Supreme Court Weekly Digest October 16 - 23, 2025

Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 - Section 15 - Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal (KSAT) - Maintainability of Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution - Service Law - Recruitment Disputes - Alternate Remedy - Jurisdiction of High Court – Held, High Courts should not entertain Writ Petition in matters within domain of Tribunals - The High Court erred in entertaining the writ petition challenging the provisional select list, as an efficacious alternative remedy was available before the KSAT - The Tribunal is the Court of first instance for all service disputes, and litigants cannot directly approach the High Courts, even to question the vires of statutory legislations - The present case does not fall under the recognized exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy, e.g., enforcement of fundamental rights, violation of natural justice, lack of jurisdiction, or challenge to the vires of the parent legislation - Appeals dismissed. [Relied on L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and Ors., (1997) 3 SCC 261; T.K. Rangarajan v. Government of T.N. and Others, (2003) 6 SCC 581; Paras 27-29, 32, 49-51] Leelavathi N. v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1013 : 2025 INSC 1242

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 34 Proviso to Section 34(2)(a)(iv)- Held that the authority of a Court under Section 34 to set aside an arbitral award in part, by severing the invalid portion from the valid portion, is inherent in the Court's jurisdiction - The doctrine of omne majus continet in se minus (the greater power includes the lesser) squarely applies, holding that the power to set aside an award necessarily encompasses the power to set it aside in part - The proviso to Section 34(2)(a)(iv) is clarificatory in nature, confirming this pre-existing inherent power - Petition dismissed. [Para 128-130] Urban Infrastructure Real Estate Fund v. Neelkanth Realty Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1028 : 2025 INSC 1255

Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996 – Sections 34, 37, 19(1)- Limitation Act, 1963 – Section 3- Code Of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order Vii Rule 11(D)- Held that A preliminary issue of limitation, even if decided by an Arbitral Tribunal on the basis of demurrer (where the opponent accepts the claimant's averments as true for argument's sake), cannot be final and cannot foreclose the issue for all future proceedings - The issue of limitation is a mixed question of fact and law which goes to the root of the claim - A decision on demurrer checks maintainability on the face of the pleadings, similar to a motion under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC - A preliminary finding on maintainability on the point of limitation, decided solely on demurrer, does not preclude a final determination on the merits of the issue based on evidence and other materials that may be adduced later by the parties - The Arbitral Tribunal is under a positive duty, stemming from Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963, to adjudicate the question of limitation and dismiss the claim if found to be barred, even if limitation is not set up as a defence or if a preliminary issue on demurrer was decided against the bar of limitation - The procedure adopted by an Arbitral Tribunal that treats a decision on demurrer as final and foreclosed, particularly when the arbitrator noted that adducing evidence might lead to a contrary finding, is contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law and offends the most basic notions of justice. [Relied on Ramesh B. Desai and Others v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta and Others (2006) 5 SCC 638; Angelo Brothers Limited v. Bennett, Coleman and Co. Ltd. & Anr., 2017 SCC OnLine Cal 7682; Paras 98, 100, 130, 134-137] Urban Infrastructure Real Estate Fund v. Neelkanth Realty Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1028 : 2025 INSC 1255

Arrest - Grounds of Arrest v. Reasons for Arrest – Held that there is a significant difference between the phrase "reasons for arrest" and "grounds of arrest" - Reasons for arrest are purely formal parameters and are general in nature (e.g., to prevent further offense, proper investigation, prevent tampering with evidence) - Grounds of arrest must be personal to the accused and required to contain all basic facts in the hand of the investigating officer which necessitated the arrest, to provide the accused an opportunity of defending himself against custodial remand and to seek bail. Ahmed Mansoor v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1026

Circumstantial Evidence - Last Seen Theory - Absence of Test Identification Parade (TIP) - Value of Scientific Evidence – Principles - The Supreme Court reiterated the 'five golden principles' for sustaining a conviction on circumstantial evidence - the circumstances must be fully established, consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt, of a conclusive nature, must exclude every possible hypothesis except that of guilt, and must form a complete chain of evidence leaving no reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with innocence - Held dock identification without Test Identification parade unreliable when witness had no familiarity with accused - noted that It is well settled that dock identification without a prior TIP has little evidentiary value where the witness had no prior familiarity with the accused - Both witnesses identified the Appellants for the first time in court, which, in the absence of a TIP, renders their dock identification less credible - Their testimonies, therefore, cannot constitute reliable evidence of identification - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra 1984 4 SCC 116; P. Saikumar v. State; Paras 27-28] Nazim v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1019 : 2025 INSC 1184

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order VII Rule 11(d) - Suit Barred by Law (Limitation) - Plaint Rejection – Principles – Held, when considering a plaint rejection application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) (suit barred by law), the Court must look only at the averments made in the plaint and accompanying documents, and not the defence - Where a suit seeks multiple reliefs, and any one of the reliefs is within the period of limitation, the plaint cannot be rejected as barred by law under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the CPC - For a suit for declaration with a further relief, the limitation is governed by the Article governing the suit for such further relief - Whether the suit is barred by any law or not is to be determined on the basis of averments made in the plaint. - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Indira v. Arumugam & Anr. 1998 1 SCC 614; Paras 15- 23] Karam Singh v. Amarjit Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1011 : 2025 INSC 1238

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) – Section 482 – Constitution of India – Article 226 & 32 – Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Second FIR - Held that the Court has a self-imposed discipline to ordinarily direct petitioners to the High Court, Article 32, being a fundamental right, cannot be rendered nugatory. The Supreme Court can entertain a petition under Article 32 to quash an FIR in glaring cases of deprivation of liberty - The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not restricted to the stage of the FIR; the High Court/Supreme Court can exercise jurisdiction even when a charge-sheet has been filed, to prevent abuse of process or miscarriage of justice - A second FIR in respect of the same cognizable offence or an occurrence that constitutes a single, composite transaction is not maintainable. Subsequent complaints that are merely counter-versions, modifications, or supplemental in nature to the first one must be treated as a part of the first FIR and investigated accordingly. [Relied on State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) 335; Para 84, 95, 100-105, 145] Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1021 : 2025 INSC 1249

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Quashing of FIR - Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 - Supreme Court Quashes FIR For Possession of Reindeer Horn - Notes reindeer not a protected species - Invokes Article 142 - The Supreme Court noted it was not in dispute that the reindeer is not a species covered under the category of a protected or prohibited animal as per the schedule of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 – Held, recovered article did not violate any statute and the petitioner's 14 day incarceration, Supreme Court found that allowing further prosecution would amount to gross abuse of the process of the Court - There is an imminent need to require jurisdictional agencies at international airports to sensitize their officers in the prevailing laws before taking drastic steps like detention and arrest of international travellers - Such steps should not be taken in haste and must be preceded by appropriate legal opinion and pragmatic approach - Supreme Court referred the current case and a recent incident at Jaipur International Airport involving the arbitrary seizure of a lawfully owned Rolex watch - Such ill-advised actions tend to bring disrepute to the country and breach human rights guarantees. [Paras 15-19] Rocky Abraham v Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1020

Commercial Courts Act, 2015 – Section 12A – Legal Test for rejection of plaint and adjudication of interim relief – Held, the Court is required to look at the plaint, pleadings, and supporting documents to decide whether urgent interim relief is genuinely contemplated - includes looking for the immediacy of the peril, irreparable harm, or where delay would render eventual relief ineffective - The court is not concerned with the merits of the urgent relief; if the relief sought seems to be plausibly urgent from the standpoint of the plaintiff, the requirement under Section 12A can be dispensed with - A proforma or anticipatory prayer for urgent relief used as a device to skip mediation will be ignored and the court can require the parties to comply with Section 12A of the Act - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Midas Hygiene Industries Private Ltd. & Anr. v. Sudhir Bhatia & Ors. (2004) 3 SCC 90; Paras 15-27] Novenco Building and Industry v. Xero Energy Engineering Solutions, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1027 : 2025 INSC 1256

Commercial Courts Act, 2015 – Section 12A – Pre-Institution Mediation and Settlement – Interpretation of the expression 'contemplates any urgent interim relief' in the context of Intellectual Property (IP) infringement suits – Held, requirement of pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act cannot be mechanically applied in cases involving continuing infringement of intellectual property rights, such as trademark violations - Insisting on mediation before filing a suit in such situations would effectively leave the plaintiff without a remedy, allowing the infringer to continue profiting under the cover of procedural formalities - The provision was never intended to produce such an “anomalous result - Scope of “urgency” under Section 12A - when a case involves ongoing infringement, the element of urgency must be assessed in light of the continuing injury and the public interest in preventing deception - Mere delay in filing a suit does not by itself negate the urgency of relief, so long as the infringement is ongoing - The court cannot be unmindful of the public interest element in IP disputes, which involves preventing confusion in the market and protecting consumers from deception, which further imparts a colour of immediacy to the reliefs sought. Novenco Building and Industry v. Xero Energy Engineering Solutions, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1027 : 2025 INSC 1256

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 21 – Right to Livelihood and Dignity – Held, termination of a qualified transgender teacher solely on the ground of her gender identity is a violation of her right to dignity and livelihood – Mandamus - Supreme Court issued a continuing mandamus and comprehensive directions to remedy administrative lethargy - i. Compensation: Directed the payment of ₹50,000 each by the discriminating private school, the Union of India, the State of Uttar Pradesh, and the State of Gujarat to the Petitioner for the violation of her rights and the lack of proper redressal mechanisms; ii. constituted an Advisory Committee (headed by Justice Asha Menon, Retd. Judge, Delhi High Court) to draft a comprehensive National Equal Opportunity Policy for transgender persons; iii. Directed the Union of India to bring forth its own Equal Opportunity Policy within three months of the Committee's report. The Court mandated that this Union Policy shall be enforceable at any establishment that fails to frame its own policy; iv. Directed States/UTs to immediately establish Transgender Welfare Boards and Transgender Protection Cells; v. Directed all establishments to designate Complaint Officers and designated the State Human Rights Commission (SHRC) as the appellate authority for grievances against the establishment head's decision. [Paras 164-174, 217] Jane Kaushik v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1018 : 2025 INSC 1248

Constitution of India - Article 22(1) - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 50A – Held that requirement of communicating the grounds of arrest in writing is not merely a formality but is essential for actualising the fundamental right to liberty and life as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution - The purpose of communicating the grounds of arrest to the detenue and their relatives is to enable them to take prompt actions to secure the release of the arrested person, which includes engaging lawyers and seeking bail at the earliest. [Relied on Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India & Ors. (2024) 7 SCC 576]; Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2024) 8 SCC 254] Ahmed Mansoor v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1026

Constitution of India - Article 226 – CBI investigation - Power of the High Court to direct a Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) inquiry - Judicial restraint in ordering CBI investigation - Held, the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to direct a CBI inquiry must be exercised sparingly, cautiously, and in exceptional situations - It should not be passed as a matter of routine or merely because a party levels allegations against the local police - There must be sufficient material to come to a prima facie conclusion that there is a need for such an inquiry, and a commission of a criminal offence is prima facie disclosed - The direction is justified only when the integrity of the process is compromised to a degree that shakes the conscience of the Courts or public faith, often involving high-ranking officials or systemic failure - In matters relating to recruitment, it would not be appropriate to direct CBI investigation in the routine course unless the facts are so abnormal that they shake the conscience of the Court - The High Court's direction for a CBI inquiry was based on mere 'doubt,' 'assumption,' and 'inexplicable details' concerning the external agency's master data, which did not satisfy the prima facie threshold required for such an investigation - Supreme Court set aside order of High Court and directed a CBI enquiry into alleged irregularities in the recruitment process for the U.P. Legislative council and Assembly Secretaries - Appeal allowed. [Relied on State of W.B. v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights; Paras 11, 14- 23] Legislative Council U.P. Lucknow v. Sushil Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1012 : 2025 INSC 1241

Demurrer - Supreme Court summarised the position of law prevailing in India on demurrer as follows - i. The plea of demurrer is an act of objecting or taking exception or a protest. It is a pleading made by one party which “assumes” the truth of the matter as alleged by the opposite party, but sets up that it is insufficient in law to sustain the claim, or that there is some other defect in the pleadings which constitutes a legal reason as to why the suit must not be allowed to proceed further - In other words, that even assuming those facts as pleaded are true, the court does not have jurisdiction as a matter of law; ii. a decision on demurrer has to be determined ex-facie the plaint; iii. Certain objections are capable of being decided by way of demurrer. Only those objections which do not involve questions of facts nor the adducing of any further evidence, could be decided by way of demurrer; iv. The rule that when a mixed question of law and fact is decided on the basis of a demurrer, the issue would not be permanently foreclosed; v. Disputed questions cannot, as a matter of rule, be decided while considering an application filed under Order VII Rule 11(d). What has to be decided is whether on the face of it, the averments made in the plaint, without any doubt or dispute, show that the suit is or is not barred by limitation or any other law in force; vi. Therefore, it is inherent in the nature of a decision as regards the rejection of a plaint that, if the court deems it fit to not reject the plaint at the threshold upon an examination of the averments in the plaint, the ground that the suit is still barred by any law can be taken by the defendant in the course of the suit proceedings, after leading evidence; vii. It cannot be said that at the stage of rejection of plaint, the defendant/respondent chooses to waive his right to plead and instead, adopts the course of only testing the sufficiency of the plaint in law- At this stage, there is no choice between either pleading or demurring and the defendant/respondent cannot be taken to have elected to demur instead of pleading- This is simply because, there exists no burden of proof on him, at that stage, to plead. [Relied on Man Roland Druckimachinen AG v. Multicolour Offset Ltd. and Another; 2004 7 SCC 447; Indian Mineral & Chemical Co. and Others v. Deutsche Bank reported in (2004) 12 SCC 376; Ramesh B. Desai and Others v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta and Others reported in (2006) 5 SCC 638; Paras 63-75] Urban Infrastructure Real Estate Fund v. Neelkanth Realty Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1028 : 2025 INSC 1255

Evidence Act, 1872 - Evidence of Eye-witnesses – Reliability – Held, when the genesis and manner of the incident itself are doubtful, conviction cannot be sustained - When the prosecution has suppressed the origin and genesis of the occurrence, the proper course is to grant the accused the benefit of doubt - The conflicting versions given by the eye-witnesses, coupled with the suppression of the genesis of the occurrence and the shifting of the place of the incident, demolish the very substratum of the prosecution case - It is unsafe to uphold a conviction based on testimony full of contradictions and inherent improbabilities - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Pankaj v. State of Rajasthan, (2016) 16 SCC 192; Bhagwan Sahai and Another v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2016 SC 2714; Paras 57-60] Kannaiya v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1016 : 2025 INSC 1246

Evidence Act, 1872 – Quality vs. Quantity of Evidence – Classification of Witnesses - Supreme Court reiterated the guiding principles for assessing the credibility of witnesses, classifying them into: (1) Wholly reliable; (2) Wholly unreliable; and (3) Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable - For the third category, corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony is required - Held that the Court is concerned with the quality and not with the quantity of the evidence. [Relied on Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras AIR 1957 SC 614; Para 28] Kannaiya v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1016 : 2025 INSC 1246

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (HSA) – Section 2 (2) – Applicability to Scheduled Tribes – Held, HSA does not apply to members of STs - Section 2(2) of the HSA, 1956 explicitly states that nothing contained in the Act shall apply to the members of any Scheduled Tribe within the meaning of clause (25) of Article 366 of the Constitution, unless the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, otherwise directs - The words of the section are explicit, and the HSA, 1956, cannot apply to Scheduled Tribes - Supreme Court set aside High Court's order directing that daughters in tribal areas in the state of H.P. shall inherit property in accordance with HSA and not as per customs and usages - High Court's directions were beyond the scope of the appeal, as the issue was neither directly nor substantially involved in the intra-party appeal, and the directions were not emanating from any of the issues framed or pleas raised by the parties - Set aside order of High Court. [Relied on Tirith Kumar & Ors. vs. Daduram & Ors., (2024) SCC OnLine SC 3810; Paras 4-6] Nawang v. Bahadur, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1025

Income Tax Act, 1961 - Section 37(1) - Business Expenditure – Deduction – Held, a "lull in business" for a non-resident company engaged in oil drilling activities, due to the non-procurement of a contract during the relevant assessment years (1996- 97, 1997-98, 1999-2000), does not amount to a "cessation of business" - Where the company continued to engage in systematic and organized activities, such as continuous business correspondence with ONGC regarding manpower supply and submitting an unsuccessful bid, it demonstrated a clear intention to carry on business - the company was entitled to claim deduction of business expenditure (administrative charges, audit fees, etc.) under Section 37(1). Pride Foramer S.A. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1015 : 2025 INSC 1247

Income Tax Act, 1961 - Section 71 - Set-off of Loss from Other Heads - Interpretation of 'Business' – Held, the expenditure, though disallowed as a deduction under the head 'Income from Business' by the ITAT (as the only income was 'Interest on Tax Refunds' taxable as 'Income from Other Sources'), was allowed to be set off against the 'Income from Other Sources' under Section 71 of the Act, on the finding that the appellant was still carrying on business - The word 'business' has a wide import and connotes a "real, substantial and systemic or organised course of activity or activity with a set purpose" - The expression 'for the purpose of business' is wider than 'for the purpose of earning profits' and includes "many other acts incidental to the carrying on of a business". Pride Foramer S.A. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1015 : 2025 INSC 1247

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 — Section 2(s) — Master and Servant Relationship — Canteen Employees — Non-Statutory Canteen Run by a Co-operative Society — Test to Determine Employer-Employee Relationship – Held, the employees working in a non-statutory canteen, run by a Co-operative Society on the Bank's premises with the Bank providing significant financial subsidy (75% of wages) and infrastructure, cannot be deemed to be the employees of the Bank (principal employer) - The mere act of a Bank playing a pivotal role in setting up the canteen, or providing necessary infrastructure, finance, subsidies, and controlling the working hours/days, is an "obligation to provide facilities to run canteen," which is distinct from a statutory or implicit "obligation to provide a canteen." - This does not make the canteen a part of the establishment - Appellant-Bank lacked the right to supervise and control the work done by the canteen employees, or to take any disciplinary action against them, the relationship of master and servant did not exist - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Parimal Chandra Raha v. LIC of India, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 611; Balwant Rai Saluja v. Air India Ltd. (2014) 9 SCC 407; Paras 36-40, 46-48] General Manager, U.P. Cooperative Bank Ltd v. Achchey Lal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1024 : 2025 INSC 1175

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 — Supreme Court laid down tests to determine employer employee relationship to be kept in mind while deciding matters arising from legislations like industrial disputes act, 1947, the factories act, 1948 etc - Factors to be considered include - (1) Control Test- (a) who appoints workers; (b) who pays the salaries/remuneration; (2) who has the authority to dismiss; (3) Organisation Test- who can take disciplinary action; (4) whether there is continuity of service; and (5) extent of control and supervision, i.e., whether there exists complete control and supervision. [Relied on Shivanandan Sharma v. Punjab National Bank Ltd. (AIR 1955 SC 404; Silver Jubilee Tailoring House v. Chief Inspector of Shops and Establishments (1974) 3 SCC 498; Workmen of Nilgiri Coop. Marketing Society Ltd. v. State of T.N. (2004) 5 SCC 514; Paras 37, 74-76] General Manager, U.P. Cooperative Bank Ltd v. Achchey Lal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1024 : 2025 INSC 1175

Mohammedan Law - Matruka Property (Inheritance) - Held that Matruka property is the property (both movable and immovable) left by a deceased Muslim - It simply refers to property left behind by the deceased person and nothing more - The scheme for distribution of matruka property first requires separating the part covered by a valid will (maximum one-third of the total matruka, and not in favor of an heir without other heirs' consent) - The balance is distributable among heirs as per Mohammedan Law rules of intestate succession – Held, the scheme for distribution of matruka property first requires separating the part covered by a valid will (maximum one-third of the total matruka, and not in favor of an heir without other heirs' consent) - Sharers are entitled to a prescribed share of the inheritance and wife being a sharer is entitled to 1/8th the share but where there is no child or child of a son how low so ever, the share to which the wife is entitled is 1/4th. [Relied on Trinity Infraventures Ltd. v. M.S. Murthy, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 738; Paras 8-15] Zoharbee v. Imam Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1014 : 2025 INSC 1245

Omission of Names in FIR – Held, failure to name two of the three Appellants in the First Information Report (FIR), despite the complainant's familiarity with them, cast a serious shadow on the subsequent attempt to implicate them - Such a significant omission in the earliest version of events raises a legitimate inference of false implication and undermines the prosecution narrative - Omissions of important facts affecting the probabilities of the case are relevant under Section 11 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, in judging the veracity of the prosecution case. [Relied on Ram Kumar Pandey v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1975) 3 SCC 815, Para 29] Nazim v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1019 : 2025 INSC 1184

Permanent Establishment (PE) / Business Connection (BC) – Held, absence of a Permanent Establishment (PE) in India is not mandatory for a non-resident company to be considered as carrying on business or to have a Business Connection (BC) in India - A non-resident can be in business "de hors" the permanent establishment - The issue of PE is primarily relevant for availing the beneficial provisions of the Double Tax Avoidance Agreement (DTAA), which was not the core consideration for allowing deductions under the Income Tax Act in this case - The High Court's view that business communications from a foreign office meant the non-resident was not carrying on business in India was held to be "wholly fallacious and contrary to the very scheme of the Act" and "wholly anachronistic" with the modern globalized trade environment - Appeals allowed. [Relied on CIT v. Vikram Cotton Mills ((1988) 169 ITR 597 (SC); Paras 11, 12, 14, 15. 17-21] Pride Foramer S.A. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1015 : 2025 INSC 1247

Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971 (Kerala) – Sections 3(1), 3(2) & 3(3) – Private Forest – Exemption for Bona Fide Plantation - Burden of Proof and standard of proof – Held, burden of proof to claim exemption from vesting under Section 3(2) or Section 3(3) of the Act lies on the claimant (owner) - the standard of proof in such civil proceedings is merely the preponderance of probabilities, not proof beyond reasonable doubt - The claimant is required to lead evidence from which a reasonable fact-finder can conclude that the ingredients of the exemption are more likely than not satisfied - The concurrent factual findings of the Forest Tribunal and the High Court are liable to be overturned where they are vitiated by a clear disregard of relevant materials or an application of wrong legal standards, such as an unrealistic burden of proof - Supreme Court observed while declaring that 37.5 acres of land in South Wayanad, cultivated with coffee and cardamom, is private plantation land and not a vested forest under the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971 - Appeals allowed. [Relied on Joseph & Another v. State of Kerala & Another (2007) 6 SCR 347; Paras 33-43] M. Jameela v State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1023 : 2025 INSC 1254

Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021 (Uttar Pradesh Conversion Act) – Section 4 (Unamended) – Locus Standi to lodge FIR - Locus Standi is Restricted – Held that the right to initiate criminal proceedings under the U.P. Conversion Act is strictly circumscribed and can only be set in motion at the behest of the aggrieved converted individual, or their immediate family members or blood relatives - This restriction is rooted in the recognition that the freedom to profess, practice, or propagate religion (and the liberty to convert) is a facet of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 21 and 25 of the Constitution of India - This liberty lies in the innermost domain of human conscience and decisional autonomy - To permit the initiation of criminal proceedings at the instance of strangers or unrelated third parties would amount to an impermissible intrusion into this protected sphere of individual freedom and would open the door to frivolous or motivated litigations - Held that criminal law cannot be allowed to be made a tool of harassment of innocent persons, allowing prosecuting agencies to initiate prosecution at their whims and fancy, on the basis of completely incredulous material. [Paras 110-111, 139] Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1021 : 2025 INSC 1249

Qualitative Distinction in Work - Supreme Court noted the finding in Dr. P.A. Bhatt case that Allopathy practitioners deal with critical care, immediate life-saving measures, invasive procedures including surgeries, and postmortem, none of which can be performed by practitioners of indigenous systems of medicine - This fundamental distinction, along with the dissimilar diagnostic methods, contrasting treatment philosophies, and disparate medicine composition, puts allopathy doctors in a different class who can be classified differently for service conditions - The classification of different retirement ages and better pay scales for allopathy doctors has a reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved: the sufficiency of qualified and experienced MBBS doctors with longer service and better pay, addressing the concern of the dearth of allopathy doctors - The "footfalls" in allopathy institutions are also noted to be far more than in institutions administering indigenous systems of medicine. [Relied on: State of Gujarat & Ors. v. Dr. P.A. Bhatt & Ors. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 503; Dr. Solamon A. v. State of Kerala and Ors. Special Leave Petition (C) No.3946 of 2023; Paras 7-11] State of Rajasthan v. Anisur Rahman, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1017

Scientific Evidence – Inconclusive FSL Report – Motive – Held, the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) reported that no complete DNA profile could be generated from the exhibits (rope, axe, and clothes), making the only scientific evidence neutral, as it neither connected the Appellants to the crime nor corroborated the oral testimony - Noted that an inconclusive or exculpatory scientific report cannot be dismissed as inconsequential in a circumstantial evidence case, and to convict on doubtful testimony while ignoring scientific tests is to substitute suspicion for proof - The alleged motive of revenge for an insult was vague and unproven - Noted that the absence of motive in a circumstantial case assumes significance and tilts the balance in favor of the accused. [Relied on Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808; Paras 52- 56] Nazim v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1019 : 2025 INSC 1184

Service Law – Departmental Enquiry – Natural Justice – Non-examination of Complainant – Perverse Findings - Where the Enquiry Officer relied upon a written complaint of bribery without examining the complainant and the other witnesses did not support the charge, such findings are perverse and cannot sustain a dismissal order – Held, the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) was justified in setting aside the penalty - the High Court erred in interfering with such findings - Non-examination of a material witness whose statement formed the foundation of the charge and was never subjected to cross-examination vitiates the enquiry for denial of fair hearing - Noted that While the High Court held that judicial review could not be exercised over findings of fact, the Supreme Court clarified that when findings are based on “completely misleading material” or are perverse, interference is justified - Judicial review is permissible where the conclusion of guilt is unsupported by evidence or based on no evidence - Appeal allowed. [Relied on State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723; Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police, (1999) 2 SCC 10; Union of India v. H.C. Goel, AIR 1964 SC 364; Paras 17-19] V.M. Saudagar v. Central Railway, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1029 : 2025 INSC 1257

Service Law – Parity in Service Conditions – Doctors (Allopathy vs. Indigenous Systems of Medicine) – Retirement Age and Pay Scales – Reference to Larger Bench - Parity in service conditions - The Supreme Court referred the issue of whether doctors practicing Allopathy and those practicing Indigenous Systems of Medicine (like Ayurveda, Homeopathy, Unani, etc.) can be treated equally for determining service conditions, specifically the retirement age and pay packages, to a larger Bench for an authoritative pronouncement - The Court noted a divergence of opinion between its previous judgments regarding whether MBBS doctors and doctors practicing indigenous systems of medicine can be treated equally for service conditions - Held that the consideration for parity in service conditions should ideally be on the touchstone of identity of functions, similarity in work carried out, and comparable duties assigned. [Paras 4-6] State of Rajasthan v. Anisur Rahman, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1017

Service Law – Recruitment – Wait List/Reserved Panel – Right to Appointment – Binding Nature of Concession on Law – Held, a candidate on a wait list/reserved panel has no vested right to be appointed - The right to be considered arises only if a selected candidate does not join, and the wait list operates for a limited period, not indefinitely, and certainly not after a fresh recruitment process has commenced - Since all selected candidates had joined, the respondent's right as a waitlisted candidate was extinguished - The statement/concession made by the appellants' counsel in 1999 that the respondent would be considered for a future vacancy in the SC quota cannot bind the appellants as it runs contrary to the statutory Recruitment Rules - Giving effect to such a concession would amount to extending the life of the wait list and filling a post in a subsequent recruitment on the basis of a previous, concluded recruitment exercise, which is impermissible and prejudices future candidates - It is open for a party to place the correct position of law before the Court and urge that it should not be compelled to give effect to an erroneous concession if compliance would result in the violation of any statutory rules or regulations - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Gujarat State Dy. Executive Engineers' Association Vs. State of Gujarat and others 1994 INSC 199; Paras 12-17] Union of India v. Subit Kumar Das, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1010 : 2025 INSC 1235

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - Section 54 - Agreement to Sell - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 100 - An agreement to sell does not, in itself, create any interest in or charge on the immovable property - A transfer of immovable property by way of sale can only be by a registered deed of conveyance (sale deed) - An agreement to sell, whether with or without possession, is not a conveyance and will not confer any title or transfer any interest in the immovable property (except for the limited right under Section 53-A of the TP Act) - Held that an Agreement to Sell does not confer any title, the property agreed to be sold but for which the sale deed was executed after the owner's death, was still the property of the deceased at the time of death and would be subject to division - When a Court forms the view that no substantial question of law arises for consideration in a Second Appeal, it has no choice but to dismiss the appeal in limine, though it must still give reasons for the dismissal. [Relied on Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. (2) v. State of Haryana, (2012) 1 SCC 656; Para 7] Zoharbee v. Imam Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1014 : 2025 INSC 1245

Transfer Petition — Priority in Filing — Substantial Overlap of Issues — Patents Act, 1970, Sections 104, 106, 108 — Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), Section 25 – Issue - Whether the Suit for Infringement (Delhi Suit) should be transferred to the Bombay High Court, or the Suit for Groundless Threat of Infringement (Bombay Suit) should be transferred to the Delhi High Court - Supreme Court allowed the transfer petition filed by petitioner - The Delhi Suit is transferred to the Bombay High Court to be tried along with the Bombay Suit - Noted that the omission of the proviso from Section 106 of the Patents Act, 1970 (which existed in the pari materia provision in the Indian Patents and Designs Act, 1911) signifies that a suit for groundless threat of Infringement has an independent cause of action from a suit for infringement - Held that Despite the independent cause of action, the questions of fact, law, and issues to be determined in both suits are substantially overlapping - To avoid duplication, multiplicity of proceedings, and the risk of conflicting judgments, it is expedient to transfer the subsequent suit to the court where the prior suit is pending - Transfer petitio allowed. [Relied on Chitivalasa Jute Mills v. Jaypee Rewa Cement, (2004) 3 SCC 85; Paras 9-13] Atomberg Technologies Private Ltd. v. Eureka Forbes Ltd, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1030 : 2025 INSC 1253

Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 - Substantive Equality – Reasonable Accommodation – Held, the concept of 'Reasonable Accommodation' is an implied obligation under the 2019 Act and a non-negotiable facet of Substantive Equality under Article 14 of the Constitution – The duty to provide such accommodation, which involves providing additional support to vulnerable persons, applies horizontally to both State and non-State actors – The Court analysed the doctrine through the four-dimensional approach to substantive equality propounded by Sandra Fredman - Horizontal Application of Fundamental Rights – The statutory prohibitions against discrimination in the 2019 Act, particularly Section 3, act as a vehicle for the indirect horizontal application of Fundamental Rights, thereby binding private institutions (like schools/employers) to the constitutional ethos of Articles 14, 15, and 21 – The obligations of equality and non-discrimination bind both State and non-State actors - The failure of the Union and State Governments to implement the mandatory provisions of the 2019 Act and its Rules (such as establishing Welfare Boards, Protection Cells, and designating Complaint Officers) amounts to 'omissive discrimination', violating the fundamental rights of transgender persons – Such inaction is liable for judicial scrutiny - Supreme Court held that transgender persons Act reduced to dead letter and inaction seems intentional. [Relied on National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India & Ors. (2014) 5 SCC 438 (NALSA); Paras 52, 125-127] Jane Kaushik v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1018 : 2025 INSC 1248

Transgender Persons – Held, transgender and gender-diverse persons are not required to seek permission from their employers to undergo gender affirmation or surgical intervention - asserting that the right to self-determination of gender is a matter of personal autonomy and dignity - the employers must be given a reasonable notice, but that should purely be to make the requisite changes and modifications in documents, etc. Jane Kaushik v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1018 : 2025 INSC 1248

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) - Section 43B - Arrest - Furnishing of Grounds of Arrest - Constitutional Mandate – Held that the explanation given by the jurisdictional Court at the time of remand, followed by the remand order which indicates that the grounds of arrest were explained, is not sufficient compliance with the mandatory requirement of furnishing the grounds of arrest at the time of securing the accused. Ahmed Mansoor v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1026

Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 - Section 19 – Liability of Insurer – Compensation Claim – Scope of Commissioner's power – Whether an insurer can be made jointly and severally liable with the employer despite the absence of a provision like Section 149 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Held, the issue is no longer res integra and stands settled by the decision in Gottumukkala Appala Narasimha Raju - The Commissioner has the power to determine the liability of a person who is required to indemnify the employer - The 1923 Act is a social welfare legislation, and its object is to provide a speedy and efficacious remedy to the workman - While Section 3 fixes liability on the employer, excluding the insurer from being jointly and severally liable, where the liability is covered by insurance, would have a deleterious effect and render the remedy illusory - If the insurer is only liable to reimburse the employer, the workman would be left without compensation if the employer fails to pay due to financial incapacity - By virtue of the power to determine liability under Section 19, the Commissioner has the power to make the insurer jointly and severally liable with the employer to pay compensation if it falls within the scope of the contract of insurance - The High Court's modification, substituting the direction to the insurer to pay with a direction to the employer to pay and seek reimbursement, was held to be unjustified - The appropriate course was to make the employer and the insurer jointly and severally liable - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Gottumukkala Appala Narasimha Raju and others v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. [(2007) 13 SCC 446; Mahendra Rai vs. United India Insurance Company Ltd. & Anr. (Civil Appeal No.6697 of 2014; Paras 10-20] Alok Kumar Ghosh v. New India Assurance Company Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1022 : 2025 INSC 1239