Supreme Court Monthly Digest July 2026

Administrative Law — Extraordinary Jurisdiction — Article 142 Powers - The invocation of extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to do complete justice is contextual and cannot be exercised mechanically - The Supreme Court will not invoke Article 142 to protect the services of irregularly or illegally appointed teachers at the cost of the students' future and the integrity of public employment streams. [Para 27-32] Najma Khatun v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 667 : 2026 INSC 691

Administrative Law — Rules of Business under Article 166 of the Constitution — Financial Implication and Deemed Consent - A delegated legislation/notification enhancing royalty rates approved by the Chief Minister (who is also the Minister-in-Charge of Mining) cannot be invalidated for want of explicit approval from the Council of Ministers or formal concurrence from the Finance Department, especially when there is no evidence of disagreement by the Finance Minister - In matters involving the collective responsibility of the Council, where a decision is taken by the Chief Minister at the helm, a deemed consent of the Finance Minister can be inferred under the peculiar facts and circumstances. [Paras 51-63] State of Haryana v. Faridabad Gurgaon Minerals, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 673 : 2026 INSC 690

Administrative Law & Public Services – Interview/Viva-Voce Benchmarks – Administrative Necessity - Prescription of Minimum 25% Qualifying Marks in Viva-Voce – The introduction of a minimum qualifying benchmark for the interview stage is neither arbitrary nor whimsical; it is rooted in profound administrative necessity to preserve the integrity, calibre, and quality of judicial administration - While a written examination evaluates academic legal knowledge, the viva-voce is essential to judge crucial personal and intellectual qualities such as alertness, resourcefulness, dependability, and decisive capability required for a high judicial office like an Additional District Judge - A candidate cannot claim a right to appointment based solely on a high aggregate score if they fail to clear the minimum interview threshold. [Relied on Mehmood Alam Tariq v. State of Rajasthan, (1988) 3 SCC 241; Paras 19-25] Manoj Goyal V. Rajasthan High Court, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 695 : 2026 INSC 699

Advocates Act, 1961 — Sections 35 and 36 — Professional Misconduct — Exclusive Jurisdiction of Bar Councils — Autonomy and Self-Regulation — Held: The legal profession is sui generis(unique in nature) and cannot be equated with traditional commercial professions - The independence of the Bar, secured by the principle of self-regulation ("peers must regulate peers"), is an inextricable feature of the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law - Under the statutory scheme of the Advocates Act, 1961, the power to investigate, adjudicate, and punish an advocate for professional misconduct or negligence vests exclusively in the State Bar Councils and the Bar Council of India - Parallel adjudicatory mechanisms or unilateral blacklisting by external agencies like banks or banking associations are legally excluded - If a bank believes an advocate is guilty of misconduct, its appropriate remedy is to place the material before the competent State Bar Council. [Paras 30 - 36] Ajay Vijh v. Indian Banks Association, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 656 : 2026 INSC 670

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 16 — Doctrine of Kompetenz-Kompetenz — Joinder of Non-Signatories — Group of Companies Doctrine — The determination of whether a non-signatory is a veritable party to an arbitration agreement involves a complex inquiry of factual, circumstantial, and legal aspects - True effect must be given to the doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz under Section 16, which empowers the Arbitral Tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction, including intricate determinations of whether a non-signatory is bound by the agreement. [Relied on SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. and Another (2005) 8 SCC 618; Deep Industries Ltd. v. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. and Another (2020) 15 SCC 706; unjab State Power Corporation Limited v. Emta Coal Limited and Another (2020) 17 SCC 93; Cox and Kings Ltd. v. SAP India Pvt. Ltd. and Another (2024) 4 SCC 1; M/s Tarini Prasad Mohanty v. M/s Sunflag Iron and Steel Company Limited 2026 INSC 566; Paras 21- 32] Manash Kamal Bezboruah v. Bokahola Tea Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 677 : 2026 INSC 701

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 16, Section 5, and Section 34 — Constitution of India — Article 227 — Maintainability of Revision Petition against Arbitral Tribunal's order rejecting jurisdictional challenge — Extent of Judicial Intervention — The High Court is not justified in entertaining a revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution against an order of the Arbitral Tribunal rejecting an application under Section 16 of the Act (seeking deletion from the array of parties as non-signatories) - The statutory scheme of the Act mandates minimal judicial interference during ongoing arbitral proceedings - The remedy against the rejection of a Section 16 application strictly lies under Section 34 of the Act after the pronouncement of the final award. Manash Kamal Bezboruah v. Bokahola Tea Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 677 : 2026 INSC 701

Arms Act, 1959 – Section 25(1-B)(a) and Section 26 – Offence of possession of unlicensed firearms – Requirement of Conscious Possession – Mere recovery of firearms and incriminating articles from the house of the accused is not sufficient to establish guilt unless the prosecution proves that the accused had conscious possession and dominion over the articles – Coercive possession or possession under threat of life cannot be termed as "conscious possession” – Held - The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's judgment which set aside the concurrent findings of conviction recorded by the Trial Court and the Appellate Court against the house owner - The prosecution established that four extremists took shelter in the respondent's house at 4:00 a.m., and upon a police raid at 6:00 a.m., three of them fled, leaving behind a country-made stein gun, ammunition, and other articles - The respondent offered an explanation that he had no option but to allow the articles under pressure and threat to life from the extremists - Accepting this explanation, the Supreme Court observed that if incriminating material is kept in a house due to grave fear or threat to life, it cannot be deemed as "conscious possession." - Coercive possession under threat cannot form the sole criteria to record a finding of guilt. [Relied on Francis Xavier Salemao vs. State Through Public Prosecutor, 2007 SCC OnLine Bom 1261; Paras 10-12] State of Jharkhand v. Jagdish Lakra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 674 : 2026 INSC 686

Banking Regulation Act, 1949 — Section 35-A — RBI Guidelines on Caution List — Scope of Caution List vs. Professional Negligence — Held: The Caution List mechanism maintained by the IBA under RBI guidelines is strictly intended to operate in cases involving fraud, dishonesty, criminality, or deliberate facilitation of fraudulent activity affecting the banking system - It is not designed to address cases resting merely on alleged negligence or errors of professional judgment - Fraud inherently imports mens rea and deliberate intent - An erroneous legal opinion or omission in title verification, absent dishonest intent, cannot be elevated to fraud - While a bank is free to disengage a panel counsel contractually, it has no power or jurisdiction to issue a sector-wide public declaration targeting an advocate's competency - the inclusion of the appellant's name in the Caution List solely on account of professional negligence is illegal and unsustainable. [Paras 25 – 35] Ajay Vijh v. Indian Banks Association, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 656 : 2026 INSC 670

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) – Section 187 – Police Custody and Remand – Extent of Window for Police Custody – Absolute Outer Limit Cannot Be Imposed By Courts – The Supreme Court observed that Section 187(2) and (3) of the BNSS enlarges the window during which police custody (not exceeding 15 days in the aggregate) may be sought, allowing it to be taken in parts during the first 40 or 60 days of detention - This legislative change was specifically intended to address situations where fresh facts or discoveries emerge later in the investigation - imposing an absolute, non-extendable outer limit on custody by courts runs counter to the statutory object of the provision. [Paras 20-24] State of Andhra Pradesh v. Suda Suresh Veera Venkata Naga Raju, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 722 : 2026 INSC 744

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) - Section 187(3) - Non-supply of charge sheet to accused not a ground for default bail - When a charge sheet is filed within the prescribed statutory period, the mere non-supply of its copy to the accused does not entitle the accused to default bail under Section 187(3) of the BNSS. Held, Section 187(3) BNSS provides for default bail only where the investigating agency fails to file the charge sheet within the stipulated time. Non-supply or non-delivery of a copy of the charge sheet to the accused after it has been filed within time does not constitute a ground for granting default bail. The Court upheld the judgment of the High Court rejecting the accused's plea for default bail in a CBI case involving large-scale cyber fraud (approx. ₹3.81 crores) registered under various provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and Information Technology Act, 2000. The appeal was accordingly dismissed. Shaurya Sunil Kumar Singh v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 649 : 2026 INSC 666

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) – Section 38 – Right of Arrested Person to Meet an Advocate During Interrogation – Ongoing Presence of Counsel Not Mandated – The Supreme Court held that a plain reading of Section 38 of the BNSS guarantees the right of an accused to meet an advocate of their choice during interrogation, but it does not contemplate the continuous, ongoing physical presence of the advocate for the entirety of each interrogation session - While the court can regulate the manner and distance of the advocate's presence to prevent interference, an unqualified entitlement to continuous presence travels beyond the scope of Section 38. [Paras 22-24] State of Andhra Pradesh v. Suda Suresh Veera Venkata Naga Raju, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 722 : 2026 INSC 744

Civil Procedure & Jurisprudence — Interim Orders — Stay Of Operation Vs. Quashing Of An Order - There is a distinct legal difference between the quashing of an order and staying its operation - While quashing restores the original position before the order was passed, a stay merely makes the order inoperative from the date of the stay without wiping it out from existence - Where the High Court's judgment striking down a recruitment Act was stayed by the Supreme Court, it created a legal vacuum where neither the original Act nor the transitional notifications could operate independently - Any public employment appointment made by managing committees after the date of the stay order (14th March 2016) without seeking express permission or leave from the Supreme Court is ex-facie illegal and invalid. [Relied On Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. v. Church of South India Trust Association, (1992) 3 SCC 1; Paras 40 - 42] Najma Khatun v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 667 : 2026 INSC 691

Civil Procedure & Practise – Doctrine of Withdrawal – Effect of Substantive Interim Orders - Withdrawal of Writ Petition with Liberty to Approach High Court – The doctrine of withdrawal cannot be weaponized to erase a prior, conscious, and substantive judicial determination by the Court declining a specific prayer. When a specific prayer challenging finalized appointments is dismissed by the Supreme Court, the subsequent withdrawal of the surviving petition (e.g., academic challenge to the vires of a rule) does not resurrect the challenge against selected candidates or wipe away the finality attained by those appointments. [Paras 25-30] Manoj Goyal V. Rajasthan High Court, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 695 : 2026 INSC 699

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order VIII Rule 5 & Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 58 – Doctrine of Non-Traverse – Non-examination of Plaintiff - Where the plaintiff sues on the basis of intestate succession, and the primary facts regarding her status as the legally wedded wife and sole surviving Class I heir are not traversed or specifically denied by the defendants in the written statement, they stand admitted - Facts admitted need not be proved, and the non-examination of the plaintiff or any witness of fact on her behalf cannot be a ground to dismiss the suit. Sardari Lal v. Bishan Dass, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 655 : 2026 INSC 669

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XXIII Rule 3 — Compromise of Suit — Absence of Express Authorisation to Counsel — Validity of Consent Decree — Mandate of Law post 1976 Amendment — A compromise decree must strictly adhere to the mandatory requirements of Order XXIII Rule 3 of the CPC - Post the 1976 Amendment, a compromise must be in writing and signed by the parties to prevent false and frivolous pleas - While a counsel or duly authorized representative is permitted to sign a compromise decree on behalf of the client, such an act requires an express authorization or the existence of exigent circumstances - An advocate should not act on implied authority to conclude or surrender the substantial legal rights of a client without clear instructions - In the absence of express authorization in the Vakalatnama or evidence of exigent circumstances, the "voluntary" aspect mandated by Order XXIII Rule 3 cannot be established, rendering the resulting compromise contrary to law. [Paras 4, 5] Krishna Kumar Ojha v. Jitendra Chaudhary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 652 : 2026 INSC 662 : AIR 2026 SC 3116

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 100 – Scope of interference in Second Appeal – Concurrent findings of fact - The High Court displaced the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court regarding the genuineness of the transaction and execution of the contract by drawing fresh inferences from surrounding circumstances, without recording any finding of perversity - Held: The High Court transgressed the limits of its jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC - The First Appellate Court is the final court of fact. The High Court in a Second Appeal cannot interfere with findings of fact merely because it would have arrived at a different conclusion on the appreciation of the same evidence - Interference is permissible only where the findings are recorded without evidence, ignore material evidence, or are otherwise vitiated by perversity - Findings on the execution of the agreement, readiness and willingness, and the falsity of a defence are pure findings of fact unassailable in a second appeal unless characterized as perverse. [Relied On: Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons, Ltd. v. Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314; Paras 15 – 27] Jaspal Singh v. Ashwani Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 682 : 2026 INSC 700

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 100 – Scope of Second Appeal – Interference with Findings on Will The question of whether suspicious circumstances surround the execution of a Will and whether they have been satisfactorily explained is essentially a question of fact - The phrase "satisfying the conscience of the Court" does not convert a question of fact into a question of law. Where the final court of fact (First Appellate Court) evaluates real and germane suspicious circumstances to discard a Will, the High Court exceeds its jurisdiction under Section 100 by interfering with such well-reasoned findings of fact. [Relied on H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma & Ors. (AIR 1959 SC 443); Rani Purnima Debi & Anr. v. Kumar Khagendra Narayan Deb & Anr. ((1962) 3 SCR 195); Smt. Jaswant Kaur v. Smt. Amrit Kaur ((1977) 1 SCC 369); Kalyan Singh v. Smt. Chhoti and Ors. ((1990) 1 SCC 266); Shivakumar & Ors. v. Sharanabasappa & Ors. ((2021) 11 SCC 277); Mansinghrao Yeshwant Rao Patil & Ors. v. Ramchandra Govindrao Patil & Ors. (1954 SCC OnLine SC 96); Paras 32 – 70] Sardari Lal v. Bishan Dass, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 655 : 2026 INSC 669

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 100 – Second Appeal – Jurisdictional Error and Perversity – The High Court commits a manifest jurisdictional error and its findings are rendered perverse when, under Section 100 of the CPC, it fails to test the legality of a reversal by the First Appellate Court and instead builds a new legal edifice by suo motu invoking statutory provisions (like Section 43 of the ToP Act) or factual premises (like interchange of boundaries) that were never pleaded, proved, or advanced by the parties, while simultaneously ignoring material admissions made by the plaintiff. [Paras 38, 39, 40, 41] Venkatesha v. K.M. Venkatamuniyappa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 679 : 2026 INSC 705

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Section 100 & Order XLII Rule 2 — Mandate to Formulate Substantial Questions of Law — The formulation of a substantial question of law is a mandatory condition precedent for admitting, maintaining, and entertaining a second appeal on merits under Section 100 of the CPC - The High Court cannot hear and decide a second appeal on merits or reverse the judgment of the First Appellate Court without expressly formulating such question(s) of law - A judgment delivered without satisfying this mandatory requirement stands vitiated in law. [Paras 23-27] R. Veronica v. Rudrayani Devaki, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 676 : 2026 INSC 703

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Section 151 — Inherent Powers — Recall of Fraudulent Compromise Decree — Delay and Limitation — The law of limitation cannot be utilized as a shield to defeat substantive rights or to perpetuate an illegality that is contrary to law - Where a compromise decree is obtained by fraud and without the signature or authorization of an affected party, the Court can exercise its inherent powers under Section 151 of the CPC to set aside the decree for the ends of justice. While a delay of 28 years (1994 to 2022) is egregiously large, the strict rule of limitation may be given a go-by based on the specific facts of a case, especially where basic facts are heavily contested and the affected party's rights are directly compromised without due process. Issues in such a partition suit require adjudication through a full trial. [Relied on Gurpreet Singh v. Chatur Bhuj Goel, (1988) 1 SCC 270; Som Dev v. Rati Ram, (2006) 10 SCC 788; Himalayan Coop. Group Housing Society v. Balwan Singh, (2015) 7 SCC 373; Para 6] Krishna Kumar Ojha v. Jitendra Chaudhary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 652 : 2026 INSC 662 : AIR 2026 SC 3116

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Section 96 & Order XLI Rule 31 — Scope and Powers of First Appellate Court — Necessity of Reasoned Judgment — Reversal of Trial Court Judgment - The First Appellate Court is the final court of fact and is vested with a valuable right to re-hear the entire case on both questions of law and fact - When reversing a judgment of the Trial Court, the Appellate Court is bound to apply its mind, evaluate the evidence independently, and record clear, cogent, and succinct reasons for its disagreement rather than passing a cryptic order - A judgment that merely extracts the Trial Court's reasoning and brushes it aside by asserting that the lower court failed to understand the dispute violates the well-established principles governing first appeals - Reason is the lifeblood and heartbeat of every judicial conclusion, serving as a deterrent against arbitrary actions and ensuring public confidence in the justice delivery system. [Paras 5-10] Lakshmi v. Gopi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 681 : 2026 INSC 709

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Order I Rule 10, Order XXII Rule 10 & Section 146 – Impleadment vs. Devolution of Interest – Constructive Res Judicata - Although Order I Rule 10 CPC (joinder of proper/necessary parties ab initio) and Order XXII Rule 10 CPC (devolution of interest pendente lite) govern distinct situations, their procedural scope overlaps when determining whether a transferee pendente lite should be brought on record - Once an application for impleadment under Order I Rule 10 CPC filed by a transferee pendente lite is conclusively decided on merits against them, a subsequent application under Order XXII Rule 10 CPC predicated upon the exact same registered sale deed and interest is barred by the principles of res judicata - Litigants cannot re-agitate a settled issue merely by switching the specific statutory provision. [Relied on Sulthan Said Ibrahim v. Prakasan, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1218; B.S. Lalitha v. Bhuvanesh, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 860] Sanjiv Kumar v. Shakuntla Devi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 726 : 2026 INSC 747

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Order XXII Rule 10 & Section 146 – Transferee Pendente Lite – Impleadment in Cross-Objections – Fresh Cause of Action - The bar of res judicata does not extend to proceedings/cross-objections where no prior application for impleadment was instituted - Where the main appeal is dismissed for non-prosecution and the transferors fail/refuse to seek its restoration while the opposing party restores the cross-objections concerning the assigned suit property, a material change in circumstances and a fresh cause of action arises - Since the transferor loses interest and the threat of collusion exists, the transferee pendente lite is entitled to be impleaded under Order XXII Rule 10 CPC to safeguard their acquired rights in the cross-objections. [Relied on: Thomson Press (India) Ltd. v. Nanak Builders and Investors Pvt. Ltd., (2013) 5 SCC 397; Amit Kumar Shaw v. Farida Khatoon, (2005) 11 SCC 403; Paras 27-38] Sanjiv Kumar v. Shakuntla Devi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 726 : 2026 INSC 747

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Section 11 & Explanation IV – Res Judicata – Interlocutory Orders – Erroneous Findings of Fact - The doctrine of res judicata applies to subsequent stages of the same proceeding if a question or issue has been decided at an earlier stage - An judicial decision, whether right or wrong, binds the parties unless it relates to a matter of jurisdiction - Where an earlier application for impleadment under Order I Rule 10 CPC was adjudicated and dismissed on merits, the findings carry binding effect upon the parties even if based upon an erroneous consideration of facts. [Relied on Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy, (1970) 1 SCC 613; State of West Bengal v. Hemant Kumar Bhattacharjee, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 319; S. Ramachandra Rao v. S. Nagabhushana Rao, (2024) 17 SCC 361; Dr. Shah Faesal v. Union of India, (2020) 4 SCC 1; Sulthan Said Ibrahim v. Prakasan, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1218; Distinguished on Allahabad Development Authority v. Nasiruzzaman, (1996) 6 SCC 424] Sanjiv Kumar v. Shakuntla Devi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 726 : 2026 INSC 747

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Legislative Intent – Metamorphosis from Old Code (1898) to New Code (1973) – Abolition of Full-Fledged Magisterial Inquiry at Committal Stage – Held - Following the recommendations of the 41st Report of the Law Commission of India, full-fledged committal inquiries were recognized as a waste of time and effort that resulted in inordinate delay - Under the existing Code, the role of the committal Magistrate has been completely metamorphosed and absolutely constricted to a "narrow inspection hole" - The evidence can only be taken after the framing of the charge, which is the exclusive domain of the Court of Session under Section 228 after evaluating the materials under Section 227 - Requiring witnesses to depose about the same set of facts twice (at the pre-committal stage and during the trial) is neither mandated by law nor serves any useful purpose. [Relied on Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 3 SCC 92; State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi (2005) 1 SCC 568; Rattiram v. State of M.P. (2012) 4 SCC 516; Paras 9-15] Neeraj Gupta v. Pardeep Kumar Bansal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 651 : 2026 INSC 660

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 154 — Multiple FIRs — Test of Sameness — Clubbing and Consolidation of FIRs — Cyber Fraud involving similar modus operandi but distinct victims and transactions - Permissibility of Second/Multiple FIRs - Registration of multiple FIRs is impermissible only if they relate to the exact same incident or form part of the "same transaction" - where a subsequent FIR relates to a distinct occurrence, an independent transaction, or a separate offence, its registration is entirely permissible - Triple-Test for 'Same Transaction' - To ascertain whether a series of acts form part of the same transaction, the Supreme Court applied the triple-test: (i) unity of purpose and design; (ii) proximity of time and place; and (iii) continuity of action - If there are several transactions and distinct offences in relation to different victims, separate trials must take place - Application to Cyber Fraud -The mere fact that a part of the defrauded amounts from different victims across multiple states (Maharashtra, Karnataka, Odisha) was transferred into a single bank account belonging to the petitioner's proprietary concern does not establish a live link or mean the incidents form part of the "same transaction" - Although the modus operandi appeared similar, the victims, the amounts involved, the transactions, and the consequences suffered were entirely distinct - the alternative relief for clubbing and composite investigation cannot be granted, especially when the investigation is at a nascent stage requiring intricate digital and forensic analysis. [Relied on T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala (2001) 6 SCC 181; Babubhai v. State of Gujarat (2010) 12 SCC 254; Anju Chaudhary v. State of U.P. (2013) 6 SCC 384; State of Rajasthan v. Surendra Singh Rathore 2025 SCC OnLine SC 358; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Khimji Bhai Jadeja 2026 SCC OnLine SC 19; Paras 14-18] Rutvij Bhagat Singh Wakhare v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 716 : 2026 INSC 740

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 164 - Section 306 – Admissibility and Evidentiary Value of Retracted Confession - Mandatory Compliance with Statutory Safeguards - Resiling Approver / Co-accused Confession - A retracted confession whose voluntariness is seriously disputed and whose authenticity is compromised by repeated recording/repudiation cannot form the primary foundation of a conviction - For a retracted confession to sustain a finding of guilt, it must receive strong, independent, and substantive corroboration in material particulars connecting the accused with the crime - Compliance with statutory warnings under Section 164(2) CrPC is an indispensable prerequisite to ensure the voluntary character of a confession. Any subsequent insertion or procedural variation indicating that warnings were not administered prior to recording diminishes the degree of assurance and invalidates its reliability - Once an approver resiles from a confession made under a grant of pardon and fails to fulfill the conditions under Section 306 CrPC, their statement can at best be treated as a confession of a co-accused under Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act - Such a confession is not substantive evidence and can only be used to lend assurance to a conclusion otherwise arrived at via independent, legally admissible evidence - Held, the conviction of Accused No. 12 (Pappu @ Salim) rested solely on successive, repeated confessional statements which he subsequently disowned in open court, denouncing his approver status. In the complete absence of independent physical, forensic, or circumstantial evidence, the conviction is unsustainable - Evidentiary superstructure cannot stand once the foundation of the confession is discredited - Conviction set aside. [Relied on Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1952) 1 SCC 275; Suresh Budharmal Kalani v. State of Maharashtra, (1998) 7 SCC 337; Paras 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 69] Abdul Hameed v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 700 : 2026 INSC 734

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 190, 465 & 482 – Wrong Section mentioned in Cognizance Order – Curable Defect – Remedial Scope of Chapter XXXV CrPC – Remand - The Magistrate took cognizance of the offence under Section 125A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (RPA), whereas the election was governed by the State legislation (Gujarat Municipalities Act) under which the penal provisions stood omitted, thereby attracting the controlling provisions of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) - The appellant argued this was a jurisdictional error vitiating the proceedings - Held: The error in taking cognizance under a wrong section is a curable defect under Section 465 CrPC, provided the Court has the competence and power to take cognizance under the correct sections - Cognizance is taken of the offence and not of the person - Chapter XXXV of the CrPC aims to prevent technical irregularities which do not go to the root of the matter or occasion a failure of justice from delaying trials at a pre-trial or inquiry stage - Filing a false affidavit in an electoral process is an offence against society at large - Order of the High Court modified; matter remanded to the Magistrate to take cognizance afresh under the appropriate provisions of the IPC and proceed in accordance with law. [Relied on Pruthvirajsinh Nodhubha Jadeja v. Jayeshkumar Chhakaddas Shah, (2019) 9 SCC 533; Pradeep S. Wodeyar v. State of Karnataka, (2021) 19 SCC 62; Paras 11- 14] Chandrikaben Kishor Dafda v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 650 : 2026 INSC 665

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 209 and Section 244 – Committal Proceedings – Requirement of Pre-Charge Evidence in Complaints Involving Offences Exclusively Triable by the Court of Session – Constricted Role of the Magistrate – Held - The High Court erred in holding that a Magistrate must record pre-charge prosecution evidence under Section 244 of the CrPC even when the offence is strictly and exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions - The scheme of the modern CrPC has consciously done away with the lengthy pre-committal inquiry and evidence gathering that existed under the old 1898 Code - The primary mandate of the Magistrate under Section 209 is merely to inspect and see whether the offence is exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions - In performing this administrative act, no evidence needs to be taken, and the Magistrate is forbidden from applying their mind to the merits of the case to determine whether an accused needs to be added or subtracted. [Paras 8 - 13] Neeraj Gupta v. Pardeep Kumar Bansal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 651 : 2026 INSC 660

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 299(1) – Purported legislative intent – Exception to Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Prevention of abuse of process - The clear intent behind Section 299(1) of the CrPC is to ensure that evidence against an accused is preserved when they have deliberately absconded from the trial - The provision cannot be given a restrictive interpretation that would defeat its very purpose or incentivize accused persons to willfully abscond for long periods to await the natural death or unavailability of material witnesses - The prosecuting agency is not required to move an application under this Section in the first trial as a matter of rule anticipating the future unavailability of a witness. [Relied on: Nirmal Singh v. State of Haryana, (2000) 4 SCC 41; CBI v. Abu Salem Ansari, (2011) 4 SCC 426; Paras 14-21] State of West Bengal v. Kader Khan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 692 : 2026 INSC 718

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 299(1) [Corresponding to Section 335 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023] – Record of evidence in absence of accused – Deposition of a deceased witness recorded in an earlier trial – Admissibility in subsequent trial against an absconding accused – Absence of a formal judicial order recording satisfaction of abscondence before recording deposition does not invalidate its admissibility - There is no statutory requirement under Section 299(1) of the CrPC mandating the formal passing of an order by the Magistrate concerned, recording that the accused is absconding and that there is no immediate prospect of arrest, before the witness deposes - What is essential is whether these two foundational facts stood established on the actual date of the deposition of the witness. [Para 14] State of West Bengal v. Kader Khan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 692 : 2026 INSC 718

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 482 vs Section 397 — Maintainability of Quashing Petition vis-à-vis Revisional Remedy — The availability of an alternative remedy of criminal revision under Section 397 of the CrPC does not operate as a threshold bar to the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC - The two provisions operate in distinct spheres - The nomenclature under which a petition is filed is wholly immaterial; to do substantive justice, the High Court can always treat and convert a petition filed under Section 482 CrPC into a revision under Section 397 CrPC, and vice versa, rather than non-suiting a party on a hyper-technical ground of maintainability. [Relied On Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2009) 2 SCC 370; Prabhu Chawla v. State of Rajasthan (2016) 16 SCC 30; Akanksha Arora v. Tanay Maben 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3688; Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (1977) 4 SCC 551; Paras 22 – 24] Standard Chartered Bank v. Enforcement Officer Ministry of Home Affairs, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 701 : 2026 INSC 727

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Sections 227 & 228 — Scope of Examination at the Stage of Charge Framing / Discharge - Held: At the stage of framing charges or considering discharge, the Court is strictly required to look only at the materials collected during the investigation that form part of the police report under Section 173(2) CrPC – Noted that the Court must proceed on the assumption that the prosecution's material is true and evaluate whether it creates a "grave suspicion" of the accused's involvement - A full-scale mini-trial, evaluation of defense materials outside the police report, or application of the standard of proof required for a final conviction is impermissible at this stage. [Paras 20, 21, 31-45] AAA v. Linda Sema, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 659 : 2026 INSC 675

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) – Appellate Jurisdiction Boundaries - Where the court of first instance only forms an opinion on 'wrong statements', the High Court, in an appeal preferred by the aggrieved party against such an order, cannot improve upon the original order by introducing fresh findings of a 'false affidavit' or 'expediency', especially when the opposite party had not challenged the first instance order - A party cannot be placed in a worse position by preferring an appeal - A direction for filing a complaint under Section 340 Cr.P.C. normally ought not to be made during the pendency of the substantive proceedings, but rather upon their conclusion - This ensures that the primary adjudication is not derailed or delayed by peripheral applications used as tools of distraction. [Relied on Iqbal Singh Marwah and another v. Meenakshi Marwah and another, (2005) INSC 129; Santokh Singh v. Izhar Hussain and another, (1973) INSC 96; James Kunjwal v. State of Uttarakhand and another, (2024) INSC 601; Para 13-17] Prabhakar Yeshwant Masram v. Sou Tula Namdeorao Jaipurkar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 703 : 2026 INSC 724

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) – Forming of Opinion on 'Expediency in the Interests of Justice' - Section 340(1) of the Cr.P.C. mandates that a Court must form a specific opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be made into the alleged offence - Prosecution is not ordered in every case or to gratify private vendetta, but in the larger interest of the administration of justice in glaring cases of deliberate falsehood - Ordering a criminal inquiry on the mere recording of a 'wrong statement' without establishing such judicial expediency renders the order bad in law. [Para 12] Prabhakar Yeshwant Masram v. Sou Tula Namdeorao Jaipurkar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 703 : 2026 INSC 724

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) – Section 340 r/w Section 195(1)(b) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 193, 199, and 200 – Scope of Inquiry – Meaning of 'Wrong Statement' vs 'False Statement' – Pre-requisites for initiating prosecution under Section 340 Cr.P.C. - Distinction Between 'Wrong Statement' and 'False Statement' -The threshold for initiating action for an offence punishable under Sections 199 and 200 of the IPC is the making of a 'false statement' and not merely a 'wrong statement' - A 'wrong statement' of fact does not automatically assume the character of a 'false statement' - A 'false statement' carries a deliberate intention to deceive or gain an undue advantage with knowledge, actual or constructive - Inadvertent typographical errors or mistakes do not qualify as deliberate falsehoods - Where the court of first instance recorded a prima facie finding that 'wrong statements' (typographical mistakes) were made, it erred in directing the filing of a complaint under Sections 193, 199, and 200 of the IPC. [Paras 11 – 15] Prabhakar Yeshwant Masram v. Sou Tula Namdeorao Jaipurkar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 703 : 2026 INSC 724

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 125(1) & Section 125(4) — Interim Maintenance — Adultery as a Defense — Adjudication of Application under Section 125(4) as an Interlocutory Stage - Section 125(4) CrPC — Pendency of Section 125(4) application per se does not bar interim maintenance — Ground of adultery raised under Section 125(4) must be decided after interim maintenance order and before final adjudication — Deferring adjudication of adultery to final disposal is unsustainable - Section 125 is oriented towards social justice, secular in character, and summary in nature to prevent vagrancy and destitution - An application for maintenance is stage one of the proceedings, wherein interim maintenance may be awarded under the second proviso to Section 125(1) - An application filed under Section 125(4) constitutes stage two, and its decision determines whether the case reaches final maintenance under Section 125(1) - If a husband files an application under Section 125(4) alleging adultery, the Court cannot defer its determination to the stage of final adjudication - Adultery, if proved, disentitles the wife to maintenance; hence, the Section 125(4) application must be decided in the interregnum after the order granting interim maintenance and before the final adjudication of the main maintenance petition - If the evidence presented along with the Section 125(4) application ex-facie/on first blush establishes adultery or if the fact is admitted, interim maintenance becomes a non-starter or will be stopped, and the main application will be dismissed - Where the evidence requires proof in accordance with law, interim maintenance will continue during the intervening period while the Court undertakes a review of the evidence to conclusively decide the Section 125(4) application. [Paras 15 - 20] Himanshu Chordia v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 748 : 2026 INSC 778

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Section 173(2), 173(8), 190(1)(b) & 218 – Cognizance and Consolidated/Split Trials – Primacy of the Court – Superior Officer's Intervention - The Superintendent of Police (S.P.) directed a charge sheet to be filed against only two accused who were in custody and ordered further investigation against the remaining fifteen accused despite the initial report finding offences made out against all seventeen - Held: The S.P.'s directive to split the investigation and halt the charge sheet against specific individuals was without authority - an invalid investigation does not nullify the subsequent cognizance or trial unless it results in a miscarriage of justice - The formation of an opinion on whether an accused must be placed on trial is the exclusive prerogative of the Investigating Officer, while the ultimate authority to accept a closure report, reject it, or take independent cognizance on the disclosed material rests solely with the Court. Multiple committal orders or separate final reports can be consolidated into a single trial or adjudicated via split trials at the discretion of the Court, provided no prejudice is caused to the accused. [Paras 10-19] Brajesh Kumar @ Birjesh Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 670 : 2026 INSC 695

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 374 (corresponding to Section 415 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 - BNSS) - Maintainability of Appeal — Reversal of Acquittal by Appellate Court — Conviction Recorded for First Time by Sessions Court in Appeal — Whether Second Appeal Lies to High Court - Held: An appeal under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (corresponding to Section 415 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) is not maintainable before the High Court against a judgment of conviction recorded by a Sessions Court while exercising appellate jurisdiction and reversing an order of acquittal passed by a Trial Court - Right of Appeal is a Creature of Statute - The right of appeal is neither an inherent nor a natural right, but a substantive statutory right - It can exist only where it is expressly conferred by law. Under Section 372 CrPC (Section 413 BNSS), no appeal shall lie except as provided by the Code - In the absence of an express statutory provision, no second appeal can be inferred or judicially created on considerations of equity or perceived hardship - Interpretation of Expression "on a trial held by" - The phrase "on a trial held by" under Section 374 CrPC refers strictly to the court which itself conducted the original trial proceedings commencing from the framing of charges and culminating in the judgment and sentence - A Sessions Court exercising appellate powers under Section 378 CrPC / Section 419 BNSS is exercising appellate jurisdiction, not trial jurisdiction - The doctrine that an appeal is a continuation of original proceedings does not transform an appellate court into a court conducting a trial - The decision of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Arun Sharma v. State of Himachal Pradesh, holding that an appeal lies under Section 374(2) CrPC against a first-time conviction by a Sessions Court in an appeal against acquittal, does not lay down the correct law and is hereby overruled - The only statutory remedy available to an accused convicted for the first time by an appellate court is to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Sections 397 read with 401 CrPC (Sections 438 read with 442 BNSS) - Where a conviction is recorded for the first time by an appellate court reversing an acquittal, the High Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 401(1) CrPC (Section 442(1) BNSS) is expected to adopt a more liberal approach and undertake a searching examination of the correctness, legality, and propriety of the conviction, as the accused has not had the benefit of a statutory appeal against such conviction. [Relied on National Commission for Women v. State of Delhi and Another, (2010) 12 SCC 599; Mallikarjun Kodagali v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 2 SCC 752; Parvinder Kansal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 19 SCC 496; Jamin and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 INSC 330; Paras 27–32, 34–36, 38–39, 53–57, 60–61] Vishnu Kumar Gupta v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 744 : 2026 INSC 770

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Sections 451 & 457 — Interim Custody of Vehicles — Registration Certificate vs. Actual Possession & Financial Undertaking - Interim custody under Sections 451 and 457 CrPC is not an adjudication of title, but a judicial mechanism to prevent decay and misuse of seized property - Registration Certificate (RC) is evidentiary and relevant, but cannot act as an inflexible or sole rule overriding admitted possession, ongoing operational control, and financial obligations borne by another party - The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's order granting interim custody of the subject vehicles to the respondent company instead of the appellant/ostensible owner in whose company's name the vehicles were registered -The Supreme Court observed that while the registration certificates stood in the name of the appellant's company, criminal proceedings alleging misappropriation of company funds to purchase those vehicles were pending against him - the vehicles were seized from the operational site of the respondent company, the loan EMI instalments were paid from the respondent company's accounts, and an undertaking executed by the appellant permitted the respondent company to retain and operate the vehicles. [Paras 27, 30, 32–37] Krishnan Narayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 724 : 2026 INSC 748

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Sections 451 & 457 — Nature and Scope of Judicial Discretion - The power of the Court to order interim custody under Sections 451 and 457 CrPC is a judicial function to be exercised judiciously and expeditiously based on reason and justice - The Supreme Court makes only a prima facie assessment regarding who is best entitled to interim possession and does not adjudicate civil title or ownership. [Relied on N. Madhavan v. State of Kerala, (1979) 4 SCC 1; Paras 27-30, 32-38] Krishnan Narayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 724 : 2026 INSC 748

Commercial Courts Act, 2015 — Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Order VIII Rule 1, Order VIII Rule 6A(3), Order VIII Rule 6G, Order VIII Rule 10 — Filing of Written Statement to Counter-Claim in Commercial Suits — Mandatory Outer Time Limit of 120 Days Applicable to Plaintiff - The Supreme Court held that the mandatory time frame of 120 days prescribed under the proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 of the CPC (as amended by the Commercial Courts Act, 2015) applies mutatis mutandis to the filing of a written statement by a plaintiff in response to a counter-claim raised by a defendant in a commercial suit. AK Ghosh & Company v. Biman Bose, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 663 : 2026 INSC 684

Commercial Courts Act, 2015 - Interplay between Order VIII Rule 6A(3) and Rule 6G CPC - While Order VIII Rule 6A(3) CPC enables the Court to fix a time frame for the plaintiff to respond to a counter-claim, the absence of such a direction does not leave the plaintiff free to file it at any time - By virtue of Order VIII Rule 6G CPC, the rules relating to a written statement filed by a defendant are made applicable to a written statement filed in answer to a counter-claim - the temporal outer limit of 120 days applies strictly to the plaintiff's reply to a counter-claim. On the expiry of 120 days, the right to file the written statement to the counter-claim stands forfeited - Denying the application of the 120-day outer limit to a counter-claim response would defeat the very object of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, which is aimed at the speedy and timely resolution of high-value commercial disputes. [Paras 27- 33] AK Ghosh & Company v. Biman Bose, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 663 : 2026 INSC 684

Commercial Courts Act, 2015 – Order XI Rule 1 and Rule 5 (as amended by the Commercial Courts Act, 2015) read with Order XVIII Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Production of additional documents at the stage of plaintiff's evidence – Application of the 'Reasonable Cause' test – Held: The strict timelines and rigours prescribed under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (CCA) cannot be watered down on the ground of evidence being voluminous or because certain facts allegedly emerged during cross-examination - A stop-and-go or piecemeal approach to the production of documents in commercial suits cannot be countenanced - When leading evidence, a plaintiff is expected not only to produce all relevant documents in their possession but also to properly anticipate the questions that may be put to its witnesses by the opposite side - If a party fails to establish a 'reasonable cause' or justifiable explanation for the subsequent discovery and non-disclosure of documents that were already within its possession at the time of filing the suit or during a previous round of additional evidence, leave to file such additional documents cannot be granted. [Paras 12, 13] Levitate Mobile Technologies v. Standard Chartered Bank, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 658 : 2026 INSC 674

Commercial Courts Act, 2015 — Section 13(1A) and Section 13(2) — Maintainability of Appeal — Orders under Order VIII CPC - An appeal under Section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, lies only against those orders that are specifically enumerated under Order XLIII of the CPC, or Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Since an order passed under Order VIII CPC (such as refusing leave to file a belated written statement) is not appealable under Order XLIII CPC, an appeal against such an order is not maintainable. [Relied on SCG Contracts (India) Private Limited v. K.S. Chamankar Infrastructure Private Limited and others, (2019) 12 SCC 210; BGS SGS SOMA JV v. NHPC Limited, (2020) 4 SCC 234; Kandla Export Corporation and another v. OCI Corporation and another, (2018) 14 SCC 715; Paras 34-37] AK Ghosh & Company v. Biman Bose, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 663 : 2026 INSC 684

Commercial Courts Act, 2015 – Section 15 – Applicability to Pending Suits – Held: The provisions of the CCA apply strictly to pending cases transferred under Section 15 - The statute makes its retroactive application abundantly clear by mandating under Section 15(3) that upon the transfer of a suit or application of a specified value to the Commercial Division or Court, the procedures of the CCA shall strictly apply - The only exception carved out by the legislature against such a transfer is where the judgment has already been reserved. [Relied on Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. v. K.S. Infraspace LLP, (2020) 15 SCC 585; Patil Automation (P) Ltd. v. Rakheja Engineers (P) Ltd., (2022) 10 SCC 1; Sudhir Kumar v. Vinay Kumar G.B., (2021) 13 SCC 7; Paras 13-16] Levitate Mobile Technologies v. Standard Chartered Bank, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 658 : 2026 INSC 674

Compassionate Appointment – Scheme for Compassionate Appointment in Public Sector General Insurance Companies – Clause 1.1 – Age Threshold Limitation – Effect of Administrative Delay – Employee applied for voluntary retirement on medical grounds before crossing the prescribed age threshold of 55 years and submitted a Civil Surgeon's incapacitation certificate – Employer kept the application pending, failed to communicate any deficiency regarding the medical certificate, and demanded a Medical Board certificate only after the employee crossed 55 years of age – Claim for compassionate appointment subsequently rejected by the employer on the ground that the employee retired after attaining 55 years of age – Held: An employer cannot rely upon the consequence of its own administrative delay to defeat a time-sensitive beneficial claim – The requirement that a claim must remain within the four corners of a scheme does not release the employer from its duty to administer it fairly and within a reasonable time – A technical construction enabling the employer to control eligibility through delayed processing would place the scheme at the mercy of administrative inaction and defeat its inherent fairness – High Court judgment set aside – Rejection communication quashed – Direction issued to grant compassionate appointment to the dependent candidate with necessary age relaxation if required. [Paras 18, 21, 25, 26, 28, 31, 32] Rahul Ramnarayan Madankar v. New India Assurance, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 693 : 2026 INSC 710

Constitution of India – Article 136 – Interference with Concurrent Findings of Fact: The Supreme Court emphasizes that while its powers under Article 136 are expansive, it will not readily disrupt concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court and the High Court unless the findings are demonstrated to be manifestly perverse, legally unsustainable, or shocking to the conscience of the Court. [Relied on Ganga Kumar Srivastava v. State of Bihar (2005) 6 SCC 211] Mehboob Shah v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 705 : 2026 INSC 729

Constitution of India — Article 14 — Non-Arbitrariness, Equality, and Fairness in Executive Actions — Denial of Refund for Unutilized Additional FSI Premium — Arbitrary Classification - The refusal of the State/Town Planning Authorities to refund the premium paid for unutilized additional Floor Space Index (FSI) for a residential/group housing project on the ground that statutory regulations only permit refund for specific categories (such as educational institutions, medical institutions, and star category hotels) or specific regions (such as Mumbai) is patently arbitrary, discriminatory, and violative of Article 14 - The principle of non-arbitrariness and duty to act fairly, justly, and reasonably under Article 14 pervades every State action, including executive decisions and contractual/regulatory matters. [Paras 11–18] Prasad Pandurang Tapkir v. Assistant Director of Town Planning, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 731 : 2026 INSC 683

Constitution of India — Article 21 — Right to a Speedy Trial — Quashing of Delayed Prosecution — The right to a speedy trial is an implicit fundamental right guaranteed under the fair, just, and reasonable procedure of Article 21 of the Constitution, extending to all stages of criminal proceedings including investigation, inquiry, and trial - While systemic delays must be analyzed using a balancing test, a chronicle of persistent, unexplained inaction and lack of ordinary diligence solely attributable to the prosecution violates this right - Keeping an accused in a state of "suspended animation" indefinitely, where 23 years have elapsed since the institution of the complaint and over three decades since the transaction without the trial progressing beyond the stage of service of summons is wholly incompatible with Article 21, warranting the quashing of the criminal proceedings. [Relied On Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225; P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka (2002) 4 SCC 578; Kailash Chandra Kapri v. State of Uttar Pradesh 2026 SCC OnLine SC 858; Paras 25 - 27, 29, 30 – 34] Standard Chartered Bank v. Enforcement Officer Ministry of Home Affairs, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 701 : 2026 INSC 727

Constitution of India – Article 21 – Safegards Against Custodial Torture – The investigating agency is bound by the inherent constitutional safeguards under Article 21 to ensure that the accused is not subjected to any threat, inducement, coercion, physical assault, or third-degree methods during custodial interrogation - Named investigating officials and jail authorities remain jointly and severally responsible for the safety and physical well-being of the accused. [Paras 20-25] State of Andhra Pradesh v. Suda Suresh Veera Venkata Naga Raju, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 722 : 2026 INSC 744

Constitution of India — Article 226 — Maintainability of Writ Petition — Disputed Questions of Fact — Efflux of Time & Remediless Claimants - Where a writ petition challenging non-payment of compensation for injuries/death caused by stray cattle was filed in 2010 and remitted after 15 years, the High Court's Division Bench erred in setting aside the Single Judge's award solely on the ground of “disputed questions of fact” and relegating the claimants to a Civil Court - The Supreme Court held that after such an extraordinary efflux of time, relegating the claimants to a civil suit would leave them completely remediless - On this short ground alone—i.e., the passage of time—the impugned High Court judgment warranted interference and adjudication on merits in the interest of justice. Nisha v. Municipal Council Sangrur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 746 : 2026 INSC 774

Constitution of India – Article 226 – Writ Jurisdiction – Pleadings and Prayers – Mending/Moulding of Reliefs – Technicalities cannot trump substantive justice - The Single Judge of the High Court granted relief of reinstatement under Section 47 of the PwD Act, 1995, even though the respondent's writ petition skeletal pleadings and prayers were limited to claiming a 100% disability pension – Held that while High Courts must generally confine themselves to pleadings and prayers to prevent judicial overreach and surprise, this is not an inflexible rule - Article 226 is a reservoir of equity meant to reach injustice wherever it is found - Where the record clearly evinces a suitor's legal entitlement to wider relief, but less is claimed due to ignorance, bona fide mistake, or poor drafting, the Court may exercise its discretion to grant appropriate relief, especially when the opponent seeks to use procedural technicalities to shield its own statutory breach. [Paras 37 – 43] Union of India v. Bali Ram No. 850808321, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 668 : 2026 INSC 689

Constitution of India - Article 227 — Supervisory Jurisdiction over Arbitral Tribunals — Narrow Band of Perversity/Patent Lack of Inherent Jurisdiction — A foray to the writ court under Article 227 against the dismissal of a Section 16 application by an arbitrator is permissible only if the order suffers from a patent lack of inherent jurisdiction - Such a patent lack must be so perverse that it stares one in the face and requires no argument whatsoever - Before entertaining such petitions, High Courts must record a prima facie finding regarding the patent lack of inherent jurisdiction after hearing the rival parties - In the absence of a manifest jurisdictional defect, interlocutory judicial interference is unwarranted and contrary to legislative policy. Manash Kamal Bezboruah v. Bokahola Tea Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 677 : 2026 INSC 701

Constitution of India – Article 311(2) – Protection of Civil Servants – Termination of Confirmed Employees Without Departmental Enquiry – Permissibility - The Supreme Court held that the termination of services of confirmed government servants through a simpliciter administrative order, without conducting a departmental enquiry, is a manifest violation of the procedural safeguards guaranteed under Article 311(2) of the Constitution – The Supreme Court emphasized that confirmation in service is not a mere administrative formality; it confers a substantive status carrying an enhanced security of tenure and constitutional protection - Even if an allegation exists that the initial appointments were irregular or illegal (e.g., made against vacancies in excess of those advertised), the protected status acquired by the civil servants cannot be undone by an administrative order bypassing the mandatory requirements of Article 311(2) - The holding of an inquiry remains the constitutional rule, and the executive cannot dispense with it at its convenience unless the case strictly falls within the narrowly tailored exceptions under the second proviso to Article 311(2). [Paras 14-21] Debashish Mohapatra v. District and Session Judge, Jagatsinghpur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 721 : 2026 INSC 743

Constitution of India — Article 32 — Maintainability of Writ Petition challenging Executed Clemency/Remission Powers - Exercise of Clemency Powers — Judicial Review vs. Judicial Appeal - When the President under Article 72 or the Governor under Article 161 has exercised the constitutional power of clemency/remission modifying a sentence, the Supreme Court cannot sit in appeal over such executive decision under Article 32 - The constitutional powers under Articles 72/161 are separate, distinct, and unaffected by statutory powers under Section 432 CrPC - The scope of judicial review of clemency orders passed by the President or Governor is extremely limited and constrained only to grounds such as non-application of mind, mala fides, extraneous considerations, exclusion of relevant material, or absolute arbitrariness - In the absence of such established grounds, a petition under Article 32 seeking further modification of a clemency order passed by the President/Governor is misdirected and not maintainable. [Relied on Union of India v. V. Sriharan (2016) 7 SCC 1; Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka (2008) 13 SCC 767; Epuru Sudhakar v. Govt. of A.P. (2006) 8 SCC 161; Maru Ram v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 107; Kehar Singh v. Union of India (1989) 1 SCC 204; Paras 6 – 18] Ramasrey @ Fakkad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 736 : 2026 INSC 764

Constitution of India — Articles 48 & 51-A(g) — Animal Welfare — Stray Cattle Menace & Compassion for Living Creatures - Directive Principles of State Policy (Article 48) impose a duty on the State to organize agriculture/animal husbandry and prevent cattle slaughter - Under Article 51-A(g), it is the fundamental duty of every citizen to have compassion for living creatures, which in its wider fold embraces cattle spoken of in Article 48 - Stray cattle roaming on public roads cause severe accidents leading to human casualties and unnecessary pain and suffering to animals. [Relied on State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat, (2005) 8 SCC 534; Animal Welfare Board of India v. Union of India, (2023) 9 SCC 322; Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar, 1958 SCC OnLine SC 176; Paras 11-16] Nisha v. Municipal Council Sangrur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 746 : 2026 INSC 774

Constitution of India — Compensation — Stray Cattle Attack/Accidents — Quantum Determination & Pre-2020 Ambiguity - While the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 principles cannot be applied as a universal rule in every non-vehicular stray animal accident case, claimants facing pre-2020 incidents (prior to quantified statutory schemes like the Punjab Bye-Laws, 2020/2023) are entitled to an equitable lump-sum compensation evaluated on the specific attending facts of the case - Considering the prolonged litigation and severe injuries sustained, the Supreme Court awarded a lump sum compensation of ₹15,000,000 (Rupees Fifteen Lakhs) to the appellant. [Para 21-25] Nisha v. Municipal Council Sangrur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 746 : 2026 INSC 774

Constitution of India — Directives / Guidelines Issued to Centre and States on Stray Bovines - Implementation of Laws - All States must strictly implement their respective cattle preservation, protection, and stray control statutes in letter and spirit - Compensation Mechanism - Centre and States/UTs are advised to frame rules or enact necessary amendments to establish a clear mechanism for awarding compensation in accidents caused by bovines/cattle (covering both pedestrian and vehicular accidents) - Mandatory Tagging: Tagging of all animals must be mandated with a 12-digit code to enable digital tracking, link to health/vaccination records, and identify owners who abandon them - Regulated Abandonment / Safe Transfer - Owners choosing to let go of cattle after their economic utility diminishes must ensure safe transfer to recognized shelters/gaushalas, accompanied by an official receipt and database updates - Nodal Officers - Corporations/Departments must depute dedicated Nodal Officers to oversee tagging, digitization of records, and smooth operation of animal shelters. [Paras 19 - 26] Nisha v. Municipal Council Sangrur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 746 : 2026 INSC 774

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 161 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 432, 433 and 433-A – Remission Policy – Applicability and Inter-se Hierarchy of Constitutional vs. Statutory Remission Policies – The State of Haryana's 'Policy Regarding Release of Life Convicts 2002' (dated 12.04.2002) is a policy framed under the constitutional powers of the Governor under Article 161 of the Constitution, identical to the 1993 Policy - A subsequent statutory policy framed by the Executive under Sections 432 and 433 of the CrPC, such as the 2008 Premature Release Policy, cannot override or dilute the benefits of a prior constitutional policy under Article 161 - A statutory policy cannot supersede the constitutional power vested in the Governor. [Paras 9-16] Parveen Kumar @ Parveen Chauhan v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 648 : 2026 INSC 667

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 171(3)(a) vs. Article 243-R — Representation of the People Act, 1950 — Section 27(2)(b) — Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 — Section 352(1)(b) — Electoral Rights of Nominated Members in Legislative Council Elections — Purpose of Local Authority Representation - Held: Nominated members of Town Panchayats/Municipalities do not possess the right to vote in elections to the State Legislative Council from a Local Authorities' Constituency - The constitutional distinction between elected representatives and nominated members under Article 243-R is clear and intentional - Nominated members are inducted for their expertise and hold a purely advisory role; they are expressly barred by the Proviso to Article 243-R from voting in the municipal bodies' own meetings - Allowing them to vote in Legislative Council elections would yield the anomalous and unreasonable consequence of granting them greater voting power in a constitutional legislative body than they possess within their own municipality - The expressions "members of municipalities" under Article 171(3)(a) and "every member" under Section 27(2)(b) of the 1950 Act must be contextually and harmoniously interpreted to apply only to those members who are elected representatives and possess active voting rights within their local authority - Inclusion of nominated members in such electoral rolls is unconstitutional and void ab initio. [Paras 30 – 38] Pranesh M.K. v. A.V. Gayathri, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 686 : 2026 INSC 716

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 21 and Article 32 – Prisons and Inmates – Incarceration of Elderly and Terminally Ill Prisoners – Right to Live with Dignity - Writ petition filed by NALSA under Article 32 raising systemic concerns over the continued confinement of convicted/undertrial prisoners of advanced age (above 70 years) and those who are terminally ill – i. Suspension of Rights Denied - The Supreme Court observed that prisons are instruments of lawful confinement but not spaces where constitutional values are suspended - The guarantees of dignity, fairness, and humane treatment continue to operate with full force even behind prison walls - Prolonged detention under conditions of severe physical suffering and inadequate medical care results in the erosion of human dignity, converting lawful punishment into cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment – ii. Locus Standi of NALSA - NALSA has the requisite locus standi to maintain public interest/social justice litigation to espouse the collective constitutional rights of vulnerable and marginalized sections under Section 4(d) of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 - iii. Federal Competence vs. Judicial Restraint - While "prisons and persons detained therein" falls exclusively under the legislative domain of States (Schedule VII, List II), the Court holds that constitutional restraint cannot equate to constitutional abdication where persistent or systemic violations of fundamental rights occur. [Relied on National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India & Ors. (2014) 5 SCC 348; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248; Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (1978) 4 SCC 494; Dr. P. Varavara Rao v. National Investigation Agency (2022 SCC OnLine SC 1004); Paras 17-38] National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 684 : 2026 INSC 713

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226 — Maintainability of Writ Petition — Alternative Remedy under Election Law - Held: The rule requiring the exhaustion of alternative remedies is a rule of convenience and discretion, not a rule of law, and does not oust writ jurisdiction where the controversy involves a pure question of law - When the challenge is raised prior to the election and goes to the root of the composition/legality of the electoral college (inclusion of nominated members) rather than routine irregularities in the electoral roll or the conduct of the election process, a writ petition under Article 226 is fully maintainable - This is particularly true when the statutory remedy under Section 27 of the 1950 Act is illusory or ineffective. [Relied on Ramesh Mehta v. Sanwal Chand Singhvi, (2004) 5 SCC 409; Shelly Oberoi v. Office of Lieutenant Governor of Delhi, (2023) 5 SCC 41; Ram & Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana, (1985) 3 SCC 267; Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India, (2006) 7 SCC 1; Paras 23, 24, 25, 26, 40-49] Pranesh M.K. v. A.V. Gayathri, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 686 : 2026 INSC 716

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226 — Maintainability of Writ Petition — Sector-wide Caution List — Nature of Function Test vs. Formal Character of Respondent — Held: A writ petition under Article 226 challenging the inclusion of a professional's name in the Indian Banks' Association (IBA) Caution List is maintainable - The High Court erred in dismissing the petition on the narrow ground that the IBA is not "State" within the meaning of Article 12 - The judicial focus has shifted from the formal character of the body to the nature of the function performed and the effect of the impugned action on legally protected rights - The maintenance of a sector-wide Caution List possesses a sufficient public law character and operates as an industry-wide adverse accreditation that directly impacts an advocate's fundamental right to practice a profession under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Ajay Vijh v. Indian Banks Association, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 656 : 2026 INSC 670

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 32 — Writ Petition seeking quashing or alternative clubbing/consolidation of multiple FIRs registered across different States — Cyber Fraud — Maintainability of Article 32 petition for quashing criminal proceedings — Relegation to alternative statutory remedies - Maintainability & Relegation under Article 32 - While a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution to quash an FIR is maintainable, the Supreme Court reiterated that it is an extraordinary remedy to be exercised sparingly - As a matter of self-imposed discipline and orderly procedure, an aggrieved party must ordinarily first approach the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution or Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Direct invocation of Article 32 is discouraged unless the facts disclose a palpable violation of fundamental rights or other exceptional, exigent circumstances. [Relied On Arnab Ranjan Goswami v. Union of India (2020) 14 SCC 12; Vinod Dua v. Union of India (2023) 14 SCC 286; Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State of U.P. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2265; Paras 8, 9]. Rutvij Bhagat Singh Wakhare v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 716 : 2026 INSC 740

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 338 — Powers and Functions of National Commission for Scheduled Castes (NCSC) — Nature of Orders / Directives — Recommendatory vs. Adjudicatory Powers — Scope of Civil Court Powers under Article 338(8) - The Supreme Court reiterated that the National Commission for Scheduled Castes (NCSC) established under Article 338 of the Constitution of India is a constitutional body with a recommendatory and advisory role, but it does not possess adjudicatory powers - The NCSC cannot take over the functions of a court or an adjudicatory tribunal to pass mandatory orders or grant consequential service benefits such as directing the payment of arrears. Mumbai Port Authority v. National Commission For Scheduled Caste, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 729 : 2026 INSC 755

Constitution of India, 1950 - Articles 21 & 22 – Right to a Fair Trial & Effective Legal Representation - Paramount importance of substantive constitutional guarantees in criminal jurisprudence, particularly in cases involving offences that shock the collective conscience of society - The right to a fair trial encompasses a real, meaningful, and impartial opportunity to defend, which includes effective representation by a counsel of choice or competent legal aid at State expense - The constitutional obligation of the Court is to ensure real and meaningful representation rather than a mere ritualistic or illusory physical presence - Facing a complex trial carrying capital punishment without legal assistance fundamentally vitiates the criminal justice process. Abdul Hameed v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 700 : 2026 INSC 734

Constitution of India, 1950 - Denial of Fair Trial vs. Consequence of Acquittal - Denial of legal representation does not invariably operate as an automatic passport to acquittal - Courts must balance the accused's constitutional entitlement to a fair trial against the nature and gravity of the offence, its societal impact, and the overarching demands of public justice - Where a trial stands constitutionally infirmed due to the complete lack of effective legal assistance, a de-novo trial is the only legally permissible remedy to restore procedural fairness while ensuring justice is carried to its logical conclusion - Held, that the Appellant (Accused No. 9), facing charges under Section 302 IPC and explosive offences carrying the death penalty, remained effectively unrepresented throughout the recording of prosecution evidence, cross-examining 81 witnesses on his own without any amicus curiae or legal aid - Such a hasty and stage-managed trial violates the baseline principle of "judicial calm" - In view of the grave nature of the Samleti bus bomb blast (claiming 14 lives), an outright acquittal is inappropriate; hence, the conviction is set aside and a de-novo trial is ordered before a designated Special Court. [Relied on Mohd. Hussain v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2012) 9 SCC 408; Naveen v. State of M.P., (2023) 17 SCC 381; Suk Das v. UT of Arunachal Pradesh, (1986) 2 SCC 401; Paras 23- 36] Abdul Hameed v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 700 : 2026 INSC 734

Constitution of India, 1950 — Interpretation of "Rights and Safeguards" - Under Article 338(5)(b), the duty of the NCSC to inquire into specific complaints regarding the deprivation of "rights and safeguards" does not confer an independent enforcement mechanism - The words "rights and safeguards" must be read together as a bundle - The provision of safeguards is a function of the Legislature, and the NCSC's role is merely to monitor, evaluate, record factual findings, and make recommendations to the Union or State Government for effective implementation - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgment and held that the directions issued by the NCSC demanding the employer to pay service arrears to the employee within 30 days were beyond its constitutional powers and non-est in law. [Relied on All India Indian Overseas Bank SC and ST Employees' Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 6 SCC 606; Collector v. Ajit Jogi, (2011) 10 SCC 357; Bhabani Prasad Jena v. Orissa State Commission for Women, (2010) 8 SCC 633; Paras 9-14] Mumbai Port Authority v. National Commission For Scheduled Caste, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 729 : 2026 INSC 755

Constitution of India, 1950 — Limited Scope of Civil Court Powers - The powers of a civil court granted to the NCSC under Article 338(8) are limited strictly to procedural matters required for facilitating an investigation or inquiry (e.g., summoning persons, discovery of documents, receiving evidence on affidavits) - The use of the word "namely" in Article 338(8) underscores the restricted scope of these powers - Such procedural powers do not convert the NCSC into a civil court, nor do they grant it the authority to pass final adjudicatory orders, issue temporary or permanent injunctions, or grant binding reliefs. [Paras 9 – 11] Mumbai Port Authority v. National Commission For Scheduled Caste, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 729 : 2026 INSC 755

Constitution of India, 1950 - Principles of Natural Justice – Audi Alteram Partem – Ex-Parte Orders Impacting Civil Rights – Held: The opportunity of being heard lies at the very heart of procedural fairness, ensuring that no one is condemned or adversely affected without being given an opportunity to present their case - The non-observance of natural justice is itself a prejudice to any person who has been denied justice - When a High Court proceeds to decide a writ petition ex-parte and dispenses with service of notice to the affected party whose ownership, possession, and rights over the suit schedule property are directly impacted, it results in a clear violation of the doctrine of audi alteram partem - Such parties are not merely proper parties but necessary ones to effectively adjudicate the dispute. [Relied on State of U.P. v. Sudhir Kumar Singh, (2021) 19 SCC 706; Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v. ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV), (2025) 4 SCC 641; Madhyamam Broadcasting Ltd. v. Union of India, (2023) 13 SCC 401; Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P., (2025) 7 SCC 545; Paras 15 - 18] Basamma v. Goparappa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 690 : 2026 INSC 712

Constitution of India, 1950; Article 226 – Writ of Certiorari – Scope and Contours of Supervisory Jurisdiction – Held: While exercising extraordinary and certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court does not act as a Court of Appeal over findings of facts recorded by subordinate Courts or Tribunals - It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the subordinate court is based - Such writ jurisdiction may be invoked only in cases where there is an error of law, jurisdictional error, or patent illegality, but not to correct an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be - Once a competent Civil Court (First Appellate Court) arrives at a finding of fact upon independent examination and appreciation of pleadings and evidence, the High Court cannot set aside such findings under Article 226. [Relied on Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences v. Bikartan Das, (2023) 16 SCC 462; C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, (1954) 1 SCC 905; Paras 12 - 14] Basamma v. Goparappa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 690 : 2026 INSC 712

Constitutional Law — Article 30(1) & Article 16 — Minority Rights Vs. Public Exchequer Accountability - Minority educational institutions do not possess an absolute right under Article 30(1) of the Constitution to burden the public exchequer through a completely non-competitive, opaque selection process - Government aid without financial accountability is constitutionally unsustainable - Clause 6 of Notification-I, which permitted a "10% Management Quota" for appointments without wide public advertisements, is unconstitutional and an anti-thesis to the mandate of equality and equal opportunity enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. [Para 35-39] Najma Khatun v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 667 : 2026 INSC 691

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 — Apportionment of Liability Among Joint Tortfeasers - The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) correctly apportioned the overall liability as 70% on the Lift Maintenance Contractor/Manufacturer (OTIS) (primary operational & maintenance failure), 25% on the Maintenance/Facility Management Agency (MES) (failure of oversight, non-maintenance of registers, and leaving the machine room accessible), and 5% on the Premises Occupier (RAW) (residual administrative oversight failure). [Relied on Khenyei v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. & Ors., (2015) 9 SCC 27; Treadwell v. Whittier, 80 Cal. 574, 22 Pac. 266 (1889); Paras 33–34] Otis Elevator v. Rashmi Handa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 734 : 2026 INSC 756

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 — Comprehensive Maintenance Duty & Negligence - The elevator manufacturer and maintenance contractor (OTIS), having exclusive technical knowledge and contractually undertaking comprehensive maintenance to keep lifts in sound condition, owes a heightened duty of care - Where the contractor was repeatedly put on notice regarding persistent breakdowns, knew that voltage fluctuations necessitated a voltage stabilizer for safe operation, but failed to follow up, halt lift operations, or impart emergency rescue training to site personnel, it cannot evade primary liability - Failure to produce contractually mandated maintenance/attendance registers also invites an adverse inference. [Paras 26-34] Otis Elevator v. Rashmi Handa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 734 : 2026 INSC 756

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 — Distinction Between 'Cause of Action' and 'Cause of Accident' - Held, while a technical investigation report may pin human error (e.g., manual release of mechanical brakes via a Brake Release Key during an emergency rescue) as the immediate cause of an accident, the Supreme Court must look at the broader chain of events establishing the cause of action when determining deficiency in service - A persistent, unrectified mechanical/electrical breakdown that sets off the rescue operation cannot be treated as an isolated or standalone event to absolve the maintenance contractor of liability. [Paras 24–28, 30-32] Otis Elevator v. Rashmi Handa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 734 : 2026 INSC 756

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 — Section 2(1)(g) / Section 21 — Deficiency in Service — Elevator Maintenance and Public Safety — Heightened Duty of Care & Liability of Joint Tortfeasors - Public Law Rationale & Nature of Passenger Elevators: Elevators, as modes of vertical transportation, function as common carriers in urban spaces - Since passengers exert no control over the conveyance and rely entirely on automation or operators, a heightened duty of care akin to common carriers is legally required to safeguard vulnerable users - In cases of accidents caused by lift malfunctions in public spaces, the manufacturer, operator, and owner/occupier are joint tortfeasors jointly and severally liable to compensate the victim at the first instance - Inter se contractual liabilities are to be apportioned separately without delaying relief to consumers. Otis Elevator v. Rashmi Handa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 734 : 2026 INSC 756

Cooperative Central Bank Employee Service (Employment, Terms and their Working Conditions) Rules, 1982 / Chhattisgarh Ke Jila Sahkari Kendriya Bank Karmachari Seva (Niyojan, Nibandhan, Tatha Unki Karya Sthiti) Niyam, 1982 — Rule 5(3)(a) — Deletion of Rule — Power to Amend Statutory Rules — Effect of Non-Tabling of Rules Before Legislative Assembly — Executive Instructions vs Statutory Authority – Held - i. Power to Amend Rules — Applicability of Section 21 of General Clauses Act, 1897 - Chhattisgarh Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 — Section 55(1) The Registrar, Cooperative Societies, possesses the statutory power under Section 55(1) of the 1960 Act to frame rules governing the terms and conditions of employment in cooperative societies - Applying Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the statutory authority conferred to frame rules inherently includes the power to amend, alter, vary, or rescind such rules - The deletion of Rule 5(3)(a) of the Niyam, 1982 by the Registrar was a valid exercise of statutory rule-making power and was not a mere executive instruction – ii. Nature of Laying Requirement — Mandatory vs. Directory - Chhattisgarh Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 — Section 95(3) Section 95(3) mandates that all rules made under the Act shall be laid before the Legislative Assembly - in the absence of any prescribed statutory consequences or penalty for non-laying, the provision is directory and not mandatory - Non-compliance with the laying procedure does not invalidate the rules or defeat the statutory exercise of power by the Registrar – iii. Exercise of Power — Nomenclature and Style of Order - Where a statutory power exists and is validly exercised, the style, nomenclature, or format of the notification (e.g., being styled as a "circular" or letter) does not denude or weaken the statutory authority enabling the act - A wrong reference or improper nomenclature does not vitiate the action if it can be justified under an existing power – iv. Setting Aside Promotion After Long Passage of Time - Where an employee continued to function on a promotional post for 13 years during the pendency of litigation, and the promotion was made pursuant to a valid exercise of statutory power, setting aside such promotion was erroneous - The appellant is entitled to restoration of status, protection of seniority, promotional benefits, and 50% back wages. [Relied on K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1; State of M.P. v. Hukum Chand Mills Karamchari, (1996) 7 SCC 81; Kiran Devi v. Bihar State Sunni Wakf Board, (2021) 15 SCC 15; Paras 10-16] S.P. Chandrakar v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 743 : 2026 INSC 769

Court Fees Act, 1870 — Section 8 — Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — Sections 23(1-A), 23(2), 26, 28, and 54 — Appeal Challenging Statutory Benefits — Liability to Pay Ad Valorem Court Fee - An appeal preferred under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, before the High Court, challenging solely the grant of statutory benefits such as the additional amount under Section 23(1-A), solatium under Section 23(2), and statutory interest under Section 28 attracts ad valorem court fee under Section 8 of the Court Fees Act, 1870, computed on the difference between the amount awarded and the amount sought to be avoided - Statutory additions under Sections 23(1-A), 23(2), and statutory interest under Section 28 do not constitute collateral or independent claims; they form an intrinsic, integral, and inseparable component of the composite "compensation" awarded under the decree of the Reference Court - An appeal seeking the deletion or reduction of any such statutory component is in substance an appeal seeking modification of the decretal compensation - payment of a fixed court fee is legally impermissible. [Relied on Indore Development Authority v. Tarak Singh and others, (1995) Supp (3) SCC 25; Sunder v. Union of India, (2001) 7 SCC 211; Narain Das Jain v. Agra Nagar Mahapalika, (1991) 4 SCC 212; Gurpreet Singh v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 457; Paras 17-26] Tehri Hydro Development Corporation Ltd. v. S.P. Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 751 : 2026 INSC 773

Criminal Jurisprudence — Circumstantial Evidence — Role and Absence of Motive - The role of motive in a criminal trial based entirely on circumstantial evidence is limited - The absence of a motive does not ipso facto break the chain of evidence or automatically lead to the acquittal of the accused if the remaining evidence on record is sufficient to prove guilt - A complete absence of motive is merely a factor that may be weighed in favour of the accused during the judicial sifting and balancing of favourable and unfavourable circumstances. [Relied On Vaibhav v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 INSC 800; Paras 24, 25] Piyush Shyamdasani v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 699 : 2026 INSC 721

Criminal Jurisprudence – Remission – Liberal Policy Principle – If a more liberal remission policy prevails on the date of consideration of a life convict's case for premature release, or if the short-sentencing policy existing on the date of conviction offers an honest expectation of release, the convict must be given the benefit of the more liberal policy - The appellant, convicted under Section 302 IPC in 2009, is entitled to have his case considered under the beneficial 2002 Policy instead of the more stringent 2008 Policy. [Relied on State of Haryana v. Jagdish (2010) 4 SCC 216; Paras 10 - 16] Parveen Kumar @ Parveen Chauhan v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 648 : 2026 INSC 667

Criminal Jurisprudence & Appellate Powers - Circumstantial Evidence – The Panchsheel Principles - To sustain a conviction based entirely on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish a complete, coherent, and unbroken chain of clinching circumstances that unequivocally points exclusively toward the hypothesis of guilt and excludes every reasonable hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the accused - Section 386(a) CrPC – Interference with Orders of Acquittal - An appellate court possesses full powers to review and reconsider the entire evidence underlying an acquittal - it must respect the double presumption of innocence operating in favour of an acquitted accused ordinary presumption under criminal law reinforced by the judicial finding of acquittal - An acquittal cannot be disturbed unless the findings of the court below are palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous, perverse, or demonstrably unsustainable - If two reasonable views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must prevail - Held, the High Court's view in acquitting Accused Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and 10 was a highly plausible and reasonable view, as the prosecution failed to produce any direct or corroborative evidence linking them specifically to the execution or planning of the Samleti bus blast, apart from generic references in an uncognate confession - Orders of acquittal affirmed. [Relied on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116; Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415; Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat, (1996) 9 SCC 225; Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor, 1934 SCC OnLine PC 42; Paras 54-60, 71-74] Abdul Hameed v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 700 : 2026 INSC 734

Criminal Jurisprudence & Evidence Act, 1872 - Official Witnesses – Reliability of Police Testimony when Independent Witnesses Turn Hostile – The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the testimony of official/police witnesses cannot be generalized as untrustworthy or discarded merely due to their official status or the lack of independent corroboration - If the testimonies of the police officials are consistent, credible, and survive strict cross-examination, a conviction can safely be sustained even if the independent seizure witnesses turn hostile. [Relied on Rizwan Khan v. State of Chhattisgarh (2020) 9 SCC 627; Paras 12-18] Mehboob Shah v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 705 : 2026 INSC 729

Criminal Procedure — Appeal Against Acquittal vs. Appeal Against Conviction — Qualitative Differences in Appellate Review - While the appellate court possesses identical statutory powers to review and reappreciate evidence in both categories of appeals, there are qualitative differences in their execution - Appeal Against Acquittal - A higher threshold is applied for reversal because an acquittal reinforces the presumption of innocence - Under the "two-views theory," if the view favoring acquittal is a plausible one, it must not be disturbed - The presumption of innocence is displaced the moment a conviction is recorded - The prosecution's case is further reinforced when concurrent findings of conviction are rendered by both the Trial Court and the High Court, though the appellate court's power to scrutinize every aspect remains absolute. [Relied on Mallappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, 2024 INSC 104] Piyush Shyamdasani v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 699 : 2026 INSC 721

Criminal Procedure – Custodial Interrogation – Audio-Visual Safeguards and Videography During Transit – While affirming that continuous audio-visual recording and CCTV coverage during actual questioning sessions are salutary safeguards to protect both the accused and the investigating agency, the Supreme Court clarified that an inflexible mandate to continuously videograph every minute of road transit (e.g., over long distances between jail and the interrogation centre) is unworkable in practice due to logistical limitations like signal loss, battery, and security considerations - The requirement stands satisfied by recording actual interrogation sessions and discovery/recovery proceedings. [Paras 20-25] State of Andhra Pradesh v. Suda Suresh Veera Venkata Naga Raju, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 722 : 2026 INSC 744

Criminal Trial – Appreciation of Defence Evidence – Hypothesis of Innocence - Trial courts must bestow equal attention and weight to defence evidence as they do to prosecution evidence - There is no legal baseline to approach evidence led by the accused with inherent distrust or scepticism - If the defence introduces a deeply probable hypothesis of innocence that establishes reasonable doubt, the absolute benefit must inure to the accused - To travel from the realm of "may be true" to "must be true," the prosecution's journey must be strictly paved with legal, reliable, and unimpeachable evidence. [Relied on Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra, 1967 SCC OnLine SC 107; H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi, (1954) 2 SCC 934; Banwari v. State of U.P., 1962 SCC OnLine SC 98; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116; Swaran Singh v. State of Punjab, (1957) 1 SCR 953; Para 34-39] Brajesh Kumar @ Birjesh Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 670 : 2026 INSC 695

Customary Law (Oraon Tribe) – Succession and Inheritance – Right of Daughter and Son-in-law (Ghardamad) – Scope of Article 136 of the Constitution of India and Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Interference with Concurrent Findings of Fact - Facts: The dispute pertained to ownership claims over the landed property of one Sukhu Oraon (grandfather), who had three sons: Dhungru, Ledura, and Bhoula - The Plaintiff (Sukhu, second son of Dhungru) claimed ownership over the entire ancestral land - The claim was resisted by Defendant No. 1 (Budhain, daughter of Bhoula) and Defendant No. 2 (Punai, husband of Budhain) on the ground that Ledura (who died issueless) had adopted Punai as his ghardamad (resident son-in-law) and that the properties were partitioned via a deed dated February 27, 1975 - The Munsif Court, First Appellate Court, and the High Court of Jharkhand concurrently dismissed the plaintiff's suit, accepting the ghardamad relationship - Held, concurrent findings of fact are not generally interfered with unless exceptional circumstances exist, such as the finding being perverse, based on no evidence, built on inadmissible evidence, ignoring material circumstances, or resulting in a miscarriage of justice - Held, the party alleging a custom must strictly prove its existence, long usage, certainty, and reasonableness - General observations cannot replace strict proof required under Section 48 of the Evidence Act, 1872 - Held, under the prevalent customary law of the Oraon community, daughters do not have a right of inheritance and are only entitled to maintenance if there is no son - While the custom of a ghardamad acquiring rights in the property of his father-in-law is established, it must be duly adopted by the last male owner or his widow - In the present case, Punai was the husband of Bhoula's daughter (Budhain) but was allegedly adopted as a ghardamad by the uncle-in-law (Ledura) - Customary law does not recognize or permit an uncle-in-law to adopt his niece's husband as a ghardamad - Held, relying upon authoritative scholarly works (The Oraons of Chotanagpur by S.C. Roy), in the absence of a son, an appropriately adopted ghardamad, or other direct male descendants, the property of an issueless Oraon male devolves upon the nearest male agnate - the plaintiff (nephew) is entitled to succeed to the property - The partition/lease deed executed between the niece and the uncle-in-law is non-est and irrelevant to the title - The High Court erred in failing to answer the formulated substantial question of law regarding the uncle-in-law's capacity to adopt a ghardamad merely on the count of concurrent findings below - Merely observing that there is no established bar against such adoption does not satisfy the requirements of Section 100 CPC - The onus was on the defendants to prove such a custom existed. [Relied on Srinivas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad, 1951 SCC 136; Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, (1983) 3 SCC 217; Mithilesh Kumari v. Prem Behari Khare, (1989) 2 SCC 95; Ramachandran v. Vijayan, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3384; Paras 6-13] Bejla Oraon v. Kali Das Oraon, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 657 : 2026 INSC 672

Doctrine of Waiver – Statutory Rights – Elements of Waiver – Onus of Proof - The Appellants argued that the respondent waived his rights under Section 47 of the PwD Act by consciously limiting his claims to disability pension and receiving terminal benefits – Held that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right and requires proof of three elements: (i) existence of a right, (ii) clear knowledge of that right, and (iii) voluntary relinquishment despite such knowledge. Mere silence, delay, or inaction does not amount to waiver - The senior officers of the establishment were under a duty to apprise the visually impaired employee of his statutory safeguards rather than assuming he voluntarily chose to forgo them - Waiver of a statutory right is heavily disfavoured when the statute serves a public welfare policy. [Paras 46-68] Union of India v. Bali Ram No. 850808321, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 668 : 2026 INSC 689

Election Law – Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963 – Gujarat Municipalities (Conduct of Elections) Rules, 1994 (as amended in 2005) – Rule 7A – Filing of False Affidavit – Disclosure of assets owned solely by the spouse – Interpretation of Grammatical Construction and Punctuation - The appellant-candidate challenged the criminal proceedings initiated against her for suppressing the landed properties owned by her spouse in the election affidavit filed during the 2015 Municipal elections - The appellant contended that Rule 7A(1) only required disclosure of properties owned by candidates themselves or jointly with their spouse, excluding properties solely owned by the spouse - Held: Rejecting the contention, the Supreme Court observed that the text of the declaration requires details of the assets of "myself, my spouse and dependents" - The 'comma' employed after the word "myself" is a listing comma serving a structural and grammatical function to separate items in a series - The word "of" applies equally to "myself", "my spouse", and "dependents" - The sentence must be read collectively, making it mandatory for the candidate to disclose properties owned solely by the spouse as well. [Paras 9-12] Chandrikaben Kishor Dafda v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 650 : 2026 INSC 665

Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 — 2021 Office Memorandum (OM dt. 07.07.2021): Held to be ULTRA VIRES and QUASHED - Issued as an administrative order, it provided a perpetual, open-ended parallel route to regularize non-compliant projects upon payment of capped compensation - An executive instruction cannot alter, supplant, or dilute delegated legislation (the 2006 Notification) - It fails the test of proportionality and Article 14 as it treats unequal's equally by equating compliant and non-compliant proponents without establishing a supervening public interest. [Paras 68 - 80] Vanashakti v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 735 : 2026 INSC 761

Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 — Application of Article 142 and Prospective Quashing -To protect supervening public interest (e.g., hospitals, public infrastructure, AIIMS Odisha, airports, slum rehabilitation projects) and resolve legal uncertainty resulting from conflicting interim orders, the quashing of the 2021 OM is made prospective - All ECs already granted under the 2017 Notification and 2021 OM remain valid - All pending applications filed under the 2017 Notification/2021 OM shall be taken to their logical conclusion in accordance with law - No fresh applications for post-facto EC under these instruments shall be entertained. [Relied on Common Cause v. Union of India (2017) 9 SCC 499; Alembic Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Rohit Prajapati (2020) 17 SCC 157; Electrosteel Steels Ltd. v. Union of India (2023) 6 SCC 615; Paras 77-80] Vanashakti v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 735 : 2026 INSC 761

Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 — Distinction Between Notification (Delegated Legislation) and Office Memorandum (Executive Instruction) - 2017 Notification (S.O. 804(E) dt. 14.03.2017) - Held that It is delegated legislation promulgated under Section 3(1) and Section 3(2)(v) read with Rule 5(3)(d) of the Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986 - It carved out a narrowly tailored, time-bound, closed-ended amnesty/violation-management mechanism for projects non-compliant as on its date - It satisfies the tests of reasonable classification under Article 14 and proportionality under Article 21 of the Constitution. [Paras 50, 63, 64, 66, 80] Vanashakti v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 735 : 2026 INSC 761

Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 — Section 3, Section 5, Section 15 — Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) Notification, 2006 — Office Memorandum dated 07.07.2021 — Ex Post Facto Environmental Clearance (EC) - Mandatory Nature of Prior EC Regime - The requirement of obtaining prior Environmental Clearance (EC) under the EIA Notification, 2006 is mandatory - The core philosophy of the notification ("look before you leap") encapsulates the precautionary principle - A project proponent commencing construction, expansion, or process without prior EC acts in breach of a non-negotiable statutory prerequisite - Such an unauthorized act is void ab initio, and penal consequences (whether criminal or civil penalties under the Jan Vishwas Act, 2023) do not automatically purge or condone the breach. [Paras 34 - 80] Vanashakti v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 735 : 2026 INSC 761

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 106 & Section 27 — Appreciation of Technical Evidence — Call Detail Records (CDRs) & Adverse Inference - Where the prosecution successfully establishes a strong incriminating nexus through Call Detail Records (CDRs) and location data proving that the accused persons were in constant communication and present around the crime scene, the burden shifts to the accused to explain these facts - The failure or refusal of the accused to offer a plausible explanation for circumstances uniquely within their exclusive personal knowledge leads to a direct adverse inference against them. Furthermore, utilizing fake SIM cards registered under third-party names to evade surveillance constitutes an additional incriminating circumstance if left unrebutted. [Paras 17- 20, 22-28] Piyush Shyamdasani v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 699 : 2026 INSC 721

Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 27 – Recovery of weapon and incriminating articles – Failure to affix lac seals at the spot – Total absence of blood at the alleged site of crime – Fatal to prosecution case – The prosecution relied on the recovery of a blood-stained grinding stone (alleged murder weapon) and clothes at the behest of Accused No. 1 - Held, the alleged articles were recovered from a public area accessible to anyone and, crucially, were not sealed at the spot - In the absence of link evidence to prove articles were kept in a sealed condition until they reached the Chemical Analyzer, the reports hold no evidentiary value as the possibility of tampering/planting cannot be ruled out - the complete absence of blood on the mattresses or pillows in the house completely contradicts the narrative that the deceased was bludgeoned to death in his bed. [Relied on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116; Tulshiram Bhanudas Kambale v. State of Maharashtra, 1999 SCC OnLine Bom 227; Salim Akhtar alias Mota v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2003) 5 SCC 499; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600; Maghavendra Pratap Singh Alias Pankaj Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2024) 12 SCC 401; Paras 27, 28, 29] State of Maharashtra v. Monika Kiran Suryawanshi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 669 : 2026 INSC 685

Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 27 – Scope and Ambit of Disclosure Statements: The statutory exception carved out under Section 27 IEA is attracted only when the information furnished by an accused distinctly relates to a relevant fact discovered which was previously unknown to the investigating agency - A mere statement expressing a willingness to identify a place or location already within the knowledge of the police, or pointing out a spot without resulting in the recovery of an incriminating fact/article having a direct nexus with the crime, does not constitute a "discovery" - Panchnama / Memorandum Not Substantive Evidence - Recitals in a panchnama or site verification memorandum do not constitute substantive evidence - The substantive evidence is the live testimony of the witness in the witness box proving the precise information furnished and the corresponding discovery - Held, the prosecution's reliance on site verification proceedings and the pointing out of Masjids/premises by Accused Nos. 1 and 10 failed to meet the threshold of Section 27, as no incriminating fact, weapon, or explosive substance linked to the Samleti blast was discovered - Generic references or travel companionship in a co-accused's confession do not substitute proof of a specific conspiracy. [Relied on Pulukuri Kotayya v. King-Emperor, 1946 SCC OnLine PC 47; Murli & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 9 SCC 41; Paras 63, 64, 65, 66] Abdul Hameed v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 700 : 2026 INSC 734

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 65B (Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023) — Electronic Records — Admissibility & Regulation of Private Investigators - Electronic Evidence & Private Investigators — Admissibility subject to Section 65B mandatory certification — Lack of legislative regulatory framework for Private Detective Agencies highlighted - Photographs, audio, or video evidence (including those procured via private investigators) are electronic records - Under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act, 1872, mandatory certification is a condition precedent to admissibility - Oral evidence cannot substitute this statutory requirement -Admissibility requires relevance to the matter in issue, identification of voice/source, and proof of accuracy by ruling out tampering or morphing - The Code of Criminal Procedure does not recognize private investigating agencies. Concerns regarding individual privacy, data protection, authenticity/morphing of evidence, and lack of regulation/grievance redressal mechanisms for private detectives were raised - The Supreme Court directed copies of the judgment to be forwarded to the Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice, and the Chairman, Law Commission of India, to consider framing appropriate rules/regulations. [Relied on Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Meghalaya, (2000) 8 SCC 323; R.M. Malkani v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 1 SCC 471; Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1; Paras 21-24] Himanshu Chordia v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 748 : 2026 INSC 778

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 68 Proviso — Applicability to Registered Sale Deeds — Interpretation of Proviso — Scope of "Specific Denial" — A registered sale deed does not require compulsory attestation under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - Section 68 of the Evidence Act applies exclusively to documents that are mandatorily required by law to be attested - neither the main section nor its proviso applies to a registered sale deed - There is no requirement in law to examine an attesting witness to prove a sale deed, even if it contains signatures of marginal witnesses - The High Court erred in expanding the proviso to include a registered sale deed and in holding that an executant must specifically deny the document by way of a separate suit or counter-claim rather than a written statement - The proviso to Section 68 cannot create an independent rule or travel beyond the main provision to cover documents not requiring compulsory attestation by law. [Relied on Nazir Mohamed v. J. Kamala and Others, (2020) 19 SCC 57; Government of Kerala v. Joseph, 2023 INSC 693 / (2001) 3 SCC 179; Bayanabai Kaware v. Rajendra s/o Baburao Dhote, (2018) 1 SCC 585; Rohitash Kumar & Ors. vs. Om Prakash Sharma & Ors., (2013) 11 SCC 451; Paras 31- 46] R. Veronica v. Rudrayani Devaki, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 676 : 2026 INSC 703

Evidence Act, 1872 — Sections 61, 64 & 65 — Proof of Official Documents — Primary vs. Secondary Evidence - Unless conditions enumerated under Section 65 of the Evidence Act are pleaded, present, and proved, an official document must be proved by primary evidence - Secondary evidence cannot be admitted without sufficient and satisfactory reasons for the non-production of the original primary source - Mere oral evidence or uncorroborated letters claiming technical error/data loss cannot override contradictory documentary record entries produced from official custody - The Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (MoRTH), Government of India, and state transport departments are suggested to undertake awareness campaigns through various mediums regarding the necessity of holding valid driving licences, streamline issuance and renewal procedures, regulate driving schools, and make licensing tests accessible in regional languages. [Relied on Beli Ram v. Rajinder Kumar, (2022) 15 SCC 572; Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 781; Tharammel Peethambaran v. T. Ushakrishnan, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 169; Telangana State Level Police Recruitment Board v. Penjarla Vijay Kumar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2915; Paras 11 - 20]. Reliance General Insurance v. Om Parkash, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 742 : 2026 INSC 767

Evidence Act, 1872 / Civil Law – Burden of Proof – Declaration of Title – A plaintiff seeking a declaration of title must succeed strictly on the strength of their own case and not on the perceived weakness of the defense - Title over an immovable property cannot rest on surmises, probabilities, or conjectural comparisons of boundaries by courts in the absence of solid revenue records, village maps, or expert evidence. [Paras 23-42] Venkatesha v. K.M. Venkatamuniyappa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 679 : 2026 INSC 705

Evidentiary Value of Coerced Witness - The testimony of a witness (PW-4) who was threatened at the point of a dagger by the accused to assist in transporting the wrapped body on a bicycle for disposal cannot be discarded as an interested witness or an accomplice - The witness stood firm in cross-examination, and his natural, limited narrative (accompanying the accused only for some distance out of fear) establishes his reliability and credibility - Where a 10-year-old minor child was left in the exclusive custody of the accused by his mother, and the child went missing for 22 days, it was naturally expected of the accused to either report the matter to the police or inform the relatives - The absolute failure of the accused to offer any justifiable or plausible explanation during his Section 313 CrPC examination constitutes a vital additional link in the chain of circumstances to establish his guilt. [Relied on Sevaka Perumal v. State of T.N., (1991) 3 SCC 471; Prithi v. State of Haryana, (2010) 8 SCC 536; Prithipal Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 1 SCC 10; Paras 14-17] Debojit Pankika Charaideo Sonari v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 691 : 2026 INSC 687

Family Courts Act, 1984 – Interlocking Arrangement vs Independent Obligation - Held, that a combined and harmonious reading of the clauses discloses a single interlocking arrangement rather than three independent obligations - Clause 8 fixed the total quantum of maintenance; Clause 9 provided an interim, transitional income-linked mechanism to secure maintenance while the lump sum was being arranged; and Clause 10 identified the definitive point of discharge - Reading Clause 9 as a permanent, standalone obligation would render the express discharge language of Clause 10 entirely redundant and otiose. Vijayalakshmi R. v. C.L. Balaji, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 706 : 2026 INSC 731

Family Courts Act, 1984 – Powers of the Executing Court - The executing court cannot go behind the decree; it must execute the decree as it stands and cannot embark upon a fresh adjudication of rights or substitute a consensual arrangement with a fresh or larger provision - The conduct of the appellant-wife in raising no demand for the income-linked component for nearly five years after the final instalment, alongside executing unconditional release deeds and affidavits acknowledging full receipt of the settlement amount, reinforces the common understanding that the income-linked obligation stood extinguished - The Supreme Court declined to invoke its jurisdiction under Article 142 to create a fresh educational corpus, reaffirming that the wide powers under Article 142 cannot be employed to supplant or recast the concluded and performed terms of a consensual settlement between financially independent parties. [Paras 20 - 41] Vijayalakshmi R. v. C.L. Balaji, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 706 : 2026 INSC 731

Family Courts Act, 1984 – Section 19(1) – Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Section 13B & Section 28A – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXI Rule 10 – Execution of Consent Decree – Interpretation of Compromise/Settlement Clauses - The dispute pertained to the construction of Clauses 8, 9, and 10 of a Settlement Petition incorporated into a mutual consent divorce decree - Clause 8 specified a lump-sum maintenance of ₹2.20 Crores for the minor son payable in installments - Clause 9 linked maintenance to 20% of the husband's annual income - Clause 10 explicitly declared that upon payment of the first ₹1 Crore out of the Clause 8 amount, the husband "need not pay any further amount towards maintenance" - The appellant-wife filed an execution petition approximately five years after the final lump-sum payment, seeking enforcement of the income-linked maintenance under Clause 9. Vijayalakshmi R. v. C.L. Balaji, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 706 : 2026 INSC 731

Finance Act, 1994 – Section 65(19) and Section 65(105)(zzb) – Business Auxiliary Service – Service Tax – Service Tax Liability on Oil Marketing Companies (OMCs) for Dispensing Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) – Sale vs. Agency – Principal-Agent Relationship – Distinction between Outright Sale and Contract of Agency - The Supreme Court allowed the appeals filed by the Revenue, setting aside the order of the CESTAT and restoring the Orders-in-Original that confirmed the service tax demand against the respondent-Corporations (BPCL and HPCL) under the category of "Business Auxiliary Service" - Key Legal Principles Settled by the Court – i. Substance Over Form in Jural Relationships- The true relationship between parties must be gathered from the conjoint reading of all terms and conditions of the agreement in substance, rather than the form, nomenclature, or isolated expressions like "Principal-to-Principal" or "sale" used by the parties; ii. Litmus Test of Title and Retention of Stock - In an outright sale, the buyer acquires absolute dominion and proprietary rights over the goods, and the seller is divested of control - Where the supplier retains ownership of the goods until final dispensation and commands that all unsold/unused stocks be returned or disposed of per its directions upon the contract's termination, the transaction is conclusively one of agency and not sale. iii. Price Control and Pre-Arranged Remuneration as Attributes of Agency - When the retail price is exclusively fixed/revised by the supplier, the infrastructure/equipment belongs to the supplier, and the distributor is remunerated by a pre-arranged commission or profit margin calculated on the actual quantity sold (rather than buying the goods to resell them at their own discretionary profit), the relationship is that of a "Principal and Agent”; iv. Taxability under Business Auxiliary Service - Since the respondent OMCs act as facilitators, marketing promoters, and commission agents for the sale of CNG belonging to their client (MGL), their activities squarely fall within the definition of "Business Auxiliary Service" under Section 65(19) read with Explanation (a) of the Finance Act, 1994, making them liable to pay service tax. [Relied on M/s Snow White Industrial Corporation vs. Collector of Central Excise; Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. vs. Sales Tax Officer (1989) 3 SCC 351; Hafiz Din Mohammad Haji Abdulla vs. The State of Maharashtra, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 208; Bharti Cellular Limited v. CIT, (2024) 8 SCC 608; Union of India vs. Future Gaming Solutions (P) Ltd., (2025) 5 SCC 601; Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. vs. Sales Tax Officer, (1977) 3 SCC 147; Para 5-12] Commissioner of Service Tax Mumbai v. Bharat Petroleum Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 698 : 2026 INSC 723

Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (FERA) — Section 61(2) Proviso & Section 56 — Mandatory Pre-condition of Opportunity Notice — The service of a meaningful and adequate opportunity notice under the proviso to Section 61(2) of FERA is a mandatory statutory pre-condition - Without complying with this requirement, no complaint under Section 56 or 57 of FERA can validly be instituted, and no Magistrate can validly take cognizance of the offence - The burden lies entirely upon the prosecution to establish at the threshold that such a notice was issued and served in the prescribed manner - Where the prosecution fails to produce the opportunity notice or its proof of service before the Magistrate, taking cognizance in a mechanical manner constitutes a manifest error and violates the principles of natural justice, rendering the summoning order unsustainable. [Relied On Devashis Bhattacharya v. Union of India 2009 SCC OnLine Del 1018; Sanjay Malviya v. R.K. Rawal, CEO, Enforcement Directorate 2015 SCC OnLine Del 7686; United India Airways Ltd. v. Chief Enforcement Officer, Enforcement Directorate 2018 SCC OnLine Del 8233; Shilpi Modes v. Directorate of Enforcement 2023 SCC OnLine Del 6816; Paras 16, 21 -25] Standard Chartered Bank v. Enforcement Officer Ministry of Home Affairs, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 701 : 2026 INSC 727

Foreigners Act, 1946 — Section 9 — Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 — Constitutional Law — Articles 14 and 21 — Principles of Natural Justice — Audi Alteram Partem — Fairness in Quasi-Judicial Adjudication — Standard Operating Procedure for Ex Parte and Effectively Ex Parte Proceedings before Foreigners Tribunals - Key Legal Propositions & Ratio Decidendi – i. Nature of Statutory Burden vs. Obligation of Lawful Adjudication - While Section 9 of the Foreigners Act,1946 shifts the onus of proof onto the proceedee to establish that they are not a foreigner, this statutory burden cannot be interpreted to mean that the Foreigners Tribunal is relieved of its own obligation to conduct a lawful, fair, and objective adjudication - The statutory burden operates strictly within a legal process; it does not replace the legal process itself - The absence or non-appearance of a proceedee cannot mechanically be treated as a substitute for an objective examination of the material and evidence placed before the Tribunal by the State [Para 12, 16]; ii. Procedural Safeguards & "Main Grounds"- Under Paragraph 3(1) of the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964,the expression "main grounds" holds significant statutory weight and requires the State to disclose the essential material basis on which the allegation is founded, rather than serving a bare assertion or undefined suspicion - An opportunity to reply and lead evidence becomes illusory if such grounds are not clearly apprised to the proceedee [Para 13, 17, 18]; iii. Duties of the Tribunal in Ex Parte Proceedings - Even when a proceedee fails to appear despite the recorded service of a notice, the Foreigners Tribunal, acting as a quasi-judicial body, cannot render a mechanical declaration - It is duty-bound to satisfy itself that the notice was lawfully served, examine the "main grounds”, independently evaluate the evidence produced by the State (via the concerned Superintendent of Police), and record a reasoned opinion containing a concise statement of facts and conclusions as mandated under Paragraph 3(16) of the 1964 Order [Para 14, 15, 32]; iv. Constitutional Protections Extended to Non-Citizens - The fundamental protections of equality before the law (Article 14) and the protection of life and personal liberty (Article 21) use the terminology "any person" and "no person" respectively, ensuring their availability to every individual within the territory of India, including those whose citizenship status is under dispute - The process of determining nationality carries grave civil consequences (such as detention, deportation, and statelessness) and must strictly satisfy the constitutional thresholds of fairness, reasonableness, and non-arbitrariness as established under the Maneka Gandhi principle [Para 18, 20, 21, 23]; v. Role of the High Court in Writ Jurisdiction - The Foreigners Tribunal is the primary statutory adjudicatory forum designed to evaluate complex factual inquiries relating to ancestry, lineage, electoral records, and public documents - Where a proceeding before the Tribunal was ex parte, the High Court under Article 226 should not substitute the statutory mechanism by becoming the first forum for the factual appreciation or testing of such vital citizenship documents - The appropriate legal course is a conditional remand to the primary forum - Acknowledging the grave consequences of a foreigner declaration, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned orders of the High Court and the Foreigners Tribunals, granting a one-time final opportunity to the appellants to contest the references on merits - The matters were conditionally remitted to the respective Tribunals with a direction to conclude the fresh, uninfluenced adjudications within six months, subject to the strict cooperation of the proceedees. [Relied on Louis De Raedt v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 554; National Human Rights Commission v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, (1996) 1 SCC 742; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248; A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262; Canara Bank v. Debasis Das, (2003) 4 SCC 557; Paras 35, 36, 37, 38-54] Sabitri Dey @ Swasthi Dey v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 672 : 2026 INSC 694

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Section 22 – Applicability to Agricultural Land – Preferential Right of Co-heirs – Constitutional Validity and Legislative Competence of Parliament – Held The preferential right given to a Class-I Hindu heir under Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (HSA) is fully applicable even if the immovable property in question is agricultural land - Key Legal Principles – i. Nature of the Right - The right of pre-emption under Section 22 of the HSA is, in its pith and substance, an incident of succession and not a regulation of transfer simpliciter - It is intrinsically and inseparably linked to succession among Class-I heirs, acting as a qualification placed by Parliament so that family properties are retained within the family - The right lives and dies with the succession relationship and cannot be invoked by strangers, tenants, or distant blood relations; ii. Legislative Competence of Parliament - Parliament possesses complete legislative competence to enact Section 22 of the HSA regarding agricultural land under Entry 5 of List III (Concurrent List) of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution - Unlike Item 7 of the Concurrent List under the Government of India Act, 1935 (which expressly excluded agricultural land), the framers of the Constitution deliberately omitted the exclusionary clause from Entry 5 of List III - Entry 5 is unqualified and covers intestacy and succession to all forms of property; iii. Doctrine of Pith and Substance - Applying the doctrine of pith and substance, the dominant character of Section 22 falls squarely within Entry 5 of List III (Succession) - It does not regulate the formalities or conditions of a transfer under Entry 6 of List III ("transfer of property other than agricultural land") or Entry 18 of List II - The mere fact that a proposed transfer triggers the right does not alter its fundamental character as a succession provision; iv. Distinction between Atam Prakash and Babu Ram - There is no conflict between the rulings in Atam Prakash v. State of Haryana (1986) and Babu Ram v. Santokh Singh (2019); Atam Prakash struck down Section 15 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, because the wide array of entitled relatives (including tenants and co-sharers without succession ties) violated Article 14 by lacking a reasonable classification based on agnatic succession - Section 22 of the HSA restricts its scope exclusively to Class-I co-heirs inheriting from a common intestate - Atam Prakash dealt with consanguinity-based pre-emption under a different statutory context and did not strike down the concept of pre-emption itself, nor did it consider Section 22 of HSA – held that where a petition under Section 22 of the HSA is instituted prior to the actual execution of a sale deed to a third party, it perfectly satisfies the requirement that the right of pre-emption applies to an alienation that is "about to happen" - There is no subsequent legal requirement for the plaintiff to challenge the completed sale deed separately, as the transaction was carried out in the teeth of an active, pending enforcement of a preferential right. [Relied on Babu Ram v. Santokh Singh, (2019) 14 SCC 162; Vaijanath v. Guramma, (1999) 1 SCC 292; Bishan Singh v. Khazan Singh, 1958 SCC OnLine SC 88; Paras Paras 7-13] Mahinder v. Puran Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 675 : 2026 INSC 698

Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 (Maharashtra) - Definition and Rights of an 'Occupier' - Section 2(25) of the MHAD Act defines 'occupier' broadly to include any person liable to pay rent, an owner in occupation, a rent-free tenant, a licensee, or even a person liable to pay damages for use and occupation - an occupancy under the Act is not a statutory tenancy that continues merely at the will of the owner or on the strength of a strict tenancy agreement - A person's status as a certified occupant in the records of the developer and MHADA enables a valid claim for the reallotment of space upon redevelopment, irrespective of the death of the original tenant. Mahabanoo Contractor v. Kalikund Developers, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 713 : 2026 INSC 737

Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 (Maharashtra) - Estoppel against Developer - Abuse of Process / Conduct of Developer - A developer cannot casually turn around after several years having obtained the occupant's consent, demolished the old building, and constructed the new building to challenge the occupant's status or the validity of a PAAA executed by its erstwhile authorized partners - Internal disputes or "Consent Terms" settled inter se between the partners of a developer firm cannot absolve the developer of its validly executed statutory obligations toward the beneficiaries/occupants who were not parties to such internal settlements - Where a developer undertakes before the High Court to keep certain flats unencumbered as part of an occupant's entitlement, but subsequently files a comprehensive civil suit challenging the occupant's rights in their entirety and seeking to declare the PAAA non-est, such a civil suit is misconceived, mala fide, and an abuse of process - High Court directed not to proceed with such a suit. [Paras 12, 19-25] Mahabanoo Contractor v. Kalikund Developers, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 713 : 2026 INSC 737

Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 (Maharashtra) - Sections 2(25) and 91A — Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority (MHADA) — Development Control Regulations for Greater Bombay, 1991, Rule 33(7) — Redevelopment of cessed buildings — Permanent Alternate Accommodation Agreement (PAAA) — Enforceability of PAAA under Writ Jurisdiction — Status of 'Occupant' versus 'Tenant' – Held - Redevelopment Scheme & Statutory Jurisdiction - A Division Bench of the High Court erred in misconstruing the Permanent Alternate Accommodation Agreement (PAAA) as a mere private arrangement not amenable to writ jurisdiction - A PAAA entered into under the statutory scheme of the MHAD Act and the Development Control Regulations (DC Regulations) is regulated by statute - The enforcement of such an agreement falls squarely within the authority conferred on the regulatory body, MHADA, under whose No Objection Certificate (NOC) the project commenced - Orders passed by MHADA to facilitate occupation and execution of a PAAA by the developer in favour of a certified eligible occupant are perfectly sustainable under the statutory scheme. Mahabanoo Contractor v. Kalikund Developers, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 713 : 2026 INSC 737

Information Technology and Adjudication – Directions to the Bar Council of India - To ensure accountability, the Supreme Court directed the Bar Council of India (BCI) to constitute a dedicated committee to deliberate on the issue of advocate members submitting fake and hallucinated AI-generated material as law precedents - The BCI is mandated to prescribe guiding principles to prevent such occurrences and outline corresponding disciplinary actions for violations. [Paras 9-13] Pooja Ramesh Singh v. Jammu and Kashmir Bank Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 653 : 2026 INSC 668

Information Technology and Adjudication – Human-in-the-loop and regulatory imperative - While acknowledging the transformative capabilities of AI technology in easing workloads and aiding efficiency, the Supreme Court asserted the necessity of maintaining absolute human control over adjudication with a human in the loop at every stage - Legal professionals and adjudicating bodies must remain cautious against delegating core thinking processes to AI, as it can insidiously compromise judicial reasoning – The Supreme Court emphasized that managing AI hallucinations requires systemic implementation through Public Policy and enforceable Rules and Regulations, coupled with conscious Bar-Bench coordination. [Paras 5-10] Pooja Ramesh Singh v. Jammu and Kashmir Bank Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 653 : 2026 INSC 668

Information Technology and Adjudication – Use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) – Verification of Precedents – Zero-Tolerance Policy - Zero-tolerance for AI-generated fake precedents - The Supreme Court declared a strict zero-tolerance mode for the Bar as well as the Bench regarding producing, citing, or using AI-generated precedents without thorough verification - Citing such fake or hallucinated judgments without verification amounts to professional misconduct on the part of an advocate - it is a serious lapse if a judge relies on such fabricated material as precedents to support a judicial determination. [Paras 10-12] Pooja Ramesh Singh v. Jammu and Kashmir Bank Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 653 : 2026 INSC 668

Information Technology and Adjudication – Validity of decisions based on hallucinated material - Any decision passed by a Court or an adjudicating authority that is based on fake, non-existent, or hallucinated AI material is considered "no decision in the eyes of the law." - This holds true irrespective of whether the hallucinated material had a direct or indirect bearing on the final decision-making - Such decisions fundamentally violate the sanctity of adjudication, subvert the rule of law, and are liable to be set aside entirely even if only an iota of fake material enters the decision-making process. [Paras 7 - 17] Pooja Ramesh Singh v. Jammu and Kashmir Bank Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 653 : 2026 INSC 668

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Admission of Disputed Claims at Notional Value – The Supreme Court upheld the action of the Resolution Professional in verifying and admitting pending/sub-judice claims of Operational Creditors at a notional value of Rupee 1 - Held, where the final list of creditors omits the clause making the liability contingent upon the outcome of ongoing proceedings and fixes it at a notional value of Rupee 1, such claims attain finality under the plan - The assignment of a notional value of Rupee 1 cannot be construed as a mechanism to keep the claim alive indefinitely pending litigation after the approval of the resolution plan. [Paras 54 - 61] Tata Steel v. Varsha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 694 : 2026 INSC 717

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Repayment Waterfall – Vulnerability of Small Operational Creditors & MSMEs – Judicial Observation – The Supreme Court observed that the current framework of the Code does not adequately account for or safeguard the position of small operational creditors, including Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) and statutory local bodies - By being placed at the bottom of the repayment waterfall, these entities face severe financial disenfranchisement as they are ill-equipped to absorb financial setbacks – The Supreme Court recommended that the Law Commission and the Legislature usefully examine the framework to establish a fair and balanced repayment mechanism alongside an efficient insolvency regime. [Relied on Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta and Others, (2020) 8 SCC 531; Ghanashyam Mishra & Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd., (2021) 9 SCC 657; Kalyani Transco v. Bhushan Power and Steel Limited and Others, 2025 SCC Online SC 2093; JSW Steel Ltd. v. Pratishtha Thakur Haritwal & Ors., (2025) 9 SCC 673; K. Sashidhar v. Indian Overseas Bank and Ors., (2019) 12 SCC 150; Paragraphs 62, 63] Tata Steel v. Varsha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 694 : 2026 INSC 717

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 31(1) – Binding Nature of Resolution Plan – Commercial Wisdom of CoC – Reaffirmed that once a Resolution Plan is approved by the Committee of Creditors (CoC) in its commercial wisdom and subsequently sanctioned by the Adjudicating Authority under Section 31(1), the claims provided therein stand frozen - The plan becomes strictly final and binding on all stakeholders, including the Corporate Debtor, its Creditors, Governmental Authorities, and Employees - Statutory authorities like the NCLT and NCLAT cannot assume the role of a court of equity or exercise plenary powers to alter the commercial treatment of creditors approved under the plan. [Paras 22 - 52] Tata Steel v. Varsha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 694 : 2026 INSC 717

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 – Reliance on Non-Existent Precedents by NCLT & NCLAT – Order Set Aside - Adjudication tainted by fake citations - Where the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) admitted a Section 7 application based on its own research containing fake and non-existent AI-generated citations, and the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) subsequently failed to scrutinize and detect the errors, the entire judicial process stood tainted - the Supreme Court set aside the orders of both the NCLT and NCLAT, restoring the Section 7 application to its original number for a fresh disposal on merits within a stipulated timeline, ordering the parties to maintain a status quo in the interim. [Relied on M. Subramaniam v. S. Janaki, (2020) 16 SCC 728; 2020 SCC OnLine SC 341; V.S. Dempo & Co. Ltd. v. Reliance Communications Ltd., (2021) 10 SCC 176; Sarbjit Singh v. Union Bank of India, (2022) 7 SCC 464; Paras 13-20] Pooja Ramesh Singh v. Jammu and Kashmir Bank Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 653 : 2026 INSC 668

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Sections 30, 31(1) & 60(6) – Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) – Clean Slate Doctrine – Extinguishment of Sub-Judice Claims – Held, all legal proceedings, including pending civil suits and arbitral references, which have not culminated into determinable and quantifiable claims by the date of approval of the Resolution Plan by the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT), stand abated, extinguished, waived, or withdrawn - A Successful Resolution Applicant cannot suddenly be faced with undecided or unresolved claims after the resolution plan has been accepted, as it would disrupt the commercial calculations and violate the fundamental principles of a "clean slate" and "fresh start" underlying the Code. [Paras 51, 55, 60, 61] Tata Steel v. Varsha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 694 : 2026 INSC 717

Insolvency Law – Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 – Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 – Interplay and Equivalence – Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993; Section 19(22) & 19(22A) – Recovery Certificate issued by the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) prior to the 2016 Amendment – Whether an Insolvency Notice can be issued based on a DRT Recovery Certificate – Held - Strict Construction of Insolvency Statutes - The Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 is a statute fraught with the grave consequence of “civil death” for an individual sought to be adjudged an insolvent - its provisions must be subjected to strict judicial interpretation - Recovery Certificate is not a "Decree" or "Order" - In terms of Section 9(2) of the Insolvency Act, an act of insolvency is committed only when a creditor obtains a “decree or order” for the payment of money against the debtor - The expressions "decree" and "order" must be understood in the light of the definitions contained in Section 2(2) and Section 2(14) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - A recovery certificate issued by the DRT under the pre-amended RDB Act cannot be strictly equated to a civil court's "decree" or "order" for the purposes of issuing an insolvency notice - Prospective Nature of the 2016 Amendment - The insertion of sub-section (22A) into Section 19 of the RDB Act via the 2016 Amendment which explicitly deems a DRT recovery certificate to be a "decree or order of the Court" for initiating insolvency or winding-up proceedings constitutes a clear legislative recognition that such an equivalence did not exist prior to the amendment - Since the amendment has not been given retrospective effect, any recovery certificate issued prior to 2016 cannot form the legal foundation for an insolvency notice - To rule otherwise would unacceptably amount to supplying a casus omissus - Rights Crystallize on the Date of Institution - It is a foundational tenant of processual jurisprudence that the rights and liabilities of litigants stand crystallized on the exact date of the commencement of the legal action - A claim or action that was fundamentally untenable when the suitor entered the portals of the court cannot become tenable simply due to a subsequent statutory development or a fortuitous event occurring during the pendency of the appeal unless explicitly made retrospective. [Relied on Paramjeet Singh Patheja v. ICDS Ltd., (2006) 13 SCC 322; Beg Raj Singh v. State of U.P., (2003) 1 SCC 726; Ebrahim Aboobaker v. Tek Chand Dolwani, (1953) 1 SCC 621; Paras 11-24] H.D.F.C. Bank V. Kishore K. Mehta, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 665 : 2026 INSC 688

Interpretation of Fiscal Statutes - Vires and Scope of Section 26 of the Stamp Act, 1899 - The Indian Stamp Act, 1899 is a fiscal legislation enacted to generate revenue for the State and must be interpreted strictly and mandatorily - There is no scope for equity or judiciousness if the letter of the law is clear and unambiguous - The Supreme Court rejected the appellant's contention that the proviso to Section 26 is inconsistent with the main section. Section 26 governs instruments where the value of the subject matter is indeterminate at the time of execution - Since the actual value of a mining lease can only be ascertained after mining operations commence, its value is inherently indeterminate at the time of execution - The proviso specifically carves out a mechanism for mining leases, providing that the estimated royalty or the value of the share shall be sufficient for determining stamp duty - Where the Government is the lessor, the Collector is empowered to estimate the anticipated royalty - Under Rule 31 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, executing a lease deed in the statutory 'Form K' is mandatory. Part IX (Clause 9) of Form K explicitly prescribes that anticipated royalty from the demised land shall be the yardstick for calculating stamp duty - Once the parties consciously execute a statutory agreement containing such a clause, it removes any ambiguity, and the method of computing stamp duty must be through anticipated royalty - Dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court held that the High Court committed no error in upholding the State's demand notice - The stamp duty for a mining lease granted by the Government is legally determinable on the basis of "anticipated royalty" as estimated by the Collector under the proviso to Section 26 of the Stamp Act, read with the statutory covenants contained in Form K of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960. [Relied on: District Registrar and Collector v. Canara Bank, (2005) 1 SCC 496; Para 8-15] Birla Corporation Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 717 : 2026 INSC 738

Judicial Discipline & Restraint — Adverse and Disparaging Remarks against Lower Judicial Officers - The practice of passing sweeping generalisations or disparaging remarks against Trial Judges and directing them to undergo training merely because their reasoning is perceived as erroneous is highly deplorable - Proper freedom, independence, fearlessness, and professional competence of lower judicial officers must be strictly protected against undue interference - Judicial pronouncements must strictly exhibit sobriety, moderation, fair play, and reserve - Robes carry immense power, and adverse remarks must not be passed lightly or in ordinary circumstances as they jeopardize judicial independence and deter officers from carrying out their duties. [Relied on Travancore Rayon Ltd. v. Union of India, (1969) 3 SCC 868; State of Punjab v. Jagdev Singh Talwandi, (1984) 1 SCC 596; Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar, (2003) 11 SCC 519; CCT v. Shukla & Bros., (2010) 4 SCC 785; Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496; State of U.P. v. Mohd. Naim, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 22; State of Punjab v. Shikha Trading Co., (2023) 20 SCC 113; Para 8-12] Lakshmi v. Gopi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 681 : 2026 INSC 709

Judicial Education & Service – Shetty Commission Recommendations – Status of Guidelines vs. Statutory Rules - Recruitment of Additional District Judges – Viva-Voce Cut-Off Marks – The recommendations made by the First National Judicial Pay Commission (Shetty Commission) prescribing that there shall be no minimum cut-off marks for the viva-voce test are merely advisory policy guidelines - They are not rigid statutory mandates and cannot override existing statutory service rules framed by a competent recruiting authority - Once statutory rules are formally enacted, the selection process must strictly adhere to them. [Relied on Mahinder Kumar v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh, (2013) 11 SCC 87; Malik Mazhar Sultan v. UP Public Services Commission, (2008) 17 SCC 703; Paras 17, 18] Manoj Goyal V. Rajasthan High Court, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 695 : 2026 INSC 699

Judicial Review — Fiscal and Economic Policy — Test of Arbitrariness - Enhancement of the rate of royalty and dead rent cannot be termed arbitrary or suffering from non-application of mind if it is based on comparative materials, such as rates prevailing in neighbouring States - Courts will not sit in appeal over fiscal policies or mathematically scrutinise the exact quantum of increase, provided it satisfies the test of Wednesbury unreasonableness and does not breach statutory intervals. [Paras 39-41] State of Haryana v. Faridabad Gurgaon Minerals, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 673 : 2026 INSC 690

Judicial Review — Fiscal and Economic Policy — Test of Arbitrariness - Key Legal Principles Established Or Reiterated - statutory trumps contractual silence – i. terms of a mining lease must yield to the statutory rules governing the lease - omission of a statutory rule's text within a lease deed does not efface its binding authority; ii. constitutional trust over minerals - minerals are held by the state in trust for the people - the state is obligated to ensure that their exploitation subserves the public interest, including securing appropriate revenue for the public exchequer; iv. significance of the chief minister's imprimatur - financial decisions impacting the state must have the involvement, approval, or at least the knowledge of the chief minister to reflect collective responsibility and maintain the constitutional scheme under articles 154 and 163. [Relied on State of Rajasthan v. J.K. Synthetics Ltd., (2011) 12 SCC 518; MRF Limited v. Manohar Parrikar, (2010) 11 SCC 374; D.K. Trivedi & Sons v. State of Gujarat, 1986 Supp SCC 20] State of Haryana v. Faridabad Gurgaon Minerals, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 673 : 2026 INSC 690

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 – Sections 15, 18(3), and 19(1) – Mandate of Section 19(1) for Children's Court upon committal – Held that the word 'may' occurring in Section 19(1) must be read as 'shall' - Passing a reasoned order under Section 19(1) by the Children's Court determining whether a child in conflict with law (CICL) needs to be tried as an adult or as a child is mandatory and not a mere procedural formality - Without such an order, the Children's Court cannot assume jurisdiction to proceed with a Sessions trial. Sagar v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 666 : 2026 INSC 692

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015; Section 2(33) and Section 2(54) — Indian Penal Code, 1860; Section 302 — Classification of Offences — Whether Murder is a "Heinous Offence" or "Serious Offence" for Juveniles - An offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC (now Section 103(1) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023) which prescribes the punishment of "death or imprisonment for life" carries life imprisonment as its minimum statutory punishment - A court convicting an accused under Section 302 IPC has no discretion to impose any lesser sentence than imprisonment for life - The disjunctive word "or" merely confers discretion to choose between death and life imprisonment based on gravity, but does not permit a sentence below life imprisonment - Section 302 IPC qualifies as a "heinous offence" under Section 2(33) of the JJ Act since its minimum punishment is seven years or more. It cannot be classified as a "serious offence" under the fourth category of offences wrapped into Section 2(54)(b) by the 2021 Amendment - The modulation of life imprisonment under Section 21 of the JJ Act (prohibiting life imprisonment without the possibility of release for juveniles) applies only at the stage of sentencing and does not alter the statutory classification of the offence for determining the forum of trial. [Relied on Babasaheb Maruti Kamble v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 13 SCC 631; Distinguished from Shilpa Mittal v. State (NCT) of Delhi, (2020) 2 SCC 787; Paras 31, 32, 33, 36, 39, 40, 41, and 85(i)] X v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 702 : 2026 INSC 728

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015; Section 101(2) vs Section 15(1) Proviso — Nature of Appellate Power — Whether the word “May” is Mandatory or Directory - The expression "may" used in Section 101(2) of the JJ Act, which states that the Sessions Court may take the assistance of experienced psychologists and medical specialists while deciding an appeal against a preliminary assessment order, is directory/permissive and not mandatory - The rule laid down in Barun Chandra Thakur—interpreting "may" as mandatory under the proviso to Section 15(1) when the Juvenile Justice Board lacks an expert member cannot be mechanically transplanted to appellate proceedings under Section 101(2) - The Sessions Court as an appellate court stands on a completely different footing; its object is to examine the legality and correctness of the Board's order based on the existing record (including any expert reports already obtained) - While the Sessions Court has the independent power and discretion to seek fresh expert assistance if the facts and circumstances necessitate it, it is not legally mandated to do so in every single appeal. [Relied On State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 5; Julius v. Lord Bishop of Oxford, (1880) 5 App Cas 214; Official Liquidator v. Dharti Dhan (P) Ltd., (1977) 2 SCC 166; Paras 46-59, and 85(ii)] X v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 702 : 2026 INSC 728

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015; Section 15 — Juvenile Justice Model Rules, 2016; Rules 8(5), 10(5), 10(9), 11(2) — Preliminary Assessment Protocol — Materials to be Considered by the Board - The sole purpose of a preliminary assessment under Section 15 is to evaluate a child above 16 years across four distinct parameters: (i) mental capacity, (ii) physical capacity, (iii) ability to understand consequences, and (iv) the circumstances of the alleged offence - The process is not an adjudication of guilt or innocence - While carrying out this assessment, the Juvenile Justice Board is not bound by the sole opinion or recommendation of the expert psychologist - The Board must apply its mind independently to the totality of the circumstances - The Social Investigation Report (SIR) and the Social Background Report (SBR) are not merely supplementary inputs; they are mandatory statutory considerations that must be evaluated alongside witness statements and expert reports - The Board cannot abdicate its judicial duty by mechanically rubber-stamping the expert's conclusion. [Relied On Pradeep Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2019 SCC OnLine Del 8251; Child in Conflict with Law v. State of Gujarat, 2023 SCC OnLine Guj 3119; Paras 64-79, 82, 84, and 85(iii)] X v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 702 : 2026 INSC 728

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Model Rules, 2016 – Rule 13 – Trial of Juvenile as an Adult without Section 19(1) determination – Effect of Non-compliance – Held: Even if a preliminary assessment under Section 15 is duly conducted by the Juvenile Justice Board, the failure of the Children's Court to independently apply its mind and pass a reasoned order under Section 19(1) strikes at the very root of the protective framework - The distinct statutory differentiation between a Sessions trial (for adults) and a summons inquiry (for children) makes this step substantive - Non-compliance vitiates the entire trial - Since the appellant has crossed 24 years of age and spent over six years in incarceration, a meaningful retrospective assessment is unfeasible; hence, the conviction and sentence are set aside - Direction to Trial Courts – Held that all Children's Courts across the country, upon receipt of records transferred under Section 18(3), must first take cognizance and immediately pass a reasoned order under Section 19(1) after due application of mind before taking any further steps in the trial. [Relied on Ajeet Gurjar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2023) 15 SCC 678; Thirumoorthy v. State rep. by the Inspector of Police, (2024) 12 SCC 307; Paras 10-15] Sagar v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 666 : 2026 INSC 692

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Ecological Character and Deemed Forest - The mere existence of trees or vegetation on a portion of the acquired land does not ipso facto elevate its status to a "forest" or "deemed forest" - Unless the relevant statutory planning framework or Master Plan recognizes the land as forest land at its inception, a subsequent proliferation of vegetation cannot be permitted to subvert an expert planning framework or derail a public infrastructure project. [Relied on Farid Ahmed Abdul Samad v. Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad, (1976) 3 SCC 719; State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, (1980) 2 SCC 471; Sooraram Pratap Reddy v. Collector, (2008) 9 SCC 552; Naveen Solanki v. Rail Land Development Authority, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 45; Paras 84-89] Alok Kotahwala v. Jaipur Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 678 : 2026 INSC 682

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Eminent Domain, Choice of Land, and Excess Acquisition - The determination of which land is suitable and the precise extent of land required for a public project falls squarely within the domain of the expert planning authorities exercising the power of eminent domain - In the absence of manifest arbitrariness, mala fides, or demonstrable error, courts must exercise judicial restraint and refrain from substituting their own opinion for that of the executive - Landowners cannot dictate which parcels of land the State should acquire or resist acquisition merely by pointing out alternative feasible governmental lands. [Paras 76-82] Alok Kotahwala v. Jaipur Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 678 : 2026 INSC 682

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Nature of LAO's Report and Recording of Reasons - The LAO, while submitting a report under Section 5A, acts as an administrative authority and not a judicial or quasi-judicial body - The report need not be a detailed, speaking order in the judicial sense - The inclusion of the phrase "objections are not being considered" in the concluding portion of the report must be read contextually to mean that the objections were considered on their merits but did not deserve acceptance in view of the paramount public purpose - Brevity of reasons is not synonymous with an absence of reasons, and a concise report does not vitiate the proceedings. [Paras 38-64] Alok Kotahwala v. Jaipur Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 678 : 2026 INSC 682

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Prior Survey and Publication - Section 4(2) of the Act uses the expression "Thereupon", which unequivocally demonstrates that the statutory power to enter and survey kicks in only after the publication of the preliminary notification under Section 4(1) - The statute does not mandate a comprehensive survey or prior newspaper publication as a condition precedent to the issuance of a Section 4 notification. [Paras 70-75] Alok Kotahwala v. Jaipur Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 678 : 2026 INSC 682

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Section 5A – Scope and Compliance of Mandatory Right of Hearing - Substantial Compliance vs. Flagrant Violation - The right to object under Section 5A(1) followed by an oral hearing under Section 5A(2) flows directly from the twin principles of natural justice and due process - this mandatory safeguard is not a mere ritual - Where landowners appeared on multiple dates but chose to remain absent on the date fixed for filing a rejoinder, and subsequently maintained silence for over a month until the Land Acquisition Officer (LAO) forwarded the report, the landowners, by their own conduct, abandoned their right of hearing - They cannot subsequently complain of a denial of hearing - A mere error or indiscretion by the LAO in not granting an additional date of opportunity to an absent party does not amount to malice in law and cannot invalidate the acquisition. [Paras 38-52] Alok Kotahwala v. Jaipur Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 678 : 2026 INSC 682

Limitation / Delay and Laches — Request for Refund vs. Administrative Inaction - Where an applicant seeks a refund of paid statutory charges/premium within three years of payment, the subsequent inaction, delay, or internal administrative movement of files by state authorities cannot be attributed to the applicant to deny relief on the ground of delay and laches - The Appellants are held entitled to a refund of the premium paid towards additional unutilized FSI (₹30,46,290/-), subject to a deduction of 10% (₹3,04,629/-) towards administrative charges - The Respondents are directed to refund the balance sum of ₹27,41,661/- along with simple interest @ 7% per annum from the date of deposit until the date of actual payment, within two months. [Relied on E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and Another, (1974) 4 SCC 3; Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi and Others v. State of U.P. and Others, (1991) 1 SCC 212; Ajay Hasia and Others v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and Others, (1981) 1 SCC 72; Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, (1989) 3 SCC 293; Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Sunil Krishna Khaitan and Others, (2023) 2 SCC 643; Para 11-15, 20] Prasad Pandurang Tapkir v. Assistant Director of Town Planning, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 731 : 2026 INSC 683

Maxims – Commodum ex injuria sua nemo habere debet – No authority can take advantage of its own default – A man cannot be permitted to take undue and unfair advantage of his own wrong to gain a favourable interpretation of law – Where an employee acts diligently and the delay is entirely attributable to the employer/authorities, the citizen cannot be made to suffer. [Relied on Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana, (1994) 4 SCC 138; Bhawani Prasad Sonkar v. Union of India, (2011) 4 SCC 209; Malaya Nanda Sethy v. State of Orissa, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 684; Kusheshwar Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (2007) 11 SCC 447; Paras 20-30] Rahul Ramnarayan Madankar v. New India Assurance, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 693 : 2026 INSC 710

Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 – Key Legal Principles & Findings – i. Presumption of Constitutionality of Subordinate Legislation - There is a strong presumption in favor of the constitutionality and validity of subordinate legislation - The burden lies heavily on the challenger to displace this presumption by showing a lack of legislative competence, violation of fundamental or constitutional rights, or manifest arbitrariness; ii. Regulation of Mines and Mineral Development - The scope of "regulation of mines and mineral development" under List I Entry 54 of the Seventh Schedule, and implemented through the MMDR Act, is wide. The fixation of rates of royalty under Section 9 read with the Second Schedule falls squarely within this regulatory domain – iii. Distinction Between Measure of Levy and Nature of Levy - The standard or measure adopted to quantify a levy is a matter of legislative policy and convenience - The standard does not need to be contoured along the lines that define the character of the levy itself - The inclusion of royalty, DMF, and NMET in the "sale value" (as a measure to compute ASP) does not alter the ad valorem nature of the royalty levy under Section 9; iv. Regulatory Measures to Prevent Tax/Revenue Evasion - Legislative and subordinate rule-making bodies possess the competence to design and enact measures/fictions specifically aimed at suppressing price manipulation, under-invoicing, and revenue evasion - Regulatory data showed that some miners deployed clever stratagems (such as showing nil or very low despatches when ex-mine prices were high, and vice versa) to artificially depress the ASP and keep their premium and royalty payouts down. Hence, loading royalty, DMF, and NMET onto the sale value is a valid regulatory antidote to check evasion and arrive at a fair mineral value; v. No Article 14 Violation (Comparison with Coal Disallowed) - Miners of iron ore cannot claim discrimination by comparing themselves to coal miners (where statutory dues are excluded from actual price calculations) - Coal has a distinct price mechanism (the National Coal Index based on notified PSU prices and imports) and has historically been subject to a public sector monopoly, whereas iron ore prices are determined by highly competitive, private-sector market forces prone to under-invoicing - Comparing coal with iron ore is akin to comparing apples and oranges; v. No Violation of Article 19(1)(g) / Public Interest Over Individual Hardship - The restriction imposed is reasonable and proportional - Individual hardship cannot override a regulatory measure designed in the larger public interest to prevent substantial losses to the state exchequer - The grundnorm is "Salus populi suprema lex" (regard for the public welfare is the highest law), and private rights must cede to public interest. [Relied On State of Tamil Nadu and Another v. P. Krishnamurthy and Others, (2006) 4 SCC 517; Sardar Baldev Singh v. CIT, Delhi & Ajmer, [1961] 1 SCR 482; Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India and Another, (2024) 10 SCC 1; Ralla Ram v. Province of East Punjab, 1948 SCC Online FC 9; Union of India & Ors. v. Bombay Tyre International Ltd. and Others, (1984) 1 SCC 467; Hingir-Rampur Coal Co., Ltd. and Others v. State of Orissa and Others, [1961] 2 SCR 537; Navnit Lal C. Javeri v. K.K. Sen, [1965] 1 SCR 909; Union of India and Another v. A. Sanyasi Rao and Others, (1996) 3 SCC 465; State of Madras v. V.G. Row, [1952] SCR 597; Paras 61-64, 72-78, 87-102]. Kirloskar Ferrous Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 664 : 2026 INSC 679

Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 – Section 15(1), 15(3) — Punjab Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1964 – Rules 10 and 21 — Power of State to Revise Royalty and Dead Rent — Implied Conditions in Statutory Leases - The lack of an express provision in a mining lease deed for fluctuating or revised rates of royalty and dead rent does not preclude the State Government from increasing these rates during the subsistence of the lease - A mining lease is a statutory grant, and the liability to pay royalty and dead rent remains dynamic and subject to revisions validly made under the statutory rules - The requirement to comply with the statutory regime constitutes an implied condition inherent in the lease deed. [Paras 24 – 30, 42-50] State of Haryana v. Faridabad Gurgaon Minerals, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 673 : 2026 INSC 690

Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 – Section 9, Second Schedule (Entry 24) – Minerals (Other than Atomic and Hydro Carbons Energy Minerals) Concession Rules, 2016 – Rule 38, Rule 42 – Mineral Conservation and Development Rules, 2017 – Rule 45(8)(a) – Constitutional Validity of Explanations to Rule 38 (2016 Rules) and Rule 45(8)(a) (2017 Rules) – Inclusion of Royalty, DMF, and NMET in Sale Value for ASP Calculation – Held - The Explanations appended to Rule 38 of the 2016 Rules and Rule 45(8)(a) of the 2017 Rules which bar the deduction of royalty, District Mineral Foundation (DMF) payments, and National Mineral Exploration Trust (NMET) payments from the "gross amount" when computing the "sale value" for the determination of Average Sale Price (ASP) are constitutionally valid - They do not violate Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, nor are they ultra vires Section 9 of the MMDR Act. Kirloskar Ferrous Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 664 : 2026 INSC 679

Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 1964 (Punjab) — Form-L (Clause 19) — Interpretation of "No Interest" Clause on Security Deposit — Two Limbs of a Clause to be Read Harmoniously - Clause 19 of Form-L consists of two interdependent limbs: (i) the security deposit shall carry no interest, and (ii) it shall be refunded within three months from the date of expiry or sooner determination of the contract - The correct interpretation is that the deposit earns no interest during the currency of the contract and up to the stipulated period for refund - The State cannot retain interest-free money in perpetuity - If the State fails to refund or adjust the security deposit within three months from the date of determination of the contract, the contractor becomes entitled to interest for the period of delay beyond the specified three months - The High Court erred in declaring Clause 19 as unsustainable in law and granting interest from the initial date of deposit. [Relied on National Highways Authority of India v. Ganga Enterprises And Another, (2003) 7 SCC 410; Shri Hanuman Cotton Mills and Others Vs. Tata Aircraft Limited, (1969) 3 SCC 522; Venkataraman Krishnamurthy And Another v. Lodha Crown Buildmart Private Limited, (2024) 4 SCC 230; Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corpn. v. Diamond & Gem Development Corporation Ltd, (2013) 5 SCC 470; Shree Ambica Medical Stores v. Surat People's Coop. Bank Ltd., (2020) 13 SCC 564; Paras 23-31] State of Haryana v. Jai Durgaa Finvest, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 671 : 2026 INSC 678

Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 1964 (Punjab) — Rule 33 and Form-L (Clause 19) — Security Deposit — Entitlement to Interest — Contractual Terms vs. Judicial Interpretation — Writ Jurisdiction - The function of the Court in contractual matters is to interpret and enforce the agreed terms, not to rewrite them, howsoever reasonable a substituted term may appear to be - In commercial contracts where parties stand on an equal footing and accept unambiguous terms with free will and open eyes, they cannot later assail a clause as unconscionable or oppressive merely because it proves to be onerous. State of Haryana v. Jai Durgaa Finvest, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 671 : 2026 INSC 678

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Conflict between "Geographical Area" and "Limitation as to Use" Clauses – Special Permit for Foreign Territory - The appellant-insurer disputed liability on the ground that the policy's geographical area was limited to "India" - the "Limitation as to Use" clause covered the vehicle's use under a "permit" within the meaning of the MVA - A special permit was validly issued under Section 88(8) of the MVA, explicitly authorizing the vehicle to ply on the Durg-Nepal route - Held, since the "Limitation as to Use" clause was cast in general terms without geographical boundaries, the existence of a valid permit extending to a foreign territory meant the policy covered the use irrespective of the geographical location - If the insurer intended to exclude cross-border territory entirely, it ought to have drafted the exclusion clearly and unambiguously. [Paras 10 - 14] Oriental Insurance v. Durg Roadways, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 696 : 2026 INSC 722

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Extra-Territorial Operation of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988: Under Article 245(2) of the Constitution of India, laws made by Parliament cannot be deemed invalid on the ground of extra-territorial operation - The legislative intent to give the MVA extra-territorial application for cross-border transit is evident from Section 139 (power to frame rules for taking vehicles outside India) and Section 149(3) (duty of insurers to satisfy foreign judgments from reciprocating countries) - the provisions of the MVA apply to the third-party claim regardless of whether the accident took place in India or Nepal. [Para 21-30] Oriental Insurance v. Durg Roadways, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 696 : 2026 INSC 722

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 147(5), Section 139, and Section 149 – Cross-Border Third-Party Insurance Coverage – Accident in Nepal – Liability of the Insurer - Interpretation of Insurance Contract – Harmonious Construction – Rule of Contra Proferentem - An insurance policy must be read as a whole to determine the intent of the parties - Different clauses must be read harmoniously, and one cannot cherry-pick a single clause in isolation to base a claim while rejecting other clauses - Where a policy contains ambiguous or multiple interpretations, the one that aligns with the beneficial purpose of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (MVA) and favours the insured (contra proferentem rule) must be adopted. [Paras 14-16] Oriental Insurance v. Durg Roadways, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 696 : 2026 INSC 722

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 166 & 168 — Just and Fair Compensation — Determination of Annual Income — Assessment based on Income Tax Returns (ITRs) — Distinction between Salaried and Self-Employed Individuals — Held, there can be no hard and fast formula for computing the annual income of a deceased person/claimant - ITRs, being statutory documents, serve as an important reference point - For salaried individuals, only the ITR of the previous year is sufficient to showcase the annual income from salary, as the financial impact of recent promotions might only reflect in that year - for self-employed individuals or those carrying out their own business, the average income specified in the ITRs of up to the previous three years should be taken as the reference point, owing to fluctuations in business income - In cases where ITRs are filed after death or income fluctuates, surrounding circumstances such as the nature, geographic location, category, growth pattern, and potential growth of the business, as well as instances of initial negative income, must be taken into consideration. [Paras 11 - 20] Rashmirekha Tripathy v. Sriram General Insurance, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 654 : 2026 INSC 661

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 168 — Just Compensation — Fundamental Objective — The objective behind the claim process under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is to grant 'just and fair compensation' - Compensation is a rough estimate to ease the financial burden on dependents, aiming to place them in nearly the same financial position as if the victim had lived their natural span of life, without being arbitrary, niggardly, or a source of profit. [Relied on V. Pathmavathi and Ors. v. Bharthi Axa General Insurance Co. Ltd. and Anr. (2026 SCC OnLine SC 158); Reshma Kumari v. Madan Mohan (2013) 9 SCC 65; Anant v. Pratap and Anr. (2018) 9 SCC 450; National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680; National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680; United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Satinder Kaur (2021) 11 SCC 780; Rajjo and Ors v. United India Insurance Company Ltd. and Ors. 2022 SCC Online SC 1699; Paras 18-24] Rashmirekha Tripathy v. Sriram General Insurance, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 654 : 2026 INSC 661

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Sections 2(28), 2(34) & 39 — Motor Vehicle — Public Place — Reach Stacker — Exemption from Definition of Motor Vehicle – Held - 1. Inland Container Depot (ICD) is not a “Public Place”: An Inland Container Depot (ICD) being a custom-bonded area under Section 7 of the Customs Act, 1962, where access is restricted only to authorized personnel, does not constitute a "public place" under Section 2(34) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Members of the general public cannot claim entry to such premises as a matter of right - 2. “Reach Stacker” is excluded from the definition of “Motor Vehicle”: A Reach Stacker—a heavy machine operating on wheels designed exclusively to lift and stack shipping containers within restricted/enclosed industrial areas—does not qualify as a "motor vehicle" under Section 2(28) of the Act - Since it exceeds maximum permissible road weight limits, lacks general road safety features, requires reinforced surfaces, and is used solely in confined spaces, it falls under the exclusionary second part of Section 2(28) (a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or enclosed premises) - 3. Registration Requirement: Where transport authorities certify that a machine is a special type adapted for enclosed premises and does not fall within Section 2(28), non-registration under Section 39 is not a mere omission or violation, but a consequence of it not being a "motor vehicle". [Relied on Ultratech Cement Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 48; Bolani Ores Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1974) 2 SCC 777; Goodyear India Ltd. v. Union of India, (1997) 5 SCC 752; Tarachand Logistic Solutions Ltd. v. State of A.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1851; distinguished from Natwar Parikh & Co. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2005) 7 SCC 364; Western Coalfields Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2016) 11 SCC 613; Paras 11-15] Container Corporation of India v. Rishi Ranjan Mishra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 740 : 2026 INSC 763

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Sections 3, 5 & 149 — Driving Licence — Non-renewal/Expired Licence — Breach of Policy Conditions — Liability of Insurer — Pay and Recover - Where a driving licence had expired and remained unrenewed for a substantial duration (between 2007 and 2010) covering the date of the accident, the High Court erred in blindly relying upon oral testimony and an official letter alleging technical loss of data without corroborative official records - Secondary evidence cannot replace primary documentary evidence unless foundational circumstances under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 are pleaded and established - The owner owes a duty to verify that the driver holds an effective driving licence and takes reasonable care to get it renewed upon expiry - Failure of the owner to produce evidence of checking the licence or taking steps for its timely renewal amounts to a breach of policy terms, exonerating the insurer from ultimate liability - applying the doctrine of 'pay and recover', the Supreme Court directed the insurer to satisfy the compensation award first and recover the same from the driver and owner. [Paras 10–12, 14–18]. Reliance General Insurance v. Om Parkash, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 742 : 2026 INSC 767

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Statutory Overriding Effect of Section 147(5) MVA over India Motor Tariff Regulations: The insurer argued that the policy was restricted to India because no additional premium was paid to extend coverage to Nepal under General Regulation 4 (GR.4) of the India Motor Tariff (IMT) 2002. Held, Section 147(5) of the MVA contains a potent non-obstante clause which imposes liability on the insurance company to indemnify the specified persons, overriding regulatory instruments like the IMT - Non-payment of the additional premium under GR.4 does not vitiate the valid permit or statutory coverage. [Paras 17 - 22] Oriental Insurance v. Durg Roadways, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 696 : 2026 INSC 722

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Validity of Indian Driving License in Nepal – Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship, 1950: The insurer contended that the deceased driver did not possess a valid driving license to drive in Nepal. Held, the driver possessed an effective Indian driving license which was verified without objection by the Nepalese authorities at the border while issuing transit documents. Furthermore, Article 7 of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between India and Nepal (1950) grants reciprocal privileges regarding the free movement of nationals, ensuring that a valid license issued in India is recognized for movement within Nepal. No evidence was adduced by the insurer to show the license was invalid in Nepal. [Relied on National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Chief Electoral Officer, (2023) 6 SCC 441; Export Credit Guarantee Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Garg Sons International, (2014) 1 SCC 686; Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sony Cheriyan, (1999) 6 SCC 451; Shivram Chandra Jagarnath Cold Storage v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2022) 4 SCC 539; Syed Mehaboob v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2011) 11 SCC 625; Ningamma v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (2009) 13 SCC 710; K. Ramya v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1338; Nidhi Bhargava v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 872; Mohd. Abdul Samad v. State of Telangana, (2025) 2 SCC 49; A.G. Varadarajulu v. State of T.N., (1998) 4 SCC 231; Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia v. Union of India, (1971) 1 SCC 85; Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, (1952) 2 SCC 237; Paras 24, 25] Oriental Insurance v. Durg Roadways, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 696 : 2026 INSC 722

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Section 21 (as amended by the Amendment Act of 2001) – Retrospective Applicability of Quantity-Based Sentencing - The Supreme Court held that the benefit of the quantity-based sentencing regime introduced by the 2001 Amendment Act cannot be extended to cases where the trial had already concluded and the appeal was pending as on the date the amendment came into force (02.10.2001) - Section 41 of the 2001 Amendment Act expressly restricts application to cases pending investigation or trial as of the commencement date. [Relied on Basheer v. State of Kerala (2004) 3 SCC 609; Para 18-20] Mehboob Shah v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 705 : 2026 INSC 729

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Section 50 – Applicability of Personal Search Conditions to Objects/Articles Carried - The Supreme Court reiterated that the sacrosanct right of an accused to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate under Section 50 of the NDPS Act is confined strictly to cases where the recovery is sought to be effected from the personal search of the accused - It has no application whatsoever when the contraband is recovered from an article or object being carried by the accused, such as a bag, container, suitcase, or water bottle. [Relied on State of H.P. v. Pawan Kumar (2005) 4 SCC 350; Ranjan Kumar Chadha v. State of H.P. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1262; State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh (1999) 6 SCC 172; Paras 12 - 13] Mehboob Shah v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 705 : 2026 INSC 729

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Section 52A – Drawing of Samples at the Spot of Seizure vs. Presence of Magistrate – The Supreme Court observed that under the NDPS Act (as it stood at the relevant time), drawing representative samples by the Investigating Officer at the spot of seizure rather than in the presence of a Magistrate is a procedural irregularity and not a fatal illegality - Mere non-compliance or delayed compliance with Section 52A does not automatically entitle the accused to an acquittal, provided the search and seizure were conducted in accordance with the mandatory provisions, a proper chain of custody is established, and no serious prejudice is shown to have been caused to the accused - Documents like the panchnama, seizure memo, and arrest memo prepared on the spot constitute valid primary evidence. [Relied on Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif (2024) 11 SCC 372; Bharat Aambale v. State of Chhattisgarh (2025) 8 SCC 452; Paras 14, 15, 16] Mehboob Shah v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 705 : 2026 INSC 729

Penal Code, 1860 - Section 201 read with Section 34 – Causing disappearance of evidence of offence – Accused caught red-handed transporting dead body – Accused Nos. 2 and 3 were intercepted by the police at 5:00 a.m. while riding a motorcycle carrying a bundle from which a human foot was protruding - The bundle contained the dead body of the deceased, and the motorcycle silencer plate had bloodstains matching the blood group of the deceased - Held, the physical reality of the accused transporting the deceased victim's tied body undeniably establishes that they knowingly caused the evidence of the commission of an offence to disappear with the explicit intention of screening the offenders - The conviction and sentence of rigorous imprisonment for one year sustained. [Paras 35 - 40] State of Maharashtra v. Monika Kiran Suryawanshi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 669 : 2026 INSC 685

Penal Code, 1860 — Section 294(b) — Distinction between Obscene and Abusive/Vulgar Words — Swear words or profanity do not automatically amount to obscenity – Held that Legally, obscenity is not synonymous with vulgarity, abuse, or profanity - The use of mere swear words, profanities, and vulgar expletives, however distasteful or uncivil, cannot be equated with obscenity under Section 294(b) IPC - To secure a conviction, the words must be shown to be lascivious, appeal to prurient interests, tend to deprave and corrupt impressionable minds, and cause annoyance to others - Verbal slangs used during altercations (e.g., "Motherfucker", "son of a whore") are, at best, abusive or vulgar but do not satisfy the legal test of obscenity in the absence of a sexual connotation that depraves morals or causes public annoyance. [Relied on Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra, 1964 SCC OnLine SC 52; Chandrakant Kalyandas Kakodkar v. State of Maharashtra, (1969) 2 SCC 687; Aveek Sarkar v. State of W.B., (2014) 4 SCC 257; Madhanagopal v. Lalitha, (2022) 17 SCC 818; Om Prakash Ambadkar v. State of Maharashtra, (2026) 2 SCC 622; Apoorva Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 6 SCC 18; Sivakumar v. State, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 529; Paras 11 - 17]. Mani @ Subramaniyam v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 687 : 2026 INSC 719

Penal Code, 1860 — Section 302 & 201 — Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Section 313 — Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 106 — Conviction on circumstantial evidence and testimony of a material witness upheld despite non-recovery of the dead body - Corpus Delicti in Murder Cases - Corpus delicti means that the offence has been committed and not that the dead body of the murdered person has been recovered - A person can be convicted of murdering another even if the later's body has not been recovered - If recovery of the dead body is treated as an absolute necessity to convict an accused, it would afford complete immunity to the guilty from being punished in cases where the body is destroyed or thrown into a flowing river - What is legally required to base a conviction for murder is reliable and acceptable direct or circumstantial evidence proving the factum of death. [Para 15] Debojit Pankika Charaideo Sonari v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 691 : 2026 INSC 687

Penal Code, 1860 - Section 302 read with Section 34 & Section 120B – Murder and Criminal Conspiracy – Circumstantial Evidence – Golden principles governing circumstantial evidence – Broken chain of events – The prosecution case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence to prove that the wife (Accused No. 1) along with her lover (Accused No. 2) and others conspired to murder the deceased - Held, the prosecution failed to establish a complete and unbroken chain of circumstances - There was no positive legal evidence proving a reciprocal love affair/motive, the "last seen" theory was found weak and unreliable, and the call detail records directly contradicted the prosecution's narrative - Suspicion cannot take the place of legal proof - The acquittal of the accused persons for the charges of murder and criminal conspiracy upheld. [Paras 19-39] State of Maharashtra v. Monika Kiran Suryawanshi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 669 : 2026 INSC 685

Penal Code, 1860 — Section 326 read with Section 320 (Seventhly) — Voluntarily Causing Grievous Hurt by Dangerous Weapons — Nasal bone fracture constitutes Grievous Hurt - A fracture or dislocation of a bone squarely falls under the definition of "grievous hurt" designated under Section 320 (Seventhly) IPC - When a nasal bone fracture is established through medical and corroborative oral evidence, and is proven to have been caused by an object like a billhook (a dangerous weapon), an offence under Section 326 IPC is fully made out - The contention that Section 326 IPC is not attracted because the injuries sustained were not in the form of incised wounds rejected. [Relied on Mathai v. State of Kerala, (2005) 3 SCC 260; Paras 20-22] Mani @ Subramaniyam v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 687 : 2026 INSC 719

Penal Code, 1860 — Section 34 vs. Section 141 — Common Intention vs. Unlawful Assembly — Physical Presence Not Mandatory For Section 34 IPC - The Supreme Court clarified the distinction between active participation under Section 34 IPC and physical participation under Section 141 IPC – The Supreme Court held that to invoke the provisions of an unlawful assembly under Section 141 IPC, it is necessary that five or more persons physically participate in the actual commission of the offence - Section 34 IPC requires mere active participation in furtherance of a common intention which can occur behind the scenes and does not mandate physical presence at the actual spot of execution. [Para 23-26] Piyush Shyamdasani v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 699 : 2026 INSC 721

Penal Code, 1860 — Section 506(ii) — Criminal Intimidation — Mere use of threatening words during an altercation is insufficient - To attract the offence of criminal intimidation under Section 506 IPC, the threat must be intentional and aimed at causing alarm to the person, or forcing them to do/omit any act to avoid the execution of the threat - The mere utterance of threatening words (such as "I will not rest until I hack you") during the course of a sudden altercation, without independent proof of an intention to cause actual alarm or compel action/omission, does not bring the act within the application of Section 506(ii) IPC. [Relied on Naresh Aneja v. State of U.P., (2025) 2 SCC 604; Paras 18, 19] Mani @ Subramaniyam v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 687 : 2026 INSC 719

Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 147, 148, 149 and 302 – Murder – Delay in forwarding FIR to Magistrate – Ante-timed FIR – Post-investigation document - The Supreme Court set aside the concurrent findings of conviction passed by the Trial Court and the High Court, extending the benefit of doubt to the surviving accused appellants - The prosecution failed to establish the time and manner of the occurrence beyond a reasonable doubt - Key Legal Principles Highlighted – i. Delay in Forwarding FIR to the Magistrate - Effect of Unexplained Delay - While a mere delay in transmitting the FIR to the jurisdictional Magistrate under Section 157 CrPC is not automatically fatal in isolation, it assumes immense significance when there are serious allegations of ante-timing, ante-dating, and manipulation - Cumulative Assessment - Where such delay is accompanied by other grave investigative lapses and suspicious attendant circumstances, it ceases to be a mere procedural irregularity - The delay must be assessed cumulatively to test the authenticity and spontaneity of the prosecution's narrative; ii. Investigative Lapses and Unnatural Conduct - Failure to Secure Dead Body - The dead body of the deceased remained lying abandoned at the place of occurrence throughout the intervening night despite the police station being merely miles away and the police having arrived at the spot on the night of the incident - Such inaction, alongside the total lack of interest by family members to guard the body, is entirely inconsistent with ordinary human behavior and standard police procedure - Delayed Inquest and Post-Mortem: Inquest proceedings were postponed to the next morning, and the post-mortem examination was delayed by nearly 48 hours without any plausible justification - Contradictions in Police Records: The complainant (PW-1) explicitly denied that certain relatives accompanied him to the police station - the contemporaneous General Diary entry recorded their arrival, striking at the very genesis of the prosecution case. [Relied on Pala Singh v. State of Punjab (1972) 2 SCC 640; Jafarudheen v. State of Kerala (2022) 8 SCC 440; Paras 44-64] Deo Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 680 : 2026 INSC 707

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 304B & 498A – Dowry Death and Matrimonial Cruelty – Standard of Proof – Evaluation of Exculpatory Dying Declaration and Defence Evidence - Conviction of the husband reversed - The prosecution failed to present independent witnesses from the neighborhood to substantiate the generalized and bland allegations of a continuous ₹50,000 dowry demand - the defence effectively dismantled the prosecution's narrative by producing substantial documentary proof of significant joint financial investments, medical receipts showing immediate specialized treatment provided by the husband, and call records demonstrating prompt notification to the bride's family - The exculpatory dying declaration recorded by an Executive Magistrate, combined with the absolute lack of a post-mortem or medical forensic analysis of the burn patterns, created a compelling probability of an accidental fire rather than homicide or suicide. [Paras 27-35] Brajesh Kumar @ Birjesh Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 670 : 2026 INSC 695

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 45 & 53 [Corresponding to Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) — Sections 2(17) & 4] — Sentence of Imprisonment for Remainder of Natural Life — Validity & Constitutionality - Sentence of imprisonment for the remainder of natural life without remission (special category sentence) in lieu of death penalty is valid and constitutional - Section 53 read with Section 45 IPC explicitly contemplates life imprisonment as imprisonment for the rest of the natural life of the convict (i.e., until their last breath) - The judicial substitution of death penalty with life imprisonment for the remainder of natural life without remission in select "rarest of rare" cases is well-founded and does not violate constitutional or statutory rights. [Paras 9-12] Ramasrey @ Fakkad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 736 : 2026 INSC 764

Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 – Section 47 – Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1949 – Medical Invalidation vs. Statutory Protection – Mandatory duty of the employer to accommodate employees acquiring disability during service - The Respondent, enrolled as a Constable (Driver) in the CRPF in 1985, developed a severe ophthalmic condition in 1996 resulting in permanent visual impairment - He was medically invalidated from service via an order dated March 11, 1998, without being considered for an alternate posting - Held: Section 47 of the PwD Act, 1995 casts an unqualified, absolute, and mandatory statutory obligation on the employer to protect an employee who acquires a disability during service - The employer is legally bound to shift the disabled employee to another post with the same pay scale and benefits, or adjust them against a supernumerary post until superannuation - The appellants failed to act as a model employer by converting a welfare provision into a dead letter. [Paras 74, 75] Union of India v. Bali Ram No. 850808321, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 668 : 2026 INSC 689

Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 – Section 47(2) Proviso – Exemption Notification dated 10th September 2002 – Prospective Application – Exemption does not validate past statutory breaches - The Appellants relied on a Government of India notification dated September 10, 2002, issued under the proviso to Section 47(2), exempting combatant personnel of Central Para Military Forces (including CRPF) from the application of Section 47 – Held that Delegated legislation and exemption notifications taking establishments out of the purview of beneficial social legislations are ordinarily prospective and must be strictly construed - The notification contained no express words or necessary implications to apply retrospectively - The respondent's ouster occurred in 1998 when Section 47 applied to the CRPF with full force - A subsequent exemption notification cannot operate retrospectively to legitimise an act that was void ab initio. [Paras 55 – 60] Union of India v. Bali Ram No. 850808321, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 668 : 2026 INSC 689

Pleadings and Reliefs – Pleadings are foundational to a claim – A court cannot grant a relief or decide a case on grounds entirely outside the pleadings of the parties without a proper amendment of the plaint – Held, no amount of evidence on a plea not put forward in the pleadings can be looked into to grant any relief. Relief premised on a case not pleaded cannot be sustained in law. [Relied on Trojan & Co. Ltd. v. Nagappa Chettiar, (1953) 1 SCC 456; Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal, (2008) 17 SCC 491; Paras 18-22] Venkatesha v. K.M. Venkatamuniyappa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 679 : 2026 INSC 705

Precedent – Doctrine of Per Incuriam – Conflict between Three-Judge Bench and Co-ordinate Bench Decisions – The judgment in State of Haryana v. Raj Kumar (2021) 9 SCC 292, which held the 2002 Remission Policy to be of purely statutory origin and superseded by the 2008 Policy, runs counter to the controlling three-judge Bench precedent in State of Haryana v. Jagdish (2010) 4 SCC 216 - Since the 1993 and 2002 policies are identical regarding the source of constitutional power under Article 161, Raj Kumar (supra) is declared per incuriam as its ratio is irreconcilable with the larger Bench decision in Jagdish (supra) – Held that a Bench of lesser strength cannot dissent from the view taken by a Bench of larger strength. [Paras 14 -18] Parveen Kumar @ Parveen Chauhan v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 648 : 2026 INSC 667

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Section 19 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 197 – Role of Sanctioning Authority - The sanctioning authority must independently apply its mind to the materials placed before it without acting under external force, coercion, or political dictate - Granting sanction upon reconsideration on identical material especially under political pressure—vitiates the sanction order and amounts to an abuse of process. [Relied on Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat, (1997) 7 SCC 622; State of H.P. v. Nishant Sareen, (2010) 14 SCC 527; Gopikant Choudhary v. State of Bihar, (2000) 9 SCC 53; State of Punjab v. Mohd. Iqbal Bhatti, (2009) 17 SCC 92; Paras 8-13] State of Rajasthan v. Dev Kant Meena, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 738 : 2026 INSC 752

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Section 19 – Grant or Refusal of Sanction – Reconsideration / Review of Order Refusing Sanction – Power of Review – Scope and Standard of Evaluation - No Express Power of Review - Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 does not contain any express provision regarding review or reconsideration of the matter by the sanctioning authority once the power to grant or refuse sanction has already been exercised – i. Review on Same Material Impermissible - A mere change of opinion per se on the exact same material is completely impermissible and cannot form the ground for reviewing an earlier order that refused to grant sanction – ii. When Review is Permissible - A review of an order refusing sanction is permissible only when fresh materials are collected by the investigating agency, which were not available at the earlier instance, provided there is a proper application of mind to such new materials – iii. External Pressure and Extraneous Dictates Vitiates Sanction - Sanction for prosecution is a statutory safeguard designed to protect innocent public servants from frivolous, vexatious, and unsubstantiated allegations - The decision-making process under Section 19 cannot be influenced by political dictates, extraneous considerations, or pressure exerted by higher authorities (such as the Chief Minister's office); iv. Standard of Evaluation by Sanctioning Authority - If the administrative/sanctioning authority itself expresses reasonable doubts and suspicions regarding the demand of bribe, the trap laid, or the recovery of money, sanction ought to be declined - Where two views are reasonably possible on the materials produced, the view exonerating the officer should be taken. [Paras 7 - 12] State of Rajasthan v. Dev Kant Meena, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 738 : 2026 INSC 752

Professional Accountability & Legal Reforms — Performance Audit of Bar Councils — Continuing Legal Education (CLE) & National Legal Academy (NLA) — Held: The right of self-regulation must withstand scrutiny on transparency and institutional effectiveness - The Bar Council of India (BCI) is directed to undertake a comprehensive performance audit of its disciplinary mechanisms and those of State Bar Councils to tackle systemic delays and pendency - to maintain high professional standards, the BCI is directed to institutionalize Continuing Legal Education (CLE) for enrolled advocates and constitute a team to evolve the establishment of a National Legal Academy (NLA) for post-enrolment structured learning and capacity building. [Relied on Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani, (1989) 2 SCC 691; Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M. V. Dabholkar, (1975) 2 SCC 702; Bar of Indian Lawyers v. D.K. Gandhi PS National Institute of Communicable Diseases, (2024) 8 SCC 430; Kaushal Kishor v. State of U.P., (2023) 4 SCC 1; Yash Developers v. Harihar Krupa Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., (2024) 9 SCC 606; S. Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 177; Yash Developers v. Harihar Krupa Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., (2024) 9 SCC 606; Paras 45-60] Ajay Vijh v. Indian Banks Association, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 656 : 2026 INSC 670

Property Law / Property Maxims – Nemo dat quod non habet – Derivative Title – No person can convey a better title than he himself possesses. A derivative title cannot outvalue the title from which it is derived. If the original owner never conveyed a specific survey number, subsequent purchasers cannot acquire or convey title to that distinct property merely by executing a unilateral rectification deed. [Para 33] Venkatesha v. K.M. Venkatamuniyappa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 679 : 2026 INSC 705

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Sections 19(1) & 21 — Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Section 176 — Failure to Report Offence — Statutory Duty of Institutional Staff — Meaning of "Knowledge" — Discharge At Stage of Framing Charges - Held: The High Court and the Trial Court erred in discharging the alleged Headmistress on the premise that a lack of physical/medical signs of sexual assault gave her a bona fide reason to believe no offence occurred - The phrase "has knowledge that such an offence has been committed" under Section 19(1) of the POCSO Act cannot be restricted to direct sensory knowledge or eye-witnessing of the crime; it statutorily includes awareness derived from credible information - When a child victim directly reports an incident of sexual assault to an authority figure or caregiver - it constitutes "credible information" and satisfies the requirement of "knowledge" under the Act. [Paras 45 - 59] AAA v. Linda Sema, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 659 : 2026 INSC 675

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Sections 19 & 21 — Scope of Institutional Enquiry Prior to Reporting — Mandate of Prompt Reporting - Held: The POCSO Act does not contemplate or permit any parallel institutional investigation or verification exercise by school authorities to determine the veracity of a child's complaint before reporting the matter to the police - Any such independent sifting of facts or questioning with an aim to discard a complaint defeats the statutory objective. Investigation must strictly follow the reporting of the incident, not precede it, as delays or unauthorized physical verifications can cause crucial biological and circumstantial evidence to disappear. Prompt reporting is a sine qua non for the effective implementation of the Act. [Paras 45, 46-56] AAA v. Linda Sema, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 659 : 2026 INSC 675

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Sections 19 & 21(3) — Liability of Co-Accused and Minor Intermediaries — Direct vs. Indirect Information - Held: Criminal liability for the failure to report under Section 21 is confined to those individuals who received the credible information directly from the victim - Other teachers, staff members, or office-bearers who did not receive a direct complaint and acted on a cautionary approach based on the primary authority's assessment cannot be automatically prosecuted for a criminal conspiracy to suppress information or for causing disappearance of evidence under Section 201 IPC in the absence of cogent material - furthermore, by virtue of Section 21(3), minor intermediaries (such as the victim's sister, friend, or the school Head Girl), being "children" under the Act, are expressly exempted from criminal liability for non-reporting. [Paras 60, 61, 63, 64] AAA v. Linda Sema, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 659 : 2026 INSC 675

Public Employment & Labour Law — Regularisation Of Service — Binding Nature Of Larger Bench Decisions - Claims of regularisation in public service cannot be entertained when the initial appointment is rooted in fundamental breaches of recruitment procedures or made against non-existent/un-sanctioned posts - Under Article 141 of the Constitution, the principle of stare decisis dictates that the strict ratios laid down by Larger Benches regarding public employment regularisation bind all courts unequivocally - Co-equal or smaller benches adopting liberal views confined to specific facts cannot dilute or contradict these established Larger Bench precedents. [Relied on State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1; Official Liquidator v. Dayanand, (2008) 10 SCC 1; Distinguished: Jaggo v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826; Sukhendu Bhattacharjee v. State of Assam, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 909; Paras 24 - 31] Najma Khatun v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 667 : 2026 INSC 691

Railways Act, 1989 – Section 65(2) Proviso, Section 93, and Section 97 – Shortage of Consignment – Goods carried at Owner's Risk Rate – "Said to contain" Remark – Burden of Proof and Liability for Negligence – Exclusion of General Liability - Interpretation of Non-Obstante Clause in Section 97 - The Supreme Court held that the non-obstante clause contained in Section 97 of the Railways Act, 1989, explicitly overrides and excludes the general obligations cast on the Railway Administration under Section 93 of the Act - Where goods are booked under the "owner's risk" category, the Railway Administration cannot be held responsible for any loss, destruction, damage, deterioration, or non-delivery in transit unless there is clear proof that the same was due to negligence or misconduct on its part or on the part of its servants - Burden of Proof under Section 65(2) Proviso: In cases where a consignment is loaded in a wagon-load or train-load directly by the consignor's employees without supervision or checking by an authorized railway servant, and a "said to contain" remark is endorsed on the Railway Receipt, the statutory burden of proving the actual weight or number of packages dispatched lies squarely on the consignor, consignee, or endorsee - Duty of Care and Negligence: For establishing negligence on the part of the Railway Authorities under Section 97, a pre-existing duty of care must be established - If the Railways were never actively involved in the noting, counting, or weighing of the goods at the booking stage, they cannot be held negligent for an alleged shortage at the destination point unless the initial quantity loaded is conclusively proved by the claimant - Dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court observed that the appellant failed to discharge the statutory burden of proof under the proviso to Section 65(2) to substantiate the initial number of bags loaded. [Relied on Mohd. Abdul Samad v. State of Telangana, (2025) 2 SCC 49; A.G. Varadarajulu v. State of T.N., (1998) 4 SCC 231; Rajkot Municipal Corpn. v. Manjulben Jayantilal Nakum, (1997) 9 SCC 552; Poonam Verma v. Ashwin Patel, (1996) 4 SCC 332; Jay Laxmi Salt Works (P) Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, (1994) 4 SCC 1; Paras 8-15] Bajaj Trading Company v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 685 : 2026 INSC 711

Railways Act, 1989 – Sections 123(c)(2) and 124A – Claims for Compensation – Untoward Incident – Bona Fide Passenger – Absence of Journey Ticket – The Supreme Court set aside the concurrent findings of the Railway Claims Tribunal and the High Court which had rejected a compensation claim on the grounds that the deceased's ticket was not recovered and his bona fides as a passenger were not established – Held, Section 124A provides for "no-fault liability" and carries a beneficial statutory intent - It must receive a purposive and liberal interpretation rather than a restrictive, literal approach - The standard of proof governing such claims is the preponderance of probabilities, not proof beyond reasonable doubt - Technical approaches or procedural lapses should not defeat the humanitarian and welfare objective of the statute. Lata v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 689 : 2026 INSC 715

Railways Act, 1989 – Status of Passenger when Ticket is Missing – Quantum of Compensation - Reaffirming established precedent, the Supreme Court held that the mere absence of a ticket on the person or body of an injured or deceased passenger is not conclusive proof to negative a claim or classify them as a ticketless traveller - The initial burden on the claimant can be effectively discharged by filing an affidavit of relevant facts, after which the burden shifts to the Railways to disprove the claim based on the attending circumstances - In the present case, since the claimant filed an undisputed affidavit detailing that the deceased purchased a ticket which was subsequently misplaced along with his untraceable luggage during the accident, the initial burden stood discharged - In terms of Schedule I to the Railway Accidents and Untoward Incidents (Compensation) Rules, 1990 (as amended), the compensation for death was awarded at ₹8,00,000/- with a direction to pay within four weeks, failing which it shall carry an interest rate of 8% per annum from the date of filing the claim petition. [Relied on Union of India v. Rina Devi, (2019) 3 SCC 572; Paras 9-21] Lata v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 689 : 2026 INSC 715

Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (MRTP Act) (Maharashtra) — Development Control Regulations — Refund of Premium for Unutilized FSI - Where an applicant pays premium for additional FSI for a proposed residential group housing construction but subsequently abandons the project and converts the development plan to plotting without utilizing the extra FSI, the State cannot retain the premium on the pretext of a lack of express provision in the regulations - Differentiating between unutilized additional FSI for commercial/institutional projects and residential projects for the purpose of granting a refund lacks rationale and logic - In fact, premium for residential housing impacts end homebuyers directly and stands on a higher or equal footing. [Paras 11-20] Prasad Pandurang Tapkir v. Assistant Director of Town Planning, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 731 : 2026 INSC 683

Rent Control Act, 1958 (Delhi) – Distinction from the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1980: An essential distinction exists between Section 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 and Section 9 of the Acquisition Act, 1980. Under the latter, a scheme becomes effective only after being placed before Parliament and undergoing potential modifications, making it legislative in character - a scheme under Section 45 of the Banking Regulation Act is merely placed before Parliament and remains administrative - judicial precedents governing legislative bank mergers do not apply to schemes under Section 45 of the Banking Regulation Act - Held: The components of Section 14(1)(b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 stood fully satisfied as the original tenant parted with possession and ceased to exist, and PNB occupied the premises without the written consent of the landlord - The judgment of the High Court setting aside the eviction decree was set aside, and the eviction decree passed by the Additional Rent Control Tribunal was restored. [Relied on Parasram Harnand Rao v. Shanti Parsad Narinder Kumar Jain, (1980) 3 SCC 56; Singer India Ltd. v. Chander Mohan Chadha, (2004) 7 SCC 1; Bhairon Sahai v. Bishamber Dayal, (2017) 8 SCC 492; Paras 13 - 21] British Motor Car Company v. Hindustan Commercial Bank, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 660 : 2026 INSC 671

Rent Control Act, 1958 (Delhi) – Section 14(1)(b) – Protection of tenant against eviction – Sub-letting, assignment, or parting with possession without written consent of the landlord – Statutory Amalgamation of Banks – Banking Regulation Act, 1949 – Section 45 – i. Factum of Parting with Possession via Amalgamation: The appellant-landlord leased premises to Hindustan Commercial Bank (HCB) - a Gazette Notification issued under Section 45(7) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, HCB was amalgamated with the Punjab National Bank (PNB), whereby the original tenant (HCB) ceased to exist and all its rights, liabilities, and assets including the tenancy rights vested in PNB without the written consent of the landlord; ii. Irrelevance of Voluntary vs. Involuntary Transfer: Section 14(1)(b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 is of wide amplitude and encompasses every mode by which possession or tenancy rights are transferred from the original tenant to another entity - The provision does not draw any distinction between voluntary and involuntary transfers, nor does it carve out an exception for transfers executed pursuant to a scheme of amalgamation or to secure compliance with law - The reasons necessitating such a transfer are wholly immaterial; iv. Nature of Amalgamation Scheme under the Banking Regulation Act: The scheme-making process under Section 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 is strictly administrative in nature and not legislative - Merely because a scheme framed by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) is sanctioned by the Central Government and placed before both Houses of Parliament does not elevate it to a statutory enactment capable of overriding the non-obstante provisions of Section 14(1)(b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. [Paras 11-18] British Motor Car Company v. Hindustan Commercial Bank, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 660 : 2026 INSC 671

Representation of the People Act, 1951 — Section 100(1)(d)(iii) — Finality of Electoral Rolls vs. Constitutional Invalidity — Material Effect Test — Secrecy of Ballot - Held: The principle of finality of electoral rolls is meant to ensure electoral stability, but it cannot override the Constitution or validate the participation of constitutionally ineligible persons whose inclusion is void ab initio - Where the margin of victory is narrow (6 votes) and the number of unconstitutional votes cast by nominated members is double the margin (12 votes), the requirement of the election being "materially affected" under Section 100(1)(d)(iii) stands fully established - the principle of secrecy of the ballot is not absolute and cannot be invoked to perpetuate a constitutional illegality - The segregation of invalid votes using ballot papers, counterfoils, and marked copies of the electoral roll by the Returning Officer is legally permissible to preserve the purity of the electoral process. [Paras 40-46] Pranesh M.K. v. A.V. Gayathri, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 686 : 2026 INSC 716

SEBI (Mutual Funds) Regulations, 1996 — "Risk Disclaimer" and "Due Diligence Advisory" as Shields - Investors who choose to invest in mutual funds do so at their own risk and peril under the statutory disclaimer - Committing a regulatory breach to allegedly avert a market loss for investors is not a valid justification for departing from the mandatory regulatory mandate, nor does it absolve the asset management company (AMC) or trustees of liability - The Trustee Company (holding unitholders' funds in a fiduciary capacity) and its Senior Executives/Directors are bound to independently assess and ensure that the course of action adopted by the Asset Management Company (AMC) is in strict adherence to the extant regulations and in the interest of unitholders - They cannot merely "beeline" or concur with the AMC's unauthorized commercial decisions - SEBI levied monetary penalties on the AMC, the Trustee Company, and its senior executives for lack of due diligence, unauthorized extension of maturity dates, and failure to make timely disclosures to SEBI and unitholders - The Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) upheld the penalties while setting aside the AMC's fee disgorgement - The Supreme Court dismissed the civil appeals, upholding the findings of regulatory infractions, and imposed exemplary costs on the AMC and Trustee Company. [Relied on Chairman, SEBI v. Shriram Mutual Fund, (2006) 5 SCC 361; Para 34, 40-42, 52-55] Nilesh Shah v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 662 : 2026 INSC 681

SEBI (Mutual Funds) Regulations, 1996 — Collective Wrong No Defense (Negative Equality)- A market participant cannot seek shelter under the alleged regulatory violations of other participants to justify its own breach, nor does the existence of other violations elsewhere absolve a party of its own liability - Negative equality is not a recognized principle in law; a collective wrong remains illegal, regardless of numbers. [Para 28] Nilesh Shah v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 662 : 2026 INSC 681

SEBI (Mutual Funds) Regulations, 1996 — Regulations 25(16), 33(4), 39(1), and Fifth Schedule — Mutual Funds — Close-ended Schemes — Mandatory winding up on maturity — Lack of due diligence in investments — Extension of maturity dates of underlying debt securities beyond the scheme maturity date to avoid immediate defaults — Regulatory compliance vs. Commercial gains - Key Legal Propositions & Reliances – i. Statutory Compliance is Consequence-Neutral - The statutory and regulatory framework designed by SEBI is consequence-neutral - The regulatory regime is strictly established to enforce compliance, irrespective of whether the deviation or breach eventually results in a commercial gain or loss to the investors - The commercial wisdom behind a conscious breach of the regulatory framework, even if done bona fide to protect investors or resulting fortuitously in gains, is beyond the pale of appellate scrutiny under Section 15Z of the SEBI Act, 1992; ii. Imposition of Penalty on Contravention - Penalty is attracted the moment a contravention of a statutory obligation under the SEBI Act or the Regulations is established - The intention (mens rea) of the defaulting parties is wholly irrelevant unless the language of the statute explicitly indicates otherwise. [Relied on Chairman, SEBI v. Shriram Mutual Fund, (2006) 5 SCC 361Paragraph 25-35] Nilesh Shah v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 662 : 2026 INSC 681

SEBI (Mutual Funds) Regulations, 1996 — Winding up and Redemption of Close-Ended Schemes - Under Regulation 33(4) read with Regulation 39(1) of the 1996 Regulations, a close-ended scheme must be fully redeemed and wound up at the end of its maturity period - The only legal exception is a "roll-over" of the scheme, which strictly requires prior disclosure of all material details to the unitholders, filing with the Board, and obtaining the express written consent of the unitholders - Any unilateral extension of underlying debt assets (such as ZCNCDs) beyond the maturity of the close-ended schemes without a statutory roll-over constitutes a brazen and indefensible breach of the regulations. [Paras 23 - 33] Nilesh Shah v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 662 : 2026 INSC 681

Service Jurisprudence – Principle of 'No Work, No Pay' – Inapplicability when non-employment is created by the Employer – Held that where an employee is illegally ousted or denied alternative employment mandated by a social welfare statute, the employer cannot take shelter behind the principle of 'no work, no pay' - The situation of non-employment being entirely the creation of the appellants, the respondent is entitled to full restitution, back wages, interest, and costs. [Relied on Kunal Singh v. Union of India & Anr. (2003) 4 SCC 524; Bhagwan Dass v. Punjab State Electricity Board (2008) 1 SCC 57; Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India (2023) 2 SCC 209; Federation of Indian Mineral Industries v. Union of India (2017) 16 SCC 186; Distinguished: Union of India v. Dileep Kumar Singh (2015) 4 SCC 421; Para 79-81] Union of India v. Bali Ram No. 850808321, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 668 : 2026 INSC 689

Service Jurisprudence & Judicial Appointments – Doctrine of Estoppel – Challenge to Recruitment Rules by Unsuccessful Candidate - Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010 – Rule 41 (as amended in 2011) – A candidate who willingly participates in a recruitment process with full knowledge of the prevailing rules, takes a calculated chance, and appears for the viva-voce examination cannot turn around and challenge the validity of the recruitment criteria or qualifying benchmarks upon being declared unsuccessful - The doctrine of estoppel operates fully against such a candidate who attempts to approbate and reprobate. [Relied on Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla and Ors., (1986) Supp SCC 285; Madan Lal and Others v. State of J & K and Ors., (1995) 3 SCC 486; Dhananjay Malik and Others v. State of Uttaranchal and Ors., (2008) 4 SCC 171; Paras 20-30] Manoj Goyal V. Rajasthan High Court, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 695 : 2026 INSC 699

Service Law – Ad Hoc Promotion – Seniority – Consultation with Public Service Commission – Directory Nature of Statutory Consultation - Uttaranchal Civil Services (Executive Branch) Rules, 2005 – Rule 24(1), Rule 24(4) Proviso – Uttaranchal Public Service Commission (Limitations of Functions) Regulations, 2003 – Regulation 5(a) – Ad hoc promotion – Counting of continuous ad hoc service within quota for computing seniority – Requirement to consult Public Service Commission for extension of ad hoc service beyond one year under Regulation 5(a) is directory and not mandatory – Held – i. Non-consultation with PSC does not invalidate appointment: Non-consultation with the Public Service Commission does not invalidate an ad hoc promotion or render the service non-est, especially when the default is attributable solely to the State's inaction over a period of time – ii. No fault of employee: Appointees have no control over the State's failure to refer ad hoc promotions to the Public Service Commission; the State cannot be permitted to take advantage of its own wrong/default to deprive promotees of their statutory rights – iii. Entitlement to Seniority: Where promotees were appointed on an officiating/ad hoc basis within their prescribed quota through a duly constituted DPC and continued uninterruptedly till regularisation, they are entitled to the benefit of the Proviso to Rule 24(4) to count their entire continuous officiating service towards inter-se seniority - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the promotee officers and held that 19 vacancies were available in the promotee quota for the recruitment year 2007–2008, establishing that the promotees were promoted within their prescribed quota – The Supreme Court held that the requirement under Regulation 5(a) of the 2003 Regulations to consult the Public Service Commission for continuing ad hoc appointments beyond one year is directory in nature - the failure of the State to seek consultation cannot disentitle the promotee officers to the benefit of the proviso to Rule 24(4) of the 2005 Rules - The promotee Deputy Collectors are entitled to the benefit of regular appointment with effect from 01.10.2007 (the date of initial ad hoc promotion) and to count their continuous officiating service for seniority. [Relied on Biswanath Khemka v. The King Emperor, 1945 SCC OnLine FC 7; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, (1957) 2 SCC 759; Suraj Parkash Gupta & Ors. v. State of J&K & Ors., (2000) 7 SCC 561; Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers' Association v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (1990) 2 SCC 715; P. Rammohan Rao v. K. Srinivas & Ors., (2025) 4 SCC 127; Paras 28–38] State of Uttarakhand v. Jagdish Chandra Kandpal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 739 : 2026 INSC 759

Service Law — Back Wages and Arrears on Re-Fixation of Scale - Where the original judgment quashing the discharge order directed reinstatement with all consequential benefits but restricted back wages to 50%, the financial arrears resulting from the retroactive grant of Selection Scale and Super Time Scale must also be computed by giving effect to the 50% back wages limitation for the period the officer remained out of service. [Relied on Union of India v. K.V. Jankiraman, (1991) 4 SCC 109; Central Bank of India v. Dragendra Singh Jadon, (2022) 8 SCC 378; R.K. Jibanlata Devi v. High Court of Manipur, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 178; Sukhdev Singh v. Union of India, (2013) 9 SCC 566; Para 40-43] High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. Abhay Jain, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 733 : 2026 INSC 762

Service Law – Equity and Fairness – Absence of Fraud or Wrongdoing by Employees – The Supreme Court highlighted that where no allegation of fraud, misrepresentation, or mala fides is leveled against the employees, and they merely participated in a regular recruitment process on merit, it would be wholly inequitable to penalize them for any alleged irregularities attributable solely to the appointing authority - Depriving employees of their livelihood after years of service and formal confirmation, in the absence of any wrongdoing on their part, lacks justification. [Paras 30-33] Debashish Mohapatra v. District and Session Judge, Jagatsinghpur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 721 : 2026 INSC 743

Service Law — Grant of Selection Scale / Super Time Scale — Consequential Benefits on Reinstatement — Non-Availability of ACRs Due to Illegal Discharge — Effect of Employer's Own Wrong - Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010 — Rules 49 and 50 — Grant of Selection Scale and Super Time Scale to District Judges — Absence of Requisite ACRs - Employer Cannot Take Advantage of Its Own Wrong - When an employee/judicial officer is wrongfully discharged/dismissed from service and subsequently reinstated with all consequential benefits including continuity of service and seniority, the employer cannot deny career progression benefits (such as Selection Scale or Super Time Scale) merely on the ground of non-availability of the requisite number of Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) for the period during which the officer was unlawfully kept out of service - Assessment on Available Valid ACRs - In circumstances where ACRs are short of the required number due to no fault of the employee, or where certain ACRs are uncommunicated/invalid, the employee's entitlement to promotion or higher pay scale must be assessed afresh on the basis of the remaining available valid ACRs, rather than rejecting their claim altogether - Uncommunicated ACRs (such as the ACR for the year 2015 recorded after the discharge order) cannot be relied upon to the detriment of the judicial officer while determining their entitlement to pay scales or career advancement. [Paras 30- 41] High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. Abhay Jain, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 733 : 2026 INSC 762

Service Law — Modified Assured Career Progression Scheme (MACPS) — Counts of Same Grade Pay Promotions — Railway Guard Cadre Structure - Modified Assured Career Progression Scheme (MACPS), Paragraphs 2, 5, and 8 — Railway Board Circulars (RBE No. 76/2011 and RBE No. 142/2012) — Entitlement to 2nd and 3rd financial upgradations to Grade Pay Rs. 4600 and Rs. 4800 — Counter-claim based on structural convergence of Grade Pay post-6th Central Pay Commission (CPC) - Key Rulings & Interpretations – i. Applicability of Paragraph 8 to the Guard Cadre - The Supreme Court held that Paragraph 8 of the MACPS strictly applies to the Railway Guard cadre - The movements across the distinct posts of Senior Goods Guard, Passenger Guard, Senior Passenger Guard, and Mail/Express Guard within the cadre constitute functional "promotions" under the relevant Recruitment Rules and Avenue Chart, despite carrying the identical compressed Grade Pay of Rs. 4200 in Pay Band PB-2 post the 6th CPC recommendations - A promotion does not cease to be a promotion merely because the employee's Grade Pay remains constant – ii. Exhaustion of MACPS Slots - An employee who has traversed the promotional hierarchy up to the terminal post of Mail/Express Guard is deemed to have earned three functional promotions (with the movement from Passenger Guard to Senior Passenger Guard ignored under Paragraph 5 due to direct merger of scales) - such an employee has exhausted all three financial upgradation slots available under the MACPS and cannot claim further financial upgradation to Grade Pay Rs. 4600 or Rs. 4800; iii. Financial Reality vs. Stagnation - The Supreme Court observed that promotions within the Guard cadre are not financially neutral - Each advancement involves a formal selection process, pay fixation, promotional increments, and an upward revision of basic pay that significantly enhances running-duty allowances and post-specific additional allowances - employees reaching the terminal post cannot be characterized as suffering from the "financial stagnation" the MACPS was designed to remedy; iv. Scope of Paragraph 5 (Transitional Adjustments) - The illustration appended to Paragraph 5 is a transitional provision regulating the treatment of pre-MACPS ACP-era promotions/upgradations up to 01.09.2008 - It does not override Paragraph 8 for the post-01.09.2008 MACPS operational period, nor does it mandate the total exclusion of structural promotional rungs when calculating future stagnation benefits; v. Binding Nature of Executive Clarifications - Departmental and executive clarifications issued by the Railway Board in consultation with the Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT), such as RBE No. 76/2011 and RBE No. 142/2012, are integral to the Scheme and binding on authorities. Financial upgradation under the MACPS cannot exceed the maximum Grade Pay ceiling attached to the highest promotional post in the respective hierarchy; vi. Precedential Value of Dismissals in Limine - A non-speaking dismissal of a Special Leave Petition (SLP), or an order keeping the question of law open, does not constitute a declaration of law under Article 141 of the Constitution of India and does not invoke the doctrine of merger. [Relied on Union of India and Others v. M.V. Mohanan Nair (2020) 5 SCC 421; Kunhayammed and Others v. State of Kerala and Another (2000) 6 SCC 359; Paras 36-65] Union of India v. Harbans Lal Verma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 712 : 2026 INSC 739

Service Law – Orissa District and Subordinate Courts' Non-Judicial Staff Services (Method of Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2008 – Provision (5) of Appendix-A – Appointment Against Anticipated Vacancies - The Supreme Court observed that under Provision (5) of Appendix-A appended to the 2008 Rules, the District Judge is explicitly empowered to make appointments from the merit list not only against "existing vacancies" but also against "vacancies that have occurred or may occur" within a period of one year from the date of the first appointment - This provision enables the District Judiciary to fill anticipated vacancies promptly for administrative efficiency and continuity without undertaking a fresh recruitment process each time - Where the candidates were selected through a regular recruitment process, continuously discharged their duties against sanctioned posts, and were subsequently confirmed in service, the authorities cannot subsequently argue that the appointments were void ab initio or outside the sanctioned cadre. [Paras 25 - 29] Debashish Mohapatra v. District and Session Judge, Jagatsinghpur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 721 : 2026 INSC 743

Service Law – Promotion – Selection Criteria and Assessment Process – Role of Expert Committees – CSIR Scientists Recruitment & Promotion Rules, 2001 (as amended by Circular dated 01.06.2011) - Interpretation of Rules — Averaging of Marks - The respondent challenged his non-selection for promotion to the post of Senior Scientist - The Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) and the High Court allowed the claim by interpreting Paragraph 3(b) of the CSIR Circular dated 01.06.2011 to mean that the final suitability score must be calculated by taking the mean/average of the marks obtained in the Annual Performance Reports/Performance Mapping Scheme (APRs/PMS) and the marks awarded on the 'Work Report' - Held: Setting aside the concurrent findings of the CAT and the High Court, the Supreme Court ruled that such an interpretation amounts to adding words to a statutory provision, which is impermissible in law unless there is an accidental omission or an absolute deprivation of meaning - Paragraph 3(b) of CSIR Circular merely mandates that the assessment must be based on both the APR/PMS and the Work Report of the residency period, but it does not prescribe any method of averaging the two scores - In the absence of specific statutory provisions or mathematical instructions governing the division of marks, the method and degree of weight given to the 'Work Report' versus the 'APR/PMS' fall exclusively within the functional domain of the Assessment Committee, which comprises domain experts - The Supreme Court emphasized that for a scientist, the complexity of research captured in the 'Work Report' is of paramount importance, and expert panels must be granted requisite latitude to evaluate suitability objectively without judicial interference, provided there are no allegations of mala fides. [Relied on Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India, (1991) 2 SCC 87; Hameedia Hardware Stores v. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar, (1988) 2 SCC 513; Paras 24-34] Director General, Council of Scientific and Industrial Research v. Anil Earnest, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 661 : 2026 INSC 677

Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 23 – Specific performance of contract – Bar founded on earnest money clause – Absence of express clause enabling enforcement through court does not bar specific performance - The High Court declined a decree for specific performance on the ground that the Agreement to Sell lacked an express clause enabling the purchaser to enforce it through court, stipulating instead that the vendor would refund the earnest money if the sale deed could not be executed - Held: Such a construction is unsustainable - Section 23 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides that a contract otherwise proper to be specifically enforced may be so enforced notwithstanding that a sum is named in it as payable in the event of breach, unless the sum was named only to give the defaulting party an option of paying money in lieu of performance - A party in breach cannot resist specific performance merely because the agreement lacks an express stipulation for that relief - The stipulation for a refund operates as a deterrent reinforcing the obligation to perform, not as a substitute for it. [Relied On M.L. Devender Singh & Ors. v. Syed Khaja, (1973) 2 SCC 515; Paras 16 – 21] Jaspal Singh v. Ashwani Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 682 : 2026 INSC 700

Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 26 – Non-participation of original transferor – A rectification deed executed unilaterally by a subsequent vendor without the participation or consent of the original executant/transferor is legally incompetent to alter the subject matter of the original conveyance or divest the rights flowing from subsequent grants/partitions - Transferees deriving title under an instrument cannot lawfully alter the subject matter of a conveyance executed by another person without the predecessor's concurrence. [Paras 26-35] Venkatesha v. K.M. Venkatamuniyappa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 679 : 2026 INSC 705

Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 26 – Rectification of Instruments – Scope and Competence of Rectification Deed – A rectification deed cannot, in the guise of correcting an error, substitute the very subject matter of a prior conveyance or alter the essential transaction itself – Held, Section 26 embodies a limited equitable jurisdiction to rectify the expression of a concluded bargain inaccurately reflected due to fraud or mutual mistake; it does not substitute one bargain for another. [Paras 30, 31] Venkatesha v. K.M. Venkatamuniyappa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 679 : 2026 INSC 705

Stamp Act, 1899 – Section 26 – Proviso – Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 – Sections 9 & 9A – Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 – Rule 31 – Form K – Mining Lease – Computation of Stamp Duty – Determinant factor – Dead Rent vs. Anticipated Royalty – Value of subject matter indeterminate at execution – Stamp duty on a mining lease is to be computed on the basis of "anticipated royalty" and not merely "dead rent" where the statutory lease deed (Form K) explicitly specifies anticipated royalty as the yardstick - Distinction between 'Dead Rent' and 'Royalty' in Mining Leases - The Supreme Court elucidated the clear distinction between "dead rent" and "royalty" - Dead rent is the minimal guaranteed amount payable to the lessor based on the leased area, irrespective of whether the mine is worked or not - royalty is a variable return directly proportionate to the actual quantity of minerals extracted or removed from the mine - Looked at from one perspective, dead rent serves as the minimum guaranteed amount of royalty payable. [Relied on D.K. Trivedi & Sons v. State of Gujarat, 1986 Supp SCC 20; Mineral Area Development Authority v. SAIL, (2024) 10 SCC 1; H.R.S. Murthy v. Collector of Chittoor, AIR 1965 SC 177; Paras 6-10] Birla Corporation Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 717 : 2026 INSC 738

Succession Act, 1925 – Section 63 – Effect of Factual Recitals and Illiteracy - Registration Act, 1908 – Sections 34, 35, 58 and 60 – Uninitialed Cuttings in Registration Endorsement - Where an illiterate testator executes a Will by thumb-mark, the presence of material recitals found to be factually incorrect (such as wrong descriptions of relationship and false claims of cohabitation/maintenance) raises a serious doubt as to whether the testator was aware of the contents or understood the disposition - Although the registration of a Will is optional, uninitialled cuttings/alterations at the back page of the Will where the Sub-Registrar records the endorsement (such as striking off the original presenter's name and replacing it with the testator's name) destroy the presumption of validity arising from registration - Such defects deprive the propounder of the benefit of proving that the text was duly read over and admitted by the testator before the registering officer. Sardari Lal v. Bishan Dass, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 655 : 2026 INSC 669

Succession Act, 1925 – Section 63 – Execution of Wills – suspicious circumstances – Illiterate Testator and Unnatural Disposition - The burden to prove a Will lies heavily on its propounder - The exercise is not confined merely to proving the signature and attestation under Section 63 of the Act, but extends to satisfying the judicial conscience of the Court that the testator executed the Will with free will, fully understanding the nature and effect of the disposition - Disinheriting a caring wife (the sole Class I heir) in favour of a non-relative is an unnatural disposition that raises a legitimate suspicion, requiring a cogent explanation from the propounder. Sardari Lal v. Bishan Dass, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 655 : 2026 INSC 669

Succession Act, 1925 — Sections 59 & 63 — Indian Evidence Act, 1872 — Sections 45, 47, 67 & 68 — Proof of Genuineness of Will — Duties of Appellate Court - Adjudication on the validity and genuineness of a Will requires specific statutory compliances, including proving the signature of the testator, evaluating the testimony of at least one attesting witness, and establishing that the testator was of sound mind, understood the nature/effect of the dispositions, and signed out of free volition - An Appellate Court tasked with determining the validity of a Will cannot overturn the Trial Court's findings without discussing these statutory aspects on the touchstone of evidence led by the parties. [Para 11] Lakshmi v. Gopi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 681 : 2026 INSC 709

Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997 - Sections 11(1)(b), 13, 14, 29 & 34 – Nature of TRAI's Power – Enforcement of Statutory Regulations vs. Adjudication of Disputes - A statutory direction issued by the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) to a Multi-System Operator (MSO) to ensure compliance with the Telecommunication (Broadcasting & Cable Services) Interconnection Regulations is a regulatory and administrative action, not an "adjudication" of a dispute - Adjudication involves a true judicial determination presupposing a lis or controversy, resulting in a binding declaration of rights - Merely calling upon an entity to follow statutory safeguards (such as the procedure for disconnecting signals under the Interconnection Regulations) does not decide an underlying commercial dispute, award damages, or mould reliefs - such directions or preparatory show-cause notices do not trespass upon the exclusive adjudicatory jurisdiction vested in the Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT) under Section 14 of the Act. [Paras 14 - 18] Telecom Regulatory Authority of India v. Polimer Cable Network, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 718 : 2026 INSC 742

Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997 - Sections 29, 34 & Chapter IV – Regulatory Enforcement Mechanism – Limitations on TRAI - While TRAI is empowered to issue directions to secure compliance with subsisting regulations and can record a prima facie finding of non-compliance for the limited purpose of enforcement, it cannot act as a judge in its own cause - Upon non-compliance, TRAI's role is strictly confined to that of a complainant under Section 34 before a competent criminal court (not below a Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or a Chief Judicial Magistrate of the First Class) - TRAI cannot itself adjudge the guilt, levy, or recover the fine stipulated under Section 29 - Final and binding adjudication of inter se contractual rights, counterclaims, and damages remains the exclusive province of the TDSAT. [Paras 17 - 19] Telecom Regulatory Authority of India v. Polimer Cable Network, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 718 : 2026 INSC 742

Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997 - Sections 36(1) & 36(2) – Scope of Regulation-Making Power - The power vested in TRAI under Section 36(1) to make regulations to carry out the purposes of the Act is wide, pervasive, and general - It is subject only to the provisions of the TRAI Act and the rules framed under Section 35, and it is neither controlled nor restricted by the specific illustrative topics listed in Section 36(2) or by Sections 11, 12, and 13. [Relied on Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited v. Telecom Regulatory Authority of India & Ors., (2014) 3 SCC 222; Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of Bharat Bank, AIR 1950 SC 188; Indian National Congress (I) v. Institute of Social Welfare, (2002) 5 SCC 685; S. Sundaram Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman, (1985) 1 SCC 591; Paras 15 - 19] Telecom Regulatory Authority of India v. Polimer Cable Network, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 718 : 2026 INSC 742

Transfer of Property – Agreement to Sell – Undivided share of a co-owner – Validity of transaction - The High Court treated the fact that the subject matter of the Agreement was an undivided half share in a jointly owned property (where the vendor's brother was not a signatory) as a suspicious circumstance casting doubt on the genuineness of the transaction – Held that a co-owner's undivided share in immovable property is a valid and marketable subject matter of transfer - An Agreement to Sell such a share cannot be viewed with suspicion merely because the vendor's co-sharer brother was not a signatory - A transfer of an undivided share is a legally recognized and enforceable transaction in its own right; the only consequence is that the transferee's remedy for actual enjoyment lies in a suit for partition - This consequence bears upon the mode of enjoyment following the decree and has no bearing whatsoever on the genuineness or enforceability of the underlying Agreement to Sell. [Relied On Sidheshwar Mukherjee v. Bhubneshwar Prasad Narain Singh & Ors., AIR 1953 SC 487; M.V.S. Manikayala Rao v. M. Narasimhaswami & Ors., AIR 1966 SC 470; Ramdas v. Sitabai & Ors., (2009) 7 SCC 444; Para 25-29] Jaspal Singh v. Ashwani Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 682 : 2026 INSC 700

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Section 43 – Doctrine of Feeding the Grant by Estoppel – Inam Lands – Applicability – The doctrine of feeding the grant by estoppel or principles relating to the re-grant of Inam lands enuring to the benefit of an earlier alienee can only be invoked when it is established as a foundational fact that the property subject to the earlier transfer and the property subsequently re-granted are one and the same - When the identity of the suit property itself is left in doubt, the legal consequences flowing from Section 43 of the ToP Act do not arise for consideration. [Distinguished N. Venkateshappa v. Munemma, (2016) 4 SCC 147; Para 29] Venkatesha v. K.M. Venkatamuniyappa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 679 : 2026 INSC 705