Construction of Documents

Construction of Documents — Literal Rule vs. Purposive Construction — Supreme Court emphasized that a contract must first be constructed in its plain, ordinary, and literal meaning - If the words are clear, the intention of the parties must be derived directly from the text. Reliance on the ex-post facto conduct of parties (such as the lessor continuing to occupy a portion not demised) is unnecessary and improper when the literal expression is unambiguous – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. R.N. Kapoor, AIR 1959 SC 1262; Paras 15-21] General Secretary, Vivekananda Kendra v. Pradeep Kumar Agarwalla, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 204 : 2026 INSC 199

Constructive Res Judicata

Constructive Res Judicata – Governing Principles - Constructive Res Judicata (Explanation IV to Section 11 CPC) applies not only to issues actually raised and decided but also to all grounds which might and ought to have been raised in the earlier proceedings. Parties cannot escape the bar by pleading negligence, inadvertence, or accident. The doctrine is a deeming fiction founded on public policy to prevent multiplicity of proceedings and to ensure that a litigant is not vexed twice over for the same kind of litigation. It applies equally to civil suits as well as writ petitions under Articles 226 and 32 of the Constitution. The expression “ought” in the phrase “might and ought” implies a higher threshold than mere possibility. It must be examined through the lens of reasonable diligence and the legitimate scope of the earlier litigation. Courts must ascertain whether the omitted ground properly arose from the dispute and whether a reasonably diligent litigant would have raised it. The applicability of constructive res judicata is fact-specific and not uniform. It depends on: The ambit and nature of the earlier proceedings; The nexus between the omitted ground and the controversy involved in those proceedings. A party who fails to raise a ground that might and ought to have been raised does so at their own peril. The requirements of “might” and “ought” operate cumulatively and without exception. Makardhwaj Ram v. Jagdish Rai, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 626 : 2026 INSC 636

Constructive Res Judicata – The dispute related to a 1960 family land transfer of 95.80 acres by Mahabir Rai in favour of his mother and son (appellant Makardhwaj Ram). Subsequent sales made by a power of attorney holder were challenged in two earlier suits, which were dismissed. When mutation proceedings were initiated in respect of the remaining land, the appellant filed a fresh suit for declaration of title and possession. The High Court dismissed the suit as barred by constructive res judicata, holding that the appellant ought to have asserted title based on the 1960 deed in the earlier suits. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's judgment, holding that there was no occasion for the appellant to seek a declaration of title over the larger parcel in the earlier suits, which were limited to challenging specific sale transactions. The ownership flowing from the 1960 deed was not in dispute in those proceedings. Applying constructive res judicata in these facts would cause an unduly harsh and inequitable result. The Court emphasised that in family property disputes, particularly long-pending ones, rigid application of technical rules without regard to surrounding facts and circumstances is inappropriate. Judges must understand the context and apply law equitably. Appeal allowed. High Court judgment set aside. Suit restored. Makardhwaj Ram v. Jagdish Rai, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 626 : 2026 INSC 636

Consumer Law

Consumer Protection – Banking Service – Deficiency in Service – Negligence in Presenting Cheques – Section 2(g) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 / Section 2(11) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 – A bank receiving cheques for collection acts as an agent of the customer and is obligated to exercise due diligence in presenting the instruments within the prescribed validity period - Failure to present cheques before they become stale, without a reasonable explanation, constitutes negligence and a "deficiency in service" - In this case, the Appellant bank failed to re-present cheques on available working days (June 1st and 2nd, 2026) after a bank strike ended, causing the instruments to expire - The Supreme Court upheld the finding of deficiency but modified the quantum of compensation. [Paras 50-69] Canara Bank v. Kavita Chowdhary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 375 : 2026 INSC 363

Consumer Protection – Compensation – Reasonable Quantum – Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 – Compensation under consumer law must be fair, reasonable, and commensurate with the loss or injury. Where the loss is indeterminate because the outcome of potential legal proceedings (e.g., Section 138 NI Act) is "imponderable" compensation should be assessed on the principle of moderation - Supreme Court reduced the NCDRC's award of 10% of the cheque amount to 6% as a "token compensation," noting that the actual loss was difficult to accurately reflect. [Relied on Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta (1994) 1 SCC 243; Chief Administrator, HUDA v. Shakuntla Devi (2017) 2 SCC 301; MSR Leathers v. S. Palaniappan (2013) 1 SCC 177; Ajay Kumar Radheyshyam Goenka v. Tourism Finance Corporation of India Ltd. (2023) 10 SCC 545; Paras 59 - 72] Canara Bank v. Kavita Chowdhary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 375 : 2026 INSC 363

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 — Section 13(7) (corresponding to Section 38(12) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019) — Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order XXII Rules 2 & 4 — Indian Succession Act, 1925 — Section 306 — Medical Negligence — Death of the Doctor/Opposite Party pending proceedings — Survivability of claims against Legal Heirs — The Supreme Court held that upon the death of an alleged medically negligent doctor during the pendency of a consumer dispute (including at the appellate/revisional stage), their legal heirs can be impleaded and brought on record - the continuation of the "right to sue" under Order XXII of the CPC is fundamentally governed by the substantive law enshrined in Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 - When adjudicating claims under the first exception to Section 306 of the 1925 Act, purely personal injury claims (such as damages for pain, suffering, or loss of reputation) lapse and abate with the death of the doctor - Conversely, distinct claims for pecuniary loss or economic damages that affect or are maintainable against the estate of the deceased doctor survive - The Consumer Commissions are duty-bound to first adjudicate the negligence aspect of the deceased doctor before recovering surviving estate-linked claims. [Relied on M. Veerappa Vs. Evelyn Sequeira, (1988) 1 SCC 556; Melepurath Sankunni Ezhuthassan Vs. Thekittil Geopalankutty Nair, (1986) 1 SCC 118; Vinayak Purshottam Dube Vs. Jayashree Padamkar Bhat, (2024) 9 SCC 398; Paras 55-71] Kumud Lall v. Suresh Chandra Roy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 454 : 2026 INSC 443

Consumer Protection – Contract of Insurance – Privity of Contract – Third-Party Claim – Maintainability – Held that a contract of insurance is a personal contract strictly between the insurer and the insured - No third party can raise any claims under such a contract - Financier / Pledgee Claim – Failure to prove nature of agreement and surrender – The appellant/financier claimed that the insured had surrendered the vehicle to him, following which it was stolen from his custody - the appellant failed to produce documents proving the surrender, nor did he provide specific details of the theft (place, date, and time), which cast aspersions on his case - Even assuming the vehicle was surrendered, the financier cannot automatically be considered the owner of the vehicle - the insurance company cannot be compelled to indemnify a third-party financier when it was not a party to the contract/loan agreement between the financier and the insured, and had no notice of the same. [Paras 10-15] K. Prakashchand v. Oriental Insurance, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 634

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 - Section 3 - The mere existence of an arbitration clause in a consumer agreement does not bar or oust the jurisdiction of the Consumer Fora to entertain and adjudicate a consumer complaint on merits. Once a consumer complaint is admitted by the District Forum, it cannot be referred to arbitration, as the statutory remedy provided under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is additional and not in derogation of other remedies. T.K.A. Padmanabhan v. Abhiyan Cooperative Group Housing Society Ltd, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 633 : 2026 INSC 649

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 - Section 12(4) - The Act creates a special adjudicatory mechanism for expeditious resolution of consumer disputes. A private contractual arbitration clause cannot override or defeat this statutory remedy. After admission of the complaint, the District Forum is statutorily restrained under the proviso to Section 12(4) from transferring the matter to any other court, tribunal, or authority, including an arbitral tribunal. The consumer cannot be driven out of the statutory forum merely because of an arbitration agreement. [Relied on: Emaar MGF Land Ltd. v. Aftab Singh, (2019) 12 SCC 751] T.K.A. Padmanabhan v. Abhiyan Cooperative Group Housing Society Ltd, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 633 : 2026 INSC 649

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 - The appellant filed a consumer complaint alleging deficiency in service due to delay in handing over possession of a residential flat. Despite admitting the complaint and issuing notice, the District Forum referred the matter to arbitration solely on the ground of the arbitration clause in the flat purchase agreement. This order was upheld by the State Commission and the NCDRC. The Supreme Court set aside the orders of all three Fora. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and directed the District Forum to decide the consumer complaint on merits expeditiously, preferably within one year. T.K.A. Padmanabhan v. Abhiyan Cooperative Group Housing Society Ltd, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 633 : 2026 INSC 649

Consumer Protection Act, 1986; Section 2(1)(d) and 2(1)(g) — Maintainability of Complaint — Commercial Purpose vs. Banking Service — Summary Proceedings — Fraud and Forgery - Commercial Purpose and Bank Deposits - The Supreme Court held that the mere earning of interest on a Fixed Deposit Receipt (FDR) does not automatically categorize the banking service as being for a "commercial purpose." - Parking surplus funds for safe custody or statutory compliance is not reflective of a commercial intent - if a deposit is made specifically to leverage credit facilities for business augmentation, it would have a direct nexus with profit-generating activity and thus fall under "commercial purpose." Sant Rohidas Leather Industries v. Vijaya Bank, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 267 : 2026 INSC 264

Consumer Protection Act, 1986; Section 2(1)(d) - Statutory Interpretation - Definition of "Consumer" - Commercial Purpose - Onus of Proof - The Supreme Court set aside the NCDRC's dismissal of a consumer complaint, holding that the mere act of leasing out a residential flat does not, by itself, classify the purchase as being for a "commercial purpose" – Noted that the onus of proving that a complainant falls within the exclusion clause of Section 2(1)(d) (i.e., that the goods or services were obtained for a commercial purpose) rests squarely upon the service provider and not the complainant - This burden must be discharged based on a "preponderance of probabilities". Vinit Bahri v. Mgf Developers Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 117 : 2026 INSC 114

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 - Dominant Purpose Test - To exclude a person from the definition of a 'consumer', it must be proved that the dominant intention or purpose behind the purchase was to facilitate profit generation through commercial activity, showing a close and direct nexus between the transaction and such profit-generating activity - The mere purchase of immovable property, or even multiple units, does not ipso facto attract the exclusion clause unless a commercial dominant purpose is established – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust vs. Unique Shanti Developers and Others (2020) 2 SCC 265; Shriram Chits (India) Private Limited vs. Raghachand Associates (2024) 9 SCC 509; Laxmi Engineering Works vs. P.S.G. Industrial Institute (1995) 3 SCC 583; Paras 11-17] Vinit Bahri v. Mgf Developers Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 117 : 2026 INSC 114

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – Section 14 – Award of Interest beyond Contractual Terms – Supreme Court rejected the appellant's contention that compensation should be restricted to the nominal rate (Rs. 10/- per sq. ft.) specified in Clause 10(c) of the Flat Buyer Agreement - It held that where a clause is found to be unfair, one-sided, or oppressive especially when compared to the high interest (24% p.a.) charged to consumers for defaults—consumer fora are not bound to mechanically enforce it and may award higher interest to prevent manifest injustice. [Paras 15 - 18] Parsvnath Developers Ltd. v. Mohit Khirbat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 178 : 2026 INSC 170 : AIR 2026 SC 1101

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – Sections 13 and 22 – Procedure and Evidence – Applicability of Indian Evidence Act – Held that the Indian Evidence Act (now Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam) is not strictly applicable to Consumer Forums, the Principles of Natural Justice must be followed - If a party seeks to cross-examine a witness or expert whose affidavit is on record, the Commission should evolve a procedure to permit such cross-examination—via written questions, video conferencing, or a court-appointed Commission to ensure fair play. ITC Limited v. Aashna Roy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 129 : 2026 INSC 135 : AIR 2026 SC 860

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – Sections 2(1)(g), 2(1)(o), 2(1)(r), and 14 – Housing Construction and Delay in Possession – Held that housing construction falls within the ambit of "service" under Section 2(1)(o), and failure to deliver possession within the stipulated period constitutes "deficiency" under Section 2(1)(g) - held that the jurisdiction of consumer fora is statutory and not merely contractual; therefore, one-sided or oppressive contractual terms cannot curtail the power of the NCDRC to award just and reasonable compensation. [Paras 10 - 18] Parsvnath Developers Ltd. v. Mohit Khirbat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 178 : 2026 INSC 170 : AIR 2026 SC 1101

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 - Summary Jurisdiction and Complex Facts – Noted that proceedings before Consumer Fora are summary in nature and not intended to adjudicate complex factual disputes involving criminal or tortious acts like fraud, cheating, or forgery - Where a Bank sets up a subsequent contract of pledge against an FDR which the complainant alleges is fraudulent or based on forged documents such a dispute must be addressed in a regular civil or criminal proceeding rather than under the 1986 Act - The burden to prove that services were availed for a "commercial purpose" lies on the respondent (Bank), whereas the burden to prove "deficiency in service" lies on the complainant. [Relied on Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust vs. Unique Shanti Developers and Others (2020) 2 SCC 265; Chairman and Managing Director, City Union Bank Limited and Another v. R. Chandramohan (2023) 7 SCC 775; Paras 21-31] Sant Rohidas Leather Industries v. Vijaya Bank, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 267 : 2026 INSC 264

Consumer Protection Act, 2019 – Section 71 – Execution of Orders – Liability of Directors/Promoters – The Supreme Court held that an order passed by a Consumer Forum against a company (Corporate Debtor) cannot be executed against its Directors or Promoters if they were not parties to the original complaint and no specific findings of liability were recorded against them - Noted that execution must strictly conform to the decree and cannot be used to enlarge liability to bind persons who were not parties to the adjudication. Ansal Crown Heights Flat Buyers Association v. Ansal Crown Infrabuild Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 40 : 2026 INSC 51

Consumer Protection – Deficiency in Service – Quantum of Compensation – Evidence and Proof – Challenge to the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) order awarding ₹2,00,00,000/- compensation for a faulty haircut – Held that while the finding of deficiency in service was upheld in the first round of litigation, the quantum of compensation must be based on "material evidence and not on the mere asking" - Compensation to the tune of crores cannot be awarded based on unauthenticated photocopies of documents, especially when their authenticity is denied by the opposite party. ITC Limited v. Aashna Roy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 129 : 2026 INSC 135 : AIR 2026 SC 860

Admissibility of Documents – Mode of Proof – Distinction between an objection to the "admissibility" of a document and its "mode of proof" - A prompt objection to the mode of proof (e.g., producing photocopies instead of originals) is necessary to allow the party tendering the evidence an opportunity to cure the defect – Noted that in this case, the appellant categorically denied the photocopies and filed applications for the production of originals and cross-examination, which the Commission failed to address - The Supreme Court found the award of ₹2,00,00,000/- unjustified as the respondent failed to establish actual financial loss or a causal link between the haircut and lost career opportunities - The appeal was partially allowed, restricting the compensation to the ₹25,00,000/- already released to the respondent. [Relied on Malay Kumar Ganguly v. Dr. Sukumar Mukherjee and others (2009) 9 SCC 221; Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple and another (2003) 8 SCC 75; Dr. J.J. Merchant and others v. Shrinath Chaturvedi (2002) 6 SCC 635; Paras 17-22] ITC Limited v. Aashna Roy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 129 : 2026 INSC 135 : AIR 2026 SC 860

Consumer Protection – Insurance Claim – Fraud and Arson – Repudiation of Claim – The Supreme Court set aside the NCDRC order that had partially allowed an insurance claim despite evidence of fraud - held that once a claim is established to be founded on fraud, the entire claim collapses, and no relief partial or equitable can be granted - Key Findings: i. Deliberate Arson: Forensic analysis (Truth Labs) identified hydrocarbon residues (kerosene) at the seat of the fire, while electrical examinations ruled out a short circuit; ii. Fabricated Evidence: The respondent relied on invoices from non-existent or unrelated suppliers and manipulated VAT returns to inflate the claim; iii. Suspicious Proximity: The enhancement of insurance coverage and procurement of an additional policy occurred in close proximity to the fire incident, raising serious doubts about the bona fides of the claim; iv. Legal Principle: Fraud vitiates all solemn acts - An insurance contract cannot be used as an instrument for unjust enrichment - directed the Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad, to form a Special Investigation Team (SIT) to investigate the orchestrated fraud. [Relied on S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath (1994) 1 SCC 1; A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (2007) 4 SCC 221; Paras 15-26] United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sayona Colors Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 303 : 2026 INSC 287

Consumer Protection – Joint Development Agreement (JDA) – Liability of Landowners for Delay in Construction – Held: Landowners cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the developer for deficiency in service arising from construction delays if the obligation to construct rests solely with the developer under the JDA and the General Power of Attorney (GPA) - The developer's right to enter into sale agreements and undertake construction for their share of the property, coupled with indemnity clauses protecting landowners from the developer's breaches, shifts the liability for delay compensation exclusively to the developer. Sriganesh Chandrasekaran v. Unishire Homes Llp, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 185 : 2026 INSC 172 : AIR 2026 SC 1081

Consumer Protection – Principal and Agent Relationship – General Power of Attorney – Held: The execution of a GPA by landowners in favor of a developer to facilitate sale agreements and title transfers does not automatically make the landowners liable for the developer's specific failures in construction, especially when no acts or omissions are attributed to the landowners regarding the delay - Held: While landowners are not liable for construction delay compensation, they remain jointly responsible with the developer to ensure the transfer of title and execution of sale deeds in favor of the flat buyers – Appeals dismissed. [Paras 12-16] Sriganesh Chandrasekaran v. Unishire Homes Llp, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 185 : 2026 INSC 172 : AIR 2026 SC 1081

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

Contempt Jurisdiction – Impugned Order Erroneous – In the subsequent contempt proceedings, the High Court erred by expanding the scope of inquiry to re-examine the appellant's eligibility for Class-III posts and his lack of Intermediate qualifications - Such re-examination was impermissible as it effectively reopened issues concluded by the final order of 1st March 2019 - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment dismissing the contempt petition - Supreme Court directed the respondent-Bank to pay the appellant gratuity of ₹2,28,000/- with 8% interest per annum from the date of retirement (31st October 2009) - awarded ₹1,00,000/- as compensation to the appellant for the prolonged and unnecessary litigation forced by the Bank. [Paras 10-17] Jalim Singh v. Nand Kishore, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 364

Contempt Jurisdiction – Scope of Inquiry – Re-adjudication Prohibited – Held that exercising contempt jurisdiction, the Court must confine its inquiry to the compliance of the operative directions contained in the original order - The jurisdiction is limited to examining compliance and does not extend to the re-adjudication of issues that have already attained finality between the parties – Noted that the High Court, in its earlier order dated 1st March 2019, unequivocally directed the respondent-Bank to pay the appellant arrears of salary and post-retiral benefits for the post of Cooperative Supervisor or an equivalent post, regardless of whether the post formally existed or whether the appellant possessed Intermediate qualifications - This order attained finality as it was not assailed by the Bank. Jalim Singh v. Nand Kishore, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 364

Contempt of Court – Invocation of Contempt Jurisdiction - Demonstrated "hesitation" or failure to act despite knowledge of a cognizable offence is a sine qua non for invoking contempt - Where the Supreme Court has issued pan-India interim directions (orders dated 21.10.2022 and 28.04.2023) mandating suo motu registration of FIRs against hate speech infractions, the failure to register a case must stem from a willful default or standard of hesitation despite having active knowledge of the cognizable offence - In cases where a petitioner has not even approached the competent authorities or placed the relevant material before them by way of a complaint, a failure to act suo motu cannot ipso facto translate to willful disobedience or automatic contempt - Foundational facts demonstrating institutional awareness and subsequent inaction are a prerequisite. [Paras 156 - 160] Ashwini Kumar Upadhyaya v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 437 : 2026 INSC 432

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – Section 19 – Suo Motu Criminal Contempt – Impleadment of Judges – Professional Conduct of Advocates – Held: A person who merely furnishes information to the Chief Justice regarding contemptuous acts cannot be construed as a complainant, nor can such a person be regarded as a necessary or proper party in contempt proceedings - The Supreme Court refused to interfere with the Bombay High Court's decision to initiate fresh suo motu contempt proceedings against an advocate for levelling serious, unsubstantiated imputations against a sitting Judge in a press conference and subsequent applications. Nilesh C. Ojha v. High Court of Judicature at Bombay, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 396 : 2026 INSC 390

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 — Section 2(c)(i) — Criminal Contempt — Scandalizing the Court — Reckless allegations by Bar President against the High Court Administration and Registry - The Appellant (President of the High Court Advocates' Association and Senior Advocate) was convicted of criminal contempt by the Gujarat High Court for branding the institution a "gambling den" and alleging corruption, nepotism, and preferential treatment towards rich litigants in matter listings during a live press conference - The Supreme Court held that the reasons assigned by the High Court for conviction warranted no interference on merits - Terming a Court a "gambling den" cannot be a permissible method to criticize its functioning, and severe emotional distress under pandemic pressures does not excuse conduct that disrupts public faith in the justice delivery system - emphasizing judicial magnanimity and balancing accountability with reform, the Supreme Court exercised its plenary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to suspend the conviction and sentence indefinitely, subject to an express undertaking of "impeccable conduct" and a mechanism for periodic review by the High Court - Key Points Elaborated in the Judgment – i. Distinct Nature of Contempt and Recall of Senior Designation - Criminal contempt proceedings under the 1971 Act and the recalling of a senior advocate's designation under Rule 26 of the relevant High Court Rules are entirely distinct parallel proceedings - Divesting an advocate of their senior gown cannot be treated as a sufficient punishment to automatically discharge or bypass statutory and constitutional contempt actions; ii. Automatic Disqualification under the Advocates Act - Upon the conviction of an advocate for criminal contempt, they face an automatic disqualification from practicing for a minimum period of two years under Section 24-A of the Advocates Act, 1961, even without separate regulatory action by the Bar Council -By suspending the conviction under Article 142, the Supreme Court protected the Appellant from this consequential disadvantage, contingent on future conduct; iii. Forgiveness with Vigil - The apex court introduced a mechanism of "measured forgiveness with vigil," directing the Full Court of the High Court to keep a watch and periodically review the Appellant's conduct every two years - If any further contumacious acts occur, the High Court is granted liberty to move the Supreme Court to revive and enforce the conviction immediately. [Relied on Mahipal Singh Rana v. State of U.P., (2016) 8 SCC 335; Paras 44 – 65] Yatin Narendra Oza v. Suo Motu, High Court of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 485 : 2026 INSC 470 : AIR 2026 SC 2433

Contempt Jurisdiction – Interim Orders – Noted that the High Court's order directing the framing of charges in a contempt petition while a fresh, detailed government rejection order remained unchallenged was found improper - Contempt should not be a shortcut for relief when appealable orders exist - The Supreme Court permitted the respondents to challenge the latest government order via a fresh writ petition to be heard alongside the contempt proceedings - The High Court is directed to pass a final order on merits and strictly prohibited from remanding the matter back to the authorities for further reconsideration, given the government's clear stance. [Paras 14-18] Mahendra Prasad Agarwal v. Arvind Kumar Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 195 : 2026 INSC 175

Contempt Jurisdiction – Non-compliance with directions for payment of salary to part-time teachers – Opportunity of hearing - the Supreme Court allowed certain part-time teachers in the State of West Bengal to make a fresh representation before the School Education Department Secretary for pay parity with full-time teachers teaching in non-government aided higher secondary schools - ordered that the competent authority shall pass a reasoned order on the representations within 4 months - Failure of Due Process – Held that while deciding representations, the authorities failed to afford the petitioners an opportunity of hearing or summon relevant school records as directed by the High Court - Directions – The Supreme Court granted liberty to the petitioners to file fresh representations within six weeks and directed the Secretary, School Education Department, is directed to: i. Afford an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners (in person or through an advocate); ii. Summon and allow inspection of engagement records from respective schools; iii. Pass a detailed reasoned order within four months. [Paras 12-15] Gurupada Bera v. Binod Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 9 : 2026 INSC 20

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971; Section 12 & 15 - Article 215 of the Constitution of India - Doctrine of Merger - Maintainability of Contempt Petition in High Court after Supreme Court affirmation - High Court's jurisdiction to punish for contempt of its own order does not cease to operate merely because said order has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in appeal - Even if the doctrine of merger applies, the order to be executed remains the directions issued by the High Court - Held: If contempt petitions were driven to the Supreme Court in every case of affirmation by a non-speaking order, the Apex Court would be flooded with such petitions - The legal provisions cannot be used to coerce a litigant to approach the Supreme Court without resorting to filing a Contempt Petition in the High Court. [Paras 13-14] United Labour Federation v. Gagandeep Singh Bedi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 208 : 2026 INSC 204

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – Civil Contempt – Intentional Delays and Administrative Hurdles – The Supreme Court deprecated the practice of government departments seeking "guidance" or citing "administrative hurdles" and "internal correspondence" as excuses for the non-compliance of clear court orders - Supreme Court noted that such actions are often a "calculated strategy" to delay or defeat the implementation of judicial directions. Israr Ahmed Khan v. Amarnath Prasad, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 209 : 2026 INSC 209

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – Liability of Non-Parties – Reiterated that even a third party or an officer not originally impleaded in the main proceedings can be held liable for contempt if they have knowledge of the court's order and act in a manner that willfully prevents its compliance or aids and abets its violation - Supreme Court emphasized that in contempt proceedings, the court cannot traverse beyond the original order or supplement its directions - The focus remains strictly on whether the specific directions issued in the judgment have been willfully disobeyed. [Relied on Sita Ram v. Balbir, (2014) 13 SCC 489; J.S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar, (1996) 6 SCC 291; Snehasis Giri v. Subhasis Mitra, (2023) 18 SCC 529; Paras 9-29] Israr Ahmed Khan v. Amarnath Prasad, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 209 : 2026 INSC 209

Contract Law

Contract of Indemnity – Absolute Obligation – Distinguished between a contingent indemnity and an absolute obligation. Where a promisor incurs an absolute obligation (indicated by terms like "ensure"), it can be enforced without awaiting actual loss or the exhaustion of all appellate remedies - The impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside, and the Promoters were granted 30 days to deposit ₹15,86,17,808/- for the benefit of the Appellants. [Relied on Khetarpal Amarnath v. Madhukar Pictures, 1955 SCC OnLine Bom 73; Paras 16-28] VPS Healthcare v. Prabhat Kumar Srivastava, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 393 : 2026 INSC 361

Contractual Interpretation – Literal vs. Purposive Construction – Rule of Every Part – Supreme Court emphasized that every limb of a contract must be given meaning to avoid rendering any part otiose - A performance timeline for an "extreme scenario" (confirmation by the Highest Court of Appeal) cannot be used to negate an unconditional obligation to protect a party from recovery at earlier stages of litigation - Purposive construction is unavailable when a plain, literal reading of all limbs together ensures an immediate enforceable obligation. VPS Healthcare v. Prabhat Kumar Srivastava, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 393 : 2026 INSC 361

Contractual Liability vs. Unjust Enrichment – Students who initially consciously contracted to take admission in a private medical institution under a higher fee structure cannot be permitted to exclusively avail the benefit of highly subsidized Government-rate fees throughout the course duration under the garb of interim orders - Permitting students to undertake a full MBBS course at a pittance of what they would have originally paid amounts to unjust enrichment - Neither the students can be given an undue advantage or bonanza, nor can the defaulting institution be permitted to take benefit of its own follies. [Paras 33 - 50] Soumya Ranjan Panda v. Subhalaxmi Dash, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 498 : 2026 INSC 488

Contract Act, 1872; Section 133 - Discharge of surety by variance in terms of contract - The Supreme Court held that any variance made in the terms of the contract between the principal debtor and the creditor without the surety's consent discharges the surety only as to transactions subsequent to the variance - The discharge of the surety is not absolute; they remain liable for the original amount for which they stood as guarantee before the unauthorized variance occurred. Bhagyalaxmi Co-Operative Bank Ltd. v. Babaldas Amtharam Patel, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 210 : 2026 INSC 205

Contract Act, 1872 - Error by Bank and Third-Party Decree – Held that the Bank committed a clear breach of duty by unilaterally remitting the amount to the vessel owner despite receiving specific instructions (Form A-2) to remit it to the Plaintiff - The Bank, not being a party to the underlying Charter Party Agreement, could not rely on its terms to ignore the customer's mandate - Under the third-party procedure (Order VIII-A CPC / Order V-A Madras High Court Original Side Rules), the Bank was held liable to indemnify the customer (Defendant No. 1) for this erroneous transfer. [Relied on Bank of Bihar Ltd. v. Damodar Prasad and others (1969) 1 SCR 620; Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. v. Electrosteel Castings Ltd. (2026) 264 Comp Cas 11; Mumbai International Airport (P) Ltd. v. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels (P) Ltd. (2010) 7 SCC 417; Paras 35, 36] Canara Bank Overseas Branch v. Archean Industries Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 252 : 2026 INSC 247 : AIR 2026 SC 1566

Contract Act, 1872 - Liability of Guarantors - Bifurcation of Liability - Supreme Court set aside the High Court's finding that guarantors are either liable for the entire amount or not at all. It held that liability can be bifurcated; sureties are liable to the extent of their original engagement (plus applicable interest) but are not liable for excess amounts permitted to be withdrawn by the creditor in connivance with the principal debtor without the sureties' intimation or consent - The cardinal rule is that a guarantor must not be liable beyond the terms of his engagement – noted that unless there is bad faith, misrepresentation, or a material variation to the prejudice of the surety, the creditor's actions within the contract terms do not automatically discharge the surety – Appeal allowed. [Relied on State of Maharashtra vs. Dr. MN Kaul (D) by his LRs, AIR 1967 SC 1634; Syndicate Bank vs. Channaveerappa Beleri & Ors., (2006) 11 SCC 506; Paras 4-7] Bhagyalaxmi Co-Operative Bank Ltd. v. Babaldas Amtharam Patel, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 210 : 2026 INSC 205

Contract Act, 1872 - Necessary Parties and Dominus Litis - Supreme Court rejected the contention that the suit was bad for non-joinder of the vessel owner (principal debtor) - It reaffirmed that the plaintiff is the dominus litis and cannot be compelled to sue a person against whom they seek no relief, unless that person is an indispensable "necessary party" without whom no effective decree can be passed. [Paras 27-32] Canara Bank Overseas Branch v. Archean Industries Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 252 : 2026 INSC 247 : AIR 2026 SC 1566

Contract Act, 1872 – Section 74 – Liquidated Damages – Public Utility Projects – Proof of Actual Loss –In projects involving public utility or public interest (such as solar power projects under the National Solar Mission), it is not mandatory to prove actual loss for the award of liquidated damages - The delay in commissioning such a utility itself constitutes a loss to the public. The burden shifts to the party in breach to prove that no loss was caused - Key Findings held – i. Admitted Breach - The Solar Power Developer (SEL) admitted to delays in commissioning the 20 MW project (two months for the first 10 MW and five months for the balance); ii. Public Interest - The project, executed under the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission (JNNSM), was a public utility activity aimed at promoting green energy; thus, the strict proof of financial loss by the nodal agency (NVVNL) was unnecessary; iii. Jurisdictional Error by Division Bench - The Division Bench, acting under Section 37, erred by recalculating and reducing the compensation from 50% of the contractual claim (as awarded by the Single Judge) to a lower amount, as this amounted to a merits-based substitution of a plausible view. [Relied on Gayatri Balasamy vs. ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited (2025 INSC 605); AC Chokshi Share Broker Private Limited vs. Jatin Pratap Desai and another (2025 INSC 174); Paras 12-18] Saisudhir Energy Ltd. v. NTPC Vidyut Vyapar Nigam Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 112 : 2026 INSC 103 : AIR 2026 SC 850

Contract Act, 1872 - Sections 126, 127, 128, and 140 - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order VIII-A – Key Issues – i. Whether a "Corporate Guarantee" issued by a charterer (Defendant No. 1) to a ship repairer (Plaintiff) to pay outstanding dues from freight amounts constitutes a valid, independent guarantee under Section 126 of the Contract Act; ii. Whether a bank is liable to indemnify its customer under third-party procedure when it erroneously remits funds to the wrong party contrary to express customer instructions – Held that the "Corporate Guarantee" (Exhibit P11) and related communications (Exhibit P10) constituted a valid, independent contract of guarantee under Section 126 of the Contract Act - It was not merely a freight-sharing arrangement as contended by the Appellant – Noted that a guarantee is a voluntary act of taking up the burden of a third party who failed to make payment - Under Section 128, the liability of the surety is co-extensive with that of the principal debtor - The creditor is entitled to proceed against the surety without first exhausting remedies against the principal debtor. [Paras 21-25] Canara Bank Overseas Branch v. Archean Industries Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 252 : 2026 INSC 247 : AIR 2026 SC 1566

Contract Law - Procedural Prerequisites and Waiver - A party at fault cannot be permitted to set up a bar of non-performance of prerequisite obligations to exclude the operation of an arbitration clause - If a party's conduct such as failing to adhere to strict timelines for Engineer decisions or Adjudicator recommendations disables preceding steps, those procedural prerequisites are deemed waived. [Relied on M.K. Shah Engineers & Contractors vs. State of M.P. (1999) 2 SCC 59; ASF Buildtech Private Limited vs. Shapoorji Pallonji & Company Private Limited (2025) 9 SCC 76; State of Goa v. Praveen Enterprises (2012) 12 SCC 581; Paras 16-20] Bhagheeratha Engineering Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 31 : 2026 INSC 4

Contract Law – Apartment Buyers' Agreement – Dominant Position and Fraud – The High Court's finding that flat owners were made to "sign on the dotted line" due to the developer's dominant position was held to be conjectural – Held - In the absence of foundational pleadings alleging fraud, misrepresentation, or coercion at the time of execution, a decade-old registered agreement cannot be disregarded or held to be executed under misrepresentation. [Paras 61, 62] Raj Singh Gehlot v. Amitabha Sen, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 72 : 2026 INSC 77

Contract Law - Interpretation of Contracts – Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence – Sections 92 and 94 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Supreme Court emphasized that when the language of a contract is plain and applies accurately to existing facts, evidence cannot be given to show it was not meant to apply to such facts - under Section 92, factual context and correspondences between parties can be used to make ambiguous terms certain. [Paras 21-22] WB State Electricity Distribution v. Adhunik Power & Natural Resource, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 213 : 2026 INSC 202 : AIR 2026 SC 1340

Contract Law - Shortfall in Tapering Linkage – Indemnity Clauses – Supreme Court set aside the compensation awarded for the period prior to the coal block cancellation (pre-25.08.2014) - It held that Article 2.5 of the PPA/PSA acted as an indemnity clause, stipulating that if coal was procured from alternative sources (e-auction/import) to meet shortfalls in tapering linkage before the captive source became operational, such coal would be deemed to be from the captive source with no separate cost escalation allowed. [Paras 19-23, 25-26] WB State Electricity Distribution v. Adhunik Power & Natural Resource, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 213 : 2026 INSC 202 : AIR 2026 SC 1340

Contractual Interpretation – Harmonious Construction – Clauses 3.20 and 3.22 – Supreme Court noted that a widely worded arbitration clause (Clause 3.22) must be read in conjunction with restrictive default clauses (Clause 3.20) - Clause 3.20, which accorded finality to the Administration's decision and barred legal proceedings, was interpreted to apply only where liability is admitted and only the quantification is at issue - Where liability is disputed, the matter falls within the ambit of the arbitration clause. [Relied on State of Karnataka v. Shree Rameshwara Rice Mills Thirthahalli, (1987) 2 SCC 160; J.G. Engineers Private Limited v. Union of India, (2011) 5 SCC 758; Sri Vedagiri Lakshmi Narasimha Swami Temple v. Induru Pattabhirami Reddi, 1966 SCC OnLine SC 243; Paras 25-38] ABS Marine Services v. Andaman and Nicobar Administration, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 287 : 2026 INSC 274 : AIR 2026 SC 1594

Contractual Interpretation — Subsequent Legislation Clause: In contracts where the bid was submitted before the actual implementation of the BOCW machinery in a specific State, the introduction of cess collection via subsequent State Notifications/Rules qualifies as "subsequent legislation." - Contractors could not have factored in the 1% cess component in their bids when no mechanism for collection existed at the time of submission (28 days prior to the bid deadline). [Relied on A. Prabhakara Reddy and Company vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others (2016) 1 SCC 600; Paras 38, 51, 52] National Highways Authority of India v. Gammon Atlanta (JV), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 71 : 2026 INSC 76

Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970

Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 – Section 10 – Sham vs. Genuine Contracts – Following the Constitution Bench in SAIL, Supreme Court reiterated that the prohibition of contract labour does not lead to automatic absorption - if a contract is found to be a "sham" or "camouflage" intended to bypass labour laws, the workers are treated as de facto employees of the principal employer - Such a determination involves disputed questions of fact that must be adjudicated by the Industrial Tribunal/Court, not a Writ Court – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL) v. National Union Waterfront Workers (2001) 7 SCC 1; Shambu Nath Goyal v. Bank of Baroda (1978) 2 SCC 353; Paras 24-40] Premium Transmission v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 86 : 2026 INSC 87

Contract Labour – Sham Contracts and Regularization – If a contract is proved to be a "camouflage" or "sham" to hide a real employer-employee relationship where the principal employer retains full control, the workers must be treated as direct employees and regularized - determining whether a contract is "sham" or "genuine" involves disputed questions of fact that must be adjudicated by the Industrial Tribunal/Court, not by Writ Courts under Article 226 – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Steel Authority of India Ltd. and others v. National Union Waterfront Workers and others (2001) 7 SCC 1; Paras 8-11] Premium Transmission v. Kishan Subhash Rathod, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 87

Co-operative Societies

Multi-State Co-operative Societies Act, 2002 – Section 64(d) – Investment of Funds – Interpretation of "Same Line of Business" – The expression "any other institution in the same line of business" under Section 64(d) is a restrictive standard introduced via the 2023 Amendment to prevent the misuse of society funds and ensure financial discipline - The determination of whether an institution is in the "same line of business" must be made primarily by examining the objects and functions set out in the bye-laws of the Multi-State Co-operative Society (MSCS) - The Supreme Court relied on the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Delisting of Equity Shares) Regulations, 2021 (specifically regarding the classification of entities under the National Industrial Classification (NIC) Code) as an illustrative benchmark to discern the ordinary and contextual meaning of "same line of business". Nirmal Ujjwal Credit Co-Operative Society Ltd. v. Ravi Sethia, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 357 : 2026 INSC 338

Society - Autonomy of Society — General Body Resolutions — Supreme Court emphasized that the Society's General Body, in an AGM held on September 30, 2025, had ratified the membership of the appellants and the subsequent purchaser – Noted that the High Court's conclusion that the Revisional Authority acted in excess of jurisdiction was unsustainable, especially since the appellants had initially approached the Society's Authorised Officer and only then availed statutory remedies under the MCS Act. [Paras 43-44] Shashin Patel v. Uday Dalal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 125 : 2026 INSC 125

Co-operative Societies Act, 2001 (Rajasthan) — Section 28 vs. Section 32 — Eligibility vs. Disqualification — Supreme Court distinguished between "disqualifications" (statutory disabilities under Section 28) and "eligibility criteria" (threshold qualifications under bye-laws) - Bye-laws prescribing minimum milk supply (Bye-law 20.2(7)) or audit classification (Bye-law 20.1(2)) are positive, objective functional requirements aimed at ensuring active participation and are not "disqualifications" - The High Court erred by conflating these two distinct legal concepts. Ram Chandra Choudhary v. Roop Nagar Dugdh Utpadak Sahakari Samiti Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 361 : 2026 INSC 347

Co-operative Societies Act, 2001 (Rajasthan) — Sections 58, 60, 104, and 105 — Alternative Remedy — Supreme Court ruled that the High Court should not have entertained the writ petitions given the existence of a comprehensive, self-contained, multi-tiered statutory remedial framework - Section 58(2)(c) specifically deems disputes relating to elections as disputes "touching the constitution, management or business" of a society, falling under the Registrar's jurisdiction - Bypassing such efficacious statutory remedies is contrary to legislative intent. [Relied on Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa (1983) 2 SCC 433; Umesh Shivappa Ambi v. Angadi Shekara Basappa, (1998) 4 SCC 529] Ram Chandra Choudhary v. Roop Nagar Dugdh Utpadak Sahakari Samiti Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 361 : 2026 INSC 347

Co-operative Societies — Right to Vote vs. Right to Contest — Supreme Court emphasized that neither the right to vote nor the right to contest is a fundamental right; they are purely statutory - While the right to vote is a member's franchise, the right to contest is an additional right subject to stricter regulation and eligibility conditions - The impugned bye-laws regulated the eligibility to contest (candidature) and did not curtail the right to vote. [Relied on Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal AIR 1982 SC 983; Supreme Court Bar Association v. B.D. Kaushik (2011) 13 SCC 774] Ram Chandra Choudhary v. Roop Nagar Dugdh Utpadak Sahakari Samiti Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 361 : 2026 INSC 347

Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (Maharashtra) — Section 154 — Revisional Powers — Maintainability — Supreme Court ruled that the revisional power under Section 154 is "extremely wide" and is not denuded by the availability of alternative remedies under Rule 107(13) or (14) - A revision to annul a sale confirmation that is void ab initio (due to violation of mandatory rules) does not require a pre-deposit of the decretal amount under Section 154(2A)- that Rule 107(11)(h) serves a larger public purpose beyond the interest of the creditor, ensuring the sanctity of public auctions and preventing price manipulation by non-serious bidders - Supreme Court set aside the auction sale dated 29.01.2005 and the confirmation order dated 18.03.2005, declaring them null and void - directed a fresh auction for the property and ordered the Bank to refund the auction purchaser's deposit with 6% interest per annum. [Relied on Shilpa Shares & Securities and others vs. National Co-operative Bank Ltd. and others (2007) 12 SCC 165; Paras 39-42, 55-58] Adishakti Developers v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 202 : 2026 INSC 197

Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (Maharashtra) — Section 23(2) and Section 154 — Membership of Housing Society — Delay in Payment of Contribution — The Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that had quashed the grant of membership to the legal heirs of a long-term tenant - held that since the Society had passed a resolution in 2005 to admit the predecessor-in-interest as a member upon payment, and that resolution was never revoked, the heirs were entitled to membership upon depositing the amount with interest - Supreme Court noted that denying membership while the parties remained in peaceful, undisputed possession of the flat would create a "serious anomaly" and "subsisting tussle". [Paras 41-45] Shashin Patel v. Uday Dalal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 125 : 2026 INSC 125

Cooperative Societies — Interplay between Reorganisation Act and 2002 Act — Legislative Continuity — Section 87 of the Uttar Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2000, embodies the doctrine of legislative continuity, allowing for the adaptation of laws for two years following bifurcation - Actions taken during this transitional period to reorganize societies to fit single-state boundaries are valid and cannot be retrospectively invalidated by Section 103 of the 2002 Act. Registrar Cane Cooperative Societies v. Gurdeep Singh Narval, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 224 : 2026 INSC 216

Co-operative Societies — Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Rules, 1961 — Rule 107(11)(g) and (h) — Mandatory Nature of Deposit Timelines — The Supreme Court held that the requirement to deposit the remainder of the purchase money within fifteen days (as per the Rule at the relevant time) from the date of auction sale is mandatory - Failure to deposit the full purchase money within this prescribed period renders the auction sale a nullity and not a mere irregularity. Supreme Court clarified that the Recovery Officer has no discretion to extend the time for making payment of the remainder of the purchase money, unlike the extension permitted for the cost of stamp duty. [Paras 47-55] Adishakti Developers v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 202 : 2026 INSC 197

Cooperative Societies — Non-obstante Clause — Section 93 of the Reorganisation Act provides that its provisions shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent in any other law - The deeming fiction of Section 103 of the 2002 Act cannot override the express statutory scheme of the Reorganisation Act where reorganisation actions were already completed – Appeal allowed. [Relied on State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary and Others v. Milkiyat Singh and Others; 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2802; Paras 13-24] Registrar Cane Cooperative Societies v. Gurdeep Singh Narval, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 224 : 2026 INSC 216

Cooperative Societies — Uttar Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2000 — Multi-State Cooperative Societies Act, 2002 — Section 103 — Status of Sugarcane Cooperative Societies upon State Bifurcation — The Supreme Court held that the Sugarcane Growers Cooperative Societies of Bajpur and Gadarpur are not Multi-State Cooperative Societies – Held that the deeming fiction under Section 103 of the 2002 Act is neither automatic nor universal; it requires a factual determination of whether a society's objects (distinguished from its area of operation) extend to more than one State. Registrar Cane Cooperative Societies v. Gurdeep Singh Narval, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 224 : 2026 INSC 216

Criminal Jurisprudence

Investigation – Cooperation of Accused – Cooperation with an investigation does not mean the accused must render a confession to suit the convenience of the prosecution – Noted that the State's claim of "non-cooperation" with "a pinch of salt" when used as a justification for continued custody in the face of successive FIR registrations. [Paras 7-13] Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 153

Legal Aid — Rights of the Accused — Fair Trial — Mandatory Procedure for Trial Courts — The Supreme Court observed that the appellant initially failed to cross-examine witnesses until she engaged her own counsel – Noted that Trial Courts are duty-bound to inform accused persons of their right to legal representation and their entitlement to legal aid counsel if they cannot afford one - Mandatory Directions - Trial Courts must scrupulously adopt a procedure to record in their orders: (i) the offer of legal aid made to the accused, (ii) the response of the accused, and (iii) the action taken thereon, all before commencing the examination of witnesses - This order is to be communicated to the Chief Justices of all High Courts for issuance of suitable instructions to all concerned Trial Courts. Reginamary Chellamani v. State Rep By Superintendent of Customs, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 121 : 2026 INSC 127 : AIR 2026 SC 800

Criminal Trial – Appreciation of Approver's Evidence – Object of Granting Pardon - The Supreme Court observed that the testimony of an approver must be evaluated with caution and requires due corroboration on material particulars - the High Court adopted an infirm approach by rejecting the approver's testimony on the sole ground that it contradicted his previous statement given to the police when he was an accused - The very object of granting pardon under the law is to elicit a "true and full disclosure" in aid of the prosecution, which inherently acknowledges that the individual had concealed the truth prior to the pardon - Rejection of post-pardon testimonies based mechanically on pre-pardon contradictions would effectively frustrate the statutory purpose of pardon in criminal trials. [Relied On: Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 637; Paras 39, 64-67] State of Tamil Nadu v. Ponnusamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 519 : 2026 INSC 507

Criminal Jurisprudence - Interference with Concurrent Findings of Fact - Summarized principles governing interference by the Supreme Court in a criminal appeal by special leave against concurrent findings of the courts below - Supreme Court would not normally interfere with a concurrent finding of fact based on pure appreciation of evidence or enter into a re-appraisement unless the assessment of the High Court is vitiated by an error of law or procedure, misreading of evidence, or is manifestly perverse and based on no evidence. [Relied on Dalbir Kaur & Ors. vs. State of Punjab (1976) 4 SCC 158; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Saleem @ Chamaru, (2005) 5 SCC 554; Bipin Bihari v. State of M.P. (2006) 8 SCC 799; Para 30-40] Roshan Lal v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 537 : 2026 INSC 524

Criminal Jurisprudence — Circumstantial Evidence — Recovery of bloodstained articles — Chain of custody — Failure to conduct Test Identification Parade (TIP) — Suppression of material witnesses - Key Rulings – i. Circumstantial Evidence - In a case resting solely on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution carries the onerous burden of establishing each incriminating circumstance independently beyond reasonable doubt - The cumulative effect of the proved circumstances must form a complete and unbroken chain pointing unerringly towards the guilt of the accused alone, while excluding every reasonable hypothesis of innocence; ii. Recovery of Bloodstained Articles - The sole circumstance of recovering a bloodstained article matching the blood group of the deceased, in isolation, cannot be considered sufficient to link the accused with the crime - Blood group 'O' is a common blood group, and its mere presence on recovered articles cannot be treated as a determinative incriminating circumstance without establishing an uncompromised connection to the crime; iii. Chain of Custody - The failure of the prosecution to lead cogent and reliable evidence establishing an unbroken chain of custody of seized forensic articles from the stage of recovery till their examination at the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) diminishes the scientific value of such reports, as the possibility of tampering or contamination cannot be reasonably ruled out; iv. Test Identification Parade (TIP) - Where the accused persons are complete strangers to the material witnesses, a Test Identification Parade assumes considerable significance to provide assurance to the dock identification - The rank failure of the investigating agency to hold a TIP, combined with showing the accused to witnesses while in police custody, substantially diminishes the evidentiary value of subsequent dock identification; v. Suppression of Material Witness - The non-examination of a natural, material witness closely related to the deceased whose statement was recorded during the investigation, without any plausible explanation, amounts to the suppression of the best available evidence and casts a serious cloud of doubt on the fairness of the investigation. [Relied on Prakash Nishad @ Kewat Zinak Nishad v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 16 SCC 357; Allarakha Habib Memon v. State of Gujarat, (2024) 9 SCC 546; Paras 40-86] Mehtab v. State of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 560 : 2026 INSC 578

Criminal Jurisprudence — Circumstantial Evidence — Last Seen Together Theory — Multi-Accused Case — Distance between "May be" and "Must be" — The circumstance of "last seen together" does not by itself necessarily lead to an inference of guilt without further corroborative evidence establishing connectivity to the crime - Where the evidence under Section 27 of the Evidence Act fails to link the accomplice appellants to any discovery, the prosecution is left solely with the "last seen together" circumstance - It is hazardous and unsafe to sustain a conviction for a serious offence like murder under Section 302 IPC exclusively on the basis of a singular, uncorroborated "last seen" circumstance - While the prosecution case "may be true", it falls short of the legal threshold that it "must be true" to justify a conviction. [Relied on State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600; Nagamma v. State of Karnataka, 2025 SCC OnLine; Lachhman Singh v. State, (1952) 1 SCC 362; Murli v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 9 SCC 417; Paras 43, 63 - 69] Anand Jakkappa Pujari @ Gaddadar v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 427 : 2026 INSC 417

Criminal Jurisprudence – Delay in Lodging FIR – Noted that High Court quashed proceedings citing unexplained delay between the 2007 transaction and the 2015 FIR - Supreme Court clarified that in criminal matters, there is no strict limitation, and delay is not fatal unless there is evidence of deliberate inaction or prior knowledge - Respondents argued that the sale deed was upheld in civil proceedings, attaining finality - Supreme Court held that the same set of facts may give rise to both civil and criminal proceedings; a civil court's validation of a title does not prevent a criminal court from examining the merits of alleged fraud or forgery - reiterated that at the quashing stage, a Court is not expected to conduct a "mini-trial" or evaluate the sufficiency of evidence – Noted that any person with knowledge of an offence can set the criminal law in motion and that delay is not inherently fatal to a prosecution - Observed that the property in question, as trust property, involves public concern, justifying the maintainability of the complaint. [Paras 19-25] State of Andhra Pradesh v. B. Reddeppa Reddy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 308

Criminal Jurisprudence – Principle of Parity – When there is similar or identical evidence against two accused ascribing them a similar role, the Court cannot convict one and acquit the other - The Principle of Parity dictates that Criminal Courts should decide like cases alike to avoid discrimination - Since the recovery evidence against the acquitted co-accused was nearly identical to that against the appellant, the appellant was entitled to the same benefit of doubt. [Para 24] Gautam Satnami v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 345 : 2026 INSC 325

Criminal Law — Cancellation of Bail — Dowry Death - Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023; Sections 85, 115(2), 352, 351(2) and 80 — Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 - Section 118 [Erstwhile Section 113(B) of the Evidence Act] — Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Sections 3 and 4 — Serious Crimes Against Women — Principles governing grant/cancellation of bail - Egregious Error by High Court - The Supreme Court set aside an order of the Allahabad High Court granting bail to a husband accused of murdering his wife for dowry, holding that the High Court committed an egregious error in exercising its discretion in favor of the accused given the serious nature of the crime – i. Presumption as to Dowry Death - The High Court erred by completely ignoring the statutory presumption under Section 118 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) - In cases where a woman dies under suspicious circumstances in her matrimonial home within seven years of marriage and faced continuous dowry harassment soon before death, the Court is mandated to presume that such person caused the dowry death; ii. Misreading of Facts & Evidentiary Value of FIR - The High Court's reliance on an alleged "delay in lodging the FIR" as a primary ground for bail was baseless and factually incorrect - The deceased died on 11.07.2024, and the FIR was promptly lodged the next day on 12.07.2024 - Even if a minor delay exists, it cannot independently justify releasing an accused on bail in a serious offense like dowry death; iii. Duty of Bail Courts: A bail court at any level must remain highly cautious to ensure its orders do not convey a message to society that courts take serious crimes against women lightly. [Relied on In Re: Enforcement and Implementation of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 [2005] INSC 295; Paras 16-31] Mahesh Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 452 : 2026 INSC 440

Criminal Law – Cancellation of Bail – Principles for Interference – High Court's Supervisory Jurisdiction – Section 437 CrPC – Article 227 of the Constitution – The Supreme Court set aside a Calcutta High Court order that had cancelled an accused's bail after eight years based on hyper-technical procedural grounds - The High Court had ruled that the Magistrate's original 2018 bail order was "born in sin" because it only bore initials rather than a full signature, allegedly violating Rule 183 of the Calcutta High Court Criminal (Subordinate Courts) Rules, 1985 – Held - Rejection of bail at the initial stage and cancellation of bail already granted must be dealt with on different bases - Bail once granted should not be cancelled in a mechanical manner without considering if supervening circumstances (such as interference with justice or absconding) render it no longer conducive to a fair trial - A procedural rule governing day-to-day functioning cannot override the substantive mandate of the CrPC unless a gross failure of justice is demonstrated - The High Court's interference after a lapse of nearly eight years on trivial grounds was "audaciously perverse". Shuvendu Saha v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 382 : 2026 INSC 367

Criminal Law — Criminal Investigation — Delayed FIR and Scripted Investigation — Impact on Prosecution - Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 147, 341, 326, 307, 323, and 302 read with Section 149 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Sections 154, 161, 162, and 164 — Appreciation of Evidence — Fatal Investigation Flaws - An inept investigation or a scripted enquiry is fatal to criminal prosecution, having lethal consequences when there is a possibility of totally innocent persons being crucified - In a case involving a brutal homicidal attack on a public road, the Supreme Court noted that despite the police reaching the place of occurrence (P.O) immediately after the incident based on a General Diary (GD) entry, no First Information Report (FIR) was registered for two days - The FIR was eventually registered based on a written complaint by a close relative (PW1) who admittedly did not witness the incident but named 13 specific accused persons after due deliberation – Suprme Court observed that if eyewitnesses were available at the spot when the Investigating Officer (IO) arrived, the IO would have registered an FIR then and there rather than waiting for a delayed complaint - The high-handed and procedural lapses by the investigation department leave the crime unresolved. [Paras 11 - 22] Sadek Ali @ Md. Sadek Ali v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 435 : 2026 INSC 421

Criminal Procedure – Limitation for taking cognizance – Relevant date for computation – Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – The Supreme Court reiterated that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 Cr.PC, the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution, and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence - held that the High Court committed a "patent error" by quashing an FIR on the ground that the charge-sheet was filed beyond one year, mistakenly treating the date of cognizance as the decisive factor. Roma Ahuja v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 351 : 2026 INSC 336

Criminal Procedure — Physical and Forensic Evidence — Failure to Produce Material Objects - Investigation Failures — Non-Forensic Examination and Non-Production of Material Objects - The prosecution's case rested heavily on the narrative that six people travelled with the deceased on four motorbikes - despite creating a seizure list detailing the vehicles, no document substantiating ownership was produced, nor were the physical motorbikes ever brought before the trial court to confront the witnesses - the weapons seized from the spot were never sent for forensic analysis, nor were they confronted to the eyewitnesses or the medical doctor who conducted the postmortem examination - The failure to collect blood spilled at the crime scene to match it with the victims further destabilizes the prosecution's foundation - In the absence of such corroborative links, the ocular evidence is rendered highly suspect. [Paras15 - 21] Sadek Ali @ Md. Sadek Ali v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 435 : 2026 INSC 421

Criminal Procedure – Quashing of FIR – Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Interference at the Stage of Investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC – The Supreme Court set aside a High Court judgment that quashed an FIR at the inception stage - The High Court had reasoned that the dispute was primarily civil and required the cancellation of sale deeds under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act before criminal proceedings could be sustained - The Supreme Court held that the existence of a civil remedy does not bar criminal proceedings if the allegations prima facie disclose a cognizable offence - At the stage of Section 156(3) CrPC, a Magistrate is only required to determine if a cognizable offence is disclosed, not to conduct a "mini-trial" or evaluate defense material - High Courts must exercise restraint and only intervene under Section 156(3) if the order lacks legal foundation or results in a failure of justice. Accamma Sam Jacob v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 368 : 2026 INSC 362

Criminal Procedure – Suspension of Sentence and Grant of Bail – Disproportionate Assets – Overlapping Allegations – Double Jeopardy – Appellant, a former Minister, was convicted for amassing assets disproportionate to known sources of income and illegal acquisition of tribal lands - Prosecution split the original case into two separate charge-sheets involving overlapping allegations and the same check period - Appellant contended that dual prosecution for identical allegations violates the right against double jeopardy under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India - The Supreme Court noted that the appellant's sentence in the first case had already been suspended by the Court and that he had undergone substantial custodial incarceration in both matters - Held: Without expressing a final opinion on the merits of the overlapping allegations which must be decided by the High Court, the Court found it fit to grant bail - Bail granted subject to the appellant filing an undertaking within seven days of release to assist in the process of restoring illegally acquired tribal land to its original status. [Paras 13-21] Anosh Ekka v. State through Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 367 : 2026 INSC 357 : AIR 2026 SC 1907 : 2026 (2) Crimes SC 133

Criminal Trial — Non-examination of Independent/Local Witnesses — Non-examination of independent villagers does not compromise the prosecution case, especially when societal realities show that common persons naturally hesitate to get entangled in thorny legal matters out of fear, particularly where a witness in a previous trial has already been gunned down. [Relied on Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras (AIR 1957 SC 614); Lallu Manjhi v. State of Jharkhand ((2003) 2 SCC 401); State of H.P. v. Gian Chand ((2001) 6 SCC 71); Ashok Kumar Chaudhary v. State of Bihar ((2008) 12 SCC 173); Baljinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2024 SCC OnLine SC 2622); Manjit Singh v. State of Punjab ((2019) 8 SCC 529); Mohd. Naushad v. State (NCT of Delhi) ((2024) 12 SCC 494; Para 12, 13] Adalat Yadav v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 415 : 2026 INSC 403

Criminal Jurisprudence – Pre-marital and Consensual Relationships – Offence of Cheating based on False Promise to Marry - Physical relationships between consenting unmarried adults do not automatically warrant an adverse inference against a candidate's character - Where a relationship spans a considerable period, a presumption of valid consent arises - Merely because a long-standing relationship between adult neighbors does not culminate in marriage, it cannot be logicized that an offence of cheating was committed or that a subsequent compromise before a Lok Adalat amounts to an admission of guilt. [Paras 18-20] Gajula Thirupathi v. Telangana State Level Police Recruitment Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 606 : 2026 INSC 493

Criminal Jurisprudence – Presumption of Innocence – Evidentiary Value of Police Report in Compounded Cases - Unless a charge is proven in a court of law, the presumption of innocence prevails - Where an offence like cheating depends entirely on the subjective deception of the prosecutrix, and the prosecutrix chooses to compound the matter before a Lok Adalat without any evidence of coercion or threat, a mere indictment in a police report (based on statements recorded during investigation) cannot form the sole basis for an employer to draw an adverse inference regarding the candidate's character. [Relied on Avtar Singh v. Union of India and Others, (2016) 8 SCC 471; Ravindra Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, (2024) 5 SCC 264; Commissioner of Police v. Mehar Singh, (2013) 7 SCC 685; Paras 22 - 25] Gajula Thirupathi v. Telangana State Level Police Recruitment Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 606 : 2026 INSC 493

Criminal Jurisprudence — Sentencing — Principle of Proportionality — Mitigating Circumstances — Reduction of Sentence to Period Already Undergone — Appeal confined strictly to the quantum of sentence - The appellant was convicted under Sections 420, 467, 468, and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, for using a forged revenue document (Bhu Adhikar Rin Pustika) to furnish surety/bail in judicial proceedings, and was sentenced to five years of rigorous imprisonment on each count – Held that while offences involving forgery and the production of fabricated documents before a Court of law strike at the purity of the administration of justice and cannot be treated lightly, the sentencing process must remain central to the principle of proportionality - It cannot be reduced to a purely retributive exercise divorced from the factual matrix of the case and the overall circumstances of the offender - The Supreme Court observed that the occurrence pertained to the year 2014, and the appellant had endured the rigors of criminal proceedings for more than a decade - there were no subsequent criminal antecedents, the appellant was not a habitual offender, and the forgery was detected at the threshold stage during bail scrutiny, avoiding irreversible pecuniary or proprietary losses - Noting that the appellant had already undergone over two years of actual incarceration, the Supreme Court found it fit to modify the substantive sentence to the period already undergone while keeping the fine unaltered. [Relied on Padum Kumar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2020) 3 SCC 35; Paras 13-26] Israfil @ Pappu @ Naimuddin Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 639 : 2026 INSC 654

Criminal Justice Administration – Loss of Case Records during Active Investigation – Misplacement of original case papers and FSL reports in transit between police station and Magistrate – Held, such incidents strike at the very core of the criminal justice system and render bona fide complaints inactionable – Even if records are lost or witnesses are untraceable, the investigating agency cannot keep the investigation pending indefinitely; it must either reconstruct records or file an appropriate closure report before the Magistrate – State directed to conclude the investigation within six weeks and file an explanatory compliance affidavit. [Relied on Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu v. State of Bihar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2511; Paras 16, 17, 18] Sahil Abdulsattar Mansuri v. Safimahamad Fafirbhai Mansuri, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 601 : 2026 INSC 626

Criminal Law - Quashing of FIR - Recording of FIR Contents in Quashing Orders - Delay not a Ground for Quashing FIR - Duty of High Court while Quashing FIR - While quashing an FIR, the High Court must give a fair idea in its order regarding the contents of the FIR and the nature of allegations levelled therein. Reproduction of the entire FIR is not necessary, but sufficient reference to the nature of the crime and allegations is expected so that the higher courts can meaningfully assess whether there was proper application of mind by the High Court. Delay in lodging the FIR by itself, without anything more, cannot be a ground to quash the FIR. Delay is a factor that may be considered by the Trial Court while appreciating evidence during trial. At the stage of considering a petition for quashing of FIR, the High Court is required to examine whether the FIR discloses the commission of any cognizable offence. The Court must advert to the nature of the crime and the allegations made in the FIR. The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court which had quashed an FIR registered under Sections relating to attempt to murder and other offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) solely on the ground of 24 days' delay in lodging the FIR, without examining the contents of the FIR or the nature of allegations. The Supreme Court restored the FIR and allowed the police to proceed in accordance with law. Pushpendra v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 584

Criminal Procedure – Faulty Investigation – Impact on Prosecution Case - Supreme Court further observed that while the investigating agency was expected to act with greater sensitivity given that it was a case of multiple murders, a faulty or sub-standard investigation cannot be a sole ground to discard other reliable, substantial material evidence brought on record by the prosecution - The concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the High Court were based on a proper appreciation of circumstantial evidence and called for no interference. [Relied on Rameshbhai Mohanbhai Koli v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 11 SCC 111; Modan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (1978) 4 SCC 435; Anter Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 10 SCC 657; Mallikarjun v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 8 SCC 359; Paras 12-20] Uperndra Khare v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 607 : 2026 INSC 538

Criminal Procedure — Release of Passport vs. Permission to Travel Abroad — Reversal of High Court and Sessions Court orders - The Supreme Court restored the Magistrate's order directing the release of the passport to the accused, while clarifying that such release does not automatically amount to a permission to leave the country - The accused is restricted from flying out of India without obtaining the express permission of the Sessions Court post-committal of the case. [Relied on Rajesh Ranjan Yadav v. CBI, (2007) 1 SCC 70; Paras 11 - 14] Seesa Santosh v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 603 : 2026 INSC 628

Criminal Trial – Interested / Related Witness - Testimony of the victim's father (PW-1) and sisters (PW-2 and PW-3) cannot be discarded solely on account of relationship - Relationship is not a ground to affect the credibility of a witness if the ocular testimony is otherwise natural, trustworthy, and cogent – Held that the appellants cannot claim the benefit of parity merely because some co-accused were acquitted - An order of acquittal for other co-accused does not lead as a necessary corollary to the acquittal of the convicts if the evidence against the latter stands on a substantially distinct and higher footing (direct eyewitness accounts and precise Section 27 recoveries). [Relied on Shaik Ahmed v. State of Telangana, (2021) 9 SCC 59; Willian Stephen v. The State of Tamil Nadu and Anr., (2024) 5 SCC 258; Wahid v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi, (2025) 3 SCC 341; Goverdhan & another v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2025) 3 SCC 378; Paras 21-30] Harjindra Singh v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2026 INSC 569

Custody of Minors

Parental Alienation Syndrome (PAS) and False Memory Creation - Invocation of PAS in Bitter Custody Disputes – Duty of Caution - The Respondent-father raised apprehensions of the child being tutored, developing "parental alienation syndrome," and falling victim to "false memory creation – Held that Parental Alienation Syndrome (PAS) is a highly convoluted and intricate phenomenon that cannot be attributed or imputed to an individual parent routinely or routinely used as a straitjacket formula - Corroborating contemporary mental health developments, the Court observed that PAS is not a diagnosable clinical syndrome but rather a process of manipulation through "alienating behaviours." – held that the Courts must look at specific, identified behaviours found to have taken place within the individual family and must not prematurely label any parent as a promoter of such behaviour without proper, clear material evidence. [Relied on Sakshi v. Union of India, (2004) 5 SCC 518; Gaurav Nagpal v. Sumedha Nagpal, (2009) 1 SCC 42; Vivek Singh v. Romani Singh, (2017) 3 SCC 231; Col. Ramneesh Pal Singh v. Sugandhi Aggarwal, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 847; Paras 84-98] Sheetal Vasant Thakur v. Chirag Arora, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 618 : 2026 INSC 638

Custody of Minors – Paramount Consideration vs. Holistic Factors - The Supreme Court held that while the welfare of the child is the "paramount consideration" in custody disputes, the High Court erred in holding that other factors—such as the conduct of the parents, financial capacity, standard of living, and the child's education are not relevant – Noted that these factors have a cumulative effect and are necessary for determining a custody arrangement - noted that the respondent-wife had removed the children from Qatar to India mid-academic session without the father's consent or original passports, using "fake or duplicate" documents - This conduct, coupled with her violation of a court undertaking to return the children to Qatar for which she was found guilty of contempt constituted material aspects that the High Court failed to consider - Supreme Court highlighted that the High Court ignored the impact of the Qatar Court's order (dated 31.10.2023), which had revoked the wife's custody due to her misconduct in removing the children from its jurisdiction - The Supreme Court observed that, at the time of the High Court's judgment, there was no subsisting order of custody in favor of the mother; rather, an order existed in favor of the father as the guardian - Relying on mediation reports and interviews, noted that both minor children expressed an inclination to join their father in Qatar, despite limited memory of life there - The elder child felt his father's presence was sufficient for his care, and both appeared comfortable being without their mother - The High Court judgment was set aside for ignoring "material and crucial aspects." The matter was remanded for reconsideration on merits within four months – Appeal allowed. [Paras 22-33] Mohtashem Billah Malik v. Sana Aftab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 115

Customs Act, 1962

Customs and Central Excise Tariffs – Classification of "n-Hexane" or "Exxsol Hexane" – Competing Entries between Chapter 27 (Petroleum Oils/Motor Spirit) and Chapter 29 (Separate Chemically Defined Organic Compounds/Pure Hydrocarbons) – Held - The imported product "n-Hexane" or "Exxsol Hexane", which is a Saturated Acyclic Hydrocarbon with the chemical formula , is correctly classifiable under Customs Tariff Heading (CTH) 2901.10 and Central Excise Tariff Heading (CETH) 2901.90 as a separate chemically defined organic compound in its pure commercial form, and not under Chapter 27 as a Petroleum Oil or Motor Spirit - The initial burden of proof rests entirely on the Revenue to show that an item is taxable in the manner claimed by them - The Revenue failed to discharge this burden by merely demonstrating that the product's flash point was below and its distillation range was between to - To classify a product as "Motor Spirit" under Chapter 27, all three conditions stipulated in the Supplementary Notes must be satisfied: (i) it must be a hydrocarbon oil, (ii) it must have a flash point below , and (iii) it must be shown to be suitable for use as fuel in spark-ignition engines - The Revenue led no evidence to establish the third condition, whereas the Assessee demonstrated its use as an industrial solvent. [Relied on CCE v. GAIL (India), 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2130; Paras 50 – 58] Commissioner of Customs v. Reliance Industries, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 544 : 2026 INSC 536

Customs and Central Excise Tariffs – Interpretation via HSN Explanatory Notes & Impurities - Harmonized System Nomenclature (HSN) Notes serve as a safe guide for resolving tariff classification disputes when the expressions used are pari materia with the Tariff Acts - Under Chapter Note 1 to Chapter 29, a "Separate Chemically Defined Compound" is defined by a constant ratio of elements and a definitive structural diagram - While n-Hexane shares its molecular formula (C6H14) with its four other isomers, it possesses a distinct, linear acyclic structural formation that differentiates its physical and chemical properties - the presence of minor, non-deliberate impurities resulting solely from the fractional distillation process (such as unconverted starting materials) does not alter its character or convert the compound into an excluded acyclic isomer mixture under Chapter 27 – Held that as per Paragraph 2.3 of the Foreign Trade Policy, any doubt regarding the classification of an item in the Indian Trade Classification (Harmonized System) [ITC (HS)] must be referred to the Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT), whose decision is final and binding - The DGFT vide Policy Circular No. 40(RE-2003)/2002-2007 dated 14.07.2004 explicitly clarified that the import of Hexane falls within Chapter 29, which binds the customs authorities. [Relied on CCE v. M/s Wood Craft Products Limited, (1995) 3 SCC 454; Atul Commodities Private Limited v. Commissioner of Customs, (2009) 5 SCC 46; Paras 23-51, 65-71] Commissioner of Customs v. Reliance Industries, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 544 : 2026 INSC 536

Customs Act, 1962; Section 28, 46 — Customs Tariff Act, 1975; General Rules of Interpretation (GRI) — Classification of "Aluminium Shelving for Mushroom Growing" - The Supreme Court set aside the CESTAT order that had classified aluminium shelves as "parts of agricultural machinery" under CTI 84369900 - held that the subject goods are "Aluminium Structures" classifiable under CTI 76109010 - 1. Analysis of General Rules of Interpretation (GRI) – i. Sequential Application: The Court reiterated that GRIs 1 to 4 must be applied sequentially; ii. Primacy of GRI 1: Classification begins and often ends at GRI 1, which prioritizes the terms of headings and relevant Section or Chapter Notes; iii. GRI 3 (Specific vs. General): GRI 3 is a "tie-breaker" invoked only if GRI 1 and GRI 2 result in a tie between two or more headings - The CESTAT erred by jumping to GRI 3 to prefer a "specific" heading without first exhausting the mandatory sequential inquiry of GRI 1; iv. Reliance on HSN Explanatory Notes - These notes are the foundation for interpreting the HSN-based tariff - affirmed that HSN notes have binding force when the domestic tariff is aligned with HSN – Held that the 'Aluminum Shelves' imported for mushroom cultivation cannot be classified as 'parts of agricultural machinery' but are liable to be classified as 'aluminium structures', attracting a customs duty. [Relied on Commissioner of Central Excise, Salem v. Madhan Agro Industries (India) Private Ltd. (2024); Paras 117- 142] Commissioner of Customs (Import) v. Welkin Foods, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 17 : 2026 INSC 19

Customs Act, 1962 - Analysis of "End Use" and "Intended Use" – Held that the taxable event is the time of import - The condition of the article at import not its eventual use is the crucial factor – Held that holding that "use" is relevant only if the tariff entry itself explicitly refers to use or adaptation; iii. Objective Characteristics: Classification must be based on objective characteristics and properties to ensure legal certainty and prevent subjectivity. [Relied on Dunlop India Ltd v. Union of India (1976); Indian Aluminium Cables Ltd v. Union of India (1985), Paras 69-83, 87-93] Commissioner of Customs (Import) v. Welkin Foods, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 17 : 2026 INSC 19

Customs Act, 1962 - Analysis of the Common Parlance Test – i. Restrictive Application: The "common parlance" or "trade parlance" test is not a measure of first resort in the HSN era; ii. Conditions for Invocation - It can only be invoked if: (i) the statute/notes provide no explicit definition; (ii) the heading lacks scientific/technical terms; and (iii) it does not contradict the statutory framework; iii. Exceptions - Where a term is used in a scientific or technical sense, common parlance is irrelevant - held that technical meanings must prevail over commercial nomenclature if the statute implies a technical sense. [Relied on Akbar Badrudin Giwani v. Collector of Customs, Bombay (1990); Paras 63-68] Commissioner of Customs (Import) v. Welkin Foods, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 17 : 2026 INSC 19

Customs Act, 1962 - Definition and Characteristics of "Machine" – i. Essential Features: A machine must consist of moving parts and utilize power (mechanical or electrical) to perform a specific task; ii. Support Structures vs. Parts: Static structures that merely support a plant are not "parts" of the machine itself – Held that All of the individual machines are already complete and fully operational on their own; their mechanical and electrical functions do not rely on aluminium shelves - These shelves do not contribute to their operation; they merely serve as a surface for the devices to perform their functions. [Relied On Saraswati Sugar Mills v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi-III (2014); Paras 124-140] Commissioner of Customs (Import) v. Welkin Foods, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 17 : 2026 INSC 19

Customs Act, 1962 – Section 135(1)(b)(i) – Smuggling of foreign wrist watches – Admissibility of Section 108 statements – Sentencing – Reduction of sentence to period already undergone – The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the appellants for the illegal import and handling of 777 foreign-made wrist watches and 879 straps - upheld the High Court's finding that statements recorded by Customs Officers under Section 108 are substantive pieces of evidence and are not barred by Sections 24, 30, or 34 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, provided they are voluntary. Amad Noormamad Bakali v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 190 : 2026 INSC 180

Customs Act, 1962 - Specific Application to Aluminium Shelves – Held that i. Heading 7610: The HSN Explanatory Notes characterize "structures" as items that generally remain in position once installed and are made of bars, rods, plates, etc., joined by riveting or bolting - The subject goods fulfilled all these criteria; ii. Heading 8436: The shelves lacked moving parts and independent mechanical functions - Integrating them post-import with watering systems did not change their character at the time of import into "agricultural machinery" – Held that the subject goods are correctly classifiable under CTI 7610 90 10 - The CESTAT judgment was set aside for misapplying the General Rules of Interpretation and over-relying on the end-use/common parlance tests in the face of clear statutory guidance – Appeal allowed. [Paras 96, 100, 117-130, 142] Commissioner of Customs (Import) v. Welkin Foods, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 17 : 2026 INSC 19

Customs Duty – Special Economic Zone (SEZ) – Electrical Energy – Supply to Domestic Tariff Area (DTA) – Levy of Customs Duty – The appellant challenged the levy of customs duty on electrical energy generated in its SEZ unit and supplied to the DTA for the period between 16 September 2010 and 15 February 2016 - The High Court of Gujarat had previously in 2015 struck down a similar levy for an earlier period (June 2009 to September 2010), holding that such a supply does not constitute an "import into India" under Section 12 of the Customs Act, 1962 - in the impugned 2019 judgment, the High Court declined to extend this relief to the subsequent period, reasoning that the later notifications (Notification Nos. 91/2010-Cus. and 26/2012-Cus.) were not specifically challenged - The Supreme Court held that the 2015 judgment had correctly identified that there was no identifiable charging event to attract customs duty under Section 12 for electricity generated within India in an SEZ and wheeled to the DTA - An SEZ is not a foreign territory, and the legal fiction in Section 30 of the SEZ Act ("as if imported") is for the purpose of determining the rate of duty and does not convert an intra-national supply into an act of import - Observed that Section 25 of the Customs Act is a power to relax or exempt duty, not a power to create or invent a new tax - The use of an "exemption" notification to introduce a fresh liability is a colourable exercise of delegated authority and is ultra vires – Appeal allowed. [Paras 45-85] Adani Power Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 3 : 2026 INSC 1 : (2026) 3 SCC 143

Delay and Laches

Mitigating Factors for Delay - Supreme Court observed that delay is not a rigid rule of law but a flexible rule of practice guided by judicial discretion - In the present case, Supreme Court declined to dismiss the petition at the threshold despite a 60-year delay due to: i. The unique historical trajectory and political insurgency in Mizoram; ii. Continuous agitation of claims by the Chiefs before various forums; iii. Official assurances and conduct of the State Government that engendered a legitimate expectation of an amicable resolution, thereby dissuading immediate litigation. Mizo Chief Council Mizoram v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 241 : 2026 INSC 236

Equity and Limitation – Delay and Laches – Unexplained delay of nearly ten years in instituting the suit challenging sale deeds executed under GPAs – Held, leaving GPAs uncancelled, allowing mutation entries to continue in the names of purchasers, and permitting subsequent sales to take place for almost a decade without objection is inconsistent with the conduct normally expected from a person alleging fraudulent and unauthorized alienation of immovable property - Prolonged silence and inaction for almost ten years are critical factors in assessing the credibility of the plaintiff's case. [Relied on H. Siddiqui (dead) by LRs v. A. Ramalingam, 2011 (4) SCC 240; Subhra Mukerjee v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., (2000) 3 SCC 312; Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao, (1999) 3 SCC 573; Para 54] Mallika v. R. Nallathambi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 534 : 2026 INSC 529

Delay and Laches – Continuing Cause of Action – Land Acquisition Compensation -The Appellant-Corporation resisted the 2019 claim for additional amenity TDR on the ground of an unexplained delay of 17 years since the surrender of land in 2002 – Held that neither the doctrine of delay and laches nor the principle of abandonment or waiver applies when a relief in the nature of statutory compensation (FSI/TDR) is sought - The right to fair compensation under Section 126(1)(b) of the MRTP Act crystallizes upon the surrender of the land, and a duty is cast on the State to pay it proactively, even in the absence of a representation - noted that between 1996 and 2009, the law regarding the scaling down of additional amenity TDR remained in "suspended animation" due to executive circulars, which was clarified only by the Supreme Court in 2009 - A clear distinction must be drawn between a delayed challenge to the acquisition process itself and a delay in seeking fair statutory compensation; the latter constitutes a continuing cause of action. [Relied on Godrej & Boyce Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2009) 5 SCC 24; Kukreja Construction Company and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., (2024) 14 SCC 594; Municipal Corpn., Greater Bombay v. Yeshwant Jagannath Vaity, (2011) 11 SCC 88; Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corpn., Greater Mumbai, (2023) 15 SCC 110; Sukh Dutt Ratra & Anr. v. State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors., (2022) 7 SCC 508; olkata Municipal Corpn. v. Bimal Kumar Shah, (2024) 10 SCC 533; Paras 58 – 70] Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation v. Vijay Nagar Apartments, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 523 : 2026 INSC 517

Delay and Laches – Public Law Jurisdiction – Seniority Dispute – A court exercising public law jurisdiction does not encourage the agitation of stale claims, particularly in matters of seniority and promotion, where the rights of third parties have crystallized in the interregnum - "Fence-sitters" cannot be permitted to raise a dispute relating to seniority and consequential promotion or challenge the validity of an order after the matter has concluded. [Relied on Shiba Shankar Mohapatra and others v. State of Orissa and others, (2010) 12 SCC 471; Para 25] T. Gnanavel v. R. Sasipriya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 457 : 2026 INSC 446

Delay - Important Observations on Incarceration & Procedural Delay - i. Attribution of Delay - noted that procedural history did not support the claim that delay was solely due to prosecutorial or judicial inaction. It observed that at various stages, the prosecution was ready to proceed, while the defense raised objections, requested deferments, or filed successive applications; ii. Complexity of the Case - noting the volume of documentary and electronic evidence and the nature of the "structured and continuing conspiracy," noted that the proceedings are inherently time-consuming; iii. Threshold for Constitutional Intervention- held that for constitutional intervention to override a statutory embargo, there must be a finding that continued detention has become "punitive or unconscionable". [Relied on Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713; National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (2019) 5 SCC 1; Union of India v. Saleem Khan (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1754; Paras 104-106, 387-390, 430, 431] Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt of NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 1 : 2026 INSC 2 : 2026 1 Crimes (SC) 32

DNA test

DNA test - Paternity Disputes - An acquittal in a criminal prosecution for rape under Section 376 IPC does not operate as a bar to the determination of paternity in a civil suit and does not preclude the court from directing a DNA test. An acquittal in a criminal case merely means that the prosecution failed to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt; it does not conclusively negate the existence of a biological relationship between the parties. In paternity disputes, especially where inheritance rights are claimed, DNA profiling constitutes the most reliable and scientific method of determining biological parentage when other evidence is inconclusive. The right to know one's biological father and the consequent legal rights flowing therefrom must be balanced against the alleged father's right to privacy. In appropriate cases, the interest of the child in establishing parentage outweighs privacy concerns, particularly when there is no material to show that the mother had any other relationship during the relevant period. Chaturbhuj Pradhan v. Amar Pradhan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 612 : 2026 INSC 600

DNA test - Paternity Disputes - The respondent, born in 1999, instituted a civil suit after attaining majority seeking a declaration that he is the biological son of the appellant and is entitled to a share in his property. The appellant had been acquitted in a rape case filed by the respondent's mother. Relying on the acquittal and earlier proceedings, the appellant opposed the suit and resisted a DNA test order passed by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court. Dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court held that the respondent had lived his entire life under the shadow of disputed parentage. Leaving the issue unresolved would potentially deny him legitimate rights if he is found to be the biological son. The Court emphasized the indispensable nature of DNA evidence in modern paternity disputes and directed the appellant to undergo DNA profiling. Chaturbhuj Pradhan v. Amar Pradhan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 612 : 2026 INSC 600

Digitalization

Digitalization of Judiciary — e-Courts Project — Handwritten Orders — Supreme Court expressed concern over Tribunals continuing to use handwritten, illegible order sheets despite the national e-Courts project started in 2007 - High Courts directed to ensure computers provided are utilized and that officers' names and UID numbers are clearly mentioned on orders. [Relied on Parminder Singh v. Honey Goyal and Others, 2025 INSC 361: (2025) 9 SCC 539; Paras 10-18] National Insurance Company Ltd v. Rathlavath Chandulal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 149 : 2026 INSC 146

Disciplinary Inquiry – Standard of Proof and Perversity – Administrative Law – Maxim “Nemo Firut Repente Turpissimus” - While a Court does not typically act as an appellate authority over an inquiry report, it can interfere if the findings are "perverse," meaning no reasonable person would have reached such a conclusion on the available material – Held in this case, neither the complainant nor the stenographer (alleged to be the conduit for bribes) was examined, and the Public Prosecutor testified that the bail orders were proper- Held that Authorities should not ignore the long-standing reputation of an officer when evaluating a sudden allegation of "doubtful integrity" based on a mere hunch or hypothesis. [Relied on Sadhna Chaudhary v. State of U.P. (2020) 11 SCC 760; R.R. Parekh v. High Court of Gujarat (2016) 14 SCC 1; Union of India v. K.K. Dhawan (1993) 2 SCC 56; Ishwar Chand Jain v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana (1988) 3 SCC 370; Krishna Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar (2019) 10 SCC 640; Paras 29-40] Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 2 : 2026 INSC 7 : (2026) 3 SCC 325

Discretionary Toolkit of the Court – Held that while exercising power under Section 29A, the Court must examine "sufficient cause" and may deploy several measures to ensure integrity and efficiency – i. Reduction of arbitrator fees (up to 5% per month of delay); ii. Substitution of one or all arbitrators; iii. Imposition of actual or exemplary costs on parties; iv. Imposition of specific terms and conditions for the conduct of proceedings. C. Velusamy v. K. Indhera, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 105 : 2026 INSC 112 : AIR 2026 SC 918

Distinction Between Precedent and Res Judicata — Section 11(7) — Held that while a "precedent" operates in rem and serves as a source of law for other parties, "res judicata" operates in personam between the same parties to ensure finality in litigation - Even if other benches of a High Court interpreted an identical clause differently in separate litigations (precedent), the specific order appointing the arbitrator between the current parties constitutes res judicata regarding the existence of the arbitration agreement - The correctness of the initial decision is immaterial unless it relates to a lack of inherent jurisdiction. Eminent Colonizers v. Rajasthan Housing Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 109 : 2026 INSC 116

Doctrines

Doctrine of Merger — Dismissal in Default — Supreme Court clarified that the dismissal of an appeal for default or as time-barred amounts to a final disposal and cannot be equated with non-filing or withdrawal - Such a dismissal has the effect of confirming the lower court's decision on merits - Held, that the execution application filed within 12 years from the date of the appellate court's dismissal order is within the limitation period. Gajanan v. Pralhad, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 341

Doctrine of Manifest Arbitrariness – Evolution and Application – Held: Manifest arbitrariness is a well-settled ground for striking down plenary legislation under Article 14. A law is manifestly arbitrary when it is "capricious, irrational, or not guided by any principle" or is "excessive and disproportionate" - A legislative enactment that targets a specific entity for total deprivation of management and property rights without following due process, providing adequate compensation, or establishing a clear public necessity (beyond mere "better management") is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017) 9 SCC 1; E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974) 4 SCC 3; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248; Paras 35-50] Anurag Krishna Sinha v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 226 : 2026 INSC 219

Doctrine of Estoppel – Participation in Selection Process – The Supreme Court rejected the High Court's view that the appellant was estopped from challenging the allotment simply because he participated in the draw of lots. The Court held that participation does not bar a challenge when the process is marred by bias and arbitrary exercise of power - Supreme Court imposed costs of ₹1 lakh on the Society (HEWO), ₹50,000 on Respondent No. 3, and ₹25,000 on Respondent No. 4. It directed a fresh draw of lots among the four eligible applicants who were available at the earlier point of time – Appeal allowed. [Paras 15 - 18] Dinesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 171 : 2026 INSC 163 : AIR 2026 SC 1495

Doctrine of Lis Pendens in Money Decrees – Supreme Court rejected the argument that lis pendens does not apply to simple money suits - If Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act were excluded from money suits, a judgment-debtor could easily defeat the decree by alienating property before execution, rendering the judicial process meaningless - Noted that "the true difficulties of a litigant begin only after they have obtained a decree". R. Savithri Naidu v. Cotton Corporation of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 151 : 2026 INSC 150 : AIR 2026 SC 913

Doctrine of Merger - Effect of Granting Leave - Once the Supreme Court grants leave in a Special Leave Petition and the appeal is thereafter decided, the doctrine of merger applies, whether the Supreme Court's order is one of reversal, modification, or mere affirmation - Distinguished cases where SLP is dismissed without granting leave, where no merger occurs – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Kunhayammed & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Anr., (2000) 6 SCC 359; Khoday Distilleries Limited & Ors. v. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Limited, Kollegal, (2019) 4 SCC 376; Paras 11-12] United Labour Federation v. Gagandeep Singh Bedi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 208 : 2026 INSC 204

Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel — Statutory Power — The doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be used to manifest an outcome that precludes the State from exercising its statutory power to withdraw an exemption in the public interest - While the State can withdraw a concession, the principles of fairness and legitimate expectation require that such withdrawal should not cause "undue hardship" to those who structured their financial planning based on the earlier concession. State of Maharashtra v. Reliance Industries Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 304 : 2026 INSC 296

Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961

Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 — Precedential Value of High Court Decisions — Neera Singh vs. State (Delhi High Court) — Per Incuriam – Held - The observations in Neera Singh vs. State (2007), which suggested that police should register cases against parents who give dowry, are of no precedential value and are considered obiter dicta - That judgment was rendered in ignorance of the specific statutory protection under Section 7(3) of the DP Act and is, therefore, not good law. [Relied on Pooja Saxena vs. State and another (2010 SCC OnLine Del 3652); Surendra Singh Rathore (2025 INSC 248); Paras 13-21] Rahul Gupta v. Station House Officer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 381 : 2026 INSC 374

Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 — Section 7(3) - Statutory Immunity against Prosecution for 'Giving' Dowry — Protection to 'Persons Aggrieved' – Held - Statements made by a wife or her family members (as aggrieved persons) regarding the giving of dowry, recorded during the investigation of an offence of 'taking' dowry, cannot form the sole basis for a counter-prosecution against them under Section 3 of the DP Act. Section 7(3) provides a statutory "shield of immunity" ensuring that such statements do not subject the aggrieved person to prosecution - A separate FIR for 'giving' dowry could only be registered if independent evidence is presented, rather than relying solely on the protected statements of the wife and her kin. Rahul Gupta v. Station House Officer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 381 : 2026 INSC 374

Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940

Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 – Section 34 – Vicarious Liability – Directors' Responsibility - The Supreme Court held: Whether Directors of a company were "in charge of" and "responsible to" the company for the conduct of its business at the time of the offense is a question of fact - Quashing a complaint at the threshold on the ground of insufficient compliance with Section 34 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act is premature; such determinations are best left to the Trial Court to be decided at the appropriate stage based on evidence – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Cheminova India Limited v. State of Punjab, (2021) 8 SCC 818; Paras 32-59] State of Kerala v. Panacea Biotec Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 206 : 2026 INSC 200 : AIR 2026 SC 1270 ; 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 285

Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940; Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 – Rule 49 – Power of the State Government to prescribe essential qualifications for the post of Drug Inspector (DI) or Drug Control Officer (DCO) - Key Issues – i. Whether the State Government, under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India (or State Acts), can prescribe "experience" as an essential qualification for appointment to the post of Drug Inspector when such qualification is absent in the Central Rules; ii. Applicability of the Doctrine of Occupied Field where the Central Government has already exercised its rule-making power under Section 33 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act (D&C Act) – Held that when a field prescribing a qualification for a public post is occupied by the Union, then it is impermissible for the States to impose additional qualifications, observed the Supreme Court - Main Findings & Ratio – i. Doctrine of Occupied Field - The D&C Act is a "central law" that occupies the field regarding the prescription of qualifications for Inspectors under Section 33(2)(b) and Section 33(2)(n) - The State Government's power to appoint persons "as it thinks fit" under Section 21 does not extend to altering the "prescribed qualifications" set by the Central Government; ii. Interpretation of Rule 49 - The substantive part of Rule 49 of the Drug Rules, 1945, mandates specific educational degrees as the only essential qualifications for appointment - The 18-month experience mentioned in the proviso to Rule 49 is not a condition for eligibility for appointment; rather, it is a condition precedent for authorizing an already appointed Inspector to inspect the manufacture of substances listed in Schedule C; iii. Constitutional Supremacy - Rules framed by the State under the proviso to Article 309 or State enactments (like the Karnataka State Civil Services Act) cannot override or be inconsistent with the Central Drug Rules in an occupied field. [Relied on A.B. Krishna v. State of Karnataka (1998) 3 SCC 495; Paras 38 – 63] State of Haryana v. Krishan Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 58 : 2026 INSC 63

Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 – Section 18(a)(vi) read with Rule 74, 18-B, 22(1)(cca), 27(d), and 28-A – Record Maintenance – Limitation for Filing Complaint – Jurisdiction of Courts – Held that i. Non-Maintenance of Records as a Substantive Offence: The Appellants were prosecuted for failing to maintain records as stipulated under Schedule M and Schedule U of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945, specifically regarding the drug Pseudoephedrine - held that allegations regarding the contravention of Section 18(a)(vi) of the Act (manufacturing/stocking in contravention of rules) are punishable under Section 27(d); ii. Limitation Period for Prosecution: The Appellants argued that the offence fell under Section 18-B (punishable under Section 28-A), which carries a maximum punishment of one year, thus attracting a one-year limitation period under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. - The Supreme Court rejected this, clarifying that since the allegations included violations of Section 18(a)(vi) punishable under Section 27(d) (imprisonment up to two years), the limitation period is three years as per Section 468 Cr.P.C; iii. Jurisdiction and Committal to Special Court/Sessions: Under Section 32(2), no court inferior to a Court of Session shall try an offence punishable under Chapter IV of the Act - While Section 36-A allows for summary trials by a Magistrate for certain offences, it explicitly excludes those triable by the Special Court or Court of Session - the committal of the case to the Special Judge-I (a Court of Session) was legally sound – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Miteshbhai J. Patel Vs. Drug Inspector, 2025 SCC online SC 2203; Paras 27-32] SBS Biotech v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 181 : 2026 INSC 171

Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 – Directions issued by the Court – i. Selection Criteria - Public Service Commissions (HPSC and KPSC) must complete selections based strictly on educational qualifications in Rule 49, ignoring the "experience" requirement added by State Rules; ii. Redrawing Merit List - Lists must be redrawn within eight weeks; iii. Protection of Existing Appointees (Haryana) - Selected candidates who remain in the new merit list shall continue in service - Those who fall out of the merit list may be continued only at the State's discretion via supernumerary posts, placed at the bottom of the seniority list. State of Haryana v. Krishan Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 58 : 2026 INSC 63

Drugs - Legal Definition of "Drugs" vs. "New Drugs" regarding Stem Cells - While autologous stem cells used in ASD treatments (not undergoing substantial manipulation) may not qualify as "new drugs" under the New Drugs and Clinical Trial Rules, 2019 (NDCT Rules), they fall under the broader definition of "drug" as "substances" under Section 3(b)(i) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 - stem-cell derived products involving "substantial manipulation" are perpetually categorized as "new drugs" under Rule of the NDCT Rules. [Relied on Chimanlal Jagjivan Das Sheth v. State of Maharashtra 1962 SCC OnLine SC 16; Ishwar Singh Bindra and Others v. State of U.P. 1968 SCC OnLine SC 98; Paras 101 – 109] Yash Charitable Trust v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 93 : 2026 INSC 96

Economic Policy

Economic Policy and Legislative Intent — Excessive Judicial Review — Supreme Court cautioned against the strategic use of litigation by unsuccessful resolution applicants to delay the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP). Excessive judicial scrutiny beyond narrow statutory boundaries leads to value destruction, erodes the going-concern status of the Corporate Debtor, and discourages future bidders by introducing legal uncertainty - The IBC prioritizes speed, finality, and predictability to ensure efficient resource allocation in the economy. [Relied on Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited vs. Satish Kumar Gupta, (2020) 8 SCC 531; Kalyani Transco vs. Bhushan Power & Steel Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2093; Swiss Ribbons Private Ltd. vs. Union of India, (2019) 4 SCC 17; Pratap Technocrats Private Ltd. vs. Monitoring Committee of Reliance Infratel Limited, (2021) 10 SCC 623; Paras 7-14] Torrent Power v. Ashish Arjunkumar Rathi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 207 : 2026 INSC 206 : AIR 2026 SC 1347

Economic Viability and Fiscal Prudence – Comparative data from Rajasthan reveals OCIs are significantly more cost-effective than closed prisons - Per-prisoner per-day expenditure in closed prisons is approximately Rs. 333.12, whereas in open prisons, it is only Rs. 49.60 - Staffing ratios also show marked efficiency: 6:1 in closed prisons versus 80:1 in open camps - While "Prisons" is a State subject (Schedule VII, List II), States are urged to implement the Model Prison Manual, 2016 and the Model Prisons and Correctional Services Act, 2023 to ensure uniformity and modernization - Specific Directions – i. Establishment of High-Powered Committee (HPC): Constituted under the Executive Chairmanship of Hon'ble Mr. Justice S. Ravindra Bhat (Retd.) to formulate Common Minimum Standards for OCI governance, eligibility, and management; ii. Expansion of Infrastructure: States lacking OCIs (e.g., Arunachal Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Telangana) must assess feasibility and develop protocols for establishment within three months; iii. Mandatory Monitoring: All High Courts directed to register a suo motu writ petition as a continuing mandamus to oversee compliance; iv. State Monitoring Committees: Every State/UT to constitute a committee headed by the Executive Chairman of the State Legal Services Authority within four weeks. [Relied on D. Bhuvan Mohan Patnaik v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1975) 3 SCC 185; Mohammed Giasuddin v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1977) 3 SCC 287; Dharambir v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1979) 3 SCC 645; Vikram Deo Singh Tomar v. State of Bihar (1988) SCC OnLine SC 450; Paras 33-36, 47-51, 67-71, 73] Suhas Chakma v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 205 : 2026 INSC 198

Education

Education Law – Medical Admission – NEET-UG – Forgery and Fraud – Restoration of Vacant Seat – A medical seat in a Government Institution is a precious national resource held in public trust - When a seat falls vacant due to the cancellation of admission obtained through fraud or forged documents, the regulatory authorities are under a bounden duty to restore that seat to the next eligible candidate in the merit list - Administrative inaction, lethargy, or silence by the National Medical Commission (NMC) and the University that leads to a seat remaining wasted is a subversion of the purpose of the NEET-UG examination. Secretary National Medical Commission v. Sanjana Thakur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 330

Pedantic Contradiction in Academic Recognition - Where a language is already being taught as an academic subject at the university level across the State, the argument that it lacks institutional or pedagogical acceptance for school education is highly pedantic and untenable - The State is obligated to translate constitutional assurances into concrete action by introducing such regional languages as a subject in schools in a phased and progressive manner. [Relied on State of Karnataka & Anr. v. Associated Management of English Medium Primary & Secondary Schools & Ors., (2014) 9 SCC 485; English Medium Students Parents Assn. v. State of Karnataka & Ors., (1994) 1 SCC 550; Devesh Sharma v. Union of India & Ors., (2023) 18 SCC 339; State of U.P. & Anr. v. Anand Kumar Yadav & Ors., (2018) 13 SCC 560; Para 50, 51] Padam Mehta v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 492 : 2026 INSC 476

National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 - Section 12A — Power of Council to determine minimum standards — The second proviso to Section 12A reinforces the legislative mandate that the minimum qualifications of a teacher must be acquired within the period specified under the RTE Act - Subordinate notifications cannot override the clear and unambiguous command of the parent statute. State of UP v. Anjuman Ishaat-E-Taleem Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 568 : 2026 INSC 597

National Education Policy (NEP), 2020 – Executive Policies vs. Ground Implementation - The NEP, 2020 underscores the primacy of the home, local, or regional language as a medium of instruction, recognizing that young children grasp complex concepts better in their mother tongue - there appears to be a substantial deficit in the actual implementation of these commitments by the State at the ground level - While frameworks and policies continue to be announced, their absence in the lived experience of the child renders the entire exercise hollow - A right that exists only on paper without corresponding administrative will or implementation is no right at all. [Paras 29-35, 40 - 45] Padam Mehta v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 492 : 2026 INSC 476

Higher Education Services Commission Act, 1980 (Uttar Pradesh) – Section 13(4) – Uttar Pradesh Education Service Selection Commission Act, 2023 – Section 31 – Waitlisted Candidates – Change of Posting – Effect of Repeal - The Supreme Court held that Section 13(4) of the Old Act does not permit a waitlisted candidate, who has already been recommended for appointment to a specific college, to seek a change of posting to another college on personal grounds - A candidate's voluntary decision not to assume charge at the initially recommended institution does not fall within the ambit of a vacancy arising out of death, resignation, or "otherwise" - Supreme Court further clarified that upon the enforcement of the New Act of 2023, which repealed the Old Act, the select list/panel prepared under the old statutory scheme automatically lapses - Authorities cannot revive the expired list to issue fresh recommendation or placement orders - Any such fresh appointment after the commencement of the New Act must strictly adhere to the procedure contemplated under Sections 10 and 11 of the New Act. [Relied on Kamlesh Kumar Sharma v. Yogesh Kumar Gupta and others, (1998) 3 SCC 45; Paras 20 - 24] Dr. Manoj Kumar Rawat v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 517 : 2026 INSC 508

Education Law – Relocation of Medical Students – Capitation and Fee Structure – Apportionment of Financial Liability - Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 142 – Recovery of Outstanding Fees of Relocated Medical Students – Sudden closing/denial of recognition to a medical college due to deficiencies creates an extraordinary situation putting the academic future of students in jeopardy - When students are relocated to other private medical colleges under judicial intervention via a State-supervised counselling mechanism, the resultant financial burden must be equitably apportioned. [Paras 4 – 6] Soumya Ranjan Panda v. Subhalaxmi Dash, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 498 : 2026 INSC 488

Election

Election Law – Remand and Filling of Lacunae - The Supreme Court set aside an order of the Punjab and Haryana High Court that had remanded an election petition to the Trial Court for fresh evidence, including expert fingerprint analysis - The dispute concerned the election for the post of Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat Khalila Majra, where allegations of double polling were made – Noted that the High Court had directed the Trial Court to call specific voters and obtain expert reports from the Finger Print Bureau to verify thumb impressions - Held: The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in issuing sweeping directions for leading fresh evidence - An election petition must be decided based on the evidence already available on record as led by the parties - Supreme Court held that there is no scope for filling up lacunae in proceedings related to an election petition, especially when neither party had raised the issue of expert evidence before the Tribunal. [Para 8-11] Rakam Singh v. Amit, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 318

Registration of Electors Rules, 1960 – Rule 21A – Procedure for Deletion/Removal of Names – The safeguards of notice and hearing under Rule 21A are not violated by the SIR guidelines - While non-submission of the enumeration form results in provisional non-inclusion in the draft roll, final deletions are only made after the claims and objections stage, where the ERO conducts an enquiry, issues show-cause notices for doubtful cases, and passes speaking orders subject to a two-tier statutory appeal. Substance of due process is preserved. [Paras 136-142] Association For Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 549 : 2026 INSC 564

Election Law – Presumption of Regularity of Existing Entries – Scope of Re-verification – Enrolment in an electoral roll carries a rebuttable evidentiary presumption of validity under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, but it does not impose a blanket embargo on the ECI's power to conduct a systemic, inquisitorial re-verification exercise - A prior entry cannot be used as a shield to obstruct the Commission's constitutional mandate of systemic oversight. [Distinguished: Labu Babu Hussein v. Electoral Registration Officer, (1995) 3 SCC 100 Paras 111-125] Association For Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 549 : 2026 INSC 564

Election - The Supreme Court urged the Election Commission of India to consider the suggestions put forth by a petitioner regarding measures to curb excessive election expenditures observing that the suggestions given by the petitioner are "worth consideration". Prabhakar Deshpande v. Chief Election Commissioner of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 218

Election - Where only two candidates contested an election, setting aside the winning candidate's election does not warrant a fresh poll; instead, the runner-up should be declared elected. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's decision to direct a fresh election, after the winning candidate's election as Panchayat Samiti Chairperson was declared null and void. Ramadebi Rautray v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 260 : 2026 INSC 243

Electricity Act, 2003

Electricity - Declared Capacity - Distinction from 'Gaming - The Court clarified that “gaming” involves intentional manipulation of declarations to make illegal profit and requires detailed inquiry and adherence to principles of natural justice. Simple failure to demonstrate capacity, however, does not fall under gaming and entails strict liability. Punjab State Power Corporation v. Talwandi Sabo Power, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 525 : 2026 INSC 515

Electricity - Declared Capacity - Generating stations receive fixed charges based on their Declared Capacity. The declaration must be made faithfully and must be capable of being met on a real-time basis. Demonstration of DC is a regulatory safeguard to ensure the veracity of the declared capability, particularly when incentives are also linked to generation exceeding 80% of DC. Punjab State Power Corporation v. Talwandi Sabo Power, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 525 : 2026 INSC 515

Electricity - Declared Capacity - Talwandi Sabo Power Limited, operating three 660 MW units, repeatedly declared higher capacities than it could actually supply in January 2017. Despite multiple demonstration notices, the company failed to meet the declared capacity within the prescribed time blocks. The Punjab State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC) imposed a penalty of approximately ₹162.74 Crore. The Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (APTEL) set aside the penalty, accepting the company's plea of absence of deliberate gaming. The Supreme Court reversed APTEL's order and restored the SERC's penalty. Demonstration of DC is a measure of ensuring that the (State Generating Stations) has the ability to generate the capacity declared on a real time basis and that the declaration is made faithfully, especially when fixed charges are paid on the declared capability. The Court emphasised that a generating station must carefully assess its coal stock, machinery condition, and other operational factors before declaring capacity. If unprepared, it should seek revision rather than make an unrealistic declaration. Appeal allowed. SERC's penalty order restored. Punjab State Power Corporation v. Talwandi Sabo Power, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 525 : 2026 INSC 515

Electricity - Declared Capacity - Upon being called upon by the State Load Despatch Centre to demonstrate capacity, the generating station must achieve the declared level within four time blocks (approximately one hour). Failure to do so automatically invites penal consequences under the regulations. Punjab State Power Corporation v. Talwandi Sabo Power, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 525 : 2026 INSC 515

Electricity - Strict Liability for Non-Demonstration of Declared Capacity (DC) - Failure of a generating station to demonstrate its declared electricity generation capacity within the stipulated time under the Punjab State Grid Code, 2013 attracts strict liability. Proof of mens rea, deliberate wrongdoing, or “gaming” is not required. Punjab State Power Corporation v. Talwandi Sabo Power, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 525 : 2026 INSC 515

Electricity Act, 2003 – Section 2(5) – Definition of "Appropriate Government" - Applying the functional test, while the Indian Railways operates under the pervasive administrative, nominal, and fiscal control of the Central Government and thus falls within the wide scope of the "Appropriate Government" under Section 2(5)(a) of the Electricity Act, 2003, this nominal status cannot automatically extend the benefit of being treated as a DDL - The status demands the substantive fulfillment of legislative obligations, namely supplying electricity to consumers within an area of supply against consideration, which the Railways does not perform. [Relied on Steel Authority of India Ltd. & Ors. v. National Union Waterfront Workers & Ors. (2001) 7 SCC 1; Paras 40 - 50] Indian Railways v. West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 476 : 2026 INSC 464

Electricity Act, 2003 – Section 42(2) & 42(4) – Liability of DDL/Consumer to pay Cross-Subsidy Surcharge and Additional Surcharge - The Indian Railways is a "consumer" under Section 2(15) of the Electricity Act, 2003, as it procures and utilizes electricity exclusively for captive self-consumption - Even in arguendo, if the Railways were treated as a DDL, its procurement of electricity through open access solely for its own consumption attracts the functionality test, rendering it a consumer for that limited purpose - the Indian Railways cannot selectively claim privileges to evade statutory socio-economic and structural charges and remains strictly liable to pay Cross-Subsidy Surcharge (CSS) and Additional Surcharge (AS) to the respective distribution licensees of the area of supply for availing non-discriminatory open access. [Relied on Sesa Sterlite Limited v. Orissa Electricity Regulatory Commission & Ors. (2014) 8 SCC 444; Paras 57-71] Indian Railways v. West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 476 : 2026 INSC 464

Electricity Act, 2003 – Section 61(d), 62, and 125 – DERC (Terms and Conditions for Determination of Generation Tariff) Regulations, 2011 – Regulations 4.1 and 6.32 – Recovery of Capital Cost through Depreciation – Useful Life vs. Regulatory Operational Framework - The Supreme Court held that tariff determination under Section 61(d) of the Electricity Act, 2003 requires balancing a utility's reasonable cost recovery against the paramount obligation to safeguard consumer interests - Consumers cannot be compelled to pay for services they do not receive - Where a power plant ceases to supply electricity to consumers after the expiration of its approved Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) period, the utility cannot pass through the remaining capital cost or depreciation to the retail consumers for the period beyond its actual operation, even if the technical useful life of the asset is longer. [Para 20] Delhi Electricity Regulatory Commission v. Tata Power Delhi Distribution Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 474 : 2026 INSC 461

Electricity Act, 2003 – Harmonious Construction of Tariff Regulations - Regulation 6.32 of the DERC Regulations, 2011, which prescribes the calculation of depreciation over the useful life of an asset, cannot be read in isolation - It must be construed harmoniously with Regulation 4.1, which confines tariff entitlement strictly to the operational period approved or adopted by the Commission in the PPA - Regulation 6.32 does not confer an absolute or unconditional right upon a generating utility to recover depreciation from retail consumers when the asset is no longer utilized for supplying electricity to them - True-up proceedings are intended to give effect to the established tariff framework and cannot be weaponized to reopen, reconfigure, or circumvent regulatory approval conditions that have already attained finality between the parties. [Relied on BSES Rajdhani Power Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1637; Paras 19 - 25] Delhi Electricity Regulatory Commission v. Tata Power Delhi Distribution Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 474 : 2026 INSC 461

Electricity Act, 2003 & Railways Act, 1989 – Deemed Distribution Licensee Status and Definition of Distribution System - The Indian Railways does not qualify as a Deemed Distribution Licensee (DDL) within the ambit of the third proviso to Section 14 of the Electricity Act, 2003 - The activities under Section 11(g) and (h) of the Railways Act, 1989, which authorize the erection and operation of "distribution installations," do not equate to a "distribution system" under Section 2(19) of the Electricity Act - A distribution system requires a multi-pronged mechanism that connects the delivery points of transmission lines to the point of connection of a "consumer" for last-mile connectivity and commercial supply - The internal conveyance of electricity by the Railways through its closed network for its own operational facilities (locomotives, signals, and stations) does not constitute commercial distribution or sale to consumers. [Paras 16-31] Indian Railways v. West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 476 : 2026 INSC 464

Electricity Act, 2003 – Regulation as an "Enterprise" – Duty of Regulators – While SERCs possess plenary power, they must not act in silos - Supreme Court adopted the model of "Regulation as an Enterprise," where regulators act as "Governments in Miniature" to balance efficiency with distributive and environmental goals - Regulatory power must be exercised as a collaborative project with other stakeholders to subserve the purpose of the Act, including energy security and the transition to renewable energy. Southern Power Distribution Company v. Green Infra Wind Solutions, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 301 : 2026 INSC 294

Electricity Act, 2003 – Sections 61, 62, 64, and 86 – Tariff Determination – Generation Based Incentive (GBI) – Power and Jurisdiction of State Electricity Regulatory Commissions (SERCs) – Whether an SERC, while exercising its exclusive power to determine tariff, can "consider and factor in" the GBI granted by the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) to renewable energy generating companies (GENCOs) - Held, there is no unallocated regulatory residue left outside the SERC's jurisdiction; tariff determination is its exclusive province - The power of the Commission to determine tariff includes the authority to consider the impact of incentives or subsidies, such as GBI, that affect the economic position of a GENCO - This authority flows directly from the Electricity Act and relevant Regulations (e.g., Regulation 20 of APERC Regulations, 2015) and is not denuded by the mere existence of a Union grant under Article 282 of the Constitution. Southern Power Distribution Company v. Green Infra Wind Solutions, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 301 : 2026 INSC 294

Electricity Act, 2003 – Treatment of GBI – Mandatory Deduction vs. Contextual Application – Held, the requirement to "take into consideration" an incentive under Regulation 20 does not mechanically translate into a mandatory deduction from the tariff - If an incentive (like GBI) is designed as a "generator-focused incentive" to encourage investment in renewable energy and not as a "consumer subsidy," the Commission must respect its underlying objective - Factoring GBI into the tariff in a manner that effectively redirects the benefit from the generator to the consumer nullifies the policy intent of the grant. [Relied on State of Himachal Pradesh v. JSW Hydro Energy Ltd., 2025 INSC 857; Paras 15-46] Southern Power Distribution Company v. Green Infra Wind Solutions, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 301 : 2026 INSC 294

Electricity Duty Act, 1958 (Bombay); Section 5A — Exemption from Electricity Duty — Withdrawal of Exemption — Power of State Government — The State Government, having the statutory power to grant exemptions in the public interest under Section 5A, also possesses the inherent power to withdraw or modify such exemptions - The power to grant an exemption is a policy decision in the realm of fiscal administration, and the State must retain flexibility to recalibrate such policies based on changing economic circumstances and public finance management. State of Maharashtra v. Reliance Industries Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 304 : 2026 INSC 296

Electricity – Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) – Change in Law – Cancellation of Coal Blocks – The Supreme Court upheld the grant of compensation to the power generator (APNRL) for additional costs incurred due to "Change in Law" events resulting from the cancellation of the Ganeshpur captive coal block – Noted that the judgment in Manohar Lal Sharma v. Principal Secy. & Ors. (2014) 9 SCC 516 and the subsequent enactment of the Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Act, 2015 constituted a "Change in Law" under Article 10 of the PPA - These events altered the legal regime for coal allocation, thereby entitling the generator to be restored to the same economic position as if the Change in Law had not occurred. [Para 24] WB State Electricity Distribution v. Adhunik Power & Natural Resource, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 213 : 2026 INSC 202 : AIR 2026 SC 1340

Electricity - Reasonable Notice Period — Fiscal Implications — Where captive power generators have made significant investments based on duty exemptions, a sudden withdrawal can be disruptive - In the interest of justice, a "reasonable notice period" must be granted to allow affected industries to adjust their financial planning - A period of one year from the date of the notifications is considered a reasonable notice period. [Relied on Shri Bakul Oil Industries & Anr. v. State of Gujarat & Anr., (1987) 1 SCC 31; Kasinka Trading and Anr. v. Union of India and Anr., (1995) 1 SCC 274; State of Rajasthan & Another v. J K Udaipur Udyog Ltd. & Another, (2004) 7 SCC 673; Paras 15-24] State of Maharashtra v. Reliance Industries Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 304 : 2026 INSC 296

Employees' Compensation Act, 1923

Employees' Compensation Act, 1923; Section 4A(3)(b) — Liability to pay Penalty — The Supreme Court reiterated that while an Insurance Company is liable to indemnify the employer for the principal compensation amount and interest, it cannot be fastened with the liability to pay the penalty component - Noted that the penalty under Section 4A(3)(b) is imposed due to the "personal fault and negligence" of the employer for failing to deposit compensation within the stipulated one month. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Rekha Chaudhary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : 2026 INSC 177

Employees' Compensation Act, 1923 - Statutory Interpretation — Section 4A — Following the 1995 Amendment, the components of compensation/interest (Clause 'a') and penalty (Clause 'b') have been severed - The legislative intent behind this severance was to ensure that the burden of penalty which is not a natural corollary of the indemnity contract remains a deterrence for the employer rather than being passed onto the insurer - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order regarding the penalty. It held that the employer (Respondent No. 4) is solely liable to pay the penalty amount of Rs. 2,57,838/- within eight weeks. [Relied on Ved Prakash Garg v. Premi Devi (1997) 8 SCC 1; Paras 10-22] New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Rekha Chaudhary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : 2026 INSC 177

Employer-Employee Relationship – Sham or Camouflage – Held that mere fact that the same individuals continued to work for the principal employer despite periodic changes in contractors does not, by itself, establish a direct relationship or prove a "sham" arrangement - Contractors may retain existing personnel to ensure continuity and prevent complaints from the principal employer - Regularization – Despite allowing the appeals, the Supreme Court exercised its discretion to direct the appellant to consider the respondents' cases for regularization on a sympathetic basis, given their decades of uninterrupted service in jobs that appear perpetual in nature - This direction was issued under the "special facts and circumstances" of the case and is not to be treated as a precedent. Municipal Council v. K. Jayaram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 38

Environmental Law

Environmental Protection — "Polluter Pays" Principle — Supreme Court directed State Pollution Control Boards to initiate time-bound proceedings for the assessment and recovery of environmental compensation from violators - This exercise must be scientific and transparent to ensure both restitution for ecological damage and effective deterrence. In Re: Illegal Sand Mining in the National Chambal Sanctuary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 386 : 2026 INSC 380

Environment Protection Act, 1986 — Section 5 & Section 23 — Solid Waste Management Rules, 2026 — Implementation and Delegation of Powers — Supreme Court directed the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC) to issue a notification delegating powers under Section 5 to District Collectors across India for one year - This delegation is exclusively for supervising, administering, and implementing the Solid Waste Management (SWM) Rules, 2026 - Key Directives for Waste Management Enforcement – i. Establishment of Special Cells: District Collectors directed to constitute a 'Special Cell', including Regional Officers of respective Pollution Control Boards, to oversee implementation - The cell is authorized to issue directions to stop electricity/water supply to bulk solid waste generators who disobey or disregard the rules; ii. Field and Spot Inspections: Regional Officers of Pollution Control Boards must conduct field inspections of authorized and unauthorized dump yards and forward photographic evidence to District Collectors and local bodies for action - Collectors must conduct virtual spot inspections and submit monthly progress summaries to the State; iii. Leveraging CSR Funds: Union Ministries directed to explore incorporating Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) contributions by industries for establishing Compressed Biogas plants or waste-to-energy technologies, prioritising improvement of local bodies where contributing industries are located; iv. Administrative & Human Resource Reforms: Directed integration of a 3-level paperless approval method for SWM projects under the Swachh Bharat Mission-Urban - States/UTs directed to review human resources, fill vacancies in local bodies in a time-bound manner, and ensure at least a full-time Panchayat Secretary in every Gram Panchayat; v. Source Segregation and Upgradation: Local Self Governments (LSGs) mandated to focus on source segregation for Bulk Waste Generators (BWGs), deploy door-to-door mapping via Safai Supervisors, upgrade to completely closed vehicles for secondary transportation, and establish neighbourhood Reduce-Reuse-Recycle (RRR) centres. [Paras 4 - 21] Bhopal Municipal Corporation v. Dr. Subhash C. Pandey, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 465

Environmental Law & Constitution of India – Protection of Ecological Hotspots, Wildlife Sanctuaries, and Tiger Reserves – Removal of Forest Encroachments vs. Humanitarian Grounds for Rehabilitation – Constitutional Imperatives - The Central Empowered Committee (CEC) flagged massive, multi-decade encroachments across the Agasthyamalai Ecological Landscape, specifically within the Srivilliputhur-Megamalai Tiger Reserve (SMTR), Kalakad- Mundanthurai Tiger Reserve (KMTR), and Kanyakumari Wildlife Sanctuary (KWS) - The report highlighted slow eviction progress by State authorities, the active extension of public utilities/welfare amenities to illegal occupants, and the presence of 118 serving or retired government employees among the encroachers - The State of Tamil Nadu sought a phased, humanitarian approach to eviction owing to the long duration of settlements and complex socio-economic ties – Held that environmental preservation cannot stand indefinitely deferred under the guise of procedural or humanitarian challenges - While the Court is fully alive to the necessity of structured human rehabilitation, complex resettlement issues cannot operate as a perpetual justification for postponing legally mandated eviction and ecological restoration - Protection of forests and fragile ecosystems is a non-negotiable constitutional imperative under Articles 21, 48A, and 51A(g) of the Constitution of India - The approach to conservation must be strictly eco-centric rather than anthropocentric, recognizing the intrinsic value of non-human species – Supreme Court issued exhaustive, time-bound mandamus directions, including a division-wise encroachment eviction plan, a blanket moratorium on welfare schemes/infrastructure in encroached pockets, stringent disciplinary action and environmental restitution charges against government employee encroachers, and the total removal of commercial/governmental structures from protected tiger habitats. [Relied on T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, (2025) 2 SCC 641; 46-65] A. John Kennedy v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 573 : 2026 INSC 605

Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 – Section 5 – Directions for Implementation – To bridge significant implementation gaps and ensure readiness for the 2026 Rules, Supreme Court issued nationwide directions: i. Three-Tier Enforcement: Failure to comply shall be treated as more than an administrative lapse, involving: Tier 1 (immediate fines), Tier 2 (criminal prosecution), and Tier 3 (prosecution of responsible officials for neglect of oversight duties); ii. Role of Elected Representatives: Mayors, Councillors, and Ward Members are designated as lead facilitators for source-segregation education; iii. Infrastructure and Monitoring: Mandated infrastructure audits by District Collectors and the establishment of multi-tier monitoring task forces by 15.03.2026; iv. Bulk Waste Generators (BWGs): Must register on a centralized portal and operate on-site wet waste processing facilities or procure EBWGR certificates by 31.03.2026. [Paras 12-19] Bhopal Municipal Corporation v. Dr. Subhash C. Pandey, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 182

Environmental Law – CPCB Methodology for Environmental Compensation – Scope and Applicability – The Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) is a facilitative and indicative tool, not a rigid or exhaustive code - While primarily designed for industrial sectors, its adoption by the NGT for residential projects is not legally impermissible, especially when the resulting quantification is not arbitrary or disproportionate. Rhythm County v. Satish Sanjay Hegde, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 98 : 2026 INSC 102 : AIR 2026 SC 1523

Environmental Law – Principle of Correlation – Actual Damage vs. Statutory Violation – While mere violation of law without demonstrable harm may not automatically warrant compensation in all cases, activities with the potential to degrade the environment or those involving "flagrant violations" (such as continuing construction despite stop-work orders) justify the imposition of deterrent and restorative damages – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on M/s. Goel Ganga Developers India Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (2018) 18 SCC 257; Deepak Nitrite Ltd. v. State of Gujarat (2004) 6 SCC 402; Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Ankita Sinha (2022) 13 SCC 401; Research Foundation for Science (18) v. Union of India (2005) 13 SCC 186; Paras 21-46] Rhythm County v. Satish Sanjay Hegde, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 98 : 2026 INSC 102 : AIR 2026 SC 1523

Environmental Law – Siting Norms – Proximity to Schools and Habitations – Mandatory nature of buffer zones and siting distances. Held: Preventive safeguards and siting norms (e.g., PPCB notification dated 02.09.1998) are designed to operate in advance to prevent avoidable risk to sensitive receptors - Demonstrable compliance based on objective, verified measurements of emission sources is required at the threshold; assumptions of compliance to be tested at a later stage (Consent to Operate) are legally insufficient. [Relied on Vellore Citizens' Welfare Forum v. Union of India (1996) 5 SCC 647; K. Ramadas Shenoy v. Town Municipal Council, Udipi (1974) 2 SCC 506; A.P. Pollution Control Board v. Prof. M.V. Nayudu (1999) 2 SCC 718; Paras 26-33] Harbinder Singh Sekhon v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 162 : 2026 INSC 159

Equitable Relief

Equitable Relief — Enhanced Interest for Delay — While recognizing the membership, Supreme Court provided liberty to aggrieved members to seek "enhanced interest" or "additional amounts" due to the significant delay (from 1995/2005 to 2025) in making the contribution – Appeals allowed. [Para 47] Shashin Patel v. Uday Dalal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 125 : 2026 INSC 125

Equity – Fixation of Reasonable Penal Rent – While upholding the right to deduct penal rent, the Supreme Court noted that full enforcement of the management's penal policy might entirely extinguish the gratuity of retired skilled/semi-skilled workers - In an equitable exercise of jurisdiction, the Court fixed a reasonable sum of Rs. 1,000 per month as penal rent for the period beyond the grace period, balancing the interests of both parties. [Relied on Secretary, ONGC Ltd. v. V. U. Warrier (2005) 5 SCC 245; Paras 16 - 21] Management of Steel Authority of India v. Shambhu Prasad Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 262 : 2026 INSC 263

Essential Commodities Act, 1955

Essential Commodities Act, 1955 – Section 3 – Uttar Pradesh Essential Commodities (Regulation of Sale and Distribution Control) Order, 2016 – Clause 2(p) – Government Order No. 6 of 2019 dated 05.08.2019 – Paragraph IV(10) and Paragraph V – Compassionate Appointment / Allotment of Fair Price Shop – Exclusion of 'Married Daughter' from the definition of 'Family' – Constitution of India – Articles 14 and 15(1) – Gender-based Stereotype - Key Issue - Whether the blanket exclusion of a 'married daughter' from the definition of 'family' for the purpose of allotment of a fair price shop under the dependent/compassionate quota is constitutionally sustainable – Supreme Court held – i. Gender Discrimination and Arbitrary Classification - The Supreme Court held that the exclusion of a married daughter from the definition of "family" under Clause 2(p) of the 2016 Order and Paragraph IV(10) of the G.O. fails the test of reasonable classification and is manifestly arbitrary - The distinction lacks any intelligible differentia having a rational nexus with the welfare-oriented object of the scheme, which is to provide immediate financial relief to the dependent family of a deceased dealer; ii. Impermissible Stereotypes - Supreme Court observed that while a married son continues to be considered a part of the family, a daughter is excluded solely because of her marriage - This distinction is founded upon a gender-based stereotype that a daughter loses all ties with her natal family upon marriage which is incompatible with the constitutional guarantees of equality under Articles 14 and 15(1) of the Constitution; iii. Dependency as a Question of Fact - Dependency is a question of fact to be determined in each individual case and cannot be conclusively or speculatively presumed based entirely on marital status or assumptions regarding local residence; iv. Doctrine of Purposive Construction Applied - Applying the doctrine of purposive construction to avoid an unjust or arbitrary result, the Court read down the provision - The expression "daughter" in Clause 2(p) of the 2016 Order must be interpreted to include a married daughter, provided she establishes factual dependency on the deceased dealer, submits a dependency certificate along with No Objection Certificates (NOCs) from other adult family members, and satisfies all other eligibility criteria, including local residence. [Relied on Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia & Ors. v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar & Ors., 1958 SCC OnLine SC 6; Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar & Ors., (1954) 2 SCC 791; Shailesh Dhairyawan v. Mohan Balkrishan Lulla, (2016) 3 SCC 619; Paras 18-27] Kulsum Nisha v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 588 : 2026 INSC 617

Essential Commodities Act, 1955 – Sections 3 and 7 – Prosecution for cement black-marketing – Effect of decontrol – The appellants were convicted for the unauthorized possession and intended sale of government-quota cement in 1994, allegedly violating the Maharashtra Cement (Licensing and Control) Order, 1973 - The Supreme Court held that since the Central Government had substantially withdrew price and distribution control over cement via S.O. 168(E) dated 01.03.1989 and rescinded state licensing powers via S.O. 624(E) dated 07.08.1990, no valid control order under Section 3 was in force on the date of the alleged offense (24.03.1994) - In the absence of a subsisting statutory order, a conviction under Section 7 is legally impermissible. Manoj v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 157 : 2026 INSC 152

Estates Acquisition

Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 (West Bengal) – Sections 6(1)(j), 53, 57A, and 57B – Power of Review – Jurisdiction of Revenue Officer – Quasi-Judicial Authorities – Separation of Powers - Whether a Revenue Officer, as a quasi-judicial authority under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (WBEA) Act, 1953, possesses the inherent or statutory power to review a vesting order that has attained finality, especially in the absence of an express legislative mandate - Key Findings of the Court – i. No Inherent Power of Review - Supreme Court reiterated that the power of review is not an inherent power; it must be expressly conferred by statute or by necessary implication - Quasi-judicial authorities can only exercise those powers specifically bestowed upon them by law; ii. Interpretation of Section 57A - held that Section 57A, which allows the State to invest authorities with the "powers of a Civil Court," does not amount to a blanket conferment of the power of substantive review - Such an interpretation would conflict with Section 57B(3), which expressly prohibits Revenue Officers from reopening matters already decided or determined; iii. Separation of Powers & Basic Structure - Conferring judicial functions like the power of review upon executive functionaries (like Revenue Officers), who lack judicial training or independence from executive control, blurs the demarcation between the executive and judiciary - This encroaches upon the Separation of Powers, which is part of the Basic Structure of the Constitution; iv. Failure on Merits of Review – Held that even if jurisdiction existed, the 2008 review failed the criteria under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC - The respondent-company failed to prove it was "exclusively engaged in farming" as of January 1, 1952, despite ample opportunities in 1971 - Subsequent economic considerations or "amicable settlements" are not legally sustainable grounds for review – v. Nullity of Orders without Jurisdiction - An order passed by an authority lacking inherent jurisdiction is void ab initio and a nullity. Its invalidity can be challenged at any stage, including collateral proceedings. [Relied on: Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyuman Singhji, (1971) 3 SCC 844; Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania, (2010) 9 SCC 437; Union of India v. Madras Bar Assn., (2010) 11 SCC 1; Balvant N. Viswamitra v. Yadav Sadashiv Mule, (2004) 8 SCC 706; Paras 31-89] State of West Bengal v. Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 126 : 2026 INSC 132

Estoppel

Estoppel and Participation – Jurisdictional Nullity – Participation in arbitral proceedings does not confer jurisdiction where an arbitration agreement is inherently absent. Since the arbitrator lacked inherent jurisdiction, the proceedings were a nullity (coram non judice) and the award was non-est - The Municipal Council was not estopped from challenging the award as it was "forced" into arbitration without consent while functioning under a State-appointed Administrator - Supreme Court rejected the application of these precedents, affirming the High Court's finding that there is no acquiescence or estoppel where a party is compelled to participate in proceedings that are a jurisdictional nullity. [Relied on N. Chellappan v. Secretary, Kerala State Electricity Board and Anr. (1975) 1 SCC 289; Inder Sain Mittal v. Housing Board, Haryana and Ors. (2002) 3 SCC 175; Paras 19-26] Bharat Udyog Ltd. v. Ambernath Municipal Council, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 291 : 2026 INSC 288 : AIR 2026 SC 1586

Eviction

Eviction Procedure – Procedural Safeguards – Supreme Court recorded and approved a policy mechanism evolved by the State of Assam to ensure fairness in removing encroachments: i. Committee Constitution: A committee comprising forest and revenue officials will be formed to oversee the process; ii. Notice and Hearing: Alleged unauthorized occupants must be served a notice and granted an opportunity to produce evidence of their right to occupy the land; iii. Revenue vs. Forest Land: If land is found within revenue limits and outside notified forest areas, the matter must be referred to the Revenue Department; iv. Speaking Order: If an occupation is found to be unauthorized after scrutiny, a speaking order must be passed and served; v. Grace Period: A 15-day notice period must be granted to vacate the premises after the speaking order is served. Abdul Khalek v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 134 : 2026 INSC 140 : AIR 2026 SC 933

Exam

Exam Rules, 2013 & Cadre Allocation Policy – Rule 1, 13, 14, and 17 of Exam Rules read with Paragraph 9 of the Policy – Interpretation of "General Standards - Emphasized that the IFS examination is a "two-tier" process where the Preliminary Examination is an integral stage - Under the proviso to Rule 14(ii), a reserved category candidate can only be adjusted against unreserved vacancies if they have been recommended without resorting to any relaxation/concession in eligibility or selection criteria at "any stage of the examination" – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Deepa E.V. v. Union of India and Ors. (2017) 12 SCC 680; Gaurav Pradhan v. State of Rajasthan (2018) 11 SCC 352; Niravkumar Dilipbhai Makwana v. Gujarat Public Service Commission (2019) 7 SCC 383; Union of India v. Sajib Roy (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1943; Paras 25-36] Union of India v. G. Kiran, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 8

Execution

Execution of Award — Procedure of Attachment — Fairness — The Tribunal issued warrants for the attachment of office furniture, fixtures, and computers of a Public Sector Undertaking (PSU) shortly after the execution petition was filed - Held: Such a process paralyzes the working of the company – Noted that while awards must be satisfied, the Executing Court should adopt fair procedures, such as the attachment of bank accounts, rather than coercive attachment of essential office equipment without judicial mind. National Insurance Company Ltd v. Rathlavath Chandulal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 149 : 2026 INSC 146

Factories Act, 1948

Factories Act, 1948; Section 59(2) — Overtime Wages — Definition of "Ordinary Rate of Wages" — Inclusion of Compensatory Allowances — The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision that compensatory allowances such as House Rent Allowance (HRA), Transport Allowance (TA), Small Family Allowance (SFA), and Clothing and Washing Allowance (CWA) must be included in the "ordinary rate of wages" for the purpose of calculating overtime wages - noted that Section 59(2) provides for only two specific exclusions: bonus and wages for overtime work - In the absence of statutory rules, the Executive cannot use Office Memorandums to read additional exclusions into the Act that the Legislature did not contemplate - Noted that different Ministries cannot assign different meanings to the same statutory provision, noting that the Ministry of Railways was already including such allowances in its calculations. [Paras 14, 15] Union of India v. Heavy Vehicles Factory Employees Union, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 70

Factories Act, 1948; Sections 64, 65, 112, & 113 — Rule-making Power — Jurisdiction of Central Government — Under Chapter VI and Chapter XI of the 1948 Act, the power to frame exempting rules or general rules is vested primarily with the State Governments - The Central Government's role is limited to issuing directions to State Governments for the execution of the Act's provisions - various Ministries (Defence, Labour, and Finance) lack the legal authority to issue clarifications or Office Memorandums that modify the definition of "ordinary rate of wages" under Section 59(2) – Held that The Factories Act, 1948, is a beneficial legislation intended to protect workers from exploitation and ensure their health and safety - Any interpretation that restricts or curtails benefits admissible to workers under the Act must be avoided - Executive instructions that lack statutory force cannot override the law or run contrary to literal statutory mandates – Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha & Anr. v. State of Gujarat (2020) 10 SCC 459; Paras 9 - 13] Union of India v. Heavy Vehicles Factory Employees Union, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 70

Family Arrangement

Family Arrangement – Oral Settlements - Oral Family Settlement – Validity and enforcement – A family arrangement or settlement can be entered into even by way of an unregistered oral agreement and is enforceable under special principles of equity – Technical considerations must give way to peace and harmony in enforcing family arrangements – Co-landlord is fully entitled to rely upon an oral family arrangement earmarking the suit premises for her exclusive use as a subsequent development. [Relied on Virender Nath Gautam v. Satpal Singh & Ors., (2007) 3 SCC 617; Ram Sarup Gupta (Dead) By LRs. v. Bishun Narain Inter College & Ors., (1987) 2 SCC 555; Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal & Anr., (2008) 17 SCC 491; Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor & General Traders, (1975) 1 SCC 770; Kale & Ors. v. Deputy Director of Consolidation & Ors., (1976) 3 SCC 11; Paras 49-50] Marietta D' Silva v. Rudolf Clothan Lacerda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 503 : 2026 INSC 496

Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999

Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 – Section 37A(4) – Interpretation of "Confirming Seizure" – Supreme Court clarified that while Section 37A(4) allows adjudication to proceed and remain unaffected by a confirmed seizure, the statute is silent on situations where the seizure is not confirmed - If a Competent Authority records a substantive finding of no evidence of violation, that finding has a direct bearing on the outcome of the adjudication proceedings. J. Sri Nisha v. Special Director, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 320 : 2026 INSC 309

Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 – Section 37A and Section 16 – Interplay between Seizure Proceedings and Adjudication – The Supreme Court set aside the final adjudication order and the High Court judgment that dismissed challenges to a Show Cause Notice (SCN) issued under FEMA - Supreme Court held that where the Competent Authority has refused to confirm a seizure of assets under Section 37A(3) based on a finding that no "reason to believe" exists regarding a contravention of Section 4, the Adjudicating Authority cannot simply bypass or "undo" that order while an appeal against it is still pending before the Appellate Tribunal - Such a course of action amounts to abdicating the powers of the Appellate Authority. J. Sri Nisha v. Special Director, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 320 : 2026 INSC 309

Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (FERA) - Section 47 – Statutory Scheme Governing Enforcement vs. Initiation of Proceedings - There is a clear statutory and conscious distinction under Section 47 of FERA between the initiation of legal proceedings to determine liability and the subsequent taking of steps for the purpose of enforcing a judgment - While there is no absolute legal bar or prohibition for an Indian or foreign court to adjudicate and determine contractual liability, the actual enforcement or execution of such an adjudicated sum or decree is strictly subject to the regulatory regime of the State - Prior approval/permission of the Central Government or the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) is a sine qua non(mandatory condition precedent) before any steps can be set in motion for the execution of such a decree. [Relied on Alcon Electronics (P) Ltd. v. Celem S.A. of France, (2017) 2 SCC 253; International Woollen Mills v. Standard Wool (U.K.) Ltd., (2001) 5 SCC 265; IDBI Trusteeship Services Ltd. v. Hubtown Ltd., (2017) 1 SCC 568; LIC of India v. Escorts Ltd., (1986) 1 SCC 264; Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co., 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644; Paras 33, 34, 73-81] Messer Griesheim GMBH v. Goyal Gases Private Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 403 : 2026 INSC 401

Foreign Trade

Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 – Section 3 – Minimum Import Price (MIP) – Commencement of Delegated Legislation – The Supreme Court held that a Notification issued under Section 3 of the Act acquires the force of law only upon its publication in the Official Gazette - The expression "date of this Notification" used in such instruments must necessarily be construed as the date of its publication in the Gazette (in this case, 11.02.2016), rather than the date it was signed or uploaded on a website (05.02.2016). Viraj Impex Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 76 : 2026 INSC 80

Foreign Trade Policy (2015-2020) – Paragraph 1.05(b) – Transitional Protection – Importers who opened irrevocable Letters of Credit prior to the actual date of Gazette publication (11.02.2016) are entitled to the transitional protection under Para 1.05(b) of the FTP - Supreme court rejected the argument that "uploading" a notification on a website constitutes sufficient notice to curtail rights before formal Gazette publication – Appeal allowed. [Relied on B.K. Srinivasan & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. (1987) 1 SCC 658; Paras 16-23] Viraj Impex Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 76 : 2026 INSC 80

Forest Law

Forest Act, 1326 (Hyderabad) - Fasli (1916 AD) & 1355 Fasli (1945 AD) – Revenue Entries – Evidentiary value on title – Scope of Writ Jurisdiction – Writ of Certiorari – Revenue records or Jamabandi entries serve only a fiscal purpose to enable the person whose name is mutated to pay land revenue - A revenue record is not a document of title and does not create or extinguish ownership, nor does it possess presumptive value regarding title - Stray or solitary entries for a single year cannot be relied upon against long, consistent revenue entries - Proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are not the appropriate forum for resolving serious disputes concerning complex questions of fact and property title - The proper function of investigating these claims lies with a civil court in a regularly constituted suit, rather than a court exercising writ jurisdiction - A Writ of Certiorari lies only on limited grounds, namely: (i) want of jurisdiction, (ii) excess of jurisdiction, (iii) violation of principles of natural justice, and (iv) an error of law apparent on the face of the record. [Relied on Sohan Lal v. Union of India, (1957) 1 SCC 439; Paras 16 - 19] Vadiyala Prabhakar Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 469 : 2026 INSC 450

Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 – Ecological Balance vs. Invasive Species – Held that the mere presence of dense vegetation does not automatically signify a natural forest ecosystem, especially if the growth consists primarily of invasive alien species like Prosopis juliflora (Vilayati Kikar), which can disrupt native biodiversity - Environmental management should prioritize the restoration of native/indigenous species over the protection of harmful invasive monocultures - reiterated that tribunals and courts should not interfere with the implementation of a long-approved Master Plan under the guise of environmental principles once that plan has attained statutory finality - Harmonizing the right to a clean environment under Article 21 with the right to development, the Court noted that integrated transport projects (like the Bijwasan Railway Station redevelopment) serve public interest by decongesting urban zones and optimizing land use. [Relied on The Auroville Foundation v. Navroz Kersasp Mody and Others (2025) 4 SCC 150; Paras 42-65] Naveen Solanki v. Rail Land Development Authority, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 277 : 2026 INSC 270

Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 – Section 2 – Deemed Forest – Interplay between Statutory Master Plan and Subsequent Vegetation Growth – The Supreme Court held that land earmarked for a project under an approved Master Plan, which was not recorded as forest or deemed forest at the time the Plan came into force, cannot be subsequently declared a "deemed forest" due to the natural proliferation of vegetation or invasive species over time - Noted that the statutory binding force and sanctity of a Master Plan must prevail to ensure certainty and stability in urban planning - The relevant date for determining whether a parcel of land qualifies as a "deemed forest" is the date of the coming into force of the Master Plan, not the date when project work actually commences on the ground. Naveen Solanki v. Rail Land Development Authority, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 277 : 2026 INSC 270

Forest Rights – Recognition of Legal Occupation – Supreme Court noted that certain residents, such as those in "Forest Villages" listed in the 'Jamabandi Register' or title holders under the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006, are legally authorized and not liable for eviction - directed the parties to maintain status quo regarding the land in occupation until a speaking order is passed and the subsequent 15-day notice period expires. [Paras 9-13] Abdul Khalek v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 134 : 2026 INSC 140 : AIR 2026 SC 933

Frivolous and Vexatious Proceedings

Frivolous and Vexatious Proceedings – Duty of Court – Held that when quashing is sought on grounds that proceedings are frivolous or malicious, the Court must examine the matter with "greater care" - The Court is not restricted to the averments in the complaint alone but must look into attending circumstances and "read in between the lines" - Noted that the appellant had registered the synopsis and scripts for the film between 2012 and 2013, well before the complainant allegedly met the appellant in June 2015 or registered his script in July 2015 - Since the appellant's work preceded the complainant's script, the question of infringement does not arise - the Screen Writers Association (SWA) Dispute Settlement Committee had already found no similarity between the works, a fact suppressed by the complainant - The proceedings were found to be manifestly frivolous and vexatious - The summoning order and the High Court's judgment are quashed and set aside - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Mohd. Wajid & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., (2023) 20 SCC 219; Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors., (1998) 5 SCC 749; Paras 13-20] Sujoy Ghosh v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 271 : 2026 INSC 267 : AIR 2026 SC 1552

Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities

Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (Uttar Pradesh) – Joint Meeting Requirement – Under Section 5(3) of the Rules, the approval of the Gang Chart must occur after a joint meeting between the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police – Held that no indication of such a meeting in the records, which constitutes a violation of the prescribed rules - Relying on the principle that when a statute prescribes a thing to be done in a particular manner, it must be done in that manner or not at all - Noted that since the Act permits the mere naming of a person as a "gangster" with "perilous consequences" to individual liberty, the prescribed procedure must be followed scrupulously – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Vinod Bihari Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2025 SCC Online SC 1216; Paras 8-12] Gabbar Singh v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 275 : 2026 INSC 271

Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (Uttar Pradesh) – Section 3(1) – Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Rules, 2021 – Rules 5 and 16 – Quashing of FIR – Procedural Irregularity in Gang Chart – The Supreme Court quashed an FIR registered under the Act of 1986 on the grounds that the accompanying Gang Chart was not prepared in accordance with the statutory mandate – Held that a valid Gang Chart requires the recommendation of the Nodal Officer (SHO) and the Additional Superintendent of Police, followed by approval from the Superintendent of Police and the District Magistrate - These recommendations must be in written form and approvals must be evidenced by signatures - In the present case, a certified copy of the Gang Chart obtained from the Court lacked these necessary signatures and recommendations. Gabbar Singh v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 275 : 2026 INSC 271

General Clauses Act, 1897

General Clauses Act, 1897 – Section 24 – Continuation of orders/regulations issued under repealed and re-enacted provisions – Section 24 has no application where the existing rules or regulations are completely inconsistent with the newly re-enacted or substituted statutory provision - Subordinate legislation cannot override or fetter the plenary legislative power of Parliament to amend the principal Act. [Paras 76 - 83] Rajesh Sharma v. North Delhi Municipal Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 640 : 2026 INSC 646

Government Grants Act, 1895

Government Grants Act, 1895 — Section 3 — Scope of Overriding Mandate — Wider Interpretation vs. Narrow Interpretation - Section 3 of the GG Act embodies a clear legislative mandate that every Government grant shall take effect according to its tenor, notwithstanding any rule of law, statute, or enactment to the contrary - The expression "any rule of law, statute or enactment" is of the widest amplitude and admits of no restrictive construction - The approach which seeks to confine Section 3 merely to the exclusion of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (TP Act), by reading it in a narrow or truncated manner, is incorrect - While Section 2 of the GG Act expressly excludes the application of the TP Act, Section 3 travels further and grants primacy to the conditions, limitations, and stipulations contained in the Government grant itself, elevating them to a position of supremacy over any general or statutory law. [Paras 51, 52, 53] Union of India v. Sir Sobha Singh and Sons Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 413 : 2026 INSC 406

Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956

Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956; Sections 21(vii) and 22 — Maintenance of Dependants — Whether a daughter-in-law who becomes a widow after the death of her father-in-law is a 'dependant' entitled to claim maintenance from his estate? - Held that a plain and literal reading of Section 21(vii) makes it crystal clear that "any widow of his son" is a dependant - The legislature deliberately avoided using the word "predeceased" before "son" in this section, unlike other statutes – At the time of the son's death, whether before or after the father-in-law's demise is immaterial for determining the status of the widow as a dependant - When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it must be given its natural meaning – Held that Courts cannot "add, and mend" or supply assumed omissions to the text of the law - Departure from the literal rule is only permissible in rare cases, as the exclusive domain to legislate lies with the legislature. Kanchana Rai v. Geeta Sharma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 41 : 2026 INSC 54

Hindu Law

Hindu Law – Alienation – Legal Necessity – Karta's Power - held that alienations by a Karta in favor of a single coparcener must be strictly proved to be for legal necessity - Vague or general recitals in sale deeds regarding "family needs" or "debts" are insufficient to bind the interests of other coparceners - upheld the item-wise scrutiny performed by the lower courts to distinguish between proved legal necessity and impermissible alienations. [Para 33] Dorairaj v. Doraisamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 119 : 2026 INSC 126

Hindu Law – Joint Family Property – Burden of Proof - Supreme Court affirmed that while the mere existence of a joint family does not render all properties joint, once it is established that ancestral properties yielding income existed and acquisitions were made during the subsistence of the joint family, the burden shifts to the person asserting self-acquisition to prove the same - noted that Hindu law does not require coparceners to establish the exact source of funds for every acquisition made by the Karta if a sufficient nucleus is shown. [Relied On Shrinivas Krishnarao Kango v. Narayan Devji Kango and Ors. (1954) 1 SCC 544; Pattusami Padayachi v. Mullaiammal and others MLJ (II) 1976 225; Paras 29, 30] Dorairaj v. Doraisamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 119 : 2026 INSC 126

Hindu Law – Wills – Suspicious Circumstances - upheld the rejection of an unregistered Will executed 72 hours prior to the testator's death - Key suspicious circumstances included the use of a thumb impression by a testator who was literate and habitually signed documents, the involvement of a close relative as a scribe instead of a professional, and the exclusion of natural heirs - since the Appellant did not challenge the Trial Court's rejection of the Will at the First Appeal stage, the finding attained finality - The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, finding no ground to interfere with the High Court's judgment, which had correctly applied principles of Hindu Law regarding coparcenary property and legal necessity – Appeals dismissed. Dorairaj v. Doraisamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 119 : 2026 INSC 126

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Section 13(1)(ia) – Mental Cruelty – Denial of Conjugal Rights & Persistent Refusal of Sexual Intercourse - Denial of conjugal rights, including the persistent refusal of sexual intercourse without a reasonable cause, constitutes mental cruelty and serves as a valid ground for divorce under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 - Withholding sexual intimacy inflicts severe emotional distress and fundamentally undermines the bedrock of marriage. [Para 19] Sonal Talpada v. Veerbhan Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 594 : 2026 INSC 620

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Section 13(1)(ia) – Mental Cruelty – Long Separation & Rigid Approaches - Where a couple has lived separately for a substantial duration (over 15 years in this case) with no hope for reconciliation, forcing them to live together after such a prolonged period itself constitutes cruelty to both sides - In matrimonial matters involving two individuals, it is not for the society or the Court to sit in judgment over which spouse's approach is correct - their strongly held, unaccommodating views and persistent refusal to adjust over a long span of time amount to mutual cruelty. [Paras 23, 24, 25] Sonal Talpada v. Veerbhan Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 594 : 2026 INSC 620

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Section 13(1)(ia) & Section 13(1)(ib) – Desertion – Evolution into Mental Cruelty & Conduct During Pendency of Litigation - Even if the statutory ground of 'desertion' under Section 13(1)(ib) has not been formally pleaded, an Appellate Court is justified in examining the overall conduct of the parties and the manner in which they discharged matrimonial obligations - Appeal is a continuation of the suit - If a statutory period of desertion continues indefinitely during the pendency of litigation without any genuine effort at reconciliation or cohabitation, it aggravates marital agony - An Appellate Court can legitimately treat such prolonged physical separation, geographical estrangement, and complete emotional alienation as a realistic indicator of mental cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) of the HMA - In such instances, the confirmation of a divorce decree by the Appellate Court is a lawful application of the statutory ground of cruelty, not an automatic invocation of Article 142. [Paras 21 – 27] Sonal Talpada v. Veerbhan Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 594 : 2026 INSC 620

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Section 25 – Permanent Alimony – Enhancement Of Maintenance – The Supreme Court Enhanced The Permanent alimony awarded to the appellant-wife from ₹15,000/- to ₹30,000/- per month - Noted that the initial amount was inadequate considering the respondent-husband's profession as a doctor with an approximate monthly income of ₹1,60,000/-, the current cost of living, and the impact of inflation – Held that a woman Is Entitled To Live A life consistent with the standard of living she was accustomed to during the subsistence of the marriage - The obligation of the husband to ensure the wife lives with dignity does not end merely because she is educated or has parental support - Sustenance does not mean mere survival; it means leading a life in a similar manner as she would have lived in the house of her husband. Anamika Jain v. Dr. Atul Jain, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 111

Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956

Hindu minority and guardianship act, 1956 – section 8 – doctrine of parens patriae – judicial scrutiny - Doctrine of Parens Patriae and Judicial Oversight - Section 8 of the HMGA embodies the doctrine of parens patriae (parent of the nation), framing guardianship as a strictly Court-supervised fiduciary responsibility where the welfare of the minor reigns paramount - The statutory requirement of seeking prior judicial approval before alienating a minor's immovable property reflects legislative caution to protect proprietary interests against irreversible decisions - Supreme Court's role under Section 8 is to perform an independent, rigorous, and forward-looking assessment of risk versus benefit, balancing the genuine welfare of the minor against the economic rights of adult co-owners to derive reasonable value from the property. Shephali Chakraborty v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 597 : 2026 INSC 621

Hindu minority and guardianship act, 1956 – section 8 – transfer of minor's immovable property – development agreement – best interest of the child - Alienation of Minor's Property via Development Agreement - The appellant (mother/natural guardian of the minor) sought permission under Section 8 of the HMGA to transfer the minor's undivided share in a joint family property to a developer in exchange for a monetary sum and a residential flat ( share in a flat) - The District Court and High Court rejected the application holding that the "necessity or evident advantage" to the minor was not adequately demonstrated beyond a bald statement - Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court held that an undivided share in undeveloped land often remains a passive, notional interest with minimal immediate utility and is susceptible to encroachment or disputes - transitioning this illiquid asset into a constructed residential unit along with liquid cash transforms it into immediate usable property capable of funding the minor's education, health, and advancement – Supreme Court clarified that while this is not an absolute proposition of law and must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, in the present facts, the conversion was demonstrably for the minor's "evident advantage" under Section 8(4) of the Act - The permission was granted subject to protective conditions, including depositing the minor's monetary share into a nationalized bank with auto-renewal until majority. Shephali Chakraborty v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 597 : 2026 INSC 621

Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 – Section 8(2) – Sale of Minor's Property – Supreme Court noted that a sale deed executed on behalf of a 12-year-old minor without court permission is hit by Section 8(2) - A voidable transaction of this nature can be repudiated through "unequivocal conduct," such as obtaining a declaratory decree, and does not necessarily require a specific suit to set aside the document. Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 372 : 2026 INSC 350

Hindu Succession Act, 1956

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – In the present case, the second wife and four daughters of the deceased each inherited a 1/5th share as tenants-in-common. The sale of a portion of the property by the widow purportedly as Karta for legal necessity (sister's marriage) was held invalid to the extent it affected the shares of the daughters. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the decree in favour of the daughters. [Relied on: M. Arumugam v. Ammaniammal, (2020) 11 SCC 103] Darubai v. Kamalabai, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 581 : 2026 INSC 613

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Sections 8 & 19 – Intestate Succession – Nature of Property Inherited by Heirs – Tenants-in-Common vs. Joint Tenancy – Karta and Legal Necessity - Heirs inheriting property of a Hindu male dying intestate under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, take the property as tenants-in-common with definite and separate shares, and not as joint family/coparcenary property or as joint tenants. The concept of “Kartaship” does not apply to such property. Consequently, no co-heir can alienate the shares of other co-heirs by invoking the doctrine of legal necessity while acting as Karta of the family. Darubai v. Kamalabai, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 581 : 2026 INSC 613

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Sections 8 & 19 – Intestate Succession – Upon intestate succession under the HSA, each heir acquires a distinct, identifiable share which is heritable by their own legal heirs and does not pass by survivorship. Property inherited under Section 8 retains its individual and statutory character and does not automatically become coparcenary property in the hands of the heirs. A co-heir (including a widow) has full rights only over her own share and cannot alienate any portion of the shares belonging to other co-heirs on the ground of legal necessity. Darubai v. Kamalabai, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 581 : 2026 INSC 613

Succession – Applicability of Personal Law of Succession – Held, properties declared as personal private properties by an erstwhile ruler lose their sovereign character upon merger and are treated as the ordinary property of a private citizen – Succession to such private ancestral properties must be governed by the personal law applicable to the ruler (Hindu Mitakshara Law/Hindu Succession Act, 1956) and not by custom or the rule of primogeniture. [Paras 62 – 65] Tikka Shatrujit Singh v. Sukjit Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 554 : 2026 INSC 571

Succession – Exemption under Section 5(ii) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Scope – The exemption from the Act under Section 5(ii) applies only to estates which descend to a single heir by the terms of a covenant – Where succession opened in 1949 (prior to the enforcement of the Act) upon the demise of the ruler, the properties had already vested under the ordinary law in force – Since the merger covenant guaranteed the custom of single-heir descent only for the Gaddi and not for private property, Section 5(ii) cannot be invoked to shield private properties from ordinary personal law. [Paras 70-79] Tikka Shatrujit Singh v. Sukjit Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 554 : 2026 INSC 571

Succession – Precedential Value and Judicial Discipline – Conflicting benches – The Division Bench decision in Trijugi Narain v. Sankoo (2019), which held that private properties continue to devolve by the rule of primogeniture, incorrectly restricted the Three-Judge Bench decision in Talat Fatima Hasan (2020) to Muslim Personal Law – The core ratio of Talat Fatima Hasan is that the rule of primogeniture is excluded for private properties upon the cessation of sovereignty, regardless of whether the personal law is Hindu or Muslim – As a matter of judicial discipline, a Division Bench decision cannot override the explicit ratios laid down by the Three-Judge Benches in the Travancore case (1993), Rampur case (2020), and Faridkot case (2022). [Relied on Revathinnal Balagopala Varma v. His Highness Padmanabha Dasa Bala Rama Varma (Travancore Case), 1993 Supp (1) SCC 233; Talat Fatima Hasan v. Syed Murtaza Ali Khan (Rampur Case), (2020) 15 SCC 655; Kunwar Shri Vir Rajendra Singh v. Union of India (Dholpur Case), (1969) 3 SCC 150; Maharani Deepinder Kaur v. Rajkumari Amrit Kaur (Faridkot Case), (2022) 9 SCC 658; Paras 73-94] Tikka Shatrujit Singh v. Sukjit Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 554 : 2026 INSC 571

Customary Law & Succession – Princely States – Rule of Lineal Male Primogeniture vs. Personal Law – Merger Covenant and Private Properties – Dispute over the character and devolution of the properties belonging to the erstwhile royal family of Kapurthala - The appellants contended that the properties declared as "private properties" by the former ruler under the merger agreement are subject to Hindu Mitakshara Law and liable for partition, while the contesting respondent claimed absolute ownership under the rule of primogeniture - Held, upon signing the merger covenant on May 5, 1948, the Maharaja ceased to be an absolute sovereign and assumed the status of an ordinary citizen - The recognition of the Maharaja as a "Ruler" under Article 366(22) of the Constitution of India was a political/executive act for ceremonial purposes and was not an indicium of property ownership – While Article XIV of the covenant guaranteed succession according to law and custom to the Gaddi (throne), it did not extend that protection or the rule of primogeniture to the private personal properties earmarked under Article XII. [Paras 47, 48] Tikka Shatrujit Singh v. Sukjit Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 554 : 2026 INSC 571

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Section 25 – Disqualification of Murderer – Applicability to Testamentary Succession – Standard of Proof in Civil Proceedings – Section 25 provides that a person who commits murder or abets murder shall be disqualified from inheriting the property of the person murdered - This disqualification is based on public policy, justice, equity, and good conscience, encapsulating the maxim nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria (no man can take advantage of his own wrong) - The bar under Section 25 applies uniformly to both intestate and testamentary succession (disposition through a Will) - Criminal conviction is not a condition precedent for the operation of this statutory bar; the civil consequence of disqualification can be examined independently on the standard of preponderance of probabilities - A person who claims title through a Will but suppresses the material fact that they are facing investigation/prosecution for the murder of the testator is disentitled from asserting any rights in a court of equity. [Relied on T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal and Another, (1977) 4 SCC 467; Mithilesh Kumari and Another v. Prem Behari Khare, (1989) 2 SCC 95; R. Rajagopal Reddy (Dead) by LRs and Others v. Padmini Chandrasekharan (Dead) by LRs, (1995) 2 SCC 630; Union of India and Others v. Major General Madan Lal Yadav, (1996) 4 SCC 127; Nusli Neville Wadia v. Ivory Properties and Others, (2020) 6 SCC 557] Manjula v. D.A. Srinivas, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 478 : 2026 INSC 465

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 — Section 6(5) (As amended by Act 39 of 2005) — Nature of Saving Clause vs. Jurisdictional Bar — Section 6(5) protects valid, completed partitions executed before 20.12.2004 from the retroactive reach of the amended coparcenary rights of daughters - It operates as a strict and narrow saving clause providing a defense on the merits, rather than a jurisdictional bar to the institution of a suit - A disputed question regarding whether a registered partition deed executed secretly behind the daughters' backs without assigning them a share is valid and binding cannot be foreclosed at the threshold stage under Order VII Rule 11. [Paras 53-70] B.S. Lalitha v. Bhuvanesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 506 : 2026 INSC 499

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 — Section 8 read with Proviso to erstwhile Section 6 — Independent Succession Rights of Class I Heirs — Devolution on Intestacy — Where a Hindu male died intestate in 1985 leaving behind daughters, his undivided coparcenary interest devolved by intestate succession under Section 8 upon all Class I heirs simultaneously - This right accrued under the unamended Act and remains wholly independent of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 - The saving clause under Section 6(5) only limits the retroactive reach of the substituted Section 6; it does not override, abrogate, or extinguish the independent devolution that took place under Section 8 - A partition suit is maintainable, at minimum, to the extent of the daughters' share in the father's property. [Paras 62-70] B.S. Lalitha v. Bhuvanesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 506 : 2026 INSC 499

Illegal Detention

Illegal Detention - Key Legal Observations & Guidelines by Supreme Court - Definition of Illegal Detention - i. The deprivation of liberty by the State without lawful authority or in violation of provisions of the Constitution is illegal detention - It includes instances where the detention lacks a valid legal basis or where a lawful power is exercised arbitrarily, in bad faith, or through a procedure that fails to observe essential safeguards; ii. Binding Nature of Judicial Orders ("Obey First, Appeal Later") - Once a competent court issues a direction, it must be obeyed and implemented without reservation - The mere filing or anticipation of an appeal does not automatically keep a judicial order in abeyance or operate as a stay - Flouting or ignoring such directions on a specious plea that the order is erroneous undermines the rule of law and invites chaos; iii. [Relied on Rudul Sah vs. State of Bihar & Anr., (1983) 4 SCC 141; Poonam Lata vs. M.L. Wadhawan, (1987) 3 SCC 347; Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. vs. Federal Motors (P) Ltd., (2005) 1 SCC 705; Kanu Sanyal vs. Distt. Magistrate, (1973) 2 SCC 674; Kanu Sanyal vs. Distt. Magistrate, (1973) 2 SCC 674; Paras 7-9] Daudayal v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 567 : 2026 INSC 599

Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956

Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 (ITPA) — Existence of Legislative Gaps & Poor State Implementation - Supreme Court noted that despite commitments made by the Union of India in 2015 to enact a comprehensive law and establish an Organised Crime Investigation Agency (OCIA), no such dedicated legislation materialized - Reviewing data across various States/UTs, Supreme Court identified severe gaps in current setups, including non-functional One-Stop Centres (OSCs), gross deficiency of referral staff, a lack of mental healthcare and vocational training inside Shakti Sadan homes, an absence of mandatory rule-formulation by several States under Section 23 of the ITPA, and an entire omission of Half-way Homes – Supreme Court concluded that the State has failed to take "reasonable measures" to progressively realize the right to rehabilitation. [Paras 298-302] Prajwala v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 574 : 2026 INSC 609

Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 (ITPA) — Interim Directions on the Victim Protection Plan - Invoking its powers under Articles 32 and 142, the Supreme Court laid down extensive guidelines encompassing the pre-rescue, rescue, post-rescue, rehabilitation, and repatriation stages - These include – i. Mandatory notification of Anti-Human Trafficking Units (AHTUs) as specialized police stations with multi-disciplinary composition; ii. Curbing degrading and unscientific "mass raids" as a default option; iii. Mandating the immediate production of child victims before Child Welfare Committees (CWCs) in terms of the Juvenile Justice Act, overriding ITPA court procedures; iv. Ensuring strict protection of identity, free professional legal aid, psychological de-addiction programs, and individual care plans; v. These guidelines shall operate as the binding law of the land until the Parliament steps in to fill the vacuum. [Paras 223 - 362] Prajwala v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 574 : 2026 INSC 609

Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 (ITPA) — Restructuring Section 17 ITPA: Agency & Primacy of Consent – Supreme Court heavily criticized the "one-size-fits-all" approach under Section 17 of the ITPA, which indiscriminately processes involuntary trafficked victims alongside adult voluntary sex workers – Held that the i. Threshold Inquiry - Magistrates are directed to conduct a preliminary inquiry to identify voluntary adult sex workers and exempt them from intrusive custody or family restoration processes, keeping in line with the principle of non-interference; ii. Primacy of Consent - For victims of trafficking, long-term institutionalization or family restoration cannot be forcibly imposed against their volition. Forcible rehabilitation violates the intrinsic dignity of a person - A victim's informed consent must govern the final orders passed by Magistrates, with judicial exceptions restricted strictly to cases of documented coercion, tutoring, or imminent physical threat to the victim's safety. [Paras 329 – 352] Prajwala v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 574 : 2026 INSC 609

Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 (ITPA) — Rights-Based Re-framing of Trafficking - The Supreme Court observed that human trafficking cannot be viewed solely through the prism of a criminal justice or crime-control response - Secure convictions do not address the multi-layered material, physical, and psychological trauma suffered by victims - Under a human rights framework grounded in Articles 21 and 23 of the Constitution, victims must be recognized as rights-holders at the centre of the state's response - Rehabilitation is a constitutional guarantee, equal to or more important than rescue, since returning a victim to a site of vulnerability without material or psychological protection risks immediate re-trafficking. [Paras 254-256, 278-281] Prajwala v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 574 : 2026 INSC 609

Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 (ITPA) — Section 17 — Heterogeneity of Victims — Threshold Inquiry & Consent — Held, the mechanism under Section 17 uniformly processes all individuals produced after a raid without differentiation - Magistrates must conduct an initial threshold inquiry under Section 17 to identify adult voluntary sex workers who do not wish to be subjected to long-term safe custody, respecting the principle of non-interference - a victim's informed consent must be the driving and primary factor in passing final orders for detention in a protective home or family restoration - Forcible imposition of rehabilitation is alien to human dignity - Exceptions are permissible only when the victim's safety is at imminent risk or consent is extracted via coercion, threat, or tutoring. [Relied on People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, (1982) 3 SCC 235; Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 161; Neeraja Chaudhary v. State of M.P., (1984) 3 SCC 243; Public Union for Civil Liberties v. State of T.N., (2004) 12 SCC 381; Dr. Ashwani Kumar v. Union of India, (2020) 13 SCC 585; Budhadev Karmaskar v. State of W.B., (2022) 20 SCC 220; Paras 324, 329, 335, 336, 343, 348-352, 400-450] Prajwala v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 574 : 2026 INSC 609

Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 (ITPA) — Sections 15, 16, 17, 19, 21 & 23 — Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) — Sections 111, 143 & 144 — Conflation between Sex Trafficking and Prostitution — Duality of thresholds under ITPA and BNS — Held, the ITPA treats all third-party involvement in prostitution as inherently exploitative without requiring a "means" element, whereas Section 143 BNS strictly requires the fulfillment of all three elements (action, means, purpose) for adults - For the purpose of the protective protocol, "victims of trafficking for CSE" collectively includes individuals identified under both the ITPA and BNS frameworks. [Paras 162, 209, 217-219] Prajwala v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 574 : 2026 INSC 609

Income Tax Act, 1961

Income Tax Act, 1961 — Reassessment Mechanism — Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) vs. Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO) — Intervening Clarificatory Legislation with Retrospective Effect - Income Tax Act, 1961; Sections 147, 148, 148A, 151A and newly inserted Section 147A — Income Tax Act, 2025; Sections 273(3), 279, 280 and 281 — Finance Act, 2026 (Act No. 4 of 2026) - Friction arose between the traditional reassessment procedure by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) and the 'e-Assessment of Income Escaping Assessment Scheme, 2022' under Section 151A, which mandated a faceless mechanism - High Courts expressed divergent views: some held JAO and National Faceless Assessment Centre (NFAC) exercise concurrent jurisdiction, while others quashed notices issued by JAOs, holding that authority vested exclusively with the faceless units - During the pendency of the appeals before the Supreme Court, Parliament enacted the Finance Act, 2026 (effective 01.04.2026), retrospectively inserting Section 147A into the IT Act with effect from 01.04.2021 - Section 147A explicitly clarifies that the "Assessing Officer" for the purposes of Sections 148 and 148A means and shall always be deemed to have meant an officer other than the NFAC or any faceless assessment unit - A corresponding amendment was made to Section 279 of the Income Tax Act, 2025 - Since the High Courts primarily quashed the reassessment notices on the ground that JAOs lacked competence, and the statutory foundation of that view stands fundamentally altered by the retrospective amending legislation, the impugned judgments are set aside on this limited ground - The Supreme Court remitted the entire batch of matters back to the respective High Courts for fresh consideration - The Supreme Court did not express any opinion on the validity, scope, effect, retrospectivity, or applicability of the amended provisions, leaving all questions open - Assessees are granted liberty to amend their writ petitions within four weeks to challenge the validity of Section 147A of the IT Act or any consequential provision - Revenue is given three weeks thereafter to file written submissions - An interim stay on further assessment/reassessment proceedings pursuant to the impugned notices shall operate during the pendency of writ petitions before the High Courts, subject to conditions - High Courts are requested to decide the matters expeditiously, preferably by 30.09.2026. [Paras 14-27] Asst Commissioner of Income Tax v. Aristo Pharmaceuticals Private Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 436

Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1991 (Kerala) – Section 12, Section 54 – Amalgamation – Set-off of accumulated losses – The Supreme Court held that an amalgamated company cannot claim a set-off of accumulated losses suffered by the amalgamating company under the Kerala Act in the absence of an express statutory provision - Unlike Section 72A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which contains a deeming fiction for such carry-forward in cases of amalgamation, the Kerala Act lacks any such enabling provision. [Paras 9 - 14] Aspinwall and Co. Ltd. v. Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 371 : 2026 INSC 359

Income Tax Act, 1961; Interpretation of Contracts – Revenue vs. Profit – Overriding Title – The interpretation of a contractual clause which is the foundation of the rights of parties is a question of law - Under Clause 7 of the AOP Agreement, the appellant was entitled to 35% of gross sale proceeds upfront, while all project expenses were to be met from the remaining 65% share of the collaborator - Since the appellant's share remained insulated from the expenses of the AOP, the receipt lacked the essential characteristics of "profit" (which is surplus after expenses) and was in substance a "share of revenue" - Such an arrangement creates an "overriding title" that diverts the income before it reaches the AOP, making it taxable in the hands of the member (assessee) as a business receipt and not exempt as a share of AOP profit under Section 86. [Relied on CIT v. Sitaldas Tirathdas, (1961) 41 ITR 367; Paras 82, 83, 94, 97-105, 119-126] Commissioner of Income Tax III v. Sanand Properties, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 488 : 2026 INSC 472

Income Tax Act, 1961; Sections 147 and 148 – Reassessment – Reason to Believe – Tangible Material – Change of Opinion – Reopening of assessment is valid if the Assessing Officer possesses "tangible material" providing a "reason to believe" that income has escaped assessment - Mere production of account books or documents during original assessment does not necessarily amount to "full and true disclosure" if the assessee fails to bring the Assessing Officer's attention to specific relevant items or if subsequent fresh information exposes the falsity of earlier statements - In the present case, while the assessee disclosed the existence of the Association of Persons (AOP) and the income derived from it, the primary fact that the income was a 35% share of gross revenue (and not tax-exempt profit) came to light only through documents impounded during a subsequent survey and a director's statement recorded under Section 131 - Since the Assessing Officer had not formed a conscious opinion on the fundamental nature of this income during the original scrutiny assessment, the reopening did not constitute a mere "change of opinion" but was a valid exercise of jurisdiction based on fresh tangible material. [Paras 64, 70-71, 75-76, 82-83, 106-113, 116, 117] Commissioner of Income Tax III v. Sanand Properties, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 488 : 2026 INSC 472

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) – India-Mauritius Treaty – Tax Residency Certificate (TRC) – Held that the limited evidentiary role of a TRC in proceedings under Section 245R(2) - While a TRC establishes residency, it does not prevent the Revenue from examining whether an entity is a mere "conduit" or a "see-through entity" used as a device for tax avoidance – Held that the applications were rightly rejected by the AAR as being hit by the threshold jurisdictional bar under proviso (iii) to Section 245R(2) – Supreme Court concluded that capital gains arising from transfers effected after the cut-off date of 01.04.2017 are taxable in India under the Income Tax Act read with the DTAA – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Vodafone International Holdings BV v. Union of India (2012) 6 SCC 613; Balvir Singh v. State of Uttarakhand (2023) SC 5551; Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan (2004) 10 SCC 1; LIC v. Escorts Ltd. (1986) 1 SCC 264; McDowell & Company Ltd v. Commercial Tax Officer (1985) 3 SCC 230; Paras 12-25; 40-50] Authority For Advance Rulings v. Tiger Global International II Holdings, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 50 : 2026 INSC 60

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 245R(2) Proviso (iii) – Advance Rulings – Chapter X-A (GAAR) – General Anti-Avoidance Rules - Rejection of application on the ground of being prima facie designed for the avoidance of tax – held that the use of the term "prima facie" in Section 245R(2) implies that the Authority for Advance Rulings (AAR) needs only an initial examination of documents to be satisfied that a transaction is for tax avoidance - The level of satisfaction for a prima facie conclusion is much lower than what is required for final proof – Held that that where evidence prima facie establishes that transactions do not qualify as lawful and are impermissible tax-avoidance arrangements, Chapter X-A becomes applicable. Authority For Advance Rulings v. Tiger Global International II Holdings, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 50 : 2026 INSC 60

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 260A – Jurisdiction of High Court – Substantial Question of Law – Whether the High Court can decide an issue (taxability under Section 28) not specifically framed as a substantial question of law – Held: Issues incidental or collateral to the main formulated question, on which parties have been heard and which go to the root of the matter, can be considered by the High Court - The absence of a formal formulation does not vitiate the judgment if no prejudice is caused and parties had the opportunity to address the dispute – Appeal dismissed. [Para 9] Jindal Equipment Leasing Consultancy Services Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax Delhi – II, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 37 : 2026 INSC 46

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 28 and Section 47(vii) – Amalgamation – Substitution of Shares held as Stock-in-Trade – Whether the receipt of shares of an amalgamated company in lieu of shares of an amalgamating company held as stock-in-trade gives rise to taxable business income – Held: Amalgamation is a statutory process of substitution - While Section 47(vii) exempts capital gains arising from such substitution if the shares are "capital assets," it does not apply if they are held as "stock-in-trade" - Taxable business income under Section 28 arises when an assessee receives a real and presently realisable commercial benefit - In the context of amalgamation, the charge under Section 28 crystallises only upon the allotment of new shares, as this is when the assessee receives realisable instruments capable of valuation in money's worth - At the stages of the "appointed date" or "date of court sanction," no such benefit accrues or is received - The profit arising on receipt of the amalgamated company's shares may be taxed under Section 28 where the shares allotted are tradable and possess a definite market value - This is a fact-sensitive test to be determined based on the realisability of the shares in each case. [Relied on Commissioner of Income-tax, Cochin v. Grace Collis and others (2001) 3 SCC 430; Orient Trading Company Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta (1997) 3 SCC 340; R. Nagaraj v. Rajamani 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 416; Shiv Raj Gupta v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Delhi (2020) 425 ITR 420 (SC); Paras 18 - 31] Jindal Equipment Leasing Consultancy Services Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax Delhi – II, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 37 : 2026 INSC 46

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 90 – Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) – India-Mauritius Treaty – Tax Residency Certificate (TRC) – Supreme Court clarified that while a TRC is a valid piece of evidence to establish residence in a contracting state, it does not act as a complete bar to further enquiry by the Revenue - If the Revenue establishes that a Mauritian company was interposed merely as a "conduit" or a "device" to avoid tax, the tax authorities are entitled to "look through" the entity and discard the device to tax the real transaction - The dispute involved the sale of shares of a Singapore-based entity (Flipkart) that derived its value substantially from assets located in India - held that even if the transfer involved shares of a non-resident company (Singapore), the capital gains are taxable in India if the value is derived from Indian assets - The AAR found that the exemption under the India-Mauritius DTAA was intended for the alienation of shares of an Indian company and did not automatically extend to shares of a company resident in a third country (Singapore). Authority For Advance Rulings v. Tiger Global International II Holdings, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 50 : 2026 INSC 60

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; Section 2(j) – Definition of "Industry" – Temple/Charitable Trust – The Supreme Court declined to interfere with the findings of the Labour Court and High Court which held that the respondent-Trust, being a temple and a charity-based institution with no object of earning profit or manufacturing activity, does not fall within the definition of "industry". Indravadan N. Adhvaryu Pipala Fali Modhvada v. Laxminarayan Dev Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 102

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Section 2(k), Section 10(1), and Section 12 – Existence of Industrial Dispute – Requirement of Prior Demand – The Supreme Court held that a formal written demand by a workman/Union to the employer is not a sine qua non (indispensable condition) for an industrial dispute to exist under Section 2(k) - The ID Act does not prescribe a specific manner for a dispute to arise - Supreme Court distinguished between an existing dispute and an "apprehended" dispute, noting that under Section 10(1), the appropriate Government has the administrative power to refer a matter if it forms an opinion that a dispute is either existing or apprehended – Held that the initiation of conciliation proceedings via a representation to the Conciliation Officer without a prior demand notice to the Management is not ex-facie illegal. Premium Transmission v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 86 : 2026 INSC 87

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Section 33(1) – Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 – Interim Relief – Status of Workman – The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the Industrial Court and the High Court which had directed the Management to provide work and pay wages to contract labourers during the pendency of a dispute - held that the restrictions under Section 33 of the ID Act against changing service conditions are attracted only if the relationship of "workman" and "management" is established - Where workers are engaged through a registered contractor, their status as direct employees of the management is a matter of adjudication - Granting interim relief that directs continuation or regularization at the preliminary stage amounts to a "virtual pre-judgment" of the main dispute. Premium Transmission v. Kishan Subhash Rathod, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 87

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Section 33(1) – Interim Relief for Contract Labour – Supreme Court set aside interim orders directing the Management to provide work and pay wages to contract labourers during the pendency of a dispute regarding their status - held that the restrictions under Section 33(1) regarding changes to service conditions are only attracted if a direct master-servant relationship is established - Granting such interim relief amounts to a "virtual pre-judgment" of the main dispute where the workers' status as "workmen" of the principal employer is still under adjudication. Premium Transmission v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 86 : 2026 INSC 87

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Termination – Grant of Monetary Compensation – Where a permanent employee (Accountant) was orally terminated after twelve years of unblemished service without an inquiry, the Court directed the payment of a lump-sum compensation of ₹12,00,000/- in full and final settlement, even without deciding on the merits of the "industry" status, to lay the entire issue to rest. [Relied on Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board vs. A. Rajappa and Others (1978) 2 SCC 213; Paras 2-5] Indravadan N. Adhvaryu Pipala Fali Modhvada v. Laxminarayan Dev Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 102

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 vs. CLRA Act, 1970 – Comparative Scope of "Workman" – Supreme Court observed that while the definition of "workman" in Section 2(1)(i) of the CLRA is textually derived from Section 2(s) of the ID Act, they differ in juridical scope - The ID Act requires a direct master-servant relationship (privity of contract), whereas the CLRA recognizes a tripartite relationship where the workman is hired through a contractor - Unlike the ID Act, the CLRA specifically excludes "out-workers" and does not extend the definition to include terminated employees for the purpose of locus standi in disputes. Premium Transmission v. Kishan Subhash Rathod, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 87

Industrial Policy

Industrial Policy, 2019 (Himachal Pradesh) - Nature and Effect of the 2022 Amendment Notification - The amendment notification dated 29.04.2022, which substituted the word "eligible" with "new" in Clause 16(a) and Rule 16(i)(a), was merely clarificatory in nature to remove an inadvertent drafting error - It did not create or extinguish any substantive rights but merely reinforced the original intent of the Policy. Being clarificatory, it operates retrospectively and relates back to the inception of the original policy - the amendment introducing a three-year limitation on the duration of benefits under Clause 16(b) was introduced for the first time, making it substantive and prospective in operation. [Paras 50-51, 60-64] State of Himachal Pradesh v. Kundlas Loh Udyog, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 541 : 2026 INSC 534

Industrial Policy, 2019 (Himachal Pradesh) - Vested Rights and Promissory Estoppel - The mere issuance of a Commencement of Commercial Production (COP) Certificate does not automatically create a vested or crystallised right to specific tariff concessions under Clause 16(a) - Per Rule 27 of the 2019 Rules, incentives must be formally sanctioned and disbursed by the Director of Industries, which was never done for the respondent under Clause 16(a) - the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked to compel the State to grant a benefit that was never intended for the recipient's class of industry - Since the respondent had already legitimately availed itself of the expansion rebate under Clause 16(b), no case of inequity or enforceable equity survives. Promissory estoppel cannot be stretched to defeat public interest, fiscal discipline, or the true scope of a state policy. [Relied on IFGL Refractories Ltd. v. Orissa State Financial Corporation, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 28; Shree Sidhbali Steels Ltd. v. State of U.P., (2011) 3 SCC 193; State of Rajasthan v. J.K. Udaipur Udyog Ltd., (2004) 7 SCC 673; Arvind Industries v. State of Gujarat, (1995) 6 SCC 53; Paras 60-64] State of Himachal Pradesh v. Kundlas Loh Udyog, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 541 : 2026 INSC 534

Industrial Policy, 2019 (Himachal Pradesh); Clause 16(a) and Clause 16(b) — Rules regarding grant of incentives, concessions, facilities for investment promotion in Himachal Pradesh, 2019; Rule 16(i)(a) and Rule 16(i)(b) — Applicability of Concessional Electricity Rates to Existing Industries undergoing Substantial Expansion — Clarificatory Amendment Notification dated 29.04.2022 — Retrospective Operation — Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel - The Supreme Court was inter-alia considering whether existing industrial enterprises undergoing substantial expansion are entitled to a 15% discount on approved energy charges under Clause 16(a) of the Industrial Policy of 2019 (meant for new enterprises) in addition to the 15% rebate on incremental power consumption under Clause 16(b) – Held that Clause 16(a) of the Industrial Policy of 2019 and Rule 16(i)(a) of the 2019 Rules were always intended to apply exclusively to "new industrial enterprises" and not to "existing industrial enterprises undergoing substantial expansion" - The overall scheme of the Policy and the contemporaneous tariff orders indicate a clear classification: new enterprises receive general concessional tariffs under Clause 16(a) to attract fresh investment, while existing units undergoing expansion are incentivized via consumption-linked rebates on additional power consumption under Clause 16(b) - Allowing expanding units to claim benefits under both clauses would result in an unintended overlapping or dual benefit, imposing an unjustified fiscal burden on the State. [Paras 44-48, 50-64] State of Himachal Pradesh v. Kundlas Loh Udyog, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 541 : 2026 INSC 534

Industrial Policy – New Industrial Unit vs. Expansion - Amalgamation and Transfer of Rights to Subsidies - Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel and Legitimate Expectation- Determination of whether an industrial unit qualifies as a "new industrial unit" under the Industrial Policy of 1989 - held that even if an entity has existing units, a newly established unit with fresh capital investment, separate registration, independent industrial license, and distinct physical location must be treated as a "new industrial unit" – Held that upon the amalgamation of companies, all properties, rights, and interests, including sanctioned subsidies and incentives, stand transferred to the successor-in-interest (the amalgamated company) as per the scheme sanctioned by the High Court - The State and its instrumentalities are bound by unequivocal promises made in Industrial Policies and specific sanction letters - Once an entrepreneur acts upon such promises by making substantial investments and setting up a unit, the authorities cannot arbitrarily resile from or retrospectively amend the policy to deny sanctioned benefits - Supreme Court noted that the MM Plant unit satisfied all criteria for a new unit: investment made after the policy's effective date, independent license, separate electricity connection, and distinct physical location (Sheds 19 & 22 vs. the old unit's Sheds 7 & 8) - The rejection based on an internal instruction from 1994 and a retrospective amendment in 2008 was held to be illegal, as the MM Plant was a "new industrial unit" and not an expansion/modernization project - Noted that the respondents' "volte-face" after sanctioning the subsidies and allowing the appellant to continue production was unfair and untenable - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and directed the respondents to disburse ₹11,14,750 with 9% p.a. interest within three months. [Relied on Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1979) 2 SCC 409; Gujarat State Financial Corpn. v. Lotus Hotels (P) Ltd. (1983) 3 SCC 379; State of Punjab v. Nestle India Ltd. (2004) 6 SCC 465; State of Jharkhand v. Brahmputra Metallics Ltd. (2023) 10 SCC 634; Paras 75-80, 90- 93, 103, 135] IFGL Refractories Ltd. v. Orissa State Financial Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 18 : 2026 INSC 18

Informed Consent vs. Patient Choice - Supreme Court clarified that while patients have the autonomy to "opt in" or "opt out" of offered treatments, they do not have a right to demand a particular form of treatment - Valid "informed consent" requires "adequate information" concerning the nature, risks, and benefits of a treatment - Because scientific evidence for stem cell therapy in ASD is currently non-existent or inconclusive, practitioners cannot provide the "adequate information" necessary for a valid consent. [Relied on Samira Kohli v. Dr. Prabha Manchandra and Another (2008) 2 SCC 1; Common Cause (A Registered Society) v. Union of India and Another, reported in (2018) 5 SCC 1; Paras 92-95, 131, 151] Yash Charitable Trust v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 93 : 2026 INSC 96

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – No Condonation of Re-filing Delay Beyond 28 Days for IBC Appeals - While the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 (SCR) allow a 28-day window for curing defects and permit discretionary condonation of re-filing delay for general laws, this relaxation cannot override the express statutory edict of the IBC - An appeal under Section 62 must be defect-free to be considered validly instituted within the limitation period - Litigants cannot circumvent the rigorous timelines of the IBC by filing a defective appeal as a device to save limitation and curing defects at leisure - Once the 60-day statutory window under the IBC and the 28-day curing window under the SCR close, the right to appeal stands frozen and extinguished – Supreme Court has no power to condone any re-filing delay beyond the permissible 28 days for an appeal under Section 62 of the IBC. [Paras 15 - 25] CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary v. Adani Infrastructure and Developers, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 611 : 2026 INSC 629

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – No Differentiated Threshold for Neutral Officers / Liquidators - Serial Indulgence Impermissible – Noted that the fact that the appellant is a neutral officer (Liquidator) acting for the benefit of stakeholders does not permit the Supreme Court to invoke its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution to dilute or override the express statutory timeframes of the IBC - The statute does not carve out a separate threshold or relaxation for such officers - A litigant who has previously secured a liberal construction of "sufficient cause" and condonation of re-filing delay at an earlier appellate stage (e.g., under Section 61 before the NCLAT) cannot claim a similar exercise of judicial discretion automatically at successive appellate stages - The discipline of limitation under the IBC does not countenance serial condonations of delay, as it would defeat the legislative objective of expedition and finality. [Relied on Mobilox Innovations (P) Ltd. v. Kirusa Software (P) Ltd. (2018) 1 SCC 353; Kalparaj Dharamshi v. Kotak Investment Advisors Limited (2021) 10 SCC 401; Saturn Ventures and Advisors Pvt. Limited v. S. Gopalakrishnan (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2484); Distinguished from CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary v. Adani Infrastructure & Developers (P) Ltd. (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1406); Paras 19-24] CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary v. Adani Infrastructure and Developers, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 611 : 2026 INSC 629

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 62 – Supreme Court Rules, 2013 – Order VIII Rule 6(3) & (4) – Condonation of Delay in Filing and Re-filing Appeal – Insurmountable Jurisdictional Bar - Strict Timelines under IBC Prevail over Procedural Rules - The statutory scheme of limitation under the IBC is strict and time-bound - An appeal under Section 62 of the IBC must be presented within 45 days, with an extendable grace period of only 15 days upon showing sufficient cause - The absolute statutory outer limit is 60 days, beyond which the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to condone filing delay ceases entirely. [Para 20-25] CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary v. Adani Infrastructure and Developers, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 611 : 2026 INSC 629

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 33(2) & Section 62 – Withdrawal or Modification of Resolution Plan – Approving and Reprobating Conditions in Letter of Intent (LoI) – Forfeiture of Earnest Money Deposit (EMD) – Commercial Wisdom of the Committee of Creditors (CoC) – Supreme Court held the following – i. No Scope for Reneging After CoC Approval - Once a Resolution Plan is approved by the CoC, the Successful Resolution Applicant (SRA) is precluded from raising grievances regarding conditions in the Letter of Intent (LoI) that were already within their knowledge and expressly agreed upon during CoC meetings. A submitted resolution plan is binding and irrevocable between the CoC and the SRA; ii. Artifices to Delay/Modify Plan Prohibited - SRAs cannot employ clever ploys or indirect attempts (subterfuges) to back out of a CoC-approved plan by characterizing standard legal contingencies in an LoI as "conditionalities" - Such actions threaten to crumble the statutory architecture of the IBC; iii. Legality of EMD Forfeiture - Forfeiture of the Earnest Money Deposit (EMD) is fully justified under the Request For Resolution Plan (RFRP) if the SRA fails to submit the required performance bank guarantee within the stipulated time or non-complies with the resolution process; iv. Paramountcy of CoC's Decision to Liquidate - The decision of the CoC to liquidate the Corporate Debtor prior to the confirmation of the resolution plan especially when the SRA defaults or vacillates is a business decision taken in its commercial wisdom and is not amenable to judicial review. [Relied on Ebix Singapore Private Limited vs. Committee of Creditors of Educomp Solutions Limited and Another (2022) 2 SCC 401; Chairman, State Bank of India and Another v. M.J. James (2022) 2 SCC 301; Nagubai Ammal and Others v. B. Shama Rao and Others (1956) 1 SCC 698; Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corporation and Another v. Diamond & Gem Development Corporation Limited and Another (2013) 5 SCC 470; Manish Kumar v. Union of India (2021) 5 SCC 1; Paras 26-42] Sanjay Dave v. Andhra Bank, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 562 : 2026 INSC 580

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - Section 61(2) Proviso – Appeal before NCLAT – Limitation and Mandatory Requirement of Certified Copy – Appeal filed/refiled without a certified copy of the impugned order or an accompanying application for exemption from filing the same is a "wholly incompetent appeal" and not a mere defective appeal - Filing an application for a certified copy is an essential indicator of the litigant's diligence under the strict timelines of the Code. [Paras 6 - 10] Angelwoods Apartment Allottees Association v. M. Lalitha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 491 : 2026 INSC 479

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 7 - Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) - Recovery Mechanism - Abuse of Process - The Code operates as a collective insolvency resolution mechanism and not as a forum for the adjudication of individual contractual claims - Where the object behind the invocation of the Code is to compel payment rather than to address genuine financial distress, such invocation amounts to an abuse of process - The Code must not be used as a tool for coercion and debt recovery by individual creditors. Dhanlaxmi Bank v. Mohammed Javed Sultan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 480 : 2026 INSC 460

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 7 - Financial Debt and Default - Intertwined Contractual Obligations - In a case where a loan was disbursed directly to a Builder under a quadripartite agreement, the Bank's disbursement is intrinsically linked to the performance of the Builder's obligations - When the dispute is predominantly contractual in character involving competing claims relating to the transfer of property and is already being adjudicated before the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT), it does not constitute a straightforward financial debt-default scenario warranting initiation of CIRP - Permitting invocation of the Code in such instances would amount to converting insolvency proceedings into a coercive mechanism for recovery, which is impermissible. [Relied on Innovative Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank & Anr. (2018) 1 SCC 407; Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. (2019) 8 SCC 416; Glas Trust Company LLC v. BYJU Raveendran & Ors. (2025) 3 SCC 625; Anjani Technoplast Ltd v. Shubh Gautam 2026 INSC 410 Paras 8-12] Dhanlaxmi Bank v. Mohammed Javed Sultan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 480 : 2026 INSC 460

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Project-Specific CIRP and Corporate Veil in Real Estate — Restoration of Resolution Plans — Appeals filed against the NCLAT judgment which had set aside NCLT orders approving project-specific resolution plans for Earth Infrastructures Limited (Corporate Debtor/Holding Company) - NCLAT had held that the project lands belonged to the subsidiary companies (lessees from GNIDA) and could not be treated as assets of the holding company under the Code - Supreme Court held: This was an eminently fit case for lifting the corporate veil as the holding company (EIL) was the main driving force in the development of the projects and payment of dues, while the subsidiaries were merely a front - The Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority (GNIDA) contributed greatly to the imbroglio through persistent inaction, ineptitude, and failure to monitor the projects despite being fully aware of the facts and the CIRP proceedings - GNIDA is disentitled from levying penal interest, penal charges, or time-extension penalties - To secure the completion of stalled real estate projects and protect innocent homebuyers, the project-specific resolution plans stand restored. GNIDA is directed to recalculate its dues strictly on principal amounts and communicate them to the resolution applicants, who shall clear the dues on their own over 24 months without burdening the homebuyers. [Paras 56 – 68] Alpha Corp Development v. Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 460 : 2026 INSC 449

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Section 25A(3A) — Representation of Class of Financial Creditors — Minority dissentient homebuyers challenging the resolution plan - Held, once an authorized representative casts a vote on behalf of a class of financial creditors (like homebuyers) based on a vote of more than 50% of the voting share of those who voted, it is not open to individual minority homebuyers to raise a separate voice of dissent against the majority vote. They must sail with the majority - Appeals filed with a delay of 34 days - Held, Section 62(2) empowers the Supreme Court to condone delay in filing an appeal up to 15 days but not more - The appeals are clearly barred by time and cannot be entertained. [Relied on Indiabulls Asset Reconstruction Company Limited vs. Ram Kishore Arora and others, AIR 2023 SC 2273; Mansi Brar Fernandes vs. Shubha Sharma and another, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1972; Life Insurance Corporation of India vs. Escorts Ltd. and others, (1986) 1 SCC 264; ArcelorMittal India Private Limited vs. Satish Kumar Gupta and others, (2019) 2 SCC 1; RPS Infrastructure Limited vs. Mukul Kumar and another, (2023) 10 SCC 718; Noida Entrepreneurs Association vs. Noida and others, (2011) 6 SCC 508; Paras 30, 31, 55-60, 65-76] Alpha Corp Development v. Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 460 : 2026 INSC 449

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) - Section 7 and Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 – Period of Limitation and Date of Default - The period of limitation for filing an application under Section 7 of the Code is three years and is strictly governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 - The right to apply accrues on the date of default, which is the date when the corporate debtor's account is classified as a Non-Performing Asset (NPA), and not from any subsequent recovery proceedings. [Relied On: Babulal Vardharji Gurjar v. Veer Gurjar, (2020) 15 SCC 1; Para 13] Shankar Khandelwal v. Omkara Asset Reconstruction Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 438 : 2026 INSC 429

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Non-Disclosure of Guarantee in Financial Statements - Mere non-disclosure of a corporate guarantee in the financial statements or annual reports of the Corporate Debtor cannot deprive the beneficiary lenders from asserting their claim on the basis of such a guarantee - At the very highest, such an omission can only be treated as a default committed by the Corporate Debtor under company law, but it cannot legitimately defeat the recognition of a financial debt or status of a financial creditor under the Code. [Para 25] State Bank of India v. Doha Bank Q.P.S.C., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 434 : 2026 INSC 423

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Production of Documents at Appellate Stage - An appeal is a continuation of the original proceeding - Documents relevant to deciding the lis (dispute)—such as corporate guarantees can be produced at the appellate stage before the NCLAT - Merely because such documents were not produced before the NCLT does not allow for any adverse inference to be drawn regarding their genuineness, provided their execution is otherwise established. [Para 27] State Bank of India v. Doha Bank Q.P.S.C., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 434 : 2026 INSC 423

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 5(8) – Financial Debt – Corporate Guarantee - A liability arising from a corporate guarantee squarely falls within the ambit of "financial debt" under Section 5(8) of the Code - The amount of any liability in respect of a guarantee for money borrowed against the payment of interest constitutes a financial debt, making the beneficiary lenders eligible to be recognized as "financial creditors" - A guarantor incurs a coextensive liability with that of the principal borrower, which is fully enforceable in law. [Paras 22 – 31] State Bank of India v. Doha Bank Q.P.S.C., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 434 : 2026 INSC 423

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 62 – Interference with Concurrent Findings - While the Supreme Court does not routinely re-appreciate facts when the NCLT and NCLAT have recorded concurrent findings, an exception is carved out where the findings of fact are shown to be glaringly and manifestly perverse - Where the tribunals reject valid claims of a consortium of lenders by misinterpreting asset classification norms or ignoring established statutory verifications, the findings warrant interference under Section 62. [Relied on Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 and Stamp Act, 1899, IN RE, (2024) 6 SCC 1; Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. Dilip Construction Company, (1969) 1 SCC 597; China Development Bank v. Doha Bank Q.P.S.C. & Ors., (2025) 7 SCC 729; Para 15 - 26, 30] State Bank of India v. Doha Bank Q.P.S.C., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 434 : 2026 INSC 423

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 – General Rule on Fresh Cause of Action vs. Contextual Misuse— While a judgment or decree for money in favor of a financial creditor gives rise to a fresh cause of action to initiate proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC, this principle does not operate in a vacuum - Every decree-holder who happens to be a financial creditor is not entitled, as a matter of right, to invoke the insolvency process in preference to execution - Whether the invocation of the IBC amounts to a misuse of the process or a recovery mechanism must be contextually examined based on the unique facts of each case. [Relied on Swiss Ribbons (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 4 SCC 17; Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 8 SCC 416; GLAS Trust Co. LLC v. BYJU Raveendran, (2025) 3 SCC 625; Tottempudi Salalith v. State Bank of India, (2024) 1 SCC 24; Para 31-33] Anjani Technoplast Ltd. v. Shubh Gautam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 418 : 2026 INSC 410

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 vs. Civil Court Decree Execution – Primary Objective of the IBC vs. Debt Recovery Mechanism — The primary focus of the IBC is to ensure the revival and continuation of the corporate debtor as a going concern, protecting it from its own management and liquidation - It is a beneficial legislation and not a debt recovery mechanism for individual creditors seeking to enforce money decrees - Initiating the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) purely to secure payment of individual dues, bypassing established civil execution remedies against a solvent and functioning company, constitutes an abuse of the process - The insolvency jurisdiction under the IBC is not designed to resolve intense disputes regarding the computation or quantum of a decretal amount. [Paras 19, 21 - 33] Anjani Technoplast Ltd. v. Shubh Gautam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 418 : 2026 INSC 410

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - The Supreme Court expressed serious concern over inordinate delays by the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) in approving resolution plans under the IBC, terming the delay of nearly two years in the present case as “very unfortunate”. The Court observed that once a resolution plan is approved by the Committee of Creditors (CoC), it is incumbent upon the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) to consider and approve the same in a timely manner. Prolonged inaction frustrates the core objective of the IBC of achieving time-bound completion of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP). AVJ Heights Apartment Owners Association v. IIFL Finance, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 392

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 9 – Initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) by Operational Creditor – Pre-existing Dispute – Plausible Contentions – The Supreme Court set aside the NCLAT judgment that had admitted a Section 9 application, holding that the NCLAT erroneously delved into the merits of the dispute rather than merely checking for its existence - Supreme Court found clear evidence of a pre-existing dispute regarding defective supplies and the need for reconciliation of accounts, which dated back to written correspondence from December 2020, long before the demand notice issued in November 2021. GLS Films Industries v. Chemical Suppliers, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : 2026 INSC 344

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Reconciliation of Accounts – Supreme Court emphasized that when there is a lack of clarity regarding the amount due and parties have called for reconciliation based on losses from defective supplies, such a situation supports the existence of a dispute - Noted that the respondent's own confusion demanding ₹4.60 crore and later "correcting" it to ₹2.92 crore after the demand notice manifested a lack of consensus on the liability. [Relied on Mobilox Innovations Private Limited vs. Kirusa Software Private Limited (2018) 1 SCC 353; Sabarmati Gas Limited vs. Shah Alloys Limited (2023) 3 SCC 229; Paras 17-21] GLS Films Industries v. Chemical Suppliers, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : 2026 INSC 344

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Scope of Adjudicating Authority's Inquiry – Summary Jurisdiction – Reaffirming the legal position, the Court stated that for the purpose of Section 9, the Adjudicating Authority only needs to satisfy itself that a "plausible" dispute exists which is not "spurious, hypothetical or illusory" - It is not required to determine whether the defence is likely to succeed or to examine the merits of the dispute beyond identifying a non-feeble legal argument. GLS Films Industries v. Chemical Suppliers, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : 2026 INSC 344

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 30(2)(e) – Eligibility of Resolution Applicant – A Resolution Professional (RP) must ensure a resolution plan does not contravene any law, including the MSCS Act - Where an MSCS seeks to acquire a Corporate Debtor (CD), it must satisfy the threshold that the CD is either a subsidiary or operates in the same line of business as defined in the MSCS's charter documents - The "same line of business" refers to a substantive sameness or close nexus in core economic activities, not remote or incidental connections - Revenue generated or profit/loss incurred is irrelevant to this determination; the inquiry is strictly governed by the approved bye-laws - Mere reproduction of the statutory language of Section 64(d) in the investment clause of the bye-laws (Clause 52) does not suffice if the core Object Clause (Clause 5) is not correspondingly amended to include the specific line of business of the target institution. [Paras 33-50] Nirmal Ujjwal Credit Co-Operative Society Ltd. v. Ravi Sethia, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 357 : 2026 INSC 338

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 14 — Moratorium — Appropriation of Security Deposit against pre-CIRP dues — Held: The appropriation of a cash security deposit available with a creditor after the initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) towards dues that arose prior to the CIRP is impermissible and contrary to the moratorium imposed under Section 14 of the IBC - Such a deposit remains the property of the Corporate Debtor until a valid adjustment is made - While payments for maintaining the supply of goods and services during the moratorium period (post-CIRP) to keep the Corporate Debtor as a going concern are permissible under Section 14(2A), the recovery of pre-CIRP dues must strictly follow the claim procedure envisaged in the IBC. Central Transmission Utility of India v. Sumit Binani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 289 : 2026 INSC 284

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Set-off in CIRP — Pari Passu Principle — Held - The principle of insolvency set-off as permitted in liquidation regulations cannot be applied to CIRP - Set-off of dues payable by the Corporate Debtor for a period prior to the commencement of the CIRP cannot be made from dues (or assets) payable to or belonging to the Corporate Debtor post the commencement of the CIRP - Allowing such a set-off would mitigate against the pari passu principle essential to the scheme of the IBC. [Relied on Bharti Airtel Ltd. v. Aircel Ltd. & Dishnet Wireless Ltd. (Resolution Professional), (2024) 4 SCC 668; Paras 15-25] Central Transmission Utility of India v. Sumit Binani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 289 : 2026 INSC 284

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 12A – Recall of Order – Maintainability – Commercial Wisdom of CoC - The Supreme Court dismissed a Miscellaneous Application (MA) seeking to recall a prior order dated 25.02.2025 that had dismissed a Special Leave Petition (SLP) - The applicant sought recall based on subsequent events, specifically a settlement reached under Section 12A of the IBC and the withdrawal of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) - Supreme Court reiterated that the decision to accept a settlement or a commercial course of action under Section 12A falls within the "collective commercial wisdom" of the Committee of Creditors (CoC) - held that a higher offer by an applicant does not, by itself, provide a ground to unsettle steps taken within the insolvency framework or to reopen the dismissal of an SLP. Lamba Exports Pvt. Ltd. v. Dhir Global Industries Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 286 : 2026 INSC 275

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 31(1) — Arbitral Proceedings — Counterclaim vs. Set-off — 'Clean Slate' Principle — Whether a respondent can raise a plea of set-off in arbitration proceedings after the approval of a Resolution Plan, even if its counterclaim was not part of the plan and stands extinguished - Held, that once a Resolution Plan is approved under Section 31(1) of the IBC, all claims not included in the plan stand extinguished - a respondent cannot seek any affirmative relief through a counterclaim that was not part of the approved plan - if the specific terms of the Resolution Plan only bar payments or settlements and do not expressly or impliedly exclude the plea of set-off as a defense, such a plea can be raised to defend against the appellant's claim - The plea of set-off is permitted only as a defensive tool to prevent the appellant from succeeding entirely or in part - If the amount due to the respondent exceeds the amount awarded to the appellant, the surplus is not recoverable. If the appellant's proceedings are withdrawn, the counterclaim/set-off defense fails. [Relied on Ghanashyam Mishra & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. (2021) 9 SCC 657; Bharti Airtel Ltd. v. Aircel Ltd. & Dishnet Wireless Ltd. (Resolution Professional) (2024) 4 SCC 668; Paras 21-27] Ujaas Energy Ltd. v. West Bengal Power Development Corporation Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 272 : 2026 INSC 268 : AIR 2026 SC 1541

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Resolution Plan — Modification vs. Clarification — Clarifications that reaffirm existing terms of a Resolution Plan—such as confirming the treatment of Bank Guarantees or the Net Present Value (NPV) of deferred payments—do not amount to an unauthorized enhancement or modification of a commercial offer after the conclusion of negotiations. Torrent Power v. Ashish Arjunkumar Rathi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 207 : 2026 INSC 206 : AIR 2026 SC 1347

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 61(3)(ii) — Material Irregularity — Seeking clarifications from resolution applicants by the Resolution Professional (RP) under the specific instructions of the CoC does not constitute "material irregularity." - The RP acts as a communicator for the CoC's queries to ensure a comprehensive evaluation of the feasibility and viability of resolution plans - Such conduct does not amount to an independent or unilateral modification of the process by the RP. Torrent Power v. Ashish Arjunkumar Rathi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 207 : 2026 INSC 206 : AIR 2026 SC 1347

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Sections 30(2), 31, 61(3), and 62 — Doctrine of Commercial Wisdom — Scope of Judicial Review — The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors (CoC) is paramount and non-justiciable - The Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) and Appellate Authority (NCLAT) have limited jurisdiction to interfere with the CoC's decision, restricted strictly to ensuring compliance with statutory requirements under Section 30(2) and identifying material irregularities under Section 61(3) – Held that courts cannot act as courts of equity or substitute their commercial assessment for that of the CoC, which comprises financial creditors who bear the economic consequences of the corporate debtor's failure. Torrent Power v. Ashish Arjunkumar Rathi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 207 : 2026 INSC 206 : AIR 2026 SC 1347

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Sections 7, 60(2), and 60(3) – Simultaneous Proceedings – Maintainability of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) against Principal Debtor and Corporate Guarantor – Held: Simultaneous proceedings for CIRP under the IBC against both the principal debtor and its corporate guarantor (or vice-versa) are maintainable - The liability of a surety is co-extensive with that of the principal debtor under Section 128 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 - The IBC permits separate or simultaneous proceedings to be initiated by a financial creditor against both entities. ICICI Bank v, Era Infrastructure, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 203 : 2026 INSC 201 : AIR 2026 SC 1371

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Discretion of Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) – Section 7 vs. Section 9 – Held: The use of the word "may" in Section 7(5)(a) confers a degree of discretion upon the NCLT to admit a financial creditor's application, whereas "shall" in Section 9(5)(a) for operational creditors is mandatory - this discretion must be exercised reasonably and not arbitrarily – Noted that the NCLT should admit a Section 7 application upon satisfaction of financial debt and default, unless there are "good reasons" to the contrary. [Relied on BRS Ventures Investments Ltd. v. SREI Infrastructure Finance Ltd. & Anr. (2025) 1 SCC 456; Maitreya Doshi v. Anand Rathi Global Finance Ltd. (2023) 17 SCC 606; Axis Bank Ltd. v. Vidarbha Industries Power Ltd. (2022) 8 SCC 352; Paras 77-104] ICICI Bank v, Era Infrastructure, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 203 : 2026 INSC 201 : AIR 2026 SC 1371

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Doctrine of Election – Applicability to IBC Claims – Held: The doctrine of election is not attracted in the context of filing claims against both the debtor and the guarantor - Restricting a creditor to elect between the two would defeat the purpose of a guarantee and potentially lead to the loss of rights under the "clean slate" principle if the full debt is not claimed in a concluding CIRP - There is no statutory proscription in the IBC against filing such simultaneous claims. ICICI Bank v, Era Infrastructure, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 203 : 2026 INSC 201 : AIR 2026 SC 1371

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Double Enrichment – Safeguards under 2016 Regulations – Held: While concerns regarding double enrichment (recovering more than the total debt) are well-founded, they do not justify a bar on simultaneous proceedings - Sufficient safeguards exist in Regulation 12A (obligation of the creditor to update claims upon partial satisfaction from any source) and Regulation 14 (duty of the Resolution Professional to revise admitted claim amounts based on new information) of the IBBI (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016. ICICI Bank v, Era Infrastructure, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 203 : 2026 INSC 201 : AIR 2026 SC 1371

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Sections 14, 36, 60(5), and 238 – Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 – Sections 24 and 27 – Jurisdiction of NCLT/NCLAT over Benami Proceedings – Held: The National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) do not have the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the legality or validity of provisional attachment orders or confiscation proceedings initiated under the Benami Act - Such proceedings fall within the realm of public law and sovereign functions of the State, which are distinct from private proprietary disputes or debt recovery actions. S. Rajendran v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 199 : 2026 INSC 187 : AIR 2026 SC 1323

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Liquidation Estate and Beneficial Ownership – Section 36 IBC – Held: Only assets beneficially owned by the corporate debtor form part of the liquidation estate - Since a benamidar (the corporate debtor in this case) possesses no beneficial interest and holds property in a fiduciary capacity, such property is expressly excluded from the liquidation estate under Section 36(4)(a)(i) and cannot be distributed to creditors. S. Rajendran v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 199 : 2026 INSC 187 : AIR 2026 SC 1323

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Moratorium – Section 14 IBC – Scope – Held: The moratorium under Section 14 is intended to protect the corporate debtor from "creditor actions" for debt recovery -It does not act as an automated stay against sovereign in rem proceedings initiated for the attachment or confiscation of property under penal statutes like the Benami Act - The protection under Section 32A is "event-based" and only triggered upon the approval of a resolution plan or a liquidation sale to an unconnected third party -It does not validate a defective title or retrospectively convert benami property into assets of the corporate debtor during the pendency of proceedings. [Relied on Embassy Property Developments (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka (2020) 13 SCC 308; State Bank of India v. Union of India (2026 INSC 153); Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Amit Gupta (2021) 7 SCC 209; Controller of Estate Duty, Lucknow v. Aloke Mitra (1981) 2 SCC 121; Paras 13-24] S. Rajendran v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 199 : 2026 INSC 187 : AIR 2026 SC 1323

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Interaction between IBC and Benami Act – Overriding Effect – Held: While the IBC is a later and special enactment, it does not displace the statutory mechanism of the Benami Act regarding the determination of "tainted" assets - The "residuary jurisdiction" of the NCLT under Section 60(5) cannot be used to "short-circuit" the specialized adjudicatory hierarchy (Adjudicating Authority, Appellate Tribunal, and High Court) established under the Benami Act. S. Rajendran v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 199 : 2026 INSC 187 : AIR 2026 SC 1323

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Section 7 — Initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) — Admissibility of Application — Existence of Debt and Default — The Supreme Court set aside the concurrent findings of the NCLT and NCLAT which had refused to initiate CIRP against the Corporate Debtor - held that for admission of an application under Section 7, the adjudicating authority is only required to examine and satisfy itself that a financial debt exists and there is a default in relation thereto - The concept of a "pre-existing dispute," relevant for operational creditors under Section 9, has no bearing on applications filed by financial creditors under Section 7. [Para 12] Catalyst Trusteeship Ltd. v. Ecstasy Realty Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 192 : 2026 INSC 186 : AIR 2026 SC 1311

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Debenture Trust Deed (DTD) — Modification of Terms — Procedure for Restructuring — Supreme Court observed that the Corporate Debtor's claim of an existing moratorium was based on unilateral e-mail exchanges with only one debenture holder (ECLF) – Held that such negotiations could not bind other debenture holders or the Debenture Trustee in the absence of express authorization - Any modification, amendment, or waiver of the DTD terms must strictly adhere to the procedure prescribed within the deed itself—specifically requiring a "Special Resolution" passed by a three-fourths majority of debenture holders and a written document signed by all parties. [Paras 13-15, 18] Catalyst Trusteeship Ltd. v. Ecstasy Realty Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 192 : 2026 INSC 186 : AIR 2026 SC 1311

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Concurrent Findings — Scope of Interference by Supreme Court — While the Supreme Court ordinarily does not reappreciate facts where the NCLT and NCLAT have recorded concurrent findings, an exception exists when the perversity of such findings is clearly established – Noted that the NCLT and NCLAT erred by ignoring binding contractual terms of the DTD based on "surmises, conjectures and assumptions"- Appeal allowed. [Relied on Innoventive Industries Limited vs. ICICI Bank and another (2018) 1 SCC 407; Indus Biotech Private Limited vs. Kotak India Venture (Offshore) Fund and others (2021) 6 SCC 436; Para 18-22] Catalyst Trusteeship Ltd. v. Ecstasy Realty Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 192 : 2026 INSC 186 : AIR 2026 SC 1311

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 vs. Companies Act, 1956 – Sections 391-394 – Overriding effect of IBC – Redundancy of Scheme of Arrangement (SOA) due to gross delay – The Supreme Court held that proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC cannot be stalled on the grounds of "judicial discipline" due to a pending Scheme of Arrangement under the Companies Act, especially when such a scheme has become defunct and inoperative due to a decade-long delay and non-compliance with statutory timelines - Noted that the IBC is a special statute aimed at the revival of companies, and its provisions prevail over inconsistent provisions in other laws by virtue of Section 238. Omkara Assets Reconstruction v. Amit Chaturvedi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 191 : 2026 INSC 189 : AIR 2026 SC 1205

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 7(2) and 7(5)(b) — Adherence to Form — An application under Section 7 is not liable to be rejected for insignificant omissions or technical errors if it is substantially in conformity with Form 1and discloses the essential ingredients: (a) applicant is a financial creditor, (b) existence of a financial debt, (c) occurrence of default, and (d) default meets the threshold under Section 4 - The Adjudicating Authority may allow the rectification of applications and the filing of additional documents at any time before the final order. B. Prashanth Hegde v. State Bank of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 156 : 2026 INSC 155

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 7 — Effect of Counterclaims and Criminal Proceedings — Mere pendency of a counterclaim for damages or the institution of criminal proceedings against the officials of a Financial Creditor does not bar the initiation of CIRP - Such proceedings have no bearing on the existence of the financial debt or the right of the creditor to invoke IBC – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Asset Reconstruction Company (India) Ltd. v. Bishal Jaiswal & Anr. (2021) 6 SCC 366; Dena Bank v. C. Shivakumar Reddy (2021) 10 SCC 330; M. Suresh Kumar Reddy v. Canara Bank (2023) 8 SCC 387; Paras 31, 37-40, 45-51, 54, 55] B. Prashanth Hegde v. State Bank of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 156 : 2026 INSC 155

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 7 — Limitation Act, 1963; Section 18 and Article 137 — Acknowledgement of Debt — The Supreme Court upheld the NCLAT's finding that a Section 7 application was within limitation despite the initial default occurring years prior - held that entry of debt in the Corporate Debtor's (CD) balance sheets serves as a valid acknowledgement under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963, provided it is signed by a director (who acts as an agent of the company) – Noted that how a bank classifies its debt for asset classification (NPA) under RBI norms is not a determining factor for the starting point of limitation if the debt is subsequently restructured and acknowledged in fresh agreements. B. Prashanth Hegde v. State Bank of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 156 : 2026 INSC 155

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Sections 18(f) and 36(4) – Applicability to Spectrum – Ownership vs. Right to Use – Held, Spectrum allocated to Telecom Service Providers (TSPs) cannot be subjected to proceedings under the IBC - While spectrum may be recorded as an "intangible asset" in the TSPs' books of account for accounting purposes in compliance with AS 26 and Ind AS 38, such recognition is not determinative of ownership - The IBC explicitly excludes assets owned by a third party but held by the corporate debtor under contractual arrangements from the insolvency/liquidation estate - Since the Union of India retains exclusive privilege and ownership over spectrum as a trustee for the public, the TSPs hold only a limited, conditional, and revocable "right to use". [Paras 60, 61, 63, 69] State Bank of India v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 152 : 2026 INSC 153

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 – Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) – Real Estate Projects – Role of Third-Party Entities – National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) Jurisdiction – Article 142 of the Constitution of India – The Supreme Court upheld the NCLAT's direction to engage NBCC India Ltd., a Government of India entity, to complete 16 stalled residential projects of M/s. Supertech Limited - held that the primary consideration in insolvency proceedings involving real estate companies is to protect the interests of home buyers who have waited decades for shelter - Claims of secured creditors, operational creditors, and land authorities (Noida, Greater Noida, and Yamuna Expressway) are, for the time being, considered secondary to the delivery of units with basic amenities – Held that such an equitable mechanism, aimed at completing construction on a "war footing," does not violate the IBC and warrants protection under the umbrella of Article 142 of the Constitution. Apex Heights Pvt. Ltd. v. Ram Kishor Arora, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 142

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Key Directions issued by the Supreme Court – i. Engagement of NBCC: NBCC is directed to complete the pending projects within stipulated timelines using its own resources and 70% of project receivables; ii. Protection for Home Buyers: Existing allottees shall not be subjected to any cost escalation beyond the original Builder Buyer Agreements; iii. Administrative Oversight: Constitution of an Apex Court Committee and Project-wise Court Committees to monitor progress and approve fund transfers between projects; iv. No Judicial Interference: No Court or Tribunal shall pass interim orders stopping projects commenced by NBCC; any grievances must be brought directly to the Supreme Court; v. Appointment of Amicus Curiae: Mr. Rajiv Jain, Senior Counsel, and Mr. Amarendra Kumar are appointed as Amicus Curiae to assist the Tribunal and monitor ongoing projects. [Paras 15-22] Apex Heights Pvt. Ltd. v. Ram Kishor Arora, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 142

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 14 — Moratorium vs. Arbitral Continuity — Noted that the High Court erred in nullifying arbitral orders passed during a moratorium period while exercising jurisdiction under the Arbitration Act - The Supreme Court used its powers under Article 142 to declare transactions (sale of flats) made pursuant to such arbitral orders as lawfully valid to protect third-party homebuyer rights. [Relied on Yashwith Constructions Pvt. Ltd. v. Simplex Concrete Piles India Ltd. & Anr. (2006) 6 SCC 204; Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 & Stamp Act, 1899, In re, (2024) 6 SCC 1; Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. Bihar Rajya Pul Nirman Nigam Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2578; Official Trustee v. Sachindra Nath Chatterjee, 1968 SCC Online SC 103; Paras 28-47] Ankhim Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Zaveri Construction Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 133 : 2026 INSC 137 : AIR 2026 SC 1042

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 – Maintainability of Joint Petition – Multi-Corporate Entities – Threshold Requirement – Supreme Court upheld the maintainability of a single Section 7 application against two separate corporate entities (Grand Venezia Ltd. and Bhasin Ltd.) where they were found to be "intrinsically linked" in the construction and implementation of a real estate project -Noted that interlinkage of related corporate debtors is beneficial for value maximization and for continuing companies as going concerns. [Para 11 - 16, 20 - 26] Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Col. Gautam Mullick, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 100 : 2026 INSC 104 : AIR 2026 SC 818

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7(1) Second Proviso – Threshold of 100 Allottees – Relevant Date for Calculation – The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the crucial date for ascertaining whether the minimum threshold of 100 allottees (or 10% of total allottees) is met is the date of filing of the petition, and not the date of its admission or hearing - Any subsequent settlements or withdrawals during the pendency of the proceedings do not render the petition non-maintainable if the threshold was met at the time of presentation. [Para 9, 21] Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Col. Gautam Mullick, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 100 : 2026 INSC 104 : AIR 2026 SC 818

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Real Estate Project – Default in Possession – Completion Certificate – Where a developer fails to obtain a final completion certificate and fails to execute tripartite sublease deeds as required by the lessor (UPSIDA), physical delivery of possession without such legal formalities has no legal import - The existence of a financial debt and default is established when units are not made ready or delivered in a fit state for occupation despite payment of consideration. [Relied on Manish Kumar vs. Union of India (2021) 5 SCC 1; Surendra Trading Company vs. Juggilal Kamlapat Jute Mills Company Limited (2017) 16 SCC 143; Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited vs. Sachet Infrastructure Private Limited (2019) SCC OnLine NCLAT 592; Paras 31 - 37] Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Col. Gautam Mullick, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 100 : 2026 INSC 104 : AIR 2026 SC 818

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Sections 31, 43, and 45 – Modification of Resolution Plan – Avoidance Transactions – Noted that the NCLT cannot, while adjudicating a miscellaneous application, grant rights to a Successful Resolution Applicant (SRA) that are better than or different from those recognized in the Committee of Creditors (CoC) approved Resolution Plan - Any such declaration amounts to an impermissible modification of the approved plan - the NCLT cannot suo motu or "by a sidewind" neutralize transactions as preferential (Section 43) or undervalued (Section 45) without a formal application by the Resolution Professional (or under Section 47 by a creditor) and without providing the affected party clear notice and a fair opportunity to respond - Such summary findings are perverse and violate principles of natural justice. Gloster Cables Ltd. v. Fort Gloster Industries Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 80 : 2026 INSC 81 : AIR 2026 SC 748

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 60(5)(c) – Jurisdiction of Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) – Declaration of Title to Assets – Held, the NCLT cannot exercise its residuary jurisdiction under Section 60(5)(c) to adjudicate upon complex disputes of title to property (such as trademarks) that are dehors the insolvency proceedings - The nexus with the insolvency of the Corporate Debtor must exist for the NCLT to exercise power under this section – Noted that in the present case, where the approved Resolution Plan itself recognized rival claims and "beliefs" regarding the ownership of the "Gloster" trademark rather than an undisputed assertion of title, the NCLT exceeded its jurisdiction by recorded a finding that the trademark was an asset of the Corporate Debtor. Gloster Cables Ltd. v. Fort Gloster Industries Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 80 : 2026 INSC 81 : AIR 2026 SC 748

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 – Locus Standi of Homebuyer Societies – Held, a society or Resident Welfare Association (RWA) does not possess locus standi to intervene in Section 7 proceedings at the pre-admission stage - At this stage, proceedings are in personam between the applicant creditor and the corporate debtor - While individual allottees are "financial creditors" under the Explanation to Section 5(8)(f), this status does not automatically extend to a society unless it is a creditor in its own right or a statutorily recognized authorized representative. [Para 13] Elegna Co-Op. Housing and Commercial Society v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 51 : 2026 INSC 58

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 – Admission of CIRP – Mandatory Nature – Discretion of Adjudicating Authority – Supreme Court issued a set of directions regarding the functioning of the Committee of Creditors (CoC) under the Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, noting that while the commercial wisdom of the CoC is paramount, such power must be exercised with responsibility, transparency and proper application of mind, particularly in real estate insolvencies where homebuyers' interests are deeply involved - Held, the inquiry under Section 7(5)(a) is confined strictly to the determination of debt and default - Once the Adjudicating Authority is satisfied that a financial debt exists and a default has occurred, it must admit the application unless it is incomplete - Considerations such as project viability, business status (going concern), stage of completion, or perceived prejudice to homebuyers are extraneous and irrelevant at the admission stage. [Para 12] Elegna Co-Op. Housing and Commercial Society v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 51 : 2026 INSC 58

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Object of Code – Resolution vs. Recovery – The fundamental object of the IBC is resolution and revival, not mere recovery - the concept of revival does not exclude recovery altogether; it only excludes the abuse of insolvency as a pressure tactic - Alternative remedies under SARFAESI or RERA remain available, but the presence of such recovery proceedings does not bar the initiation of CIRP under Section 7. [Para 10, 12] Elegna Co-Op. Housing and Commercial Society v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 51 : 2026 INSC 58

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Protection of Homebuyers – Specific Directions – To ensure transparency and safeguard homebuyer interests during CIRP - issued mandatory directions: (i) The Information Memorandum must disclose comprehensive details of all allottees; (ii) The CoC must record specific written reasons if they find it not viable to approve handover of possession under Regulation 4E; and (iii) Any recommendation for liquidation must be accompanied by a reasoned justification. [Relied on Innoventive Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank (2018) 1 SCC 407; Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd v. Union of India (2019) 8 SCC 416; GLAS Trust Co. LLC v. BYJU Raveendran (2025) 3 SCC 625; Swiss Ribbons (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (2019) 4 SCC 17; Para 15] Elegna Co-Op. Housing and Commercial Society v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 51 : 2026 INSC 58

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 14 – Moratorium – Liability of Natural Persons – While a moratorium under Section 14 shields the corporate debtor, it does not extend to its directors or promoters - the mere absence of a moratorium-related bar does not automatically make directors liable in execution proceedings unless their independent liability was established during the adjudicatory process - A company is a distinct legal entity from its shareholders and directors - The doctrine of "piercing the corporate veil" is an exceptional measure that requires specific pleadings and a determination of fraud or dishonest misuse of the corporate personality, which cannot be introduced for the first time at the execution stage. [Relied on Rajbir v. Suraj Bhan (2022) 14 SCC 609; Electronics Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Secy., Revenue Deptt., Govt. of A.P. (1999) 4 SCC 458; Paras 11-20] Ansal Crown Heights Flat Buyers Association v. Ansal Crown Infrabuild Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 40 : 2026 INSC 51

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - Extinguishment of Debt under Resolution Plan - The approval of a Resolution Plan under Section 31 of the IBC does not ipso facto result in the extinguishment of the entire debt against third-party sureties or security providers unless expressly provided for in the plan - Where a Resolution Plan (specifically Clause 3.2(ix) in this case) explicitly reserves the rights of financial creditors to proceed against third parties or promoters for the "unsustainable debt" portion, the discharge of the Corporate Debtor does not bar claims against such third-party security providers – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Lalit Kumar Jain v. Union of India (2021) 9 SCC 321; Paras 23-25] UV Asset Reconstruction Company v. Electrosteel Castings, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 33 : 2026 INSC 14 : AIR 2026 SC 439

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 7 and Section 31 — Contract Act, 1872; Section 126 — "See to it" Guarantee — Distinction between an Undertaking to Infuse Funds and a Contract of Guarantee — Extinguishment of Debt against Third-Party Sureties - Contract of Guarantee vs. Deed of Undertaking - A "Deed of Undertaking" requiring a promoter to arrange for the infusion of funds into the borrower to comply with financial covenants does not, by itself, constitute a contract of guarantee under Section 126 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 - To constitute a guarantee, there must be a direct and unambiguous promise to the creditor to perform the promise or discharge the liability of the third person in case of default - An obligation to facilitate the borrower's compliance with covenants is not equivalent to a promise to discharge the borrower's liability to the lender. [Para 20-22] UV Asset Reconstruction Company v. Electrosteel Castings, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 33 : 2026 INSC 14 : AIR 2026 SC 439

Interest Act, 1978

Interest Act, 1978; Section 3(3) - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Section 34 - Contractual Bar on Interest - Sustainability of interest on delayed payments when specifically excluded by contract – The Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that had granted interest for delayed payments to a government contractor - held that when parties explicitly agree via a contract clause (such as Clause 5 of the preliminary agreement) that no interest or damages shall be claimed for belated settlement of bills, such terms are binding - The Interest Act, 1978, mandates interest only in the absence of an agreement or where terms are contrary to law - Section 3(3) of the Interest Act, 1978, ensures that contractual prohibitions on interest are respected, and Section 34 of the CPC does not have an overriding effect on this provision. [Paras 6 - 10] Kerala Water Authority v. T.I. Raju, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 172

Interpretation of Statutes

Interpretation of Statutes – Legal Maxims – Role in developing legal concepts – Professional Ethics – Duty of Advocates – Binding Precedents - The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of legal maxims such as actus curiae neminem gravabit (an act of the court shall prejudice no one) and nullum tempus aut locus occurrit regi (time does not run against the king/crime never dies) as guiding principles founded in reason and public convenience - Noted that advocates have a duty to respect binding precedents and should not consume public time by making submissions that contradict well-settled law or "strong-operated" precedents from a Constitution Bench. [Relied on Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases (2014) 2 SCC 62; Paras 5-10] Roma Ahuja v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 351 : 2026 INSC 336

Interpretation of Statutes — Limitation — Held that courts should avoid a hyper-technical approach in matters of limitation to ensure substantive rights are not defeated by rigid procedural rules - A party cannot be allowed to take advantage of its own wrong, such as gaining a limitation benefit from an appeal being dismissed due to their own constant absence. [Relied on Shyam Sundar Sarma vs. Pannalal Jaiswal & Ors. (2005) 1 SCC 436; Sheodan Singh vs. Daryao Kunwar (SMT) 1966 SCC OnLine SC 98; Paras 17-23] Gajanan v. Pralhad, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 341

Statutory Interpretation – Relevance of Proposed / Draft Legislation to Determine Legislative Intent - Although a draft bill has no force of law, a legislative proposal (such as the Draft Electricity (Amendment) Bill, 2025) that seeks to specifically introduce provisions to phase out or eliminate surcharges for a particular entity confirms that such exemptions or privileges do not exist under the prevailing statute - A legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by the judicial interpretative process to read an absent exemption into the current framework - Furthermore, being a Central Government entity, the Appellant cannot advance contentions contrary to the position adopted under the proposed statutory amendments under the principles of estoppel. [Relied on Vodafone International Holdings BV v. Union of India & Anr. (2012) 6 SCC 757; Paras 65-70] Indian Railways v. West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 476 : 2026 INSC 464

Statutory Interpretation — Executive Clarification During Litigation - The State Executive or Government cannot be impleaded at a belated stage to interpret its own statutory notification to influence a ongoing lis exclusively between private parties - The executive cannot be allowed to explain away or reinterpret a statutory instrument during litigation to the prejudice of a party. [Relied on Shalini Shyam Shetty and Another v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329; Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC 97; Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel, (2022) 4 SCC 181; Paras 33-36] Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises Ltd. v. B. Gurappa Naidu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 445 : 2026 INSC 434

Statutory Interpretation — Literal vs Purposive Construction — Separation of Powers - Where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and unambiguous, the Court is bound to construe them in their natural, ordinary, and grammatical sense - Resorting to contextual or purposive interpretation to arrive at a meaning contrary to the plain language of a clear statute does violence to the text and constitutes a breach of the doctrine of separation of powers - Modulating the definition of "a party" based on the outcome of arbitration would amount to an impermissible judicial amendment. [Paras 33 - 56] Home Care Retail Marts Pvt. Ltd. v. Haresh N Sangavi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 425 : 2026 INSC 415

Interpretation of Statutes – Amendment by Substitution – Retrospectivity – "Pen and Ink" Theory – Mere use of the word "substitute" or "substitution" in an amending Act does not automatically make the substituted provision relate back to the date of enforcement of the original provision - Unless an express or implied legislative intent dictates otherwise, a substituted provision operates prospectively from the date it is introduced into the statute book. [Relied on Ram Narain v. Simla Banking and Industrial Company Limited, (1956) 2 SCC 75; Property Owners Association & Others v. State of Maharashtra & Others, (2024) 18 SCC 1 (Para 43); Shamarao V. Parulekar v. District Magistrate, Thana, (1952) 2 SCC 1; Paras 38, 44, 46 & 52] Rajesh Sharma v. North Delhi Municipal Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 640 : 2026 INSC 646

Interpretation of Statutes – Meaning of the phrase "May Be" / "May Be Made" – The expression "may be" is predominantly used with reference to the future rather than the past or present - In Section 59(d), the words "may be made" signify the legislative intent to exclude existing regulations - Any interpretation rendering the words "may be made" redundant or superfluous must be avoided. [Relied on Vijay Kumar Shukal v. Lakhpat Ram and Another, (1990) 4 SCC 246; Paras 72-74] Rajesh Sharma v. North Delhi Municipal Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 640 : 2026 INSC 646

Interpretation of Statutes — Special or Local Law vis-à-vis General Law of Limitation — Exclusion of Section 5, Limitation Act — Principles restated — Held: While a special statute may prescribe a distinct period of limitation, that by itself does not automatically exclude the operation of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act - The exclusion must be founded on clear statutory language or a legislative scheme indicating that the prescribed limitation is absolute and incapable of enlargement - Section 9 of the Adhiniyam merely provides a thirty-day limitation period but lacks restrictive expressions such as "but not thereafter" or "not exceeding", nor does it provide a specific, limited grace period - The absence of such prohibitive language demonstrates that the legislature did not intend to insulate the enactment from the general law of limitation. [Paras 23-24] Sardari Lal v. Bishan Dass, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 645 : 2026 INSC 669

Interpretation of Statutes – Omission of Provisions – Where a statutory provision is unconditionally omitted without a saving clause, all proceedings founded upon such provision must lapse - noted that while the diversion of government property might attract the Indian Penal Code, the investigating agency failed to invoke those provisions, and the High Court cannot substitute a conviction under a distinct statutory offense for the first time in appeal – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd. v. Union of India (2000) 2 SCC 536; Paras 16-25] Manoj v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 157 : 2026 INSC 152

Interpretation of Statutes - Statutory Interpretation – Harmonious Construction – Conflict between IBC and Telecommunication Laws – Where two special statutes contain non-obstante clauses, the court must analyze the dominant purpose of each - The IBC focuses on the reorganization of the corporate debtor, whereas the Telegraph Act, Wireless Telegraphy Act, and TRAI Act form an exhaustive code for the telecom sector - The IBC cannot be permitted to make inroads into the telecom sector to restructure rights and liabilities arising from the administration of spectrum, which falls under the exclusive legal province of the Union and the Regulator. [Relied on Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, (2012) 3 SCC 1; Natural Resources Allocation, In Re, Special Reference No. 1 of 2012, (2012) 10 SCC 1; Embassy Property Developments (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2020) 13 SCC 308; Union of India v. Association of Unified Telecom Service Providers of India, (2011) 10 SCC 543; Swiss Ribbons (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 4 SCC 17; Paras 64, 66, 67] State Bank of India v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 152 : 2026 INSC 153

Intervenors/Non-Parties

Intervenors/Non-Parties — Right to Seek Review — Even a non-party to the proceedings can seek a review of an order if they perceive themselves to be an "aggrieved person" and satisfy the court of such a standing - Judgments in service matters often affect a class of employees beyond the immediate parties. Such judgments are not strictly in personam and can adversely affect the rights of others who were not joined in the original litigation. [Relied on Union of India v. Nareshkumar Badrikumar Jagad (2019) 18 SCC 586; Ajit Babu v. Union of India (1997) 6 SCC 473; K. Ajit Babu v. Union of India (1997) 6 SCC 473; Paras 13-20] Dr. Jiji K.S. v. Shibu K., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 212 : 2026 INSC 207

Interim Relief

Interim Relief – Grant of Interim Bail Pending Reference - Recognizing that the determination of the legal issues by a larger Bench may consume further time, the Supreme Court noted that the appellants cannot be made to suffer continued incarceration merely because an important question of law has arisen for authoritative settlement - Without expressing any opinion on the merits, the Supreme Court granted interim bail to the appellants for a period of six (6) months subject to stringent safeguards. [Paras 27 - 30] Tasleem Ahmed v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 533

Investigation

Investigation - Lapses in Investigation – Failure to Secure Crime Scene and Independent Witnesses - Held: Overzealous or lethargic investigations are equally fatal to the prosecution - The failure of the Investigating Officer (I.O.) to draw a scene mahazar, conduct forensic examinations to rule out accidental fire (e.g., cylinder burst), or examine independent witnesses despite their presence at the scene constitutes a serious lacuna – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Atbir v. Government of NCT of Delhi (2010) 9 SCC 1; Laxman v. State of Maharashtra (2002) 6 SCC 710; Paras 10-31] Sanjay Kumar Sharma v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 230 : 2026 INSC 223

Judiciary

Judicial Conduct – Adverse Remarks against District Judiciary – The Supreme Court condemned the practice of casting disparaging remarks or strictures against Judicial Officers in judicial orders - Power of superintendence under Article 227 should be a mechanism for "nurturing and guiding" rather than a "tool of oppression" - Supreme Court directed that the strictures against the Magistrate be expunged and recommended that all High Courts adopt an "in-house mechanism" (remark slips) for administrative follow-up on judicial infirmities instead of recording them in public judgments. [Relied on Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349; Paras 14-32] Shuvendu Saha v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 382 : 2026 INSC 367

Judicial Independence and Public Confidence – Judicial independence is a foundational feature of the Constitution - The strength of the judiciary lies in the confidence and trust reposed in it by the public - Reckless aspersions and unfounded allegations of lack of impartiality or improper motives against a sitting Judge strike at the foundation of judicial independence and diminish the credibility of the justice delivery system. Nilesh C. Ojha v. High Court of Judicature at Bombay, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 396 : 2026 INSC 390

Judicial Restraint vs. Statutory Regulators – The Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, is a complete code that established the FSSAI as a specialized body for food safety regulation - When the legislature creates a specialized authority with technical expertise, the Court must exercise judicial restraint. In the absence of demonstrated systemic failure, the Court cannot assume the role of a "super-regulator" or substitute its wisdom for that of the statutory body - Article 32 jurisdiction cannot be expanded to undertake supervisory or managerial functions over statutory fora in technical domains - Intervention in the functioning of a regulatory framework without compelling material runs contrary to the settled principles of separation of powers - Stray instances of non-compliance do not justify a court-directed overhaul of an existing legal machinery. [Relied on Holicow Pictures Pvt. Ltd. v. Prem Chandra Mishra & Ors., (2007) 14 SCC 281; Kushum Lata v. Union of India, (2006) 6 SCC 180; Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India and Others, (2024) 4 SCC 115; Paras 7- 9] Dr. K.A. Paul @ Kilari Anand Paul v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 355

Judicial Discipline & Hierarchy of Benches — Benches of smaller strength are strictly bound by the decisions rendered by larger Benches - Smaller Benches cannot dilute, circumvent, or progressively hollow out the constitutional force of a larger Bench decision without expressly referring the matter to a larger Bench - Confessional statements or explanation memos made before the police are prima facie self-incriminating and strictly hit by the exclusionary rule of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - In the absence of any conscious possession or recovery of contraband/cash from the person or premises of the appellant, continuing indefinite detention solely based on the seriousness of the allegations is unconscionable, particularly when juxtaposed with abysmal conviction rates under the UAPA - High Court's order denying bail set aside; Appellant directed to be released on bail. [Relied on Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713; Paras 21-53] Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v. National Investigation Agency, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 512 : 2026 INSC 503: 2026 (2) Crimes SC 298

Judicial Monitoring – Systematic Pendency Data – Directives to High Court - To make the right to a speedy trial meaningful and real rather than illusory, the Supreme Court directed the Registrar General of the Allahabad High Court to submit a comprehensive affidavit on oath detailing the statistics of pending cases before Judicial Magistrates and Sessions Courts, the functional and vacant strength of the judicial cadre, and categorized data regarding the period of custody undergone by undertrial prisoners awaiting bail. [Relied on Abdul Rehman Antulay & Ors. v. R.S. Nayak & Anr., (1992) 1 SCC 225; P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578; Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713; Imtiyaz Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., (2012) 2 SCC 688; State of Kerala v. Rasheed, (2019) 13 SCC 297; Paras 42 - 44] Kailash Chandra Kapri v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 487 : 2026 INSC 473

Judicial Oversight & Continuing Mandamus - Decentralization of Monitoring to High Courts - Recognizing that day-to-day compliance monitoring on a pan-India scale is administratively burdensome and that local issues require grassroots supervision, the Supreme Court decentralized the oversight mechanism - All High Courts directed to register a suo moto writ petition titled “In Re: Compliance with the directions issued by the Supreme Court in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No(s). 5 of 2025” as a continuing mandamus - High Courts are fully empowered to monitor field compliance, tailor directions to suit regional exigencies without diluting their intent, and initiate contempt or disciplinary proceedings against erring municipal or state officials for deliberate non-compliance - Updated compliance affidavits by Chief Secretaries and relevant authorities are to be filed before the respective High Courts on or before 7th August, 2026 - States/UTs must systematically expand sterilization and vaccination capacities and establish at least one fully functional, well-equipped Animal Birth Control Centre in each district, scaling up based on local population densities. [Paras 110–111] In Re : City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2026 INSC 506

Judicial Review - Separation of Powers - Constitutional Courts cannot step into the shoes of administrative/executive authorities or assume the role of framing and implementing specific infrastructural solutions. Neither a High Court under Article 226 nor the Supreme Court under Article 136 should devise remedial measures for civic problems such as waterlogging and inadequate drainage. While Courts can monitor and direct authorities to perform their duties, they cannot themselves prescribe detailed engineering or administrative solutions (such as directing the laying of a specific sewer line across AIIMS premises). All India Institute of Medical Sciences v. Shailendra Bhatnagar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 511

Judicial Review – Disciplinary Proceedings – Scope of Interference – Natural Justice – Held: The Division Bench's interference with the disciplinary penalty was justified where the findings of the Enquiry Officer were vitiated due to a violation of natural justice and a complete absence of evidence - The Enquiry Officer improperly relied upon preliminary statements of co-accused officers who were never examined as witnesses during the domestic enquiry, thereby depriving the delinquent employee of an opportunity to cross-examine or rebut the material used against her. [Relied on State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya, AIR (1961) SC 751; T. Baba Prasad v. Andhra Bank, Hyderabad and others, (2011) SCC OnLine AP 276; Paras 9 – 14] Canara Bank v. Prem Latha Uppal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 497 : 2026 INSC 478 : AIR 2026 SC 2420

Judiciary and Case Management – Non-accountability of Trial Courts – Ineffectiveness of Guidelines - The Supreme Court lamented that multiple guidelines issued by it over the last two decades for the expeditious conduct of criminal trials often remain merely on paper - Trial courts frequently fail to implement these guidelines because there is an absolute lack of accountability and no one is made answerable or held accountable for the resulting systemic delays. [Para 39] Kailash Chandra Kapri v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 487 : 2026 INSC 473

Guide for Judicial Magistrates – Discretionary Power - The use of the word "may" in Section 175(4) signifies discretionary power- i. If the Magistrate is prima facie satisfied the act was in the discharge of official duty, they must follow the Section 175(4) procedure; ii. If they are satisfied the act had no reasonable nexus to official duty, they may proceed under the general procedure of Section 175(3); iii. Magistrates are not required to wait indefinitely for a report from superior officers; if a report is not submitted within a reasonable time, the Magistrate may proceed based on the public servant's version if available - Supreme Court reiterated that a judicial order passed by a Magistrate in criminal matters (such as calling for a report under Section 175(4)) cannot be challenged through a writ petition under Article 226 - The appropriate remedy is a petition under Section 528 of the BNSS or Article 227 of the Constitution. [Paras 46-55] xxx v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : 2026 INSC 88

Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 – Section 3(2) First Proviso – Interpretation – Joint Committee – Supreme Court dismissed the writ petition filed by Justice Yashwant Varma of the Allahabad High Court challenging the Lok Sabha Speaker's decision to form an inquiry committee as per the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, in the impeachment motion moved against him in relation to the discovery of unaccounted cash at his official residence - The first proviso to Section 3(2) of the Inquiry Act mandates the constitution of a Joint Committee only in the specific situation where notices of motion are given in both Houses of Parliament on the same day and are subsequently admitted by both Houses - The proviso is situational and not exhaustive; it does not contemplate or govern scenarios where a notice is admitted in one House but rejected in the other - Rejection of a motion in one House does not render the other House incompetent to proceed independently - To hold otherwise would allow for the scuttling of proceedings through the deliberate introduction of defective notices in one House to frustrate a valid motion in the other. [Relied on Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 699; Tribhovandas Haribhai Tamboli v. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, (1991) 3 SCC 442; Amina Marwa Sabreen v. State of Kerala, (2018) 14 SCC 193; Paras 12, 14-22, 29- 45] X v. Speaker of the House of the People, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : 2026 INSC 65

Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 – Section 3 – Role of the Secretariat – The Secretariat of a House should exercise restraint and confine its role to administrative scrutiny, such as verification of procedural compliance (e.g., signature verification) - It cannot assume quasi-adjudicatory functions by performing a substantive assessment of the merits of allegations or the correctness of facts pleaded in a notice of motion - The final decision on the admission of a motion rests solely with the Speaker or the Chairman as the case may be. [Paras 49 - 54] X v. Speaker of the House of the People, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : 2026 INSC 65

Judicial Conduct – Appellate Court's handling of Non-Appearance – The Supreme Court expressed that it was "appalling and shocking" for an Appellate Court to insist on the appearance of an appellant on every date despite a suspension of sentence - If a counsel is not assisting or has been changed frequently, the appropriate course is for the Court to appoint an amicus curiae or allow the accused to make alternative arrangements, rather than immediately cancelling bail and issuing Non-Bailable Warrants (NBW). Meenakshi v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 60

Judicial Discipline and Binding Precedents – Noted that Subordinate authorities must follow the orders of higher appellate authorities unreservedly - Disregarding the law laid down in previous decisions or overreaching superior court orders subverts the Rule of Law and undermines constitutional authority. [Relied on Baradakanta Misra v. Bhimsen Dixit, (1973) 1 SCC 446; Union of India v. Kamlakshi Finance Corpn. Ltd., 1992 Supp (1) SCC 443; C. Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee, (1995) 5 SCC 457; Paras 11- 15] Rajesh Goyal v. Laxmi Constructions, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 297 : 2026 INSC 299

Judicial Discipline and Precedent – Supreme Court emphasized that once a declaration of law is made by a High Court and affirmed by the Supreme Court, it acquires binding normative force - A coordinate Bench of the High Court cannot deny relief for a subsequent period when the underlying legal framework and factual footing remain unchanged - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's 2019 judgment and directed the refund of customs duty collected for the period from 16 September 2010 to 15 February 2016. [Paras 89-91] Adani Power Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 3 : 2026 INSC 1 : (2026) 3 SCC 143

Judicial Discipline – Supreme Court observed that when proceedings are terminated due to the existence of an alternative remedy, the proceedings do not survive and must end immediately - Passing interim orders in such circumstances "circumvents" statutory provisions and exceeds the scope of Article 226. [Relied on State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta (1952) AIR 1952 SC 12; Paras 6, 7, 8] Mangal Rajendra Kamthe v. Tahsildar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 194 : 2026 INSC 185

Judicial Discipline vs. Economic Implications – While judicial discipline is a cornerstone of justice, it cannot be used by "tardy litigators" to jeopardize public funds or put the economy in a "hostage situation." - In cases with significant economic implications, the larger national interest of rehabilitating an industry and ensuring financial probity takes pre-eminence – Appeals allowed. [Relied on A. Navinchandra Steels (P) Ltd. v. Srei Equipment Finance Ltd. (2021) 4 SCC 435; Paras 13-20] Omkara Assets Reconstruction v. Amit Chaturvedi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 191 : 2026 INSC 189 : AIR 2026 SC 1205

Judicial Independence – Fearless Trial Judiciary – Role of High Courts – Held that fearless judge is the bedrock of an independent judiciary - High Courts, while exercising supervisory control, must ensure that judicial officers are not put through the ordeal of disciplinary proceedings for mere errors of judgment - The "lurking fear" of administrative action often leads trial judges to shirk their responsibility in bail matters, resulting in the flooding of High Courts and the Supreme Court with bail applications. Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 2 : 2026 INSC 7 : (2026) 3 SCC 325

Judicial Propriety – Right of Hearing – Held, that the High Court should not have entertained and disposed of the matter without issuance of notice to either the State or the Defacto Complainant – Noted that in petitions praying for the quashing of an FIR, the High Court should not pass orders directing compliance with Section 41-A Cr.PC (or Section 35(3) BNSS) as it indirectly amounts to granting relief that should only be considered if a prima facie case for quashing is established. [Relied on Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2021) 19 SCC 401; Paras 9-13] Practical Solutions Inc. v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 74

Judicial Review – Recruitment Process – Interference with Answer Key – Power of High Court to act as Subject Expert – Held: The High Court, while exercising its power of judicial review, cannot assume the role of a "super-examiner" or subject expert - Even in examinations for judicial services where Judges may have vast legal experience, the exercise of re-evaluating or re-considering an answer key should ordinarily be left to domain experts. Jharkhand Public Service Commission v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 138

Judicial Scrutiny of Bail Orders – Held that the High Court's decision to grant bail by dissecting medical evidence and questioning the "intent to kill" due to a gap between the assault and death (septicaemia) was found to be premature - Such detailed analysis is reserved for the trial - The presence of multiple injuries, including cerebral damage from blunt trauma, outweighed the "extraneous considerations" of pending civil litigation and lack of specific role attribution – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ajwar v. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768: (2025) 1 SCC (Cri) 320; Shabeen Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2025) 4 SCC 172; Victim 'XX' v. State of Bihar & Anr. (2025) INSC 877; Paras 21, 22, 29 - 31] Shobha Namdev Sonavane v. Samadhan Bajirao Sonvane, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 188 : 2026 INSC 181 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 278

Judicial Sensitivity – Protection of Vulnerable Victims – Guidelines – Taking note of the "insensitivity" and "impassive judicial decisions" in cases involving sexual offences, the Supreme Court directed the National Judicial Academy to constitute a Committee of Experts to draft comprehensive guidelines - These guidelines aim to inculcate compassion and empathy into the judicial process, specifically for cases involving children and women. [Relied on State of Madhya Pradesh v. Mahendra alias Golu, (2022) 12 SCC 442; Paras 11-24] In Re: Order Dated 17.03.2025 Passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 168 : 2026 INSC 165

Jurisprudence

Jurisprudence – Ex ante vs. Ex post judicial scrutiny - Distinction Between Post-Facto Liability and Preventive Assessment - Supreme Court demarcated the conceptual difference between ex ante mechanisms (preventive, forward-looking assessments made before harm or conduct occurs) and ex post mechanisms (retrospective scrutiny determining legality, liability, or punishment after the fact) - Section 8 of the HMGA is an illustrative example of an ex ante statutory mechanism, mandating prior judicial assessment to forestall foreseeable harm to a minor's proprietary rights before any transaction can validly take effect. [Relied on Vishwambhar & Ors. v. Laxminarayan, (2001) 6 SCC 163; Nangali Amma Bhavani Amma v. Gopalkrishnan Nair, (2004) 8 SCC 78; Saroj v. Sunder Singh, (2013) 15 SCC 727; Annie Besant v. G. Narayaniah, 1914 SCC OnLine PC 40; Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248; Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511; Bhuwan Mohan Singh v. Meena, (2015) 6 SCC 353; Paras 1018] Shephali Chakraborty v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 597 : 2026 INSC 621

Juvenile Justice

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 — Section 94 — Mandatory Procedure for Age Determination — The procedure for determining the age of a victim or juvenile is strictly governed by Section 94(2) of the JJ Act - Priority must be given to: (i) school/matriculation certificates, or (ii) birth certificates from local authorities - Medical age determination (ossification test) can only be resorted to in the absence of such documentary evidence – Held that the High Court erred in holding that medical reports could prevail over school records at the bail stage. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 29 : 2026 INSC 47

Labour Law

Labour Law - Unauthorised Absence - Burden of Proof - Duty to Update Address - An employer is entitled to send communications to the address furnished by the employee. If an employee changes his residence but fails to intimate the new address to the employer, he cannot later complain of non-receipt of a show-cause notice sent to the recorded address and claim any benefit on that ground. Satya Narayan Shukla v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 558 : 2026 INSC 583

Labour Law - An employer is entitled to send communications to the address furnished by the employee. If the employee changes his residence without informing the employer, he cannot take advantage of his own omission and raise a plea of non-receipt of notice. An employee who remains absent without authorization and fails to produce any documentary evidence in support of the alleged reason for absence (such as mother's illness) cannot justify such unauthorized absence on the basis of unsubstantiated oral assertions. Mere verbal intimation to a superior officer, without any written communication or leave application during the period of absence, is insufficient to explain prolonged unauthorized absence. Rifilis Engineering Pvt. Ltd. v. Arjun Gupta, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 636

Labour Law — The Building and Other Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1996 (BOCW Act) and The Building and Other Construction Workers' Welfare Cess Act, 1996 (Cess Act) — Implementation and Levy: Held, that although the BOCW Act and Cess Act were enacted in 1996, they remained "dormant" in various states until the necessary machinery, specifically the Welfare Boards under Section 18, was constituted - The constitution of Welfare Boards is a sine qua non (condition precedent) for the levy and collection of cess - While the registration of workers is not a prerequisite for collecting cess, the existence of a Board to receive and utilize the funds is essential. [Paras 36, 50, 59] National Highways Authority of India v. Gammon Atlanta (JV), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 71 : 2026 INSC 76

Land Law

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - The Supreme Court dismissed the State of Chhattisgarh's appeal as “absolutely frivolous” and imposed costs of ₹2 lakh on the State for re-litigating a settled issue and causing harassment to the landowners. The Court upheld the High Court's order directing the State to pay enhanced compensation at ₹5,380 per square metre along with statutory interest. State of Chhattisgarh v. Parikshit Singh Gupta, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 635

Land Disposal/Allotment Policy — New Bombay Disposal of Lands Regulations, 1975 — Regulation 4 — Modes of Disposal — Mode of allotment through individual application – Held that since Regulation 4 permits disposal of CIDCO plots not only by auction or tender but also by considering individual applications as determined from time to time, an allotment on an individual application where earlier tender attempts had failed was not per se illegal - The legal infirmity lay in the pricing mechanism and the absence of a transparent competitive process, not in the mode of allotment itself. [Paras 18 - 21] K. Raheja Corp. v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 575 : 2026 INSC 551

Land Acquisition (Special Railway Projects) Rules, 2016 — Railways Act, 1989 — Section 20-F — Setting aside of Award — Scope of judicial interference — Representative Capacity — The Supreme Court held that the setting aside of a compensation award on grounds of excessive payment, collusion, or "colourable exercise of powers" against specific land owners does not ipso facto result in the entire acquisition award being set aside for all beneficiaries - Noted that out of 550 land owners, only a few were specifically impleaded and alleged to have received unjust enrichment - Since the appellant was not part of the inquiry report, not arrayed as an accused in the FIR, and his specific award was not challenged by the Railways, the High Court erred in applying a blanket cancellation of his award based on a separate judgment involving different parties - noted that the Railways Act, 1989, does not confer any power of review on the Competent Authority or the Arbitrator appointed under the Rules of 2016 - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's orders and restored the initial award and the arbitral enhancement in favor of the appellant, directing disbursement within three months with interest and solatium – Appeal allowed. [Paras 10-14] Niraj Jain v. Competent Authority-cum-Additional Collector, Jagdalpur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 83 : 2026 INSC 86

Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Section 28-A - Delay and Redetermination – Noted that the fact that landowners received compensation based on an earlier Section 28-A application is irrelevant to their right to seek further parity with enhanced awards passed by higher courts for similarly placed landowners - The purpose of Section 28-A is to remove inequality between affluent landowners who can afford litigation and poor landowners who cannot - Acquisition – When an appeal is preferred against an award of the Reference Court, the High Court's decision becomes the operative award - The principle of merger ensures that the finality of the compensation is determined by the highest court that has adjudicated the matter. [Relied on Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari (1995) 2 SCC 736; Bharatsing v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 92; Paras 15-27] Andanayya v. Deputy Chief Engineer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 300 : 2026 INSC 293

Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Section 28-A - Re-determination of Compensation - Maintainability of second application - Doctrine of Merger – The Supreme Court held that landowners are entitled to seek re-determination of compensation based on a subsequent High Court award even if they had previously filed an application based on a Reference Court award – Noted that once a Reference Court's award is challenged and decided by the High Court, the lower award merges into the High Court's judgment - there is no legal bar for appellants to seek re-determination based on the High Court's award, as the earlier Reference Court award no longer exists independently. Andanayya v. Deputy Chief Engineer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 300 : 2026 INSC 293

Land Acquisition – Disparity in Compensation Mechanism – National Highways Act, 1956 vs. Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 – Supreme Court observed a lack of "intelligible differentia" in the treatment of land owners whose land is acquired under the 1956 Act compared to those under the 2013 Act - While 2013 Act acquisitions involve judicial oversight by District Judges, the 1956 Act relies on administrative officers (Collectors/Commissioners) acting as arbitrators who may lack a "judicially trained mind" to adjudicate complex market value issues – Noted that the Union of India to revisit the legislative scheme to bring parity in the mechanism for determining market value with reference to Article 300-A of the Constitution – Supreme Court directed that the Interim orders to continue; Registry directed to forward the order to the Attorney General and Solicitor General of India for consideration. [Relied on Union of India & another vs. Tarsem Singh & others, (2019) 9 SCC 304; Para 5-12] Riar Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 65

Landlord and Tenant — Right of Eviction — Absence of Express Covenant - In the absence of any express stipulation or clause in the lease deed providing for re-entry or eviction on account of non-payment of rent, no such right can be inferred - The Government grant must operate according to its tenor, and its silence cannot be converted into a ground for forfeiture. In such cases, the lessor's/respondent's remedy is strictly confined to the recovery of rent/arrears in accordance with law. [Paras 55] Union of India v. Sir Sobha Singh and Sons Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 413 : 2026 INSC 406

Landlord-Tenant Dispute — Bonafide Need — Subsequent Events — Scope of Judicial Review under Article 227 — The Supreme Court set aside a Bombay High Court order that had dismissed a writ petition solely due to the plaintiffs' failure to file a rejoinder to an affidavit alleging subsequent events - held that a writ petition challenging the reversal of an eviction decree should not be dismissed on the narrow ground of "non-traverse" regarding additional material - While courts can take note of subsequent events, such events must be brought promptly, follow procedural rules (affording the opposite party an explanation), and have a material bearing on the right to relief. Maria Martins v. Noel Zuzarte, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 385 : 2026 INSC 376

Lease

Cancellation of Lease - Conditional Extension – Compliance with Prescribed Format – UPSIDA had offered an extension of time subject to the deposit of an extension fee and the submission of an affidavit in a specific format - The appellant failed to submit the affidavit in the required format and language within the fixed period and deposited the fee only after the cancellation order was issued. [Para 64, 67, 72] Piaggio Vehicles Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 332 : 2026 INSC 321

Cancellation of Lease - Lease Forfeiture – Industrial Plot – Failure to utilize land – Breach of Covenants – The Supreme Court upheld the forfeiture of a 33-acre industrial plot by the Uttar Pradesh State Industrial Development Authority (UPSIDA) due to the appellant's failure to complete construction and commence production within the stipulated timeframe - noted that the primary purpose of industrial areas is to generate revenue, create employment, and foster economic development, requiring allottees to strictly adhere to time-bound project implementation – Held that The appellant was in clear breach of sub-clauses (e) and (o) of Clause 3 of the lease deed dated 19th March 2002 for failing to raise construction or commence industrial activity. [Para 57, 58, 59-69] Piaggio Vehicles Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 332 : 2026 INSC 321

Legal Maxim

Legal Maxim – Commodum ex injuria sua nemo habere debet – No one should derive a benefit from their own wrong - Since the closure was occasioned due to the serious fundamental deficiencies of the defaulting institution in relation to infrastructure and teaching faculty, the primary brunt of liability must be fastened upon the defaulting management/trust - Amount secured by way of bank guarantees furnished by the defaulting Trust with the MCI/NMC along with the amount deposited before the Supreme Court Registry ordered to be released and distributed among the transferee private medical colleges in equal proportions - For the remaining shortfall, transferee colleges are permitted to represent to the National Medical Commission (NMC) to recover the deficit amount from the passed-out students based on the original fee structure of the defaulting college, while adjusting the amounts initially paid by them - Students complying with the determined fee liability shall be entitled to receive their academic and course-completion documents forthwith. [Relied on Priya Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2012) 7 SCC 433; Paras 27, 38 – 42, 44 - 54] Soumya Ranjan Panda v. Subhalaxmi Dash, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 498 : 2026 INSC 488

Legal Maxim — Aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum — What cannot be done directly cannot be permitted to be done indirectly - This principle embodies the rule that what is expressly prohibited by law cannot be circumvented through indirect means - Since the statutory proviso relaxing eligibility for final year candidates was explicitly deleted by a state notification, candidates who have not acquired the requisite qualification as on the last date of application cannot circumvent this prohibition to participate in the selection process. [Paras 18-24] Rajasthan Public Service Commission v. Lavanshu Sankhla, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 455 : 2026 INSC 444

Legal Profession

Legal Profession – Professional Misconduct – Supreme Court expressed concern over the "sorry state of affairs" where legal professionals turned into perpetrators of violence - noted that while fraternity among lawyers is understandable, it cannot justify lawlessness or the burning of a colleague's property for defending an accused - The Bar Council of India was directed to take appropriate action against the erring members. [Paras 12-17] Vishvjeet v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 257 : 2026 INSC 254

Legitimate Expectation

Legitimate Expectation – Duty to Allot – In the absence of fraud, collusion, or material irregularity, the highest bidder whose bid exceeds the reserve price has a legitimate expectation to receive an allotment letter. The returning of earnest money does not legitimize an arbitrary cancellation – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Eva Agro Feeds (P) Ltd. vs. Punjab National Bank (2023) 10 SCC 189; K. Kumara Gupta vs. Sri Markendaya & Sri Omkareswara Swamy Temple (2022) 5 SCC 710; Subodh Kumar Singh Rathour vs. Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority (2024) 15 SCC 461] Golden Food Products India v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : 2026 INSC 22

Limitation Act, 1963

Limitation Act, 1963; Article 136 — Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Order 21 — Execution of Decrees - Starting point of limitation when an appeal is dismissed in default — The Supreme Court held that the dismissal of an appeal, even if for non-prosecution or on preliminary grounds like limitation, resets the limitation clock for execution proceedings - While a decree remains enforceable if not stayed during the pendency of an appeal, the dismissal of such an appeal confirms the Trial Court's decree and provides a fresh starting point of 12 years for execution under Article 136 - Supreme Court emphasized that an appeal is a continuation of the suit; therefore, a decree does not attain absolute finality until the appeal is disposed of. Gajanan v. Pralhad, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 341

Limitation Act, 1963 – Condonation of Delay – Gross Delay of 31 Years – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court and Board of Revenue orders that had condoned a 31-year delay in filing an appeal against a 1975 decree - held that delay condonation cannot be an act of generosity that defeats substantial justice or causes prejudice to the opposing party - The grounds for delay alleging fraud and lack of knowledge were belied by trial court records showing the defendant appeared through counsel, filed applications, and led evidence through witnesses. Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 372 : 2026 INSC 350

Limitation Act, 1963 – Section 18 - Acknowledgment must be within the Limitation Period - An acknowledgment of liability under Section 18 of the 1963 Act can only renew or extend a limitation period if it is made before the original period of limitation has already expired - Any entry or admission made after the expiry of the limitation period does not ensure to the benefit of the creditor. [Relied On: Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. v. Kew Precision Parts Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., (2022) 9 SCC 364; Laxmi Pat Surana v. Union Bank of India & Anr., (2021) 8 SCC 481; Reliance Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. v. Hotel Poonja International Pvt. Ltd., (2021) 7 SCC 352; Para 17] Shankar Khandelwal v. Omkara Asset Reconstruction Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 438 : 2026 INSC 429

Limitation Act, 1963 – Section 7 read with Section 18 - Admission of Claim by Resolution Professional (RP) / Interim Resolution Professional (IRP) does not extend Limitation - The admission of a claim by an IRP or RP is merely an administrative and clerical task performed under statutory duties to collate claims under Section 18 of the Code - The RP has no adjudicatory powers. Such admission amounts to a mere entry or recital of a debt and does not constitute a conscious and unequivocal acknowledgment of liability under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 - it cannot be used to extend the period of limitation. [Relied On: Swiss Ribbons Private Limited & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., (2019) 4 SCC 17; Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta & Ors., (2020) 8 SCC 531; Para 16] Shankar Khandelwal v. Omkara Asset Reconstruction Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 438 : 2026 INSC 429

Limitation Act, 1963; Section 5 — Condonation of Delay — State/Government Litigants — The Supreme Court dismissed a Special Leave Petition filed by the State of Odisha, refusing to condone a delay of 123 days in filing and 96 days in re-filing – Held that while a liberal approach and certain latitude ("play at the joints") are traditionally extended to the State due to procedural red tape, there is a limit to such indulgence – Noted that the State's explanation—citing "procedural delay in obtaining approval from the higher authority"—as a "lame excuse" rather than a "sufficient cause." – Noted that condonation of delay is not a matter of right but a discretionary power, and the State had shown "utter lethargy" throughout the proceedings in both the High Court and the Supreme Court. State of Odisha v. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 161 : 2026 INSC 148

Limitation Act, 1963; Section 5 — Sufficient Cause vs. Bureaucratic Indifference — Relying on its previous observations in Amateur Riders Club, reiterated that "there is a point beyond which even the courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant is Government which is itself under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference." - noted that despite decades of judicial optimism that governmental promptitude would improve, there has been no conspicuous change, leading to the exhaustion of judicial patience regarding stereotyped explanations for delay. [Relied on Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay v. Amateur Riders Club, Bombay, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 603; Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107; G. Ramegowda v. Land Acquisition Officer, (1988) 2 SCC 142; Postmaster General v. Living Media India Limited, (2012) 3 SCC 563; Paras 12-20] State of Odisha v. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 161 : 2026 INSC 148

Limitation Act, 1963 – Article 135 of the Schedule – Execution of Decree for Mandatory Injunction – Period of Limitation – The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of an execution application filed beyond the prescribed three-year period - Under Article 135, the limitation for enforcing a decree granting a mandatory injunction is three years, commencing from the date of the decree or the date fixed for performance - Where the decree does not specify a particular date for performance, the limitation period begins from the date of the decree itself - The petitioners sought to execute a mandatory injunction part of a decree dated 06.01.2005 - The execution application was filed on 12.08.2010 - As the decree did not specify a performance date, held that the application was barred by limitation under Article 135, as it was filed more than three years after the decree was passed. [Paras 4, 5] Babu Singh v. Jalandhar Improvement Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 175

Limitation Act - Distinction Between Section 5 and Section 14 of Limitation Act — Supreme Court highlighted a "vital distinction": Section 5 involves a discretionary power to extend time based on "sufficient cause," whereas Section 14 is a mandatory provision for the exclusion of time if specific conditions are met - Principles of Section 14 may be applied by analogy to tribunals to prevent manifest injustice, but the discretionary power under Section 5 must be specifically granted by the legislature - Procedural laws like limitation can have substantive effects by depriving a party of an accrued right to plead a time-bar - Since the respondent's remedy was already time-barred under the old regime before Section 433 of the Act, 2013 came into force, the change in law cannot ensure to their benefit – Held that The High Court erred in affirming the CLB's order condoning a 249-day delay - The CLB lacked the authority to apply Section 5 of the Limitation Act to an appeal under Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013 – The mechanism envisaged under Section 5 is proximally bound and tethered to the discretion with which a civil court is empowered and that under Section 14 is anchored on restoring the right of a litigant to institute an appeal or application, as the case may be, within the prescribed period of limitation - Both provisions work in the interest of the litigant and seek to further the cause of substantive justice, the kind and nature of the power exercised under the two provisions, as well as the mechanism envisaged therein, are quite distinct - Appeal allowed. Property Company (P) Ltd. v. Rohinten Daddy Mazda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 19 : 2026 INSC 33

Limitation and Accrual of Right – The right to approach the Tribunal for broad banding of disability pension effectively accrued on 10.12.2014 (the date of the Ram Avtar judgment), which removed previous legal impediments – noted that claims filed thereafter are not barred by the Limitation Act or Section 22 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act - Supreme Court maintained its consistent stance that the right to receive disability pension is a valuable right, and once found due, the benefit must be granted from the date it became due without being curtailed by a three-year limitation period. [Relied on Union of India & Others v. Ram Avtar, 2014 SCC Online SC 1761; Paras 15-22]. Union of India v. Sgt Girish Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 148 : 2026 INSC 149

Limitation – Commencement of Period – Identity of Offender – Section 468 & 469(1)(c) CrPC - The Supreme Court held: In cases involving misbranded or substandard drugs where an investigation is necessary to establish the exact chain of supply and the identity of the manufacturers/distributors, the limitation period for taking cognizance commences from the date the identity of the offender is known to the aggrieved person or the investigating officer, as per Section 469(1)(c) of the CrPC - The three-year limitation period under Section 468(2)(c) is computed from the date the identity of all accused persons is clearly established by the competent authority, not necessarily from the date of the initial tip-off or the date of the offense. State of Kerala v. Panacea Biotec Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 206 : 2026 INSC 200 : AIR 2026 SC 1270 ; 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 285

Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990 (Chhattisgarh) — Section 9 — Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 5 and Section 29(2) — Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to statutory appeals under the Adhiniyam — Condonation of delay — Held: Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is not excluded either expressly or by necessary implication from proceedings under Section 9 of the Chhattisgarh Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990 - The appellate authority retains the discretion to condone delay in appropriate cases upon sufficient cause being shown. [Paras 25, 26] Sardari Lal v. Bishan Dass, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 645 : 2026 INSC 669

Maintenance and Alimony

Maintenance and Alimony – Financial Incapacity as Subterfuge – Noted that respondent-husband defaulted on interim maintenance orders despite undertakings to the High Court – Supreme Court rejected his claim of financial incapacity, noting he had resigned from directorships in family-connected companies to evade obligations - A consolidated sum of Rs. 5 Crores was awarded as permanent alimony and child support - held that the appellant-wife's relocation of the children to Kolkata was a protective measure given the intense hostility in Mumbai - Absolute custody was granted to the mother, with specific monthly visitation rights and temporary holiday custody granted to the father. [Relied on Rajnesh v. Neha and Another (2021) 2 SCC 324; Paras 52-62] XXX v. YYY, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 347 : 2026 INSC 334

Maintenance – Computation and Jurisprudential Basis – Principles of Restitutio in Integrum - The Supreme Court examined the jurisprudential framework for computing and awarding compensation under the head of "Prosthetic Limb" in motor accident cases - Emphasizing the mandate of Section 168 to determine "just compensation", Supreme Court reiterated that while damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculations or expected to be a windfall, they must represent equitability, fairness, and reasonableness, avoiding a pittance - Key Principles Established by the Court- i. Standard Formula for Prosthetic Replacement - Following its prior ruling in Chandra Mogera v. Santosh A. Ganachari & Anr. (2025) and Mohd. Sabeer @ Shabir Hussain v. Regional Manager, U.P. State Road Transport Corporation (2022), the Court recognized a block of five (5) years as the reasonable replacement period for a prosthetic limb, with an assumed maximum life expectancy of 70 years for the claimant; ii. Governmental Rates Not Binding - The Court categorically rejected the abysmally low pricing slabs prescribed under Government Notifications - Grounded in the principle of restitutio in integrum (restoring the injured party to their original position as far as money can buy) , held that if the treatment or device chosen by the claimant is reasonable to meet their needs, the insurer/respondent cannot compel them to accept cheaper options or government-subsidized alternatives; iii. Requirement of Price Quotations - Supreme Court reiterated the mandatory directive from Chandra Mogera (supra)that any future claim for compensation under the head of a prosthetic/artificial limb must be accompanied by genuine price quotations from at least two or three service providers to enable tribunals to make an informed, actual cost assessment; iv. Assessment of Income Without Documentary Evidence - Relying on Ramachandrappa (2011) and Syed Sadiq (2014), the Court held that a claim for monthly income cannot be rejected merely due to a lack of documentary evidence if the claimed amount is reasonable considering the specific strata of income, year of the accident, and nature of employment (e.g., heavy vehicle driver). [Relied on Syed Sadiq v. Divisional Manager, United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (2014) 2 SCC 735; Chandra Mogera v. Santosh A. Ganachari & Anr. (Civil Appeal No. 12183/2025); Paras 25-35] Prahlad Sahai v. Haryana Roadways, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 407 : 2026 INSC 396

Maintenance – Determination of Quantum – Deduction of Loan Repayments from Gross Salary – Held, Primary and continuing duty of the husband to maintain the spouse cannot be subordinated to voluntary financial arrangements - Deductions arising out of financial commitments such as loan repayments, especially those contributing toward the creation of assets (capital investments), cannot be equated with essential or unavoidable expenditure - Such voluntary deductions cannot be permitted to substantially dilute the real earning capacity of the husband for determining maintenance. Deepa Joshi v. Gaurav Joshi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 387 : 2026 INSC 370

Maintenance – Object and Standard – Held, Maintenance must not be illusory and should enable the wife to live with dignity and a standard commensurate with that enjoyed during the subsistence of the marriage - The determination must achieve a just balance between the earning capacity of the husband and the reasonable needs of the wife – Noted that Respondent, a Bank Manager with a gross monthly income of ₹1,15,670/-, was initially directed by the Family Court to pay ₹8,000/-, which was enhanced to ₹15,000/- by the High Court - Supreme Court, noting the improper weightage given to asset-generating deductions, further enhanced the maintenance to ₹25,000/- per month. [Relied on Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai (2008) 2 SCC 316; Shamima Farooqui v. Shahid Khan (2015) 5 SCC 705; Rajnesh v. Neha and Another (2021) 2 SCC 324; Paras 11-16] Deepa Joshi v. Gaurav Joshi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 387 : 2026 INSC 370

Market Manipulation

Market Manipulation – Sale of Shares below Last Traded Price (LTP) in Cash Segment – Placing large sell orders in the cash segment during the closing minutes of a settlement day at a price discounted below the Last Traded Price (LTP) does not conclusively prove a fraudulent intent to depress prices - In an online live trading system driven by market forces, a seller may legitimately discount its asking price to ensure trade fulfillment during a brief phase of high price volatility - it is commercially improbable for a promoter retaining a massive majority stake (70%) to intentionally depress equity values, as the marginal gains reaped in the futures segment would be severely offset by the systemic depreciation of its residual corporate valuation. [Paras 202 - 225] Reliance Industries v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 564 : 2026 INSC 585

Maternity Benefit

Maternity Benefit – Adoptive Mothers – Constitutional Validity of Section 60(4) of the Code on Social Security, 2020 (pari materia with Section 5(4) of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961) – Age Limit for Adoption – The Supreme Court struck down the three-month age limit prescribed for an adopted child to entitle the adoptive mother to maternity benefits - held that the distinction between women adopting a child below three months and those adopting an older child lacks a rational nexus with the object of the legislation, which is to dignify motherhood and ensure child welfare - Key Findings noted – i. Motherhood vs. Childbirth: Supreme Court emphasized that maternity benefit is associated with the process of motherhood rather than the biological process of childbirth - Motherhood is a gradual process that takes shape in the heart, and the bond formed outside the womb is as crucial as that formed inside; ii. Article 14 (Equality): The three-month cap was found to be discriminatory and under-inclusive - Adoptive mothers are similarly situated regardless of the child's age, as the need for emotional bonding, nurturing, and family integration remains constant; iii. Article 21 (Reproductive Autonomy): Adoption is an expression of reproductive and decisional autonomy - Denying benefits based on an arbitrary age threshold violates the mother's right to a dignified life and the child's right to holistic care; iv. Practical Unworkability: noted that the legal procedure to declare a child "legally free for adoption" under the Juvenile Justice Act and CARA Regulations typically exceeds two to three months - Thus, the age limit rendered the statutory benefit illusory and otiose in practice; v. Best Interest of the Child: The principle of "best interest" is a continuing obligation that persists throughout the integration period; vi. Judicial Redrafting of Section 60(4): directed that the provision must now be meaningfully read as: "A woman who legally adopts a child or a commissioning mother shall be entitled to maternity benefit for a period of twelve weeks from the date the child is handed over"; vii. Paternity Leave: Supreme Court urged the Union of India to recognize paternity leave as a social security benefit, noting that shared parenting is essential for a child's development and for dismantling gendered roles. [Relied on Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Female Workers (Muster Roll), (2000) 3 SCC 224; Deepika Singh v. PGIMER, Chandigarh, (2023) 13 SCC 681; State of Gujarat v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., (1974) 4 SCC 656; State of Gujarat v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., (1974) 4 SCC 656; Lakshmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India, (1984) 2 SCC 244; State of Kerala v. Unni, (2007) 2 SCC 365; Paras 66-69, 75-82, 131-136, 146-152, 155-158, 166] Hamsaanandini Nanduri v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 250 : 2026 INSC 246

Matrimonial Litigation

Matrimonial Jurisprudence – Dissolution of Marriage – Cruelty and Desertion – Gender Stereotypes and Women's Autonomy – Facts - Wife, a qualified dentist, established a private dental clinic at Ahmedabad to secure her professional future and provide a safe medical environment for her minor daughter who suffered from seizure episodes - Family Court and High Court granted and affirmed divorce on grounds of cruelty and desertion, viewing her actions as a disregard for family emotions and a violation of her bounden duty to reside wherever her husband chooses - Pursuit of professional career by a qualified woman and her choices made for the welfare of her child cannot be branded as "cruelty" or "desertion" – A well-educated and professionally qualified woman cannot be expected to be confined within the rigid boundaries of matrimonial obligations alone - Marriage does not eclipse her individuality or subjugate her identity - Regressive assumptions that a wife's professional identity is subject to an implied spousal veto, or that she must automatically sacrifice her career to conform to the geographical postings of her husband, are ultra-conservative, patriarchal, and legally unsustainable - Held: The approach of the Courts below is pedantic, regressive, and reflective of a male chauvinistic mindset - If there was a role reversal, a husband would never be expected to sacrifice his professional career, and his failure to do so would not be branded as cruelty - Not utilizing an earned professional degree constitutes a sinful wastage of talent and resources - Since the respondent-husband had already remarried and the appellant-wife did not seek to contest the divorce itself but prayed to clear her name, the decree of divorce is upheld but modified - All findings and observations pertaining to "cruelty" and "desertion" attributed to the wife are expressly expunged and set aside - The decree shall be deemed to have been passed solely on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. [Paras 21 - 27, 30 - 32] Ann Saurabh Dutt v. Lieutenant Colonel Saurabh Iqbal Bahadur Dutt, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 489 : 2026 INSC 475

Matrimonial Litigation – Misuse of Courts – Perjury and Costs - Supreme Court criticized the practice of warring couples treating courts as "battlefields" to settle scores, noting that the parties had filed over 40 cases against each other - While disposing of all matrimonial disputes, the Court specifically directed that applications related to perjury (Section 340 CrPC / Section 379 BNSS) must continue, as no one can be permitted to "pollute the stream of justice" - imposed a token cost of ₹10,000 on each party for choking the judicial system with numerous litigations - Supreme Court emphasized that earnest efforts should be made for pre-litigation mediation and counselling - It observed that the immediate initiation of criminal proceedings often destroys any chance of reconciliation and leads to a "point of no return," especially if arrests occur. [Relied on Shilpa Sailesh vs. Varun Sreenivasan, (2023) 14 SCC 231; Achin Gupta vs. State of Haryana, (2024) 6 SCR 129; Rakesh Raman vs. Kavita, (2023) 3 SCR 552; Paras 11 – 15, 26-32] Neha Lal v. Abhishek Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 73 : 2026 INSC 73

Medical Law

MBBS Admissions – Cut-off Dates vs. Equity – While adherence to the admission schedule is necessary for the timely induction of doctors, the schedule is a "servant of the admission process" and not a "master" that can sacrifice the career of a meritorious student who is not at fault - In exceptional cases where the candidate has been prompt in seeking legal remedies and the delay is entirely attributable to the failure of authorities to detect fraud or respond to communications, equity requires granting admission in the next possible academic year. Secretary National Medical Commission v. Sanjana Thakur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 330

Medical Professionals - Criminal Prosecution - Standard of Care – Reiterated that medical professionals are placed on a different pedestal under criminal law – Prosecution for negligence must show the doctor did something that no medical professional of ordinary senses and prudence would have done - The Supreme Court noted that the Investigating Officer had previously sought an opinion on the consent form from the Director of Medical and Rural Health Services, who did not find fault in it - Since no forensic report indicated interpolation via different ink or handwriting, and the medical necessity was established, the Court found no justification for a criminal trial. [Relied on Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab (2005) 6 SCC 1; Para 16-20] Dr. S. Balagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 331 : 2026 INSC 319

Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 — Sections 3(2)(b)(i), 3(3), and 5 — Medical Termination of Pregnancy Rules, 2003 — Rule 3B(c) — Constitution of India — Articles 21, 32, and 226 — Late-Term Pregnancy of Minor — Reproductive Autonomy and Decisional Autonomy as Fundamental Rights — Lack of Statutory Remedy No Bar to Constitutional Remedy - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and permitted the medical termination of the pregnancy - The Court laid down the following key propositions: i. Reproductive Autonomy under Article 21 - The right to make decisions concerning one's body and reproduction is an integral facet of personal liberty and privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution of India - No court ought to compel any woman, especially a minor child, to carry an unwanted pregnancy to full term against her express will - The choice of the pregnant woman must be prioritized over the interest of an unborn child or suggestions of giving the child up for adoption; ii. Statutory Limitations vs. Constitutional Remedy - A lack of remedy under a statute (such as the MTP Act) does not bar a constitutional remedy under Article 32 or 226 - The statute merely codifies a part of the constitutional remedy - When statutory limits are exhausted, Constitutional Courts must view the case through the lens of the pregnant woman's welfare and fundamental rights rather than adopting a prohibitory approach, which inadvertently drives women toward unsafe, illegal abortion centers; iii. Foetal Normalcy and Passage of Time - The invocation of foetal normalcy or the advanced duration of a pregnancy cannot be used to deny termination - Subordinating a woman's fundamental rights to the pathology of a fetus instrumentalizes her into a mere conduit - the passage of time does not extinguish reproductive choices, as delays often stem from systemic barriers, irregular cycles, lack of awareness, financial constraints, or fear; iv. Assessment of Mental Health and Distress - The absence of a clinically diagnosed psychiatric disorder in a Medical Board report does not negate the presence of severe emotional trauma, distress, or anguish - The minor's two suicide attempts demonstrated acute mental suffering that the law cannot ignore - Since the Medical Board found the minor physically fit for the procedure and she consented through her mother, the request could not be denied. [Relied on X v. Health & Family Welfare Department, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1321; A (Mother of X) v. State of Maharashtra & Others (Civil Appeal No. 827 of 2026); Paras 10-16] S v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 446

Brain Death Certification - Apnea Test - Supreme Court directs AIIMS to constitute an expert medical committee to examine alternatives to Apnea Test for Brain Death Certification. Dr. S. Ganapathy v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 449

Medical Ethics – Best Interest Principle – Substituted Judgment Standard – For incompetent patients, the decision to withdraw treatment must be grounded in the "best interest of the patient" - Held: The inquiry is not whether it is in the patient's best interest to die, but whether it is in their best interest to prolong life artificially through futile treatment - The "Substituted Judgment" standard—ascertaining what the patient would have wanted if competent is a critical component of determining their best interest from a dignity-centric lens. [Paras 131, 228, 229] Harish Rana v Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 229 : 2026 INSC 222

Medical Ethics – Procedural Guidelines – Minimal Judicial Intervention – Supreme Court emphasized that judicial intervention under Article 226 is only a fallback mechanism when medical boards disagree or hospitals fail to act. In the ordinary course, hospitals must constitute Primary and Secondary Medical Boards as per the Common Cause framework - Implementation of the boards' decision must follow a mandatory "Reconsideration Period" of 30 days to allow aggrieved parties to seek legal recourse. [Relied on Common Cause v. Union of India, (2018) 5 SCC 1; Paras 23, 109, 274, 322] Harish Rana v Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 229 : 2026 INSC 222

Medical Evidence vs. Ocular Testimony — Victim Anonymity — Section 228-A IPC — Held that medical evidence is corroborative and an expert opinion - While it may be ignored if it contradicts credible ocular evidence, in this case, the medical findings of lacerated wounds and a torn hymen squarely supported the victim's version - Supreme Court deprecated the practice of freely using the victim's name in court records, despite the 1983 amendment and subsequent mandates intended to prevent social stigma - Directed all Registrars General of High Courts to ensure strict compliance with the proscription of disclosing a victim's identity. [Relied on State of Rajasthan v. Chatra (2025) 8 SCC 613; State of M.P. v. Balveer Singh (2025) 8 SCC 545; State of Himachal Pradesh v. Manga Singh (2019) 16 SCC 759; State of U.P. v. Ajmal Beg 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2801; State of U.P. v. M. K. Anthony (1985) 1 SCC 505; Para 12- 15] State of Himachal Pradesh v. Hukum Chand @ Monu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 294 : 2026 INSC 290

Medical Jurisprudence — Postmortem Examination — Professional Misconduct — Premature Disclosure to Media - Held: The conduct of an autopsy surgeon in furnishing an erroneous report based on "naked eye" observations—without waiting for forensic (FSL) results and publicizing sensational claims to the media constitutes professional misconduct and contempt of court - Such actions spread misinformation, erode trust in investigative agencies, and violate the sub judice rule - Justice is served by truth established through impartial investigation, not by following majority sentiment or public pressure amplified by premature media reports. [Relied on Munna Kumar Upadhyay Alias Munna Upadhyaya vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2012) 6 SCC 174; State of W.B. vs. Mir Mohammad Omar & Ors., (2000) 8 SCC 382; Raj Kumar vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2014) 5 SCC 353; Abhinav Mohan Delkar vs. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC Online SC 1725; Patel Babubhai Manohardas vs. State of Gujarat, 2025 SCC Online SC 503; Paras 102-106, 110, 117-119] Gudipalli Siddhartha Reddy v. State C.B.I., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 166 : 2026 INSC 160 : AIR 2026 SC 950

Medical Law – Clinically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration (CANH) – Definition of "Medical Treatment" – Supreme Court clarified that CANH (enteral or parenteral nutrition via tubes) is a technologically mediated medical intervention, not mere basic care or sustenance - Held: Since CANH involves specialized medical protocols, risks of complications, and clinical assessment, it constitutes "medical treatment" amenable to withdrawal or withholding under the Common Cause guidelines. [Paras 118, 125, 128, 130] Harish Rana v Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 229 : 2026 INSC 222

Medical Negligence and Standard of Care: Permissibility of Stem Cell "Therapy" for Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) - held that every medical practitioner owes a fiduciary duty to exercise a reasonable degree of care, skill, and knowledge expected of a prudent practitioner - A practitioner fails to meet this standard if they administer an intervention that lacks credible scientific evidence of safety and efficacy, or is explicitly not recommended by authoritative medical bodies - Since therapeutic use of stem cells in ASD is not recognized as a "sound and relevant medical practice" by the ICMR or NMC, offering it as a routine clinical service outside an approved clinical trial constitutes a failure to meet the reasonable standard of care. [Relied on Indian Medical Association v. V.P. Shantha and others (1996) 86 COMP 806; Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab (2005) 6 SCC 1; M.A. Biviji v. Sunita and Others, reported in (2024) 2 SCC 242; Paras 59, 61, 63, 70, 90, 151] Yash Charitable Trust v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 93 : 2026 INSC 96

Medical Termination of Pregnancy – Reproductive Autonomy and Bodily Integrity – Right to Life and Liberty under Article 21 – Supreme Court allowed the medical termination of a 30-week pregnancy of a girl who conceived as a minor – Supreme Court set aside the Bombay High Court's order which had declined termination on the grounds of foetal viability and the possibility of adoption - Key Principles Established – i. Priority of Maternal Rights: held that the reproductive autonomy and bodily integrity of the pregnant woman must be given sufficient emphasis over the rights of an unborn foetus; ii. Decisional Autonomy: A woman's right to choose whether to carry a pregnancy to term is firmly rooted in her right to bodily autonomy – Noted that forcing a woman to continue an unwanted pregnancy causes "visceral" trauma and ignores the physical and mental transformations a woman's body undergoes; iii. Irrelevance of Foetal Viability: When a pregnant woman is determined to terminate and has detached herself from the pregnancy, considerations such as whether the child would be born healthy or is viable are not relevant; iv. Status of the Mother: The fact that the daughter had crossed 18 years of age by the time of the High Court order was deemed "irrelevant," as she was a minor at the time of conception and the pregnancy resulted from a relationship outside of wedlock. [Relied on X vs. Health & Family Welfare Department, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1321; Paras 15-17] A (Mother of X) v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 160

Medical Negligence

Medical Negligence – Expert Panel Guidelines – Absence of Peer Specialist – The investigative guidelines require an independent medical opinion from a doctor qualified in the specific branch of medicine involved before initiating criminal prosecution against a medical professional - The constitution of a four-member expert medical panel without an anaesthetist to review a case involving technical nuances of epidural anaesthesia constitutes a significant legal and procedural flaw, rendering its conclusion incompetent. [Paras 26, 27] Supriya Kumari M.C. v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 540 : 2026 INSC 537

Military

Military Pension – Disability Pension – Attributes of Service – Impact of Lifestyle Habits – The Supreme Court upheld the denial of disability pension to an army personnel suffering from "Stroke Ischemic RT MCA TERRITORY" - Noted that the disease was neither attributable to nor aggravated by military service, as the Medical Board clearly opined that the condition could have been occasioned by the appellant's habit of smoking ten bidis per day. Sarevesh Kumar v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 163

Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957

Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 — Section 9 — Royalty cannot be frozen by contract — Interpretation of "Dispatch" – The Supreme Court clarified that the word "applicable" regarding the royalty rate denotes applicability at the relevant time of removing the goods and does not freeze the rate of royalty to the date of the auction agreement - Relying on the 9-Judge Bench decision, the Supreme Court reiterated that royalty is fundamentally payable on the dispatch/movement of minerals from the leased area - If the movement of minerals occurs after a statutory revision, the buyer cannot escape the liability of the enhanced rate due to a piecemeal or delayed approach in transporting the mineral. [Relied on Mineral Area Development Authority v. SAIL, (2024) 10 SCC 1; Paras 9 - 13] Director of Mines and Geology v. BMM Ispat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 600 : 2026 INSC 627

Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 — Section 9 — Subsequent Statutory Enhancement of Royalty — Contractual terms vs. Statutory Amendment — Liability to pay enhanced royalty on dispatch - The Supreme Court held that the enhancement of a mineral's royalty rate via statutory amendment overrides pre-existing contractual arrangements or tender conditions limiting a bidder's liability - Royalty is legally linked to the dispatch or removal of minerals from the leased area, not the date of auction or contract finalization - Successful auction purchasers who remove or transport the mineral after a statutory rate revision comes into force are legally liable to pay the enhanced royalty rate - Contractual provisions must give way to statutory amendments. [Paras 11-13] Director of Mines and Geology v. BMM Ispat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 600 : 2026 INSC 627

Money-lending Law

Money-lending Law - Courts must 'nip in the bud' proceedings instituted by unlicensed money lenders; Enforcement and investigation under existing laws need not await new legislation - The Supreme Court clarified that its earlier order closing the suo motu proceedings concerning unauthorised money lending does not imply that no law exists on the subject or that enforcement actions must wait for fresh legislation by States/Union Territories. Raj Kumar Santoshi v. Prashant Malik, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 342