Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Sections 16, 18, 31(8), 37(2) – Pre-deposit condition in arbitration clause – Validity and constitutionality under Article 14 of the Constitution of India and Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 – Correctness of 3-Judge Bench decision in S.K. Jain v. State of Haryana – Reference to Larger Bench - Doubting the correctness of the three-Judge Bench decision in S.K. Jain v. State of Haryana, (2009) 4 SCC 357 (which upheld a pre-deposit condition requiring a contractor alone to deposit security prior to arbitration as a valid mechanism to prevent frivolous claims), a two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court has referred the matter to the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India for constitution of a larger Bench – The Supreme Court observed that an arbitration clause cannot impose pre-deposit conditions so onerous as to render the right to sue, at the threshold, illusory or nugatory - A requirement mandating the deposit of a substantial percentage of the claim amount prior to arbitration inevitably suppresses claims, deters recourse to alternative dispute resolution (ADR), and defeats the objective of declogging the court system - Although a two-Judge Bench in ICOMM Tele Ltd. v. Punjab State Water Supply, (2019) 4 SCC 401 struck down a 10% pre-deposit condition as arbitrary under Article 14, and subsequent decisions in Lombardi Engineering Ltd. v. Uttarakhand Jal Vidyut Nigam Ltd., (2024) 4 SCC 341 and the Constitution Bench in Central Organisation for Railway Electrification (CORE) v. M/s ECI-SPIC-SMO-MCML (JV), (2025) 4 SCC 641 reiterated that party autonomy cannot violate fundamental rights or principles of non-arbitrariness, Lombardi Engineering had held there was no conflict between S.K. Jain and ICOMM Tele as the clauses were materially distinct - Mindful of judicial discipline, the Court held that being a two-Judge Bench, it could neither declare the 3-Judge Bench ruling in S.K. Jain to be sub silentio or bad in law, nor override it directly - Following the principles laid down in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 2 SCC 673 and Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal, (2025) 6 SCC 1, the Bench framed questions on whether one-sided pre-deposit conditions violate Section 18 of the Arbitration Act, Section 28 of the Contract Act, and Article 14 of the Constitution, and referred the issue to the CJI to consider listing before a larger Bench. [Relied on ICOMM Tele Ltd. v. Punjab State Water Supply and Sewerage Board & Anr., (2019) 4 SCC 401; Lombardi Engineering Ltd. v. Uttarakhand Jal Vidyut Nigam Ltd., (2024) 4 SCC 341; Central Organisation for Railway Electrification (CORE) v. M/s ECI-SPIC-SMO-MCML (JV), (2025) 4 SCC 641; Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal & Ors., (2025) 6 SCC 1; Paras 20-32] Santosh Associate v. Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 818 : 2026 INSC 872

Banking Accounting Practice for NPAs & Suspense Account - Capitalisation of Interest & Directives - As per applicable accounting guidelines, once a loan account is classified as an NPA, the bank applies interest only up to the NPA date in the main loan statement and thereafter maintains a separate suspense account for interest due on the outstanding loan amount - A balance certificate reflecting only the outstanding amount in the primary loan account cannot be misconstrued to wipe out the accrued interest maintained in the separate suspense account - Reaffirming the law settled by the Constitution Bench, banks are entitled to charge interest on periodical rests and capitalise unpaid interest in accordance with RBI directives and voluntary contracts - The borrower cannot present self-serving, inconsistent account statements by selectively ignoring the interest component/suspense account – Held - The High Court committed an oversimplification of calculations by relying solely on a balance certificate while completely ignoring the interest component kept in the suspense account post-NPA classification - The High Court's orders directing full and final settlement on a reduced amount set aside, and the order of the DRAT Kolkata determining the liability at ₹54,90,413/- with pendente lite and future simple interest @ 9% p.a. restored. [Relied on Central Bank of India v. Ravindra and others, (2002) 1 SCC 367; Union of India v. Association of Unified Telecom Service Providers of India and others, (2020) 3 SCC 525; Paras 10 -15] Punjab National Bank v. Shree Jyoti Education and Management Trust World, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 796 : 2026 INSC 836

Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 — Section 69, Section 132 read with Central Goods and Service Tax Rules, 2017, Rule 8 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 438 / Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, Section 482 — Power to Arrest — Requirement of prior communication of arrest order to the accused before arrest — Mandatory Nature - An order passed by the Commissioner under Section 69(1) of the CGST Act recording "reasons to believe" is a sine qua non for an accused to entertain an apprehension of arrest and maintain an application for anticipatory bail - Principles of natural justice, fairness in administrative action, and Article 21 require that communication of the arrest order under Section 69 to the person sought to be arrested is mandatory prior to arrest - The order may be communicated electronically (via email/mobile provided under Rule 8 of the CGST Rules), under BNSS provisions, or via other permissible modes - Without such communication, the question of arrest does not arise, so as to enable the accused to exercise their right to seek pre-arrest bail or judicial review of the reasons. [Paras 14–22] Union of India v. Sunil Biyani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 797 : 2026 INSC 849

Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 — Section 70 — Summons — Status of a Summoned Person - Mere issuance of summons under Section 70 of the CGST Act does not per se make the person summoned an accused - The prohibitive sweep of Article 20(3) of the Constitution does not go back to the stage of interrogation, and in the absence of an order under Section 69, there can be no apprehension of arrest to maintain an application for anticipatory bail. [Relied on Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India, (2025) 6 SCC 545; Deepak Mahajan, (1994) 3 SCC 440; Poolpandi v. CCE, (1992) 3 SCC 259; Dukhishyam Benupani v. Arun Kumar Bajoria, (1998) 1 SCC 52; Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 5 SCC 1; Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248; Paras 15-22] Union of India v. Sunil Biyani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 797 : 2026 INSC 849

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Disapproval of Mini-Trials at Interlocutory Stage: The Supreme Court strongly deprecated the recurring practice of writing lengthy, merits-laden orders at the interlocutory stage or in appeal by conducting "mini-trials" upon affidavits - The courts must strictly confine their enquiry to the three cardinal tests (prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury) without embarking upon an examination of the final merits or the probable outcome of issues properly triable upon evidence. [Relied on Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi & Ors., (2024) 11 SCC 351; Seema Arshad Zaheer & Ors. v. Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai & Ors., (2006) 5 SCC 282; Shyam Sel and Power Limited v. Shyam Steel Industries Limited, (2023) 1 SCC 634; Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. & Ors. v. Coca Cola Co. & Ors., (1995) 5 SCC 545; Wander Ltd. & Anr. v. Antox India P. Ltd., 1990 Supp SCC 727; Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 719; Paras 37-40] Shruti Manav Sharma v. Sunanina Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 798 : 2026 INSC 843

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) – Evidence Act, 1872, Section 60 – Admissibility and Redaction of Evidence Affidavit in Lieu of Examination-in-Chief – Oral Evidence qua Inadmissible/Irrelevant Internal Documents – Permissibility – Principles on Res Judicata at Interlocutory Stages - Where internal documents, internal emails, and inter-se correspondence unilaterally prepared by a party have been consistently held irrelevant and inadmissible by the court, and such orders have attained finality, a party cannot be permitted to adduce oral evidence as to the contents of those very documents or what transpired in internal meetings by an indirect method - The earlier orders operate as res judicata and are binding during the trial - An interlocutory order ruling on the relevance and non-production of such documents cannot be circumvented by invoking Section 60 of the Evidence Act under the guise of oral testimony of a witness who was party to internal discussions – Held that the High Court was fully justified in meticulously scrutinizing and redacting the yellow-marked portions of the evidence affidavits of the defendant's witness (DW-1) that sought to introduce the contents of excluded internal communications and meetings, while retaining portions that pertained strictly to the witness's personal perception/state of mind or inter-party correspondence. [Paras 13–20] Reliance Industries v. NTPC Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 806 : 2026 INSC 862

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Framing of Issues & Appellate Power — Adequacy of Existing Issues - Where existing issues framed by the Trial Court are sufficiently broad and comprehensive to cover the core disputes between the parties (e.g., validity/binding nature of a registered sale deed and legal necessity), and the parties went to trial knowing the controversy and leading evidence accordingly, an appellate court cannot routinely remand the matter merely on the premise that specific distinct issues (such as limitation, possession, or whether the deed is sham/nominal) were not explicitly framed - The First Appellate Court possesses full jurisdiction to evaluate the available evidence and return findings on questions of fact and law. [Relied on Ashwini Kumar K. Patel v. Upendra J. Patel & Ors., (1999) 3 SCC 161; P. Purushottam Reddy & Anr. v. Pratap Steels Ltd., (2002) 2 SCC 686; Zarif Ahmad (Dead) Through LRs. & Anr. v. Mohd. Farooq, (2015) 13 SCC 673; Paras 14-17] Shivappa v. Shantavva, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 812 : 2026 INSC 857

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Object of Interlocutory Injunction — Principle of Minimisation of Irremediable Prejudice - An interlocutory injunction decides nothing on final merits; it is purely a holding operation designed to preserve the status quo of the subject-matter so that the trial is not rendered a barren or meaningless exercise - The fundamental principle guiding the court is to adopt the course that carries the lower risk of injustice and causes the least irremediable injury. [Paras 20 - 23] Shruti Manav Sharma v. Sunanina Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 798 : 2026 INSC 843

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2, Order XLIII Rule 1(r), Section 94(c), and Section 151 — Specific Relief Act, 1963 — Sections 36 & 37(1) — Temporary Injunction — Interlocutory Jurisdiction — Nature and Scope of Relief — Trinity Test — Appellate Interference and Standard of Review — Mini-Trial at Interlocutory Stage deprecated - Scope of Appellate Interference under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) - An order passed on an application for a temporary injunction is purely discretionary - The appellate court does not ordinarily substitute its own discretion or view for that of the court of first instance merely because it might have arrived at a different conclusion on the same material - Interference is warranted only where the court of first instance has exercised its discretion arbitrarily, capriciously, perversely, mala fide, upon irrelevant or extraneous considerations, or contrary to settled legal principles - The Division Bench erred in substituting its own appreciation of the Will, parties' conduct, and statutory provisions for that of the Single Judge, which was squarely impermissible under the settled legal principles. [Paras 17- 39] Shruti Manav Sharma v. Sunanina Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 798 : 2026 INSC 843

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Prima Facie Case — Standard & Meaning - Balance of Convenience & Irreparable Injury - A prima facie case does not require full-proof title or a case proved to the hilt - It only requires the demonstration of a substantial question raised bona fide which is not frivolous or vexatious and needs investigation and decision on merits at trial - The court must weigh the injury apprehended by the plaintiff against the prejudice likely to be caused to the defendant - The loss of controlling shareholding in family companies or the creation of third-party rights over properties traceable to disputed transfers cannot be compensated in money or damages and constitutes irreparable injury in equity. [Paras 24 – 35] Shruti Manav Sharma v. Sunanina Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 798 : 2026 INSC 843

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Section 107, Order XLI Rule 23, Order XLI Rule 24 & Order XLI Rule 27 — Scope and exercise of power of remand by the First Appellate Court — Remand is not a matter of routine course - An order of remand should not be adopted as a matter of ordinary course - The First Appellate Court is required not only to determine the legality and tenability of the Trial Court's judgment, but it also exercises all the jurisdiction that the Trial Court had to decide the issues - When the necessary pleadings and evidence (both oral and documentary) are already available on record, the First Appellate Court ought to decide the appeal itself on merits rather than remitting the matter to the Trial Court to re-frame issues and record further evidence, which only serves to cause unnecessary delay, uncertainty, and avoidable prolonged litigation - The discretion to remand is to be exercised only when imminently warranted by the specific circumstances of a given case (such as where a suit was disposed of strictly on a preliminary issue without evidence on other issues). [Paras 14 - 16] Shivappa v. Shantavva, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 812 : 2026 INSC 857

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Section 11 — Res Judicata qua Common Judgment in Consolidated Suits - Where two suits filed by the same plaintiff are consolidated, tried together on common evidence, and disposed of by a single common judgment, a composite appeal challenging the common judgment and both decrees is not barred by the principle of res judicata - Res judicata applies qua a judgment and not a decree; where there is one trial, one finding, and one decision, two decrees drawn are in substance one. [Relied on Charan Singh v. Ram Saroop, Civil Appeal Nos. 1585–1586 of 2025; Narhari and others v. Shankar and others, 1950 INSC 24; P.A. Oommen v. Moran Mar Baselius Marthoma, 1992 INSC 175; Paras 14-18] Bassanna v. Bhimanna, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 800 : 2026 INSC 838

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) – Section 60(1)(ccc) [as applicable to Delhi, Punjab, and Haryana via Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act, 1934] – Exemption of main residential house from attachment and sale – Exemption is personal to the Judgment-Debtor and not available to Legal Representatives - The protection under Section 60(1)(ccc) of the CPC exempting one main residential house belonging to and occupied by a judgment-debtor (other than an agriculturist) is personal to the judgment-debtor - A legal representative is a distinct juridical concept, and the liability devolving upon them is limited to the estate in their hands - A legal representative cannot, merely by virtue of residing in a house that belonged to the deceased judgment-debtor, claim the personal exemption provided to the judgment-debtor alone. [Relied on Yogesh Sharma & Ors. v. Devi Dayal & Ors., AIR 1977 Delhi 270; K.L. Bawa v. Basant Textiles, AIR 1982 P&H 275; Pargat Singh & Anr. v. Gurmail Kaur & Ors., 2014 SCC OnLine P&H 23436; Paras 41–44] Sheela Gehlot v. Mohini Hardayal Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 808 : 2026 INSC 863

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Section 96, Section 11, Section 151, Order XLI Rule 1 — Maintainability of Composite First Appeal against Common Judgment dismissing two consolidated suits filed by the same plaintiff — Procedural defect vs. Substantive right — Defect of Form - A single/composite appeal filed under Section 96 CPC challenging a common judgment of the trial court dismissing two consolidated suits instituted by the same plaintiff is maintainable, provided certified copies of both decrees are filed, requisite court fees payable for both appeals are paid, and a specific prayer challenging the dismissal of both suits is made - The absence of a separate memorandum of appeal for each suit is merely a defect of form and not of substance, which is curable in nature and not fatal - The right of appeal is a substantive right, and rules of procedure under the CPC, being the handmaid of justice, cannot be utilized as a sword to deprive a party of an adjudication on merits. [Paras 12-20] Bassanna v. Bhimanna, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 800 : 2026 INSC 838

Code of Criminal Procedure — Anticipatory Bail / Pre-arrest Bail — Grant of interim protection while dismissing non-maintainable application — Impermissibility - An interim relief can only be granted in aid of and as ancillary to the main relief - While dismissing an application seeking pre-arrest bail on the ground that it is not maintainable (whatever be the ground therefor), neither the High Court nor the Sessions Court can extend or grant protection against arrest in the nature of interim relief that could otherwise be granted during the pendency of the application. [Relied On State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta, 1951 SCC 1024; Hema Mishra v. State of U.P., (2014) 4 SCC 453; Mangal Rajendra Kamthe v. Tahsildar, Purandhar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 297; Paras 8 - 11] Union of India v. Sunil Biyani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 797 : 2026 INSC 849

Code of Criminal Procedure — Bail to Foreign Nationals — Absence/Abscondence on Fake Sureties — Cancellation of Bail - Where a foreign national accused jumped bail and absconded, and upon subsequent verification, the sureties, PAN card, Aadhaar details, employer declaration, and bank account provided were found to be completely fabricated and non-existent, the appeal against the grant of bail metamorphoses into a proceeding for cancellation of bail due to breach of bail conditions - Impugned bail order set aside and bail cancelled. [Paras 17 - 20.1] Union of India v. Chidiebere Kingsley Nawchara, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 817 : 2026 INSC 870

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) — Section 227 — Discharge - When the entire prosecution material taken at face value fails to disclose the essential statutory ingredients of abetment under Section 306 IPC or offences under Sections 504 and 506 IPC, the refusal to grant discharge is unsustainable - High Court's dismissal of the revision application and Trial Court's rejection of the discharge application set aside; accused discharged. [Relied on Abhinav Mohan Delkar v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2026) 6 SCC 233; Prakash & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., (2026) 6 SCC 251; Ude Singh & Ors. v. State of Haryana, (2019) 17 SCC 301; Pawan Kumar v. State of H.P., (2017) 7 SCC 780; Paras 26 - 28] Vinod Shivakumar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 814 : 2026 INSC 867

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 154 — Delay in Lodging FIR — When Not Fatal - Mere delay in lodging the FIR is not fatal to the prosecution if reasonably and satisfactorily explained in light of the surrounding facts and circumstances - Where a 15–16 year old girl (PW-3) witnessed the gruesome assault and death of her mother late in the evening and lodged the report the following morning upon the arrival of her maternal uncle due to shock, despair, and lack of immediate support, the delay of a few hours stood sufficiently explained. [Relied on Ramdas and Others v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 2 SCC 170; Paras 29-35] Balku Oram v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 802 : 2026 INSC 852

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 31(1) & Section 31(2) — Sentencing — Multiple Offences at One Trial — Consecutive vs Concurrent Running of Sentences — Sentence of Life Imprisonment along with Fixed-Term Sentences or Multiple Life Sentences — Imprisonment for life implies imprisonment till the end of the normal life of the convict - a sentence of life imprisonment cannot be directed to run consecutively, either with another life sentence or with a fixed-term sentence - Where an accused is awarded multiple sentences for multiple offences at one trial and one of the sentences awarded is life imprisonment, the sentences must only run concurrently and not consecutively - Directions issued by the Trial Court and High Court ordering consecutive execution of multiple life sentences and fixed-term sentences modified to run concurrently. [Relied on Muthuramalingam and Ors. v. State, Rep. by Inspector of Police, (2016) 8 SCC 313; O.M. Cherian alias Thankachan v. State of Kerala and Ors., (2015) 2 SCC 501; Duryodhan Rout v. State of Orissa, (2015) 2 SCC 783; Paras 20 - 23] Gopi @ Sahaya Puruna v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 820 : 2026 INSC 880

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 354(5) [Corresponding to Section 393(5) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)] — Mode of Execution of Death Sentence by Hanging — Constitutional Validity — Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India — Challenge to Hanging as the Sole Method of Execution - Writ petition under Article 32 seeking declaration of Section 354(5) CrPC / Section 393(5) BNSS as ultra vires Articles 14 and 21 on the ground that execution by hanging is barbaric, cruel, and inhumane, and seeking declaration that the right to die by a dignified procedure is a fundamental right - Dismissing the petition, held - The constitutional validity of Section 354(5) CrPC was conclusively settled by a three-Judge Bench in Deena v. Union of India and subsequently approved by a Constitution Bench in Shashi Nayar (Smt) v. Union of India (1992) 1 SCC 96 - The doctrine of stare decisis mandates that a smaller bench should not depart from the ratio of a larger bench that has stood for over four decades unless it is shown to have lost efficacy due to significant constitutional developments, legislative amendments, or cogent scientific/empirical evidence - The petitioners failed to demonstrate, by any unimpeachable evidence, even a single instance of a botched execution in India under the existing framework - The 187th Report of the Law Commission (2003) is merely recommendatory, and Parliament consciously retained hanging under Section 393(5) of the BNSS, 2023 - No compelling case made out to refer the matter to a larger Bench. [Paras 48–51, 60–63] Rishi Malhotra v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 823 : 2026 INSC 873

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 386(b), Section 397 & Section 401 — Powers of Appellate Court / Revisional Jurisdiction — Enhancement of Sentence — Scope and limits — Absence of Appeal or Revision for Enhancement — In an appeal against conviction preferred by the accused, the appellate court cannot, while maintaining the conviction, enhance the sentence awarded by the trial court so as to leave the convict in a position worse off than prior to the filing of the appeal - The right to appeal is both a statutory and constitutional right - Where no appeal or revision for enhancement has been filed either by the State, the victim, or the complainant, the High Court cannot invoke or exercise its suo motu revisional jurisdiction to enhance the convict's sentence (herein, life imprisonment enhanced to imprisonment for the remainder of natural life) - Such an order of enhancement is impermissible and illegal. [Relied on Nagarajan v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 INSC 802; Paras 17-23]. Gopi @ Sahaya Puruna v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 820 : 2026 INSC 880

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 437/439 — Bail Application — Evidentiary Value of Admissions - Indian Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 8 — Subsequent Conduct of Accused — Abnormal Conduct not Inculpatory Evidence - Presumptions and alleged admissions raised in bail applications cannot form the basis of sustaining a conviction for murder in a case based on circumstantial evidence - Fleeing from the scene in panic upon witnessing a friend accidentally drown, omitting to call for rescue, lying initially to family members, and subsequently going to watch a movie or returning empty soda bottles though morally reprehensible, foolish, or strange cannot be elevated to an incriminating circumstance establishing premeditated murder - The human mind is fickle, manipulative, and unpredictable in the face of sudden adversity - Where the hypothesis of accidental drowning is far more probable and plausible, the chain of circumstances cannot be held to be complete to exclude the hypothesis of innocence - Dock identification of unknown accused persons by witnesses for the first time in court without a prior Test Identification Parade (TIP) carries no evidentiary value, especially when the allegations are levelled months after the occurrence. [Paras 17 - 23] Taher Vajiyuddin Rangwala v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 810 : 2026 INSC 859

Commercial Suits – Delay and Obstruction of Trial – Imposition of Exemplary Costs - Criticism of the tendency of well-resourced litigants to obstruct and prolong commercial litigation by repeatedly generating rounds of interlocutory applications, appeals, and special leave petitions - Permitting a party to prolong a 2006 commercial suit for two decades without crossing the evidence stage is a sad reflection on the conduct of judicial proceedings - Reiteration of directions for expeditious disposal of the trial and dismissal of the appeal with costs of ₹10,000,000 (Rupees Ten Lakhs) payable to the Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association. [Relied on NTPC Limited v. Reliance Industries Limited (SLP (C) Nos. 11741–11742 of 2018, Paras 21–23] Reliance Industries v. NTPC Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 806 : 2026 INSC 862

Constitution of India — Article 136 — Scope of Interference with Concurrent Findings of Fact - Powers under Article 136 are wide and plenary, but the Supreme Court does not reappraise evidence or interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by courts below unless the findings are manifestly perverse, unsupportable from record, vitiated by error of law/procedure, or where the decision shocks the conscience of the Court. [Relied on Shahaja alias Shahajan Ismail Mohd. Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 12 SCC 558; Balak Ram v. State of U.P., (1975) 3 SCC 219; Paras 15-25] Balku Oram v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 802 : 2026 INSC 852

Constitution of India — Article 14 — Differential Modes of Execution Under Ordinary Criminal Law vs. Military Law — Army Act, 1950, Air Force Act, 1950, and Navy Act, 1957 - The argument that permitting execution by shooting as an alternative mode under special military enactments amounts to hostile discrimination under Article 14 against civilian convicts executed solely by hanging under CrPC/BNSS was rejected - Military statutes operate in a distinct field governing a separate class of persons subject to military discipline and necessity, and cannot serve as a benchmark to assess the constitutional validity of procedures governing civilian convictions. [Paras 55, 56] Rishi Malhotra v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 823 : 2026 INSC 873

Constitution of India — Article 142 read with Article 21 — Guidelines & Comprehensive Directions for Grant of Bail to Foreign Nationals in NDPS Commercial Quantity Cases — Surety Verification and Regulatory Mechanism - To plug the systemic loophole and eliminate the rampant menace of fake/professional sureties used by foreign nationals to abscond, the Supreme Court exercised its plenary jurisdiction under Article 142 to issue binding mandatory directions and introduce standard Form-47A – i. Passport & Travel Restrictions - The passport of the foreign national accused must be mandatorily deposited with the jurisdictional Court - An application for release of passport for travel must be decided expeditiously, preferably within four weeks - Travel outside the country is restricted without prior permission – ii. FRRO Registration - The accused must register with the FRRO within one week of release and submit proof thereof in writing to the Court and IO - The FRRO/MHA shall create a dedicated portal for this purpose – iii. Two Solvent Sureties - The accused must furnish two solvent sureties of like amount; relaxable only upon recorded reasons by the Court – iv. Strict Verification Timelines - Verification of sureties and physical re-verification of the accused's Indian residential address must be completed within 3 working days prior to release on bail – v. Disclosure of Finances & Embassies - Accused must disclose income sources and bank details via affidavit within one week of release - The IO must formally communicate the accused's involvement to the relevant Embassy/Consulate – vi. Charge/Lien on Surety Property - A lien/charge equivalent to the surety bond amount shall be created on the surety's movable/immovable property, realizable in the event of forfeiture – vii. Centralised Database & Portal - Ministry of Law and Justice along with NIC to maintain a centralised database of accused persons and sureties - High Courts via their IT Committees directed to implement digital portals for authentication of financial and property credentials – viii. Accountability of Erring Officials - Departmental inquiries must be initiated against police, revenue, or court officials responsible for approving fake/fabricated sureties due to negligence or collusion – ix. Form-47A - Insertion and adoption of the specialised mandatory undertaking and surety verification format (Form-47A) under BNSS, 2023. [Relied on State of Punjab v. Sukhwinder Singh, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 671; Narcotics Control Bureau v. Mohit Aggarwal, (2022) 18 SCC 374; Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713; Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409; Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India, (2005) 5 SCC 665; Paras 28, 29] Union of India v. Chidiebere Kingsley Nawchara, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 817 : 2026 INSC 870

Constitution of India — Article 21 — Death Penalty — Alternative Modes of Execution — Lethal Injection vs. Hanging – noted that contention that intravenous lethal injection is a demonstrably superior, scientific, and painless alternative to hanging was rejected - Referring to Deena v. Union of India, the Supreme Court reiterated that comparative analysis of alternatives (electrocution, lethal gas, shooting, and lethal injection) showed no distinct or demonstrable advantage over hanging - material placed on record revealed that lethal injection in jurisdictions like the United States has been plagued with systemic issues and numerous botched executions - In the absence of unimpeachable empirical evidence establishing that lethal injection or another method is more humane, the statutory prescription cannot be invalidated. [Paras 53 - 62] Rishi Malhotra v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 823 : 2026 INSC 873

Constitution of India — Social Justice & Constitutional Morality — Witch-Hunting — Practice Derogatory to Dignity of Women - Witch-hunting is a deeply rooted social malady driven by superstition, prejudice, and irrational fear, where vulnerable women are targeted as scapegoats and subjected to extreme brutality and ostracization - Such derogatory practices strike at the root of constitutional morality, human dignity, equality, and scientific temperament envisioned by the Constitution of India; reason must prevail as a bulwark against collective irrationality. [Paras 31-38] Balku Oram v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 802 : 2026 INSC 852

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 136 – Special Leave Appeal – Scope of Interference with Concurrent Findings of Fact: The Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the trial court and the High Court unless the findings are shown to suffer from patent perversity or absurdity. [Relied on Balak Ram v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1975) 3 SCC 219; Paras 24 - 51] Kashmir Ram @ Pappi v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 804 : 2026 INSC 854

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 21, Article 32, and Article 226 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 176 and Section 154 — Custodial Death — Failure to register FIR and investigate — Award of interim compensation — Transfer of investigation to Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) - Custodial Violence and Statutory Inaction - Deceased was arrested for an excise offence carrying a maximum sentence of 3 years and subsequently died in judicial/police custody - Judicial Magistrate First Class conducted an inquiry under Section 176 CrPC and reported that the death resulted from complications arising from a blunt-force head injury, with post-mortem showing multiple antemortem injuries - Despite the inquiry report and the High Court holding that the deceased died due to custodial violence, the State authorities (including DGP and Jail Authorities) failed to register an FIR or initiate an investigation, taking the stance that the judicial inquiry report had not been formally received by police officials - Held: that the stance of "blissful ignorance" and inaction taken by the senior State authorities is reprehensible, sacrilegious, and amounts to an attempt to cover up custodial violence. [Paras 5–7, 14–17] Lahra Bai Tamre v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 794 : 2026 INSC 840

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 226 – Writ Jurisdiction – Mixed Questions of Law and Fact cannot be raised for the first time in a Writ Petition - While a pure question of law can be raised at any stage of the proceedings, a question of fact or a mixed question of law and fact requiring factual inquiry and investigation cannot be permitted to be agitated for the first time in a writ petition without laying a proper factual foundation in the pleadings before the subordinate authorities/tribunals - The High Court erred in remitting the matter to the DRT for a factual inquiry into the claim of exemption under Section 60(1)(ccc) CPC when no such plea or evidence was placed before the Recovery Officer or the DRT. [Relied on Greater Mohali Area Development Authority & Ors. v. Manju Jain & Ors., (2010) 9 SCC 157; Paras 30 - 46] Sheela Gehlot v. Mohini Hardayal Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 808 : 2026 INSC 863

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226 — Writ Jurisdiction — Maintainability in Electrocution Claims — Disputed Questions of Fact - Writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not an appropriate remedy to claim compensation for death or injury caused by electrocution where disputed questions of fact are involved - The High Court erred in entertaining writ petitions and awarding compensation by treating the occurrence as a matter of absolute liability and ignoring factual disputes relating to negligence, contributory negligence, compliance with statutory safety distances, and third-party liability - Where material facts are in dispute, parties must be relegated to civil courts or appropriate alternate forums. [Relied on Chairman, Grid Corpn. of Orissa Ltd. (Gridco) v. Sukamani Das, (1999) 7 SCC 298; Radha Krishan Industries v. State of H.P., (2021) 6 SCC 771; T.N. Cements Corpn. Ltd. v. Unicon Engineers, (2025) 4 SCC 1; Paras 8-16] Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation v. Rekha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 799 : 2026 INSC 847

Constitution of India, 1950 — Articles 14, 16, and 32 — Service Law — Pay Fixation & Parity — Central Government Industrial Tribunals-cum-Labour Courts (CGIT-cum-LCs) — Re-employed Judicial Officers — Claim for 6th Central Pay Commission (CPC) Pay Scales at par with other Central Tribunals vs. Pay Scales applicable to District Judiciary based on Justice E. Padmanabhan Committee / Shetty Commission Recommendations — Permissibility of reasonable classification — Scope of Judicial Review - Petitioners, retired judicial officers appointed on a re-employment basis as Presiding Officers of Central Government Industrial Tribunals-cum-Labour Courts (CGIT-cum-LCs), challenged the denial of 6th CPC pay scales and their equation with the District Judiciary for pay fixation – Held - Classification of re-employed pensioners as a distinct class for pay fixation is valid and does not violate Articles 14 or 16 of the Constitution - Upon re-employment after superannuation, such officers cease to be homogeneous vis-à-vis regular government employees and are governed by a special scheme under the Central Civil Services (Fixation of Pay of Re-employed Pensioners) Orders, 1986 - The determination of pay structures and equation of posts is an executive function based on expert body recommendations (such as the Shetty Commission and Justice E. Padmanabhan Committee) - The Industrial Tribunals/Labour Courts in which petitioners are appointed are established within the State; thus, equating their pay scale with that of the District Judiciary carries a rational and intelligible differentia and is free from arbitrariness - Judicial review in pay fixation is limited and courts must refrain from interfering with the executive domain unless patent arbitrariness, malafides, or apparent anomalies are demonstrated. [Relied on State of U.P. and Others v. J.P. Chaurasia and Others, (1989) 1 SCC 121; Union of India v. Dineshan K.K., (2008) 1 SCC 586; Union of India v. Indian Navy Civilian Design Officers Association and Another, (2023) 19 SCC 482; Union of India v. T.V.L.N. Mallikarjuna Rao, (2015) 3 SCC 653; Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of India, 1950 SCC 833; Paras 5 - 6] R.K. Yadav v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 801 : 2026 INSC 848

Contract Act, 1872 — Section 196 — Ratification — Prospectivity of Endorsement - Ratification must be a conscious adoption of the very unauthorized act in question - Where an additional endorsement enhancing the sum insured is expressly made effective from a prospective date, it negates any intention to ratify, with retrospective effect, an agent's prior assurance that risk cover continued after exhaustion of the original sum insured - ratification cannot be employed to defeat a mandatory statutory requirement governing the assumption of risk. [Relied on Deokar Exports (P) Ltd. v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2008) 14 SCC 598; Harshad J. Shah v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, (1997) 5 SCC 64; State of Orissa v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1997) 5 SCC 512; State of W.B. v. Gitashree Dutta, (2022) 19 SCC 388; Paras 12, 13] New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Louis Dreyfus Commodities India Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 821 : 2026 INSC 876

Contract Act, 1872 — Sections 182, 186, 187, 188, 226, 227 & 237 — Law of Agency — Principal and Agent — Actual vs. Ostensible/Apparent Authority — Competence of an Agent/Officer to Bind Principal Insurer Beyond Authority and Statutory Mandate — Separability of Authorised and Unauthorised Acts - The usual or implied authority of an employee or managerial agent of an insurer (such as a Divisional Manager) to administer, correspond, or explain an existing policy does not equate to the authority to rewrite it, enlarge the risk, create an independent source of unlimited cover, or dispense with statutory preconditions governing the attachment of risk under Section 64VB - Apparent or ostensible authority under Section 237 of the Contract Act proceeds from the manifestations, conduct, or holding out of the principal towards third parties, and cannot be established by the mere self-serving assertion or communication of the agent - An agent cannot, by invoking apparent authority, confer upon the principal a capacity or liability which the governing statute itself withholds from the principal - Under Section 227 of the Contract Act, where the authorised part of the agent's act can be separated from the unauthorised part, the insurer is bound only to the extent of the valid administration/clarification within the lawfully insured limits, and not by unauthorised representations assuring cover beyond the insured limit. [Paras 12, 13] New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Louis Dreyfus Commodities India Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 821 : 2026 INSC 876

Criminal Trial — Appreciation of Evidence — Related Witness vs. Interested Witness - A witness can be regarded as an “interested witness” only when it is demonstrated that the witness has a direct motive, personal animosity, or reasons to falsely implicate the accused - A close relative who is a natural witness cannot be equated with an interested witness merely on account of the relationship - Relationship far from being a foundation to discard testimony is often a sure guarantee of truth, as a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprit to falsely implicate an innocent person. [Relied on Shio Shankar Dubey and Others v. State of Bihar, (2019) 6 SCC 501; Kartik Malhar v. State of Bihar, (1996) 1 SCC 614; Dalbir Kaur v. State of Punjab, (1976) 4 SCC 158; Paras 24-35] Balku Oram v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 802 : 2026 INSC 852

Election Law - Seizure of Cash & Assets by Flying Squads (FS) / Static Surveillance Teams (SST) - Seizure of cash or valuables requires a recorded suspicion of crime/inducement - To protect ordinary citizens from unwarranted harassment while maintaining transparency, the seizing authority must mandatorily record written reasons disclosing a prima facie nexus between the seized asset and the suspected electoral offence - Where SST detects cash exceeding ₹10,00,000, information must immediately be transmitted to the Income Tax Department - To prevent the "under-investigation" tag from lingering endlessly and to allow voters to make informed choices before the next election cycle, the Investigating Officer (IO) must make all endeavors to complete the probe within one year - Reasons for delay must be reported to the ECI, and quarterly status reports approved by the SSP/DCP must be furnished to the ECI - High Courts are directed to designate Special Courts for prompt hearings and expeditious disposal of cases involving candidates/sitting MPs/MLAs. [Paras 17 - 18] State of Karnataka v. Prathik Parasrampuria, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 816 : 2026 INSC 868

Election Law - Summary of Directives Issued – 1. Reporting of Seizure within 24 Hours - Written reasons establishing the prima facie nexus to the electoral offence must be submitted to the DM/ADM/Competent Court within 24 hours of seizure; 2. Investigation Timeline - IOs must endeavor to finish the investigation within 1 year; failures must be explained in writing to the ECI; 3. Quarterly Reporting - Quarterly progress reports must be routed to the ECI via the Nodal Officer after approval by the district SSP/DCP; 4. Income Tax Reference - Seizures exceeding ₹10,00,000 must be notified to Income Tax authorities; 5. Special Courts: High Courts are to designate special fast-track courts for cases involving candidates/sitting MPs/MLAs; 6. Mandatory High Court Approval for Withdrawal - No electoral prosecution against candidates may be withdrawn under Section 321 CrPC without High Court sanction; 7. Compliance - Compliance report to be filed by the ECI and State Governments by November 18, 2026. State of Karnataka v. Prathik Parasrampuria, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 816 : 2026 INSC 868

Election Law - Withdrawal of Cases against Candidates / Politicians (Section 321 CrPC / BNSS) - Unilateral withdrawal of electoral offences by State Governments upon political changes is antithetical to an unbiased criminal justice system - Candidates contesting elections stand on the same pedestal as sitting MPs/MLAs regarding prosecution; hence, withdrawal of prosecution against election candidates cannot be done without the prior approval and leave of the concerned High Court. [Relied on: State of Kerala v. K. Ajith, (2021) 17 SCC 318; Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India, (2021) 20 SCC 599; Paras 14 - 18] State of Karnataka v. Prathik Parasrampuria, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 816 : 2026 INSC 868

Election Law & Criminal Jurisprudence — Electoral Offences, Seizure of Black Money, and Withdrawal of Prosecutions — Comprehensive Directions issued to curb money power, streamline investigations, and regulate withdrawal of criminal cases filed during elections - Constitutional Role of Election Commission & Free/Fair Elections - Article 324 of the Constitution vests wide superintendence, direction, and control of elections in the Election Commission of India (ECI), which acts as a reservoir of residuary powers in unoccupied fields to ensure purity and transparency in the electoral process - Purity in elections and the rule of law are indispensable basic features of democracy. [Relied on: Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975 Supp SCC 1; Rameshwar Prasad (6) v. Union of India, (2006) 2 SCC 1; Union of India v. Assn. for Democratic Reforms, (2002) 5 SCC 294; Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr., (1978) 1 SCC 405; A.C. Jose v. Sivan Pillai, (1984) 2 SCC 656; Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India, (2023) 6 SCC 161; Kanwar Lal Gupta v. Amar Nath Chawla, (1975) 3 SCC 646; Ashok Shankarrao Chavan v. Madhavrao Kinhalkar, (2014) 7 SCC 99; Paras 8 - 12] State of Karnataka v. Prathik Parasrampuria, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 816 : 2026 INSC 868

Electricity Act, 2003 — Section 57 — Compensation in Electrocution Claims — Inapplicability of Motor Vehicles Act Multiplier Formula - The calculation paradigm and multiplier method provided under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 cannot be applied mutatis mutandis to determine compensation in electrocution cases - In the absence of a prescribed calculation method under the Electricity Act, 2003, compensation must be determined on the overarching principle of awarding just, fair, and reasonable compensation based on proven income and relevant facts before the competent forum. [Relied on Raman v. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd., (2014) 15 SCC 1; Balram Prasad v. Kunal Saha, (2014) 1 SCC 384; Para 15-16] Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation v. Rekha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 799 : 2026 INSC 847

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 134 — Quality vs. Quantity of Evidence — Sole Eyewitness - The legal system lays emphasis on the value, weight, and quality of evidence rather than on quantity, multiplicity, or plurality of witnesses - The time-honoured principle is that “evidence has to be weighed and not counted” - There exists no legal impediment to convicting an accused solely on the testimony of a single witness, provided such testimony is wholly reliable and inspires confidence. [Relied on Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras, 1957 SCC OnLine SC 13; Prithipal Singh and Others v. State of Punjab and Another, (2012) 1 SCC 10; Sunil Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2003) 11 SCC 367; Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 14 SCC 150; Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of W.B., (2010) 12 SCC 91; Paras 20-35] Balku Oram v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 802 : 2026 INSC 852

Evidence Act, 1872 — Sections 68 & 69 — Invocation of Section 69 — Proof where no attesting witness can be found — Conditions Precedent — Evidentiary Burden - Section 69 is not an alternative which the propounder may freely choose, but an exceptional mode of proof available only when proof through an attesting witness has become impossible - The opening condition "if no such attesting witness can be found" requires strict proof that the witnesses are dead, beyond the jurisdiction, untraceable despite diligent search, or incapable of giving evidence - A bare, unparticularised statement by an interested propounder regarding the death of a witness, unsupported by credible oral or documentary evidence or enquiry, is insufficient to invoke Section 69 - The mere absence of a contrary suggestion in cross-examination cannot reverse the statutory burden or establish the foundational fact required to bypass Section 68 - Even if Section 69 is applicable, proving the handwriting of one attestor and the mark of the testatrix only satisfies the formal limb and does not create a presumption of capacity, free will, or elimination of suspicious circumstances. [Relied on Babu Singh v. Ram Sahai alias Ram Singh, (2008) 14 SCC 754; Paras 72–76, 78–85, 96–98] Pazhanathal v. Alamathal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 813 : 2026 INSC 860

Evidence Law - Appreciation of Evidence – Falsus in Uno, Falsus in Omnibus not applicable – Sifting Chaff from Grain - The doctrine falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus has no strict application in Indian criminal jurisprudence - When evidence is separable, the court must sift the chaff from the grain and act on acceptable evidence - Discrepancies on collateral particulars that do not shake the core of the prosecution case or touch the documentary/forensic chain of custody do not warrant acquittal. [Relied on Arvind Kumar alias Nemichand v. State of Rajasthan, (2021) SCC OnLine SC 1099; Ramabora alias Ramaboraiah v. State of Karnataka, (2022) SCC OnLine SC 996; Paras 43–46] Kashmir Ram @ Pappi v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 804 : 2026 INSC 854

Government Contracts and Public Tenders – Challenge to Eligibility Conditions – Delay and Laches – Cause of Action – Stage of Intervention – Judicial Review under Article 226/136 - A facial challenge to a tender condition or eligibility criterion—as distinguished from a challenge to bid evaluation or disqualification accrues on the very day the tender condition is published, as nothing further remains to be discovered - An entity finding itself ineligible or excluded by an allegedly arbitrary clause must approach the Court at the earliest - Delay in public procurement tenders is measured not merely by calendar days or the statutory limitation period, but against the progression of the procurement process itself - Where tenderers consciously delay approaching the court until the tender process has advanced substantially, third-party rights have intervened, or public interest would be prejudiced, relief is liable to be refused on the sole ground of delay and laches. Non-judicial representations and legal notices do not arrest delay or cure a lack of diligence. [Paras 19 - 26] Utkarsh Enterprises v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 825 : 2026 INSC 881

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 — Section 15(2)(b) — Devolution of property inherited by female Hindu dying intestate and issueless - Where the Will propounded by one branch fails for lack of legal proof and failure to remove suspicious circumstances, the testatrix is deemed to have died intestate - property inherited by an issueless female Hindu from her husband does not devolve under general rules of Section 15(1), but reverts to the heirs of the husband under Section 15(2)(b) - The heirs representing the branches of the predeceased wives are entitled to their proportionate partition shares accordingly. [Paras 136–139] Pazhanathal v. Alamathal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 813 : 2026 INSC 860

Insurance Act, 1938 — Section 64VB — Marine Cargo Annual Turnover Policy — Advance Payment of Premium — Mandatory Statutory Embargo on Assumption of Risk — Surpassing Insured Turnover Prior to Occurrence of Loss — Retrospective Regularisation impermissible — Estoppel cannot operate against statute - Under Section 64VB of the Insurance Act, 1938, there is an absolute statutory embargo prohibiting an insurer from assuming risk unless and until the premium is received in advance or guaranteed in the prescribed manner - Where an insured entity under a Marine Cargo Annual Turnover Policy surpasses the total agreed sum insured/turnover limit prior to the date of the loss incident, the insurance coverage ceases to attach in the absence of advance payment of additional premium - The subsequent payment of additional premium and issuance of an endorsement accepting the same cannot retrospectively regularise the policy or resurrect lapsed coverage for an incident that occurred when the policy limit stood exhausted - The insurer cannot be held bound by estoppel or waiver by conduct, as the rule of estoppel cannot be applied against or in contravention of a mandatory statutory command. [Paras 10 - 13] New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Louis Dreyfus Commodities India Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 821 : 2026 INSC 876

Judicial Review & Separation of Powers — Legislative and Executive Domain — Future Scrutiny - The choice and substitution of penal methods of execution fall squarely within legislative and executive policy - Dismissal of the writ petition does not foreclose future constitutional scrutiny if compelling scientific, medical, or empirical evidence emerges to displace the foundational premise of Deena v. Union of India - The Union Government is not precluded from undertaking a comprehensive review through an expert body (comprising specialists in law, forensic medicine, neuroscience, penology, and allied disciplines) to assess if any alternative method better balances pain minimization with human dignity. [Relied on Deena v. Union of India, (1983) 4 SCC 645; Shashi Nayar (Smt) v. Union of India, (1992) 1 SCC 96; Paras 45 - 65] Rishi Malhotra v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 823 : 2026 INSC 873

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000; Section 7A, Section 15(1)(g), Section 19, and Section 20 read with Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015; Section 25 — Claim of Juvenility at Appellate Stage — Effect on Conviction and Sentence - A plea of juvenility can be raised at any stage before any court, even after the final disposal of the case - The subsequent declaration of juvenility does not, by itself, erase or annul a finding of guilt recorded on evidence by a regular court - It primarily affects the forum and nature of the permissible disposition and renders the adult sentence legally ineffective - Where a person below eighteen years of age on the date of commission of an offence was tried and sentenced as an adult, the conviction on merits is to be maintained, but the substantive adult sentence, fine, and default stipulations are deemed to have no effect and must be set aside - When the juvenile has already undergone detention well beyond the maximum permissible period of three years under Section 15(1)(g), remanding the matter back to the Juvenile Justice Board is an empty formality; the accused is not required to surrender and is entitled to statutory protection against disqualifications arising from conviction under Section 19. [Paras 12, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33] Dinesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 805 : 2026 INSC 842

Law of Torts — Electrocution Cases — Principle of Liability Applicable — Strict Liability vs. Absolute Liability — Exceptions to Strict Liability - In cases of electrocution involving electricity transmission and distribution entities, the standard of liability applicable is Strict Liability (under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher), and not Absolute Liability - Although transmission of electricity is inherently dangerous and enterprises engaging in it are strictly liable irrespective of absence of negligence/fault, such liability remains subject to recognized legal exceptions (e.g., act of God, act of a stranger, default/negligence of the plaintiff, consent, statutory authority) - The standard of absolute liability (evolved in M.C. Mehta without exceptions) does not apply indiscriminately to all electrocution cases so as to preclude statutory and factual defences. [Relied on Union of India v. Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar, (2008) 9 SCC 527; M.P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari, (2002) 2 SCC 162; Kaushnuma Begum v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2001) 2 SCC 9; Distinguished from M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (Shriram - Oleum Gas), (1987) 1 SCC 395; Paras 10-14] Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation v. Rekha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 799 : 2026 INSC 847

Limitation Act, 1963 – Section 14 – Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction – Winding up proceedings vs. Suit for recovery of money – Initiation of winding up / insolvency proceedings does not suspend or extend the limitation period for filing an independent civil suit for recovery of money - The remedy of winding up and the remedy of a civil suit for recovery are separate and independent - A Company Court has no competence or jurisdiction to extend the statutory period of limitation for instituting a recovery suit. [Relied on Yeswant Deorao Deshmukh v. Walchand Ramchand Kothari, 1950 SCC 766; Jignesh Shah and Anr. v. Union of India and Anr., (2019) 10 SCC 750; Distinguished from Kalpraj Dharamshi and Anr. v. Kotak Investment Advisors Limited and Anr., (2021) 10 SCC 401; J. Kumaradasan Nair v. Iric Sohan, (2009) 12 SCC 175; Paras 13 - 16] Mageba Bridge Products v. Trade Centre, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 795 : 2026 INSC 839

Limitation Act, 1963 – Section 18 & Section 19 – Acknowledgment of debt and effect of part payment – Invoices vs. Running Account – A suit instituted strictly on the strength of individual unpaid invoices/bills, and not on a mutual, open, and current running account, cannot claim extension of limitation merely because the debtor made payments against specific admitted invoices while disputing all other claims - Payment restricted to distinct admitted invoices does not constitute a part-payment of the entire disputed liability nor does it amount to an acknowledgment of debt under Section 18/19 of the Limitation Act – Appeal allowed. [Paras 7 – 18] Mageba Bridge Products v. Trade Centre, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 795 : 2026 INSC 839

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; Section 166(1)(c) – Claim Petition by Legal Representatives – Dependency vs Devolution of Estate - Liability to pay compensation under the Act does not cease merely because of the absence of dependency of the legal representative - The right to file a claim petition extends to all legal representatives upon whom the estate devolves or who represent the estate of the deceased. [Relied on National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi and Others, (2017) 16 SCC 680; Magma General Insurance Company Limited v. Nanu Ram and Others, (2018) 18 SCC 130; National Insurance Company Limited v. Birender and Others, (2020) 11 SCC 356; Puttamma and Others v. K.L. Narayana Reddy and Another, (2013) 15 SCC 45; Paras 5-7] Sameem Begum v. K. Venkat Swamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 809 : 2026 INSC 864

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; Sections 166, 168 – Motor Accident Compensation – Conventional Heads – Loss of Consortium – Spousal and Parental Consortium – Enhancement of 10% every three years - The head of 'consortium' is an indispensable and vital component of just compensation in motor accident claim cases - The term 'consortium' is a compendious concept encompassing spousal consortium (loss of company, society, and conjugal affection to the surviving spouse), parental consortium (loss of guidance, care, protection, and affection to surviving children), and filial consortium (loss suffered by parents on the death of a child) - All legal representatives, including major children, who suffer on account of the vehicular death are entitled to claim and receive compensation under the head of consortium - In accordance with the principles laid down in Pranay Sethi and Magma General Insurance, each surviving dependent/legal representative (spouse and children) is entitled to compensation of ₹40,000/- under the head of spousal or parental consortium, subject to a mandatory 10% enhancement every three years - the Supreme Court awarded ₹48,400/- each to the surviving wife (spousal consortium) and each of the three children (parental consortium), along with ₹15,000/- each towards funeral expenses and loss of estate. [Paras 5 - 9] Sameem Begum v. K. Venkat Swamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 809 : 2026 INSC 864

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Section 31A read with Section 37(2) — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 436A [Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 — Section 479] — Maximum Detention Period for Undertrials — Inapplicability where Capital Punishment is Specified - Where the accused was previously convicted under the NDPS Act and subsequently implicated as a mastermind in trafficking commercial quantities (approx. 5 kg heroin), the enhanced penalty provisions under Section 31A of the NDPS Act (which prescribe death penalty as an alternative punishment) stand attracted - The statutory protection under Section 436A CrPC (or Section 479 BNSS) for release upon undergoing one-half of the maximum sentence is expressly inapplicable to offences for which the punishment of death is specified. [Paras 15, 16] Union of India v. Chidiebere Kingsley Nawchara, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 817 : 2026 INSC 870

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Section 37 — Commercial Quantity — Grant of Bail to Foreign Nationals — Mandatory Twin Conditions — Article 21 & Incarceration - Right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution is not exercised in isolation from statutory rigours; in cases involving commercial quantities under special enactments such as the NDPS Act, the Article 21 right must be exercised within the framework of Section 37 and cannot be pressed into service solely on the ground of delay to override the twin statutory conditions - The High Court erred in granting bail to a foreign national solely on grounds of prolonged incarceration (2.5 years) and reliance on Tofan Singh without recording mandatory satisfaction under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) that there were reasonable grounds to believe he was not guilty and unlikely to commit an offence while on bail. [Paras 11-14] Union of India v. Chidiebere Kingsley Nawchara, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 817 : 2026 INSC 870

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) - Section 42 – Search and Seizure – Secret Information received on the move – Substantial Compliance - Total non-compliance with the requirements of Sections 42(1) and 42(2) is impermissible - where information is received while an empowered officer is on patrol duty/on the move and emergent action is required to intercept a vehicle in transit, immediate recording in writing is not feasible - Where the Investigating Officer scribed a contemporaneously recording the substance of the information before interception and summoned a superior Gazetted Officer who supervised the search, there is substantial compliance with Section 42 - The registration and dispatch of an FIR under the CrPC cannot by itself assume compliance with Section 42, but it is a relevant circumstance that can be weighed alongside other contemporaneous material to determine if the statutory purpose has been served. [Relied on Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana, (2009) 8 SCC 539; Bahadur Singh v. State of Haryana, (2010) 4 SCC 445; Paras 27–35] Kashmir Ram @ Pappi v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 804 : 2026 INSC 854

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) - Section 50 – Scope of Personal Search vs Search of Conveyance - The safeguard enacted under Section 50 applies exclusively to the search of the person of an individual to prevent unwitnessed personal searches, and does not extend to the search of a bag, container, or conveyance - The search of a vehicle and the incidental personal search of an occupant are two separate and independent steps - Where contraband is recovered solely from the vehicle (beneath a tarpaulin) and nothing is recovered during personal search, Section 50 is not attracted and the entire search is not vitiated - The substantive rank/current duty charge status of the Gazetted Officer overseeing the search is inconsequential when Section 50 is not attracted. [Relied on State of Himachal Pradesh v. Pawan Kumar, (2005) 4 SCC 350; Paras 35–37] Kashmir Ram @ Pappi v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 804 : 2026 INSC 854

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) - Section 52A & Standing Order 1/88 – Delay in dispatching samples to Chemical Examiner – Procedural Irregularity - The requirement for prompt dispatch (e.g., within 72 hours) is aimed at foreclosing tampering or substitution while samples are outside judicial custody - Where the case property was produced before the Magistrate within 24 hours (who verified seals and drew representative samples) and the Chemical Examiner confirmed seals intact and matching the specimen impressions, the possibility of tampering is independently foreclosed - An interval between seizure and chemical examination constitutes a mere procedural irregularity that does not vitiate the trial in the absence of evidence of tampering. [Relied on Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif, (2024) 11 SCC 372; Paras 38–40] Kashmir Ram @ Pappi v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 804 : 2026 INSC 854

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) - Section 54 & Section 15 – Presumption from Possession of Illicit Articles – Ownership vs Possession - For an offence under Section 15, what is material is conscious possession and not title or registration of the conveyance - The fact that a vehicle is registered in the name of a third party does not absolve the occupants when commercial quantity contraband is recovered from the vehicle - Once conscious possession is established, the statutory presumption under Section 54 is attracted, casting a reverse onus on the accused to provide a satisfactory account - Bare assertions of false implication unsupported by complaints to higher authorities do not rebut this presumption. [Paras 40-48] Kashmir Ram @ Pappi v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 804 : 2026 INSC 854

National Coal Wage Agreement - VI (NCWA) – Clause 9.3.4 – Compassionate Appointment – Age Eligibility – Relevant Date for Determining Upper Age Limit – Administrative Delay by Employer – Welfare Nature of Scheme - The Supreme Court held that the age eligibility of a candidate seeking compassionate appointment under Clause 9.3.4 of the National Coal Wage Agreement (NCWA) cannot be reckoned with reference to the date of consideration of the application where the delay is attributable to the employer - An otherwise eligible dependent who was within the prescribed upper age limit (35 years) on the date of death of the employee and when the compassionate appointment process commenced (marked by the employer directing police verification) cannot be rendered ineligible merely because administrative formalities or processing took time - Employers cannot be permitted to defeat the claim of an eligible dependent by taking advantage of their own administrative delay. [Paras 15 - 26] Raspelli Bhagya Kishaiya v. General Manager Western Coalfields, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 811 : 2026 INSC 841

National Coal Wage Agreement - VI (NCWA) – Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) / Circular Reference No. 1416/2020-21 – Commencement of Process - Directive issued by the employer requiring the applicant to undergo police verification is an intrinsic part of the compassionate appointment process under the SOP and cannot take place unless a claim has already been initiated - Rejection of the claim on the ground that the formal application was received on a later date when the candidate had crossed 35 years is legally unsustainable when the process was initiated prior to the applicant crossing the age limit - Allowing the appeal against the judgment of the Bombay High Court, the Supreme Court directed the respondent-authorities to reconsider the claim of Appellant No. 2 for compassionate appointment by treating him as eligible in age and to verify only the remaining eligibility conditions within 8 weeks, with appointment to be offered within 4 weeks thereafter if found eligible. [Relied on Malaya Nanda Sethy v. State of Orissa & Ors., (2024) 15 SCC 766; Paras 17-23] Raspelli Bhagya Kishaiya v. General Manager Western Coalfields, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 811 : 2026 INSC 841

Partnership Act, 1932 – Section 69(2) – Effect of non-registration – Proof of registration of firm – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XLI Rule 27 – Additional Evidence – A memorandum issued by the Registrar of Firms acknowledging the filing/registration of documents and allotting a specific Registration Number conclusively proves the registration of the partnership firm - Production of a certified copy of Form-VIII under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC is permissible to further the cause of justice and corroborate the registration status. Mageba Bridge Products v. Trade Centre, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 795 : 2026 INSC 839

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Circumstantial Evidence — Delayed FIR & Motive as an Afterthought - Gross, unexplained delay of about four months in lodging the First Information Statement (FIS)/FIR alleging motive for murder renders the story of motive a deliberated afterthought - Conduct of the deceased's family members in allowing the deceased to travel with the accused on friendly terms dispels the alleged pre-existing enmity. [Paras 13 - 21] Taher Vajiyuddin Rangwala v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 810 : 2026 INSC 859

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 300 (Exceptions), Section 302 vs. Section 304 Part I/Part II — Determination of Intention to Cause Death - The distinction between murder (Section 302) and culpable homicide not amounting to murder (Section 304) depends on the intention of the accused, to be gathered from totality of circumstances including the nature of the weapon, target area, force employed, premeditation, and whether blows were struck on vital body parts - The infliction of extensive ante-mortem injuries and grievous blows on vital parts (head, neck, chest) reflects clear murderous intention - In the absence of evidence attracting any Exception under Section 300, plea for conversion of conviction to Section 304 Part I/Part II rejected. [Relied on Pulicherla Nagaraju alias Nagaraja Reddy v. State of A.P., (2006) 11 SCC 444; Paras 26-32] Balku Oram v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 802 : 2026 INSC 852

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 302 r/w Section 34 — Murder — Witch-Hunting — Conviction based on Sole Eyewitness Testimony — Upheld - Direct ocular evidence, if found natural, cogent, and trustworthy, constitutes the best form of evidence and ordinarily prevails over all other forms - The testimony of a single reliable eyewitness (PW-3, daughter of the deceased) who witnessed the brutal lathi assault on her mother after being dragged from her house on the accusation of practicing witchcraft, was consistent, unshaken, and duly corroborated by medical evidence. [Paras 17 - 22] Balku Oram v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 802 : 2026 INSC 852

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 306 — Abetment of Suicide in Workplace Setting — Official Reprimands, Administrative Supervision, and Stern Behavior by Superior Officer - Ordinary administrative directions, disciplinary supervision, official reprimands, show cause notices issued in the course of discharge of duty, or stern conduct of a superior officer even if perceived as harsh or unpleasant by a subordinate cannot be elevated to the status of abetment under Section 306 IPC in the absence of material demonstrating a conscious intention (mens rea) to drive the subordinate to suicide - Where the incidents alleged (such as work assignments, encroachment removal, or past departmental interactions) occurred months prior to the incident, there was a complete absence of any proximate act of instigation immediately preceding the suicide - criminal proceedings against the senior officer amounted to an abuse of the process of law, and the appellant was entitled to discharge. [Paras 22 - 26] Vinod Shivakumar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 814 : 2026 INSC 867

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 306 read with Section 107 — Abetment of Suicide — Essential Ingredients — Requirement of Proximate Act, Instigation, and Mens Rea - To attract the offence of abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC read with Section 107 IPC, three essential ingredients must be satisfied - (i) direct or indirect instigation/incitement, (ii) in close proximity to the commission of suicide, along with (iii) a clear mens rea to abet the commission of suicide - Mere allegations of continuous harassment or stern behavior by a superior officer over a period of time do not automatically constitute abetment unless there is a proximate prior act that goaded, incited, or created circumstances leaving the victim with no other option but to take their own life - Mens rea cannot be gleaned merely from what goes on in the mind of the victim or the tragic outcome alone; there must be a conscious, deliberate intention on the part of the accused to drive the deceased to commit suicide. [Paras 14-25] Vinod Shivakumar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 814 : 2026 INSC 867

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 302, 120B, 201 read with Section 34 — Circumstantial Evidence — Accidental Death vs. Homicidal Death — Chain of Circumstances - Conviction of the appellants-accused by the Trial Court and the High Court under Sections 302, 120B, and 201 read with Section 34 IPC set aside - The Supreme Court held that the prosecution miserably failed to establish the foundational fact of a homicidal death - Medical evidence established the cause of death as 'Cardio-Respiratory arrest due to Asphyxia due to drowning' - Non-grievous injuries found on the body could have been sustained due to friction with hard or sharp objects in the river flow, corroborating the defence version of accidental drowning rather than a premeditated attack - Alleged use of a broken soda bottle as a weapon was unsupported due to non-confrontation of the object to the medical expert, absence of seizure, and lack of forensic matching. [Paras 10 - 21] Taher Vajiyuddin Rangwala v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 810 : 2026 INSC 859

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 504 and 506 — Intentional Insult and Criminal Intimidation — Official Capacity - Allegations arising out of acts performed in an official capacity as a superior officer such as reprimands regarding official work or threats of suspension which the officer had no independent competence to execute do not constitute an intentional insult likely to provoke a breach of the peace under Section 504 IPC, nor do they amount to criminal intimidation under Section 506 IPC. [Para 27] Vinod Shivakumar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 814 : 2026 INSC 867

Penal Code, 1860; Sections 302/34 and 392/34 — Circumstantial Evidence — Last-Seen Theory & Unexplained Possession of Stolen Property — Indian Evidence Act, 1872; Section 27 and Section 106 - Conviction based on circumstantial evidence upheld where foundational circumstances were firmly established in an unbroken chain - (i) deceased was last seen leaving with the accused persons in his taxi; (ii) deceased went missing and his decomposed body was subsequently found along the route; (iii) accused persons were intercepted within five days in joint, unexplained possession of the deceased's taxi and its original papers while attempting to dispose of it; and (iv) personal belongings (driving licence and tiffin carrier) of the deceased were recovered from a sugarcane field pursuant to disclosure statements under Section 27 of the Evidence Act - Held, failure of the accused to offer any plausible explanation under Section 313 Cr.P.C. regarding recent possession of the taxi supplied an additional link under Section 106 of the Evidence Act - Inability of medical evidence to ascertain the precise cause of death due to advanced decomposition does not override an otherwise complete and consistent chain of circumstantial evidence. [Relied on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116; Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 13 SCC 211; Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2010) 5 SCC 344; Jitendra Singh @ Babboo Singh v. State of U.P., (2013) 11 SCC 193; Paras 14–23] Dinesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 805 : 2026 INSC 842

Public Procurement – Nature of Tender Timelines – Equitable Considerations and Third-Party Rights - Tender schedules operate within compressed, purpose-bound timelines where even a period of four months marks a significant progression from invitation to evaluation and final selection - Bidders who comply with all tender conditions and successfully clear rigorous technical evaluations acquire legitimate rights and interests as their price bids reach final evaluation - Permitting fence-sitters, non-participants, and belated challengers to derail an ongoing public procurement process at an advanced stage is inequitable and unjust - Courts must exercise extreme circumspection to prevent disruption of tenders affecting large-scale public interest—such as the supply of sports and gymnasium equipment to over 16 lakh school children. [Paras 19 - 27] Utkarsh Enterprises v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 825 : 2026 INSC 881

Public Tender - Accrual of Cause of Action for Challenging Tender Conditions - A challenge to a tender condition or eligibility criterion distinct from a challenge to bid evaluation or rejection of a bid accrues on the very day the condition is published - Nothing further is required to be discovered - A party finding itself ineligible must approach the court with utmost expedition - Approaching the Court four months after publication when bids have substantially advanced to technical/financial stages or contracts have been awarded disentitles the petitioner from discretionary relief under Article 226 - Merely making representations or issuing legal notices does not explain the lack of diligence. [Paras 22–25] Keshvendra Singh v. Shankar Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 815 : 2026 INSC 866

Public Tender - Third-Party Rights & Public Interest - Distinction of Precedent on Local Experience Restrictions - Entities that participated, complied with all criteria, and progressed through evaluation acquire legitimate interests - Stalling procurement intended for public welfare (such as sports infrastructure for school children) at the behest of non-participating "fence-sitters" who approach the Court belatedly is impermissible - Vinishma Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Anr., held that restricting past performance strictly to past supplies made within a single State creates an arbitrary, exclusionary barrier - Such principle does not apply automatically to a operational clause requiring a fully functional local office/warehouse to ensure prompt delivery, servicing, and safety for government school equipment - The Supreme Court affirmed the Delhi High Court's refusal to interfere with the ongoing tenders due to unexplained delay and non-participation, leaving the larger question regarding the validity of Clause 2.17 open to be examined in an appropriate proceeding - Appeals dismissed. [Distinguished from Vinishma Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Anr., 2025 INSC 1182; Paras 19 - 37] Keshvendra Singh v. Shankar Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 815 : 2026 INSC 866

Public Tender / Procurement — Challenge to Eligibility Conditions — Delay and Laches — Accrual of Cause of Action — Judicial Review — Scope of Interference — High Court declining to interfere with tender conditions for procurement of sports goods and gymnasium equipment for government schools on the ground of delay, laches, and non-participation — Held - Assessment of Delay in Tender Matters - Delay in public procurement is not merely measured against the calendar for the purposes of limitation, but against the progression of the tender process -Tender schedules operate within compressed and purpose-bound timelines; delay must be assessed with reference to what has transpired, whose rights/interests have arisen, and the public consequences of unsettling the ongoing process. [Paras 19, 20] Keshvendra Singh v. Shankar Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 815 : 2026 INSC 866

Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 – Sections 2(g) & 19(20) – Banking Regulation Act, 1949 – Section 21A – Recovery of Dues – Calculation of Dues Post-NPA Classification – Interest Maintained in Suspense Account – High Court's Simplification of Dues Setting Aside DRAT Order Unsustainable - Definition of Debt & Inclusion of Interest - Under Section 2(g) of the Act of 1993, 'debt' includes any liability inclusive of interest claimed as due by a bank - Section 19(20) empowers the DRT to pass orders for payment of interest up to the date of realisation, and Section 21A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 bars courts from reopening transactions on the ground of excessive interest. [Para 12] Punjab National Bank v. Shree Jyoti Education and Management Trust World, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 796 : 2026 INSC 836

Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 – Sections 22, 29, and 31 read with Income Tax Act, 1961 – Second Schedule, Rules 2 and 61 – Transfer of execution proceedings from Civil Court to DRT – Applicability of Order XXI Rule 22 CPC vs. Rule 2 of Second Schedule to 1961 Act – Non-service of notice under Rule 2 – Validity of Auction Sale - Upon the transfer of execution proceedings from a Civil Court to the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) under Section 31 of the 1993 Act, the Recovery Officer is empowered to recover dues in accordance with the procedure under Section 29 of the 1993 Act read with the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961, superseding the CPC execution procedure - The execution before the Recovery Officer is governed by Rule 2 of the Second Schedule and not Order XXI Rule 22 CPC. Consequently, non-compliance with Order XXI Rule 22 CPC has no impact on the validity of the auction sale - where the legal representatives had full knowledge of the execution and auction proceedings and filed objections/applications for recall, non-service of formal notice under Rule 2 causes no substantial injury - Absence of notice under Rule 2 does not render the execution or auction sale void per se, particularly when the remedy under Rule 61 (to set aside the sale on grounds of non-service/irregularity upon establishing substantial injury and making requisite deposit) was not availed. [Paras 35–44] Sheela Gehlot v. Mohini Hardayal Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 808 : 2026 INSC 863

Registration Act, 1908 — Section 17(1A) — Unregistered Agreement to Sell — Inapplicability of Section 53A of TP Act - Post the 2001 amendment inserting Section 17(1A) into the Registration Act, any contract to transfer immovable property for consideration executed on or after 24.09.2001 must be registered to claim the protection of part performance under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act - An unregistered agreement to sell executed after the amendment cannot be relied upon to shield possession under Section 53A, and subsequent impounding for deficient stamp duty cannot cure the defect of non-registration. [Relied on Shah Mathuradas Maganlal & Co. v. Nagappa Shankarappa Malage and Others, (1976) 3 SCC 660; Vayyaeti Srinivasarao v. Gaineedi Jagajyothi, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 84; Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Limited (2) Through Director v. State of Haryana and Another, (2012) 1 SCC 656; Ameer Minhaj v. Dierdre Elizabeth (Wright) Issar and Others, (2018) 7 SCC 639; Distinguished from R. Kanthimathi and Another v. Beatrice Xavier (Mrs.), (2000) 9 SCC 339; Arjunlal Bhatt Mall Gothani and Others v. Girish Chandra Dutta and Another, (1973) 2 SCC 197; Paras 20 - 27] Nazim Shaikh Hasan v. Nasir Mushtaq Shaikh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 803 : 2026 INSC 853

Service Law – Appointment by Transfer vs. Direct Recruitment Quota – Illegality of Absorption against Direct Recruitment Posts - Where statutory rules prescribe recruitment solely through two regular modes (50% direct recruitment and 50% promotion), appointment by transfer under Rule 10 is an exceptional mode permissible only in "special circumstances" with Commission approval - Because Rule 2(9) expressly excludes appointment by transfer from the definition of direct appointment, an officer cannot be absorbed/appointed by transfer against a vacancy earmarked for direct recruitment - Facilitating absorption of officers who failed or bypassed regular competitive selection amounts to achieving indirectly what could not be achieved directly, constituting an impermissible backdoor entry. [Paras 46 – 93] Hemant Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 822 : 2026 INSC 878

Service Law – Deputation, Absorption, and Appointment by Transfer – Punjab Service of Engineers, Class II, P.W.D. (Buildings and Roads Branch) Rules, 1965, Rules 2(9), 6, 10, 11, 12 – Backdoor Entry – Political Machination – Meaning of "Special Circumstances" – Revocation/Revival of Lien - Deputation and Consensual Tripartite Nature - Deputation means service outside the cadre or parent department on a temporary basis to meet exigencies of public service - It is essentially consensual and requires consensus among the lending authority, the borrowing authority, and the employee concerned - A deputationist per se has no vested right to claim permanent absorption unless supported by statutory rules - The initiation of deputation directly by probationary officers through personal overtures or through political recommendations of outside ministers bypassing service discipline is completely alien to the concept of deputation and constitutes manifest illegality. [Paras 49–53, 70–78] Hemant Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 822 : 2026 INSC 878

Service Law – Extinguishment and Revival of Lien - No government servant can simultaneously hold two liens across different cadres - While permanent substantive absorption in a borrowing department extinguishes past lien, such lien automatically revives in the parent department once the deputation and absorption are quashed as illegal, null, and void - The officers must be repatriated to their parent cadre with seniority fixed immediately above those who were junior to them at the time of leaving. [Relied on Kunal Nanda v. Union of India, (2000) 5 SCC 362; CBI v. Ramesh Chander Diwan, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 871; Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1; Paras 115 - 117] Hemant Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 822 : 2026 INSC 878

Service Law – Judicial Sympathy cannot Perpetuate or Regularize Illegality - When an appointment or absorption is fundamentally void ab initio and in infraction of statutory rules, it is an incurable illegality distinct from an irregularity - The High Court erred under Article 226 in taking a "sympathetic view" to protect and sustain illegal absorptions on grounds of prolonged service of over 18 years - An illegality cannot be sanctified or regularized by mere passage of time or misplaced judicial sympathy. [Paras 114, 115] Hemant Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 822 : 2026 INSC 878

Service Law – Scope of "Special Circumstances" under Rule 10 - Routine accrual of vacancies, departmental shortage of staff, or an undertaking given to court deferring fresh recruitments do not constitute "special circumstances" - Rule 10 contemplates out-of-the-ordinary exigencies, such as specialized projects requiring specific talent or qualifications that cannot await regular recruitment - Merely holding a higher degree (M.Tech) or the prospect of becoming junior-most upon repatriation cannot justify bypassing statutory recruitment rules under the guise of "special circumstances". [Paras 92, 107–109, 112] Hemant Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 822 : 2026 INSC 878

Succession Act, 1925 — Section 63(c) — Indian Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 68 — Proof of execution and attestation of Will — Dual statutory requirement — Distinction between Scribe and Attesting Witness — Animus Attestandi - Sections 63 of the Indian Succession Act and 68 of the Evidence Act perform related but distinct functions - Section 63 prescribes what must have occurred when the Will was executed, whereas Section 68 prescribes the ordinary manner in which the occurrence of those acts must be proved - Proof of the testatrix's signature or thumb impression alone does not establish due execution unless the statutory attestation by at least two witnesses is proved - The concession in Section 68 permitting examination of only one attesting witness does not dilute the requirement that the witness examined must be capable of proving the complete statutory execution of the Will, including attestation by both witnesses - A scribe who signs the document merely to authenticate authorship and not animo attestandi cannot be treated as an attesting witness, nor can his testimony cure the lack of proof of attestation under Section 68. [Relied on N. Kamalam v. Ayyasamy, (2001) 7 SCC 503; Janki Narayan Bhoir v. Narayan Namdeo Kadam, (2003) 2 SCC 91; Paras 50–59, 60–68, 70–71] Pazhanathal v. Alamathal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 813 : 2026 INSC 860

Succession Act, 1925 — Sections 59 & 61 — Indian Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 68 — Testamentary Capacity, Sound Disposing Mind, and Cumulative Suspicious Circumstances - Proof of physical execution or thumb impression of an illiterate testatrix does not dispense with the necessity of proving testamentary capacity, sound disposing mind, and conscious approval of the dispositions - Where a registered Will exhibits multiple suspicious circumstances incorrect recital describing ancestral property inherited from the husband as "self-acquired", describing a step-daughter as own daughter without disclosure of true relation, unexplained exclusion of other legal heir branches, attestation by a close relative of a beneficiary, witnesses brought from another village, beneficiary branch in proximate control/possession, unexplained custody, and non-examination of the key surviving person (the step-daughter) best placed to explain the family arrangement—the court must evaluate the cumulative effect - Registration and subsequent survival of the testatrix for years do not by themselves remove legitimate suspicions where independent evidence of informed, free agency is lacking. [Relied on Bharpur Singh v. Shamsher Singh, (2009) 3 SCC 687; Paras 99–104, 110–121, 122–134] Pazhanathal v. Alamathal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 813 : 2026 INSC 860

Tender Conditions – Territorial/Operational Nexus vs. Discriminatory Past Local Supply Conditions – Distinction from State-Confined Supply Criteria - Distinguishing Vinishma Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Anr., which invalidated a past performance condition restricting eligibility solely to bidders with past supply experience inside that particular State as arbitrary and discriminatory - A tender stipulation requiring a functional office in Delhi and a warehouse in Delhi/NCR for the last three years (Clause 2.17) serves an operational rather than a geographical purpose, designed to ensure prompt delivery, inspection, servicing, maintenance, and replacement of bulk sports equipment at short notice for government school children. The ruling in Vinishma Technologies does not have a decisive bearing on an operational infrastructure clause; however, due to the belated nature of the challenge and lack of bona fides, the substantive validity of Clause 2.17 was left open for adjudication in an appropriate proceeding. [Distinguished from Vinishma Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Anr. (2025 INSC 1182); Paras 28 - 35] Utkarsh Enterprises v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 825 : 2026 INSC 881

Transfer of Investigation to CBI - Enhancement / Award of Interim Compensation in Public Law - Where state police and jail authorities exhibited blatant indifference, suppressed material facts (such as post-mortem reports before the High Court), and attempted to mislead inquiry via contradictory preliminary jail medical records, the ends of justice require entrusting the investigation to an independent agency - The Supreme Court directed the Director, CBI, to forthwith register a regular criminal case and investigate the custodial death as well as the conduct of state officials who failed to take follow-up action on the Section 176 CrPC inquiry report - High Court had awarded a "pittance" of Rs. 1,00,000/- as compensation under Article 226 for the custodial death of the 34-year-old sole breadwinner - Held: The compensation awarded was completely inadequate and not commensurate with the gravity of the loss - Supreme Court directed the State of Chhattisgarh to pay Rs. 25,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty-Five Lakhs) as an interim measure to the widow/dependents within four weeks, subject to final determination of total compensation. [Paras 16–22] Lahra Bai Tamre v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 794 : 2026 INSC 840

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 — Section 111(e), Section 111(f) & Section 53A — Agreement to Sell with Existing Tenant — Determination of Tenancy — Part Performance - Mere execution of an agreement to sell between a landlord and tenant upon payment of part consideration does not ipso facto determine the subsisting tenancy or alter the jural relationship to that of vendor and vendee - It is only when the express terms of the agreement or the unequivocal conduct of the parties disclose an express or implied surrender of the lease under Section 111(e) or Section 111(f) of the Transfer of Property Act that the tenancy stands determined - Continuous possession of a tenant even after executing an agreement to sell does not amount to part performance under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act unless such possession is directly relatable to, and flowing from, the agreement to sell rather than the pre-existing lease - An agreement to sell, not being a registered conveyance deed, does not by itself confer any title or proprietary interest in immovable property under Section 54 of the Act. [Paras 14-24] Nazim Shaikh Hasan v. Nasir Mushtaq Shaikh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 803 : 2026 INSC 853