Administrative Law — Precedents & Internal Departmental Notings — Legal Efficacy - Internal Departmental File Notings — Held - Departmental file notings do not carry the sanction of law to become an executable order - A noting recorded by an officer (such as the Executive Director / LAD of SEBI) represents mere internal viewpoints/opinions expressed for internal deliberations and does not constitute a final binding adjudication or confer legal rights/immunities upon an assessee/noticee. [Relied On: M/s Sethi Auto Service Station & Anr. v. Delhi Development Authority & Ors., (2009) 1 SCC 180; Paras 26–28] Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Vedanta Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 919 : 2026 INSC 978

Administrative Law & Judicial Discipline – Subsistence of Interim Judicial Direction vs. Subsequent Executive Action - An executive authority cannot, during the subsistence of an operative interim direction issued by a constitutional court granting provisional permission, render that direction ineffective or redundant by passing an administrative order inconsistent with it - If the authorities find compliance impracticable or contrary to rules, the appropriate course is to approach the court for modification, clarification, or stay. [Paras 25, 26] Indian Kayaking and Canoeing Association v. Union Territory of J&K, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 922 : 2026 INSC 981

Administrative Law & Revenue Jurisprudence — Revisional Power to be Exercised within Reasonable Time — Doctrine of Stale Claims - Even where an enactment does not explicitly prescribe a period of limitation for the exercise of suo motu revisional power, such power must be exercised within a "reasonable time" - Factors such as the nature of the statute, accrued rights/liabilities, prejudice caused, and the creation of third-party interests must be weighed - Public interest demands that authorities do not reopen settled, stale matters - Where the statute affirmatively specifies a 3-year outer limit, initiating an inquiry after 35–40 years and after third-party apartment owners have acquired rights is without statutory mooring and void at its very inception. [Relied on State of Gujarat v. Patil Raghav Natha and Others, (1969) 2 SCC 187; Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Sunil Krishna Khaitan and Others, (2023) 2 SCC 643; Mansaram v. S.P. Pathak and Others, (1984) 1 SCC 125; Government of India v. Citedal Fine Pharmaceuticals, Madras, and Others, (1989) 3 SCC 483; State of Orissa and Others v. Brundaban Sharma and Another, 1995 Supp (3) SCC 249; State of Punjab and Others v. Bhatinda District Cooperative Milk Producers Union Ltd., (2007) 11 SCC 363; Paras 14-16] M.R.R. Setty (Dead), by LRs Versus Government of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 889 : 2026 INSC 944

Administrative Law & Service Law – Deputation / NOC for National Sports Assignments – Exercise of Administrative Discretion – Article 14 of the Constitution – Duty of Timely Consideration - Although a government employee or a borrowing sports federation does not possess an absolute or vested right to claim deputation, relieving, or foreign travel permission, the absence of an absolute right cannot be equated with the absence of a right to a fair, reasonable, non-arbitrary, and timely consideration of a request - Administrative discretion must be exercised on relevant considerations, excluding extraneous ones, and within a reasonable timeframe - Where an assignment involves representing or coaching the Indian National Team at time-sensitive international events (such as the Asian Games or World Cups), delay itself defeats the object of the power exercised - A belated rejection order passed after an international event has already concluded cannot retrospectively cure prolonged executive inaction. [Paras 21–32] Indian Kayaking and Canoeing Association v. Union Territory of J&K, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 922 : 2026 INSC 981

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 2(1)(h) read with Section 7 — Definition of "Parties" — Binding Non-Signatories - The requirement of a written arbitration agreement under Section 7 does not preclude binding a non-signatory party - The subjective intention and mutual consent of parties to be bound by an arbitration clause can be gathered from surrounding circumstances, negotiation, execution of composite documents, and conduct. Modern commercial arbitration mechanisms must remain elastic enough to accommodate multi-party and multi-contract arrangements without compromising party autonomy. [Relied on ASF Buildtech Private Limited v. Shapoorji Pallonji and Company Private Limited, (2025) 9 SCC 76; Ajay Madhusudan Patel and Others v. Jyotrindra S. Patel and Others, (2025) 2 SCC 147; Cox and Kings Limited v. SAP India Pvt. Ltd., (2024) 4 SCC 1; Inox Wind Limited v. Thermocables Limited, (2018) 2 SCC 519; Paras 20-28] National Skill Development Corporation v. Surya Wires, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 930 : 2026 INSC 977

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 7(5) — Arbitration agreement — Incorporation by reference — Composite transaction — Interconnected agreements — Personal Guarantee forming an integral part of Loan Agreement - Where parties structure a single commercial transaction through several interconnected instruments and the ancillary agreement (Personal Guarantee) is contractually defined as a "Facility Agreement" forming an integral and inseparable part of the principal agreement, the arbitration clause in the principal agreement stands incorporated by reference under Section 7(5) into the ancillary agreement - The Supreme Court held that the phrase "shall be deemed to be part of this Agreement as if the provisions thereof were set out herein in extension" operates as an internal deeming fiction that binds every facility agreement including the Personal Guarantee within the same legal and arbitral framework as the principal Loan Agreement - A personal guarantee exacted as a mandatory pre-disbursement condition precedent to secure public funds cannot be severed for the purpose of dispute resolution alone while remaining tethered to the main contract for every other purpose, including liability - the guarantor, despite signing the Loan Agreement only in an official capacity and executing the Personal Guarantee in a personal capacity, is bound to submit to arbitration. [Paras 24-29] National Skill Development Corporation v. Surya Wires, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 930 : 2026 INSC 977

Banking Regulation Act, 1949 – Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 – Section 21 & Section 35A – Trading and Assignment of Non-Performing Assets – Regulatory Validity – Held that assignment of debt is a permissible banking activity under the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, and RBI guidelines issued under circulars have statutory force - Banks are permitted to engage in trading in NPAs to resolve bad debts and clean their balance sheets. Interpreting the SARFAESI Act restrictively to deny an assignee bank the remedy of enforcing security interest under the Act upon default would defeat the object of the financial system and the enactment. [Paras 27 - 29] Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. v. Trupti Sanjay Mehta, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 886 : 2026 INSC 943

Banking Regulation Act, 1949 – Section 36AAA(1) & (7) – Extension of Supersession beyond the Elected Statutory Term of the Board of Directors – Held, Permissible - Once an order of supersession is passed, the Board ceases to exist and its powers vest in the Administrator - Under Section 36AAA(7) of the BR Act, the Administrator is required to convene a general meeting to elect new directors only "on and before expiration of the period of supersession" specified by the RBI - The statutory tenure of the erstwhile Board of Directors has no bearing upon the exercise or continuation of the RBI's power of supersession, provided the total period of supersession does not exceed the aggregate limit of five years - Where supersession was initiated during the Board's term, it can validly be extended even after the expiry of the original term. [Paras 36, 37, 38] Sandeep S. Ghandat v. Reserve Bank of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 895 : 2026 INSC 955

Banking Regulation Act, 1949 – Section 36AAA(1), First Proviso – Requirement of Consultation with State Government – Scope – Multi-State Co-operative Bank – Held, Inapplicable - The requirement of prior consultation with the State Government under the proviso to Section 36AAA(1) applies exclusively to a co-operative bank registered with the Registrar of Co-operative Societies of a State (uni-State co-operative bank) and does not extend to multi-State co-operative banks. [Relied on Pandurang Ganapati Chaugule v. Vishwasrao Patil Murgud Sahakari Bank Ltd., (2020) 9 SCC 215; Union of India v. Rajendra N. Shah and Anr., (2022) 19 SCC 520; DMRC v. Tarun Pal Singh, (2018) 14 SCC 161; Commissioner of Commercial Taxes & Ors. v. Ramkishan Shrikishan Jhaver & Ors., 1967 SCC OnLine SC 31; Para 30-39] Sandeep S. Ghandat v. Reserve Bank of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 895 : 2026 INSC 955

Civil Law – Dedication vs. Adverse Possession – Mutually Destructive / Inconsistent Pleas - A party asserting title cannot simultaneously claim ownership on the contradictory doctrines of completed dedication and adverse possession - If property has already vested by dedication, adverse possession cannot arise, as adverse possession necessarily proceeds on the premise that title originally vested in another and was subsequently extinguished by hostile possession for the statutory limitation period - Long and continuous possession, by itself, cannot be equated with adverse possession in the absence of pleading and proving the specific time when possession became hostile (animus possidendi) to the knowledge of the true owner. [Paras 26–31] Bhag Singh v. Basant Kaur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 923 : 2026 INSC 983

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 100 – Second Appeal – Interference with Concurrent Findings of Fact - Concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court and First Appellate Court are not immune from interference under Section 100 CPC where such findings are vitiated by an erroneous application of settled legal principles, ignore material legal requirements, or equate long possession with adverse possession without establishing hostile animus – Held that a plaintiff in a suit for declaration must succeed on the strength of their own title and not merely on the weakness of the defendant's title – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Suraj Bhan v. Financial Commissioner, (2007) 6 SCC 186; Vadiyala Prabhakar Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 815; Government of Kerala v. Joseph, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 961; Dharampal v. Punjab Wakf Board, (2018) 11 SCC 449; A. Shahul Hameed v. N. Malligarjuna, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 969; Paras 37–41] Bhag Singh v. Basant Kaur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 923 : 2026 INSC 983

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Section 11 — Res Judicata in Continuous Service Claims - Prior rounds of litigation concerning claims for regularization do not operate as res judicata against subsequent claims claiming pensionary consequences and retiral benefits flowing from regularizations voluntarily effected thereafter - The causes of action and reliefs are distinct, and hyper technical bars cannot foreclose consideration of statutory retiral rights arising out of a continuing service relationship. [Relied on Harbans Lal v. State of Punjab & Ors., 2010 SCC OnLine P&H 8181 (affirmed in SLP (C) No. 23578 of 2012); Paras 20-32] Punjab School Education Board v. Satnam Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 914 : 2026 INSC 965

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 222, 386(b), & 464 – Conversion of POCSO Conviction to Section 376 IPC in Absence of Formal Charge – Cognate Offences & Absence of Failure of Justice - The omission to frame a specific or alternative charge under Section 376 IPC does not bar the Appellate Court from convicting the accused under Section 376 IPC where the charge under Section 4 POCSO Act fails due to lack of proof of the victim's age, provided the actus reus of rape is conclusively proved - Section 375 IPC and Section 3 of the POCSO Act share identical ingredients and actus reus, with the victim's minority being the sole distinguishing feature - Where the accused was put to notice and given full opportunity to defend against penetrative sexual assault, no prejudice or failure of justice is occasioned under Section 464 CrPC - Under Section 222 and Section 386(b) CrPC, the Appellate Court is fully empowered to alter the finding and convict the accused for the cognate/minor offence under Section 376(1) IPC and modify the sentence accordingly. [Distinguished from Luis Caetano Viegas v. Estrelina Mariana R.M.A Da'Costa, (2002) 9 SCC 144; Relied on P. Yuvaprakash v. State, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 846; Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 263; Sandeep Yadav v. Satish, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 474; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Swaroop @ Barkat, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 442; Sachin v. State of Maharashtra, (2025) 9 SCC 507; Paras 41–47, 50-58] Pynchemalangaki Bareh v. State of Meghalaya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 924 : 2026 INSC 984

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 378 & Section 386 — Appeal against Acquittal — Scope of Appellate Interference — Principles governing reversal of trial court's acquittal - An appellate court considering an appeal against acquittal must bear in mind the cardinal principles - (1) presumption of innocence in favour of the accused is not weakened but reinforced by an acquittal; (2) if two reasonable views are possible on the evidence, the one favourable to the accused must be adopted; (3) the appellate court must give proper weight and consideration to the trial court's assessment regarding credibility and demeanour of witnesses, as the trial judge had the distinct advantage of seeing and hearing them; and (4) the accused is entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt - To reverse an acquittal, it is imperative for the appellate court to record a clear finding that the trial court's view is perverse, misread the evidence, or is an impossible conclusion unsupported by the material on record. [Relied on Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor, AIR 1934 PC 227(2); State of Uttar Pradesh v. Samman Dass, 1972 INSC 11; Paras 7 - 13] Sanjay Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 901 : 2026 INSC 948

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 482 — Maintainability of Corporate Prosecution without Arraigning or Identifying Natural Persons / Alter Ego - Criminal proceedings against a corporate entity cannot be quashed under Section 482 of the CrPC on the sole ground that no natural person/alter ego has been identified or arraigned alongside it in the chargesheet - The role and mental element of a company can be prima facie disclosed through its own conduct, decisions, and surrounding circumstances without naming specific individuals at the threshold stage - Establishing attribution conclusively is a matter of evidence to be determined during trial - While non-arraignment under provisions like Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is fatal to prosecuting individuals because liability is vicarious and derivative, no such condition precedent applies in reverse to corporations prosecuted for direct offences under the IPC or Prevention of Corruption Act. [Relied on Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd. v. Securities Commission, [1995] 2 A.C. 500; Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2005) 4 SCC 530; Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours Pvt. Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661; Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc., (2011) 1 SCC 74; Paras 175–187, 188–197] Sanofi India Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 904 : 2026 INSC 957

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 482 & Section 362 – Inherent Powers of the High Court – Bar under Section 362 – Scope of Recall vs. Substantive Review – Claim of Juvenility – Recall of earlier order dismissing appeal – Permissibility where order suffered from inherent lack of jurisdiction or mistake by Court resulting in grave injustice - The High Court has inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to recall its previous order or judgment where an accused/convict was a juvenile on the date of occurrence and was deprived of statutory benefits due to a mistake committed by the Court - The bar enacted under Section 362 CrPC against altering or reviewing a judgment does not extinguish or curtail the inherent powers of the High Court to correct palpable mistakes, procedural irregularities, or orders passed under a misconception of law that result in a failure of justice - The principle actus curiae neminem gravabit (no person should suffer on account of a mistake of the Court) applies squarely - A petition seeking recall of an order on the ground of an inherent lack of jurisdiction (such as lack of trial jurisdiction over a juvenile) is in the nature of a procedural review, which is not barred by Section 362 CrPC. [Relied on A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak & Anr., (1988) 2 SCC 602; Ganesh Patel v. Umakant Rajoria, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2050; Asit Kumar Kar v. State of West Bengal & Ors., (2009) 2 SCC 703; P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578; Paras 27–33] Mahavir @ Avnish v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 892 : 2026 INSC 942

Constitution of India — Article 142 — Inherent Powers — Direction for Independent Inquiry into Genuineness of Academic Degree - Even when declining to disturb the appointment of a candidate on a writ of quo warranto because he held the mandatory UGC-NET qualification, the Court cannot turn a blind eye to prima facie evidence demonstrating that an additional Ph.D. degree used to secure selection was forged or fabricated - In exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court directed the employing University to conduct a full-fledged departmental inquiry in accordance with the principles of natural justice, ensuring presence of original records and officials of the degree-awarding university - If the degree is found to be forged, the appointment will not be protected, and the authorities shall be at liberty to initiate criminal prosecution. [Relied on A.N. Shastri v. State of Punjab, (1998) Supp SCC 127; R.K. Jain v. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 119; B. Srinivasa Reddy v. Karnataka Urban Water Supply & Drainage Board Employees Association, (2006) 11 SCC 731; Paras 18–20] Annu Kumar v. Maharshi Dayanand University Rohtak, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 913 : 2026 INSC 968

Constitution of India — Article 21 and Article 47 — Right to Health as part of Right to Life — State's affirmative duty to protect public health — Front-of-Package Labelling ("FoPL") on packaged food - The right to life guaranteed under Article 21 encompasses the right to health, casting a positive duty upon the State under Article 47 to take affirmative steps to safeguard public health and protect consumers especially growing children from the scientifically substantiated perils of foods High in Fat, Sugar, or Salt (HFSS) and Ultra-Processed Foods (UPF) - Prompt, clear, and consumer-friendly Front-of-Package Labelling (FoPL) is vital to enable informed consumer choice and encourage product reformulation. [Paras 28-38] 3S and Our Health Society v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 926 : 2026 INSC 988

Constitution of India — Article 226 — Maintainability of Writ Petition challenging Show Cause Notice — Exceptions - A writ petition directed merely against a show cause notice is ordinarily not maintainable where statutory alternative remedies exist - two narrow exceptions exist through which a writ court may entertain a challenge at the threshold - (i) want of jurisdiction (where the authority has no power in law to embark upon an inquiry, rendering the notice non est); and (ii) abuse of jurisdiction (i.e., mala fide exercise of jurisdiction) - Where the authority is competent under the statute and no mala fides are established, the notice cannot be quashed at inception merely on disputed questions of valuation. [Paras 10–12] Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. District Revenue Officer (Stamps), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 907 : 2026 INSC 963

Constitution of India — Article 226 — Writ of Quo Warranto — Essential Requirements and Locus Standi — Scope of Inquiry - To seek and succeed in a proceeding for a writ of quo warranto, the petitioner (even if a stranger) must establish that an appointee lacks the mandatory statutory eligibility/qualifications for occupying a public office or suffers from a statutory disability/disqualification, and has consequently usurped the public office - The initial burden of proof lies heavily on the petitioner to produce unimpeachable evidence, following which the onus shifts to the appointer and appointee - A writ of quo warranto cannot be employed as a vehicle for the vindication of personal grievances by unsuccessful candidates who participated in the selection process and failed to qualify on merit - Where the appointee holds the minimum mandatory qualification (here, UGC-NET) and a Ph.D. degree was merely a desirable/alternative qualification under the applicable recruitment rules and UGC Regulations 2010, the appointee cannot be declared to have usurped the public office. [Paras 8, 9, 11–17] Annu Kumar v. Maharshi Dayanand University Rohtak, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 913 : 2026 INSC 968

Constitution of India — Article 299 — Transactions executed in the name of the President of India — Effect on Stamp Duty Inquiries - The mere fact that the constitutional nomenclature of the President of India figures in an instrument of transfer as the transferor does not preclude an inquiry under Section 47-A into whether the consideration or market value has been truly set forth in the instrument - Instruments entered into in the exercise of the executive power of the Union are expressed in the name of the President and executed by authorised officers, but this does not render the question of true market value or fraudulent intention incapable of arising as a matter of law. [Relied on Ramesh Chand Bansal v. District Magistrate/Collector, (1999) 5 SCC 62; Shanti Bhushan v. State of U.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 489; Special Director v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse, (2004) 3 SCC 440; Union of India v. VICCO Laboratories, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 489; Para 12 - 23] Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. District Revenue Officer (Stamps), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 907 : 2026 INSC 963

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 142 — Invalidation of Scheduled Tribe Certificate — Protection of Pensionary and Retiral Dues — Scope of equitable relief - The appellant was appointed as Junior Engineer (Civil) in 1994 on the basis of a caste certificate certifying him as belonging to the "Tokre Koli" Scheduled Tribe and retired on superannuation on 30.06.2025 after more than three decades of service - The Scrutiny Committee invalidated and confiscated his caste certificate, and the High Court dismissed his writ petition relying on pre-constitutional family records showing the caste of his paternal ancestors as "Koli" - Affirming the findings of the Scrutiny Committee and the High Court on the invalidity of the caste claim, the Supreme Court considered the question of protecting his retiral benefits – The Supreme Court observed that while ordinarily an appointment obtained on the basis of an invalid caste certificate would not survive, in exceptional circumstances where equities of the case so warrant, the Supreme Court may exercise its power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to render complete justice - Taking note that the appellant had rendered more than 30 years of unblemished service until superannuation, and filed an affidavit stating that he has no children and no member of his family had derived any benefit from the invalidated certificate, the Court directed that the service rendered by the appellant from 21.10.1994 to 30.06.2025 shall stand protected for the limited purpose of computation and release of his retiral and pensionary benefits - It was explicitly clarified that such protection shall neither amount to validation/recognition of the caste claim nor entitle the appellant or his family to claim future benefits. [Relied on Chairman and Managing Director, Food Corporation of India & Ors. v. Jagdish Balaram Bahira & Ors., (2017) 8 SCC 670; R. Sundaram v. Tamil Nadu State Level Scrutiny Committee, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 287; Surekha Baljorsingh Thakur v. Caste Scrutiny Committee & Anr., Civil Appeal No. 4586 of 2024; Paras 11–16] Shirish Pandharinath Patil v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 898 : 2026 INSC 949

Constitution of India, 1950 – Part IXB – Article 243ZL and Article 243ZT – Banking Regulation Act, 1949 – Section 36AAA(1), (2), (7) & Section 56 – Multi-State Co-operative Societies Act, 2002 – Supersession of Board of Directors of Multi-State Co-operative Bank – Six-month limitation under Article 243ZL(1) – Whether RBI's power of supersession under Section 36AAA of the BR Act is circumscribed by the six-month ceiling under Article 243ZL(1) – Held, No, the third proviso to Article 243ZL(1) explicitly states that in the case of a co-operative society carrying on the business of banking, the provisions of the BR Act "shall also apply" - The expression "shall also apply" is used in an additive and non-restrictive sense, incorporating the provisions of the BR Act into Part IXB of the Constitution by reference insofar as it relates to multi-State co-operative banks - The third proviso acts as an independent substantive legislative provision rather than a qualifying or restrictive clause - the fourth proviso to Article 243ZL(1), which extends supersession from six months to one year for banking co-operative societies, explicitly excludes a multi-State co-operative society carrying on the business of banking - An exclusion presupposes prior inclusion - the six-month ceiling on supersession under Article 243ZL(1) does not apply to multi-State co-operative banks, and the RBI retains statutory power under Section 36AAA(1) of the BR Act to supersede the Board of Directors for a period not exceeding five years in aggregate. [Paras 20-34] Sandeep S. Ghandat v. Reserve Bank of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 895 : 2026 INSC 955

Constitution of India, 1950 — Seventh Schedule, List I Entry 57 and List II Entry 21 — Division of Legislative and Executive Powers — EEZ and Territorial Waters - The regulatory domains governing maritime fishing are distinctly bifurcated. While Entry 57 of List I grants the Parliament legislative competence (and the Union executive power) to regulate fishing and fisheries beyond territorial waters (in the EEZ), Entry 21 of List II vests the State Legislature and State Executive with authority to regulate fisheries within territorial waters - These powers are co-equal and autonomous in their respective spheres, with no direct conflict between the Union's Sustainable Harnessing of Fisheries in the Exclusive Economic Zone Rules, 2025 and the Tamil Nadu Marine Fishing Regulation Rules, 2020. [Para 14] Fisherman Care v. Government of India Department of Animal Husbandry, Dairying and Fisheries, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 888 : 2026 INSC 937

Constitutional Law — Cooperative Federalism and Article 19(1)(g) — Delay in Processing Applications as Unwritten Ban - Both the Union and the State are constitutional duty-bearers obligated by principles of cooperative federalism to enforce regulations harmoniously and ensure that citizens can pursue their fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(g) subject only to reasonable restrictions - Where the State Verifying Authority kept 226 out of 257 Access Pass applications pending without timely verification, such administrative lethargy virtually amounted to an impermissible "unwritten ban" - The State was directed to process and clear verification applications in an effective and time-bound manner, and notify transit channels under Rules 15(5) and 15(6) of the 2020 Rules for vessels transiting to the EEZ. [Relied on Union of India and Anr. v. Mohit Minerals Private Ltd., (2022) 10 SCC 700; State of Kerala v. Joseph Antony, (1994) 1 SCC 301; Kerala Swathanthra Malaya Thozhilali Federation and Others v. Kerala Trawlnet Boat Operators' Association and Others, (1994) 5 SCC 28; Paras 15-17] Fisherman Care v. Government of India Department of Animal Husbandry, Dairying and Fisheries, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 888 : 2026 INSC 937

Corporate Criminal Liability — Possession of Mens Rea and the Three-Stage Sequential Framework of Attribution - The Supreme Court held that corporations can possess mens rea and be held criminally liable for offences requiring intent - Attributing the act and state of mind of an individual to a corporation fixes direct liability on the company, distinct from vicarious liability – The Supreme Court laid down a three-stage sequential/hierarchical framework to answer - "If X, a natural person, does an act while acting for a corporation, in what circumstances is X's act, and the state of mind accompanying it, to be treated as the corporation's own?" – I. Primary Stage: Examines whether the constitutional documents (Memorandum / Articles of Association) or rules implied by company law vest the person with the power to do the act; II. General Stage: Inquires whether the power to do the act was delegated (expressly or impliedly) to the person with sufficient discretion and independence in doing the act; III. Special Stage: Involves statutory construction to determine whether the purpose of the statute requires fashioning a special rule of attribution - Where the statutory purpose is narrow, it is tested in the abstract; where broad, it is examined in the specific facts and circumstances of the case. [Paras 23, 24, 137, 142–151, 171] Sanofi India Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 904 : 2026 INSC 957

Criminal Jurisprudence — Defective Investigation — Shifting of Dead Body to Police Station vs. Hospital — Medical Impossibility of Instantaneous Death - Unexplained conduct and shoddy investigation creating reasonable doubt — Held: Medical expert evidence established that the gunshot wound sustained by the deceased could not cause instantaneous death and that a person of his physique would have survived for 3 to 6 hours - Conduct of relatives carrying the injured victim directly to the police station instead of taking him to a medical facility/hospital is highly unnatural and suspicious - the Investigating Officer's complete failure to prepare a site map of the scene of occurrence, non-recovery of firearms/empty cartridges from the spot, failure to seize blood-stained clothes, and failure to produce the gun license in court, fundamentally impair the prosecution version. [Paras 9-18] Ashok Upadhyay v. State of of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 917 : 2026 INSC 971

Criminal Law — Circumstantial Evidence — "Last Seen Together" Theory — Inferences from Cross-Examination Suggestions — Impermissibility - The theory of "last seen together" cannot be established when the witness testimonies lack consistency, contain material improvements over police statements, and fail to establish that the deceased accompanied the accused in close proximity to the time of death - The High Court committed a manifest error by holding that even if prosecution witnesses failed to depose in their examination-in-chief that the child accompanied the accused, a mere suggestion put by the defence counsel during cross-examination could be treated as an admission/inference establishing the "last seen together" theory to clinch the guilt of the accused - Circumstantial links cannot be substituted with erroneous inferences drawn from defence cross-examination suggestions. [Paras 23-42] Sahab Singh @ Sat Pal v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 887 : 2026 INSC 945

Criminal Law — Circumstantial Evidence — Extra-Judicial Confession — Evidentiary Value — Duty of Court - An extra-judicial confession is inherently a weak piece of evidence and, per se, cannot form the sole basis of conviction without independent and cogent corroboration - Wherever the court intends to base a conviction on an extra-judicial confession upon due appreciation of the entire evidence, it must ensure that the confession inspires confidence and is corroborated by other prosecution evidence - If it suffers from material discrepancies or inherent improbabilities, the court is fully justified in ruling such evidence out of consideration - the prosecution alleged an extra-judicial confession was made to the village Sarpanch (PW-9) on 14.03.2007, whereas shopkeepers (PW-7 and PW-8) testified that the accused was already in police custody and brought to the shop on 12.03.2007 - This material contradiction, combined with the lack of intimate connection between the accused and the Sarpanch, completely belied the prosecution story. [Relied On Sahadevan v. State of T.N., (2012) 6 SCC 403; Paras 31 – 43] Sahab Singh @ Sat Pal v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 887 : 2026 INSC 945

Criminal Law — Failure to Collect Corroborative Physical Clues / Telltale Evidence - Failure to recover any spent cartridges despite allegations of indiscriminate firing, non-recovery of the offending weapons, failure to seize the blood-stained clothes of the deceased or of the witnesses who allegedly carried him, omission to subject seized blood-stained earth to chemical examination, non-examination of independent eye-witnesses, and absence of injuries on accompanying witnesses despite indiscriminate firing, render the entire prosecution case doubtful and justify acquittal – Appeals allowed. [Paras 5-11] Dhrub Singh v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 883 : 2026 INSC 935

Criminal Law — Forensic Evidence — Burden of Proof — Section 106, Evidence Act — Absence of DNA Profiling - Where human semen is detected on the underwear of the accused as well as on the rectal swab of the deceased, the prosecution is duty-bound to establish a positive link through DNA profiling or scientific matching - In the absence of a DNA match connecting the two samples, the mere presence of semen on the clothing of an unmarried accused cannot lead to a presumption of guilt - The burden cannot be shifted to the accused to prove that the semen did not belong to him or did not match the victim; the initial burden of proving the charge beyond reasonable doubt remains squarely on the prosecution. [Paras 26 – 45] Sahab Singh @ Sat Pal v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 887 : 2026 INSC 945

Criminal Law — Hypothesis of Innocence — Benefit of Doubt - Applicability of the Principle of Hypothesis of Innocence — Direct vs. Circumstantial Evidence — Held: Even where the prosecution case relies on purported direct eyewitness evidence, if the oral accounts suffer from irreconcilable contradictions and surrounding objective circumstances give rise to a plausible and reasonable hypothesis of innocence, the court is precluded from entering a conviction - The appellants are entitled to the benefit of doubt. Conviction and sentence set aside. [Paras 18–21] Ashok Upadhyay v. State of of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 917 : 2026 INSC 971

Criminal Law — Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Section 302 read with Section 34 — Arms Act, 1959 — Section 27 — Appreciation of Eyewitness Evidence — Related and Interested Witnesses - Reliability of Interested and Related Eyewitnesses — Significant contradictions, improvements, and lack of independent corroboration — Held: While related witnesses cannot be branded as interested witnesses solely by reason of relationship, where circumstances disclose a ring of falsity, closer scrutiny of their testimonies is warranted - Where the First Information Statement (FIS) omits material witnesses, substantial contradictions emerge with Section 161 CrPC statements, injury claims of alleged injured eyewitnesses are contradicted by medical evidence, and no independent local villagers are examined, unreserved reliance cannot be placed on such related witnesses to sustain a conviction. [Paras 12-20] Ashok Upadhyay v. State of of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 917 : 2026 INSC 971

Criminal Law — Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 302, 307 read with Section 149, Section 148, Section 147 — Arms Act, 1959 — Section 27 — Defective/Collusive Investigation — Presumption of Guilt — Medical Evidence Contradicting Eye-witness Account — Inquest Prepared Prior to Registration of FIR/FIS - Investigation / Benefit of Defective Investigation - While a faulty investigation cannot ordinarily inure to the benefit of the accused, the Court cannot presume the guilt of the accused where there is a complete absence of reliable evidence simply because the Investigating Officer (I.O.) was recalcitrant or because allegations/complaints of collusive investigation were raised against the investigator - The High Court egregiously erred in relying upon a complaint against the I.O. that was not even brought on record during the trial to plug glaring evidentiary gaps and hold the prosecution case clinching. [Para 9 – 11] Dhrub Singh v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 883 : 2026 INSC 935

Criminal Law — Medical Evidence vs. Ocular Testimony - Inquest Prior to First Information Statement (FIS) - Where ocular witnesses claimed that the party was walking in a single file led by the deceased and that the accused ambushed and shot the deceased in the back during indiscriminate firing from behind, but the expert medical evidence (ballistic/post-mortem) demonstrated that the deceased suffered an oval bullet entry wound with tattooing/blackening indicating a shot fired from close range (3–4 feet) while the victim was in a sitting position, the medical evidence directly discredited the eye-witness version - The High Court erred in brushing aside such expert medical evidence on mere conjectures of a "shaking hand" or moving target - The admission by the I.O. that the inquest was carried out before the First Information Statement was recorded renders the narration of events suspicious and premeditated. [Paras 7-11] Dhrub Singh v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 883 : 2026 INSC 935

Delay in uploading judgments - Delay in uploading judgment after 2 years 5 months of pronouncing of judgment, is a matter of grave concern and a practice to be deprecated - However, there was no infirmity in the appreciation of evidence by the lower courts and concluded that the delay, by itself, was not sufficient to set aside the judgment - Delay in judgment uploading alone cannot nullify a conviction if the judgment is otherwise sound - Practice of High Courts deprives the aggrieved party of the opportunity to seek further judicial redressal more particularly in criminal matters wherein the appeal is dismissed affirming the judgment and order of conviction passed by the Trial Court - Such delays should not recur and reiterated the guidelines from the case Anil Rai v. State of Bihar to address delays in pronouncing and uploading judgements - Judgments should be made available to the parties within 3 months from the date of reserving - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Anil Rai v. State of Bihar (2001) 7 SCC 318; Ravindra Pratap Shahi v. State of U.P. & Ors. 2025 INSC 1039; Ratilal Jhaverbhai Parmar & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Ors. 2024 INSC 801; Paras 41-47] Ras Al Khaimah Investment Authority v. Matrix Pharmacorp Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 879 : 2026 INSC 932

Environmental Law — EIA Notification, 2006 & RG, 2016 — Status of Land Allotment at Various Regulatory Stages – I. Form 1 Stage (Clause 6, EIA 2006) - Procurement or allotment of land is not a condition precedent for submitting Form 1; identification of a prospective site is sufficient; II. Appraisal Stage: In terms of MoEF&CC O.M. dated 07.10.2014, the project proponent must furnish a credible document evidencing the status of land acquisition (e.g., allotment letter or provisional allotment) before final appraisal; III. Consent to Establish (CTE): Land allotment is not a condition precedent to apply for or obtain a CTE under the Water and Air Acts, provided that if the land is under one acre, relaxation under Clause 7(b) of the RG, 2016 must precede the grant. [Paras 65–93, 110(iv)-(viii)] Punahchakran Pvt. Ltd. v. Indotech Waste Solution, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 905 : 2026 INSC 956

Environmental Law — Revised Guidelines for CBWTF, 2016 — Clause 7(b) — Relaxation of Land Area Requirement - The requirement under Clause 7(a) to set up a CBWTF on a plot size of not less than one acre is a mandatory rule - under Clause 7(b), the land area may be relaxed down to 0.5 acres by the SPCB/PCC in consultation with CPCB subject to: (i) location within municipal limits with a population over 25 lakhs, OR within a rural area; and (ii) mandatory prescription of additional environmental control measures - Held: Where an industrial area was declared via official notification in a village (rural area) outside municipal/Nagar Panchayat limits, the pre-condition for relaxation was satisfied - The NGT erred in quashing the EC and CTE on the ground of an impermissible relaxation. [Paras 55–63, 110(iii)] Punahchakran Pvt. Ltd. v. Indotech Waste Solution, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 905 : 2026 INSC 956

Environmental Law — Revised Guidelines for CBWTF, 2016 (RG, 2016) — Mandatory Nature and Publication Mode - The Revised Guidelines for Common Bio-Medical Waste Treatment and Disposal Facilities, 2016 (RG, 2016) framed by the CPCB under the Bio-Medical Waste Management Rules, 2016 (BMWM Rules) and the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 are mandatory and enforceable - Non-publication in the Official Gazette does not vitiate their binding nature - Where neither the parent Act nor the subordinate rules prescribe a mandatory mode of publication, publication through any other reasonable mode is sufficient - The uploading of technical guidelines on the official website of the CPCB constitutes sufficient and reasonable publication. [Relied on B.K. Srinivasan and Others v. State of Karnataka and Others, (1987) 1 SCC 658; Air India Cabin Crew Assn. v. Yeshaswinee Merchant and Others, (2003) 6 SCC 277; Bengaluru Development Authority v. Sudhakar Hegde and Others, (2020) 15 SCC 63; Hanuman Laxman Aroskar v. Union of India, (2019) 15 SCC 401; Distinguished from, Gulf Goans Hotels Co. Ltd. v. Union of India (2014) 10 SCC 673; Paras 34–54, 110(i)-(ii)] Punahchakran Pvt. Ltd. v. Indotech Waste Solution, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 905 : 2026 INSC 956

Environmental Law — Terms of Reference (ToR) — Invalidation of Prior EC Does Not Automatically Void ToR - Setting aside an Environmental Clearance (EC) does not mechanically render the Terms of Reference (ToR) void - If the flaw that invalidated the EC lay solely at the appraisal stage and there was no material concealment affecting scoping/Form 1, the ToR remains operative for its prescribed validity period of four (3+1) years under MoEF&CC Office Memorandums. [Paras 94–109, 110(ix)] Punahchakran Pvt. Ltd. v. Indotech Waste Solution, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 905 : 2026 INSC 956

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 165 (BSA, 2023, Section 168) r/w CrPC — Section 311 (BNSS, 2023, Section 348) — Role and Duty of Trial Court - A criminal trial is not an adversarial game where the Presiding Officer acts as a mere recording machine - Under Section 165 of the Evidence Act and Section 311 of the CrPC, the Court possesses wide powers and is required to take an active, participatory role to elicit truth and ensure material evidence necessary for just adjudication is brought on record - When the accused was present in the courtroom from judicial custody, the failure of the Public Prosecutor and the Trial Judge to have the victim identify the accused from the dock was a gross omission. [Paras 45–48, 54] Dhanraj v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 906 : 2026 INSC 958

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 27 [Now Proviso to Section 23(2), Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023] — Disclosure Statement & Information Leading to Discovery — Inadmissibility when no new fact is discovered - A confession made to a police officer is inadmissible except to the extent permitted under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, where a fact is discovered in consequence of information received from the accused - Where no new fact is discovered and the disclosure statement merely relates to the demarcation or identification of places/spots already within the prior knowledge of the police and recorded in the site plan, Section 27 cannot be invoked, and the disclosure statement cannot be taken into consideration - The High Court fundamentally erred in holding that the disclosure statement dated 14.03.2007 led to the recovery of the deceased's body from the well, when the body had already been recovered by the police two days earlier on 12.03.2007. [Paras 38–44] Sahab Singh @ Sat Pal v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 887 : 2026 INSC 945

Evidence Act, 1872 — Test Identification Parade (TIP) vs. Dock Identification — Evidentiary Value - Substantive evidence of identification is the identification of the accused by the witness while testifying in Court (dock identification); Test Identification Parade (TIP) conducted during police investigation is merely corroborative and not substantive evidence - Where the accused was not named in the FIR, his name was disclosed to the victim by the police, the sketch prepared with the victim's assistance was withheld from the Court, and the child victim explicitly stated that she could identify the accused if produced, but no dock identification was elicited during her sworn testimony, relying solely on the TIP to convict the accused was fatal to the prosecution. [Paras 40–44, 53- 54] Dhanraj v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 906 : 2026 INSC 958

Finance Act, 1979 (as amended by Finance Act, 1994) – Chapter V – Foreign Travel Tax (FTT) – Section 35(2), Section 35A, Section 38(3), Section 38(4), Section 38(5) read with Foreign Travel Tax Rules, 1979, Rules 4, 9, 11, and 12 – Imposition of penalty for delayed deposit of Foreign Travel Tax – Whether delayed payment is equivalent to 'failure to pay' under Section 38(3) – Automatic vs. Discretionary imposition of penalty – Doctrine of Reformatio in Peius - 'Failure to Pay' vs. 'Delayed Payment' - The expressions "fails to pay the foreign travel tax" and "the amount of the tax not so paid" under Section 38(3) of the Finance Act, 1979 contemplate absolute non-payment/failure to pay FTT into the credit of the Central Government, and cannot be equated with mere delay in making payment - Section 38(3) does not cover delayed payment of FTT; instead, delayed payment falls within the ambit of Section 38(4) read with Rules 4 and 9 of the 1979 Rules - Any deposit made prior to the issuance of a show-cause notice constitutes delayed payment, whereas deposit made after the issuance of a show-cause notice constitutes non-payment. [Relied on U.S. Technologies International Private Limited v. Commissioner of Income Tax, (2023) 8 SCC 24; Paras 35 – 48] M/s. Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 880 : 2026 INSC 933

Finance Act, 1979 (as amended by Finance Act, 1994) – Chapter V – Foreign Travel Tax (FTT) – Section 35(2), Section 35A, Section 38(3), Section 38(4), Section 38(5) read with Foreign Travel Tax Rules, 1979, Rules 4, 9, 11, and 12 – Discretionary Nature of Penalty & Exclusion of Mens Rea - The presence of the word "shall" in Section 38 does not make the levy of penalty automatic upon breach of timeline - Automatic imposition of penalty and exclusion of mens rea are two distinct concepts - Even in provisions creating strict liability without proof of mens rea, imposition of penalty is not automatic where the statutory scheme provides for an adjudicatory process (issuance of show-cause notice, opportunity of representation, and personal hearing under Section 38(5) proviso and Rule 12) and discretionary condonation of delay (provisos to Rules 4 and 9) - The power to impose a penalty inherently includes the power not to impose a penalty where the breach is technical, venial, or properly explained - The question of applying minimum statutory penalty arises only after the authority judiciously concludes that a penalty is warranted. [Relied on Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1972) 83 ITR 26; Paras 37-48] M/s. Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 880 : 2026 INSC 933

Finance Act, 1979 (as amended by Finance Act, 1994) – Chapter V – Foreign Travel Tax (FTT) – Section 35(2), Section 35A, Section 38(3), Section 38(4), Section 38(5) read with Foreign Travel Tax Rules, 1979, Rules 4, 9, 11, and 12 – Doctrine of No Reformatio in Peius - An appellant cannot be placed in a worse condition or situation than before simply as a result of preferring an appeal - Where the original adjudicating authority had imposed a penalty of Rs. 12,000/- and the matter was remanded by the appellate authority, enhancing the penalty to Rs. 71,29,140/- in de novo proceedings violates the rule of no reformatio in peius, which is an integral part of fair procedure, natural justice, and procedural equity. [Relied on Jyoti Plastic Works Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 2276; Nagarajan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2025) 8 SCC 331; Paras 50, 51, 52, 53, 54] M/s. Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 880 : 2026 INSC 933

Food Safety and Standards (Labelling and Display) Regulations, 2020 — Front-of-Package Labelling Proposal — Ambiguities in FSSAI's Phased Hexagonal Warning Model - Examining an affidavit filed by the FSSAI proposing a red-coloured hexagonal warning label ("HIGH FAT", "HIGH SUGAR", "HIGH SALT", "HIGHLY SWEETENED BEVERAGE"), the Supreme Court observed that several practical aspects remain ambiguous and require scientific justification: i. Phased Implementation & Timelines: The proposal lacked fixed and binding timelines separating Phase I (triggering labels only when products are high in two or more nutrients of concern) from Phase II (triggering labels for any one nutrient) - Indefinite timelines based on commercial reformulation cannot be accepted; ii. Nutrient Threshold Criteria ("Total" vs. "Added" Nutrients): FSSAI must clarify why the proposal assesses "Added Sugar" and "Added Fat" rather than "Total Sugar" and "Saturated Fat / Trans Fat", which was the consensus reached in earlier stakeholder consultations; iii. Food Categorization & Degree of Processing: Threshold calculations must account for the distinction between moderately processed foods without additives (Group B) and excessively processed/ultra-processed foods with additives (Group C) as classified under the ICMR-NIN Dietary Guidelines for Indians, 2024; iv. Visual Accessibility, Font Size & Packaging Dimensions: A strictly text-heavy label assumes literacy across diverse demographics; FSSAI must evaluate combining words with distinct pictorial icons - font sizes (proposed as merely one point larger than the back nutrition table) and logo dimensions must be assessed in proportion to the principal display panel to prevent consumer misinterpretation, including potential confusion between the colour red and non-vegetarian dietary indicators; v. Mandatory vs. Voluntary Compliance: The Supreme Court directed the FSSAI to specify whether the FoPL regime will be enforceable mandatorily from inception or incorporate a strictly defined transitional period; vi. Nutritional Literacy in Schools: The Union of India was directed to formulate structured initiatives and curriculum integration to foster nutritional literacy among schoolchildren. [Paras 6-12, 28–32, 37, 38 – 43, 48-50] 3S and Our Health Society v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 926 : 2026 INSC 988

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) – Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) – CIRP Costs – Real Estate Project – Time Extension Charges / Delay Penalty imposed by Local Industrial Authority – Whether delay penalty / time extension charges payable to a development authority can be mulcted on Homebuyers or Successful Resolution Applicant (SRA) as CIRP Costs – Held that no, the default charges stipulated in the lease deed or subsequent policy directives specify a percentage of the lease premium to penalise a defaulting developer and serve as a deterrent against time lags - Where the defaulting corporate debtor/developer is out of the picture and the homebuyers pooled funds under a 'Pool and Build' mechanism and approved a resolution plan to complete the half-baked project, it is unjust to penalise the homebuyers and the SRA for the past sins of the Corporate Debtor - Local development authorities operate with the underlying welfare objective of facilitating urban housing and development, not merely a commercial profit motive - in such peculiar circumstances, time extension charges/delay penalties cannot be validly imposed or treated as CIRP costs - Direction of the NCLAT treating time extension charges as CIRP costs set aside - NOIDA's claim for extended charges up to the 10th year rejected. [Paras 11–16] Authorised Representative for Granite Gate Properties v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 893 : 2026 INSC 952

Investor Protection – High-Risk Speculative Trades – Unauthorised Fixed-Return / Ponzi Schemes run by Trading Member – Maintainability of Claim against Clearing Member - Where investors voluntarily entrust securities to a Trading Member (TM) acting unauthorisedly as a Portfolio Management/Derivatives Advisory Service assuring fixed returns a practice prohibited by Stock Exchange regulations the investors cannot hold the Clearing Member (PCM) liable for the liquidation of such securities upon the TM's default - Participants who knowingly enroll in speculative and volatile F&O trades and illegal assured-return schemes cannot seek indemnification or restitution from the PCM, with whom they had no privity, but are at liberty only to pursue appropriate legal remedies against the defaulting TM. [Paras 29–30, 45, 53, 54, 55–56] Edelweiss Custodial Services Limited v. NSE Clearing Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 891 : 2026 INSC 941

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 – Section 7A & Proviso – Plea of Juvenility – Stage at which it can be raised – Effect of earlier dismissal of Special Leave Petition as withdrawn - The plea of juvenility goes to the root of the jurisdiction of the trial Court and constitutes a jurisdictional fact - Under the Proviso to Section 7A of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, a claim of juvenility can be raised before any Court at any stage, even after the final disposal of the case - The dismissal of a Special Leave Petition as "withdrawn" does not constitute an adjudication on merits and does not operate as an irrevocable bar of finality preventing the High Court from entertaining an application under Section 482 CrPC to give effect to an inquiry report of the Juvenile Justice Board declaring the convict to have been a juvenile on the date of the offence - The beneficial and remedial provisions of the Juvenile Justice legislations must receive a purposive and wide interpretation. [Relied on Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand & Anr., (2005) 3 SCC 551; Jitendra Singh alias Babboo Singh & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2013) 11 SCC 193; Ashwani Kumar Saxena v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2012) 9 SCC 750; Paras 19–33] Mahavir @ Avnish v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 892 : 2026 INSC 942

Land Acquisition — Constitutional Validity & Retrospective Scope — Interpretation of Precedents - Effect of striking down Section 3J of the NH Act — Held: Striking down Section 3J in Tarsem Singh-ensured that solatium and interest could not be denied to acquisitions made under the NH Act between 1997 and 2015 - declining prospective application in Tarsem Singh-II merely established parity that solatium and interest are universally payable across all periods; it did not mandate that pre-01.01.2015 awards must be calculated according to the higher compensation scales of the 2013 Act. [Relied on Union of India & Another v. Tarsem Singh & Others (Tarsem Singh-I), (2019) 9 SCC 304; Union of India & Another v. Tarsem Singh & Others (Tarsem Singh-II), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 235; National Highways Authority of India v. Tarsem Singh & Others (Tarsem Singh-III), 2026 SCC OnLine SC 481; Paras 6–13] Manav Bhanot v National Highway Authority of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 915 : 2026 INSC 973

Land Acquisition — National Highways Act, 1956 — Competent Authority's Determination vs. Arbitrator's Award - Nature of Section 3G(1) determination vis-à-vis Section 3G(5) Arbitral Award — Held: The initial determination of compensation by the Competent Authority under Section 3G(1) of the NH Act corresponds to an "award" passed under Section 11 of the 1894 Act (or Section 23 of the 2013 Act) - The determination of a dispute by an Arbitrator under Section 3G(5) of the NH Act is akin to a reference determination by a Civil Court under Section 18 of the 1894 Act - for the purposes of attracting Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act, the relevant cut-off event is the date of the Competent Authority's determination under Section 3G(1) and not the date of the Arbitrator's award. [Relied On Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and Others, (2020) 8 SCC 129; Paras 19–24] Manav Bhanot v National Highway Authority of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 915 : 2026 INSC 973

Land Acquisition — National Highways Act, 1956 — Sections 3G(1), 3G(5), and 3J — Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 — Section 24(1)(a) and Section 105 read with Fourth Schedule — Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Applicability of 2013 Act vs. 1894 Act for calculating Solatium, Interest, and Interest on Solatium for NH Act acquisitions — Relevant cut-off date — Held: Although landowners acquired under the NH Act are entitled to solatium, interest, and interest on solatium, the rate and statutory regime governing such benefits depend upon the date on which the initial compensation determination (award) was made by the Competent Authority under Section 3G(1) - Under Section 105(1) & (3) of the 2013 Act, a one-year hiatus was provided for Schedule IV enactments; the 2013 Act compensation provisions were extended to NH Act acquisitions only with effect from 01.01.2015 (via Ordinance 9 of 2014, Ordinance 5 of 2015, and subsequent notification) - if the Competent Authority's determination under Section 3G(1) was passed prior to 01.01.2015, benefits must be computed exclusively under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, even if the Arbitrator's award under Section 3G(5) was rendered subsequent to 01.01.2015. [Paras 11–13, 17-19, 22- 27] Manav Bhanot v National Highway Authority of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 915 : 2026 INSC 973

Land Revenue Act, 1964 (Karnataka) — Section 56(1) read with Proviso to Section 56(3) & Section 52 — Scope of Revisional Power and Limitation - The revisional power under Section 56(1) in respect of an un-appealed order cannot be initiated beyond the statutory limitation of three years prescribed under the proviso to Section 56(3) - Section 52 permits the application of Sections 4, 5, and 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 only to appeals, not to revisions under Section 56 - Provisions of the Limitation Act cannot be imported or "smuggled in" to bypass, override, or defeat the express limitation bar contained in the proviso to Section 56(3). [Paras 9-16] M.R.R. Setty (Dead), by LRs Versus Government of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 889 : 2026 INSC 944

Land Revenue Act, 1964 (Karnataka) — Sections 24 and 25 (as amended by Karnataka Land Revenue (Amendment) Act, 2025) — Administrative Allotment of CTS Numbers Not an Order of a Revenue Court - The allotment of City Title Survey (CTS) numbers by a Revenue/Survey Officer is an administrative exercise, not a quasi-judicial determination between the State and a private party - the officer cannot be regarded as a "Revenue Court" within the meaning of Section 24 - The State cannot press into service the inherent power under Section 25 or its newly amended review proviso to review administrative CTS entries made decades earlier. [Paras 12, 13] M.R.R. Setty (Dead), by LRs Versus Government of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 889 : 2026 INSC 944

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 166 – Claim of Status as Legally Wedded Wife – Burden of Proof – Apportionment of Compensation - The claimant asserted the status of being the legally wedded wife of the deceased - The burden of proof, even in summary proceedings before the MACT, rests squarely on the claimant. In the absence of documentary evidence proving the factum of marriage, and where employment records indicated the status as "fiancé" without financial dependency, the claimant cannot be treated as a legally wedded wife - the High Court's equitable apportionment awarding her a share (Rs. 7,50,000/-) warrants no interference - Mathematical precision is not always sought or applied by courts; claimants are awarded just and fair compensation where what is due is not denied and what is undeserving is not awarded. [Paras 7 - 15] Reliance General Insurance Company v. Priyanka Das, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 897 : 2026 INSC 950

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 166 – Standard of Proof in MACT Proceedings – Preponderance of Probabilities - Proceedings before the Claims Tribunal are summary in nature - The issue of rashness and negligence is to be adjudicated on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities, and not on the strict criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt - Registration of FIR and filing of chargesheet discharge the primary onus of proving negligence against the offending driver. [Relied on Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation, (2009) 6 SCC 121; National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi & Ors., (2017) 16 SCC 680; Munna Lal Jain v. Vipin Kumar Sharma, (2015) 6 SCC 347; Sube Singh v. Shyam Singh, (2018) 3 SCC 18; Manjuri Bera v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr., (2007) 10 SCC 643; Paras 6 - 12] Reliance General Insurance Company v. Priyanka Das, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 897 : 2026 INSC 950

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Sections 166 and 168 – Fatal Accident – Multiplier Determination for Bachelor Deceased – Age of Deceased vs. Age of Dependents/Parents – Multiplier Matrix - In motor accident compensation claims arising out of the death of a bachelor, the multiplier to be applied must be determined strictly based on the age of the deceased and not on the age of the dependents or parents - The legal position is settled and no longer res integra - The deceased was 33 years old, falling squarely in the age bracket of 31 to 35 years, which attracts a multiplier of 16 as per the standardised matrix - The Tribunal and the High Court correctly applied the multiplier of 16. [Paras 13, 14] Reliance General Insurance Company v. Priyanka Das, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 897 : 2026 INSC 950

National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 – Reversing the High Court's judgment, the Supreme Court held – i. Traceability of Power and Competence of Executive Committee - The power to call for an annual Performance Appraisal Report is explicitly traceable to Section 12(k) of the NCTE Act, which empowers the Council to evolve a suitable performance appraisal system, norms, and mechanisms for enforcing accountability on recognised institutions - In its 48th General Body meeting held on 05.02.2019, the Council approved the substitution of 'Annual Renewal of Recognition' with the requirement of submitting a 'PAR' through a proforma to be developed by the NCTE - Under Section 19 of the NCTE Act, the Executive Committee is the statutory body entrusted to discharge functions assigned to it by the Council - It acts as the executive arm to implement the Council's decisions; thus, issuing the Public Notice through its Member Secretary to operationalise the PAR mechanism was well within jurisdiction and legal authority; ii. Incidental and Ancillary Powers of Regulators - Even absent explicit statutory empowerment, such a regulatory measure is inherently incidental and ancillary to the duties, functions, and mandate of a statutory regulator charged with achieving planned and coordinated development and maintenance of standards in teacher education - Given that NCTE itself is subjected to a performance audit by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG), it is natural and incidental that it requires stakeholders within its regulatory sweep to furnish appraisal reports; iii. Nature of Charges Levied - The requirement to remit ₹5,000/- or ₹15,000/- while uploading the PAR on the portal is in the nature of a processing fee, which falls squarely within the incidental and ancillary powers of the statutory regulator; iv. Scope of Judicial Review over Regulatory Authorities - When examining the exercise of power by a statutory regulator, Courts must evaluate whether the authority has violated any mandatory statutory provision or transgressed its vested power, rather than adopting a pedantic or hyper-technical approach - Constitutional Courts owe a positive duty to ensure regulators exercise their statutory functions effectively, efficiently, and in an accountable manner; v. Constitutional Framework & Seven Duty Bearers of Elementary Education - Under the constitutional mandate of Article 21A read with Section 23 of the RTE Act and the NCTE Act, quality teacher education is fundamental to the life and development of children - To the five duty bearers recognized in Dinesh Biwaji Ashtikar v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (Appropriate Governments, Local Authority, Neighbouring Schools, Parents/Guardians, and Elementary School Teachers), two additional duty bearers are added - (vi) The Teacher Education Institutions (TEIs) recognized under Section 2(e) of the NCTE Act, and (vii) The National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) - The regulatory duties entrusted to the NCTE and its Executive Committee are of the highest order among duty bearers; vi. Principle of Accountability in Administrative Law - Accountability is an essential principle of administrative law, comprising three constituent dimensions: (a) Responsibility (identifying duties and obligations), (b) Answerability (reasoned decision-making), and (c) Enforceability (corrective measures against dereliction of duty). [Relied on Dinesh Biwaji Ashtikar v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 56; Vijay Rajmohan v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2023) 1 SCC 329; Paras 8-25] National Council For Teachers Education v. Association of NCTE Approved Colleges Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 894 : 2026 INSC 953

National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 – Section 12(k), Section 12, Section 19, Section 17 & Section 31 – Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 – Section 23 – Regulatory Powers of NCTE and Executive Committee – Mandatory Submission of Annual Performance Appraisal Report (PAR) by Teacher Education Institutions (TEIs) – Levy of Processing Fee - Regulatory jurisdiction and powers of the National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) and its Executive Committee – Validity of Public Notice mandating annual Performance Appraisal Report (PAR) with processing fees - The challenge before the Court pertained to the Public Notice dated 22.09.2019 issued by the Member Secretary of the Executive Committee of NCTE, mandating all recognised Teacher Education Institutions (TEIs) to submit an online annual Performance Appraisal Report (PAR) along with requisite fees (₹5,000/- for Central/State Government institutions and ₹15,000/- for all other categories), failing which action under Section 17(1) of the NCTE Act would be attracted - The Division Bench of the High Court had set aside the Public Notice on technical grounds, holding that the specific proforma was not formally placed before and approved by the Council and that power under Section 12(k) had not been delegated under Section 27 to the Member Secretary. National Council For Teachers Education v. Association of NCTE Approved Colleges Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 894 : 2026 INSC 953

Partnership Act, 1932 — Dissolution vs. Retirement — Distinction and Settlement Mode - Distinction between Retirement under Section 37 and Dissolution under Section 48 — Held: While on retirement the reconstituted firm continues and the retiring partner's dues are settled as a simple debt (compensable with interest as on the retirement date), in the case of a dissolution of the firm, the entire partnership comes to an end and all accounts and surplus residues must be wound up and distributed strictly under Section 48. [Relied on Karumuthu Thiagarajan Chettiar v. E.M. Muthappa Chettiar, AIR 1961 SC 1225; Pamuru Vishnu Vinodh Reddy v. Chillakuru Chandrasekhara Reddy, (2003) 3 SCC 445; Guru Nanak Industries v. Amar Singh, (2021) 14 SCC 672; Paras 50–52] V. Sumitra Reddy v. K. Ranganadha Reddy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 918 : 2026 INSC 979

Partnership Act, 1932 — Sections 4, 14, 46, and 48 — Nature of Partnership Assets Post-Dissolution — Continuation by Reconstituted Firm Without Settlement - Right of continuing partners to retain erstwhile firm's properties — Held: A partnership firm is not an independent legal entity; its assets belong to all partners in proportion to their shares - Continuing partners who reconstitute a new firm cannot retain the properties of the dissolved firm unless they purchase them from the dissolved partnership upon mutual agreement - Unilateral retention of such property by a reconstituted firm is illegal - Restricting an outgoing partner's entitlement to the asset valuation that existed decades prior (e.g., in 1983) while continuing partners retain appreciated property would cause serious prejudice, work gross injustice, and defeat equity. [Paras 39, 44-60] V. Sumitra Reddy v. K. Ranganadha Reddy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 918 : 2026 INSC 979

Partnership Act, 1932 — Sections 7, 43, 46, 47, and 48 — Dissolution of Partnership at Will — Final Decree Proceedings — Valuation of Immovable Partnership Assets - Whether in the dissolution of a partnership at will, an outgoing/dissolving partner's share in immovable assets is restricted to the valuation as on the date of dissolution or on the date of assessment/liquidation in final decree proceedings — Held: Outgoing partner is entitled to their proportionate share in the real/market value realized upon liquidation or current valuation, and not restricted to historical valuation as on the date of dissolution - The date of dissolution (fixed in the preliminary decree) is relevant strictly for ascertainment and settlement of business profits and losses, and has no bearing on the partner's right to receive their proportionate value in the residue of the assets - Unless all partners mutually agree to buy out the outgoing partner's share at current market rates, the assets must be liquidated by public auction and proceeds distributed rateably under Section 48(b). [Paras 40–46, 55 - 60] V. Sumitra Reddy v. K. Ranganadha Reddy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 918 : 2026 INSC 979

Penal Code, 1860 – Section 201 Part II – Causing disappearance of evidence of offence – Essential Ingredients – Acquittal of main offence – Legality of conviction - A conviction under Section 201 Part II IPC cannot be sustained in the absence of proof that the main crime was committed, that the accused knew or had reason to believe that such offence had been committed, and that the accused caused evidence thereof to disappear with the specific intention of screening the offender from legal punishment - Where the prosecution fails to establish the offences of dowry death and murder under Sections 302 and 304B IPC, resulting in an unassailed acquittal of the accused for those substantive offences, an isolated conviction under Section 201 IPC cannot be maintained and must be set aside. [Relied on Suleman Rehiman Mulani & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, (1967) SCC OnLine SC 337; Kedar Nath & Ors. v. State of M.P., (1993) Supp (1) SCC 7; Para 32] Mahavir @ Avnish v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 892 : 2026 INSC 942

Penal Code, 1860 — Section 376 — Medical Evidence — Discrepancy Regarding Time of Incident and Absence of DNA Profiling - Where the medical officer opined that the victim's genital injuries were 5 to 7 days old with foul pus and maggots, the prosecution's narrative that the crime was committed only 2 days prior stood contradicted and unreconciled - in the absence of any DNA profiling or serological matching connecting the biological fluids (sperm) found on the victim to the accused, the prosecution failed to establish a conclusive nexus, entitling the appellant to the benefit of doubt. [Relied on Rameshwar Singh v. State of J&K, (1971) 2 SCC 715; Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 4 SCC 158; Paras 33–36, 51–59] Dhanraj v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 906 : 2026 INSC 958

Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 302, 201, and 377 — Murder, Causing Disappearance of Evidence, and Unnatural Offences — Circumstantial Evidence — Missing Links in Chain of Events — Benefit of Doubt - Where conviction rests solely on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution is required to establish an unbroken and complete chain of events leading solely to the hypothesis of the accused's guilt - Where there are significant gaps including unexplained seizure of ordinary consumer articles (generic packet of namkeen) before any disclosure, ante-timed/contradictory custody prior to the alleged extra-judicial confession, invalid reliance on Section 27 recoveries, uncorroborated "last seen" theory, and lack of forensic DNA matching the chain remains broken - Conviction and sentence set aside; appellant extended the benefit of doubt and ordered to be released forthwith after serving over 16 years of incarceration – Appeal allowed. [Paras 27–36, 46–50] Sahab Singh @ Sat Pal v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 887 : 2026 INSC 945

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 306 read with Section 107 — Abetment of Suicide — Matrimonial Discord — Necessary Ingredients — Mens Rea and Actus Reus - To sustain a conviction under Section 306 IPC, specific abetment as contemplated under Section 107 IPC is an indispensable requirement - There must be clear evidence of active instigation, intentional aiding, or positive acts by the accused intended to drive the deceased to commit suicide - Mere marital disputes, ordinary domestic discord, or general allegations of harassment do not, ipso facto, satisfy the ingredients of Section 306 read with Section 107 IPC in the absence of any instigation or mens rea - Where the husband, upon learning that his wife ingested poison, immediately summoned medical assistance and rushed her to the hospital, such bona fide conduct militates against an intention to abet suicide. [Relied on Madan Mohan Singh v. State of Gujarat, 2010 INSC 521; Paras 14, 15] Sanjay Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 901 : 2026 INSC 948

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 498-A & Section 306 — Cruelty and Abetment of Suicide — Vague and General Allegations — Failure of Prosecution to Prove Charges - Where the prosecution witnesses (relatives of the victim) depose in general and vague terms without citing specific incidents of dowry demand, cruelty, or torture, and their statements suffer from material omissions and improvements not disclosed during the police investigation, the charges under Sections 498-A and 306 IPC cannot be held to be proved beyond reasonable doubt - The High Court erred in reversing the well-reasoned judgment of acquittal recorded by the Sessions Court without coming to close quarters with the reasons assigned by the trial court and by resting its conviction on findings unsupported by the record. Acquittal restored. [Paras 8-17] Sanjay Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 901 : 2026 INSC 948

Prohibition Act, 1949 (Gujarat) — Section 98(2) read with Section 132 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 451, Section 457 [Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — Section 497, Section 503] — Seizure of Vehicle carrying Prohibited Liquor — Interim Custody / Release of Vehicle pending Trial — Scope of Statutory Embargo - Section 98(2) of the Gujarat Prohibition Act, 1949 does not operate as an absolute embargo against the release of a seized vehicle on interim custody pending trial - The second part of Section 98(2) and Section 451 CrPC [Section 497 BNSS] operate in distinct fields - Section 98 deals with confiscation of articles when an offence has been committed, and the second part of sub-section (2) comes into play when the seized article liable to be confiscated (and not required as evidence) is forwarded to the Collector under Section 132(b) - when the seized property/vehicle is produced before the jurisdictional Criminal Court under Section 132(a) during inquiry or investigation, the Court is competent to exercise powers under Section 451 CrPC to pass appropriate orders for its proper custody - Keeping seized conveyances parked indefinitely at police stations or court premises exposes them to decay, cannibalisation, loss of roadworthiness, and causes undue economic hardship to owners without serving any fruitful purpose - Courts must dispose of interim custody applications expeditiously and judiciously by adopting safeguards such as Panchama's, photographs, videography, and imposing appropriate surety/bonds rather than leaving vehicles in a state of suspended animation - The High Court and the Courts below erred in declining interim release solely relying on Section 98(2) of the Prohibition Act - Vehicle directed to be released on interim custody subject to conditions. [Relied on Khengarbhai Lakhabhai Dambhala v. The State of Gujarat, 2024 INSC 285; Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai v. State of Gujarat, (2002) 10 SCC 283; Basavva Kom Dyamangouda Patil (Smt.) v. State of Mysore and Another, (1977) 4 SCC 358; General Insurance Council and Others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others, 2010 INSC 225; Distinguished from State of Madhya Pradesh v. Uday Singh, (2020) 4 SCC (Cri) 473; Multani Hanifbhai Kalubhai v. State of Gujarat and Another, 2013 INSC 69; Paras 10-17] ABC Express v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 885 : 2026 INSC 940

Property Law – Title vs. Revenue Entries – Evidentiary Value of Jamabandi / Revenue Entries – "Gair Marusi Bila Lagan Bawaja Dharam Arth" - Entries in revenue records are maintained primarily for fiscal purposes; they neither create nor extinguish title to immovable property, nor do they constitute conclusive proof of ownership - The revenue description "gair marusi bila lagan bawaja Dharam Arth" (non-occupancy tenant without payment of rent on account of religious purpose) indicates that possession was associated with religious/charitable purposes, but it does not, by itself, establish a completed and irrevocable dedication divesting the owner of title, nor does it establish hostile assertion of ownership. [Paras 23 - 42] Bhag Singh v. Basant Kaur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 923 : 2026 INSC 983

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – Section 34 – Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 – Section 94 – Determination of Age of Child/Victim – Inadmissibility of Baptismal Certificate Alone - The procedure for determining the age of a victim under the POCSO Act is strictly governed by the hierarchy of documents prescribed under Section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 - Age must be proved firstly by the date of birth certificate from the school / matriculation certificate; in its absence, by a birth certificate issued by a corporation, municipal authority, or panchayat; and only in the absence of both, by an ossification test or latest medical age determination test - A Baptismal Certificate issued by a church authority, even if supported by oral testimony of parents, does not fall within the statutory classes of documents enumerated in Section 94 of the JJ Act - In the absence of statutory certificates or an ossification test, the prosecution fails to establish minority, rendering conviction and enhanced punishment under Section 4(2) of the POCSO Act unsustainable. [Paras 35- 38] Pynchemalangaki Bareh v. State of Meghalaya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 924 : 2026 INSC 984

Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 — Sections 15U and 15Z — Discrepancies in Trading Data — Remand to Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) - Scope of Appellate Powers under Section 15Z vs. Fact-Finding Powers of SAT under Section 15U — Disputed Order Book Data — Held: Supreme Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 15Z is confined to questions of law and is not the appropriate forum to resolve disputed, contradictory, and irreconcilable electronic order book/trading volume data from the NSE and BSE - SAT, being vested with the powers of a Civil Court under Section 15U (such as summoning witnesses, examining records, and issuing commissions), is properly equipped to assess evidence - The matter was remanded to SAT to independently resolve data discrepancies, reconcile conflicting internal SEBI reports, assess surrounding corroborative materials, and arrive at fresh findings on the charge of fraud within six months. [Paras 53–59] Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Vedanta Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 919 : 2026 INSC 978

Securities Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 2000 – Rule 21 – Inherent / Procedural Powers of the SAT – Scope and Limitations - Rule 21 of the SAT (Procedure) Rules, 2000 regulates procedural aspects before the Tribunal and cannot be invoked as a source of substantive power to issue directions of restitution or disgorgement suo motu where the original authority (MCSGFC/NCL) itself lacks the statutory jurisdiction under the parent Act to grant such relief - An appellate tribunal is a creature of statute and cannot assume substantive plenary powers exceeding those permitted by law. [Relied on SEBI v. S. Kumars Nationwide Ltd., Civil Appeal No. 2049 of 2010; Paras 22–35] Edelweiss Custodial Services Limited v. NSE Clearing Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 891 : 2026 INSC 941

Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 – Section 9(3)(b) & Section 12A – Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 – Section 11B – Power of Clearing Corporation / Member and Core Settlement Guarantee Fund Committee (MCSGFC) to Order Restitution or Monetary Penalties – Scope of Bye-laws – Power of Disgorgement - The MCSGF Committee constituted by a Clearing Corporation (NCL) has no statutory jurisdiction or authority under the Bye-laws to direct a Professional Clearing Member (PCM) to restitute liquidated securities or pay equivalent monetary amounts - Section 9(3)(b)(iv) of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 empowers Stock Exchanges to make bye-laws providing for penalties such as fine, suspension, or expulsion, but expressly prohibits "any other penalty of a like nature involving the payment of money" - The extraordinary remedy of disgorgement or restitution involving monetary liability has been exclusively conferred by Parliament upon SEBI under Section 11B of the SEBI Act and Section 12A of the SCRA, and has been consciously excluded from the bye-laws of Stock Exchanges and Clearing Corporations - Directing the restitution of shares or blocking margin collaterals with an added 5% markup amounts to imposing a monetary penalty without statutory sanction - Such powers cannot be assumed or exercised under the garb of equity, justice, and good conscience. [Distinguished from Dr. Poornima Advani v. Government of NCT, (2025) 7 SCC 269; South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. State of M.P. & Ors., (2003) 8 SCC 648; Kavita Trehan & Anr. v. Balsara Hygiene Products Ltd., (1994) 5 SCC 380; Paras 42–54] Edelweiss Custodial Services Limited v. NSE Clearing Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 891 : 2026 INSC 941

Securities Law – Futures & Options (F&O) Segment – Professional Clearing Member (PCM) vs. Trading Member (TM) – Absence of Privity of Contract – Obligation to Verify Individual Client Balances Prior to Liquidating Collateral - Prior to the enforcement of SEBI's daily client-level segregation and reporting mechanism (vide Circular dated 20.07.2021) and the margin pledge/re-pledge framework (dated 25.02.2020), a Professional Clearing Member (PCM) had neither privity of contract with the individual end-clients/investors of a Trading Member (TM) nor the regulatory visibility to ascertain the real-time debit or credit positions of individual constituents - Under the then-existing NCL Regulations (including Regulations 1.7 and 4.5.4) and weekly reporting Circulars, the constituent of the PCM was the TM alone, from whom collaterals were collected on a gross basis - The prohibition against using the collaterals of one constituent for another applies to a PCM only as between different TMs, and does not impose a statutory obligation on the PCM to verify constituent-wise balances within a defaulting TM before liquidating securities proffered by that TM to meet settlement shortfalls - the PCM committed no regulatory illegality in liquidating the collaterals deposited by the defaulting TM. [Paras 26–28, 33–41, 45, 50–54] Edelweiss Custodial Services Limited v. NSE Clearing Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 891 : 2026 INSC 941

Securities Law — PFUTP Regulations — Standard of Proof and Test for Establishing Market Manipulation/Fraud - Standard of Proof for Fraud under PFUTP Regulations — Preponderance of Probabilities vs. Mere Suspicion — Held - Allegations of fraud and market manipulation cannot be sustained on conjectures, surmises, or bare suspicions - While direct evidence of a meeting of minds is rarely available in securities transactions, fraud must be established on a preponderance of probabilities through a logical inferential process grounded in objective, proximate, and surrounding facts - Where no third-party investor inducement is demonstrated by SEBI, the standard of proof required is a higher degree of preponderance of probabilities, necessitating that the tactic or device resorted to admits of no explanation other than that of fraud. [Relied On KSL Industries v. The Chairman, SEBI, 2003 SCC OnLine SAT 32; SEBI v. Kishore R. Ajmera, (2016) 6 SCC 368; SEBI v. Kanaiyalal Baldevbhai Patel, (2017) 15 SCC 1; SEBI v. Terrascope Ventures Ltd., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 403; Alupro Building Systems (P) Ltd. v. CCE, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 986; Paras 38, 41-46–48, 51] Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Vedanta Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 919 : 2026 INSC 978

Securities Law — SEBI (Buyback of Securities) Regulations, 1998 — Regulations 14(3) and 15B(8) — SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 2003 (PFUTP Regulations) — Release of Escrow Account vs. Inquiry into Fraud - Whether release/exemption of Cash Escrow under Regulation 15B(8) of the Buyback Regulations bars independent proceedings or finding of fraud under PFUTP Regulations — Held - No. The scope of enquiry under Regulation 15B(8) is strictly confined to determining whether the escrow deposit is liable to be forfeited or released due to non-fulfilment of the mandatory 50% target under Regulation 14(3) - The statutory mechanism for escrow forfeiture neither defines nor determines fraud - The release of the escrow amount does not operate as an automatic statutory bar or confer immunity from proceedings under the PFUTP Regulations - Release of escrow is not equivalent to the absence of fraud, and both enquiries operate in completely distinct legal fields. [Paras 23–25, 32–36, 52-57] Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Vedanta Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 919 : 2026 INSC 978

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act) – Sections 2(1)(c), 2(1)(f), 2(1)(m), 2(1)(zb), 2(1)(zd), 13 & 14 – Enforcement of Security Interest – Assignment of Debt – Recourse to SARFAESI Act by an Assignee Bank for recovery of debt taken over from an NBFC not covered by the Act at inception – Held that a bank governed by Section 2(1)(c) of the SARFAESI Act is fully entitled to take recourse to the provisions of the SARFAESI Act to recover a debt assigned to or taken over by it from an entity (such as a Non-Banking Financial Company) that was not a notified "financial institution" under Section 2(1)(m) at the time of creation of such debt - When an institution is already one to which the SARFAESI Act applies, the acquisition of a non-performing secured loan account by it immediately clothes the said loan account with the attributes of a "secured debt" covered under the Act - It makes no legal difference whether it is the debt along with the institution that comes within the ambit of the Act or it is the debt alone that comes within the ambit by virtue of being assigned to/taken over by a qualifying bank. [Relied on M.D. Frozen Foods Exports Private Limited and others v. Hero Fincorp Limited, (2017) 16 SCC 741; Indiabulls Housing Finance Limited v. Deccan Chronicle Holdings Limited and others, (2018) 14 SCC 783; ICICI Bank Limited v. Official Liquidator of APS Star Industries Limited and others, (2010) 10 SCC 1; Mardia Chemicals Ltd. and others v. Union of India and others, (2004) 4 SCC 311; Paras 30-36] Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. v. Trupti Sanjay Mehta, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 886 : 2026 INSC 943

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act) – Scope and Object – Applicability to "Live and Owing" Debts – Purposive Interpretation of Definition Clauses – Held that the definition clauses under Section 2(1) convey the legislative intent that the Act applies to all existing loan agreements, irrespective of whether the original lender was a notified financial institution on the date of execution of the agreement - The date of classification of a debt as a non-performing asset (NPA) has no relevance, as the Act becomes applicable qua all debts "owing and live" once the institution holding the debt comes within the purview of the Act - Borrowers cannot dissect or nit-pick definition clauses under Section 2(1) to evade the Act. Borrowers who avail loans from NBFCs not initially covered under the SARFAESI Act cannot claim immunity or an inherent right to delay enforcement through time-consuming ordinary civil proceedings upon valid assignment of such debt to a covered banking institution. [Paras 17-40] Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. v. Trupti Sanjay Mehta, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 886 : 2026 INSC 943

Service Law – Fundamental Rule 56(j) – Holistic Evaluation of Service Dossier vs. Unsubstantiated Adverse Notes – Selective Application of Precedents - The Review Committee cannot selectively rely on judgments permitting consideration of past adverse entries while failing to adhere to the equally binding principles that the entire service record must be evaluated, the immediate past must be accorded due weight, and a merit-based promotion inures to the benefit of the officer - An unverified, hearsay confidential note prepared by a superior officer recording oral allegations from private industry representatives unsupported by written complaints or proof cannot form the basis of compulsory retirement of an officer with decades of unblemished service. [Relied on Baikuntha Nath Das v. District Medical Officer, (1992) 2 SCC 299; State of Gujarat v. Umedbhai M. Patel, (2001) 3 SCC 314; Rajasthan SRTC v. Babu Lal Jangir, (2013) 10 SCC 551; Central Industrial Security Force v. Om Prakash, (2022) 5 SCC 100; Paras 45–57] S.S. Das v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 921 : 2026 INSC 980

Service Law – Fundamental Rule 56(j) – Premature / Compulsory Retirement – Scope of Judicial Review – Effect of Regular Promotion on Merit Preceding Compulsory Retirement – Non-punitive character of FR 56(j) is not a blanket immunity - The Supreme Court held that while an order of compulsory retirement in the public interest under FR 56(j) is not per se punitive, it is bound by the precincts of public power and cannot be elevated into a mantra to repel all judicial challenges - A merit-based promotion granted shortly before an order of compulsory retirement stands as proof of a recent, objective assessment of the officer's entire service record and fitness to shoulder higher responsibilities - Such a promotion is irreconcilable with, and directly negates, the conclusion that the officer has become 'dead wood' or is of doubtful integrity - An order of compulsory retirement cannot be invoked as a shortcut to bypass disciplinary safeguards under Article 311 of the Constitution, nor can it be used without material, to wreck vengeance, or to serve vested interests. Selective bureaucratic reliance on isolated remarks while ignoring consistent 'Outstanding' appraisals and recent promotion constitutes malice in law, perversity, and a colourable exercise of power. [Paras 41, 46, 48–51, 58–61] S.S. Das v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 921 : 2026 INSC 980

Service Law – Pending Departmental Inquiries – Relevance in National Sports Coaching Requests - The mere existence of a pending departmental inquiry cannot be treated as an automatic, inflexible disqualification to reject an application for relieving a government employee for a national sporting camp or competition - The competent authority must balance the nature of the inquiry against the limited duration and national character of the sporting assignment - A writ court adjudicating a petition for an NOC/relieving order ought not to return conclusive adverse findings on the validity of the employee's initial appointment or service qualifications when such matters are not directly in issue. [Paras 28–30] Indian Kayaking and Canoeing Association v. Union Territory of J&K, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 922 : 2026 INSC 981

Service Law — Pension — Nature of Pension — Deferred Wage and Socio-Economic Justice - Pension is neither a bounty nor an ex-gratia payment, but payment for past service rendered and a social welfare measure aimed at rendering socio-economic justice - When an employee has rendered long and continuous service and is ultimately regularized, denial of pensionary benefits based on technicalities or artificial distinctions is unjustified. [Paras 23-27] Punjab School Education Board v. Satnam Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 914 : 2026 INSC 965

Service Law — Regularization — Counting of Pre-Regularization Ad-hoc/Daily-Wage Service for Pension — Applicability of Old Pension Scheme vs. Defined Contributory Pension Scheme - Where employees initially engaged on ad-hoc, contractual, or daily-wage basis prior to 01.01.2004 are subsequently regularized (even after the cut-off date of 01.01.2004) pursuant to an established regularization policy adopted by the employer, the substance of the engagement must prevail over form and nomenclature - Pre-regularization service rendered continuously, ignoring purely artificial, notional, or administrative breaks, must be computed as 'qualifying service' for the purposes of retiral and pensionary benefits under the Punjab School Education Board (Employees' Pension, Provident Fund and Gratuity) Regulations, 1991 - such employees are deemed to have entered service prior to 01.01.2004 and are entitled to the benefits of the Old Pension Scheme (GPF Scheme) rather than being compulsorily governed by the new Defined Contributory Pension Scheme. [Paras 22-33] Punjab School Education Board v. Satnam Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 914 : 2026 INSC 965

Stamp Act, 1899 — Section 47-A — Scope and Pre-conditions for Reference — Requirement of "wilful undervaluation" or "fraudulent intention" — Referral to Larger Bench - Under the plain language of Section 47-A(1) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, the registering officer is required to have "reason to believe" that the market value of the property or the consideration has not been truly set forth in the instrument - The terms "wilful undervaluation" and/or "fraudulent intention" are conspicuously absent in the plain statutory phraseology - Reading a culpable mindset or fraudulent intent into Section 47-A as an independent jurisdictional condition precedent amounts to judicial legislation and impermissibly alters a valuation-centric inquiry into a quasi-criminal inquiry - Coordinate Bench decisions in Ramesh Chand Bansal v. District Magistrate/Collector (1999) 5 SCC 62 and Shanti Bhushan v. State of U.P. (2023) SCC OnLine SC 489 affirm that stamp duty is assessed on actual market value under strict literal construction of a taxing statute, without equitable considerations - The two-Judge Bench expressed serious doubt regarding the correctness of the three-Judge Bench decisions in V.N. Devadoss v. Chief Revenue Control Officer-cum-Inspector of Stamps (2009) 7 SCC 438 and Registrar of Assurances v. ASL Vyapar (P) Ltd. (2024) 17 SCC 572, which held that the basis for exercise of power under Section 47-A is wilful undervaluation with fraudulent intent - On grounds of judicial propriety, the following questions were referred to the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India for consideration by a larger Bench - (i) Whether V.N. Devadoss (supra), followed in ASL Vyapar (P) Ltd. (supra), correctly interprets and declares that the basis for exercise of power under Section 47-A of the Stamp Act is wilful undervaluation with fraudulent intention to evade proper stamp duty, or whether power thereunder can and ought to be exercised on its own terms irrespective of culpable mindset?; (ii) Whether the decisions in Ramesh Chand Bansal (supra) and Shanti Bhushan (supra) do not lay down correct law? [Paras 8-12, 16–25] Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. District Revenue Officer (Stamps), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 907 : 2026 INSC 963