without proactive efforts to procure them. (Para 14, 15, 18) Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam v. Bharat Heavy Electricals, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 496 : 2025 INSC 533

Order XX Rule 12A - Decree for specific performance of contract for the sale or lease of immovable property - Where an appeal is filed against the decree passed by the trial court and the appeal is disposed of, the appellate court should specify time to deposit the balance sale consideration. (Para 50) Ram Lal v. Jarnail Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 283 : 2025 INSC 301

Order 21, Rules 32 and 11A - Imprisonment of Judgment Debtor – Drastic Measure Requiring Proof of Wilful Disobedience - Imprisonment under Order 21 Rule 32 for violating an injunction decree is a severe measure requiring clear evidence of wilful disobedience. The court must establish that the judgment debtor had knowledge of the decree, opportunity to comply, and deliberately disobeyed. The decree-holder must prove these elements, supported by an affidavit as required under Order 21 Rule 11-A. Non-compliance with this procedural mandate invalidates detention orders. The executing court erred in ordering detention and attachment without verifying wilful disobedience or conducting a proper inquiry. The High Court, under Article 227, failed to rectify this error, narrowly limiting its review to jurisdictional issues and overlooking procedural fairness. Courts must ensure a fair hearing before ordering detention. The Trial Court's dismissal of written objections without granting a hearing was improper, and the High Court's affirmation was inadequate. Impugned orders set aside. Decree-holders may file fresh applications for future violations. Judgment to be circulated to all High Courts and District Courts for guidance. (Paras 35 - 59) Bhudev Mallick @ Bhudeb Mallick v. Ranajit Ghoshal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 184 : 2025 INSC 175

Order 21 Rule 32 - Limitation Act, 1963; Article 136 - Execution of Decree Granting Perpetual Injunction – No Limitation Period - A decree granting a perpetual injunction is not subject to limitation under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Court dismissed objections to executing a 40-year-old decree, holding that such a decree remains enforceable whenever the judgment debtor violates it by disturbing the decree holder's peaceful possession, dispossessing them, or obstructing their enjoyment of property over which they hold a declared title. Each violation constitutes a fresh cause of action, not barred by res judicata, empowering courts to take strict action against successive breaches. (Paras 41, 46) Bhudev Mallick @ Bhudeb Mallick v. Ranajit Ghoshal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 184 : 2025 INSC 175

Order 21 Rule 32 - Scope of - Courts must exercise caution in ordering detention, ensuring strict compliance with procedural safeguards to uphold judicial integrity. Failure to enforce injunction decrees appropriately may undermine public respect for judicial institutions. (Para 44) Bhudev Mallick @ Bhudeb Mallick v. Ranajit Ghoshal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 184 : 2025 INSC 175

Order XXI - Limitation Act, 1963 - Article 136 - Execution of Permanent Injunction Decree - Satisfaction recorded in an Execution Petition (EP) for a prior breach of a permanent injunction does not bar subsequent EPs for new breaches. A permanent injunction, being perpetual, remains enforceable against future violations without being barred by res judicata. Each fresh breach constitutes a new cause of action, and no limitation period applies under Article 136 for enforcing such decrees. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's dismissal of a subsequent EP based on prior "full satisfaction," allowing the appeal and affirming the perpetual enforceability of permanent injunctions against judgment debtors, their assignees, and successors. (Paras 6 & 7) Saraswati Devi v. Santosh Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 587 : 2025 INSC 715

Order 23 Rule 3 - A suit by legal heirs to set aside a compromise decree under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC is not maintainable if the original party did not file a recall application. The Court reaffirmed that the only remedy against a compromise decree is a recall application, as per Order 23 Rule 3A CPC, which bars suits to challenge the legality of such decrees. Appeal dismissed where appellants failed to show that their father, the original party, challenged the decree. (Paras 11 & 12) Manjunath Tirakappa Malagi v. Gurusiddappa Tirakappa Malagi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 446 : 2025 INSC 517

Order XXII, Rules 1, 3, 4 - Limitation Act, 1963; Section 5, Articles 120, 121 - Abatement of Suit/Appeal - Under Order XXII Rule 1 CPC, a suit or appeal does not abate upon the death of a party if the right to sue survives. Rules 3 and 4 prescribe procedures for substituting legal representatives of a deceased plaintiff/appellant or defendant/respondent, respectively. As per Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1963, an application for substitution must be filed within 90 days from the date of death, failing which the suit/appeal abates automatically. Lack of knowledge of the death does not exempt abatement. Post-abatement, an application to set aside the abatement must be filed within 60 days, i.e., between the 91st and 150th day from the date of death (Article 121). If filed beyond 150 days, an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act must accompany the application to set aside abatement. The procedural sequence is: (1) file for substitution within 90 days; (2) if not filed, apply to set aside abatement within 60 days; (3) if delayed beyond 150 days, file applications for substitution, setting aside abatement, and condonation of delay. Upon showing sufficient cause, the court may condone the delay, set aside the abatement, and allow substitution, enabling the suit/appeal to proceed on merits. (Para 11) Om Prakash Gupta v. Satish Chandra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 194 : 2025 INSC 183

Order XXII Rule 4 - An application for substitution of legal heirs under Order XXII Rule 4 CPC inherently includes a prayer to set aside abatement, obviating the need for a separate application. A request to bring legal representatives on record implicitly encompasses a prayer to set aside abatement. The High Court's requirement for a separate application was overruled, and the appeal was allowed, setting aside the abatement in the interest of justice. (Paras 9, 23, 32) Om Prakash Gupta v. Satish Chandra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 194 : 2025 INSC 183

Order XXII, Rule 10A - Rule 10A mandates that a pleader inform the court of a party's death, and the court is generally required to notify the opposing party. However, this notification is not mandatory if the opposing party's pleader is present when the death is reported or if the court records the death in the order sheet. In such cases, further notice serves no substantial purpose and its absence does not violate Rule 10A. (Para 29) Om Prakash Gupta v. Satish Chandra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 194 : 2025 INSC 183

Order XXIII Rule 1 - Abandonment of Claim - Res Judicata - The dismissal of the respondent's first amendment application as "not pressed" did not amount to an abandonment of the claim under Order XXIII Rule 1 of the CPC. The subsequent amendment application was filed at a different stage and was based on new facts, making it legally sustainable. The dismissal of an earlier amendment application as "not pressed" does not bar subsequent amendment applications based on new facts. State of West Bengal v. Pam Developments, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 52 : 2025 INSC 69 : (2025) 3 SCC 356

Order XXXIX Rule 2A - Consequence of disobedience or breach of injunction –Subsequent setting aside of an injunction order does not absolve a party from liability for disobedience committed during its pendency. (Para 7.4) Lavanya C v. Vittal Gurudas Pai, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 290 : [2025] 3 SCR 450

Order XXXIX Rule 2A - Consequence of disobedience or breach of injunction –Rule 2A provides for punishment by attachment of property or imprisonment for up to three months for violating injunction orders issued under Rules 1 and 2. This Rule applies to disobedience of injunctions during the pendency of a suit, while violations of a decree should be addressed through execution proceedings under Order XXI Rule 32. (Para 7.3 & 8) Lavanya C v. Vittal Gurudas Pai, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 290 : [2025] 3 SCR 450

Order 41 Rule 31 - Appellate Court not bound to frame points of determination when not raised in appeal. Appellate Court's failure to frame points of determination does not invalidate judgment if substantially compliant with rule and appellant raises no specific issues for reconsideration - High Court erred in setting aside Appellate Court's decision for non-compliance with Rule 31 when no points were urged by appellant - Rule 31 requirements apply only when specific points are raised - Substantial compliance suffices, and technical interpretation should not compromise substantial justice - Appeal allowed. (Paras 7, 10, 12 & 14) Nafees Ahmad v. Soinuddin, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 458 : 2025 INSC 520

Commercial Courts Act, 2015

Section 12A - Pre-Institution Mediation - Mandatory as per Patil Automation Pvt. Ltd. v. Rakheja Engineers Pvt. Ltd., (2022) 10 SCC 1, but applies prospectively from 20.08.2022 - Held, for commercial suits filed before 20.08.2022 without Section 12A compliance, courts shall stay the suit and refer parties to time-bound mediation if an objection is raised under Order VII Rule 11 CPC or parties express intent to mediate, unless exceptional circumstances apply (e.g., plaints rejected and not re-filed within limitation, or filed after jurisdictional High Court declared Section 12A mandatory). Suits filed on or after 20.08.2022 without pre-institution mediation must be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. The Court upheld the High Court's order staying the 2019 suit and directing mediation within three months, extendable by two months, as per Pre-Institution Mediation and Settlement Rules, 2018. Appeal dismissed. (Paras 62 - 65) Dhanbad Fuels v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 579 : 2025 INSC 696 : [2025] 6 SCR 431

Section 13(1A) - Limitation Act, 1963; Section 5 - Limitation Period for Filing Appeal - Commencement from Date of Judgment Pronouncement - Held, the limitation period for filing an appeal under Section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, begins on the date of judgment pronouncement, not the date of receiving its certified copy. The Court clarified that while Order XX Rule 1 CPC mandates providing judgment copies, litigants must diligently procure them. A party cannot claim the limitation period starts only upon receiving the copy unless they demonstrate reasonable efforts to obtain it. Interpreting otherwise would defeat the Commercial Courts Act's objective of timely case disposal and the diligence required under limitation laws. The appellants' appeal was dismissed for failing to justify a 301-day delay, as they made no efforts to obtain the judgment copy within the 60-day statutory period. (Para 13, 14, 16) Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam v. Bharat Heavy Electricals, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 496 : 2025 INSC 533

Competition Act, 2002

Section 4 - The Competition Commission of India (CCI) alleged that Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. (Schott India), a dominant player in the market for neutral borosilicate glass tubing used in pharmaceutical packaging, abused its dominant position under Section 4 of the Act, 2002, through exclusionary pricing, discriminatory rebates, and restrictive agreements favoring its joint venture, Schott Kaisha. The CCI found a violation, but the Competition Appellate Tribunal (COMPAT) set aside the order, holding the practices commercially justified and non-anti-competitive. Aggrieved, the CCI appealed to the Supreme Court. Whether volume-based rebates, structured as tiered slabs (2%, 5%, 8%, and 12%) triggered by aggregate annual tonnage purchases and applied uniformly to all customers, constitute an abuse of dominant position under Section 4 of the Act, 2002. Held, COMPAT's order affirmed. Volume-based rebates do not amount to abuse of dominance where they are objectively tied to operational efficiencies, uniformly applied without regard to buyer identity, and mechanically triggered by volume thresholds. Such rebates incentivize stable, high-volume orders essential for amortizing capital costs in continuous-process industries like glass manufacturing, transmitting scale economies to downstream customers without distorting competition. No evidence of market foreclosure was found, as rival converters increased production and imports during the relevant period (2007-08 to 2011-12), and container prices to pharmaceutical companies remained stable. Rebate structures that rise solely with volume, are transparently communicated in advance, and promote efficiency cannot be condemned as "unfair" under Section 4(2)(a) absent proof of exclusionary effects under Section 4(2)(b)(i). Appeal dismissed. Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 557 : 2025 INSC 668

Section 53T - Appeal under - The Competition Commission of India (CCI) alleged that the Respondent, a dominant entity in the relevant market, abused its dominant position by introducing a volume-based rebate scheme structured in four slabs, which allegedly favored its joint venture, Schott Kaisha, thereby distorting competition. The CCI held the Respondent liable for abuse of dominance. On appeal, the Competition Appellate Tribunal (COMPAT) set aside the CCI's order, finding the rebates commercially justified, uniformly applied to all buyers meeting volume thresholds, and non-anti-competitive. Aggrieved, the CCI appealed to the Supreme Court. Issues: 1. Whether the Respondent's volume-based rebate scheme constituted an abuse of dominant position under the Competition Act, 2002, merely due to its market size or structure. 2. Whether competition enforcement should adopt a rigid procedural approach or an effects-based standard, particularly in light of India's economic goals as a global manufacturing hub. 3. The true scope and purpose of the Competition Act—whether it penalizes success and dominance achieved through innovation or protects the competitive process from actual harm. Held: (Affirming COMPAT's order) 1. No Abuse of Dominance: The rebate scheme was non-discriminatory, based solely on purchase volume rather than buyer identity, and accessible to any purchaser meeting the specified slabs. It did not favor the joint venture or disrupt market competition, lacking evidence of anti-competitive effects. Dominance alone, without proof of harm to the competitive process, does not constitute abuse. 2. Effects-Based Standard Essential: Rigid, procedure-driven enforcement detached from market realities discourages long-term capital, innovation, and scale—critical for India's ambition to become a global manufacturing, life-sciences, and technology hub amid protectionist policies elsewhere (e.g., U.S. and Europe). An effects-based approach is a constitutional safeguard against arbitrary restraints on enterprise and a strategic imperative to foster investment and growth. 3. Purpose of Competition Law: The Act is not designed to punish success, market share, or dominance earned through effort and innovation. Its core aim is to preserve the competitive process—ensuring rivals can challenge incumbents on merits, consumers benefit from efficiency, and innovation thrives—without stifling productivity. Penalizing size sans tangible harm would undermine the law, freeze capital formation, and harm the public interest it protects. "Heavy-handed enforcement, divorced from market effects, would discourage the long-term capital and expertise the economy urgently needs. Appeal dismissed; no costs. Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 557 : 2025 INSC 668

Constitution of India

75 years into our republic, we cannot be seen to be so shaky on our fundamentals that mere recital of a poem or for that matter, any form of art or entertainment, such as, stand-up comedy, can be alleged to lead to animosity or hatred amongst different communities. Subscribing to such a view would stifle all legitimate expressions of view in the public domain which is so fundamental to a free society. (Para 42 ix) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : 2025 INSC 410

Article 12 and 226 - Function Test for Writ Jurisdiction - The Court emphasized the "function test" for determining whether a body is subject to writ jurisdiction. A private entity may be subject to writ jurisdiction only if it discharges a public duty or function, which Muthoot Finance Ltd. does not. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that no case was made out for interference. The petitioner was left free to pursue civil remedies or arbitration. The judgment reinforces the principle that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is not available against private entities unless they perform public functions or are statutorily obligated to do so. Private disputes, even involving regulated entities, must be resolved through civil or arbitration proceedings. S. Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 125

Article 12 and 226 - Regulatory Compliance and Writ Jurisdiction - The petitioner argued that Muthoot Finance Ltd., being a non-banking financial institution regulated by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), could be subject to writ jurisdiction if it breached statutory regulations. The Court rejected this argument, stating that regulatory compliance does not transform a private entity into a "State" or imbue it with public functions. The Court clarified that the petitioner's appropriate remedy lies in civil litigation or arbitration, as per the arbitration clause in the loan agreement. The High Court had also protected the petitioner's interests by directing the deposit of Rs. 24,39,085/- (from the sale of pledged gold) in a fixed deposit, with interest accruing to the petitioner. S. Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 125

Article 12 and 226 - Writ Jurisdiction and Private Entities - Public vs. Private Law - The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision that Muthoot Finance Ltd., a private company registered under the Companies Act, 1956, does not qualify as a "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution. Consequently, it is not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, as it does not perform any public or sovereign functions. The Court reiterated the distinction between public and private law, emphasizing that writ jurisdiction is generally limited to actions involving public duties or functions. Private entities, unless performing public functions or discharging statutory obligations, are not subject to writ jurisdiction. S. Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 125

Article 12 - Police officers must abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals. Police machinery is a part of the State within the meaning of Article 12. Moreover, the police officers being citizens, are bound to abide by the Constitution. They are bound to honour and uphold freedom of speech and expression conferred on all citizens. (Para 29) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : 2025 INSC 410

Article 12 - Whether Air Force School constitutes a “State” or “authority” under Article 12 of the Constitution, making it amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 for teachers' employment disputes. Held, Air Force School is not a “State” under Article 12. The school, managed by the Indian Air Force Educational and Cultural Society, operates as a non-profit, non-public fund entity primarily funded by student fees and voluntary contributions from IAF personnel, not from the Consolidated Fund of India. No evidence of deep or pervasive control by the Government or Indian Air Force (IAF) over the school's administration. Ex-officio IAF officers on governing committees do not indicate statutory or governmental control. The school's operations, including staff employment, are governed by private contracts, lacking a public law element. Even if the school performs a public function (education), this alone does not bring it within Article 12. Appeals dismissed. [Relied on: St. Mary's Education Society and Army Welfare Education Society, (Para 22-24)] Dileep Kumar Pandey v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 629 : 2025 INSC 749

Article 14, 15 - Residence-based reservation in PG Medical Courses is constitutionally impermissible. Such reservations violate Article 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees equality before the law. The concept of regional or provincial domicile is alien to the Indian legal system. All citizens of the country carry a single domicile, which is the "domicile of India". Institutional preference is permissible to a reasonable extent. The Court upheld the reservation of 32 seats for students who completed their MBBS from the same institution, as it creates a reasonable classification with a nexus to the object sought to be achieved. State Quota seats must be filled strictly based on merit in the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test (NEET). The Court clarified that its decision would not affect students already admitted under the residence-based reservation, as they had completed their courses or were in the process of doing so. Higher education, especially in specialized fields like medicine, must prioritize merit to maintain national standards and development. Dr. Tanvi Behl v. Shrey Goel, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 122 : 2025 INSC 125 : AIR 2025 SC 1445

Article 14, Entry 97, List I (Union List), Entry 62, List II (State List) – Kerala Tax on Luxuries Act, 2006 – Constitutional Validity – Cable TV Services – Legislative Competence – Aspect Theory – Held, cable TV services qualify as a “luxury” under Entry 62, List II, enabling State taxation. No conflict exists between State's luxury tax on entertainment and Central service tax on broadcasting under Entry 97, List I. Initial arbitrary exemptions under the Act violated Article 14, but the revised framework rectified these issues. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of Kerala's luxury tax on cable TV services under the Kerala Tax on Luxuries Act, 2006, affirming the State's legislative competence under Entry 62, List II. Applying the aspect theory, the Court distinguished the State's luxury tax on entertainment (cable TV services) from the Central tax on broadcasting services under the Finance Act, finding no constitutional overlap. The aspect theory, in India, focuses on the taxable event's nature, not legislative competence, unlike its Canadian application. The High Court's ruling striking down exemptions for smaller cable operators (under 7,500 connections) as violative of Article 14 was upheld, but the revised framework was deemed constitutionally valid. The tax was not discriminatory against cable TV operators compared to DTH providers. The appeal was allowed, reversing the High Court's decision to strike down the tax. (Para 17) State of Kerala v. Asianet Satellite Communications Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 611 : 2025 INSC 757

Article 14 - A classification would be reasonable only when there is an intelligible differentia which has a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved through the statute. (Para 15) Md. Firoz Ahmad Khalid v. State of Manipur, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 454 : 2025 INSC 535

Article 14 and 16 - Bihar Chaukidari Cadre (Amendment) Rules, 2014; Rule 5 (7) proviso (a) - Constitutional validity of - Hereditary Appointment - Allowing chaukidars to nominate dependent kin for appointment prior to retirement – Held, appointment to the public posts cannot be done on hereditary basis. The High Court's suo motu action in declaring the proviso void was upheld, as it was manifestly contrary to fundamental rights and binding precedents. The impugned proviso was deemed an archaic practice favoring a select group, undermining equality of opportunity in public employment. The Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition challenging the High Court's judgment which struck down the aforementioned proviso as violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. (Para 10, 11, 32 & 33) Bihar Rajya Dafadar Chaukidar Panchayat v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 394

Article 14 and 16 - Fair and open recruitment processes - Negative Equality - The petitioner's claim of discrimination based on the promotion of two other employees to the post of Tracer was rejected. Held, Article 14 does not permit negative equality, and illegal actions by the State cannot be perpetuated. Past illegalities cannot justify future violations of statutory rules. The Court expressed concern over the State's casual approach in handling the litigation, noting that the relevant 1979 Rules were not properly presented before the Tribunal or the High Court. The Court criticized the State for creating false hopes among employees by granting promotions contrary to the Rules, leading to unnecessary litigation. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the post of Tracer is to be filled exclusively by direct recruitment as per the 1979 Rules, and the petitioner was not eligible for promotion. The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to statutory rules and proper documentation in judicial proceedings to avoid unnecessary litigation and ensure justice. A copy of the judgment was directed to be sent to the Chief Secretary of Odisha for corrective action. Petition dismissed. Jyostnamayee Mishra v. State of Odisha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 91 : 2025 INSC 87

Article 14 and Article 300A - National Highways Act, 1956; Section 3J - Constitutional Imperative - Section 3J created an "intelligible differentia"-less disparity between similarly situated landowners (NH Act vs. other acquisitions), violating equality. Retrospective rectification is essential to uphold Article 14 and Article 300A (right to property), especially as the 2013 Right to Fair Compensation Act applies post-2015. The ruling does not reopen concluded cases but extends benefits to unresolved claims, avoiding violation of the doctrine of immutability. NHAI's plea indirectly evades unequivocal directions in Tarsem Singh, (2019) 9 SCC 304. Granting solatium/interest is a core compensatory mechanism, not disruptive. Financial strain is untenable where NHAI has already paid thousands of claims; costs ultimately pass to project proponents and commuters (e.g., via tolls) under public-private partnerships, not justifying constitutional evasion. Appeals dismissed; authorities directed to compute and disburse solatium/interest per Tarsem Singh. No costs. Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 161 : 2025 INSC 146

Article 14 - Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008 – Section 27A – Conversion Fee Exemption – No Exemption for Land Exceeding 25 Cents – Held, the exemption from conversion fee under Section 27A applies only to landholdings up to 25 cents and not to larger landholdings exceeding 25 cents. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment, which had directed that the conversion fee for land exceeding 25 cents be calculated after deducting 25 cents. The notification dated 25th February 2021 intended to exempt small landholdings (up to 25 cents) from the conversion fee to facilitate construction without financial burden. The exemption notifications must be interpreted strictly and literally, and the State was competent to classify landholdings into two categories: those up to 25 cents (exempt) and those exceeding 25 cents (liable for 10% of fair value as fee). A subsequent notification dated 23rd July 2021 and Rule 12, Clause 9 of the Rules, 2008, further clarified that no exemption applies to land exceeding 25 cents. The High Court's interpretation, which fused the two categories, was erroneous. (Para 18, 19, 24) State of Kerala v. Moushmi Ann Jacob, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 235 : 2025 INSC 255

Articles 14, 15, 21 and 25 - Right to dignity in death and freedom of religion - Burial ground / Graveyard - The Court recognized the appellant's right to dignity in death and freedom of religion but balanced it against the State's duty to maintain public order and provide designated burial grounds. The Court criticized the Gram Panchayat for failing to formally designate a burial ground for Christians, leading to the dispute. The Court underscored the importance of secularism and fraternity, as enshrined in the Constitution, and called for harmony among different religious communities. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal in part, directing the appellant to bury his father in the designated Christian burial ground at Karkapal, with State support. The Court also directed the State to demarcate exclusive burial sites for Christians within two months to avoid similar controversies in the future. Ramesh Baghel v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 113 : 2025 INSC 109

Articles 14, 15, 21 and 25 - Right to dignity in death and freedom of religion - Burial ground / Graveyard - Whether the appellant, a Christian, has the right to bury his deceased father in the village graveyard of Chhindwada, where his ancestors were buried, despite objections from the local Hindu and tribal communities. Whether the State's refusal to allow burial in the village graveyard and insistence on using a Christian burial ground 20-25 km away violates the appellant's fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15, 21, and 25 of the Constitution. Whether the Gram Panchayat's failure to formally designate a burial ground for Christians in the village constitutes a violation of the appellant's rights. The appellant, a third-generation Christian, sought to bury his father in the village graveyard of Chhindwada, where his ancestors had been buried for decades. However, the local villagers, predominantly Hindu and tribal, objected to the burial, leading to threats and police intervention. The appellant approached the High Court seeking permission to bury his father in the village graveyard and police protection. The High Court denied relief, citing potential public unrest and the availability of a Christian burial ground in a nearby village, Karkapal, 20-25 km away. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the refusal to allow burial in the village graveyard violated his fundamental rights, including the right to dignity in death and freedom of religion. Justice B.V. Nagarathna held that the appellant should be allowed to bury his father in his private agricultural land in Chhindwada, with police protection. She emphasized that the Gram Panchayat had failed to formally designate a burial ground for Christians, leading to the controversy. She also directed the State to demarcate exclusive burial sites for Christians within two months. Justice Satish Chandra Sharma dissented, holding that the appellant should bury his father in the designated Christian burial ground in Karkapal, as per the State's rules. He emphasized the importance of maintaining public order and the State's duty to provide designated burial grounds for all communities. The Supreme Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, directed that the appellant bury his father in the Christian burial ground at Karkapal, with logistical support and police protection from the State. The Court emphasized the need for an expeditious and dignified burial, given the prolonged delay. Ramesh Baghel v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 113 : 2025 INSC 109

Articles 14, 16, 21 - Reasonable Accommodation - Persons with Benchmark Disability (PwBD) - MBBS Admission - Held, reasonable accommodation for PwBD candidates is a fundamental right under Articles 14, 16, and 21, not a discretionary benefit. The Supreme Court directed the allotment of an MBBS seat for the 2025-26 session at AIIMS, New Delhi, under the Scheduled Castes Persons with Benchmark Disability (SC/PwBD) quota for the appellant, who has congenital absence of multiple fingers in both hands and left foot involvement. Denial of admission was deemed "grossly illegal, arbitrary, and violative" of fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 16, reflecting institutional bias and systemic discrimination. The Court declared the National Medical Commission's (NMC) guideline requiring "both hands intact" for MBBS admission as arbitrary and directed its revision within two months, before the 2025-26 counselling session, in line with Om Rathod v. Director General of Health Sciences, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 770 and Anmol v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 236. The appellant, with a NEET-UG 2024 category rank of 176, was found functionally capable by a Medical Board, with the minor challenge of wearing sterilized gloves insufficient to justify denial of admission. The Court ordered admission without requiring the appellant to reappear for NEET-UG 2025, emphasizing individualized, evidence-based assessments to ensure substantive equality and dignity for PwBD candidates. (Paras 9, 14) Kabir Paharia v. National Medical Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 532 : 2025 INSC 623 : AIR 2025 SC 2861

Articles 14, 16, and 21 - Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1955; Rule 25(a) - Seniority in Direct Recruitment – Constitutional Validity of Retrospective Amendment – Whether the 2017 amendment to Rule 25(a) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1955, granting seniority to in-service candidates over direct recruits based on prior service instead of competitive examination marks, violates Articles 14, 16, and 21 of the Constitution. Held, seniority in direct recruitment must be determined solely based on merit, i.e., marks obtained in the competitive examination, and not prior in-service experience. The retrospective application of the 2017 amendment, which favored less meritorious in-service candidates, was arbitrary and unconstitutional, violating Articles 14 (equality before law), 16 (equality of opportunity in public employment), and 21 (due process). The Supreme Court struck down the 2017 amendment to Rule 25(a) and directed the State to: (i) recast seniority lists for direct recruits from 1995 based exclusively on examination ranks within 60 days; (ii) ensure no reversion of existing promotions but halt further promotions until revised lists are issued; and (iii) grant notional promotions and consequential benefits (excluding back wages) to eligible direct recruits based on revised lists. (Para 22–27) R. Ranjith Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 528 : 2025 INSC 612

Articles 14, 16, and 21 - Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1955; Rule 25(a) - Seniority in Direct Recruitment – Directions – (i) Recast seniority lists for direct recruits (80% open market, 20% in-service) based solely on competitive examination marks within 60 days. (ii) No reversion of officers promoted under prior seniority lists, but no further promotions until revised lists are finalized. (iii) Grant promotions to eligible departmental candidates based on revised seniority lists within two months. (iv) Direct recruits found eligible in revised lists entitled to notional promotions and consequential benefits (excluding back wages). (v) Conduct a common competitive examination for 100% direct recruitment, with seniority determined strictly by examination marks/ranks. (Para 28) R. Ranjith Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 528 : 2025 INSC 612

Articles 14 and 16 - The Jharkhand High Court issued an advertisement on July 29, 2010, for recruitment of IV Class Employees, which omitted mention of the total number of posts, reservation ratios (reserved vs. unreserved seats), and any decision against providing reservations based on adequate representation data. - Candidates were selected and appointed through this process, but their services were later terminated due to procedural irregularities. - Aggrieved candidates challenged the termination before the Supreme Court. Whether advertisements for public employment are valid if they fail to specify the total number of posts, reservation ratios, minimum qualifications, selection procedures, and any decision to forgo reservations, thereby lacking transparency and violating constitutional mandates under Articles 14 and 16. Held, the Supreme Court upheld the termination of the selected candidates and set aside the entire 2010 recruitment exercise as illegal, unconstitutional, and a nullity in law. Advertisements inviting applications for public employment must mandatorily include: (i) the total number of seats; (ii) the ratio of reserved and unreserved seats; (iii) minimum qualifications; and (iv) procedural clarity on selection stages (e.g., written exams, interviews). Failure to do so renders the advertisement invalid due to lack of transparency. If the State opts against reservations due to quantifiable data showing adequate representation, this decision must be explicitly stated in the advertisement alongside the above details. Any appointment in violation of statutory rules or Articles 14 (equality) and 16 (equality in public employment) of the Constitution is void ab initio. The Court emphasized that such omissions deprive candidates of fair opportunity and equal access, undermining the constitutional scheme for public recruitment. The judgment reinforces trite law on transparent public hiring, ensuring procedural fairness and non-arbitrariness. [Relied on: Renu v. District and Sessions Judge, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi (2014) 14 SCC 16; State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (2006) 4 SCC 1] Amrit Yadav v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 180 : 2025 INSC 176

Articles 14 and 16 - West Bengal Central School Service Commission Recruitment Case (2016) - Selection Process for Assistant Teachers (Classes IX-X, XI-XII) and Non-Teaching Staff (Groups C, D) - Cancellation of Entire Process - The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's en bloc cancellation of the 2016 recruitment process conducted by the West Bengal Central School Service Commission (WBSSC) for 12,905 Assistant Teachers (Classes IX-X), 5,712 Assistant Teachers (Classes XI-XII), 2,067 Group C, and 3,956 Group D non-teaching staff, due to systemic irregularities including OMR sheet manipulation, rank jumping, out-ofpanel appointments, and destruction of records. The Court found segregation of tainted and untainted candidates impossible due to WBSSC's failure to retain OMR sheets and discrepancies in recovered data, justifying cancellation despite some selectees' claims of innocence. Principles of natural justice were deemed satisfied by public notices, given the scale of fraud (over 6,276 illegal appointments). Pleas of delay and laches were rejected as illegalities surfaced in 2021-2022. The Court modified the High Court's relief: tainted candidates' services terminated with salary refunds at 12% interest; untainted appointees terminated without refunds; previously employed candidates allowed to rejoin prior posts with preserved seniority; disabled candidates (except one) to continue with wages until fresh selection, with age relaxation for all eligible candidates. (Para 43 – 51) State of West Bengal v. Baishakhi Bhattacharyya, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 385 : 2025 INSC 437 : AIR 2025 SC 1882

Article 15 - Judicial Service - Persons with Disabilities - Reasonable Accommodation - Equal Opportunity - No person can be denied consideration for recruitment in the judicial service solely on account of their physical disabilities. (Para 67) In Re Recruitment of Visually Impaired In Judicial Services v. Registrar General the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 274 : 2025 INSC 300

Article 15 - Judicial Service - Visually impaired candidates are eligible for judicial service, and Rule 6A of the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 1994, was struck down to the extent it excluded them. Rule 7 prescribing additional requirements for PwDs (such as three years of practice or securing 70% marks in the first attempt), was partially struck down as violative of equality and reasonable accommodation. Separate cut-offs must be maintained for visually impaired candidates, in line with the Indra Sawhney judgment. (Para 68) In Re Recruitment of Visually Impaired In Judicial Services v. Registrar General the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 274 : 2025 INSC 300

Article 15 - Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 - No distinction can be made between Persons with Disabilities (PwD) and Persons with Benchmark Disabilities (PwBD) for employment rights. (Para 67) In Re Recruitment of Visually Impaired In Judicial Services v. Registrar General the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 274 : 2025 INSC 300

Article 16 - Equal opportunity in public employment - Even as we near 80 years of independence, generating enough jobs in the public sector to absorb those eager to enter public service remains an elusive goal. While there is no dearth of eligible candidates in the country waiting in the queue, the quest for 2 public employment is thwarted by a lack of sufficient employment opportunities. (Para 13) Bihar Rajya Dafadar Chaukidar Panchayat v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 394

Article 16—Public Employment—Eligibility Criteria—Mandatory Nature - In appointments to public office under statutory schemes, eligibility criteria prescribed by law, including minimum years of experience in specified leadership roles, constitute mandatory requirements that cannot be waived or relaxed by administrative authorities. Such criteria ensure fairness, non-arbitrariness, and reasonableness under Article 16 of the Constitution. Where an appointee misrepresents experience or lacks verifiable proof of requisite qualifications, the selection process stands vitiated, warranting judicial interference notwithstanding limited scope of review in service matters absent mala fides. Dr. Amaragouda L v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 197 : 2025 INSC 201

Article 19, 21, 226 - Writ Jurisdiction - Natural Justice - The courts under its writ jurisdiction do not interfere with selections made by expert bodies by reassessing the comparative merits of the candidates. Interference with selections is limited to decisions vitiated by bias, malafides and violation of statutory provisions. Administrative action can be reviewed on the ground of proportionality if it affects fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India. (Para 16) Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 129 : 2025 INSC 126

Article 19, 21, 32 - Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 - The court reaffirmed that all benefits granted to Persons with Benchmark Disabilities (PwBD) must also be extended to Persons with Disabilities (PwD) in examination settings, including facilities such as scribes and compensatory time, without discrimination. The court reviewed the Office Memorandum (OM) dated 10.08.2022, issued in compliance with its earlier judgment in Vikash Kumar, which provided guidelines for PwD candidates with less than 40% disability and writing difficulties. However, the petitioner highlighted several deficiencies in the OM, including its failure to incorporate reasonable accommodation, its restrictive focus on "difficulty in writing," and the absence of alternative examination modes (e.g., Braille, computers). The court also noted the lack of a grievance redressal mechanism and inconsistencies in implementation across examination bodies. The court directed the respondent authorities to revise the OM within two months, ensuring uniform compliance, extending benefits to all PwD candidates, and incorporating measures such as a grievance redressal portal, periodic sensitization drives, and flexibility in examination modes. The court emphasized the need for strict adherence to the RPwD Act, 2016 and the principles of reasonable accommodation, as outlined in Vikash Kumar and Avni Prakash. The matter was posted for compliance reporting after two months. (Para 19) Gulshan Kumar v. Institute of Banking Personnel Selection, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 151 : 2025 INSC 142 : AIR 2025 SC 1063 : (2025) 4 SCC 90

Article 19(1)(a) - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 499, 500 – Criminal Defamation – Quashing of Proceedings – Freedom of Speech – Media Responsibility – The Supreme Court quashed a criminal defamation case filed in 2014 against the Editorial Director of Bennett Coleman and Co. Ltd. (Times of India) and others over an article allegedly implying the complainant auctioned counterfeit artworks. The Court set aside the High Court's order and the Magistrate's summons, citing insufficient specific allegations, non-compliance with the mandatory inquiry under Section 202(1) CrPC, and failure to demonstrate reputational harm. Highlighting the primacy of freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a), the Court underscored the media's responsibility to exercise caution in publishing content, given its influence on public opinion and potential to cause reputational damage. (Para 20, 21) Jaideep Bose v. Bid and Hammer Auctioneers, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 222 : 2025 INSC 241

Article 19(1)(g) - Right to carry on Business - Article 19(1)(g) includes right to shut down a business subject to reasonable restrictions - Right to close down a business is an integral part of the right to carry it on. [Para 7] Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 673 : 2025 INSC 801

Article 19 - Freedom of Speech and Expression - The poem falls under the appellant's fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a). This right includes dissent and protest, essential to democracy, unless restricted reasonably under Article 19(2). The FIR's registration was a mechanical act, bordering on perversity, and an abuse of process, violating constitutional ideals of liberty of thought and expression. (Para 36) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : 2025 INSC 410

Article 20(3), Article 21 - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 27 – Narco-Analysis Test - Right to Voluntary Narco-Analysis - Prohibition on Involuntary Tests - Evidentiary Value - An accused may voluntarily undergo a narco-analysis test during the evidence stage of a trial, subject to court approval, free consent, and appropriate safeguards. However, this right is not absolute. Involuntary narco-analysis tests violate Articles 20(3) and 21, as held in Selvi v. State of Karnataka (2010), and their reports or derived information are inadmissible as evidence. Information obtained from a voluntary test may be admissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, but a report alone cannot sustain a conviction without corroborative evidence. The High Court erred in permitting narco-analysis tests during a bail hearing in a dowry death case, as bail decisions should focus on the nature of allegations, custody duration, and offense, not investigative methods. Courts must assess consent and safeguards before authorizing voluntary tests. The impugned order was set aside, reinforcing constitutional protections and procedural propriety. (Paras 8, 11, 12, 15, 20 & 21) Amlesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 674 : 2025 INSC 810 : AIR 2025 SC 2753

Articles 21 and 22(1) - Murder - Reversal of Acquittal - The appellants were acquitted by the trial court in a murder case. The High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted the appellants, sentencing them to life imprisonment. The appellants challenged the High Court's decision, arguing that the reversal of acquittal into conviction was in violation of the statutory bar under Section 401(3) CrPC, which prohibits the conversion of an acquittal into a conviction in revisional jurisdiction. Additionally, the appellants contended that they were not given an opportunity to be heard, violating principles of natural justice and their constitutional rights under Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution of India. Whether the High Court erred in reversing the acquittal and convicting the appellants in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 CrPC, despite the statutory bar under Section 401(3) CrPC ? Whether the High Court violated the principles of natural justice by not providing the appellants an opportunity to be heard before reversing the acquittal ? Whether the proviso to Section 372 CrPC, which grants victims the right to appeal against acquittals, is retrospective in operation and applicable to the case ? Whether the appellants are entitled to compensation for unlawful detention and violation of their fundamental rights? Held, the High Court committed a grave error in reversing the acquittal and convicting the appellants in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. Section 401(3) CrPC expressly prohibits the conversion of an acquittal into a conviction in revisional proceedings. The High Court's action was in direct violation of this statutory bar. The Court further held that the High Court violated the principles of natural justice by not providing the appellants an opportunity to be heard before reversing the acquittal. The appellants' constitutional rights under Articles 21 and 22(1) were infringed, as they were not given a fair chance to defend themselves. The proviso to Section 372 CrPC, which grants victims the right to appeal against acquittals, is not retrospective in operation. Since the revision petition was filed in 2006, before the proviso was introduced in 2009, the victim had no statutory right to appeal at the time. The Court awarded compensation of Rs. 5,00,000/- to each of the appellants for the unlawful detention and violation of their fundamental rights. The State Government was directed to pay the compensation within four weeks. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's judgment, and acquitted the appellants. The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to statutory limitations on revisional jurisdiction and upholding the principles of natural justice. The State Government was held responsible for the violation of the appellants' rights and was ordered to pay compensation. Section 401(3) CrPC prohibits the High Court from converting an acquittal into a conviction in revisional jurisdiction. Natural Justice requires that the accused be given an opportunity to be heard before any adverse order is passed. Proviso to Section 372 CrPC is not retrospective and does not apply to cases filed before its introduction in 2009. Compensation can be awarded for unlawful detention and violation of fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The appeals were allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the State Government was directed to pay Rs. 5,00,000/- as compensation to each appellant within four weeks. Mahabir v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 121 : 2025 INSC 120

Articles 21 and 22 - Requirement to Communicate Grounds of Arrest under Article 22(1) in Warrant-Based and Warrantless Arrests - Held, Article 22(1) is a constitutional safeguard mandating that grounds of arrest be communicated to the arrestee. In warrantless arrests, non-compliance with Article 22(1) renders the arrest illegal, prohibiting further custody. Grounds must pre-exist, be documented, and conveyed meaningfully to the arrestee, preferably with notice to their family, to facilitate release arrangements. In arrests pursuant to a warrant, reading the warrant aloud to the arrestee satisfies Article 22(1), and no separate grounds are required. Police must prove compliance with Article 22(1) if non-communication is alleged, supported by diary entries or documents. Appeal dismissed, affirming compliance with Article 22(1) in warrant-based arrest. (Para 16, 36) Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 628 : 2025 INSC 768

Article 21, 22 - Applicability of Cr.P.C. to PMLA - The Court clarified that Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), which incorporates the requirement of Article 22(2), applies to PMLA proceedings by virtue of Section 65 of the PMLA. There is no inconsistency between the PMLA and Cr.P.C. in this regard. Directorate of Enforcement v. Subhash Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 137 : 2025 INSC 141

Article 21, 22 - Duty of Courts to Uphold Fundamental Rights - The Court reiterated that when a court finds that the fundamental rights of an accused have been violated during or after arrest, it is the court's duty to release the accused on bail. The illegality of the arrest vitiates the detention, and bail cannot be denied based on the twin conditions under Section 45 of the PMLA. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the High Court's order granting bail to the respondent. The Court emphasized the importance of upholding constitutional rights and the rule of law in criminal proceedings. The appeal was dismissed, and the respondent's bail was upheld. Directorate of Enforcement v. Subhash Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 137 : 2025 INSC 141

Article 21, 22 - Illegal Arrest and Bail - Violation of Fundamental Rights - The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to grant bail to the respondent in a case under PMLA. The High Court had found that the arrest was illegal due to a violation of Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India, which mandates that an arrested person must be produced before a magistrate within 24 hours of arrest. The respondent was detained at Airport pursuant to a Look Out Circular (LOC) issued by the Directorate of Enforcement (ED). The ED took physical custody of the respondent on March 5, 2022, but he was formally arrested only on March 6, 2022, and produced before a magistrate later that day. The Court found that the respondent was not produced before a magistrate within 24 hours of being taken into custody, rendering the arrest illegal. The Court emphasized that the failure to produce the respondent before a magistrate within 24 hours violated his fundamental rights under Articles 21 (right to life and personal liberty) and 22(2) of the Constitution. Consequently, the arrest was deemed vitiated, and the respondent was entitled to bail. Directorate of Enforcement v. Subhash Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 137 : 2025 INSC 141

Article 21, 47 and 48A - Lack of adequate and hygienic toilet facilities in court premises across India - Directions Issued - Construction and Maintenance of Toilets - Formation of Committees - Maintenance and Hygiene - Special Facilities - Funding and Transparency - Compliance Reporting - All High Courts and State Governments/UTs must ensure the construction and availability of separate toilet facilities for males, females, PwD, and transgender persons in all court premises and tribunals across the country. Toilets must be clearly identifiable, accessible, and equipped with functional amenities such as water, electricity, hand soap, napkins, and toilet paper. Each High Court shall constitute a committee chaired by a Judge nominated by the Chief Justice, with members including the Registrar General, Chief Secretary, PWD Secretary, Finance Secretary, and a representative of the Bar Association. The committee will conduct a survey, assess infrastructure gaps, and ensure the implementation of adequate toilet facilities. Regular maintenance of toilets must be ensured, preferably through outsourcing to professional agencies. A mandatory cleaning schedule and periodic inspections must be implemented. A grievance redressal mechanism must be established for reporting and resolving issues related to toilet facilities. Separate washrooms must be provided for judges, advocates, litigants, and staff. Child-friendly washrooms must be constructed in family courts. Nursing rooms with breastfeeding facilities and changing stations must be provided for mothers. Sanitary pad dispensers must be installed in women's, PwD, and transgender washrooms. State Governments/UTs must allocate sufficient funds for the construction and maintenance of toilet facilities. A transparent and separate monetary fund must be established for this purpose. All High Courts and State Governments/UTs must file a status report within four months. The Supreme Court disposed of the writ petition with the above directions, emphasizing that access to proper sanitation is not merely a matter of convenience but a fundamental right essential for human dignity and the fair administration of justice. This judgment reinforces the constitutional obligation of the State to provide basic sanitation facilities as part of the right to life and dignity under Article 21. It also highlights the need for inclusive and accessible infrastructure in public spaces, particularly in judicial premises, to ensure equality and justice for all. Rajeeb Kalita v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 72 : 2025 INSC 75 : AIR 2025 SC 468

Article 21, 47 and 48A - Whether the lack of adequate and hygienic toilet facilities in court premises across India violates the fundamental right to life and dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Whether the State and Union Territories are obligated to provide separate, accessible, and well-maintained toilet facilities for men, women, persons with disabilities (PwD), and transgender persons in all court complexes. Held, access to clean, functional, and hygienic toilet facilities is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. The right to life includes the right to live with dignity, and the absence of proper sanitation facilities in court premises undermines this right. The State's duty under Articles 47 and 48A of the Constitution to improve public health and protect the environment, which includes providing adequate sanitation facilities. Rajeeb Kalita v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 72 : 2025 INSC 75 : AIR 2025 SC 468

Article 21, 51A(e) - Rights of Breast Feeding Women – Establishment of feeding rooms, child care rooms, and other related facilities for nursing mothers and infants in public places - Court directed the Union of India to issue a reminder communication to all States and Union Territories to ensure compliance with the advisory. The States and Union Territories were urged to incorporate such facilities in existing and upcoming public buildings, ensuring privacy and dignity for nursing mothers. (Para 18 – 23) Maatr Sparsh an initiative by Avyaan Foundation v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 275 : 2025 INSC 302

Article 21 and 22 - Arrest and Detention - Communication of arrest grounds to a relative is not equivalent to informing the arrestee. Arrest memo contents (e.g., name, address, FIR details) do not include grounds of arrest. Vague or afterthought diary entries cannot substitute compliance with Article 22(1). (Paras 21, 27) Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2025 INSC 162 : (2025) 5 SCC 799

Article 21 and 22 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 50 (Section 47 of the BNSS) - Person arrested to be informed of grounds of arrest and of right to bail - Non-compliance with Section 50 of the CrPC, requiring notification of arrest details to the accused's nominated persons, also vitiates the arrest. The Court overturned the High Court's decision and ordered the immediate release of the petitioner, due to failure to communicate the grounds of arrest. (Paras 21, 3) Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2025 INSC 162 : (2025) 5 SCC 799

Article 21 and 22 - Non-compliance with Article 22(1) of the Indian Constitution, which mandates informing an arrested person of the grounds of arrest in a clear and effective manner, renders the arrest illegal. Such violation constitutes a breach of fundamental rights under Articles 21 and 22, warranting the accused's immediate release or grant of bail, even in the presence of statutory restrictions. The Court emphasized the magistrate's duty to verify compliance with Article 22(1) during remand proceedings. (Paras 20, 21) Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2025 INSC 162 : (2025) 5 SCC 799

Article 21 and 243G - Public Interest Litigation - Public Libraries in Villages - The Supreme Court refused to direct State Governments to establish public libraries in rural areas, emphasizing that pressing issues like clean water, sanitation, health, and education under Article 21 (Right to Life) take precedence over library initiatives. The Court highlighted the lack of comprehensive data on rural conditions and financial constraints, noting that resource allocation is a policy matter for governments. While acknowledging the value of libraries in promoting knowledge and democratic values, the Court encouraged States to explore innovative solutions, such as e-libraries and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) funds, to address the issue within their means. The petition was disposed of with a call for States to take effective steps to promote library facilities in rural areas. (Paras 3 - 6) Mundona Rural Development Foundation v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 452

Article 21 - Duty of Courts - Courts must zealously protect freedom of expression, a cornerstone of democracy and dignified life under Article 21. The effect of words must be judged by reasonable, strong-minded standards, not weak or insecure ones. Even if a large number of persons dislike the views expressed by another, the right of the person to express the views must be respected and protected. Literature including poetry, dramas, films, stage shows, satire and art, make the life of human beings more meaningful. (Para 38 & 39) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : 2025 INSC 410

Article 21 - Human Rights Act, 1993; Section 2(1)(d) - Dignity - FIR Registration - Police Misconduct - Compensation - Every citizen approaching a police station to report a crime is entitled to be treated with dignity. The Supreme Court upheld the State Human Rights Commission's order directing the government to pay ₹2 lakh as compensation, recoverable from a police inspector who refused to register an FIR and used derogatory language against the complainant's mother. The inspector's actions, including failure to register the FIR and use of objectionable language, were held to violate human rights under Section 2(1)(d). The High Court's order affirming the SHRC's decision was upheld, and the petition was dismissed. (Para 6 - 8) Pavul Yesu Dhasan v. Registrar State Human Rights Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 562 : 2025 INSC 677

Article 21 - Judicial Language - Condemnation of Misogynistic Terms - Gender Bias Addressed - The Supreme Court criticized the High Court's use of terms such as “illegitimate wife” and “faithful mistress” to describe a woman in a void marriage, holding that such language is misogynistic and violates the right to dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Court noted a gender disparity, as similar derogatory terms were not applied to men in void marriages, highlighting judicial gender bias. The ruling aligns with the Supreme Court's Handbook on Combating Gender Stereotypes, which prescribes gender-just terminology for legal pleadings, orders, and judgments. The use of such misogynistic terms in judicial pronouncements was deemed unconstitutional and contrary to the constitutional ethos of dignity. (Para 24) Sukhdev Singh v. Sukhbir Kaur, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 195 : 2025 INSC 197

Article 21 – Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (KAAPA) – Preventive Detention – Distinction between 'Public Order' and 'Law and Order' – Bail Cancellation – Habeas Corpus – Held, preventive detention, an exceptional measure, must be exercised with utmost caution and strict adherence to constitutional safeguards under Article 21. It cannot be used as a substitute for criminal prosecution or to bypass bail orders. The detenu's actions, related to pending criminal cases under various statutes, did not amount to a disturbance of public order justifying detention. The detaining authority failed to substantiate how the detenu's conduct threatened public order, and the State should have sought bail cancellation instead. The detention order was quashed, emphasizing that preventive detention must strictly comply with legal and constitutional standards. [Para 17 - 22] Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 681 : 2025 INSC 809 : AIR 2025 SC 2868

Article 21 - Penal Code, 1860; Section 84 - Legal Insanity - Held, a person with mental insanity cannot be held criminally liable as they lack the capacity to exercise their right to self-defense under Article 21. The Court found prosecution witnesses' evidence raised reasonable doubt about the appellant's mental condition at the time of the offence in 2018. Under Section 84 IPC, the accused need only establish reasonable doubt of legal insanity, not conclusive proof. Medical examination conducted in 2023, five years post-incident, was deemed irrelevant. The Court criticized the prosecution's failure to conduct a timely medical examination despite evidence of the appellant's mental instability. Granting the benefit of doubt, the Court acquitted the appellant. Convictions under Sections 302, 352, and 201 IPC set aside due to reasonable doubt regarding the appellant's mental sanity at the time of the offence. (Paras 8, 10) Dashrath Patra v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 618

Article 21 - Right to Appeal against Conviction - Appeal challenging the dismissal of a criminal appeal by the High Court due to a delay of 1637 days in filing - The appellant, convicted under Sections 366 and 376(2)(n) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment, sought condonation of delay, citing lack of monetary resources and his absence from the station to earn a livelihood. The High Court had dismissed the delay condonation application, construing the appellant's absence as absconding, and consequently dismissed the appeal. Held, right to appeal, particularly in cases affecting personal liberty, is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. Dismissing an appeal solely on the grounds of delay without examining the reasons for the delay is erroneous. Consequently, the Supreme Court condoned the delay, restored the criminal appeal, and directed the High Court to decide the appeal on merits. Mahesh Singh Banzara v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 28

Article 21 - Right to Speedy Trial - Undertrial Accused - Prolonged Detention - Excessive Witnesses - Judicial Responsibility - Accused, charged under UAPA for alleged Naxalite activities, in custody since 2020. Prosecution planned to examine 100 witnesses, with 42 already examined, many providing repetitive testimonies. Bail granted due to excessive trial delays violating the fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21, irrespective of the offence's gravity. Prolonged detention (6-7 years) as an undertrial, coupled with unnecessary examination of excessive witnesses to prove a single fact, deemed unwarranted.. Delayed trials cause significant stress, financial loss, social stigma, and disruption to the accused's life, with no remedy for acquitted individuals. Such delays undermine justice for the accused, victims, society, and the judicial system's credibility. Courts must leverage Criminal Procedure Code provisions to ensure efficient trial progression. Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order denying bail, and granted bail to the accused. [Para 14, 15] Tapas Kumar Palit v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 211 : 2025 INSC 222 : AIR 2025 SC 940

Article 22 (1) - Compliance with - Duty to inform an arrestee of the grounds of arrest - Held, informing an arrestee's relative (e.g., wife) about the arrest does not fulfill the constitutional obligation under Article 22(1) to directly inform the arrestee of the grounds of arrest. Recording arrest details in the arrest memo, remand report, or case diary does not constitute compliance with this mandate, as these documents merely note the fact of arrest, not the reasons for it. Reliance on vague or non-contemporaneous case diary entries was deemed insufficient. The Court declared the appellant's arrest illegal for non-compliance with Article 22(1) and set aside the High Court's decision. Appeal allowed. (Paras 21, 27) Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2025 INSC 162 : (2025) 5 SCC 799

Article 32, 226, 248 - The Supreme Court dismissed the Union Government's appeals against the High Court's ruling, holding that lottery distributors are not liable to pay service tax under clause (zzzzn) of Section 65(105) of the Finance Act, 1994, as inserted by the Finance Act, 2010. The Court affirmed that the activity of promoting, marketing, or organizing lotteries constitutes "betting and gambling" under Entry 62, List II of the Seventh Schedule, exclusively within the State Legislature's taxing competence. The relationship between lottery distributors and the State of Sikkim was held to be principal-to-principal, not principal-to-agent, thus no service is rendered by distributors to attract service tax liability. The Court upheld the High Court's finding that the said clause is ultra vires the Constitution and reiterated that only the State Government can levy gambling tax on such activities. [Para 15 - 18] Union of India v. Future Gaming Solutions, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 189 : 2025 INSC 181

Article 32, 226 - Each branch of the State in a democracy, be it the legislature, executive or the judiciary, especially in a constitutional democracy, acts within the framework of the Constitution. It is the Constitution that is higher than all of us. It is the Constitution which imposes limits and restrictions on the powers vested in the three organs. The power of judicial review is conferred by the Constitution on the judiciary. Statutes are subject to judicial review to test their constitutionality as well as for judicial interpretation. Therefore, when the constitutional courts exercise their power of judicial review, they act within the framework of the Constitution. (Para 7) Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 547 : 2025 INSC 647

Article 32, 226 - Judicial decisions are made in accordance with legal principles and not in keeping with political, religious or community considerations. When citizens approach the court praying for exercise of the power of judicial review, they do so in furtherance of their fundamental and/or legal rights. The court's consideration of such a prayer is the fulfilment of its constitutional duty. (Para 9) Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 547 : 2025 INSC 647

Article 32, 226 - Village Recognition - Inter-District Boundary Dispute - Non-Compliance with Village Recognition Criteria - Inadequate Consideration of Objections - Requirement for Fresh Public Notice and Comprehensive Objection Review - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order directing recognition of Kakiho Village within three months, holding that the conditions for village recognition under the Nagaland State Government's Memoranda dated March 22, 1996, and October 1, 2005, were not satisfied. The Court found that objections, including those raised by the appellant (Jalukai Village Council), were not adequately considered. It directed the State to issue a fresh public notice for Kakiho Village's recognition, conduct a comprehensive review of all objections, and complete the process within six months, with strict compliance mandated. The Court clarified that the inter-district boundary dispute between Kohima and Dimapur is irrelevant to Kakiho Village's recognition, as the village is located approximately 3.7 km outside the disputed buffer zone. The matter was listed as part-heard, to be reviewed after six months. (Paras 49, 63, 73) Old Jalukai Village Council v. Kakiho Village, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 632 : 2025 INSC 766

Article 32 and 226 - Fake Encounters - The petitioner, an advocate, challenged a High Court order dismissing his Public Interest Litigation (PIL) seeking an independent probe into alleged fake police encounters in Assam. The petition claimed over 80 fake encounters since May 2021, citing non-compliance with PUCL guidelines, including failure to register FIRs against police personnel and inadequate investigations. Specific cases, such as the Tinsukia encounter, were highlighted, alleging procedural irregularities and police coercion. The Supreme Court directed the Assam Human Rights Commission (AHRC) to conduct an independent, expeditious inquiry into allegations of 171 fake encounters, ensuring victim participation and confidentiality. The petition alleged widespread violation of guidelines laid down in People's Union for Civil Liberties & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2014) 10 SCC 635, regarding police encounter investigations. The Court underscored the role of human rights commissions in safeguarding civil liberties and the rule of law, noting that proven fake encounters violate Article 21 of the Constitution. While each of the 171 cases requires objective scrutiny, blanket directions based solely on compiled allegations were deemed unwarranted. The AHRC was granted authority to initiate further investigations, with state cooperation mandated and institutional barriers to be removed. The Assam State Legal Services Authority was directed to provide legal aid to victims, and measures were ordered to protect the identities of victims, families, and witnesses. The Court dismissed concerns raised by the Solicitor General about potential misuse of legal assistance, affirming confidence in the judicial system. The petitioner's locus standi was upheld, recognizing the role of individuals in exposing alleged state excesses. While most cases did not prima facie indicate flagrant violations of PUCL guidelines, some warranted further scrutiny. The Court clarified that PUCL guidelines mandate investigation of the encounter incident, not necessarily the police officers involved. (Para 55) Arif Md Yeasin Jwadder v. State of Assam, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 638 : 2025 INSC 785

Article 32 - Plea to regulate private hospitals that compel patients to purchase medicines, devices, implants, and consumables from their inhouse pharmacies at exorbitant prices. The Court disposed of the writ petition, directing all State Governments to consider the issue of unreasonable charges and patient exploitation in private hospitals and take appropriate policy decisions. (Para 16 – 18) Siddharth Dalmia v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 324 : 2025 INSC 351

Article 32 - The petitioners sought several reliefs, including a declaration that a judgment of the High Court was illegal for being passed without hearing necessary parties, a direction to survey properties to ascertain encroachment on government land, regularization of their apartments, and an injunction against interference by the State and its agents. Held, the High Court's judgment could not be declared illegal under Article 32. The petitioners were advised to pursue alternative remedies, such as filing for recall of the judgment or challenging it under Article 136. The writ petition was dismissed, leaving the petitioners free to explore other legal remedies. Vimal Babu Dhumadiya v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 140

Article 32 - Validity of the laws relating to Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments of the States of Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Telangana - Petitioners sought declaration of provisions as ultra vires Articles 14, 19, 25, 26, 29, and 31A – Held, Challenges to state-specific legislation more effectively addressed by respective High Courts due to distinct legislative schemes and sociocultural contexts. Liberty granted to petitioners to approach jurisdictional High Courts. High Courts advised to consider historical, socio-economic, and religious aspects and may constitute Expert Committees. Writ petitions disposed of. (Para 4 – 8) Sh.Dayanand Saraswati Swamiji v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 413 : 2025 INSC 465

Article 32 - Writ Petition - Challenge to Supreme Court's Final Judgments - Impermissible - Article 32 cannot be used to challenge the Supreme Court's final judgments, directly or indirectly, as it undermines judicial finality, hierarchy, and the principle of res judicata. A conscious distinction of an earlier precedent does not render a judgment per incuriam. Aggrieved litigants must seek remedies through review or curative petitions, not writ proceedings under Article 32, which is a remedial provision for enforcing fundamental rights. In this case, retired employees challenged the Court's ruling in State of H.P. v. Rajesh Chander Sood, (2016) 10 SCC 77, which upheld the repeal of a pension scheme with cut-off dates, alleging it was per incuriam for ignoring D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305. The Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that Rajesh Chander Sood validly distinguished D.S. Nakara and remains binding. The petitioners were directed to pursue review or curative remedies. Writ petition dismissed as misconceived. (Para 29, 30, 32) Satish Chander Sharma v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 431 : 2025 INSC 491 : AIR 2025 SC 2050

Article 41 - Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 - Graduate Medical Education Regulations (Amendment), 2019 - National Medical Commission (NMC) - The condition of “both hands intact” lacks legal sanctity, fails to provide functional assessment, and perpetuates ableism, undermining the RPwD Act and Article 41. The Court emphasized the need for individualized functional assessments over a “one size fits all” approach, as mandated by precedents in Omkar Ramchandra Gond v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 770 and Om Rathod v. Director General of Health Services, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 857. The AIIMS assessment report was found inadequate for not adhering to the functional competency tests laid down in prior judgments and for failing to provide reasons for denying admission. The Court reiterated the need to revise NMC guidelines to align with the RPwD Act, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and constitutional principles, as previously directed in Omkar Ramchandra Gond v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 770 and Om Rathod v. Director General of Health Services, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 857. The approach advocated by Dr. Satendra Singh, allowing candidates to pursue MBBS and choose non-surgical or medical branches post-course, was endorsed as fair and inclusive. Anmol v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 236 : 2025 INSC 256

Article 51A - Legality of Ex-Post Facto Environmental Clearances (ECs) under Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) Notification, 2006 - Supreme Court declared ex-post facto ECs for projects, particularly mining, commenced without prior EC as illegal and restrained the Central Government from granting such clearances in the future. Set aside the 2017 Notification, 2021 Office Memorandum (OM), and related circulars/orders permitting ex-post facto ECs as violative of the EIA Notification, 2006. Clarified that ECs already granted under the 2017 Notification and 2021 OM remain unaffected. Held that the EIA Notification, 2006 mandates prior EC, and ex-post facto approvals contradict this requirement. Projects initiated without prior EC cannot be regularized, as such actions by companies, real estate developers, and others constitute "gross illegalities." The 2021 and 2022 OMs created an impermissible framework for post-facto approvals, undermining the mandatory "prior environmental clearance" requirement reiterated 34 times in the EIA Notification, 2006. Rejected the Union's argument that denying regularization would cause environmental harm through demolitions, emphasizing compliance with the polluter pays principle and the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. (Para 32 -34) Vanashakti v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 588 : 2025 INSC 718 : AIR 2025 SC 2843

Articles 74(2) and 163(3) - West Bengal School Selection Commission Act, 1997 - Illegal Appointments - CBI Investigation - Supernumerary Posts - Cabinet Decision - Constitutional Immunity - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's direction for a CBI investigation into the Government's cabinet decision to create supernumerary posts during the pendency of a challenge to the 2016 WB SSC appointments. Held, the High Court erred in ordering the CBI probe, as: (1) the writ petition before the High Court lacked a specific prayer challenging the cabinet decision or seeking investigation into the order dated 19.5.2022; (2) a government note dated 5.5.2022 clarified that actions under S.19 of the WB SSC Act, 1997, were subject to the pending litigation's outcome; and (3) Articles 74(2) and 163(3) of the Constitution bar judicial inquiry into advice tendered by the Council of Ministers to the Governor. The Court clarified that its observations were limited to the supernumerary posts issue and did not affect other aspects of the CBI's investigation into the Teachers' Recruitment Scam. State of West Bengal v. Baishakhi Bhattacharyya, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 484

Article 129 – Environmental Law – Contempt of Court – Unauthorised Tree-Felling in Delhi Ridge – Delhi Development Authority (DDA) – Constitutional Morality – Public Interest – Afforestation Measures – The Supreme Court held DDA officials in contempt for unauthorised tree-felling in the Delhi Ridge without prior court approval for a road-widening project to facilitate access to CAPFIMS Paramilitary Hospital. Two violations identified: (i) failure to seek court permission, and (ii) deliberate concealment of tree-felling, constituting criminal contempt. Contempt proceedings against former DDA Vice Chairman Subhashish Panda closed due to his dissociation from DDA. Other DDA officials fined ₹25,000 each as an environmental fee, with formal censure, without prejudice to departmental action. The Court directed: (i) mandatory disclosure of pending court proceedings in all notifications/orders related to afforestation, tree-felling, or ecologically impactful activities; (ii) urgent afforestation by DDA and GNCTD within three months, overseen by a court-constituted committee; (iii) identification of 185 acres for afforestation, costs borne by DDA; (iv) joint compliance reports by DDA and Forest Department; and (v) a one-time levy on beneficiaries of the road-widening project. The Court emphasized constitutional morality, social justice, and public interest in providing medical access to paramilitary personnel, while condemning the incident as a “classic case of institutional missteps and administrative overreach” due to non-compliance, disregard for court orders, and environmental degradation. Ignorance of pending court proceedings no longer a valid defense. Afforestation plan to be framed and implemented under committee supervision, with periodic compliance reports. (Paras 16, 21, 28, 32 & 33) Bindu Kapurea v. Subhasish Panda, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 637 : 2025 INSC 784 : AIR 2025 SC 2901

Article 136 - Scope of Appellate Jurisdiction - Limited Interference with Concurrent Findings - Exceptional Circumstances - No Ordinary Appellate Jurisdiction - Scope of Review - In criminal appeals by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is distinct from its appellate jurisdiction under Article 134. The scope of interference in such appeals is limited and subject to self-imposed constraints, as established in Pappu v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(2022) 10 SCC 321] and Mst Dalbir Kaur and Others v. State of Punjab [(1976) 4 SCC 158]. Key principles governing the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 include: The Supreme Court does not generally interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the Trial Court and High Court based on pure appreciation of evidence. Reappraisal or review of evidence is not undertaken unless the assessment is vitiated by: Errors of law or procedure. Misreading of evidence. Non-consideration of glaring inconsistencies or striking features that demolish the prosecution's case. Violation of principles of natural justice or mandatory legal provisions causing serious prejudice or injustice. Interference is warranted only in rare and exceptional cases where there is manifest illegality, substantial and grave injustice, or disregard of judicial process, as highlighted in Pappu v. State of Uttar Pradesh (paras 63, 71) and Mst Dalbir Kaur (paras 2, 3, 8). The Supreme Court is not an ordinary court of criminal appeal. Appeals under Article 136 are not regular appeals, and the Court does not reassess evidence or credibility of witnesses to substitute its own opinion unless special circumstances exist, such as perverse findings or conclusions based on no evidence. The Court examines the High Court's judgment and evidence to determine if the principles laid down are followed. Findings of fact may be disturbed if the High Court overlooks critical evidence that undermines the prosecution's case or arrives at conclusions that are manifestly perverse or unsupportable. These decisions do not preclude reappreciation of evidence to assess whether a case falls within the parameters for interference but emphasize that such power is exercised sparingly to prevent grave miscarriage of justice. (Paras 37 - 39) Agniraj v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 644 : 2025 INSC 774 : AIR 2025 SC 2674

Article 136 - There is no bar for the Supreme Court to erase defective orders by setting them aside, even in the absence of any challenge thereto. (Para 21) Om Prakash Gupta v. Satish Chandra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 194 : 2025 INSC 183 : AIR 2025 SC 1201

Article 136 - Tripartite Agreement - Subvention Scheme - Homebuyers alleged collusion between builders, banks, and Housing Finance Companies (HFCs) in subvention schemes, where builders promised to pay EMIs until possession but defaulted, leaving buyers liable for EMIs despite incomplete projects. Held, a prima facie “unholy nexus” existed between builders, banks, and HFCs, indicating a systematic failure by statutory and government authorities to perform their duties. The Court noted circumvention of the regulatory framework by banks and HFCs, with coercive actions taken against homebuyers despite incomplete units and no valid offer of possession. The Supreme Court directed the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to register seven Preliminary Enquiries to thoroughly investigate the alleged collusion, ascertain the modus operandi, and identify any criminality involved. (Paras 1, 2, 17) Himanshu Singh v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 574

Article 136 - While exercising its appellate jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court possesses the authority to scrutinize not only the conviction of an accused but also the appropriateness of the sentence imposed. (Para 23) Deen Dayal Tiwari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 124 : 2025 INSC 111

Article 141 - Ratio laid down by the Supreme Court, is applicable irrespective of the stage at which it is relied upon. What is relevant is the ratio and not the stage. Such contentions go against the spirit of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. Once a ratio is laid down, the courts have to apply the ratio, considering the facts of the case and once, found to be applicable, irrespective of the stage, the same has to be applied, to throw out frivolous suits. Correspondence RBANMS Educational Institution v. B. Gunashekar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 429 : 2025 INSC 490

Article 142, 246, 254 - Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC); Sections 14, 238 - Moratorium under Section 14 of IBC does not bar property attachments under the Maharashtra Protection of Interest of Depositors (in Financial Establishments) Act, 1999 (MPID Act). The MPID Act, enacted under the State List, enables recovery for victims of financial fraud through asset attachment, and such vesting with the State Competent Authority is unaffected by the IBC moratorium. No inconsistency exists between the IBC and MPID Act, negating claims of repugnancy under Article 254 of the Constitution. Arising from the 2013 NSEL scam involving ₹5,600 crore in defaults, the case involved a challenge to property attachments under the MPID Act during an IBC moratorium. The Court, exercising its powers under Article 142, upheld the actions of a Supreme Court-appointed Committee in executing decrees and distributing proceeds from attached properties to ensure equitable distribution to depositors, despite the IBC moratorium. Section 238 of the IBC was held inapplicable due to the absence of conflict between the two statutes. (Paras 48, 51, 52) National Spot Exchange Ltd. v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 577 : 2025 INSC 694

Article 142; Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Sections 34 and 37 - The Supreme Court's plenary powers under Article 142 can be cautiously exercised to modify arbitral awards to ensure complete justice and expedite protracted proceedings, provided such modifications do not interfere with the award merits or violate the core principles of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Modifications must align with fundamental rights and the legislative intent of the Act, aiming to resolve disputes efficiently while saving time and costs, without rewriting the award. [Relied: Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 375]. Justice KV Viswanathan dissented, holding that Article 142 cannot be used to modify arbitral awards, as Section 34 provides the exclusive mechanism for challenging awards under the 1996 Act. He opined that such modifications contravene substantive law, undermine the ethos of arbitration, and could create uncertainty, thereby diminishing arbitration's efficacy as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. (Paras 85 & 157) Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 508 : 2025 INSC 605

Article 142 empowers the Supreme Court to mandate regularization of long-serving ad hoc employees in public institutions where systemic delays and non-compliance perpetuate injustice, bypassing procedural hurdles like UPSC approval if equity demands. - Prolonged ad hoc engagements, absent bona fide recruitment efforts, constitute exploitation; Umadevi prohibits regularization of backdoor entries but does not bar relief for qualified incumbents denied due process by employer inaction. Governments must ensure accountability for rule violations in public hiring; judicial orders for schemes (e.g., regularization) bind all arms of state, including UPSC. Addresses entrenched malpractices in Union Territory education recruitment, emphasizing equity for deserving employees while mandating vigilance against nepotism/corruption. Reinforces judiciary's role in enforcing constitutional mandates against executive inertia. Union of India v. K. Velajagan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 170

Article 142 - It is only rarely, and in extraordinary cases, that this Court may, in the exercise of its plenary power to temper justice with mercy grant a convict a prison-term waiver. As and by way of illustration, a convict (on bail) who is too ill to understand why he needs to be sent to prison or too ill to be taken to prison or the like, could qualify for grant of extreme leniency by this Court but only on production of unimpeachable evidence to that effect. (Para 30) Dashrath v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 553 : 2025 INSC 654

Article 142 - Law is, thus, well-settled that exercise of power conferred by Article 142, in a case such as the present where a minimum sentence is prescribed by the statute, cannot be tinkered, for, the same would amount to legislation by the Court; and, prescription of a term of sentence quite contrary to what the Parliament has legislated would be legally impermissible. The statutory prescription in relation to punishment for a minimum period, unless challenged, cannot be reduced by this Court even in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution. (Para 28) Dashrath v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 553 : 2025 INSC 654

Article 142 - Scope of Appeal - Special leave petition was granted on a limited question regarding the applicability of the PC Act and the quantum of sentence for other offenses. Whether the scope of appeal could be expanded beyond the limited notice issued by the Supreme Court. Held, even when a limited notice is issued, the Court has the discretion to expand the scope of the appeal under Article 142 of the Constitution if substantial justice so requires. This discretionary power remains with the Court even after granting special leave. Biswajit Das v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 89 : 2025 INSC 85

Article 200 - Constitutional Duty of the Governor - The Governor must act in harmony with the State legislature and government, respecting the democratic will of the people, and avoid actions driven by political expediency. The constitutional oath mandates prioritizing the welfare of the State's people. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481

Article 200 - Constitutional Values - Constitutional authorities must uphold the spirit of the Constitution, reflecting on whether their actions align with their oath and the ideals enshrined therein, as emphasized by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar's remarks on the efficacy of the Constitution depending on those who operate it. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481

Article 200 - First Proviso - The first proviso is intrinsically linked to the option of withholding assent, mandating the Governor to return the bill with a message for reconsideration by the House(s) "as soon as possible" when withholding assent. The decision in State of Punjab correctly interprets this linkage, and the expression in Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary that a bill "falls through unless the procedure under the first proviso is followed" does not imply discretion in initiating the proviso. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481

Article 200 - Governor's Discretion - The Governor generally acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers under Article 200, except in cases under the second proviso to Article 200, specific constitutional provisions requiring Presidential assent (e.g., Articles 31A, 31C, 254(2)), or where a bill endangers fundamental principles of representative democracy. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481

Article 200 - Judicial Precedents - The decision in State of Punjab is not per incuriam and aligns with Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary. However, B.K. Pavitra is per incuriam to the extent it suggests the Governor has discretion in reserving bills for the President's consideration or that such actions are beyond judicial scrutiny, contradicting Samsher Singh and the removal of "in his discretion" from the Government of India Act, 1935. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481

Article 200 - Judicial Review - The Governor's actions under Article 200, particularly when exercised in discretion, are subject to judicial review on grounds of arbitrariness, mala fides, or irrelevance. The President's actions under Article 201 are also justiciable, especially for arbitrary withholding of assent or inaction beyond three months. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481

Article 200 - No Pocket or Absolute Veto: The concepts of 'pocket veto' or 'absolute veto' are impermissible under Article 200. The Governor must act expeditiously, as the phrase "shall declare" and "as soon as possible" indicate a constitutional obligation to choose one of the three options without delay or arbitrary inaction. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481

Article 200 – Powers and Functions of the Governor – Legislative Process – Assent to Bills – Judicial Review - Options under Article 200: The Governor, under Article 200, has three options when a bill passed by the State legislature is presented: (i) to give assent; (ii) to withhold assent; or (iii) to reserve the bill for the President's consideration. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481

Article 200 - Reconsideration of Bills - The Governor cannot reserve a bill for the President's consideration in the second round after reconsideration under the first proviso, unless the bill is materially different from the original. The phrase "shall not withhold assent therefrom" mandates assent in such cases. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481

Article 200 - The Governor's reservation of ten bills for the President's consideration in the second round on 28.11.2023 was illegal and set aside, as was any subsequent Presidential action. Due to the Governor's undue delay and lack of bona fides, the bills are deemed assented to on 18.11.2023 under Article 142. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481

Article 200 - The writ petition is disposed of, declaring the Governor's actions erroneous and non-est, with the ten bills deemed assented to on 18.11.2023. The Governor and State Government are urged to work harmoniously for the people's welfare. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481

Article 200 - Timelines for Action: While Article 200 does not prescribe explicit time-limits, the Governor must act within a reasonable period. The Court prescribes: (i) one month for withholding assent or reserving a bill for the President with the Council's advice; (ii) three months for withholding assent or reservation contrary to advice; and (iii) one month for granting assent after reconsideration. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481

Article 201 - President's Role under Article 201 - The President must either grant or withhold assent to a reserved bill, with reasons for withholding, and act within three months. In cases of patent unconstitutionality threatening democratic principles, the President should seek an advisory opinion under Article 143. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481

Article 212 – Legislative Privilege - Expulsion – Proportionality – Judicial Review – Held: Legislative decisions, distinct from proceedings, are subject to judicial review. Ethics Committee recommendations are not immune from scrutiny as they do not constitute legislative functions. Disproportionate punishment undermines democratic principles and electorate rights. The Supreme Court quashed expulsion of a Member of Legislative Council (MLC) for defamatory remarks against the Chief Minister, finding the punishment "grossly excessive" and disproportionate. Though the MLC's conduct was "reprehensible" and unbecoming, permanent expulsion was unwarranted. The expulsion violated fundamental rights and the electorate's rights. The Council's process breached natural justice principles, including denying the MLC an adequate opportunity to defend himself. The seven months of expulsion already served were deemed sufficient as a suspension. Judicial review of such decisions does not infringe legislative privilege under Article 212. The bye-election notification for the MLC's seat was quashed, and he was cautioned against future misconduct. Invoking Article 142, the Court substituted the punishment to uphold proportionality and democratic values. (Para 88) Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v. Bihar Legislative Council, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 244 : 2025 INSC 264

Article 224A - Appointment of ad-hoc Judges - Rising backlog of cases in High Courts - Implementation of continuing mandamus for judicial appointments - The Supreme Court, while considering the issue of pendency of cases in High Courts, observed that as of 25.01.2025, over 62 lakh cases were pending, with more than 18.2 lakh criminal cases and over 44 lakh civil cases. Referring to its earlier judgment dated 20.04.2021, the Court reiterated that the Constitution should be dynamic to address existing judicial challenges. In light of the situation, the Court temporarily set aside the condition that appointments under Article 224A should only be made if 80% of the sanctioned judicial strength was either working or recommended. The Court allowed High Courts to appoint ad-hoc Judges (ranging from 2 to 5, not exceeding 10% of the sanctioned strength) to expedite the disposal of criminal appeals. These ad-hoc Judges would function under a Bench presided over by a sitting Judge of the High Court. The Court directed that the existing Memorandum of Procedure be followed for such appointments and granted liberty to the parties to file further applications if necessary. The matter remains open for further directions. Lok Prahari v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 144

Article 226 - Acquittal in a criminal case based on the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard does not bar departmental disciplinary proceedings against a public servant, which are governed by the "preponderance of probabilities" standard. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's Division Bench decision setting aside the dismissal of an Assistant Engineer (Civil) at the Airports Authority of India (AAI), who was acquitted in a corruption case but dismissed following a departmental inquiry. The Disciplinary Authority is not obligated to address every ground raised by the delinquent officer or provide exhaustive reasons in disciplinary orders, provided the findings are supported by a reasoned conclusion and evidence establishing guilt on the preponderance of probabilities. In an intra-court writ appeal, the Appellate Court must exercise restraint, and interference with the Single Judge's judgment is permissible only if it is perverse or suffers from an apparent error of law. The Supreme Court upheld the Disciplinary and Appellate Authorities' decisions, reinstating the respondent's dismissal, and found the Single Judge's dismissal of the respondent's writ petition to be well-reasoned. Appeal allowed; respondent's dismissal from service reinstated. (Paras 33, 34, 37 & 38) Airports Authority of India v. Pradip Kumar Banerjee, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 162 : 2025 INSC 149 : AIR 2025 SC 1052 : (2025) 4 SCC 111

Article 226 - Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985; Section 20 - Time-Barred Claims - A time-barred service dispute cannot be brought within the limitation period by filing a belated representation. When a government servant is aggrieved by a denial of a benefit, which is not based on a formal order, then a representation must be filed within a reasonable time. The cause of action to approach the Administrative Tribunal arises when an order is passed on such representation or no order is passed after the lapse of six months from the submission of the representation. There may be situations such as denial of promotion or increment, which are not based on formal orders. In such cases, filing of a representation may be necessary, even if the service rules do not provide specifically for such a remedy. (Paras 34 - 36) Chief Executive Officer v. S. Lalitha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 479 : 2025 INSC 565

Article 226 - Blacklisting of Contractors - An authority's power to blacklist a contractor must be exercised judiciously, based on substantial grounds, not mere allegations of contractual breach. A show cause notice for blacklisting must comply with judicial principles, ensuring careful evaluation of facts and the nature of the alleged violation. Blacklisting, being a severe measure that can ruin a contractor's livelihood, requires significant deviation or aberrant conduct, as held in Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of W.B., (1975) 1 SCC 70. Issuing a show cause notice without sufficient grounds is a hollow formality, leading to avoidable litigation. Relying on Kulja Industries Limited v. Chief General Manager, Western Telecom Project BSNL & Ors., AIR 2014 SC 9, the Court identified three grounds for blacklisting: habitual failure to supply equipment on time, unsatisfactory performance of supplied equipment, or unjustified failure to honor a bid. In this case, the appellant faced a show cause notice for blacklisting and forfeiture of EMD due to delays in printing books caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The Supreme Court quashed the blacklisting portion of the notice as unjustified, while upholding other parts. The Court criticized authorities for issuing show cause notices with predetermined intent to blacklist, burdening High Courts with unnecessary litigation. Authorities must apply judicial principles at the notice stage to prevent such outcomes. (Para 30, 32) Techno Prints v. Chhattisgarh Textbook Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 217 : 2025 INSC 236

Article 226 - Cancellation of Land Allotment – Validity of Legal Notice - The Supreme Court dismissed the Trust's appeal, affirming that UPSIDC's cancellation of the allotment complied with procedural requirements under Clause 3.04(vii) of the UPSIDC Manual. The appellant argued that only the notice dated 13.11.2006 qualified as a "legal notice," claiming three consecutive notices were required. However, the Court held that prior communications dated 14.12.2004 and 14.12.2005 also met the criteria for valid legal notices, as they clearly outlined the default, breach, intent to take legal action, and consequences, despite not being explicitly labeled as such. A valid legal notice requires clear facts, notice of breach, intent to hold the recipient liable, and compliance with statutory provisions, without suppressing material information. No prejudice was caused to the appellant, and the High Court's decision was upheld. (Paras 22 - 24) Kamla Nehru Memorial Trust v. U.P. State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 652 : 2025 INSC 791

Article 226 - CBI Investigation - High Courts should not order CBI investigation in a routine manner or on basis of vague allegations. Mere bald allegations against the incompetence of the local police to investigate the case without any kind of substantiation would not justify the transfer of the investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). The Court set aside the High Court's decision which had transferred the investigation from local police to CBI based on bald allegations of the complainant that the local police was incompetent to investigate the case. The High Courts should direct for CBI investigation only in cases where material prima facie discloses something calling for an investigation by CBI. The “ifs” and “buts” without any definite conclusion are not sufficient to put an agency like CBI into motion. (Para 8 & 9) Vinay Aggarwal v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 417 : 2025 INSC 433 : (2025) 5 SCC 149

Article 226 - CBI Investigation - In the present, an FIR was registered against the appellant for impersonating an IB officer and extorting ₹1.49 crore from the complainant, respondent no. 3. The complainant sought a transfer of investigation to the CBI, alleging collusion between the appellant and the police. The High Court allowed this transfer. Setting aside the High Court's decision, the Court noted the High Court's decision to transfer investigation to CBI was based on vague allegations (appellant's acquaintance with police) without substantiated evidence. The Court found that the investigation into the case was underway by the Special Investigation Team (SIT) under the Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP), and there was no evidence suggested by the complainant that the local police were incapable or biased. After going through the records of the case, held, that the present case is not the one where CBI investigation ought to have been directed by the High Court. Resultantly, the appeal was allowed. (Para 2 - 9) Vinay Aggarwal v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 417 : 2025 INSC 433 : (2025) 5 SCC 149

Article 226 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 482 (Equivalent to Section 528 BNSS) - The High Court wrongly concluded the poem 2 disturbed social harmony without evidence, relying solely on its “tenor” and social media responses. No absolute bar exists against quashing an FIR at a nascent stage if no offence is prima facie made out. The High Court failed to prevent an abuse of process. (Para 35 & 37) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : 2025 INSC 410

Article 226 - Conflicting Supreme Court Judgments - When two Supreme Court decisions appear inconsistent, High Courts must not prefer one over the other but should attempt to reconcile both, following the decision most aligned with the facts of the case at hand. (Para 35) A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. Tahsildar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 260 : 2025 INSC 274

Article 226 - Contempt of Court - CBI Investigation - Breach of Stay Order - CBI registered FIR despite Supreme Court's interim stay - Contempt petition filed - CBI officer offered unconditional apology, citing mistake - Remedial steps taken - Apology accepted, contempt petition disposed. (Para 12) Vinay Aggarwal v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 417 : 2025 INSC 433 : (2025) 5 SCC 149

Article 226 - Contempt Proceedings - Mediation - Validity of High Court's order referring a contempt matter to mediation without mutual consent - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order referring a contempt matter to mediation without the consent of both parties. Mediation is a consensual process and cannot be thrust upon unwilling parties, particularly in contempt proceedings where compliance with judicial orders is at stake. The Court criticized the High Court's approach of referring the matter to mediation based solely on the State's willingness to offer alternative land, despite opposition from the appellant. The Supreme Court directed the State to comply with the High Court's earlier judgment dated 10th February 2020, failing which the Chief Secretary was ordered to appear before the Court. High Court's mediation order set aside; State directed to comply with High Court's judgment. (Para 9, 10, 12) Rupa and Co. v. Firhad Hakim, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 233 : 2025 INSC 245

Article 226 - Delay and laches are valid grounds for dismissing a writ petition, especially when the petitioner has an alternative remedy and fails to act within a reasonable time. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Century Textiles and Industries Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 34 : 2025 INSC 36 : AIR 2025 SC 731 : (2025) 3 SCC 183

Article 226 - Delay and Laches - Natural Justice in CIRP - The Court emphasized that the respondent's delay of nearly three years in approaching the High Court, despite being aware of the proceedings, was fatal to their case. The initiation of parallel proceedings under the IBC further undermined the justification for invoking writ jurisdiction. The High Court had set aside the resolution plan on the ground of violation of natural justice due to inadequate notice (less than 24 hours) for a Committee of Creditors (CoC) meeting. The Supreme Court, however, found that the delay in approaching the High Court and the availability of alternative remedies under the IBC rendered the writ petition untenable. Mohammed Enterprises v. Farooq Ali Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 19 : 2025 INSC 25 : AIR 2025 SC 1079

Article 226 - Disciplinary Proceedings - Acquittal in Criminal Case - Disciplinary action cannot be sustained when an employee is acquitted in a criminal case involving substantially similar charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances, as upholding such findings would be unjust, unfair, and oppressive. The Court awarded Rs. 30 lakhs compensation and Rs. 5 lakhs in costs to the appellant, a constable wrongfully dismissed from Bihar Police Service, due to procedural illegalities, including withheld departmental records, vague charges, and denial of cross-examination rights, rendering the dismissal violative of fairness and natural justice. (Paras 37, 40, 44, 47, 50 & 52) Maharana Pratap Singh v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 474 : 2025 INSC 554

Article 226 - Finality of CIRP Proceedings - The Supreme Court reiterated the importance of timely conclusion of CIRP proceedings, as delays undermine the objectives of the IBC. The Court set aside the High Court's order and directed the Adjudicating Authority to resume the proceedings from the stage they were interdicted and conclude them expeditiously. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the resolution plan approved by the CoC. The Adjudicating Authority was directed to expedite the completion of the CIRP proceedings. Mohammed Enterprises v. Farooq Ali Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 19 : 2025 INSC 25 : AIR 2025 SC 1079

Article 226 - Goa (Prohibition of Further Payments and Recovery of Rebate Benefits) Act, 2002 - Promissory Estoppel - Public Interest - Electricity Tariff Rebates - Recovery of Incentives - Public Exchequer - Whether the Goa Government's withdrawal of electricity tariff rebates under the 1991 Notification and recovery of rebates erroneously granted under the 1996 amendments, as mandated by the 2002 Act, violates promissory estoppel. Held: The Supreme Court upheld the Goa Government's authority to withdraw electricity tariff rebates in the public interest, particularly when such incentives strain public finances. The doctrine of promissory estoppel does not apply rigidly when government promises conflict with public interest, as safeguarding the public exchequer prevails over private commercial interests. The Court affirmed the High Court's ruling that demand notices for recovery of rebates were valid, relying on Goa Glass Fibre Ltd. v. State of Goa, (2010) 6 SCC 499, which upheld the constitutionality of the 2002 Act. The 1996 amending notifications, which purported to extend rebate benefits, were declared void ab initio by the Bombay High Court in 2001, a decision upheld by the Supreme Court. Citing Pawan Alloys & Casting (P) Ltd. v. UP SEB, (1997) 7 SCC 251, the Court reiterated that public interest overrides strict enforcement of promissory estoppel in cases involving withdrawal of incentives. The appeal by the industrial units was dismissed, as they were not entitled to rebates post the rescission of the 1991 Notification on 31 March 1995, despite applying for power supply prior to its withdrawal. (Para 28) Puja Ferro Alloys v. State of Goa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 207 : 2025 INSC 217

Article 226 - Habeas Corpus - Child Custody - A father appealed a High Court decision dismissing his habeas corpus petition for custody of his child, who resided with him for nearly 10 years until the mother's death, after which the child was placed with maternal grandparents. The High Court denied custody, citing the child's comfort with the grandparents and the father's remarriage. Whether maternal grandparents have a superior claim to custody over the father, the natural guardian. Held: The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's decision, holding that the father, as the natural guardian, has a superior claim to custody over the grandparents. No allegations of matrimonial disputes, abuse, or factors disqualifying the father's legal rights or intent to seek custody were raised. The child's welfare was best served by granting custody to the father, an educated and employed natural guardian, with whom the child lived for 10 years. The High Court erred in overlooking this relationship. Grandparents cannot claim superior custody rights absent disqualifying factors against the natural guardian. Custody was granted to the father, with visitation rights allowed for the maternal grandparents. (Para 10) Vivek Kumar Chaturvedi v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 185 : 2025 INSC 159

Article 226 - High Court Remand Order—Scope of Appellate Review - An appellate court (Division Bench) cannot remand a matter as a matter of routine where it has already affirmed procedural validity and exhaustively evaluated merits based on evidence. Remand must not be an "empty formality"; appellate courts should dispose of appeals on merits to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. Judicial review under Article 226 targets the decision-making process, not substitution of views on merits. Held: The Division Bench's remand to the Single Judge for merits reconsideration (while upholding procedure) was legally flawed and untenable, as the dissolution's substantive validity was conclusively determined. Remand set aside; matter finally resolved in favor of dissolution. Appeal Dismissed. State Government's dissolution order upheld; High Court's remand quashed. No costs. [Relied on: Nadekerappa since Deceased by LRs. And Ors. v. Pillamma since Deceased by LRs. And Ors. (2022 SCC OnLine SC 387); Gohil Vishvaraj Hanubhai and Ors v. State of Gujarat and Ors.; Union of India v. G. Ganayutham (1997 SCC OnLine SC 135)]. CMJ Foundation v. State of Meghalaya, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 204 : 2025 INSC 211

Article 226 - High Courts, under Article 226, exercise discretionary powers and may refrain from interfering in cases of procedural violations if it serves substantial justice. The Court set aside a High Court judgment that invalidated a 2007 bank auction sale due to a procedural lapse (non-issuance of 15-day notice), emphasizing that such technicalities should not override equitable considerations when the auction had attained finality. The appellant, an auction purchaser, faced frivolous litigation initiated by the guarantor in 2008, despite the sale certificate being issued and significant investment (approx. Rs. 1.5 Crore) made in the property. The High Courts should adopt a practical approach, considering the factual context and equities, rather than acting as a court of appeal. Appeal allowed; High Court's order set aside; no costs imposed on the respondent. [Para 5, 8, 10] M.S. Sanjay v. Indian Bank, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 193 : 2025 INSC 177

Article 226 - In academic matters, the Courts are generally reluctant to interfere, inasmuch as they do not possess the requisite expertise for the same. However, when the academicians themselves act in a manner that adversely affects the career aspirations of lakhs of students, the Court is left with no alternative but to interfere. (Para 8) Siddhi Sandeep Ladda v. Consortium of National Law Universities, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 584 : 2025 INSC 714

Article 226 – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Interference with IBC Proceedings via Writ Jurisdiction – Whether the High Court, under Article 226, can halt insolvency proceedings against a personal guarantor at the preliminary stage by determining waiver of liability, bypassing the statutory mechanism under the IBC. Held, the appointment of a Resolution Professional under Section 97 of the IBC to examine and report on the debt (under Section 99) is a mandatory preliminary step. The Adjudicating Authority is not required to ascertain the existence of debt before this stage. The High Court's exercise of writ jurisdiction was erroneous as it: (i) disrupted the statutory process under the IBC, and (ii) prematurely adjudicated the existence of debt, a mixed question of law and fact within the Adjudicating Authority's jurisdiction under Section 100 of the IBC. While High Courts possess judicial review powers, they should not act as the decision-making authority in place of statutory tribunals tasked with adjudicating specific legal and factual issues. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, which had barred insolvency proceedings against a personal guarantor by holding that the guarantor's liability was waived, as it interfered with the IBC's statutory framework. The appellant's application before the Adjudicating Authority was restored, with directions for expeditious disposal, considering the matter's pendency since 2021. [Para 9, 11, 12] Bank of Baroda v. Farooq Ali Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 234 : 2025 INSC 253 : AIR 2025 SC 1591

Article 226 - Interpretation of Statutes - A statutory provision must be interpreted harmoniously to avoid rendering any part of the statute nugatory. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Century Textiles and Industries Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 34 : 2025 INSC 36 : AIR 2025 SC 731 : (2025) 3 SCC 183

Article 226 - Judicial Review - Administrative Decisions - Courts should be cautious in interfering with the administrative decisions of the Governing Board, particularly when such decisions are in furtherance of implementing a statutorily approved Master Plan. (Para 16) Auroville Foundation v. Natasha Storey, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 313 : 2025 INSC 348 : AIR 2025 SC 1638

Article 226 - Judicial Review - Disciplinary Proceedings - Bank Officials - Adequacy of the evidence adduced during disciplinary inquiry cannot be gone into in writ jurisdiction. (Para 16) General Manager Personnel Syndicate Bank v. B.S.N. Prasad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 92 : 2025 INSC 89

Article 226 - Jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 in Insolvency Matters - Held, the High Court should not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to interfere with Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), 2016, especially when statutory remedies are available. The IBC is a complete code with its own checks, balances, and appellate mechanisms. Mohammed Enterprises v. Farooq Ali Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 19 : 2025 INSC 25 : AIR 2025 SC 1079

Article 226 - Maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution against an order passed by the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council (MSEFC) under Section 18 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (MSMED Act). The Court examined conflicting judgments, including Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Limited v. State of Rajasthan, 2021 LiveLaw SC 753 and Gujarat State Civil Supplies Corporation Limited v. Mahakali Foods Private Limited, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 893 regarding whether the MSEFC, after acting as a conciliator, could also act as an arbitrator, and whether a writ petition could be entertained against its orders. The Court also considered the mandatory pre-deposit requirement under Section 19 of the MSMED Act, which mandates a 75% deposit of the awarded amount for challenging an award. The Court expressed reservations about the absolute bar on writ jurisdiction and referred the following questions to a larger Bench of five Judges: (i) Whether the judgment in M/s India Glycols Limited, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 992 completely bars writ petitions against MSEFC orders. (ii) If not absolute, under what circumstances the principle of alternative remedy would not apply. (iii) Whether MSEFC members, after conciliation, can act as arbitrators under Section 18 of the MSMED Act, despite Section 80 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Court emphasized that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is a constitutional right and part of the basic structure, and its exercise is not precluded by statutory remedies, especially in cases involving violations of natural justice, jurisdictional errors, or challenges to the vires of a statute. The matter was referred to a larger Bench for further consideration. Tamil Nadu Cements Corporation Ltd. v. Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 95 : 2025 INSC 91 : (2025) 4 SCC 1

Article 226 - Mere existence of disputed questions of fact does not deprive a High Court of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to grant appropriate relief. If the State disputes facts solely to create grounds for rejecting a writ petition, the High Court must reject such contentions and investigate the disputed facts when required in the interest of justice. The Court clarified that issues like possession, as in this case involving the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, may constitute a mixed question of law and fact, not purely a factual dispute. The Court set aside the Division Bench's order, which had overturned a Single Judge's ruling, and restored the Single Judge's judgment, emphasizing that Article 226 remains effective even in cases involving disputed facts if the State's objections are merely tactical. (Para 48) A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. Tahsildar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 260 : 2025 INSC 274

Article 226 - Public Trust Doctrine – Transparent Allocation of Public Resources – Industrial Land Allotment – Systemic Flaws in UPSIDC Process - The Supreme Court upheld the cancellation of a 125-acre industrial land allotment to Kamla Nehru Memorial Trust by the Uttar Pradesh State Industrial Development Corporation (UPSIDC) due to payment defaults, as confirmed by the Allahabad High Court in 2017. The Court criticized UPSIDC for systemic flaws in allotting the land in 2003 within two months without competitive bidding, violating the Public Trust Doctrine. This doctrine mandates transparent, fair, and publicly beneficial allocation of state resources, requiring consideration of economic benefits, environmental sustainability, and regional development. The Court noted that UPSIDC's non-transparent process deprived the public exchequer of revenue and undermined the State's fiduciary duty to citizens. It directed Uttar Pradesh and UPSIDC to ensure future allotments are transparent, non-discriminatory, and aligned with public interest, industrial development, and environmental goals, with the subject land to be re-allotted strictly per these principles. (Paras 29 - 38) Kamla Nehru Memorial Trust v. U.P. State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 652 : 2025 INSC 791

Article 226 - Suo motu powers - It is not only the duty of the writ courts in the country to enforce Fundamental Rights of individuals, who approach them, but it is equally the duty of the writ courts to guard against breach of Fundamental Rights of others by the three organs of the State. Writ Courts have the authority to exercise suo motu powers to strike down subordinate legislation if it violates fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution, rendering it void and unconstitutional. Constitutional Courts possess inherent powers to strike down patently unconstitutional subordinate legislation in exceptional cases, even without a formal challenge, provided the State is heard. (Para 33) Bihar Rajya Dafadar Chaukidar Panchayat v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 394

Article 226 - Tender - Judicial Review - Government may cancel and reissue tenders to safeguard state financial interests, with judicial intervention limited to cases of mala fide intent or manifest arbitrariness. Setting aside the High Court's ruling, which quashed the Kerala Forest Department's 2020 e-tender cancellation for tree felling due to low participation amid COVID-19, the government's decision to invite fresh tenders was held rational and aimed at ensuring fair competition. The scope of judicial review in tender matters is narrow, rejecting the High Court's view that re-tendering solely to obtain better prices is impermissible. Appeal allowed, affirming the government's authority in tender processes to promote public interest and fair play. (Paras 22 & 23) Principal Chief Conservator of Forest v. Suresh Mathew, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 482 : 2025 INSC 569

Article 226 - The power of judicial review in matters concerning implementation of policy objectives should transcend the standard power of judicial review to issue writs to perform statutory duty and proceed to examine whether the duty bearers, the authorities and bodies constituted properly and also whether they are functioning effectively and efficiently. By ensuring institutional integrity we achieve our institutional objectives. Further, effective and efficient performance of the institutes can reduce unnecessary litigation. (Para 23) Lifecare Innovations v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 256 : 2025 INSC 269

Article 226 - The responsibility, of fixing qualifications for purposes of appointment, promotion etc. of staff or qualifications for admissions, is that of expert bodies (in the present case, the AICTE), and so long as qualifications prescribed are not shown to be arbitrary or perverse, the Courts will not interfere. In other words, normally, courts should not interfere with the decisions taken by expert statutory bodies regarding academic matter: may it relate to qualification for admission of students or qualification required by teachers for appointment, salary, promotion, entitlement to a higher pay scale etc. However, this does not mean that Courts are deprived of their powers of judicial review. It only means that courts must be slow in interfering with the opinion of experts in regard to academic standards and powers of judicial review should only be exercised in cases where prescribed qualification or condition is against the law, arbitrary or involves interpretation of any principle of law. Consequently, where a candidate does not possess the minimum qualifications, prescribed by an expert body, for appointment or promotion to a particular post in an educational institution, such a candidate will not be entitled to get appointed or will be deprived of certain benefits. (Para 25) Secretary All India Shri Shivaji Memorial Society v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 373 : 2025 INSC 422 : (2025) 6 SCC 605

Article 226 - Whether the High Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, could interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the lower authorities regarding the classification of disputed land as "Johad (Pond)" in revenue records. Whether the High Court erred in setting aside the permanent injunction granted by the Civil Judge which prohibited the respondent from interfering with the villagers' use of the disputed land as a water reservoir. The appellant contended that the land was a water reservoir used by villagers, while the respondent claimed ownership based on a 1981-82 patta, asserting the land was "Oosar" (barren). The Additional District Magistrate and Additional Commissioner found the patta to be fictitious and upheld the land's classification as a pond. The High Court, however, reversed these findings, holding that the land was mistakenly recorded as a pond and should be treated as "Oosar." Held, the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 226 by reappreciating evidence and overturning the concurrent factual findings of the lower authorities, which had determined the land was a pond. The High Court erred in disregarding the permanent injunction granted by the Civil Judge, which was based on independent consideration and not solely reliant on the Collector's order. The findings of the lower authorities, declaring the land as "Johad (Pond)," were restored, and the High Court's interference was deemed unjustified in the absence of perversity or illegality in the lower authorities' decisions. The Supreme Court emphasized that the High Court, in writ jurisdiction, cannot re-examine factual findings unless there is a clear perversity or jurisdictional error. The concurrent findings of the lower authorities were reinstated, and the land was declared to be a pond, upholding the villagers' rights to its use as a water reservoir. Ajay Singh v. Khacheru, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 29 : 2025 INSC 9 : AIR 2025 SC 1083 : (2025) 3 SCC 266

Article 226 - While exercising judicial review of administrative action in the context of Statutes, laws, rules or policies establishing statutory or administrative bodies to implement the provisions of the Act or its policy, the first duty of constitutional courts is to ensure that these bodies are in a position to effectively and efficiently perform their obligations. (Para 22) Lifecare Innovations v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 256 : 2025 INSC 269

Article 226 - Writ Jurisdiction - Money Claim - Availability of Alternative Remedy – Long Pendency – Held, merely because an alternative remedy was available, the High Court was not justified in dismissing the writ petitions after a delay of over a decade, particularly when the parties had already exchanged affidavits. Non-payment of admitted dues could be seen as arbitrary action, justifying the exercise of writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court restored the writ petitions to their original numbers for fresh adjudication by the High Court, emphasizing that writ jurisdiction could be exercised even in money claims under certain circumstances. Utkal Highways Engineers and Contractors v. Chief General Manager, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 63

Article 226 - Writ Jurisdiction - Property Rights - Unlawful Occupation - Held, Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is discretionary and can be exercised in exceptional cases to address prolonged injustice, despite the availability of alternative remedies. The High Court erred in dismissing a writ petition seeking recovery of flats unlawfully occupied by the Maharashtra Police Department since 1940, without rent payment since 2008, by citing the availability of a civil suit. The rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction due to alternative remedies is a rule of discretion, not compulsion. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, criticizing its failure to consider the 84-year unlawful occupation, likely initiated by forcible taking during British rule in the 1940s. The Court directed the Deputy Commissioner of Police to file an affidavit undertaking to vacate the flats within four months and hand over possession to the appellants. Appeal allowed; Maharashtra Police Department ordered to vacate the flats within four months. Neha Chandrakant Shroff v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 430 : 2025 INSC 484

Article 226 - Writ Petition - Suppression of Material Facts - Abuse of Process - Doctrine of Clean Hands – Costs - A litigant who suppresses material facts in a writ petition disqualifies themselves from obtaining relief. The doctrine of "clean hands" mandates full disclosure of relevant facts to the court. Repeatedly filing petitions with substantially similar reliefs, without disclosing the dismissal of earlier petitions, constitutes an abuse of the process of law. Litigants who abuse the process of law by filing frivolous petitions may be burdened with costs. (Para 9, 11 & 19) Auroville Foundation v. Natasha Storey, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 313 : 2025 INSC 348 : AIR 2025 SC 1638

Article 227 - Judicial restraint in arbitration matters - Whether the High Court was justified in granting an additional opportunity to cross-examine the witness, despite the Arbitral Tribunal's refusal to do so. During the arbitration, the respondent sought multiple extensions to cross-examine the witness, which the Arbitral Tribunal eventually denied, citing lack of preparedness and excessive delay. The respondent challenged the Tribunal's decision before the High Court which granted an additional opportunity for cross-examination, citing "exceptional circumstances." Held, the Arbitral Tribunal had provided sufficient opportunity for cross-examination, with the respondent having already cross-examined RW-1 for over 12 hours across multiple sessions. The High Court's interference was unjustified, as it failed to demonstrate any perversity in the Tribunal's order, which is a prerequisite for judicial intervention under Article 227. The Tribunal's decision to deny further cross-examination was upheld, and the arbitration process was directed to proceed without further delay. Serosoft Solutions v. Dexter Capital Advisors, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 14 : 2025 INSC 26

Article 245 - Principle of Functus Officio – Applicability to Executive Rule-Making Authority - the principle of *functus officio* does not apply to executive rule-making authority under Article 245 of the Constitution of India and is limited to judicial or quasi-judicial forums. Applying functus officio to the State's rule-making power would cripple executive functions and paralyze governance. The State is not required to provide a prior hearing to affected individuals during the exercise of its rule-making authority, as such a requirement would impose undue procedural constraints and undermine efficient policy implementation. The High Court's decision quashing a revised memorandum on the grounds of functus officio and lack of prior hearing was held to be untenable and ultra vires the Constitution. The impugned judgment was set aside, and the appeal was allowed. (Para 42, 45, 47) P. Rammohan Rao v. K. Srinivas, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 208 : 2025 INSC 212 : AIR 2025 SC 1335 : (2025) 4 SCC 127

Article 246A - A penalty or prosecution mechanism for the levy and collection of GST, and for checking its evasion, is a permissible exercise of legislative power. The GST Acts, in pith and substance, pertain to Article 246-A of the Constitution and the powers to summon, arrest and prosecute are ancillary and incidental to the power to levy and collect goods and services tax. In view of the aforesaid, the vires challenge to Sections 69 and 70 of the GST Acts must fail and is accordingly rejected. Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 255 : 2025 INSC 272 : (2025) 6 SCC 545

Article 300A - Delay in filing an appeal against a land acquisition compensation award does not justify denying landowners just, fair, and reasonable compensation. The Court allowed the appeal filed after a 4908-day (13.5-year) delay, overturning the High Court's dismissal for refusing to condone the delay. Emphasizing Article 300A of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to property and mandates fair compensation for land acquired under eminent domain, the Court reiterated a liberal approach to condoning delays in land acquisition cases, especially considering factors like poverty and illiteracy of land losers. However, no interest on compensation is payable for the delayed period. The case was remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration, excluding the issue of delay, with no interest awarded for the condoned delay period. [Paras 11 & 13] Suresh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 473 : 2025 INSC 550

Article 300A - Right to Property - Deprivation without Compensation - Issuance of Pattadar Passbook vested property rights - Resumption of land for public purpose (DIET building) without due process or compensation violated Article 300A – “No compensation” clauses in assignments unconstitutional per Mekala Pandu, 2004 SCC OnLine AP 217 – Appellants entitled to market value compensation. (Para 121 - 125) Yerikala Sunkalamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 344 : 2025 INSC 383

Article 311 doesn't mean only appointing authority can initiate disciplinary action against government servant. The appointing authority is not required to initiate disciplinary proceedings against a state employee. While the appointing authority's approval is necessary for dismissal, it is not required for initiating disciplinary action. The High Court's decision, which quashed the state employee's dismissal solely due to the lack of prior separate approval from the Chief Minister for the charge sheet, is erroneous. (Para 33, 34 & 39) State of Jharkhand v. Rukma Kesh Mishra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 368 : 2025 INSC 412 : AIR 2025 SC 1656

Article 142 - If the initial appointment is illegal, then the candidate cannot claim equitable relief to secure the post invoking the special powers under Article 142. If a candidate gained entry through a process which was not legal and valid, then the Court cannot come to his rescue in the exercise of powers under Article 142. (Relied on: Ashok Kumar Sonkar v. Union of India, (2007) 4 SCC 54; Para 38 - 40) Jomon K.K. v. Shajimon P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 381 : 2025 INSC 425

List II in the Seventh Schedule - the event, that is inter-State movement of the goods, Civil Appeal Nos. 941-945 of 2004 & Ors. Page 44 of 47 which does not amount to inter-State sale, falls within the legislative domain and power of the State Legislature. The State, when it imposes such tax, does not exceed its power to impose tax conferred by the State List as inter-State sale of goods is not being subjected to tax. C.T. Kochouseph v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 554 : 2025 INSC 661

Part III, IV - Article 21 - Forest Act, 1927, Section 29 – Forest Conservation Act, 1980, Sections 2, 3A, 3B – Zudpi Jungle/Forest in Maharashtra – Protected Forests – Sustainable Development – Encroachments – Afforestation – Non-Forestry Use – Compensatory Afforestation – Special Task Force – State Accountability – The Supreme Court, following the T.N. Godavarman judgment (1996), declared Zudpi Jungle lands in Maharashtra as forest lands under the Forest Conservation Act, 1980, requiring Central Government approval for any non-forestry use under Section 2. Pre-December 12, 1996, allotments of Zudpi Jungle lands may be regularized without compensatory afforestation or Net Present Value (NPV) payments, subject to State approval under Section 2. Post-December 12, 1996, allotments require Central Government approval, strict compliance with forest laws, and punitive action against officers for illegal allotments under Sections 3A and 3B. Pre-1980 encroachments may be regularized if legally permissible; post-1980 commercial encroachments must be cleared within two years by a district-level Special Task Force. Approximately 7.76 lakh hectares of unallotted Zudpi Jungle lands to be transferred to the Forest Department within one year for afforestation. Unallotted fragmented parcels (<3 hectares, not adjoining forest areas) to be declared Protected Forests under Section 29 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927. Sub-Divisional Magistrates to prevent future encroachments, with accountability for violations. Non-forestry use proposals require FC Act compliance and cannot be diverted to non-governmental entities. Zudpi Jungle lands may be used for compensatory afforestation only if non-forest land is unavailable, certified by the Chief Secretary, with double the area afforested per MoEF&CC guidelines. The Central Empowered Committee (CEC) to monitor land transfer and compliance. State Governments/Union Territories to investigate and recover forest lands allotted to private entities or recover afforestation costs if retention serves public interest. (Para 138) In Re: Zudpi Jungle Lands, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 609 : 2025 INSC 754

Consumer Protection Act, 1986

Homebuyers cannot be forced to accept possession of a property after an undue delay and are entitled to a refund if the unit is not delivered within the agreed timeframe. (Para 14) Nagpur Housing and Area Development Board v. Manohar Burde, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 360 : 2025 INSC 398

Section 2(1)(d) - Definition of 'Consumer' - SelfEmployment – Commercial Purpose - When a product is bought to be utilised in an established commercial venture by the buyer's employees and not the buyer himself, the buyer cannot be considered a 'consumer'. While a buyer using a product for 'self-employment' can be considered a 'consumer' under the Act, the facts of each case need to be examined. [Relied on: Paramount Digital Colour Lab v. Agfa India Pvt. Ltd., (2018) 14 SCC 81] Virender Singh v. Darshana Trading Co., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 359

Section 2(1)(d)(ii) - "Consumer" - Project Loan - Commercial Purpose - Deficiency in Service - Whether a borrower of a project loan for commercial purposes falls within the definition of "Consumer" - Held, no. A company availing a project loan for the post-production of a movie, with the dominant intention of generating profits, does not fall within the definition of "Consumer" under Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The transaction constitutes a business-to-business transaction for a commercial purpose, and the explanation to Section 2(1)(d) regarding self-employment does not apply. The dominant purpose of the loan, even if partly for brand-building, is ultimately profit generation. The NCDRC lacks jurisdiction in such cases. (Para 19 & 21) Chief Manager Central Bank of India v. Ad Bureau Advertising, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 264 : 2025 INSC 288

Section 2(1)(d)(ii) - The "commercial purpose" exclusion in Section 2(1)(d)(ii) applies to loans availed for profit-generating activities. Business-to-business loan transactions for commercial purposes are outside the purview of the Consumer Protection Act. (Para 19 & 21) Chief Manager Central Bank of India v. Ad Bureau Advertising, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 264 : 2025 INSC 288

Section 2(1)(d)(ii) - 'dominant intention' - The dominant intention behind the transaction determines whether it is for a commercial purpose. Dominant purpose test is crucial in determining whether a person availing services qualifies as a 'consumer.' [Relied on: National Insurance Company v. Harsolia Motors, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 313 and Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust v. Unique Shanti Developers. (2020) 2 SCC 265; (Para 18 & 21)] Chief Manager Central Bank of India v. Ad Bureau Advertising, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 264 : 2025 INSC 288

Section 2(1)(d)(ii) - Project Loan – Wrongful Reporting to CIBIL – Maintainability of Complaint before NCDRC - The NCDRC held the Central Bank of India liable for deficiency in service and wrongful reporting of the respondent company as a defaulter to CIBIL, thereby causing reputational and financial loss. The NCDRC awarded compensation of Rs. 75,00,000/- and litigation costs of Rs. 20,000/- in favor of the respondent, along with a direction to issue a certificate stating that the loan account was settled and that the wrongful reporting was incorrect. Held, the Respondent which availed a project loan of Rs. 10 crores for the post-production of a movie, did so with the dominant purpose of generating profits. Hence, it was a business-to-business transaction and fell within the ambit of 'commercial purpose.' Since the loan had a direct nexus with profit generation and commercial gain, the respondent did not fall within the definition of 'consumer' under the Act. Consequently, the complaint before the NCDRC was not maintainable. (Para 22) Chief Manager Central Bank of India v. Ad Bureau Advertising, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 264 : 2025 INSC 288

Section 2(1)(r) - "unfair trade practice" - In 2014, the respondents booked an apartment in the Godrej Summit project in Gurgaon, Haryana, entering into an Apartment Buyer Agreement (ABA) with the appellant-builder, Godrej Projects Development Ltd. The ABA included a clause allowing forfeiture of 20% of the earnest money upon cancellation. In 2017, after the apartment was ready for possession, the respondents canceled the booking citing market recession and declining property prices, seeking a full refund of ₹51,12,310 paid. The appellant invoked the forfeiture clause. The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) ruled in favor of the respondents, permitting forfeiture of only 10% of the Basic Sale Price (BSP) as reasonable earnest money, with the balance refundable at 6% interest per annum. The builder appealed. Issues 1. Whether the 20% forfeiture clause in the ABA constitutes an excessive penalty under Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, rather than genuine pre-estimated liquidated damages. 2. Whether one-sided, unreasonable forfeiture clauses in builder-buyer agreements amount to an "unfair trade practice" under Section 2(1)(r) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (now 2019). 3. Enforceability of such clauses where buyers lack bargaining power. Held, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the NCDRC's order. The 20% forfeiture was deemed excessive, arbitrary, and a penalty, limited to 10% of BSP as reasonable earnest money. One-sided clauses in standard-form builder-buyer agreements, tilted in favor of developers, constitute unfair trade practices under consumer protection laws and are unenforceable. Godrej Projects Development Ltd. v. Anil Karlekar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 150 : 2025 INSC 143

Consumer Protection Act, 2019

Constitution of India; Article 142 - Uniform pay and allowances structure for Presidents and Members of State and District Consumer Commissions across all States and Union Territories - Significant disparities in remuneration due to varying State rules under Section 102 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, despite the Central Government's Consumer Protection (Salary, Allowances and Conditions of Service) Model Rules, 2020. The Supreme Court emphasized that adequate remuneration is essential for the effective discharge of duties under the 2019 Act, which aims to protect consumer interests and ensure efficient dispute resolution. (Paras 5–7) In Re Pay Allowance of the Members of The UP State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 650

Consumer Protection Act, 2019; Section 102 - Consumer Protection (Salary, Allowances and Conditions of Service) Model Rules, 2020; Rules 7, 8, 9, and 11 - Directions - State Commission Members entitled to pay and allowances equivalent to District Judges in the super-time scale as per the Second National Judicial Pay Commission, with Rules 7, 8, and 9 of the Model Rules inapplicable. District Commission Presidents entitled to pay and allowances equivalent to District Judges in the super-time scale, with Rules 7, 8, and 9 inapplicable. District Commission Members entitled to pay and allowances equivalent to District Judges in the selection grade, with Rules 7, 8, 9, and 11 inapplicable. Last pay drawn by Presidents/Members to be protected if higher than prescribed, minus applicable pension. No distinction between full-time/part-time or judicial/non-judicial members; all treated as full-time for pay purposes. States/Union Territories paying higher remuneration may continue to do so. Directions effective from 20 July 2020; arrears to be disbursed within six months. States/Union Territories to amend rules to align with these directions; compliance report due by 22 September 2025. (Paras 8–9) In Re Pay Allowance of the Members of The UP State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 650

Judicial Role in Legislative Ecosystem - Scope of judicial power to direct executive performance audits of statutes to assess their implementation and efficacy. Held, auditing and assessing the implementation of statutes is an integral component of the Rule of Law. Constitutional courts possess both the power and duty to direct the executive to conduct performance audits of laws where there is demonstrable evidence (e.g., judicial data or cogent material) that the statute has failed to ameliorate beneficiary conditions or is gridlocked by bureaucratic/judicial delays. Such judicial directions facilitate executive introspection, promote debate, and ensure statutes function as intended, but cannot compel legislative reforms or amendments. In the specific context of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, the Central Consumer Protection Council (under Sections 3, 5) and Central Consumer Protection Authority (under Sections 10, 18-22) were directed to undertake surveys, reviews, and advisory measures to the government for effective implementation, emphasizing efficiency, expertise, integrity, transparency, accountability, and regular audits. Given India's government-dominated legislative process (with rare private member bills), courts must bridge gaps by directing audits, but only on prima facie findings of inefficacy, not as a routine oversight. The Act's built-in mechanisms (Council and Authority) are statutorily obligated to monitor and advise on implementation. Their effective coordination is essential to protect consumer interests, warranting judicial nudges for operational enhancements without overstepping into legislative domain. This judgment reinforces the judiciary's facilitative role in statutory accountability, expanding beyond constitutional challenges to proactive audits, while delineating limits on reform compulsion. It underscores the need for empirical evidence to trigger such directions, balancing separation of powers. Rutu Mihir Panchal v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 503 : 2025 INSC 593

Sections 34, 47, and 58 - Pecuniary jurisdiction based on value of consideration paid (not compensation claimed) - Constitutional validity - The petitioners, legal heirs of a deceased individual who perished in a fire caused by a manufacturing defect in a Ford Endeavour vehicle (purchase price: ₹44 lakhs), filed a consumer complaint before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) seeking damages exceeding ₹50 crores. The NCDRC dismissed the complaint for want of pecuniary jurisdiction, as the value of consideration paid fell below the ₹2 crore threshold under Section 58 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019. Aggrieved, the petitioners challenged the constitutionality of Sections 34, 47, and 58 of the 2019 Act—prescribing pecuniary jurisdiction of District, State, and National Commissions based on the value of goods/services paid as consideration (up to ₹50 lakhs for District; ₹50 lakhs–₹2 crores for State; above ₹2 crores for National), rather than the compensation claimed—alleging violation of Article 14 (equality) due to irrational classification and anomalies in forum allocation. Whether the pecuniary jurisdiction provisions under Sections 34, 47, and 58 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019—determining forum competence based on the value of consideration paid for goods/services, instead of the quantum of compensation claimed—are constitutionally valid and non-discriminatory under Article 14. Held, upheld as constitutional. The classification of claims based on the value of consideration paid is neither illegal, discriminatory, nor manifestly arbitrary under Article 14. It constitutes a valid, non-suspect classification with a direct rational nexus to the Act's objective of establishing a hierarchical structure of consumer fora for efficient redressal. The value of consideration is objectively verifiable, closely relatable to the transaction's worth, and preferable to self-assessed damage claims, which may inflate jurisdiction. This basis ensures streamlined adjudication without undermining access to remedies. Rutu Mihir Panchal v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 503 : 2025 INSC 593

Section 67 - Marine Insurance - Monsoon Clause - An insurance company cannot reject a marine insurance claim based on a contract condition impossible to fulfill. The Court set aside the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission's dismissal, holding that a monsoon clause requiring a voyage to complete before the monsoon was non-material, as the policy was intended to cover the voyage during foul weather. The insurer's repudiation of the claim for a barge's total loss due to engine failure was deemed invalid, as the insured had disclosed voyage details, and the condition's strict interpretation would defeat the policy's purpose. The matter was remanded to NCDRC to determine the payable insured sum. (Para 20 & 21) Sohom Shipping v. New India Assurance, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 403 : 2025 INSC 453

Whether consumer forum can award interest on loan taken by allottee in addition to agreed interest on deposited amount – Held, consumer forums cannot award interest paid by an allottee on a home loan, in addition to the agreed upon interest on the deposited amount, when compensating for delayed possession or deficiency in service - The amount of interest awarded on investment made by complainant is the compensation for being deprived of the fruits of that investment - Hence, awarding additional interest on a loan taken by the allottee would amount to awarding compensation under multiple heads for a singular default, which is unsustainable - Consumer Forums have power to award compensation for loss or injury due to negligence, including punitive damages, such awards cannot be arbitrary - Compensation should be just and determined based on the facts and circumstances of each case - There are no “exceptional or strong reasons” in the present case to justify GMADA paying the interest on the loan taken by respondents - Modified the order of NCDRC to exclude the payment of interest on loan taken by respondents - Appeals allowed. [Relied on Bangalore Development Authority v. Syndicate Bank (2007) 6 SCC 711; DLF Homes Panchkula (P) Ltd. v. D.S. Dhanda (2020) 16 SCC 318; Paras 13-17] Greater Mohali Area Development Authority (GMADA) v. Anupam Garg, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 677 : 2025 INSC 808

Contempt of Court

Allegations against Court Order - Applicants alleged that the Court recorded a statement/consent in its order dated 17th May 2024, which was not made by their counsel, amounting to an imputation against the Court. The Court deprecated such reckless allegations, emphasizing trust in counsel's statements and warning that such claims may necessitate affidavits to verify counsel's authority. Considering the applicants are public sector companies and their contention that counsel lacked authority, the Court recalled the order dated 17th May 2024, restoring the appeals at the applicants' risk, to be listed on 3rd March 2025. Applicants directed to pay Rs.5,00,000/- per application to the Supreme Court Legal Services Authority within three weeks as a condition precedent. Applications and related contempt petition disposed of accordingly. (Para 1 – 3) Transmission Corporation of Andhra Pradesh v. SLS Power Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 183

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971; Section 19 - Once a High Court Judge finds a party guilty of contempt, another Single Judge of the same court cannot re-examine or contradict that finding, as it violates judicial propriety and exceeds jurisdiction. Such action amounts to a Single Judge exercising appellate powers over a coordinate bench, which is impermissible. Post-contempt finding, the only issues for consideration are whether the contempt has been purged and the appropriate punishment. The proper recourse for an aggrieved party is an appeal under Section 19 before a Division Bench. (Paras 18 & 19) Rajan Chadha v. Sanjay Arora, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 469

Contract Act, 1872

Section 27 - Employment Bond - Restraint of Trade - Public Sector Undertakings - Exclusivity Clauses - Liquidated Damages - Validity of Minimum Service Tenure Clauses - Reasonableness in Public Sector Context - Distinction from Post-Employment Restraints - Exclusivity provisions in employment contracts requiring a minimum service period, enforceable through liquidated damages for premature resignation, do not constitute a restraint of trade under Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Such clauses operate during the subsistence of the employment contract and do not restrict post-termination employment opportunities. In the era of economic liberalization, public sector undertakings (PSUs) like banks must adopt measures to retain skilled personnel and minimize attrition to enhance efficiency and compete with private entities. A ₹2 lakh penalty for early exit is neither unconscionable, unfair, nor contrary to public policy, particularly where it offsets the costs of mandatory competitive recruitment under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Unlike post-termination non-compete clauses, which are void under Section 27, intra-employment restrictions aimed at perpetuating the contract for a fixed term are permissible if reasonable and in furtherance of legitimate organizational interests. Vijaya Bank v. Prashant B. Narnaware, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 565 : 2025 INSC 691

Section 27 - The appellant, a public sector bank, issued a recruitment notification for the post of Senior Manager (Cost Accountant) requiring selected candidates to execute an indemnity bond of ₹2 lakhs, forfeitable upon resignation within three years of service. The respondent, appointed under this condition, resigned prematurely to join another bank (IDBI Bank), tendered the penalty under protest, and challenged the clause before the Karnataka High Court as violative of Section 27. The High Court quashed the clause, terming it a restraint of trade. Aggrieved, the bank appealed to the Supreme Court. Allowing the appeal and setting aside the High Court order, the Court held that Clause 11(k) of the employment contract imposed a restriction on the employee's option to resign within three years, enforceable via liquidated damages, to promote retention and managerial efficiency in a competitive market. This was not a restraint on future trade but a tool to sustain the employment relationship, thus outside the ambit of Section 27. PSUs, bound by constitutional mandates for fair recruitment, face significant administrative burdens from untimely resignations, including open advertisements and competitive processes. The ₹2 lakh penalty, modest relative to the respondent's salary as a Scale-III officer, reasonably mitigates such costs without being oppressive. Rejecting arguments of unconscionability in standard-form contracts, the Court emphasized that such provisions are a legitimate response to post-liberalization challenges, ensuring skilled staff retention without violating public policy. Appeal allowed; respondent directed to refund ₹2 lakhs to the bank with interest. No costs. Vijaya Bank v. Prashant B. Narnaware, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 565 : 2025 INSC 691

Section 28 - Agreements in restraint of legal proceeding void – Held, Section 28 does not bar exclusive jurisdiction clauses in contracts. Exclusive jurisdiction clauses in employment contracts, which confers exclusive jurisdiction on the courts of a particular location to decides disputes relating to the contract, are not barred by Section 28 of the Act. Section 28 declares void any agreement that restricts a party from enforcing their rights under a contract through legal proceedings, or limits the time within which they can do so, except in cases of arbitration agreements. However, for an exclusive jurisdiction clause to be valid, it should be : (a) in consonance with Section 28 of the Contract Act, i.e., it should not absolutely restrict any party from initiating legal proceedings pertaining to the contract, (b) the Court that has been given exclusive jurisdiction must be competent to have such jurisdiction in the first place, i.e., a Court not having jurisdiction as per the statutory regime cannot be bestowed jurisdiction by means of a contract and, finally, (c) the parties must either impliedly or explicitly confer jurisdiction on a specific set of courts. (Relied: Swastik Gases (P) Ltd. v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd (2013) 9 SCC 32; Para 29 - 31) Rakesh Kumar Verma v. HDFC Bank Ltd, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 407 : 2025 INSC 473

Section 28 - Agreements in restraint of legal proceeding void – Employee contended that in a situation of unequal bargaining power between the worker and the bank, the exclusive jurisdiction clause cannot be given effect to. Held, clauses of a valid contract must be given effect to, regardless of the status of the parties. A contract – be it commercial, insurance, sales, service, etc. – is after all a contract. It is a legally binding agreement, regardless of the parties involved or their inter se strengths. To make a distinction for employment contracts on the specious ground that a mighty lion and a timid rabbit are the contracting parties would violate the principle of equality, in the sense that rights and liabilities would not be dependent on the parties' status, power or influence. Contracts should be treated equally, without bias or distinction. The fact that one party is more powerful or influential (the mighty lion) and the other more vulnerable (the timid rabbit) does not justify making exceptions or distinctions in the application of contractual principles. Law treats all contracts with equal respect and unless a contract is proved to suffer from any of the vitiating factors, the terms and conditions have to be enforced regardless of the relative strengths and weakness of the parties. (Overruled: Vishal Gupta v. L & T Finance, 2009 SCC OnLine Delhi 2806; Para 24 - 26) Rakesh Kumar Verma v. HDFC Bank Ltd, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 407 : 2025 INSC 473

Section 74 — Forfeiture of earnest money — Real estate booking cancellation — Builder forfeited 20% of basic sale price (BSP) as earnest money under Apartment Buyer Agreement upon purchasers' cancellation — NCDRC limited forfeiture to 10% BSP and directed refund of excess with 6% interest — Builder's appeal to Supreme Court — Held, Forfeiture of reasonable earnest money as security for performance permissible and outside purview of S. 74 as it does not amount to penalty. However, 20% BSP forfeiture excessive, arbitrary, and punitive, qualifying as penalty under S. 74. Reduction to 10% BSP justified as just, fair, and non-penal amount. NCDRC's order on forfeiture upheld; interest on refund deleted as unjustified in facts and circumstances. Appeal partly allowed. [Relied on: Maula Bux v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 554; Satish Batra v. Sudhir Rawal, (2013) 1 SCC 345; Paras 18, 33, 36 37] Godrej Projects Development Ltd. v. Anil Karlekar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 150 : 2025 INSC 143

Control of Organized Crime Act, 1999 (Maharashtra)

Section 21(4) - Whether the High Court, while considering a bail application, transgressed into impermissible areas by making findings on the merits of the case, especially in light of the stringent conditions for bail under Section 21(4) of MCOCA. Whether the High Court failed to consider the rigors of MCOCA while granting bail to the accused. Held, the High Court had made observations akin to findings on the merits of the case, such as concluding that the accused had no direct or indirect contact with the gang leader (accused No. 4) and that they played no role in the shooting. Such findings are impermissible at the bail stage, as they could prejudice the trial. The High Court failed to adequately consider the stringent conditions for bail under MCOCA, particularly Section 21(4), which imposes specific requirements for granting bail in cases involving organized crime. Jayshree Kanabar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 10

Conveyance

A lessee seeking conveyance of property must fulfill all statutory and contractual obligations, including payment of costs, to enforce such a claim. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Century Textiles and Industries Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 34

Obligation to Convey - Whether the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM) was obligated to convey the leasehold property (Block-A) to Century Textiles and Industries Limited (Respondent No. 1) upon the expiration of the 28-year lease under the Bombay Improvement Trust Transfer Act, 1925. Century Textiles applied in 1918 under the City of Bombay Improvement Act, 1898, for a scheme to construct dwellings for poorer classes. The scheme was approved, and Century Textiles constructed 476 dwellings and 10 shops by 1925, less than the originally planned 980 dwellings and 20 shops. In 1927, Century Textiles requested an alteration to the scheme, which was approved by the Board, and a 28-year lease for Block-A was granted in 1928, expiring in 1955. After the lease expired, Century Textiles continued in possession of Block-A without any demand for conveyance until 2006, when it issued a legal notice. No suit was filed, and in 2016, Century Textiles filed a writ petition seeking conveyance of Block-A. The High Court allowed the writ petition, directing MCGM to execute the conveyance. MCGM appealed to the Supreme Court. Held, neither the lease deed nor the Board Resolution of 1927 obligated MCGM to convey Block-A to Century Textiles upon the expiration of the lease. The lease deed did not contain any clause mandating conveyance, and the Board Resolution did not approve the conveyance of Block-A. Section 51(2) of the 1925 Act, which provides for conveyance upon the expiration of the lease, must be read harmoniously with Section 48(a), which requires the lessee to leave the premises in good condition. The conveyance under Section 51(2) is contingent upon the lessee fulfilling its obligations, including payment of costs, which Century Textiles failed to do. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Century Textiles and Industries Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 34

Copyright Act, 1957

Section 15(2) - Designs Act, 2000 - Twin test to determine whether a work qualifies for protection under the Copyright Act or the Designs Act, 2000. Held, copyright protection for an artistic work ceases under Section 15(2) if the work is a design capable of registration under the Designs Act, remains unregistered, and is industrially reproduced more than 50 times. However, dismissal of a copyright suit does not automatically grant design protection, which requires separate evaluation. Cryogas Equipment v. Inox, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 426 : 2025 INSC 483

Section 15(2) - Designs Act, 2000 - Twin Test for Copyright-Design Conflict - (1) Nature of Work - (2) Functional Utility Test - Determine if the work is a purely artistic work under the Copyright Act or a design derived from such work and subjected to industrial processes, as per Section 15(2). If the work does not qualify for copyright protection, assess its dominant purpose. Works with primary functional utility, rather than aesthetic appeal, do not qualify for protection under the Designs Act. Cryogas Equipment v. Inox, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 426 : 2025 INSC 483

Section 15(2) - Designs Act, 2000 - The case arose from a 2018 lawsuit by Inox India Limited alleging copyright infringement by Cryogas Equipment and LNG Express India in engineering drawings for cryogenic semi-trailers. The Commercial Court dismissed Inox's suit under Order VII Rule 11, CPC, holding the drawings were unregistered designs reproduced over 50 times, falling under the Designs Act. The High Court reversed this, restoring the suit for trial. Cryogas appealed to the Supreme Court. Upholding the High Court's ruling, the Supreme Court criticized the Commercial Court's premature dismissal, which incorrectly assumed the drawings were designs without evidence of industrial reproduction or aesthetic nature. Determining the nature of the work involves a mixed question of law and fact, unsuitable for resolution at a preliminary stage. The case was remanded for trial to assess the true nature of the proprietary engineering drawings and related claims of literary works and confidential information infringement using the twin test. Appeal dismissed; Commercial Court directed to conduct a trial applying the twin test and independently evaluate all claims. Cryogas Equipment v. Inox, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 426 : 2025 INSC 483

Criminal Law

Criminal Appeal - Pendency in High Courts - Noted the significant pendency of criminal appeals across various High Courts in India with a total of 7,24,192 criminal appeals pending as of March 2025 - Noted that only 79 judges are there in Allahabad High Court (with pendency of over 2 lakh criminal appeals) out of sanctioned strength of 160 - In Bombay High Court, 66 judges out of 94 are functioning - Calcutta High Court has sanctioned strength of 72 but has only 44 judges - Delhi High Court has only 41 judges out of sanctioned strength of 60 - Court held that Central Government needs to act and ensure that the recommendations made by the Collegium for judge appointments are cleared without delay - Court expressed concern that 29 recommendations made by this Court Collegium since November, 2022 which are still pending. [Para 2] In Re Policy Strategy for Grant of Bail (Collegium & HC Practice Directions), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 671

Amicus Curiae Suggestions - Policy strategy for bail and speedy disposal of criminal appeals - Model Action Plan for Baseline Report of NCMS (National Case Management System) - which has been approved by Chief Justice of India and forwarded to all High Courts for adoption - Vacancies in High Courts directly impact and corelate with the pendency of criminal appeals - Video Conferencing and roster rationalization by having dedicated benches for criminal appeals to improve disposal of old appeals - Adjournments and legal aid - Relied on Bani Singh v. State of U.P. (1996) 4 SCC 720 - If counsel for accused is not cooperating, recourse must be taken by appointing legal aid lawyer for accused - Automatic calling of soft copy records of Trial Court by the Registry - This Court directed High Courts to consider above suggestions and place their action plans on record. [Paras 3-15] In Re Policy Strategy for Grant of Bail (Collegium & HC Practice Directions), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 671

Afterthought Allegations - Allegations introduced at a later stage, inconsistent with the FIR, are treated as afterthoughts, especially when such allegations pertain to facts that should have been known and mentioned at the time of filing the FIR. B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 4

Classification of bank accounts as fraudulent - Administrative Actions - Principles of Natural Justice - Audi Altarem Partem - Held, Quashing the classification of bank accounts as fraudulent on technical grounds, such as violation of natural justice, does not automatically nullify related criminal proceedings or FIRs for fraud. Restoring various criminal actions initiated by banks, the Court distinguished administrative actions under RBI's Master Directions from criminal proceedings, emphasizing that FIRs are maintainable based on cognizable offences, independent of administrative outcomes. High Courts erred in quashing FIRs without jurisdiction or fair hearing to CBI. Administrative authorities can initiate fresh actions if set aside for procedural lapses, not on merits. Specific directions were issued for different categories of cases. (Paras 7 - 12) Central Bureau of Investigation v. Surendra Patwa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 481 : 2025 INSC 572

Criminal Procedure - If a court intends to add a person as an accused, it cannot direct the police to include their name in the charge sheet. Instead, the court may issue a summons to the proposed accused if sufficient grounds exist, even if they are not named in the charge sheet. (Para 3) Gopal Pradhan v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 328

Criminal Trial - Supreme Court rules against physical production of accused in Jammu Court for trial in 1989 IAF officials' assassination and kidnapping cases, citing security concerns and a Central Government order restricting movement. Accused permitted to cross-examine witnesses via video conferencing from Tihar Jail, as facilities are available under BNSS Section 530 and High Court guidelines. Trial court's order for physical production set aside; no observations made on case merits. CBI v. Mohd Yasin Malik, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 451

Delay in trial and lack of identification parade - Incident occurred in 1997, but the trial took place in 2005, approximately eight years later. The delay raised concerns about the identification of the accused, as no identification parade was conducted. Identification of the accused for the first time in court after such a long gap cast serious doubt on the prosecution's case. Venkatesha v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 116

Further investigation can be directed even after filing of chargesheet & commencement of trial. Rampal Gautam v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 164

Invalid Initial Process and Its Consequences - If the initiation of a criminal process is not in consonance with legal requirements, all subsequent proceedings are vitiated. The maxim sublato fundamento cadit opus applies, wherein the removal of the foundation invalidates the structure built upon it. B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 4

Investigation – Right of Accused – Held, prospective accused has no locus standi to challenge court-ordered transfer of investigation to CBI once FIR is registered and probe underway; discretion lies with court to entrust agency, and accused cannot intervene in mode or manner of investigation prior to framing of charges. Ramachandraiah v. M. Manjula, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 468 : 2025 INSC 556

Register of FIR - The Supreme Court refused to entertain a writ petition seeking the registration of an FIR against Justice Yashwant Varma of Delhi High Court, over the alleged discovery of illicit cash at official premises. The petition, which also challenged the in-house inquiry being conducted by a committee of three judges as per the directions of the Chief Justice of India, was premature. Mathews J. Nedumpara v. Supreme Court of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 372

The Supreme Court, while exercising its inherent powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, quashed the sentence of the present accused-appellant for rape and kidnapping charges after noting that he married the complainant and they have four children. Shriram Urav v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 160

Application seeking exemption from surrender admissible only when petitioner sentenced to term of imprisonment. Jasminbhai Bharatbhai Kothari v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 159

Significance of FIR - An FIR must disclose the commission of a cognizable offense. While it need not be exhaustive, it must contain sufficient information to justify suspicion of such an offense. B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 4

Custodial Death

Transfer of Investigation to CBI – Protection of Eyewitness – Bail Considerations - Supreme Court transfers investigation into alleged custodial torture and murder of 25-year-old to CBI, finding deliberate cover-up by the Police; no arrests despite FIR registered 8 months ago; omission of murder charge; prevention of initial FIR; and influenced post-mortem. Directs arrest of accused police officials within 1 month and completion of probe within 90 days thereof. Applies nemo judex in causa sua; holds local police shielding own officers. Grants liberty to sole eyewitness (co-accused) to seek bail before High Court; directs State authorities to ensure his safety under witness protection scheme; observes deliberate implication in multiple cases to break his spirit and prevent testimony. Criticizes medical board's failure to opine on cause of death despite multiple injuries; rejects police claim of heart attack. Strongly deplores systemic custodial violence and State's inaction. (Para 28 - 33) Hansura Bai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 569 : 2025 INSC 711

Custodial Violence - The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals filed by the State challenging the acquittal of the respondents by the High Court for offences under Sections 302, 364, and 261 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The case was based on circumstantial evidence, with the key circumstance being the "last seen together" theory. However, the sole witness (PW1) failed to identify the accused in court or confirm their presence with the deceased, leading to the breakdown of the chain of circumstances. Held, the High Court's view was plausible and that no other conclusion was possible on the evidence presented. Additionally, the Court expressed concern over the custodial violence inflicted on the first respondent who suffered a leg fracture due to police assault, as confirmed by a jail doctor (DW1). The Court directed the District Magistrate to conduct an inquiry into the incident, initiate legal action against responsible officials, and submit a report. Acquittal upheld based on insufficient circumstantial evidence. Witnesses failed to establish the "last seen together" theory. Custodial violence confirmed; inquiry ordered against erring officials. Appeals dismissed. State of Uttarakhand v. Nanku @ Pappu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 109

Customs Act, 1962

The appellant imported crude degummed soybean oil and claimed exemption from customs duty under a notification excluding "agricultural produce." The Assistant Commissioner denied the benefit, classifying it as a manufactured product. The High Court upheld this, ruling the oil retained its agricultural character as an unfinished, non-consumable derivative of soybeans. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court. Whether crude degummed soybean oil, processed from soybeans, qualifies as an "agricultural product" exempt from customs duty, or if the processing constitutes "manufacture" stripping it of agricultural character. Held, crude degummed soybean oil is a manufactured product, not agricultural produce, and is eligible for the customs duty exemption. The High Court's order is set aside. Noble Resources and Trading v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 570 : 2025 INSC 684

Absent a statutory definition of "agricultural product," the Court adopted the High Court's formulation in P. Narayanan Nair v. Dr. Lokeshan Nair (AIR 2014 Ker 141): an agricultural product must be the direct result of cultivation in its natural, unmanufactured state. Applying the SC's test for "manufacture" from Union of India v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. AIR 1963 SC 791 and Deputy CST v. Pio Food Packers, 1980 Supp. SCC 174, the Court held that manufacture involves a transformation yielding a new, commercially distinct commodity with a different name, character, or use. The process of extracting crude degummed soybean oil from soybeans satisfies this: (i) it involves a series of processes (crushing, solvent extraction, degumming); (ii) the raw soybean undergoes fundamental transformation; (iii) a new commodity emerges; (iv) it has a distinct identity (marketable as "crude degummed soybean oil"); and (v) it is trade-recognized as separate from soybeans. The High Court erred in focusing on edibility post-refining; consumability is irrelevant—the test is transformation to a distinct product. While soybeans are agricultural, the oil is not "the same thing." Thus, it falls outside the notification's exclusion for agricultural produce. Processed derivatives of agricultural raw materials lose their "agricultural" status if they emerge as new, commercially viable products via manufacturing processes. Appeal allowed. Noble Resources and Trading v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 570 : 2025 INSC 684

Sections 14(1) and 14(1A) – Customs Valuation (Determination of Price of Imported Goods) Rules, 1988; Rule 9(1)(a) and 9(1)(e) - Assessable Value – Inclusion of Engineering and Technical Service Fees - Whether engineering and technical service fees paid by the importer have a direct nexus with the import of goods and should be included in the assessable value for customs duty under the Customs Act, 1962. The Supreme Court upheld that engineering and technical service fees (8% of Free on Board (FOB) value) paid by the appellant (Coal India) to the Indian distributor (M/s Voltas Limited) for imported spare parts have a direct nexus with the value of the goods imported. Such fees are includible in the assessable value for computing customs duty under Sections 14(1) and 14(1A) of the Customs Act, 1962, read with Rule 9(1)(e) of the Customs Valuation Rules. The payments were a condition of sale, not linked to specific services rendered by the distributor, but directly related to the import of goods as product support services. The Orders of the lower authorities, including the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), were affirmed, and the appeal was dismissed. (Paras 25.1, 33 & 34) Coal India v. Commissioner of Customs, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 517 : 2025 INSC 609

Section 27 – Doctrine of Unjust Enrichment – Refund of Bank Guarantee – Held, Section 27 of the Customs Act, which mandates proof that the duty burden was not passed on to consumers for a refund, does not apply to refunds of bank guarantees encashed coercively, as such encashment does not constitute payment of customs duty. The doctrine of unjust enrichment is inapplicable to coercive recoveries. The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's decision, and directed the Customs Department to refund the encashed bank guarantee amount with 6% interest within four months. [Followed: Union of India v. Param Industries Ltd., (2016) 16 SCC 692, Para 30] Patanjali Foods v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 634 : 2025 INSC 733

Customs Tariff Act, 1975

Central Excise Rules, 2002; Rules 18, 19(2) - Held, the Central Board of Excise and Customs (CBEC) Circular dated 17.09.2010, clarifying All Industry Rate (AIR) duty drawback under earlier notifications, applies retrospectively. Being explanatory, the Circular does not create a new fiscal regime but resolves ambiguities in prior Notifications, notably Notification No. 81/2006 dated 13.07.2006. The decision ensures uniform application of the 1% AIR customs duty drawback benefit for merchant-exporters, including those dealing in Soyabean Meal (SBM), without imposing new obligations. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's ruling, which had held the Circular prospective, allowing retrospective benefits from 2008 onwards. The Court emphasized fairness, holding that clarificatory provisions should not be restricted unless arbitrary or unfair. (Para 15, 17, 18) Suraj Impex (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 635 : 2025 INSC 755

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

Disobedience of High Court Order—Demolition of Slum Dwellers' Structures—Leniency in Sentencing—Rule of Law. Held, in a contempt proceeding arising from the deliberate violation of High Court interim orders restraining eviction and directing consideration of house site applications, the Supreme Court confirmed the conviction for civil contempt but modified the sentence imposed by the High Court (two months' simple imprisonment and ₹2,000 fine) to demotion by one hierarchical level (from Deputy Collector to Tahsildar) and a fine of ₹1 lakh, payable within four weeks. Promotional avenues post-demotion to be considered from the date of the order. The Court emphasized that disobedience of judicial directions by public authorities, however high-ranking, undermines the foundation of the rule of law essential to democracy, and no leniency can excuse callous actions displacing vulnerable slum dwellers. While recognizing the "majesty of law lies not in punishing, but in forgiving" and factoring in the contemnor's family hardships (including education of minor children), the Court rejected pleas for complete exoneration, observing that the contemnor ought to have anticipated such consequences before deploying 88 police personnel to raze structures and render families homeless, in defiance of explicit High Court warnings. The decision balances deterrence with humanitarian considerations, sending a "message" that adamant defiance of court orders will invite proportionate professional repercussions without total impunity. The appellant, then serving as Tahsildar in Guntur District, Andhra Pradesh, ignored two High Court single-judge orders dated September 13, 2013, and December 11, 2013—issued in writ petitions by slum dwellers seeking house site pattas (land grants)—which mandated consideration of their eligibility within fixed timelines and prohibited disturbance of possession or forcible evictions. Despite these restraints, he orchestrated demolitions on December 6, 2013, and January 8, 2014, using police force to remove 88 personnel-assisted encroachments claimed as overnight third-party structures. Contempt petitions followed, leading to the High Court's finding of willful disobedience, upheld on appeal by the Division Bench. The appellant's Supreme Court challenge invoked family welfare and post-facto inquiries questioning the petitioners' occupancy, but the Court prioritized judicial authority over such defenses. Tata Mohan Rao v. S. Venkateswarlu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 571 : 2025 INSC 678

Criminal Contempt - Deprecation of scandalous remarks against Judiciary - The Court strongly deprecated "highly irresponsible" and "attention-seeking" comments by a Member of Parliament, who alleged that the CJI was responsible for "civil wars" and that the Supreme Court was inciting "religious wars" in the wake of judicial interventions in Waqf (Amendment) Act petitions. Such statements scandalize the Court, lower its authority, interfere with justice administration, and reflect ignorance of constitutional courts' roles. However, no contempt proceedings were initiated, as courts are not "fragile as flowers" and public confidence remains unshaken by "absurd" or "ludicrous" critiques. Judicial wisdom prioritizes values like free press, fair trial, and community trust over personal protection via contempt powers. (Para 5 - 10) Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 547 : 2025 INSC 647

Misleading the court to obtain an order with no intention of compliance constitutes civil contempt. (Paras 30, 36, 38 & 39) Chithra Woods Manors Welfare Association v. Shaji Augustine, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 480 : 2025 INSC 567

Death Penalty

The Supreme Court commutes death penalty to life imprisonment for man convicted of killing wife and four children, citing no prior criminal record, good conduct during 16-17 years of incarceration, mental health issues due to past trauma, and contributions to inmate welfare. The Court, while acknowledging the severity of the crime, removes the convict from death row but orders lifelong imprisonment without release, emphasizing penance for the crime. (Para 17) Reji Kumar @ Reji v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 457 : 2025 INSC 538

Supreme Court criticises 'undue haste' of trial court in awarding death penalty in 2 months without proper opportunity for defence. Irfan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 167 : 2025 INSC 150

Delay and laches

Condonation of delay - Advocate's Fault - The appellant filed a civil suit seeking, inter alia, a declaration that she was the legally wedded wife of the late Raj Kishore Sahoo. The suit was dismissed, and her first appeal met the same fate. She filed a second appeal before the High Court after a delay of 225 days, attributable to her advocate's failure to timely inform her of the first appellate order's dismissal. The High Court rejected the condonation application, deeming the explanation unsatisfactory. Whether a 225-day delay in filing a second appeal, caused by counsel's negligence, warrants condonation, particularly in light of the litigant's socio-economic vulnerability. Held, delay condoned; appeal allowed; matter remitted to the High Court for expeditious disposal. While courts must exercise caution in condoning protracted delays under the Limitation Act, 1963, the scales of justice demand a balanced approach, especially for India's socio-economically disadvantaged litigants who are often wholly reliant on their advocates. An innocent litigant ought not suffer for her counsel's default, a principle enduring since Rafiq v. Munshilal, (1981) 2 SCC 788, notwithstanding evolving socio-economic realities in under-resourced regions. Here, the appellant acted with diligence upon learning of the dismissal, rendering the delay sufficiently explained and non-deliberate. Condonation of delay is not merely procedural but a facet of substantive justice, tilting in favor of equity where advocate fault prejudices a vulnerable party, without condoning laxity. Kumari Sahu v. Bhubanananda Sahu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 165

Whether the High Court erred in condoning a delay of approximately 2200 days in filing an application for recall, thereby reviving a suit pending for 48 years? Whether the High Court overlooked the principles of limitation, judicial restraint, and the doctrine of res judicata while condoning the delay? The dispute pertains to a property initially purchased in 1916. Multiple suits were filed over the years where the deceased respondent was found not to be a bona fide purchaser. The respondent filed O.S. No. 1833/1980, which was dismissed for default in 1983, restored in 1984, and later abated in 2000 due to the respondent's failure to bring the legal heirs of a deceased defendant on record. In 2006, the respondent filed an application for recall, which was dismissed by the Trial Court in 2014, citing inordinate delay, lack of bona fides, and the suit being barred by res judicata. The High Court, in 2020, condoned the delay of 2200 days, allowing the revival of the suit. Held, the High Court ignored the inordinate delay of 6 years in filing the recall application and the respondent's repeated negligence in prosecuting the suit. The High Court failed to consider the principles of limitation, which are based on sound public policy and equity, and should not be overridden by a "liberal approach" to condone delay. The suit, pending for 48 years, was barred by res judicata and lacked bona fides, as the respondent's rights had already been adjudicated in prior suits. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order and restoring the Trial Court's dismissal of the recall application. The Court emphasized that rules of limitation are not merely technical but serve to prevent dilatory tactics and ensure prompt resolution of disputes. H. Guruswamy v. A. Krishnaiah, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 53

If a court is inclined to condone the delay, it should not delve into the merits of the case before the appeal is properly heard. The High Court's scope in a challenge to the rejection of a delay condonation application is limited to assessing whether sufficient cause was shown. Observations on the merits of the case at the delay condonation stage are unwarranted and prejudicial. Surendra G. Shankar v. Esque Finamark Pvt. Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 111

Whether the High Court erred in refusing to condone the delay in filing the appeals before the Maharashtra Real Estate Appellate Tribunal. Whether the High Court was justified in commenting on the merits of the orders passed by the Maharashtra Real Estate Regulatory Authority (RERA) and the Appellate Tribunal while considering the delay condonation issue. Held, the High Court should have limited its examination to the issue of condonation of delay and should not have commented on the merits of the case, especially when the Appellate Tribunal had not adjudicated on them. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment and the Appellate Tribunal's order rejecting the delay condonation application. The delay in filing the appeals was condoned, and the appeals were restored for consideration on merits before the Appellate Tribunal. Surendra G. Shankar v. Esque Finamark Pvt. Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 111

Delay and laches are valid grounds for dismissing a writ petition, especially when the petitioner has an alternative remedy and fails to act within a reasonable time. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Century Textiles and Industries Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 34

Lease - Conveyance - Whether the writ petition filed by Century Textiles in 2016, 61 years after the lease expired in 1955, was barred by delay and laches. Held, Century Textiles' writ petition, filed 61 years after the lease expired, was barred by delay and laches. Century Textiles had not taken any legal steps to enforce its claim for conveyance until 2016, despite the lease expiring in 1955 and a legal notice being issued in 2006. The High Court erred in entertaining the writ petition, especially when Century Textiles had an alternative remedy of filing a suit for specific performance or mandatory injunction, which it failed to pursue within the limitation period. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and dismissed Century Textiles' writ petition. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM) was not obligated to convey Block-A to Century Textiles, and the writ petition was barred by delay and laches. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Century Textiles and Industries Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 34

Disability

Education Law - Rights of Persons with Disabilities - Appointment of Special Teachers - Non-compliance with prior judicial orders - Directions issued. Rajneesh Kumar Pandey v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 302

Doctrines

Doctrine of Restitution – Held, when a person is deprived of the use of his money to which he is legitimately entitled, he has a right to be compensated for the deprivation which may be called interest or compensation. (Para 17) Dr. Poornima Advani v. Government of NCT, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 254 : 2025 INSC 262

Doctrine of Restitution - Interest as Compensation for Deprivation of Money – Held, a person deprived of money to which they are legitimately entitled has a right to interest as compensation under the doctrine of restitution, which aims to restore the party to their original position by addressing unjust enrichment and the loss of use of funds. (Para 25) Dr. Poornima Advani v. Government of NCT, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 254 : 2025 INSC 262

Doctrine of Restitution - The appellant purchased an e-stamp paper worth ₹28,10,000 for a property transaction, which was misplaced by the broker, necessitating a repurchase and delaying the deal. After filing a police complaint and public notice, the appellant sought a refund from the Collector of Stamps, which was denied. The High Court granted the refund but rejected interest. On appeal, the appellant claimed interest under the doctrine of restitution for the deprivation of funds. Held, doctrine of restitution applies, entitling the appellant to interest on the refunded amount as normal accretion on capital and compensation for wrongful retention. The Court explained restitution as restoring what was lost due to a decree/order or its execution, including compensation for benefits derived from wrongdoing or losses caused to another. Interest follows where the doctrine is attracted, preventing unjust enrichment. Appeal allowed, the respondents were directed to pay ₹4,35,968 as interest within two months. [Relied on: Union of India v. Tata Chemicals Ltd., (2014) 6 SCC 335; Authorised Officer, Karnataka Bank v. M/s R.M.S. Granites Pvt. Ltd. and Secretary, Irrigation Department, Govt. of Orissa v. G.C. Roy, (1992) 1 SCC 508, Para 17, 25, 29] Dr. Poornima Advani v. Government of NCT, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 254 : 2025 INSC 262

Doctrine of Separation of Powers - Principle of Checks and Balances – ultra vires - Contempt of Court - Law made by Parliament or Legislature Held, that passing of an enactment after the order of this Court by the legislature of State of Chhattisgarh cannot be said to be an act of contempt of the order passed by this Court. Every state legislature has plenary powers to pass an enactment and so long as the said enactment has not been declared to be ultra vires the Constitution or, in any way, null and void by a Constitutional Court, the said enactment would have the force of law. Interpretative power of a Constitutional Court does not analyze a situation of declaring exercise of legislative functions and passing of an enactment as an act of contempt of court. Legislative function includes power to enact as well as amend laws. Legislature has power to pass a law, to remove the basis of a judgement or to validate a law which has been struck down by a Constitutional Court by amending or varying it to give effect to judgement of Court. This is the core of doctrine of separation of powers. Any law made by the Parliament or a State legislature cannot be held to be an act of contempt of a court. Promulgation of an enactment is only an expression of the legislative function and cannot be said to be an act in contempt unless it is established that the statute so enacted is bad in law constitutionally. Any piece of legislation enacted by a legislature can be assailed within the manner known to law and that is by mounting a challenge against its validity on the twin prongs of legislative competence or constitutional validity. Relied on Indian Aluminium Co. vs. State of Kerala (1996) 7 SCC 637. Held, that prayers in contempt petition are in the nature of writs of mandamus which cannot be granted as such in Contempt petition. Petitions contending that State of Chhattisgarh's enactment of the Chhattisgarh Auxiliary Armed Police Force Act, 2011 amounted to contempt of court were dismissed. Nandini Sundar v. State of Chattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 662

Domestic Workers

Need for better legal safeguards for domestic workers, particularly concerning exploitation - Vulnerability of domestic workers and the need for stronger legal protections against exploitation - Whether the existing legal framework sufficiently protects domestic workers' rights -. The Supreme Court, recognizing the vulnerability of domestic workers and the lack of comprehensive legal protection, directed the Ministry of Labour and Employment, in conjunction with other relevant ministries, to form an expert committee. This committee is tasked with exploring the feasibility of recommending a legal framework to protect and regulate the rights of domestic workers, with a report due within six months. The government is then expected to consider enacting such a framework. Directions issued to the government regarding the formation of an expert committee to examine legal protections for domestic workers. Ajay Mallik v State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 120

Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961

Section 4 - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 306, 498-A and 304B - Evidence Act, 1872; Sections 113A and 113B - The deceased allegedly faced harassment from her husband, in-laws, and the appellant (her brother-in-law) due to dowry demands, leading her to commit suicide by self-immolation. The trial court acquitted all accused of dowry death under Section 304B IPC but convicted them for abetment of suicide. The High Court upheld the conviction. Held, Dowry death cannot be presumed without clear evidence of incessant harassment. There was no cogent evidence to establish that the appellant, as the brother-in-law of the deceased, abetted her suicide. Presumptions under Section 113A of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked without evidence of cruelty or harassment. Mere familial relation to the deceased does not justify the presumption of abetment in the absence of direct or circumstantial evidence. The appeal was allowed, and the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant were set aside. Ram Pyarey v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 66

Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act, 1954

Misleading medical advertisements - Supreme Court issues comprehensive directions for effective implementation of the Act, 1954, criticizing its poor enforcement over 70 years. States directed to appoint gazetted officers under Section 8 within one month, establish grievance redressal mechanisms within two months, and sensitize police on the Act's provisions. Publishers and designers of misleading advertisements held liable under Sections 3, 4, and 5. States and Union of India to report compliance by June 2025. Indian Medical Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 410

Directions - (1) Appointment of gazetted officers under Section 8 and Rule 3 of DMR Rules, 1955 within one month; (2) Sensitization of police through training academies; (3) Establishment of grievance redressal mechanisms with toll-free numbers or email within two months; (4) Immediate action on complaints by authorized officers, including FIR registration; (5) National Legal Services Authority to conduct public sensitization programs; (6) Union to develop a dashboard for tracking state actions within three months. Indian Medical Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 410

Education

Admission Eligibility - Curing Defect During Course - Interim Orders - Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit - Where a student, initially admitted to a B.A.M.S. course without fulfilling the mandatory English subject requirement, subsequently passed the English exam during the pendency of a writ petition and completed the entire course under interim orders, and where the college itself had provisionally admitted the student subject to passing the English exam, the High Court erred in dismissing the writ petition based solely on the initial ineligibility. The principle of "Actus curiae neminem gravabit" dictates that an act of the court should not prejudice anyone, and this principle was disregarded by the High Court. The student's subsequent fulfillment of the eligibility criteria, coupled with the college's provisional admission and the completion of the course under interim orders, warranted the issuance of the B.A.M.S. degree. (Para 8) Zaid Sheikh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 319 : 2025 INSC 353

Constitutional Law—Education—Fee Regulation—NRI Quota in Self-Financing Medical Institutions—Power of Admission and Fee Regulatory Committee - The Admission and Fee Regulatory Committee, constituted under the Kerala Medical Education (Regulation and Control of Admission to Private Medical Educational Institutions) Act, 2017, lacks the authority to direct the transfer of fees collected from NRI quota seats in self-financing medical colleges to a State-maintained corpus fund for subsidizing education of Below Poverty Line (BPL) students, absent enabling legislation. Such direction exceeds the Committee's limited regulatory powers, which are confined to prescribing non-exploitative fees and admission procedures for NRI seats, as delineated in P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 6 SCC 537 (para 131) and Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 6 SCC 697 (para 7). The State must enact suitable legislation to create mechanisms for subsidizing economically weaker sections through NRI fees, rather than delegating such fiscal redistribution to the Committee. Held, Self-financing institutions are entitled to retain NRI quota fees previously transferred to the State corpus fund, subject to utilizing a substantial portion thereof to subsidize BPL students' education within their institutions, without charging additional fees beyond the approved subsidized rates. The institutions are designated as trustees of such retained funds until State legislation is enacted, with accountability for compliance via audited accounts. BPL students admitted under scholarship schemes are entitled to refunds of any excess fees paid beyond subsidized rates, payable within three months, or set off against future dues. NRI students remain liable for full approved fees, with no refund entitlement for transferred amounts. The 2018 Kerala Government Order establishing BPL scholarship terms via the corpus fund was struck down, upholding the High Court's view, as it improperly expanded the Committee's mandate without legislative backing. Appeal allowed in part; directions issued accordingly. State of Kerala v. Principal KMCT Medical College, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 586 : 2025 INSC 518

National Education Policy (NEP) 2020 - Court cannot issue any direction under Article 32 of the Constitution to compel any State to adopt the NEP. G.S. Mani v. Government of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 572

Issue of eligibility criteria for the JEE (Advanced) examination. The petitioners challenged the abrupt change in eligibility criteria from three academic years (2023, 2024, and 2025) to two years (2024 and 2025) through subsequent press releases dated 05.11.2024 and 18.11.2024, respectively. The petitioners, acting on the initial promise, had dropped out of their colleges to prepare for JEE (Advanced), claiming detriment due to the change. The Court, applying the principle of estoppel, held that the respondents could not withdraw the promise made in the 05.11.2024 press release to the detriment of the petitioners. Consequently, the Court permitted students who withdrew from their courses between 05.11.2024 and 18.11.2024 to register for JEE (Advanced), without commenting on the merits of the decision to restrict eligibility. Mithin Mondal v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 55

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009; Section 23 - National Council for Teacher Education (Recognition Norms and Procedure) Regulations, 2014 - Any teacher who was in-service as on 10.08.2017 and who acquired the Diploma In Elementary Education (D. El. Ed.) qualification through National Institute of Open Schooling's (NIOS) 18-months programme prior to 01.04.2019 is a valid diploma holder and at par with a teacher who completed the 2 years D. El. Ed. programme. Such of the teachers who were in employment as on 10th August 2017 and who completed the 18 months D. El. Ed. (ODL) programme through NIOS before 1st April 2019 shall be considered as valid diploma holders for the purpose of applying in other institutions and/or for promotional avenues. (Para 33) Kousik Das v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 393 : 2025 INSC 448

Election

Election Law - Recount of Votes - Sanctity of Electoral Process - Principle of secrecy of ballots - Conditions under which a recount can be ordered - Whether the SubDivisional Magistrate was justified in ordering a recount of votes in an election for the post of Gram Pradhan under the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947. The appellant challenged the election results for the post of Gram Pradhan of Gram Panchayat alleging discrepancies in the vote count. The appellant claimed that the Presiding Officer orally informed him of 1194 votes cast in three polling booths, while the official Form 46 recorded 1213 votes. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate ordered a recount, but the High Court set aside this order, citing lack of documentary evidence and the principle of secrecy of ballots. Held, a recount of votes should not be ordered lightly and must be based on specific allegations supported by material facts. A recount is permissible only when: (i) The election petition contains adequate material facts supporting the allegations of irregularities. (ii) The court is prima facie satisfied that a recount is necessary to ensure justice. (iii) The secrecy of the ballot is not compromised without sufficient cause. The Court underscored the importance of maintaining the integrity of the electoral process. Each vote holds intrinsic value, and any irregularities in the counting process must be addressed to uphold democratic principles. The Court found that the appellant had raised legitimate concerns about the discrepancy in vote counts and the missing Presiding Officer's diary, which was a crucial document. Additionally, three out of four candidates supported a recount, further justifying the need to verify the election results. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the Sub-Divisional Magistrate's order for a recount of votes. The judgment reaffirms the principles of free and fair elections, the sanctity of the ballot, and the conditions under which a recount can be ordered. It highlights the judiciary's role in ensuring that electoral processes adhere to constitutional values and democratic norms. The appeal was allowed. (Para 1, 15, 16, 19) Vijay Bahadur v. Sunil Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 296 : 2025 INSC 332

Representation of the People Act, 1951; Section 5 - The appellant, A. Raja (CPI(M) candidate), was elected as MLA from the Devikulam (SC-reserved) Assembly Constituency in Kerala's 2021 elections by a margin of 7,848 votes. Respondent D. Kumar filed an election petition under Section 5 of the Act, 1951, challenging Raja's eligibility on the ground that he was not a member of the 'Hindu Parayan' Scheduled Caste as notified for Kerala under the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, but was instead a Christian. The petitioner alleged Raja's paternal grandparents migrated from Tirunelveli, Tamil Nadu, post-1950; his parents were baptized in 1992 by the CSI Church; and Raja himself was baptized and married per Christian rites. Raja countered that he belonged to the Hindu Parayan community in Kerala, his parents were Hindus (mother's name Easwari, not Esther), and any Christian associations (e.g., his father's name) stemmed from unfruitful prayers at a church, not conversion. The Returning Officer rejected nomination objections. The Kerala High Court (March 23, 2023) annulled the election, finding insufficient proof of pre-1950 migration, suspicious alterations in church records (Family, Baptism, and Burial Registers), and evidence of Christian profession via wedding photographs. The Supreme Court stayed the High Court order on April 29, 2023, permitting Raja's Assembly participation sans voting rights or emoluments. Whether the elected candidate (appellant) qualified as a member of the 'Hindu Parayan' Scheduled Caste under Kerala's notification for contesting a reserved constituency, or if prior conversion to Christianity disqualified him under Section 5 of the 1951 Act. Held, the High Court's judgment was set aside; the election petition dismissed. Appellant entitled to all consequential benefits as MLA for the full term. The High Court erred in annulling the election without adjudicating the validity of the appellant's caste certificate, which was not challenged before it. Mere peripheral evidence (e.g., church record alterations, wedding photos) insufficient to conclusively establish religious conversion or non-membership in the specified Scheduled Caste, absent direct scrutiny of the certificate's authenticity. Section 5 requires membership in the State-specific Scheduled Caste/Tribe at election time; peripheral migration or nominal Christian associations do not vitiate eligibility where certificate stands unimpugned. Appeal Allowed; No Costs.

The Supreme Court of India disposed of a public interest litigation (PIL) filed under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the use of public funds for constructing statues, parks, and memorials glorifying the Chief Minister and the election symbol of a political party. The petitioners alleged that the expenditure of crores of rupees from the state exchequer for such purposes was a misuse of public funds, violated the principles of free and fair elections, and was contrary to the constitutional duty of protecting public resources. The respondents defended the actions, stating that the memorials honored Dalit leaders and social reformers, and the expenditure was approved through proper budgetary processes. The Election Commission of India (ECI) had earlier declined to grant relief, citing the difficulty in assessing the impact of such constructions on elections. The Court, while disposing of the petition, emphasized the need for compliance with ECI guidelines issued in 2016, which prohibit the use of public funds or places for political propaganda. The Court refrained from adjudicating on the specific prayers but underscored the importance of adhering to the ECI's directives to ensure free and fair elections. Ravi Kant v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 107

Electricity Act, 2003

Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (Terms and Conditions of Tariff) Regulations, 2004; Regulation 53 - Additional Capital Expenditure - Transmission Utility - Replacement of Damaged Inter-Connecting Transformers (ICTs) - Operational Expense - Tariff Revision - Whether costs for replacing damaged ICTs qualify as additional capital expenditure under Regulation 53, allowing recovery through tariff revision - Held, replacement of transformers due to operational failure constitutes an operational expense, not "additional work" under Regulation 53. Such costs cannot be passed to consumers via tariff hikes, as maintaining a reliable transmission system, including replacing damaged equipment, falls within the utility's routine operation and maintenance responsibilities. The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of CERC and APTEL, affirming that operational risks are borne by the transmission utility. Power Grid Corporation of India's appeal to recover ₹24 crores for replacing damaged ICTs through tariff revision was dismissed. (Para 29) Power Grid Corporation v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 535 : 2025 INSC 626

Cross-Subsidy Surcharge (CSS) - Whether CSS under the Electricity Act, 2003, must be determined simultaneously with tariff rates or can be fixed separately based on prevailing tariff rates. Held, CSS is a statutory charge payable by open access consumers to compensate distribution licensees for subsidization losses. The Electricity Act, 2003, and Regulation 90 of the Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (Terms and Conditions for Determination of Tariff) Regulations, 2014, do not mandate simultaneous determination of CSS and tariff rates. The Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (APTEL) erred in setting aside the Rajasthan State Commission's CSS determination, which was validly based on the prevailing tariff rates effective from 22 September 2016 until 2 November 2017. CSS can be determined independently under Regulation 90, provided it aligns with the prevailing tariff rates for the relevant financial year. The Supreme Court set aside APTEL's judgment and restored the State Commission's order dated 1 December 2016. Appeal allowed. (Paras 19 - 21) Jaipur Vidyut Vitaran Nigam Ltd. v. Rajasthan Textile Mills Association, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 529 : 2025 INSC 592

Power Purchase Agreement – Change in Law – Compensation – Late Payment Surcharge – Principle of Restitution - Held, Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd. (APRL) was entitled to compensation and Late Payment Surcharge (LPS) under the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) for increased operational costs due to Coal India Limited's Evacuation Facility Charges (EFC) notification dated 19.12.2017, recognized as a “Change in Law” event. The Court applied the principle of restitution to restore APRL to its original economic position, as if the EFC had not been imposed, and upheld LPS at 2% above the State Bank Advance Rate (SBAR) from the notification date, per Article 10 of the PPA. Additional charges imposed by State instrumentalities after the cut-off date qualify as “Change in Law” events, entitling power generators to compensation. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal by Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. (JVVNL) and affirmed the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity's (APTEL) decision. [Relied on: GMR Warora Energy Ltd. v. CERC, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 329 (Paras 18–28)] Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 631 : 2025 INSC 770

Sections 9, 42, 79, 86, 181 - Electricity Regulatory Commission (Terms and Conditions for Open Access) Regulations, 2016 (Rajasthan) - Validity of - Open Access – Jurisdiction of State Commission - Captive Power Plants - Grid Stability - Penalties and Scheduling Requirements – Held, the State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC) can regulate open access even for inter-state power supply if it affects their grid. While the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) holds jurisdiction over inter-state electricity transmission, this does not preclude State Electricity Regulatory Commissions (SERCs) from regulating inter-state power supply when such transactions affect the state grid. Even when electricity is sourced from another state, the State Commission maintains regulatory oversight if the power supply has consequential impacts on the state's electricity network. (Para 44, 45, 47 & 67) Ramayana Ispat Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 384 : 2025 INSC 424

Section 63 - Determination of tariff by bidding process - Importance of harmonizing the provisions of the Electricity Act with environmental laws - Whether the application under Section 63 of the Act could have been made by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) which is a “local authority” within the meaning of Section 2(41) of the Act ? Held: Section 63 of the Act allows local authorities like the MCD to file applications for tariff adoption. Section 63 does not restrict the filing of tariff adoption applications only to distribution licensees or generating companies. The MCD, as a local authority, was entitled to file an application under Section 63 for the adoption of tariffs determined through a competitive bidding process for a Waste-to-Energy (WTE) project. The MCD was fulfilling its statutory obligations under the Solid Waste Management Rules, 2016, and the project was in the public interest to address Delhi's waste management crisis. The Delhi Electricity Regulatory Commission (DERC) had the authority to approve the tariff of Rs. 7.38/KWh for the WTE project, as the bidding process was transparent and complied with the guidelines. The WTE project aligned with the National Tariff Policy, 2016, and the Renewable Purchase Obligation (RPO). The judgment reaffirmed the DERC's orders which had approved the tariff and dismissed challenges to the MCD's authority to issue tariff-based bids. The Supreme Court criticized APTEL for adopting a hyper-technical approach and failing to consider the larger public interest served by the WTE project. The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of harmonizing electricity and environmental laws to promote renewable energy projects. The judgment underscores the role of local authorities in addressing urban waste management challenges through sustainable solutions. The appeals were allowed, and set aside APTEL's judgment. Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gagan Narang, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 5

Section 79(1), 178 - The appellant, Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd. (PGCIL), completed construction of an inter-state transmission line and substation at Indore but could not operationalize it due to the respondent, Madhya Pradesh Power Transmission Co. Ltd. (MPPTCL), delaying the downstream intra-state transmission infrastructure. PGCIL claimed compensation from CERC for revenue losses attributable to MPPTCL's delay. CERC, exercising powers under Section 79(1) of the Electricity Act, 2003, awarded compensation to PGCIL via orders dated 21.01.2020 and 27.01.2020. MPPTCL challenged these orders before the High Court via writ petition, arguing CERC lacked jurisdiction absent specific regulations under Section 178 framing such compensation. The High Court admitted the petition despite available statutory remedies under the Act, prompting PGCIL's appeal to the Supreme Court. Whether the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) possesses authority under Section 79(1) of the Electricity Act, 2003, to issue case-specific regulatory orders awarding compensation for delays in inter-state transmission projects, even in the absence of general regulations promulgated under Section 178. Held, Yes. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and upheld CERC's jurisdiction. Section 79(1) confers broad regulatory powers on CERC, enabling it to pass tailored orders addressing regulatory gaps where no Section 178 regulations exist, without conflating regulation with adjudication. Power Grid Corporation v. Madhya Pradesh Power Transmission Company, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 583 : 2025 INSC 697

Section 79(1), 178 - CERC's functions under Section 79(1) are inherently regulatory, serving as a comprehensive repository of powers to regulate the electricity sector, including transmission planning and execution. Absent Section 178 regulations, CERC is not rendered powerless; it may exercise Section 79(1) to issue interstitial or case-specific directives to prevent regulatory lacunae from impeding statutory objectives. A regulation cannot be created via adjudication, but this does not impose a blanket prohibition on CERC issuing regulatory orders under Section 79(1). The 2014 Tariff Regulations' silence on delay-attributable compensation does not bar such relief. The High Court's writ admission was erroneous given the exhaustive statutory remedies under the Act, reinforcing the principle against bypassing specialized forums. Affirms CERC's proactive regulatory role in inter-state transmission disputes, promoting accountability for delays without awaiting legislative rulemaking. The judgment underscores the Electricity Act's intent for efficient grid development, potentially influencing similar claims in energy infrastructure projects. Power Grid Corporation v. Madhya Pradesh Power Transmission Company, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 583 : 2025 INSC 697

Employees' Compensation Act, 1923

Courts are not strictly bound by the schedule under the Act, 1923, when determining compensation for functional disability. Courts may deviate from the statutory schedule to account for the actual loss of earning capacity due to functional disability, adopting a liberal interpretation of the Act as beneficial legislation. Overturning the High Court's reduction of disability from 100% to 34% for an employee who lost four fingers, the Court assessed the functional disability at 50%, considering the severe mutilation of the employee's right hand. It awarded enhanced compensation of ₹1,60,177.5 with 12% interest from the date of the accident and a penalty of ₹80,088.75. (Paras 8-12) Kamal Dev Prasad v. Mahesh Forge, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 510 : 2025 INSC 591

Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948

Section 2(17) - Principal Employer - A person exercising supervisory control over an establishment, irrespective of their official designation, qualifies as a 'principal employer' under Section 2(17) of the ESI Act. The Court upheld the conviction of a company's General Manager for failing to remit ESI contributions to the ESIC, sentencing him to six months' imprisonment and a ₹5,000 fine, emphasizing that liability persists for individuals acting as managing agents or supervising the establishment. Arguments that only the company bears responsibility were dismissed. (Paras 20 & 23) Ajay Raj Shetty v. Director, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 442 : 2025 INSC 500

Environmental Law

Auroville Foundation Act, 1988 - National Green Tribunal Act, 2010; Section 2(1)(m) and 14 - Not every environmental dispute constitutes a "substantial question relating to environment" under Section 2(1)(m) of the NGT Act. A substantial question must involve a direct violation of a specific statutory environmental obligation under the enactments in Schedule I. The NGT cannot assume jurisdiction and interfere with an approved Master Plan under the guise of applying the "Precautionary Principle" when no substantial environmental question arising from the implementation of Schedule I enactments is established. The Auroville Foundation Act, 1988, being a special Act with overriding effect, must be considered in assessing the validity of NGT directions. (Para 9, 13 & 14) Auroville Foundation v. Navroz Kersap Mody, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 312 : 2025 INSC 347

Environmental and Heritage Preservation - Construction of Verandah at Punjab and Haryana High Court - Compliance with UNESCO World Heritage Guidelines - Preservation of Chandigarh Capitol Complex's World Heritage Status - Development of Green Paver Blocks in Kutcha Parking Area - Balancing Sustainable Development with Chandigarh Master Plan, 2031. Held, the construction of a verandah in front of Court Room No. 1 aligns with the existing architectural design and complies with UNESCO's Operational Guidelines (para 172) for the Chandigarh Capitol Complex, a World Heritage Site. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's directions to construct the verandah and develop the kutcha parking area with green paver blocks and tree plantation within the High Court premises. The verandah, a non-invasive structure, addresses the need to protect Court Room No. 1 from environmental damage while preserving the Outstanding Universal Value (OUV) of the Capitol Complex. Modern architectural techniques ensure aesthetic and structural integrity, and ex post facto approval from UNESCO may be sought if necessary. The Court directed the High Court administration to consult landscaping experts to optimize parking capacity, enhance green cover, and provide shade, ensuring compliance with the Chandigarh Master Plan, 2031. Contempt proceedings for non-compliance were held in abeyance for 12 weeks to allow implementation. The Court emphasized balancing public interest (facilities for lawyers and litigants) with environmental sustainability and heritage preservation. Green paver blocks mitigate dust, pollution, and sludge in the parking area, promoting ecological sustainability. Appeals and pending applications disposed of, with directions to implement the High Court's orders while adhering to heritage and environmental guidelines. (Para 39, 45 & 46) Chandigarh Administration v. Registrar General, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 639 : 2025 INSC 786

Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 - District Survey Report = Environmental Clearance - Sand Mining - EIA Notification, 2006 - Precautionary Principle - The Uttar Pradesh government issued an e-auction notice for sand mining leases under Category B2 minor mineral projects, relying on a 2017 District Survey Report (DSR) that had expired after its five-year validity in 2022, and a draft 2023 DSR not yet finalized. The National Green Tribunal (NGT) invalidated the auction, holding it violative of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, and the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Notification, 2006 (as amended in 2016), which mandates a valid DSR as a prerequisite for environmental clearance (EC). The State appealed. Whether an expired or draft DSR can form the basis for granting EC and auctioning mining leases, absent a valid and subsisting DSR prepared in accordance with EIA Notification procedures. Held, a valid and subsisting DSR—not older than five years—is a mandatory precondition for EC applications under the EIA Notification for Category B2 projects. Neither an expired DSR nor a draft DSR suffices, as the latter is "virtually non-existent" for EC purposes. The NGT's order invalidating the auction is affirmed. The DSR, prepared per Appendix-X and Para 7(iii)(a) of the EIA Notification, is a "document of seminal importance" enabling informed appraisal of ecological sensitivities. It must cover all districts, be publicly displayed for 21 days, hosted on district websites, and maintained at the Collectorate. Its five-year lifespan reflects the precautionary principle, accounting for rapid environmental changes; post-expiry, a fresh DSR is required. District Environment Impact Assessment Authority (DEIAA) and District Environment Appraisal Committee (DEAC) bear statutory duty to prepare and update DSRs every five years, ensuring real-time eco-fragility assessment. Non-compliance renders EC applications incomplete and auctions unlawful. Strict enforcement is imperative to uphold environmental safeguards. The appeal is dismissed. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Gaurav Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 548 : 2025 INSC 650

Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 — Ss. 2 & 7 — Illegal diversion of reserved forest land — Nexus between politicians, bureaucrats, and builders — Constitution of SITs by States/UTs for investigation and reclamation — Supreme Court quashed allotment and sale of 11.89 hectares of reserved forest land in Pune (notified in 1879) to private family (1998) for agricultural use and subsequent transfer to housing society (1999) as front arrangement, without prior Central Government approval; held actions in breach of public trust by Revenue Minister and Divisional Commissioner; quashed 2007 environmental clearance for residential/commercial complex; directed handover of land to Forest Department; issued pan-India directions to States/UTs to: (i) constitute SITs to probe illegal allotments of reserved forest land held by Revenue Departments to private entities; (ii) reclaim possession or recover market value (for afforestation); (iii) form special teams for implementation within 1 year; (iv) restrict reclaimed lands to afforestation only. In Re: T.N. Godavarman Thirumalpad v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 590

Forest Conservation Act, 1980 and Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 - Survey of encroachment on forest land - Encroachments and depleting forest cover in Tamil Nadu's Agasthyamalai landscape - Conflict between forest conservation and rehabilitation of displaced tea estate workers - The Supreme Court directed the Central Empowered Committee (CEC) to conduct a scientific survey within 12 weeks to demarcate forest boundaries, identify encroachments, and recommend measures for restoring reserved forests, tiger habitats, elephant corridors, and wildlife sanctuaries, while ensuring state support for the process. (Para 27 – 30) A. John Kennedy v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 395 : 2025 INSC 443

Forests form the lungs of the ecosystem, and any depletion / destruction of forest areas has a direct impact on the entire environment. The world at large is facing the calamities caused by the climate change, and the primary culprit behind this is the depleting forest cover owing to a myriad of issues including rapid urbanization, unchecked industrialization, encroachments, etc. - India has a forest cover of about 7,15,343 sq. km as per 'India State of Forest Report 2023', which is about 21.76% (approx.) of the total landmass of the country. Nepal has 44.74% (approx.), Bhutan has 72% (approx.), and Sri Lanka has 29% (approx.) forest cover. Hence, clearly the forest cover in India is not adequate and needs to be enhanced. A recent report, submitted by the Ministry of Environment and Forests, in proceedings before the National Green Tribunal indicates that almost 13000 sq. kms. area of forests is under encroachment. This Court has time and again taken up this issue and passed mandatory directions to remove the encroachments from the forest areas and to curb any attempt to reduce the forest cover in the country. (Para 2 & 4) A. John Kennedy v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 395 : 2025 INSC 443

National Green Tribunal Act, 2010; Section 2(1)(m) - Substantial question relating to environment - Auroville Township Project – National Green Tribunal barred the Auroville Foundation from developmental activities in their township in Puducherry - Held, no substantial question relating to environment had arisen, nor violation of any of the enactments specified in Schedule-I was alleged. The Tribunal therefore had committed gross error in assuming the jurisdiction and giving directions untenable in law. (Para 18 & 19) Auroville Foundation v. Navroz Kersap Mody, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 312 : 2025 INSC 347

Restoration of Khajuria Lake - Directions - The Supreme Court set aside the Bombay High Court's 2018 direction to restore Khajuria Lake, a natural water body filled by the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (BMC) to construct a municipal park. The Court directed that the park be preserved in perpetuity as a green space for public use without predominant commercial activity. An expert committee was ordered to be constituted within 3 months to explore creating an alternative water body, and comprehensive ecological restoration of other water bodies in the municipal area was mandated within 12 months. The Court considered: (1) the lake's prior condition, noting its deteriorated state as a garbage dumping ground by 2009; (2) the park's current ecological and recreational value as a vital urban green space; and (3) the impracticality of restoration due to high costs, ecological harm, and lack of a natural catchment area, which could lead to health hazards. The Court also noted the petitioner's 5-year delay in raising the grievance, deeming the park's transformation an irreversible fait accompli. (Para 21) Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Pankaj Babulal Kotecha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 653 : 2025 INSC 792

Though it is true that precautionary principle and polluter pays principle are part of the environmental law of the country, it is equally true that while the right to clean environment is a guaranteed fundamental right under Article 14 of the Constitution of India, the right to development equally claims priority under the fundamental rights, particularly under Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, there is a need for sustainable development striking a golden balance between the right to development and the right to clean environment. (Para 17) Auroville Foundation v. Navroz Kersap Mody, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 312 : 2025 INSC 347

Liability of tanneries for environmental pollution under the "Polluter Pays Principle" and "Precautionary Principle." Continuation of liability for compensation beyond 1998 until ecological damage is reversed - Implementation of schemes for ecological restoration and compensation to affected individuals/families - Role of the State and Central Governments in enforcing environmental laws and ensuring compliance - Explained. Vellore District Environment Monitoring Committee v. District Collector, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 131

Compensation - The appeals arose from the pollution caused by tanneries in Vellore District, Tamil Nadu, particularly the discharge of untreated effluents into the River Palar, leading to severe environmental degradation, health hazards, and loss of livelihood for local communities. The Vellore District Environment Monitoring Committee and the All India Skin and Hide Tanners and Merchants Association (AISHTMA) challenged the orders of the High Court regarding compensation and the liability of tanneries for ongoing pollution. The State Government is directed to disburse the compensation to all affected individuals/families as per the awards dated 07.03.2001 and 24.08.2009. The State shall recover the compensation amount from the polluters under the Revenue Recovery Act or other legal means. Vellore District Environment Monitoring Committee v. District Collector, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 131

Polluter Pays Principle - The tanneries are absolutely liable for the environmental damage caused by their operations. The liability extends not only to compensating affected individuals/families but also to restoring the damaged ecology. The liability continues until the pollution is curbed and the ecological damage is reversed. Vellore District Environment Monitoring Committee v. District Collector, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 131

Ecological Restoration - A committee, chaired by a retired High Court Judge, shall be constituted to oversee the implementation of a comprehensive scheme for ecological restoration, including the establishment of Common Effluent Treatment Plants (CETPs) and Individual Effluent Treatment Plants (IETPs), and ensure Zero Liquid Discharge (ZLD). Vellore District Environment Monitoring Committee v. District Collector, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 131

Government Responsibility - The State and Central Governments are responsible for enforcing environmental laws, ensuring compliance, and taking preventive measures to protect the environment. The "Government Pay Principle" is invoked, holding the government accountable for regulatory lapses. Vellore District Environment Monitoring Committee v. District Collector, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 131

Monitoring and Compliance - The State Pollution Control Board (TNPCB) and Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) shall monitor industries, enforce emission standards, and ensure real-time water quality monitoring. Industries failing to comply with environmental norms shall face strict action, including closure. Vellore District Environment Monitoring Committee v. District Collector, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 131

Health and Safety of Workers - The State shall ensure that tannery workers are provided with protective gear, health check-ups, and insurance coverage. The Factories Act and other labor laws shall be strictly enforced. Vellore District Environment Monitoring Committee v. District Collector, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 131

Public Participation - The State shall establish platforms for citizens to report pollution incidents and ensure transparency in environmental data. Vellore District Environment Monitoring Committee v. District Collector, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 131

Directions Issued - The State Government shall pay compensation to affected individuals/families within six weeks and recover the amount from polluters. A committee shall be constituted to oversee ecological restoration and ensure ZLD compliance. The State shall implement a comprehensive rejuvenation plan for the River Palar, including desilting and pollution removal. Quarterly inspections of tanneries shall be conducted, and non-compliant industries shall face strict action. The State shall promote sustainable practices, including waste recycling and reuse, and ensure the health and safety of workers. Vellore District Environment Monitoring Committee v. District Collector, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 131

The Supreme Court emphasized the need for a balanced approach between economic development and environmental protection. The tanneries' liability for pollution is absolute and continuing until the ecological damage is reversed. The State and Central Governments have a crucial role in enforcing environmental laws and ensuring compliance to protect public health and the environment. Vellore District Environment Monitoring Committee v. District Collector, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 131

Environmental Compensation – Validity of Calculation Method – Jurisdiction of NGT under PMLA - The Uttar Pradesh Pollution Control Board (PCB) determined environmental compensation against Waris Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. for polluting groundwater by storing hazardous chromium waste. The National Green Tribunal (NGT) disapproved of the PCB's method for calculating the compensation, which was based on the total waste found at the site (62225 MT) without properly considering the appellant's actual contribution. The NGT imposed compensation of Rs. 25,39,68,750/- and also held the appellant liable under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA). Held; the Supreme Court set aside the NGT's decision, noting that the PCB's method of calculating compensation was flawed as it did not accurately attribute the waste to the appellant. The Court remanded the matter to the PCB for redetermination of the environmental compensation in accordance with law. The NGT exceeded its jurisdiction by holding the appellant liable under the PMLA, especially since no criminal complaint or FIR was filed for any scheduled offence under the PMLA. Citing Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, 2022 Live law (SC) 633 the Court emphasized that proceedings under PMLA require a registered scheduled offence. The Court expressed doubt on the jurisdiction of the NGT to direct prosecution under PMLA but did not decide on it, as the impugned order was set aside on other grounds. The appeal was partly allowed. The PCB was directed to re-evaluate the environmental compensation. The NGT's findings on liability under the PMLA were set aside. Waris Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. v. Uttar Pradesh Pollution Control Board, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 87

Evidence Law

The prosecution must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the accused's failure to explain certain circumstances does not alleviate this burden. In circumstantial evidence cases, the chain of evidence must be complete, consistent, and exclude all reasonable alternative hypotheses. While absence of motive is not a basis for acquittal, it is a relevant factor in evaluating guilt in such cases. (Para 26) Vaibhav v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 680 : 2025 INSC 800

Factories Act, 1948

Section 2 (k) and (m) - Interpretation of "Factory" and "Manufacturing Process" - Washing and Cleaning as Manufacturing - Welfare Legislation - Applicability of Definition under Central Excise Act – Held, the definition of "manufacturing process" under Section 2(k) of the Factories Act, 1948, clearly encompasses "washing and cleaning" of any article or substance with a view to its delivery. The Act is a welfare legislation aimed at protecting workers' health and safety, and therefore, its provisions must be interpreted liberally to give effect to the legislative intent. The Court rejected the High Court's reliance on the definition of "manufacture" under the Central Excise Act, 1944, stating that the Factories Act provides its own specific definition, which must be applied. The Court underscored that the inclusion of "washing and cleaning" in the 1948 Act, absent in the 1934 Act, was a deliberate expansion to include previously excluded undertakings. Thus, a laundry business involving cleaning and washing clothes, including dry cleaning, using power and employing more than ten workers, falls within the definition of "factory" under Section 2(m) of the Act. (Paras 30, 36, 38 & 42) State of Goa v. Namita Tripathi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 276 : 2025 INSC 306

Section 2(k) and 2(m) - Interpretation of - "Manufacturing Process" - Washing and Cleaning - Applicability to Laundry Services - Effect of ESIC Act Amendments – Held, the activity of washing and cleaning, including dry cleaning, carried out by a laundry service, constitutes a "manufacturing process" under Section 2(k) of the Factories Act, 1948. This activity, aimed at the use, delivery, or disposal of cleaned linen, squarely falls within the definition. Consequently, the premises where such activity is conducted, employing more than ten workers with the aid of power, qualifies as a "factory" under Section 2(m) of the Act. The Court rejected the respondent's contention that dry cleaning does not render a product usable or saleable, emphasizing the plain meaning of the statutory definition. The Court distinguished prior judgments under the Employees' State Insurance Corporation (ESIC) Act, noting that the definition of "manufacturing process" was incorporated into the ESIC Act only in 1989, and thus, earlier decisions based on the pre-amendment definition are inapplicable. The 1948 Act's definition, which explicitly includes "washing and cleaning," must prevail. The registration of the respondent as a factory under the ESIC Act, although not the sole basis of the decision, supports the conclusion that the respondent's activities fall within the scope of the Factories Act, 1948. (Para 42 - 49) State of Goa v. Namita Tripathi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 276 : 2025 INSC 306

Family Law

Divorce by Mutual Consent - Mediation - Property Settlement - Stamp Duty Exemption - Where parties in a transfer petition for divorce, referred to mediation, reached a mutual agreement to dissolve their marriage and settle their property dispute, the Supreme Court, exercising its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, directed the dissolution of the marriage by mutual consent. The Court further directed the transfer of absolute ownership of a jointly owned flat to the wife, waiving stamp duty on registration, relying on Section 17(2)(vi) of the Registration Act, 1908, which exempts registration fees for decrees or orders of the Court, except compromises involving immovable property outside the subject matter of the proceedings. As the flat was the subject of the compromise within the proceedings, the exemption applied. The Court also directed the Sub-Registrar to register the flat in the wife's name without any encumbrances, and the wife waived her right to alimony. (Para 6 & 7) Arun Rameshchand Arya v. Parul Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 305

Family Courts Act, 1984

Legitimacy - Jurisdiction of Civil and Family Courts - Whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the original suit regarding legitimacy. The Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the original suit regarding legitimacy, as the Family Court's exclusive jurisdiction under the Family Courts Act, 1984, applies only to matters involving marital relationships. Since the case involved an alleged extra-marital relationship, the Civil Court was the appropriate forum. The Family Court's jurisdiction is limited to matters involving marital relationships, and it cannot entertain claims based on alleged extra-marital relationships. Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 118

Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006

Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006; Section 97 - Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954; Section 20AA - Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 - Appellants convicted under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 ("PoFA") for offences committed between 1976 and 2006 (PoFA's repeal by Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 ("FSS Act")). They sought probation under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, invoking Articles 14 & 21 (equality & right to life) and reformative justice principles, arguing legislative shift to leniency in FSS Act (omission of PoFA's s. 20AA bar) warranted retrospective benefit under Article 20(1) via lighter FSS sentencing. Whether s. 20AA of PoFA (barring probation for non-minors) applies to bar relief under Probation of Offenders Act for offences during 1976–2006, despite FSS Act's repeal, or if FSS's omission of probation bar and savings clause (s. 97) permits retrospective leniency. Held, Probation of Offenders Act inapplicable. S. 20AA of PoFA expressly excludes probation for food adulteration offences (post-1976 insertion), and s. 97 of FSS Act preserves PoFA penalties for pre-repeal offences, blocking retrospective modification. Public health imperatives in food adulteration override reformative justice; no retrospective leniency absent explicit legislative intent. Appeal partly allowed—conviction upheld; sentence modified to fine only. [Distinguished: T. Barai v. Henry Ah Hoe, (1983) 1 SCC 177; Followed: Basheer v. State of Kerala, (2004) 3 SCC 609] Nagarajan v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 580 : 2025 INSC 703

The State Government has no authority to impose additional restrictions or interpretations on qualifications for the post of Food Safety Officer (FSO) as prescribed by the Central Government. (Para 23 – 27) Chandra Shekhar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 336 : 2025 INSC 372

Foreigners Act, 1946

Section 3 - Foreigners (Tribunal) Order, 1964 - Whether a Foreigners Tribunal has the authority to reopen and review its own concluded judgment on citizenship. Held, Foreigners Tribunal lacks the power to sit in appeal over its own judgment or reopen a concluded issue of citizenship. The Court set aside the Tribunal's order dated December 24, 2019, which reopened an inquiry into the appellant's citizenship despite a prior final order on February 15, 2018, declaring the appellant an Indian citizen. The Court also set aside the High Court's judgment upholding the Tribunal's action, noting that the State failed to challenge the original order and no legal provision permitted the Tribunal to review its own findings. The February 15, 2018, order was deemed final and unchallengeable by the State or Union. (Para 7, 8) Rejia Khatun @ Rezia Khatun v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 238

Section 9 - Whether inclusion in the draft National Register of Citizenship (NRC) can invalidate a prior Foreigners Tribunal declaration of non-citizenship under the Act, 1946 - Held, inclusion in the draft NRC does not annul a Foreigners Tribunal's declaration that a person is a foreigner. The Tribunal's decision takes precedence, as affirmed by the High Court, and NRC inclusion holds no legal value in such cases, as per Abdul Kuddus v. Union of India, (2019) 6 SCC 604. The appellant failed to discharge the burden of proof under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act to establish citizenship. Appeal dismissed, upholding the Tribunal's declaration of the appellant as a foreigner. (Para 27) Rofiqul Hoque v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 600 : 2025 INSC 730

Section 9 - Indian Citizenship - Foreigners Tribunal - Res Judicata - Abuse of Process - Whether initiating a second Foreigners Tribunal proceeding against a person previously declared an Indian citizen violates the principle of res judicata. Whether the High Court erred in declining to quash the subsequent proceeding against the appellant. Held, the findings of a Foreigners Tribunal are binding and operate as res judicata unless successfully challenged or set aside through permissible legal remedies. No provision for review of such orders was established. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, which had declined to quash a second Foreigners Tribunal proceeding initiated in 2018 against the appellant, who was declared an Indian citizen in 2016. Initiating fresh proceedings on identical grounds was barred by res judicata, as the earlier Tribunal order, supported by credible documentary and oral evidence, had attained finality. The State's failure to challenge or seek recall of the 2016 order provided no legal basis for the subsequent proceeding, which constituted an abuse of process. The appeal was allowed, and the 2018 proceeding was quashed. [Followed: Abdul Kuddus v. Union of India, (2019) 6 SCC 604 (Para 9)] Tarabanu Begum @ Tarabhanu Khatun v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 527

Whether a Foreign Registration Officer or Civil Authority must be impleaded in bail applications filed by foreigners under the Foreigners Act, 1946. The Court held that it is not necessary to implead such authorities in bail applications, as they have no locus to oppose bail unless the offence falls under Section 14 of the Foreigners Act. However, the Court directed that upon granting bail to a foreign national, the prosecuting agency or State must immediately inform the concerned Registration Officer, who will then notify the Civil Authority. This ensures compliance with the Foreigners Order, 1948, and allows authorities to take appropriate legal steps. The Court emphasized that this process avoids unnecessary delays in bail proceedings while safeguarding the interests of the State. Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 23

Gangsters

Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (Uttar Pradesh); Section 3 – Gang Membership – Mere inclusion of multiple accused in a list, without evidence of their organizational roles, command structure, or prior/continued coordinated criminal activities, fails to satisfy the stringent criteria for establishing gang membership under the Act. (Para 17) Lal Mohd. v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 685 : 2025 INSC 811

Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (Uttar Pradesh); Section 3 – Gang Membership – Habitual Criminality – Communal Clash – Organized Crime – Quashing of FIR – Held, involvement in a single communal clash does not warrant invocation of the Act absent proof of habitual or organized criminal conduct. The Act targets habitual offenders, not individuals involved in isolated incidents. The FIR, arising from a communal protest on 10.10.2022, lacked evidence of a hierarchical structure, systematic planning, or ongoing criminal activity. The gang chart, prepared post facto on 29.04.2023, was an attempt to recharacterize the incident as organized crime without new evidence. Consequently, the FIR under Section 3(1) was quashed, as its continuation would amount to an abuse of process. (Paras 18–20) Lal Mohd. v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 685 : 2025 INSC 811

Police Act, 1963 (Karnataka) - Section 87 - Cooperative Societies Act, 1959 (Karnataka) - Section 17(1) - Gambling - Moral Turpitude - Held, playing cards, for which the appellant was convicted under Section 87 of the Karnataka Police Act, does not inherently involve moral turpitude. Not every instance of playing cards, particularly when done as a form of entertainment, constitutes moral turpitude, which requires conduct that is inherently base, vile, or depraved. The appellant, not a habitual gambler, was fined Rs. 200 without trial for playing cards on a roadside. The disqualification of the appellant from the Board of Directors of a Cooperative Society was disproportionate to the misconduct. The Supreme Court set aside the disqualification, restoring the appellant's election to the Board, as the impugned action was unsustainable. (Paras 5 - 7) Hanumantharayappa Y.C. v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 647

Strict scrutiny of the FIR is required registered under stringent laws like the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters Act to prevent its misuse in property or financial disputes. Jay Kishan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 196 : 2025 INSC 198

Haj Policy

These Writ Petitions, filed by various Haj Group Organisers (HGOs), challenged the Union of India's quota allocation for Haj pilgrims under the Haj-2025 Policy. The petitioners alleged arbitrary and discriminatory allocation. The Court, after hearing the parties, initially directed a meeting to facilitate equitable redistribution of quota among HGOs. Following this, some redistribution occurred, and the Court extended the deadline for submission of revised Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) to allow for further discussions. The Court clarified that it was not interfering with the Haj-2025 Policy itself, but addressing its initial implementation issues. The petitions were disposed of, with liberty granted to parties to raise future grievances before the appropriate forum. Interlocutory applications seeking to raise additional issues were dismissed as not maintainable. (Para 8 – 12) Kolkata Tours and Travels v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 335

Hate Speech

Intolerance for Hate Speech & Communal Hatred - Attempts to spread communal hatred, indulge in hate speech, or provoke disharmony—particularly in sensitive contexts like Waqf Act challenges—must be dealt with an "iron hand" as criminal offenses. Hate speech erodes dignity, self-worth, tolerance, and equality in a multi-cultural society, fostering alienation and humiliation of targeted groups. Authorities are reminded to act suo motu (per 2023 directions) without awaiting complaints, ensuring strict enforcement to preserve social cohesion. (Para 5 - 10) Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 547 : 2025 INSC 647

Hindu Law

Partition of Joint Family Property – Self-Acquired Property – Whether the suit property, acquired by Defendant No. 1 post-partition, was ancestral (joint family) or self-acquired property. Held, upon partition of joint Hindu family property, shares allotted to coparceners become their self-acquired property, with absolute rights to sell, transfer, or bequeath. No presumption exists that property is joint family property merely due to the existence of a joint Hindu family; the claimant must prove it is joint family property, typically by showing a joint family nucleus used for its acquisition. Ancestral property is limited to that inherited from paternal ancestors within three generations. The doctrine of blending requires clear intention by the owner to relinquish self-acquired property into the joint family pool; mere use by family members or acts of generosity do not suffice. Here, Defendant No. 1's purchase of his brother's share post-partition, using a loan and not joint family funds, established the property as self-acquired. The subsequent sale to the Appellants was valid. The High Court's judgment, invalidating the sale by misapplying the doctrine of blending and overlooking evidence of independent acquisition, was set aside. Appeal allowed; suit property held to be self-acquired by Defendant No. 1, and sale to Appellants upheld. (Paras 13 - 20) Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 494 : 2025 INSC 532

Homoeopathy

National Commission for Homoeopathy Act, 2020—Sections 4(2) & 19—Interpretation of "Leader - Section 4(2) requires the Chairperson of the National Commission for Homoeopathy to possess a postgraduate degree in Homeopathy and at least twenty years' experience in the field, including not less than ten years as a "leader" in healthcare delivery, growth/development of Homeopathy, or its education. The term "leader" denotes the "Head of a Department" or "Head of an Organisation," connoting a substantive decision-making position with supervisory authority over subordinates, as discerned from organizational structure and official orders. Equivalent experience cannot be inferred from mere administrative allocations or junior roles without explicit designation as "Head"; ipse dixit assertions by appointing authorities, unsupported by documents, are perverse and unsustainable. Dr. Amaragouda L v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 197 : 2025 INSC 201

Income Tax Act, 1961

Section 2(47) - Whether the reduction in share capital of a subsidiary company, resulting in a proportionate reduction in the number of shares held by the assessee, constitutes a "transfer" under Section 2(47) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, thereby allowing the assessee to claim a capital loss. The respondent-assessee, M/s. Jupiter Capital Pvt. Ltd., held 99.88% shares in Asianet News Network Pvt. Ltd. (ANNPL). Due to financial losses, ANNPL filed for a reduction in share capital, which was approved by the High Court. The share capital was reduced from 15,35,05,750 shares to 10,000 shares, and the assessee's shareholding was proportionately reduced from 15,33,40,900 shares to 9,988 shares. The face value of the shares remained unchanged at Rs. 10. The assessee claimed a long-term capital loss of Rs. 164,48,55,840/- due to the reduction in share capital. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim, stating that the reduction did not amount to a "transfer" under Section 2(47) of the Income Tax Act, as there was no extinguishment of rights or sale of shares. The CIT(A) upheld the Assessing Officer's decision, but the ITAT allowed the assessee's claim, holding that the reduction in share capital amounted to a transfer under Section 2(47). The High Court affirmed the ITAT's decision. The Supreme Court dismissed the Revenue's appeal, holding that the reduction in share capital amounted to a "transfer" under Section 2(47) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court relied on its earlier decision in Kartikeya v. Sarabhai v. CIT (1997) 7 SCC 524, which held that the extinguishment of rights in a capital asset, even without a sale, constitutes a transfer. The Court emphasized that the reduction in the number of shares held by the assessee resulted in the extinguishment of rights in the capital asset, and the assessee was entitled to claim a capital loss. The Court also noted that the face value of the shares remaining unchanged did not negate the fact that the assessee's rights in the shares had been extinguished. Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-4 v. Jupiter Capital, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 41

Section 2(47) - "transfer" - Reduction of Share Capital - Capital Loss - Legal Principles - The definition of "transfer" includes the extinguishment of any rights in a capital asset, even if there is no sale or exchange. A reduction in share capital, resulting in the extinguishment of a shareholder's rights, constitutes a transfer under Section 2(47). The assessee is entitled to claim a capital loss when there is a reduction in share capital that results in the extinguishment of rights in the capital asset. The Supreme Court held that the reduction in share capital of the subsidiary company and the consequent reduction in the assessee's shareholding amounted to a transfer under Section 2(47) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The assessee was entitled to claim a capital loss, and the petition filed by the Revenue was dismissed. Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-4 v. Jupiter Capital, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 41

Sections 276CC, 279(2) - Compounding of offences - "First offence" under Guidelines for Compounding of Offences under Direct Tax Laws, 2014 - Interpretation - Assessee filed delayed returns for AY 2011-12 (due 30.09.2011, filed 04.03.2013) and AY 2013-14 (due 31.10.2013, filed 29.11.2014), leading to prosecution proposals under Section 276CC - Compounding application for AY 2011-12 accepted on 11.11.2014 post show-cause notice dated 27.10.2014 - For AY 2013-14, show-cause notice issued 12.03.2015; compounding rejected on ground it was not "first offence" due to prior compounding – High Court upheld rejection – Held, Offence u/s 276CC committed on day immediately following due date for filing return (01.10.2011 for AY 2011-12; 01.11.2013 for AY 2013-14), relying on Prakash Nath Khanna v. CIT, (2004) 9 SCC 686 - Subsequent belated filing does not erase commission of offence - "First offence" u/para 8.1 of 2014 Guidelines (superseding 2008 Guidelines) means offence committed prior to issuance of show-cause notice or intimation of prosecution, whichever earlier - Both offences here preceded respective show-cause notices - Prior compounding for AY 2011-12 immaterial as each offence assessed independently against "first offence" criteria - Rejection of compounding for AY 2013-14 set aside; assessee directed to file fresh application within 2 weeks - If accepted, trial proceedings abate - Appeal allowed. (Para 35, 41, 44, 69, 70) Vinubhai Mohanlal Dobaria v. Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 173 : 2025 INSC 155

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

Section 2(oo)(bb) - The 73-year-old petitioner, a former employee, filed a Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution challenging a labour dispute denial of reinstatement. Appearing in person due to financial constraints, he struggled with English submissions. The Court appointed Advocate Sanchar Anand as Amicus Curiae, who rendered pro bono assistance over 14 hearings spanning two years, facilitating a negotiated settlement. The respondents (employer) agreed to a lump-sum payment in lieu of reinstatement under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, initially offering Rs.10 lakhs, revised to Rs.15 lakhs, and finally settled at Rs.20 lakhs. Issue(s): 1. Whether a lump-sum compensation of Rs.20 lakhs in lieu of reinstatement is just and equitable for an aged workman who waives claims on merits, per Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 2. The ethical duty of advocates, particularly young members of the Bar, to provide voluntary legal aid to indigent litigants to ensure access to justice, and to dispel the misconception that the Supreme Court is accessible only to the wealthy. Held, the Court directed the respondent-employer to pay Rs.20,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty Lakhs) via Demand Draft within three weeks as full and final settlement of all claims, extinguishing the petitioner's rights to reinstatement or further relief. This was deemed just, equitable, and proportionate given the petitioner's advanced age (73 years), long pendency, waiver of merits-based claims, mutual consent, and the employer's voluntary enhancement of the offer. No costs were awarded. As appreciation for the Amicus Curiae's selfless service, the Court directed an additional Rs.1,00,000/- to be paid to him by the respondents (Paras 9-11, 15) Shankar Lal Sharma v. Rajesh Koolwal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 199 : 2025 INSC 200

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016

Sections 14, 238 - Moratorium under Section 14 of IBC does not bar property attachments under the Maharashtra Protection of Interest of Depositors (in Financial Establishments) Act, 1999 (MPID Act). The MPID Act, enacted under the State List, enables recovery for victims of financial fraud through asset attachment, and such vesting with the State Competent Authority is unaffected by the IBC moratorium. No inconsistency exists between the IBC and MPID Act, negating claims of repugnancy under Article 254 of the Constitution. Arising from the 2013 NSEL scam involving ₹5,600 crore in defaults, the case involved a challenge to property attachments under the MPID Act during an IBC moratorium. The Court, exercising its powers under Article 142, upheld the actions of a Supreme Court appointed Committee in executing decrees and distributing proceeds from attached properties to ensure equitable distribution to depositors, despite the IBC moratorium. Section 238 of the IBC was held inapplicable due to the absence of conflict between the two statutes. (Paras 48, 51, 52) National Spot Exchange Ltd. v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 577 : 2025 INSC 694

Section 61(2) - The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) lacks jurisdiction to condone delays in filing appeals beyond the 45-day limit (30 days + 15 days condonable) prescribed under Section 61(2) of the IBC. The limitation period commences from the date of order pronouncement, rejecting the respondent's contention that it began later due to disclosure to the stock exchange. The appeal, filed on 24.05.2022, was time-barred as it exceeded the 45-day limit ending on 22.05.2022, with no relief under Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963, as the initial 30-day period ended on a working day (07.05.2022). NCLAT cannot condone delays beyond 15 days, even on equitable grounds, to uphold the IBC's time-bound appellate framework. The appeal was allowed, reinforcing the strict limitation regime under the IBC. [Relied on: Kalpraj Dharamshi v. Kotak Investment Advisors Ltd., (2021) 10 SCC 401 (Paras 10-13) Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 542

Sections 30(2) and 33(1) - the Supreme Court set aside the approval of JSW Steel Ltd.'s resolution plan for the corporate debtor, Bhushan Power & Steel Ltd. (BPSL), holding it illegal, non-compliant with Section 30(2) IBC, and vitiated by the Resolution Professional's (RP) dereliction of statutory duties and the Committee of Creditors' (CoC) failure to exercise commercial wisdom. The Court ordered immediate liquidation of BPSL under Section 33(1) IBC, invoking Article 142 of the Constitution to prevent further abuse of process. Kalyani Transco v. Bhushan Steel and Power Ltd, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 524 : 2025 INSC 622

Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) initiated against BPSL in 2017 at the behest of Punjab National Bank. JSW's ₹19,700 crore plan—allocating ₹19,350 crore to financial creditors and ₹350 crore to operational creditors (against admitted claims of ₹733 crore)—was approved by CoC, National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) on September 5, 2019, and National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) on February 17, 2022. However, JSW wilfully delayed implementation for two years post-approval, made misrepresentations to CoC, and contravened plan terms, frustrating IBC objectives. Appeals allowed from operational creditors. Kalyani Transco v. Bhushan Steel and Power Ltd, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 524 : 2025 INSC 622

Issues - 1. Whether the RP discharged statutory duties under IBC and CIRP Regulations during BPSL's CIRP. 2. Whether CoC exercised commercial wisdom in approving JSW's non-compliant plan, and protected creditor interests. 3. Whether JSW's post-approval non-compliance and misrepresentations rendered the plan void. 4. Validity of NCLT/NCLAT approvals under Sections 30(2) and 31(2) IBC. Held: 1. RP's Failure: The RP utterly failed in statutory duties, warranting condemnation for enabling flawed CIRP. 2. CoC's Lapse: CoC abdicated commercial wisdom by approving a plan in "flagrant violation" of mandatory IBC provisions and CIRP Regulations; contradictory stances before Court and acceptance of JSW payments without demur undermined creditor protection. 3. JSW's Conduct: JSW's wilful non-compliance for two years, absent legal impediments, and misrepresentations to secure the bid constituted abuse of process; such delays frustrated IBC's revival objective, vitiating proceedings. 4. Plan's Invalidity: JSW's plan non-conformant with Section 30(2) IBC (e.g., inadequate creditor distributions); NCLT erred in not rejecting it under Section 31(2); NCLAT's judgment perverse and coram non judice. NCLT/NCLAT orders quashed; JSW's plan rejected; liquidation of BPSL directed forthwith. JSW's payments to creditors and equity infusions recoverable per CoC's undertaking (to refund within two months if appeals succeed, as recorded on March 6, 2020). State's appeal (Odisha) on dues dismissed without adjudication. Kalyani Transco v. Bhushan Steel and Power Ltd, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 524 : 2025 INSC 622

Sections 31, 32A, 60, 61 – Companies Act, 2013 – Sections 408, 410 – Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) – Provisional attachment of assets – Jurisdiction of NCLT/NCLAT – Judicial review under public law – Interference with statutory authorities – Held, the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), being creatures of the Companies Act, 2013, and exercising circumscribed jurisdiction under the IBC, lack the power to review or interfere with actions of statutory authorities like the Enforcement Directorate (ED) under the PMLA, which operates in the realm of public law. Such interference, including staying provisional attachment orders post-approval of a resolution plan under Section 32A IBC or declaring investigations abated, exceeds their statutory mandate and renders findings coram non judice. The phrase "arising out of or in relation to the insolvency resolution" in Section 60(5)(c) IBC does not encompass judicial review of public law decisions by government or statutory bodies. [Referred: Embassy Property Developments Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2020) 13 SCC 308, Para 27, 30] Kalyani Transco v. Bhushan Steel and Power Ltd, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 524 : 2025 INSC 622

Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) – Resolution Plan – Approval – Timelines – Avoidance Transactions – Commercial Wisdom of CoC – Delay Tactics – Sections 12, 29A, 30(2); Regulations 38, 39(4) IBBI (IRPCP) 2016 – Held, Resolution Plan of JSW Steel for BPSL set aside as illegal and contrary to IBC; mandatory 270-day limit (pre-2019 amendment) violated; RP failed to file avoidance applications, certify eligibility/compliance; CoC exercised no commercial wisdom, took contradictory stands; JSW adopted mala fide delays misusing judicial process; NCLT erred in post-expiry approval; fresh compliance mandated. Kalyani Transco v. Bhushan Steel and Power Ltd, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 524 : 2025 INSC 622

CIRP initiated against BPSL (one of RBI's "dirty dozen") on 26.07.2017 by Punjab National Bank - JSW Steel's plan (total ₹19,700 crore: ₹19,350 crore to financial creditors; ₹350 crore to operational creditors vs. ₹733 crore claims) approved by CoC via e-voting (15-16.10.2018); filed with NCLT on 14.02.2019 - NCLT approved on 05.09.2019 with conditions; NCLAT modified/approved on 17.02.2020. Appeals by ex-promoters/creditors (e.g., Sanjay Singhal, Kalyani Transco) challenging procedural lapses/delays. Held, 1. Timelines under S.12 IBC (pre-2019 amendment): Mandatory 180+90=270 days from admission (max. 330 including litigation); RP filed Section 31 application after 1.5 years without extension under Section 12(2) or Regulation 39(4) (15-day pre-maximum filing); Arcelormittal India Private Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta and Others, (2019) 2 SCC 1 and ESSAR Steel India Ltd. Committee of Creditors v. Satish Kumar Gupta, (2020) 8 SCC 531 followed – Held, plan ex facie invalid; NCLT gravely erred in entertaining / approving post-expiry. 2. Avoidance Transactions (Ch. III IBC): RP statutorily obligated to file applications for preferential / undervalued / extortionate / fraudulent pre-CIRP transactions, especially for "dirty dozen" debtor – Held, RP's failure vitiates process. 3. RP's Other Non-Compliances: No certification of JSW's Section 29A eligibility; unverified Section 30(2) compliance (lawful, priority to operational creditors); Regulation 38(1) violated by prioritizing financial over operational creditors (pre-2019) – Held, RP abdicated duties. 4. CoC's Commercial Wisdom: Must ensure time-bound revival, asset maximization, statutory compliance (Sections 12, 29A, 30(2); Regulation 38 feasibility / viability); not mere rhetoric – Held, CoC approved non-feasible / non-compliant plan; contradictory affidavits (criticized JSW delays, then accepted ₹19,350 crore belatedly) indicate collusion / lack of bona fides, vitiating wisdom. 5. JSW's Delay Tactics: Challenged NCLT conditions via NCLAT appeal; post-NCLAT, delayed 2+ years citing appeal pendency (no stay granted); filed interim applications to prolong – State Bank of India and Others v. Consortium of Murari Lal Jalan and Florian Fritsch and Another, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 866 followed – Held, mala fide misuse of process; cannot ratify violations or grant leeway for non-implementation; dishonest intent in securing high score via misrepresentation, then stalling amid steel price rise. NCLAT/NCLT orders set aside; JSW plan illegal; process vitiated ab initio. CoC/RP faulted for non-discharge of duties; undue creditor prejudice from delays. (No explicit remand specified; implies re-initiation / fresh compliance.) Reinforces strict timelines, RP/CoC accountability, and zero tolerance for procedural abuse / delays in IBC; prioritizes creditor interests over tactical litigation. (Para 43, 53, 57, 64, 71, 72, 73, 77, 78, 82) Kalyani Transco v. Bhushan Steel and Power Ltd, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 524 : 2025 INSC 622

Sections 8 and 9 - Service of demand notice under Section 8 on Key Managerial Personnel (KMP) of corporate debtor at its registered office - Validity of – Held, Delivery of demand notice under Section 8 to KMP of corporate debtor, in their official capacity at registered office, constitutes substantial compliance with statutory requirement and amounts to deemed service, thereby validly triggering insolvency resolution process under Section 9. (Para 14) Visa Coke v. Mesco Kalinga Steel, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 505 : 2025 INSC 597

Sections 8 and 9 - Purpose of notice - to afford opportunity to corporate debtor to repay operational debt or raise genuine dispute - is fulfilled where notice explicitly demands payment from corporate debtor and no prejudice is demonstrated by debtor due to mode of service. Substantive rights of operational creditor ought not to be defeated on mere technicalities. NCLT/NCLAT orders rejecting Section 9 petition on ground of non-service directly on corporate debtor set aside; matter remanded to NCLT for adjudication on merits. (Para 14) Visa Coke v. Mesco Kalinga Steel, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 505 : 2025 INSC 597

Sections 8 and 9 - Operational creditor (Visa Coke Limited) supplied coke to corporate debtor (Mesco Kalinga Steel Limited) and issued demand notice dated 31.03.2021 under Section 8 IBC to debtor's KMP at registered office, claiming unpaid operational debt. Debtor neither repaid nor disputed debt within 10 days. Operational creditor filed Section 9 petition before NCLT, which dismissed it holding notice invalid as not addressed directly to corporate debtor. NCLAT upheld dismissal. During pendency, debtor sought settlement (unfruitful) but showed no prejudice from service on KMP. Operational creditor appealed to Supreme Court. Held, Section 8 mandates delivery of demand notice to "corporate debtor" but does not prescribe mode; service on KMP at registered office, addressed in official capacity and demanding payment from debtor, achieves statutory object without procedural irregularity causing prejudice. Notice deemed served on corporate debtor. Technical rejection of Section 9 petition unsustainable; appeal allowed. (Paras 14-18) Visa Coke v. Mesco Kalinga Steel, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 505 : 2025 INSC 597

An arbitral award for claims not included in an approved IBC resolution plan is unenforceable, as such claims are extinguished upon approval under Section 31 of IBC. The Court allowed Electrosteel Steels Ltd.'s appeal against the enforcement of an Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council (MSEFC) arbitral award, ruling it non-executable due to the approved resolution plan settling operational creditors' claims at nil. The Court clarified that objections to an award's execution under Section 47 CPC are permissible if the award is a nullity, independent of a challenge under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, and that the MSEFC lacked jurisdiction to pass the award post-approval. (Para 50 - 52) Electrosteel Steel v. Ispat Carrier, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 491 : 2025 INSC 525

Companies Act, 2013; Section 212 and 447 - Punishment for Fraud - Investigation into affairs of company by Serious Fraud Investigation Office - Bail, including anticipatory bail, cannot be granted for an offence under Section 447 of the Act 2013 unless twin conditions are satisfied. Section 212 (6) of the Companies Act states that the offences covered under Section 447 are cognisable in nature and no person can be released on bail unless he satisfies the twin conditions, that are: (1) that a Public Prosecutor should be given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release; (2) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person is not guilty and is unlikely to commit any offence while on bail. Cryptic orders granting bail without adverting to the facts or the consideration of such restrictive conditions are perverse and liable to be set aside. (Relied: Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC 1; Union of India v. Kanhaiya Prasad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 201; Para 23 – 25)) Serious Fraud Investigation Office v. Aditya Sarda, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 414 : 2025 INSC 477

Companies Act, 2013; Section 212 (6) and 447 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 82, 204 and 438 –Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO) investigated Adarsh Group for illegal loans worth Rs. 1700 crores, alleging fraud and siphoning of funds. Special Court issued bailable and non-bailable warrants and initiated proclamation proceedings against accused for non-compliance. High Court granted anticipatory bail, ignoring mandatory bail conditions under Section 212(6) and 2 accused's absconding conduct. High Court orders set aside as perverse for disregarding legal provisions and Special Court proceedings. Accused directed to surrender. (Para 23 - 30) Serious Fraud Investigation Office v. Aditya Sarda, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 414 : 2025 INSC 477

Section 61 - National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) Rules; 2016 - Rule 22 - The incident which triggers the running of the limitation period under the IBC is the date of pronouncement of the Order and in case of non-pronouncement of the Order when the hearing concludes, the date on which the Order is pronounced or uploaded on the website. Where the judgment was pronounced in open Court, the period of limitation starts running from that very day. However, the party is entitled to exclude the period, as per Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act 1963, during which the certified copy of the order was under preparation on an application filed by that party. When a party does not apply for certified copy, the period of limitation would start from the very next day of pronouncement of the order as the date of the pronouncement of order is excluded as per Section 61. Exemption from filing of certified copy cannot be claimed as a matter of right in terms of the statutory requirements of the Rules. The benefit of Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act is available only on an application for grant of certified copy of the Order having been filed till the date of preparation of the said certified copy. Since no such steps have been taken by the appellant for applying the certified copy, the appeal was beyond limitation. (Para 24 - 27) A. Rajendra v. Gonuganta Madhusudhan Rao, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 392 : 2025 INSC 447

Avoidance Transactions vs. Fraudulent / Wrongful Trading – Distinction Clarified - The Supreme Court elucidated the distinction between avoidance transactions under Chapter III and fraudulent or wrongful trading under Chapter VI of the IBC, 2016. Avoidance transactions, including preferential, undervalued, extortionate credit, and fraudulent transactions, are dealt with under Section 25(2)(j) and can be set aside by the Adjudicating Authority under Sections 44, 48, 49, and 51, focusing on ascertainable properties and persons involved. In contrast, fraudulent or wrongful trading under Section 66 requires a deeper inquiry into the intent behind the corporate debtor's business activities, with the Adjudicating Authority empowered to order contributions to the debtor's assets by individuals knowingly engaged in such activities. The Court emphasized that Section 66 applications are excluded from Section 25(2), operating in distinct situations, and the filing of avoidance applications under Section 26 does not affect insolvency proceedings. (Para 61) Piramal Capital and Housing Finance Ltd. v. 63 Moons Technologies, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 374 : 2025 INSC 421

Resolution Plan Approval – Commercial Wisdom of Committee of Creditors (CoC) Upheld - The Supreme Court upheld Piramal Capital and Housing Finance Ltd.'s resolution plan for Dewan Housing Finance Corporation Ltd. (DHFL), setting aside the NCLAT's January 2022 order that directed reconsideration of the plan's valuation of ₹45,000 crore in avoidance transactions at a nominal ₹1. The Court affirmed the commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors (CoC), which approved the plan with 93.65% votes, emphasizing that NCLAT overstepped its jurisdiction by modifying the plan. Recoveries from avoidance transactions under Sections 43, 45, and 50 were allocated to the CoC, while proceeds from fraudulent trading under Section 66 were assigned to Piramal. Appeals by fixed deposit holders, non-convertible debenture holders (including 63 Moons Technologies), and former promoter Kapil Wadhawan, challenging the distribution mechanism and valuation, were dismissed, as the plan complied with RBI and NHB regulations. The NCLT was directed to decide pending avoidance applications afresh. (Para 102) Piramal Capital and Housing Finance Ltd. v. 63 Moons Technologies, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 374 : 2025 INSC 421

Section 31 - Contempt of Court - JSW Steel Ltd., successful resolution applicant (SRA) for a corporate debtor under IBC, faced demand notices from Chhattisgarh tax authorities for pre-resolution plan dues (GST and other taxes) despite NCLT approval of the plan under Section 31. Authorities had not filed claims during resolution process and were aware of binding precedent in Ghanshyam Mishra and Sons (P) Ltd. v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd., (2021) 9 SCC 657 (covering JSW's case). JSW filed contempt petition alleging willful disobedience. Whether issuance of demand notices for extinguished pre-plan statutory claims post-NCLT approval amounts to contempt, and whether authorities entitled to benefit of doubt despite non-participation in NCLT proceedings. Held; Reaffirming Ghanshyam Mishra, all stakeholder claims (including statutory dues to Central/State governments or local authorities) not part of approved resolution plan stand extinguished from approval date; no proceedings can continue or initiate thereon. Echoing Essar Steel, (2020) 8 SCC 531 SRA cannot face "undecided" post-approval claims, as all must be submitted to RP/CoC for finality. Demands were "totally contemptuous" as authorities proceeded despite notice of binding precedent; non-participation in NCLT does not exempt binding effect of approved plan. However, accepting unconditional apology and good faith contention (first post-Ghanshyam Mishra enforcement case), no punishment imposed; benefit of doubt extended. Demand notices and recovery proceedings quashed; petition disposed. (Para 17, 22, 27) Jsw Steel v. Pratishtha Thakur Haritwal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 361 : 2025 INSC 401

Section 31(1) – Effect of Resolution Plan Approval - Post-Resolution Income Tax Demand - Held, once a Resolution Plan is approved by the Adjudicating Authority, all claims not included therein, including statutory dues owed to the Central Government, stand extinguished. (Para 8) Vaibhav Goel v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 330 : 2025 INSC 375

Section 14 & 17 - Where the cause of action for an offence under Section 138 NI Act arises after the imposition of a moratorium under Section 14 IBC, proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act cannot be initiated against the Director of the Corporate Debtor. Upon the imposition of a moratorium and the appointment of an Interim Resolution Professional (IRP) under Section 17 of the IBC, the management of the Corporate Debtor vests in the IRP, and the powers of the Board of Directors are suspended. Consequently, the Director lacks the capacity to fulfil the demand raised by a notice under Section 138 NI Act. The judgment in P. Mohan Raj v. M/s Shah Brothers Ispat Pvt. Ltd. (2021) 6 SCC 258 is distinguishable, as in that case, the cause of action under Section 138 NI Act arose before the imposition of the moratorium. Proceedings under section 138 of the NI Act are quashed, when the cause of action arises after the imposition of moratorium, and the director of the company has been suspended from his duties, and the IRP has taken over the management of the company. (Para 11 - 13) Vishnoo Mittal v. Shakti Trading Company, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 314 : 2025 INSC 346

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 61(2) - Condonation of Delay - Limitation - Hyper-technical Approach - Foreign Company – Held, while timelines under the IBC are crucial, a hyper-technical approach by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) can lead to undue delays, defeating the purpose of the Code. In a case where an appeal was e-filed within the permissible 15-day condonation period under Section 61(2) of the IBC, but the hard copy was filed after a weekend holiday, the delay adequately explained. The appellant's status as a foreign company, the NCLAT should have exercised discretion and condoned the delay. The Court set aside the NCLAT's order rejecting the condonation of delay and directed the NCLAT to proceed with hearing the appeal on merits. (Para 2, 5 & 6) Power Infrastructure India v. Power Finance Corporation Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 285

Condonation of Delay - National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) - Lengthy Orders - Verbose Submissions - The Supreme Court expressed concern regarding the NCLAT's practice of issuing excessively lengthy orders, particularly in applications for condonation of delay, citing a 17-page order in the present case. The Court acknowledged that while detailed orders may sometimes be necessary, it also pointed to the role of "verbose and unnecessary long submissions of the members of the Bar" in contributing to such lengthy adjudications. The Court observed a trend of lengthy submissions and pleadings from legal practitioners before the NCLAT, even in routine matters like condonation of delay. (Para 4) Power Infrastructure India v. Power Finance Corporation Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 285

Section 96 - Consumer Protection Act, 1986; Section 27 – Penalties imposed by the NCDRC are regulatory and punitive in nature, aimed at ensuring compliance with consumer protection laws, and do not fall within the definition of "debt" under the IBC. The interim moratorium under Section 96 of the IBC applies only to debts and does not extend to regulatory penalties or criminal proceedings. The Court distinguished between civil debt recovery proceedings and regulatory penalties, emphasizing that the latter serve a public interest function and cannot be stayed under the IBC moratorium. The Court rejected the appellant's reliance on precedents related to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, noting that penalties under the Consumer Protection Act are distinct and serve a different purpose. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was directed to comply with the NCDRC's penalty orders. (Para 29, 38, 40) Saranga Anilkumar Aggarwal v. Bhavesh Dhirajlal Sheth, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 284 : 2025 INSC 314

Section 79 (15) - "excluded debts" - Damages awarded by NCDRC for deficiency in service fall under "excluded debts" under Section 79(15) of IBC, thus not covered by moratorium. The definition of "excluded debts" under Section 79(15) of the IBC, which includes fines and statutory penalties, reinforces that such liabilities remain enforceable despite an ongoing insolvency process. (Para 32 & 33) Saranga Anilkumar Aggarwal v. Bhavesh Dhirajlal Sheth, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 284 : 2025 INSC 314

Section 14 and 96 - Distinction between the moratorium applicable to a corporate debtor under Section 14 of the IBC and the interim moratorium applicable to individuals and personal guarantors under Section 96 of the IBC - The former is much broader in scope and stays all proceedings against the corporate debtor, including execution and enforcement actions. However, Section 96 of the IBC is more limited in its scope, staying only "legal actions or proceedings in respect of any debt." Unlike corporate insolvency proceedings, where the goal is a comprehensive resolution of the company's liabilities, individual insolvency proceedings are designed primarily for restructuring personal debts and providing relief to the debtor. The legislative intent behind limiting the scope of the interim moratorium under Section 96 of the IBC must be respected, and a blanket stay on all regulatory penalties would result in defeating the objectives of consumer protection laws. (Para 30) Saranga Anilkumar Aggarwal v. Bhavesh Dhirajlal Sheth, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 284 : 2025 INSC 314

Section 95 and 96 - Whether the execution of penalty orders imposed by the NCDRC can be stayed during an interim moratorium under IBC. The appellant, a real estate developer, faced multiple penalties (27 in total) imposed by the NCDRC for failing to deliver possession of residential units to homebuyers within the agreed timeline. The appellant sought a stay on the penalty proceedings, citing an interim moratorium triggered under Section 96 of the IBC due to insolvency proceedings initiated against them under Section 95 of the IBC. The NCDRC rejected the application, holding that consumer claims and penalties do not fall within the moratorium under the IBC. Held, regulatory penalties imposed under the Consumer Protection Act for non-compliance with consumer rights do not fall 2 within the scope of the interim moratorium under Section 96 of the IBC. The decision reinforces the distinction between debt recovery proceedings and regulatory actions, ensuring that consumer protection mechanisms remain effective even during insolvency proceedings. (Para 37) Saranga Anilkumar Aggarwal v. Bhavesh Dhirajlal Sheth, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 284 : 2025 INSC 314

Interference with IBC Proceedings via Writ Jurisdiction – Whether the High Court, under Article 226, can halt insolvency proceedings against a personal guarantor at the preliminary stage by determining waiver of liability, bypassing the statutory mechanism under the IBC. Held, the appointment of a Resolution Professional under Section 97 of the IBC to examine and report on the debt (under Section 99) is a mandatory preliminary step. The Adjudicating Authority is not required to ascertain the existence of debt before this stage. The High Court's exercise of writ jurisdiction was erroneous as it: (i) disrupted the statutory process under the IBC, and (ii) prematurely adjudicated the existence of debt, a mixed question of law and fact within the Adjudicating Authority's jurisdiction under Section 100 of the IBC. While High Courts possess judicial review powers, they should not act as the decision-making authority in place of statutory tribunals tasked with adjudicating specific legal and factual issues. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, which had barred insolvency proceedings against a personal guarantor by holding that the guarantor's liability was waived, as it interfered with the IBC's statutory framework. The appellant's application before the Adjudicating Authority was restored, with directions for expeditious disposal, considering the matter's pendency since 2021. [Relied on: Dilip B. Jiwrajka v. Union of India, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 1010 and Mohammed Enterprises (Tanzania) Ltd v. Farooq Ali Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 19; Para 9, 11, 12] Bank of Baroda v. Farooq Ali Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 234 : 2025 INSC 253 : AIR 2025 SC 1591

Section 31(4) proviso - Approval of the resolution plan - A resolution plan under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, containing a proposed combination (a merger or amalgamation of entities), should only be placed before the Committee of Creditors (CoC), after it has been approved by the Competition Commission of India (CCI). Independent Sugar Corporation v. Girish Sriram Juneja, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 126

Section 31(4) proviso - The appeal arose from the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) of Hindustan National Glass and Industries Ltd. (HNGIL), a major player in the glass packaging industry. AGI Greenpac Ltd., the successful resolution applicant, proposed a combination with HNGIL, which would result in a significant market share in the glass packaging industry, raising concerns of an Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition (AAEC). The appellant, Independent Sugar Corporation Ltd. (INSCO), challenged the approval of AGI Greenpac's resolution plan, arguing that the CCI's approval was not obtained prior to the CoC's approval, as required under the proviso to Section 31(4) of the IBC. The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) held that while CCI approval is mandatory, the requirement to obtain it prior to CoC approval is directory, not mandatory. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the proviso to Section 31(4) of the IBC is mandatory, and CCI approval must be obtained before the CoC approves a resolution plan containing a combination. The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to statutory timelines and procedural requirements to ensure the integrity of the insolvency resolution process and competition law. The Court underscored the importance of maintaining a balance between the objectives of the IBC and the Competition Act, ensuring that the resolution process does not distort market dynamics. The Court highlighted that conditional approvals, such as the divestment of assets, must be rigorously monitored to prevent anti-competitive practices. The Court reiterated that procedural safeguards are non-negotiable and must be strictly followed to ensure fairness and transparency in the regulatory process. Independent Sugar Corporation v. Girish Sriram Juneja, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 126

Section 31(4) proviso - Mandatory Nature of CCI Approval - Literal Interpretation - Whether the approval of the Competition Commission of India (CCI) for a proposed combination must be obtained prior to the approval of a resolution plan by the Committee of Creditors (CoC) under Section 31(4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), 2016. Whether the proviso to Section 31(4) of the IBC, which mandates CCI approval before CoC approval, is mandatory or directory. Held, the proviso to Section 31(4) of the IBC is mandatory, requiring CCI approval for combinations before the CoC approves the resolution plan. The legislative intent was to ensure that combinations do not adversely affect competition, and thus, prior CCI approval is essential. The Court rejected the purposive interpretation argued by AGI Greenpac and upheld a literal interpretation of the proviso, stating that the language is clear and unambiguous. The Court noted that the proviso creates an exception for combinations, requiring stricter compliance. Independent Sugar Corporation v. Girish Sriram Juneja, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 126

Section 31(4) proviso - Procedural Lapses - Consequences of Non-Compliance - Whether procedural lapses in the CCI's approval process, including the failure to issue a show cause notice to the target company, vitiate the approval of the combination. The Court found that the CCI's failure to issue a show cause notice to the target company (HNGIL) was a procedural lapse. However, it did not vitiate the CCI's approval, as the Resolution Professional (RP) did not object to the process. The Court set aside the approval of AGI Greenpac's resolution plan, as it was approved by the CoC without the requisite CCI approval. The Court directed the CoC to reconsider INSCO's resolution plan and any other plans that had obtained CCI approval as of the date of the CoC's original approval. Independent Sugar Corporation v. Girish Sriram Juneja, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 126

Jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 in Insolvency Matters - Held, the High Court should not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to interfere with Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), 2016, especially when statutory remedies are available. The IBC is a complete code with its own checks, balances, and appellate mechanisms. Mohammed Enterprises v. Farooq Ali Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 19

Article 226 - Delay and Laches - Natural Justice in CIRP - The Court emphasized that the respondent's delay of nearly three years in approaching the High Court, despite being aware of the proceedings, was fatal to their case. The initiation of parallel proceedings under the IBC further undermined the justification for invoking writ jurisdiction. The High Court had set aside the resolution plan on the ground of violation of natural justice due to inadequate notice (less than 24 hours) for a Committee of Creditors (CoC) meeting. The Supreme Court, however, found that the delay in approaching the High Court and the availability of alternative remedies under the IBC rendered the writ petition untenable. Mohammed Enterprises v. Farooq Ali Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 19

Finality of CIRP Proceedings - The Supreme Court reiterated the importance of timely conclusion of CIRP proceedings, as delays undermine the objectives of the IBC. The Court set aside the High Court's order and directed the Adjudicating Authority to resume the proceedings from the stage they were interdicted and conclude them expeditiously. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the resolution plan approved by the CoC. The Adjudicating Authority was directed to expedite the completion of the CIRP proceedings. Mohammed Enterprises v. Farooq Ali Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 19

Insurance

Insurance claim cannot be denied for breach of impossible condition. An insurance company cannot reject a claim on the grounds of breach of a condition in the contract that was impossible to fulfill. (Para 18 & 20) Sohom Shipping v. New India Assurance, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 403 : 2025 INSC 453

Life Insurance - Repudiation of Claim - Non-Disclosure of Material Facts - Duty of Insured - Uberrima Fides - Whether non-disclosure of existing life insurance policies by the insured justifies repudiation of a claim under a life insurance policy. Held, insurance contracts are founded on the principle of uberrima fides (utmost good faith), obligating the insured to disclose all material facts that could influence a prudent insurer's decision to accept the risk. Non-disclosure of material facts may justify claim repudiation, but materiality is assessed on a case-by-case basis. In this case, the insured disclosed a life insurance policy of Rs. 40 Lakhs but omitted other policies totaling Rs. 2.3 Lakhs. The non-disclosed policies were of negligible value and did not constitute material facts affecting the insurer's decision to issue the policy. The policy in question was a life insurance cover, and the insured's death resulted from an accident unrelated to the non-disclosed policies. Thus, the non-disclosure did not warrant repudiation. The insurer, aware of the insured's ability to pay premiums for a higher-sum policy (Rs. 40 Lakhs), issued the present policy (Rs. 25 Lakhs) with confidence in the insured's financial capacity. The repudiation was unjustified. The Court directed the insurer to release all policy benefits with 9% per annum interest to the appellant. The appeal was allowed, and the orders of the State and National Consumer Commissions were set aside. [Distinguished: Reliance Life Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rekhaben Nareshbhai Rathod, (2019) 6 SCC 175; Para 12, 18, 19] Mahaveer Sharma v. Exide Life Insurance, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : 2025 INSC 268

Insurance Policy - Suppression of Material Facts - Exclusion Clause - Hospital Cash Benefit Policy - Repudiation of Claim - Chronic Alcoholism – Pre-existing Condition – Consumer Disputes Redressal Forums - The Supreme Court allowed an appeal by the Life Insurance Corporation (LIC) against an order of the NCDRC which had upheld the decisions of the State and District Consumer Forums directing LIC to compensate the respondent-claimants under the “Jeevan Arogya” hospital cash benefit policy. The deceased insured, a chronic alcoholic, had suppressed this fact in the proposal form, answering “No” to questions regarding alcohol consumption. Following his hospitalization and death due to complications linked to chronic liver disease and cardiac arrest, LIC repudiated the claim under Clause 7(xi) of the policy, which excludes coverage for conditions arising from alcohol misuse. Held, the lower forums erred in interpreting the policy terms and the exclusion clause, as the deceased's chronic alcoholism was a material fact directly related to his hospitalization and death. Overruling the NCDRC's reliance on Sulbha Prakash Motegaoneker v. LIC, the Court clarified that suppression of a pre-existing condition justifies repudiation if it is linked to the cause of death. The appeal was allowed, the NCDRC order was set aside, and the repudiation upheld. However, considering the respondents' hardships and payments already made (approximately ₹3,00,000), the Court directed that no recovery of these amounts be sought, though no further payments were to be made. (Para 16 – 21) Life Insurance Corporation v. Sunita, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 346

Vehicle Insurance - Insurance Policy Condition - Crane Accident - Insured Premises - Absurd Condition - Substantial Justice - Held, a condition in an insurance policy limiting liability to accidents occurring solely within the insured's premises is absurd, especially for a vehicle like a crane, typically used at construction sites. The appellant had insured a Tata Hitachi Heavy Duty Crane, which was damaged in an accident in 2007 at Tata Steel's powerhouse in Jamshedpur. The insurer rejected the claim, citing the policy condition that the accident occurred outside the insured's premises. Both the Commercial Court and the High Court upheld the rejection. The Supreme Court criticized the parties for overlooking this impractical condition at the time of insuring the crane and noted the insurer's delay in communicating the rejection. To ensure substantial justice, the Court directed the insurer to pay Rs. 40–45 lakh, including taxes, to settle the claim. The appeal was accordingly disposed of. (Para 21, 22, 24) Tarapore and Co v. United India Insurance, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 231

Interpretation of Statues

A statutory provision must be interpreted harmoniously to avoid rendering any part of the statute nugatory. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Century Textiles and Industries Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 34

Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956

Section 12(c) - Adoption and Property Rights - Doctrine of Relation Back - The appellant was adopted by defendant No.1, on 16.07.1994, after the death of her husband. The appellant claimed a half share in the suit schedule properties, arguing that he became the legal heir upon adoption. Held, under Section 12(c) of the Act an adopted child cannot divest any person of any estate that vested before the adoption. The court applied the "Doctrine of Relation Back," which states that adoption by a widow relates back to the date of the death of the adoptive father, creating an immediate coparcenary interest in the joint property. However, lawful alienations made by the widow before the adoption are binding on the adopted child. The court upheld the validity of the sale deed executed by defendant No.1 in favor of defendant Nos.2 and 3, as the alienation was made after defendant No.1 had become the absolute owner of the property. The appellant's challenge to the sale deed was dismissed. The court declared the gift deed executed by defendant No.1 in favor of defendant Nos.4 and 5 as null and void. The court found that the gift deed lacked the necessary prerequisites for a valid gift, such as delivery and acceptance of the property. The trial court's decision to grant the appellant the entire 'B' and 'C' schedule properties as the sole legal heir of defendant No.1 was restored. Sri Mahesh v. Sangram, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 6

Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019

Jammu and Kashmir Grant of Permit for Resettlement in (or Permanent Return) to the State Act, 1982 - Constitutional Validity of – Held, the issue of its constitutionality no longer survives as the Act was never enforced and was repealed by the Act, 2019. The 1982 Act, enacted to permit pre-1954 state subjects who migrated to Pakistan after 1947 to return to Jammu and Kashmir, was stayed by the Supreme Court in 2002 and never came into force. The Act was repealed under Section 95(2) read with Section 96 and Table-3 of the Fifth Schedule of the Act, 2019. An affidavit filed by the erstwhile State of Jammu & Kashmir confirmed that no Competent Authority was notified under the 1982 Act, and thus, no benefits were conferred under it. The challenge to the Act's constitutionality became infructuous due to its repeal. Writ petitions disposed of as the 1982 Act was repealed and never enforced. (Para 15) Jammu & Kashmir National Panthers Party v.. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 594