Supreme Court Weekly Digest October 24 - 31, 2025]

Advocate - Procedure for Summoning an Advocate (in exceptional cases) - Status of in-house counsel - Supreme Court laid down procedure for summoning advocates in exceptional cases - i. An Investigating Officer (I.O.) can only summon an Advocate if the I.O. has knowledge of an issue that falls under the exceptions to Section 132 of the BSA (e.g., communication made in furtherance of an illegal purpose)- In such a case, the summons must specifically mention the exception under which the Advocate is being summoned; ii. Any summons issued against an Advocate by an I.O. must be with the prior approval and satisfaction of the hierarchical Superior, not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police (SP), and a reasoned order must be recorded; iii. In-house counsel are not entitled to the professional privilege under Section 132 of the BSA since they are not Advocates practicing in Courts as spoken of in the BSA- they would be entitled to the protection under Section 134 insofar as any communication made to the legal advisor of their employer- The protection under Section 134 cannot be claimed for the communications between the employer and the In-house counsel themselves. [Relied on Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, (2005) 6 SCC 1; Paras 48-50, 59-67] In Re : Summoning Advocates, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1051 : 2025 INSC 1275

Advocate - Treatment of Advocate's Digital Devices and Confidentiality- Supreme Court held that - i. While examining any digital device of an Advocate, care shall be taken by the Court not to impair the confidentiality with respect to the other clients of the Advocate; ii. The discovery shall be strictly confined to the information sought by the Investigating Officer, provided it is found to be permissible and admissible. [Paras 54 - 58] In Re : Summoning Advocates, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1051 : 2025 INSC 1275

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Arbitral Award - Unexplained Delay – Validity – Held, an inordinate and unexplained delay in the pronouncement of an arbitral award (in the pre-Section 29A era) is not, per se, a ground for setting aside an award under Section 34. However, where the negative effect of such delay is explicit and adversely reflects on the findings in the award, it can be construed to be in conflict with the public policy of India or vitiated by patent illegality - Section 14(2) not mandatory pre-condition: An aggrieved party is not required to invoke the remedy under Section 14(2) of the Act (termination of the arbitrator's mandate) as a condition precedent to laying a challenge to a delayed and tainted award under Section 34, as both provisions operate independently. [Para 19, 20, 48, 63] Lancor Holdings v. Prem Kumar Menon, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1056 : 2025 INSC 1277

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Unworkable Award - Patent Illegality - Public Policy – Held, the very basis and public policy underlying the process of arbitration is the achievement of a speedy and final resolution of disputes. An arbitral award that is unworkable in that it fails to finally settle the disputes but instead irrevocably alters the parties' pre-existing balance and compels them to initiate a fresh round of arbitration/litigation defeats this public policy - Such an unworkable arbitral award would not only be in conflict with the public policy of India under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) but would also be patently illegal on the face of it under Section 34(2A). [Relied on Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan 2023 14 SCC 231; Para 20, 48, 55, 58, 59, 63] Lancor Holdings v. Prem Kumar Menon, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1056 : 2025 INSC 1277

Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA); Section 132 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS); Section 179 – Constitution of India; Articles 14, 21 – Advocate-Client Privilege - Advocate-Client Privilege – Summoning of Advocates by Investigating Agencies – Held, Investigating Agency/Prosecuting Agency/Police cannot directly summon a lawyer who is appearing in a case to elicit details of the case, as this would violate the statutory privilege conferred by Section 132 of the BSA and infringe upon the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution (Articles 14 and 21) - The privilege is a fundamental feature of a fair and free legal system, which requires an atmosphere of uninhibited communication between a client and their legal representative. [Paras 24-28] In Re : Summoning Advocates, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1051 : 2025 INSC 1275

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 389 - Suspension of Sentence and Bail - Supreme Court expressed dismay at an order passed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court which suspended the sentences of two murder convicts on the condition to plant 10 saplings each as a matter of social cause - Held that Order did not disclose any reason whatsoever as to the basis on which the bail had been granted - Noted that the High Court imposed a condition that the accused persons, convicted under Section 302 IPC, must "carry out plantation of saplings on the premise that it would serve social cause" - The Supreme Court expressed dismay and surprise, noting that the High Court seemed "to have got swayed to grant the prayer for suspension of sentence and grant of bail on the basis they (accused persons) would purge in their misdeeds" - Held that granting bail based on this condition, without considering the merits of the suspension of sentence, could not stand the test of law - Appeal allowed. [Paras 5, 6] Surajpal Singh Jadon v. Prashant Sikarwar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1049

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Special Leave Petition (Criminal) - Delay - Legal Aid - National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) Scheme - Misuse of Process - Supreme Court noted that SLP was filed with a delay of 2298 days by a convict and held that the petition was filed merely under a legal aid programme without the convict's consent, and that such a practice amounts to misuse of process - Held that since the petitioner never expressed any desire to file the Special Leave Petition, its filing only in view of the NALSA programme is a misuse of the process - Noted that that the delay in filing the same does not stand explained at all - Petition dismissed. [Paras 4, 5] Kamaljit Kaur v State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1035

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 142 - Scope of power to do complete justice - Supreme Court is justified in exercising its plenary power under Article 142 of the Constitution, without being bound by procedural provisions, where it is required and necessary to bring the litigation or dispute to an end - When setting aside an unworkable or patently illegal award, relegating the parties to fresh arbitration/litigation after a protracted period (e.g., 16 years) would be a travesty of justice - In such cases, the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142 is the only viable alternative. [Relied on Gayatri Balasamy vs. ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited 2025 7 SCC 1; Paras 58, 60] Lancor Holdings v. Prem Kumar Menon, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1056 : 2025 INSC 1277

Dying Declaration – Multiple dying declarations – Evidentiary value – Corroboration by independent evidence - Supreme Court dismissed the appeal against the High Court's order, affirming the conviction – Held, in a case of multiple dying declarations, each must be considered independently - The first dying declaration given to the independent witness, which stated the appellant poured kerosene and set the deceased ablaze, and disclosed the motive, was found to be duly proved and trustworthy - Minor discrepancies in subsequent statements do not weaken first dying declaration if found reliable and consistent - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Nallam Veera Stayanandam & Ors. v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., (2004) 10 SCC 769; Paras 10-14] Jemaben v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1042 : 2025 INSC 1268

Employees Compensation Act, 1923 - Section 2(1)(d)(ii)(d) - "dependent" - Whether the definition of "dependent" as per Section 2(1)(d)(ii)(d) of the Act, specifically whether widowed sisters of the deceased, who were not minors, could be considered dependents entitled to compensation – Held, Section 2(1)(d)(ii)(d) of the 1923 Act defines dependents to include a "minor brother, or an unmarried sister, or a widowed sister if a minor" and noted the incongruity with present-day realities, referring to the context of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, which makes the occurrence of a "widowed minor sister" unlikely - Supreme Court declined to interfere with the High Court judgment which treated widowed adult sisters as dependents, allowing compensation - Supreme Court left the question of law about the definition of "dependent" open and recommended the Law Commission of India to consider suitable amendments to the Employees Compensation Act to reflect current social realities. [Paras 2 - 6] New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Kogga, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1039

Evidence Law - Extra-Judicial Confession - Held that an extra-judicial confession is considered a weak piece of evidence and must be accepted with great care and caution - Standard of Proof: The prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt that the confession was genuinely made, voluntary, and its contents were true - The standard is even higher when the entire case rests on the EJC – Corroboration - Held that the court will generally look for independent, reliable corroboration before relying on an EJC, especially if suspicious circumstances surround it - Held that the circumstances, taken together, do not conclusively establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, as required for a conviction, even in the case of a heinous crime - Supreme Court held that evidence not clear, there can't be moral conviction - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra: (1984) 4 SCC 116 Para 35; Pritinder Singh alias Lovely v. State of Punjab: (2023) 7 SCC 727; Paras 15, 16, 19, 20, 24, 25] Sanjay v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1033 : 2025 INSC 317

Evidence Law - Principles for Conviction Based on Circumstantial Evidence - Supreme Court reiterated the established principles governing cases of circumstantial evidence, noting that the chain of events must be so established that the Court has no option but to come to one and only one conclusion: the guilt of the accused person. If any doubt creeps in at any stage, the benefit must flow to the accused. The chain of circumstances must be so complete as to lead to only one conclusion, the guilt of the accused, and mere suspicion, however strong, cannot be a substitute for proof. If two views are possible on the evidence, one pointing to guilt and the other to innocence, the view favorable to the accused must be adopted - Supreme Court pointed out several deficiencies in prosecution's case - i. Non-examination of material witness; ii. Doubtful arrest and recovery; iii. Lack of forensic; iv. Last seen theory weakness - Set aside order of High Court - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Karakkattu Muhammed Basheer v. State of Kerala, (2024) 10 SCC 813; Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1973) 2 SCC 808; Paras 13-18, 20-30] Mohamed Sameer Khan v. State Represented By Inspector Of Police, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1045 : 2025 INSC 1269

Forest and Environment Law – Judicial Discipline – Interference with Pending Supreme Court Proceedings – Contempt of Court - Supreme Court has strongly criticised the Uttarakhand High Court for entertaining a plea and staying a sanction order that was passed during the pendency of proceedings before the Apex Court concerning illegal constructions and felling of trees in the Corbett Tiger Reserve - The High Court, no doubt, is a Constitutional Court and not inferior to this Court. However, in judicial matters, when this Court is seized of the matter, it is expected of the High Courts to keep their hands away - Notice is issued to Shri Rahul (IFS), Chief Conservator of Forests, to remain present and show cause as to why an action for committing contempt of this Court be not initiated against him. [Paras 9 - 13] In Re: T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1046

Hindu Law - Temples and Religious Practices - Interim Relief Granted - Supreme Court grants interim relief in a Petition for Special Leave to Appeal, directing the Respondents to continue performing the Udayasthamana Pooja at the Guruvayur Sree Krishna Temple on Vrishchikam Ekadasi (01.12.2025), strictly in accordance with the temple's tradition and without any change - Any ritual which has become a long-standing tradition and assumed religious significance "ought not be unsettled on the apprehension that there would be potential public inconvenience"- The "faith of the worshippers at large ought not to be put aside on the anvil of managerial and administrative concerns and must be given precedence and respect as far as possible" - Inconvenience to the public cannot be a ground to discontinue / alter the rituals / pooja to be performed on the sacred day for the deity. [Paras 5 - 8] P.C. Hary v. Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1055

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) - Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) – Section 7 IBC – Financial Creditor – Financial Debt – Cumulative Redeemable Preference Shares (CRPS) – Commercial Effect of Borrowing (Section 5(8)(f) IBC – Held, a holder of Cumulative Redeemable Preference Shares (CRPS) is a shareholder and not a financial creditor and cannot initiate the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) against the Corporate Debtor. EPC Constructions v. Matix Fertilizers and Chemicals, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1036 : 2025 INSC 1259

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) - CRPS Holder is a Shareholder, Not a Creditor - A CRPS is part of the company's share capital, and the amount paid is neither a loan nor a debt - Difference between Debt and Preference share - Held that Preference shareholders are not in the position of creditors and cannot, as a matter of right, claim a return of their share money except in a winding-up - An unredeemed preference shareholder does not automatically assume the character of a 'creditor' - Held that preference shares are part of the company's share capital and the amounts paid up on them are not loans. Dividends are paid on the preference shares when company earns a profit-if the dividends were paid without profits or in excess of profits made, it would amount to an illegal return of the capital - Amount paid up on preference shares not being loans, they do not qualify as a debt. [Relied on Lalchand Surana vs. M/s Hyderabad Vanaspathy Ltd 1988 SCC OnLine AP 290.; Para 19, 20, 26, 27] EPC Constructions v. Matix Fertilizers and Chemicals, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1036 : 2025 INSC 1259

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) - Financial Debt - Test of Time Value of Money - Held that for a debt to be classified as a 'financial debt' under Section 5(8) of the IBC, the basic element is that it ought to be a disbursal against the consideration for the time value of money - The requirement of a 'debt' and 'disbursal against consideration for the time value of money' remains an essential part of all sub-clauses of Section 5(8) - The paid-up amounts towards shares, being part of the share capital, do not possess the character of a debt and, therefore, do not fall within the definition of 'financial debt' - Appeals dismissed. [Para 29-42, 47, 48] EPC Constructions v. Matix Fertilizers and Chemicals, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1036 : 2025 INSC 1259

Insurance Law - Fire Insurance Policy - Accidental Fire – Held, once it is established that the loss is due to fire and there is no allegation/finding of fraud or that the Insured is the instigator of the fire, the cause of fire is immaterial, and it must be assumed and presumed that the fire is accidental and falls within the scope of the fire policy. The precise cause of a fire remains immaterial, provided the claimant is not the instigator of the fire - The final Surveyor's conclusion that the fire was not accidental was held to be incorrect, especially when the report did not conclude that the fire fell within the exception/exclusion clause or that the Insured caused the fire, fraud, or intentional damage -The final Surveyor's report was found to be perverse and to have misdirected itself in law for: i. Failing to deal with the 5,855 pages of documents provided by the Insured; ii. Ignoring the Cost Sheets for each item maintained in the regular course of business, which tallied with primary documents like purchase orders; iii. Arbitrarily assigning a uniform average unit price of ₹450/- for all identifiable damaged stock (e.g., leather jacket, leather belt, polyester lining), without considering the nature of the stock or the value of non-identifiable (charred) goods. [Relied on New India Assurance Company Limited and Others vs. Mudit Roadways, (2024) 3 SCC 193; Paras 32-43] National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Orion Conmerx Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1047 : 2025 INSC 1271

Insurance Policy - Interpretation of - Coverage of 'FFF' – Held, the phrase 'FFF' under the head "Description of Risk" in the policy clearly means Furniture, Fixtures, and Fittings, and the Insured was entitled to the claim amount under this head, contrary to the Surveyor and National Commission's view - Coverage provisions should be interpreted broadly, and in case of ambiguity, the same should be resolved in favour of the Insured - The exclusion clauses must be read narrowly - It is settled law that the contract of fire insurance is a contract to indemnify the Insured against loss by fire, the court said, while specifying the following rules to determine whether in a particular case, the loss is caused by fire: a) There must be an actual fire; hence mere heating or fermentation will not be sufficient to render the insurers liable for loss occasioned thereby; b) There must be something on fire which ought not to have been on fire; c) There must be something in the nature of an accident, but a fire occasioned by the wilful act of a third person without the consent of the Insured, is to be regarded as accidental for the purpose of this rule - If these requisites are satisfied, any loss attributable to the fire, whether by actual burning or otherwise, is within the contract - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Canara Bank vs. United India Insurance Company Limited and Others, (2020) 3 SCC 455; Paras 44-60] National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Orion Conmerx Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1047 : 2025 INSC 1271

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988: Section 149 (Insurance of Motor Vehicles against Third Party Risks) – 'Pay and Recover' Principle – Applicability when a vehicle deviates from the prescribed route as per its permit - Whether a deviation from the prescribed route in a transport vehicle's permit impacts the Insurance Company's liability for an accident occurring on the deviated route – Held, insurance companies cannot deny compensation to accident victims merely because the vehicle involved had deviated from its permitted route- Emphasising the social purpose of motor vehicle insurance, held that to deny compensation on such a technical ground would be “offensive to the sense of justice”- to deny compensation to the victim's dependents because the accident occurred outside the bounds of the permit would be offensive to the sense of justice, as the accident was not their fault; thus, the Insurance Company must pay - Since the contract of insurance operates within certain bounds, expecting the insurer to pay compensation for an incident clearly outside the bounds of the agreement (violation of the permit condition) would be unfair to the insurer - Balancing the need for compensation to the victim with the interests of the insurer, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's order applying the 'pay and recover' principle in cases of deviation from the permitted route, finding it entirely justified and requiring no interference. [Relied on National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh (2004) 3 SCC 297, New India Assurance Co. v. Kamla (2001) 4 SCC 342, Parminder Singh v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd (2019) 7 SCC 217, S. Iyyapan v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd (2013) 7 SCC 62; M/s Chatha Service Station v. Lalmati Devi & Ors. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 756; Paras 7 - 10] K. Nagendra v. New India Insurance Co. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1044 : 2025 INSC 1270

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Assessment of Compensation – Deceased Employed in Foreign Country – Divergent Views on 'Double Deduction' and Moderation of Foreign Income - The Supreme Court referred the issue of assessing compensation in motor accident cases where the deceased was employed in a foreign country to a Larger Bench, noting divergent judicial views on the application of "double deduction" - Held that the issue had “wide ramifications” given the growing number of Indians working overseas, especially in the IT sector, the Bench stated that there being divergent views on the application of double deduction, the issue deserves to be resolved by a larger Bench. [Paras 11 - 15] Tharunoju Eshwaramma v. K. Ram Reddy, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1053

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 166 — Motor Accident Compensation — Denial of 'Future Prospects' Benefit – Held, deceased being a self-employed person in a foreign country (USA), the law laid down by the Constitution Bench in National Insurance Company v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 must be followed and applied to determine just compensation - As the deceased was 31 years old (below 40) at the time of the accident and was self-employed, an addition of 40% of the established income must be made towards future prospects as per the principles in Pranay Sethi - The multiplier of 16 applied by the High Court (having regard to the deceased's age of 31 years) was correctly applied and is in consonance with Pranay Sethi - The amounts awarded under conventional heads must be rectified as per Pranay Sethi - i. Loss of Estate: Rs. 15,000/- (Revised from Rs. 10,000/-); ii. Funeral Expenses: Rs. 15,000/- (Revised from Rs. 25,000/-); iii. Loss of Consortium: Rs. 40,000/- per claimant. (Four dependents—wife, daughter, son, and parents —were considered for consortium, totalling Rs. 1,60,000/-) - The High Court's award of Rs. 1,00,000/- for loss of consortium and love and affection was set aside - Total compensation enhanced from Rs. 1,17,20,200/- to Rs. 1,60,15,280/-, granting an additional compensation of Rs. 42,95,080/- with 6% interest. [Relied on National Insurance Company v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680; Paras 4-6] Kulwinder Kaur v. Prashant Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1052 : 2025 INSC 950

Municipal Laws - Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957- Master Plan for Delhi (MPD) 2021 -Shop-cum-Residence (LSC) Conversion - Misuse and Unauthorised Construction - The Supreme Court rejected the applicant's Interlocutory Application (I.A.) for de-sealing of Shop/Plot situated in New Rajinder Nagar Market, New Delhi and the prayer for permitting the use of upper floors as commercial – Held, the applicant's property was sanctioned as a “shop-cum-residence”, permitting commercial use only on the ground floor, while the upper floors, which the applicant himself had sought and obtained for residential use, were being illegally utilized for commercial purposes - The classification of New Rajinder Nagar Market as a "designated Local Shopping Centre (LSC)", a shop-cum-residence complex where only the ground floor is meant for commerce, and the upper floors are residential - Directed the MCD to conduct a fresh inspection of the premises and to issue a detailed order identifying non-compoundable violations that must be demolished, calculating the requisite conversion charges for changing the land use, and imposing penalty charges for the excess construction - The applicant was permitted to seek de-sealing of the property only after removing non-compoundable constructions and paying all prescribed charges in full. [Paras 21 - 24] M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1050

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Seizure, Storage, Sampling and Disposal) Rules, 2022 – Held, NDPS Act does not divest the Special Courts under the NDPS Act of their jurisdiction to entertain an application for interim custody or release of a seized conveyance under Section 451 & 457 CrPC - The Rules of 2022, being subordinate legislation, are only supplemental to the scheme of disposal contemplated under the NDPS Act and cannot supersede the provisions of the parent legislation - The Rules are notably silent on the rights of persons whose property (like a conveyance) is affected by the disposal process - A conjoint and holistic reading of Sections 60(3) and 63 of the NDPS Act makes it abundantly clear that the power to determine whether a seized conveyance is liable to confiscation vests in the Special Court, not in any administrative or executive authority such as the DDC- i. Section 60(3) provides a defence to the owner to prove that the conveyance was used without their knowledge or connivance and that they had taken all reasonable precautions; ii. Section 63 mandates that no final order of confiscation can be passed without affording an opportunity of hearing to the person claiming ownership - Mere fact that a vehicle may be liable to confiscation under Section 60 cannot, by itself, operate to deny interim custody to a bona fide owner in the absence of an express bar under the NDPS Act - Confiscation is a measure resulting in deprivation of property and must be preceded by a prior hearing to ensure an innocent owner is not subjected to undue hardship - When the owner of a vehicle establishes that it was used for transporting narcotics substances without his knowledge or connivance, he cannot be denied interim custody of the vehicle pending trial- Appeal allowed. [Relied on Bishwajit Dey v. State of Assam 2025 INSC 32; (Criminal Appeal No. 1305 of 2025) Paras 13-19, 24- 34] Denash v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1032 : 2025 INSC 1258

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 - Section 14 - Assam Financial Corporation (Amendment) Staff Regulations, 2007 - Regulation 107 - Gratuity Ceiling - Employee's right to higher gratuity ceiling – Held, when a statutory corporation's service regulation (Assam Financial Corporation's 2007 Staff Regulation, Regulation 107) itself provides for the payment of gratuity at a maximum limit, which is either an amount fixed by the Corporation or "as notified by the Govt. of Assam from time to time," the Regulation must be interpreted to be in favor of the employees - The right of the employees to the higher ceiling flows from the beneficial interpretation of the Regulation itself - Once the State's regulation specifies a higher limit for the grant of gratuity, then there can't be discrimination regarding the disbursal of the amount of gratuity and every employee shall be given equal treatment - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 16 - 21] Assam Financial Corporation Ltd. v. Bhabendra Nath Sarma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1057 : 2025 INSC 1264

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC); Section 195A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC); Sections 154, 156, 195(1)(b)(i), 195A, 340 - Threatening a person to give false evidence –Procedure for taking cognizance – Cognizable or Non-Cognizable Offence – Held, offense of threatening a witness under Section 195A IPC is a cognizable offense, empowering the police to directly register an FIR and investigate, without waiting for a formal complaint from a court - Offence under Section 195A IPC is a cognizable offence - The procedure under Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC is not applicable to the offence under Section 195A IPC - Section 195A IPC was conceptualized as distinct and different from the offences under Sections 193 to 196 IPC - The threat to a witness under Section 195A IPC may be given long before they come to Court, and making it cognizable allows for immediate steps to be taken - Requiring the victim to go before the Court concerned and necessitate a complaint under Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC along with an inquiry under Section 340 CrPC would cripple and hamper the process - Section 195A CrPC provides an additional remedy - The use of the word 'may' in Section 195A CrPC means it is not compulsory for the threatened person to only approach the Magistrate - Since the offence is cognizable, the police have the power to take action under Sections 154 CrPC and 156 CrPC - Argument that Section 195A IPC should be split into two categories (one requiring a Court complaint if committed in relation to a proceeding, and the other allowing a private complaint otherwise) was rejected as it would require rewriting the provision - Applied the rule of harmonious construction to synchronize the provisions and give full effect to the legislation - Appeals allowed. [Relied on Abdul Razzak v. State of M.P. and another, 2023 SCC OnLine MP 7152; Paras 22-29] State of Kerala v. Suni @ Sunil, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1034 : 2025 INSC 1260

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Section 306, 107 - Quashing of FIR / Criminal Proceedings under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. - Core Ingredients – Refusal to Marry -Held, to constitute the offence of abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC, two basic ingredients must be present: suicidal death and abetment thereof - Abetment, as defined under Section 107 IPC, requires either instigation, conspiracy, or intentionally aiding the doing of a thing - Conviction under Section 306 IPC requires a clear mens rea and an active or direct act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid the commission of suicide, which must have led the deceased to commit suicide leaving no option - Mere refusal to marry, even if true, by itself, would not amount to 'instigation' as explained under Section 107 of the IPC - His refusal to marry, or even his statement that he "does not care in case she dies" made when the deceased threatened suicide, could not be said to have been made with the intention to push the deceased into a situation where she was left with no option but to commit suicide - The ingredients necessary to constitute the offence of abetment punishable under Section 306 IPC were not borne out - Putting the accused to trial would be a travesty of justice and an empty formality - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Nipun Aneja and Others Versus State of Uttar Pradesh SCC OnLine SC 4091; Geo Varghese v. State of Rajasthan, (2021) 19 SCC 144; Paras 15, 17-21] Yadwinder Singh @ Sunny v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1058

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) - Sections 147, 148, 149, 302, 304 Part II, 307 - Unlawful Assembly - Murder and Attempt to Murder - Interference with Concurrent Findings (Article 136 of the Constitution of India) - The Supreme Court reiterated that it generally exercises caution in interfering with concurrent findings of fact unless there is a manifest illegality or grave and serious miscarriage of justice on account of misreading or ignoring material evidence, or where the conclusions are manifestly perverse and unsupportable from the evidence on record - Noted that present case did not meet this threshold - Supreme Court noted that there was - i. delay in FIR and non-recovery of weapon not fatal, where there is consistent medical evidence and ocular evidence; ii. Testimonies of injured eye witness holds presumption of truth; iii. Intention to cause death can be gathered from various factors like attacking with lathis, spades, phawadas etc - Held that appellants, in furtherance of their common intention, formed an unlawful assembly, and some were armed with sharp-edged deadly weapons, committing the murder of the deceased and attempting to murder the injured witness - The conviction and sentence were upheld - Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Ekala Sivaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Shahaja alias Shahajan Ismail Mohd. Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra 2023 12 SCC 558; State of H.P. Vs. Gian Chand 2001 6 SCC 71; Jarnail Singh & Ors. v State of Punjab 2009 9 SCC 719; Paras 24, 25, 33-39, 42, 43, 46-48, 49, 50]. Om Pal v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1037 : 2025 INSC 1262

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 147, 148, 149, 302, 307 – Unlawful Assembly – Vicarious Liability – Reversal of Acquittal by High Court – Scope of Appellate Interference – Held, interference with an acquittal order must be exercised with caution, but it is justified if the Trial Court's findings are manifestly perverse, unreasonable, or contrary to the evidence on record – The Trial Court's acquittal suffered from a fundamental misappreciation of evidence, specifically by overlooking the consistent testimony of injured eyewitnesses and failing to appreciate the legal effect of the appellants' active participation in an unlawful assembly. The High Court's reversal was based on a proper appraisal of the record and was well-reasoned - The nature of the weapons used, the ferocity and precision of the attack, and the joint execution unmistakably demonstrated that the common object extended to the commission of murder - Upheld order of High Court - Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415; Masalti v. State of U.P., AIR 1965 SC 202; Paras 29-30, 41-44] Haribhau @ Bhausaheb Dinkar Kharuse v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1043 : 2025 INSC 1266

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 302, 376(2)(G) and 201- Circumstantial Evidence — Extra-Judicial Confession — Last Seen Theory- Case based on Circumstantial Evidence- Held that in a case based on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish that the circumstances point conclusively toward the guilt of the accused alone, excluding any other hypothesis, including the possibility of innocence or third-party involvement - The chain of evidence must be so complete as to leave no reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the accused's innocence - Explained Principle of Two Views - Held where a perusal of the evidence in a circumstantial case allows for two views, the one favourable to the accused must be adopted. Suspicion, however strong, cannot replace proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Sanjay v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1033 : 2025 INSC 317

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Proof of demand and acceptance of bribe – Held, for an offence under Section 7 of the PC Act, the demand of illegal gratification is a sine qua non to prove the guilt - Mere recovery of currency notes cannot constitute an offence unless it is proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money, knowing it to be a bribe - The proof of acceptance can follow only if there is proof of demand - Sole testimony of the complainant, who is an interested witness, cannot be relied upon without corroboration with independent evidence - Statutory presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act is not automatic and arises only once the foundational facts of demand and acceptance are proved - Suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Rajesh Gupta vs. State through Central Bureau of Investigation, 2022 INSC 359; Panna Damodar Rathi vs. State of Maharashtra, (1979) 4 SCC 526; Ayyasami vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (1992) 1 SCC 304; Paras 18, 19, 33] P. Somaraju v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1040 : 2025 INSC 1263

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Sections 7, 13(1)(d), 13(2), and 20 – Demand and acceptance of illegal gratification – Statutory presumption – Failure of prosecution to prove foundational facts – Held, an appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate, and reconsider the evidence - However, due to the reinforced or 'double' presumption of innocence after acquittal, interference must be limited - If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the record, the acquittal should not be disturbed. Judicial intervention is only warranted where the Trial Court's view is perverse, based on misreading or ignoring material evidence, or results in manifest miscarriage of justice - The Appellate Court must address the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal before reversing it and assigning its own. [Relied on Chandrappa & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 (Para 11); Mallappa & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka, 2024 INSC 104; Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund & Anr. vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 INSC 258; Paras 11-14] P. Somaraju v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1040 : 2025 INSC 1263

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 - Quashing of Conviction and Sentence - Article 142 of the Constitution of India – Held, quashing of conviction under Section 366 IPC and Section 6 of POCSO Act using Article 142 power of "complete justice" where the appellant and victim married and have a child - Supreme Court invoked its extraordinary power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to quash the criminal proceedings, including the conviction and sentence, against the appellant for offences under Section 366 of the Indian Penal Code, 1872 and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 - Supreme Court acknowledged that while the law provides that proceedings for a heinous offense cannot be quashed on the basis of a compromise, ignoring the wife's cry for compassion and empathy would not serve the ends of justice - This is a case where the law must yield to the cause of justice - The appellant was subjected to the specific condition of not deserting his wife and child and to maintain them for the rest of their life with dignity - Appeal allowed. [Paras 8 - 13] K. Kirubakaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1048 : 2025 INSC 1272

Service Law – Appointment in excess of advertised vacancies – Termination – Justification of termination – Scope of Rule 12 of the relevant Rules – Maintenance of Wait List – Complete Justice- Held that Rule 12 was interpreted in Naseem Ahmad case to permit a waiting list of 'reasonable dimensions' to be maintained, which is adequate to meet vacancies that might be available within a reasonable period in the year of recruitment or the year succeeding thereto - The explicit rider in the advertisement that the vacancies could be increased or decreased indicated the Appointing Authority's intention to maintain a wait list to fill up excess vacancies, as permissible under the rules - Given that the next advertisement was only after 8 years (in 2008), it was evident that vacancies arose within that period, justifying the appellants' appointments subsequent to the twelve advertised vacancies - Held that the termination was found to be unjustified. [Relied on Naseem Ahmad and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2011) 2 SCC 734; Paras 6,7,10,11,12] Sanjay Kumar Mishra v. District Judge, Ambedkar Nagar (UP), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1031

Service Law – Directions in Exercise of Complete Justice - Held, the appellants were out of employment for almost 17 years and had worked for eight years, the Court issued specific directions, making it clear that they were in the peculiar circumstances of the case and shall not be a precedent – Directed - i. To be accommodated in existing Class IV vacancies in the District Judgeship of Ambedkar Nagar - If no vacancies exist, they shall be appointed in a supernumerary post, to be adjusted against future vacancies or cease on retirement, whichever is earlier; ii. Appellants who have crossed the age of superannuation: To be entitled to minimum pension dehors (irrespective of) completing only 8 years in employment; iii. Appointed appellants: Shall be continued without any seniority but the prior service period shall be reckoned for determining pensionable service, and they shall be granted pension at the minimum; iv. Intervening period (17 years) shall not be treated as notional service or for computing pensionable service. [Paras 11] Sanjay Kumar Mishra v. District Judge, Ambedkar Nagar (UP), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1031

Specific Relief Act, 1963 - 2018 Amendment - Supreme Court clarified that the 2018 amendment to the Act of 1963, which made the grant of specific performance of contracts a mandatory relief, has no retrospective effect and does not apply to suits or transactions that arose before its enforcement on October 1, 2018. [Relied on Katta Sujatha Reddy v. Siddamsetty Infra Projects (P) Ltd. 2023 1 SCC 355; Siddamsetty Infra Projects (P.) Ktd. V. Katta Sujatha Reddy 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3214; Paras 34-38] Annamalai v. Vasanthi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1041 : 2025 INSC 1267

Specific Relief Act, 1963 - Requirement of Declaration of Title and Recovery of Possession – Held where the plaintiff asserts title based on a Will but does not have possession (which is admitted to be with the defendant), a suit for injunction simpliciter cannot be maintained - The plaintiff should have sought a declaration of title and consequential recovery of possession - This is especially true when the defendant claims possession as a co-owner with absolute rights, having made valuable improvements - Appeal is disposed of with reservation of liberty to both parties to file a fresh suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession. [Paras 10-13] S. Santhana Lakshmi v. D. Rajammal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1059 : 2025 INSC 1197

Specific Relief Act, 1963 - Section 10, Section 14, Section 20 (as prior to 2018 Amendment) - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Section 100 - Agreement for Sale of Immovable Property - Suit for Specific Performance - Readiness and Willingness - When should a plaintiff seeking specific performance of contract must also seek a declaration that the termination of the contract by the other party was invalid – Held, a suit for specific performance is maintainable without seeking a declaration that the termination of the agreement was invalid where the contract did not confer a right to unilaterally terminate, or where the right conferred was waived, and the termination was a unilateral act - The vendors, by accepting the additional amount, waived their right to forfeit the advance consideration and acknowledged the contract's subsistence; thus, their subsequent termination notice was a void act and a breach of contract by repudiation. The Plaintiff-Appellant had the option to treat the contract as subsisting and sue for specific performance. [Paras 31-33] Annamalai v. Vasanthi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1041 : 2025 INSC 1267

Specific Relief Act, 1963 - Section 20 - Discretionary Relief of Specific Performance – Held, the High Court erred in declining the discretionary relief under Section 20 (pre-2018 Amendment) based on the unsustainable grounds of the plaintiff setting up a false claim of additional payment and of possession - The failure to prove possession alone does not make the claim false - Considering the payment of over 90% of the agreed consideration, the additional payment, and the non-bona fide conduct of the vendors in selling part of the property to a related party even before termination, the relief of specific performance should not have been denied - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ravinder Singh v. Sukhbir Singh and Others, (2013) 9 SCC 245; Babu Lal v. Hazari Lal Kishori Lal, (1982) 1 SCC 525; Para 25-32, 38, 39] Annamalai v. Vasanthi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1041 : 2025 INSC 1267

Specific Relief Act, 1963 - Section 38 (Perpetual Injunction) - Suit for Injunction Simpliciter - Declaration of Title - Recovery of Possession – Held, a suit filed for an injunction restraining alienation/encumbrance and interference with peaceful possession is an injunction simpliciter - When the plaintiff admits in the pleadings and oral evidence (witness box) that possession is with the defendant, an injunction against the interference of peaceful enjoyment of the property ought not to have been granted - Possession was admitted to be with the defendant in the original plaint on the basis of a tenancy arrangement and later in evidence as well. [Para 11] S. Santhana Lakshmi v. D. Rajammal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1059 : 2025 INSC 1197

Supreme Court orders – Modification of - Expunging observations regarding conduct of counsel – Waiver of costs imposed while dismissing SLP – Decorum of proceedings – Role and duty of counsel – Held, once a Bench has indicated its inclination and requested counsel to refrain from making further submissions, such direction must be respected, as continued insistence thereafter serves no purpose and affects the decorum of proceedings - Emphasized that persistent submissions despite the Court expressing its mind is improper and undermines court decorum - Acknowledged the assurance from senior bar leaders that such conduct would not reoccur and the advocate's remorse - Considering the apology and it being a first instance, the application was allowed with a caution, deleting adverse remarks and waiving the costs - Advocates are bound to respect the Court's indication and maintain decorum to ensure orderly proceedings - however, genuine remorse and apology may warrant recall of adverse observations and costs - Application allowed. [Paras 5 - 9] State Election Commission v. Shakti Singh Bharthwal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1038 : 2025 INSC 1261

Tender — Technical Bid Disqualification — 'Haisiyat Praman Patra' (Solvency Certificate) Requirement - Principle of Judicial Review in Tender Matters – Held, neither Clause 18 nor any other condition in the NIT (Notice Inviting Tender) specified that the 'haisiyat praman patra' must be issued only by a District Magistrate in terms of the Uttar Pradesh government notification dated 29.10.2018. Since the terms of an NIT must be clear and unambiguous, if the Mandi Parishad intended for the certificate to be issued by the District Magistrate alone, it ought to have specified so in the NIT conditions - Having failed to specify the issuing authority, the 1st respondent-Mandi Parishad could not have rejected the certificate simply because it was not issued by a District Magistrate - The appellant's certificate was issued by an experienced valuer registered with the Income Tax Department, who is otherwise competent to issue such a certificate - The power of judicial review should only be exercised if the tendering authority's decision is dehors the terms of the NIT or is patently arbitrary - The rejection of the appellant's technical bid on the ground that the certificate was not issued by the District Magistrate was held to be dehors the terms of the NIT and is liable to be quashed - Set aside the order of High Court and remanded the same - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651; Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Ors., (1978) 1 SCC 405; Paras 12-18] Kimberley Club Pvt. Ltd. v. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1054 : 2025 INSC 1276