Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Supreme Court Half Yearly Digest Jan - Jun, 2026

Civil Procedure & Precedents – Finality of Civil Court Decrees – Scope of Appellate Review - The Division Bench of the High Court was not justified in rendering observations to virtually unsettle a permanent injunction decree passed by a Civil Court way back in 1988, which had already attained finality after the Municipal Corporation's subsequent appeals were dismissed - The scope of adjudication before the Division Bench should have been strictly confined to the direction given by the learned Single Judge namely, to consider the prayer for incorporation of the plot in the layout plan and nothing beyond that. [Paras 24-34] Pawan Garg v. South Delhi Municipal Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 397 : 2026 INSC 389

Civil Suit - A plaintiff seeking declaration of title and injunction must succeed on the strength of their own case and cannot derive any benefit from the alleged weakness of the defendant's title. Hari Shankar Jain v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 313

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Interconnected Proceedings – Independent Remedies – Multiple proceedings pending including a parent writ petition, an intra-court appeal (LPA), and a civil revision (CR) – Held: Overlap between proceedings is not the same as identity - Unless there is a statutory interdict, maintainable remedies should not be rendered dormant for an indefinite period awaiting the outcome of a broader challenge - Directed the High Court to decide the LPA and CR together on their own merits, independently of the parent writ petition. [Relied on Mumbai International Airport Private Limited v. Regency Convention Centre and Hotels Private Limited (2010) 7 SCC 417; Paras 7-15] Chopra Hotels v. Harbinder Singh Sekhon, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 352 : 2026 INSC 335

Civil Procedure – Practice and Procedure – Deficiency in Pleadings raised in Appeal - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Pleadings – Deficiency raised for the first time in appeal – Where the pleadings in substance contain the necessary averments, and the parties went to trial fully conscious of the case and the issues, leading evidence thereon, it is not open to a party to raise the question of deficiency or absence of specific pleadings in appeal. [Para 41] Marietta D' Silva v. Rudolf Clothan Lacerda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 503 : 2026 INSC 496

Civil Procedure – Practice and Procedure – Taking Cognizance of Subsequent Events - Subsequent developments – Power of the Court to take note of subsequent events – While relief is ordinarily judged based on the date of institution of the suit, the Court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognizance of subsequent events and developments to ensure the remedy matches current realities, provided rules of fairness are scrupulously observed. [Para 47] Marietta D' Silva v. Rudolf Clothan Lacerda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 503 : 2026 INSC 496

Civil Suit for Declaration of Title and Possession — Burden of Proof — Management vs. Ownership — Shifts of Burden — In a suit for declaration of title and restoration of possession, the burden of proof lies squarely upon the plaintiff to establish a clear and cogent title to the suit property on the strength of their own case, and not on the weakness of the defense - The mere fact that a society exercises certain supervisory or managerial functions over a temple, participates in the appointment of pujaris (priests/caretakers), or maintains periodic control over temple articles does not ipso facto confer proprietary title or ownership of immovable property upon it - The distinction between the management of a religious institution and the ownership of its properties is well-recognized in law, and the two cannot be conflated - Even if the defendant fails to conclusively establish their claim of independent title or hereditary succession, such an infirmity does not enure to the benefit of the plaintiff - The plaintiff must independently discharge the burden under Sections 101, 102, and 110 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 by producing legally admissible documents of title, deeds of dedication, or endowments evidencing ownership - Courts below cannot misdirect themselves in law by shifting the focus from the requirement of proof of title onto the weaknesses of the defense. [Relied on Union of India v. Vasavi Co-op. Housing Society Ltd., (2014) 2 SCC 269; Paras 12 - 19] Kishan Chand v. Gautam Gaur Hitkarak Sabha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 463 : 2026 INSC 448

Section 2 - Definitions.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) – Section 2(2), Order XX Rule 18 – Partition Suit – Executability of Decree – Execution of Preliminary Decree without drawing a formal Final Decree – Distinction between Preliminary and Final Decree - The Supreme Court observed that the fundamental error in the High Court's appreciation was that it proceeded solely on the nomenclature assigned to the Decree - A decree can be both preliminary and final, or partly preliminary and partly final - Where a decree determines the entitlement or right to possession, fixes mesne profits, and provides a specific alternate mechanism (such as sale/auction) if physical division by metes and bounds is reported to be impossible, the direction to file a fresh application for a separate final decree is completely unwarranted - Supreme Court emphasized that once a preliminary decree is passed, the trial court should proceed for drawing up the final decree suo motu and there is no need to file a separate final decree proceeding - where the Advocate Commissioner reported that the small flat was unavailable for division by metes and bounds, the executing court was well within its jurisdiction to proceed with the bidding process and auction of the subject matter - High Court's order setting aside the execution proceedings on the rigid technicality that a final decree was a sine qua non for execution was set aside. [Relied on Shankar Balwant Lokhande v. Chandrakant Shankar Lokhande, (1995) 3 SCC 413; Bimal Kumar v. Shakuntala Debi, (2012) 3 SCC 548 (Paragraph 13); Kattukandi Edathil Krishnan v. Kattukandi Edathil Valsan, (2022) 16 SCC 7; Paras 14 - 17] Jennifer Messias v. Leonard G Lobo, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 513 : 2026 INSC 502

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 2(9), Order XIV Rule 1, Order XX Rule 4(2) – Requirements of a valid judgment in ex parte proceedings – Framing of Issues vs. Points for Determination – Held: Although framing of formal issues is not mandatory under Order XIV Rule 1(6) where the defendant makes no defense, the court is still obligated to deliver a "judgment" as defined under Section 2(9) - A valid judgment must contain a concise statement of the case, the points for determination, the decision thereon, and the reasons for such decision as per Order XX Rule 4(2) - Simply granting a decree on default without resolving the controversy through reasoned findings constitutes a "material irregularity". Pramod Shroff v. Mohan Singh Chopra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 384 : 2026 INSC 378

Section 9 - Courts to try all civil suits unless barred

Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – The Supreme Court held that one party to a contract cannot be the sole arbiter to decide whether the other party committed a breach when liability is disputed. Such an interpretation violates the fundamental principle that no party shall be a judge in its own cause - Supreme Court clarified that while certain matters may be "excepted" from arbitration, they cannot be "excluded" from judicial remedy entirely, as a vacuum in legal remedies is opposed to the Rule of Law. ABS Marine Services v. Andaman and Nicobar Administration, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 287 : 2026 INSC 274 : AIR 2026 SC 1594

Section 11 - Res judicata

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Section 11, Explanation VI — Joint Defense — Same Title — Where multiple defendants collectively resist a partition suit, share a common interest, defend the same partition deed, and assert an identical plea against the plaintiffs, they litigate under the same title - An earlier final order passed against some of the defendants binds the remaining co-defendants or their legal representatives - They cannot escape the bar of res judicata merely because their specific predecessor was not the applicant in the first round. [Paras 37-70] B.S. Lalitha v. Bhuvanesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 506 : 2026 INSC 499

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 11, Explanation IV — Constructive Res Judicata — The principle of constructive res judicata applies to matters which "might and ought" to have been made a ground of attack in former proceedings - An adjudication is conclusive not only as to actual matters determined but also as to every matter essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation that the parties ought to have litigated – Held that High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by reassessing the entire factual matrix and interfering with concurrent findings of fact without demonstrating perversity.. Interference in a second appeal is limited to cases involving a "substantial question of law" and should not result in a "third trial on facts." [Relied on Gurbux Singh v. Bhooralal, AIR 1964 SC 1810; Paras 12-38] Channappa v. Parvatewwa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 354 : 2026 INSC 343

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Section 11, Section 105(1), and Order II Rule 2 — Maintainability of Subsequent Suit — Res Judicata and Constructive Res Judicata — The Supreme Court set aside a High Court judgment that had decreed a second suit (Suit-II) for declaration of title and possession, which was filed while an appeal for a previous suit (Suit-I) for injunction and cancellation of an adoption deed was pending – Noted that that the failure to challenge an interlocutory order (specifically the rejection of an application under Order II Rule 2 CPC) at the time it is made does not preclude the party from questioning its correctness while appealing the final decree - The legislative scheme of Section 105(1) ensures that non-appealable interlocutory orders can be assailed in an appeal against the final decree unless a statute expressly mandates otherwise. Channappa v. Parvatewwa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 354 : 2026 INSC 343

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 11 – Res Judicata – Dismissal at Threshold without Adjudication on Merits - Where an earlier application for cancellation of leases/pattas under Section 198(4) of the Abolition Act was dismissed at the threshold by the revenue authority on the sole ground that the execution of the leases had not been established/proved, without entering into the validity or legality of the pattas on merits, the principle of res judicata has no application to subsequent proceedings - For res judicata to apply, the issue must have been directly and substantially in issue and finally decided on merits in the previous proceeding. [Relied on Hinch Lal Tiwari vs. Kamala Devi and others (2001) 6 SCC 496; Jagpal Singh and others vs. State of Punjab and others (2011) 11 SCC 396; Paras 34, 35, 36] Babu Singh v. Consolidation Officer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 405 : 2026 INSC 395

Sections 11, 151, and 152 CPC – Res Judicata between stages of the same proceeding – Clerical Errors – Once a High Court holds at an intermediate stage that an appeal has not abated because the deceased's interest is sufficiently represented, it cannot revisit and reverse this finding at a later stage of the same proceeding - Such a reversal is barred by the principle of res judicata - a typographical error in a court order directing the deletion of the original party instead of a deceased legal representative is a clerical mistake that can be corrected under Sections 151 and 152 of the CPC and should not be used to the disadvantage of a party. [Paras 41-44] Kishorilal v. Gopal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 39 : 2026 INSC 48

Section 13 - When foreign judgment not conclusive.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 13 - Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage — Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decrees — The Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that had dismissed a divorce petition in India on the grounds of a pre-existing US divorce decree - held that the foreign decree was not binding as it was granted on a ground (irretrievable breakdown) not recognized under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and the husband had not effectively submitted to the foreign jurisdiction - Exercising its powers under Article 142, the Supreme Court granted a decree of divorce to bring a quietus to the 18-year-long separation - Key Legal Points – i. Non-Binding Nature of Foreign Decrees: A foreign decree of divorce is not conclusive or binding if it is granted on grounds not available under the matrimonial law governing the parties (in this case, the Hindu Marriage Act) and where the opposite party did not voluntarily or effectively submit to the foreign court's jurisdiction; ii. Effective Participation: Mere service of summons or filing a jurisdictional objection by post does not constitute "effective participation" or "voluntary submission" to a foreign forum - Principles of natural justice require a meaningful opportunity to contest the proceedings; iii. Article 142 Power: Where a marriage has irretrievably broken down and parties have been separated for a prolonged period (nearly 18 years), the Supreme Court can exercise its plenary power under Article 142 to dissolve the marriage directly to ensure justice. [Relied on Y. Narasimha Rao v. Y. Venkata Lakshmi (1991) 3 SCC 451; Paras 8-11] Kishorekumar Mohan Kale v. Kashmira Kale, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 259

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 13(b), (c), (d), and (f) – Refusal to Enforce Summary Foreign Judgment: Even if a foreign court (English Court) is a court of competent jurisdiction by contractual agreement, its summary judgment is unenforceable in India under Section 44A if it fails the substantive tests of Section 13 - Denying leave to defend where triable issues exist violates procedural fairness [Section 13(d)]; failing to consider binding statutory conditions imposed by Indian regulatory authorities attracts Section 13(c); and enforcing a liability in direct breach of those statutory conditions brings the decree within the prohibition of Section 13(f). [Paras 85, 86, 87] Messer Griesheim GMBH v. Goyal Gases Private Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 403 : 2026 INSC 401

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 13(b) – Foreign Judgment 'On Merits' vs. Summary Judgment - A foreign decree cannot be regarded as having been rendered "on the merits" within the meaning of Section 13(b) of the CPC if it is passed without any investigation into the substantive issues or where a party is foreclosed from a full opportunity to defend despite disclosing bona fide triable issues - Adjudication by way of a summary procedure, which refuses leave to defend in the face of highly contested facts and statutory contemporaneous documents (such as audited Balance Sheets under the Companies Act), amounts to a premature adjudication that denies a fair trial. [Paras 41, 46, 52-86] Messer Griesheim GMBH v. Goyal Gases Private Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 403 : 2026 INSC 401

Section 34. Interest

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Section 34 - Contractual Bar on Interest - Sustainability of interest on delayed payments when specifically excluded by contract – The Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that had granted interest for delayed payments to a government contractor - held that when parties explicitly agree via a contract clause (such as Clause 5 of the preliminary agreement) that no interest or damages shall be claimed for belated settlement of bills, such terms are binding - The Interest Act, 1978, mandates interest only in the absence of an agreement or where terms are contrary to law - Section 3(3) of the Interest Act, 1978, ensures that contractual prohibitions on interest are respected, and Section 34 of the CPC does not have an overriding effect on this provision. [Paras 6 - 10] Kerala Water Authority v. T.I. Raju, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 172

Section 47 – Questions to be determined by the Court executing decree.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 47 – Jurisdiction of Executing Court – Power to modify decree – Held: The Executing Court has no jurisdiction to go beyond the decree sought to be executed - It must execute the decree as it stands, without changing its terms or assuming the role of a trial court to substitute its own view - Even if the execution of certain portions of the land as per the decree is deemed "impracticable" due to unauthorized construction or third-party sales, these reasons are immaterial and do not authorize the Executing Court to alter the terms of a compromise decree. [Paras 24 - 30] Maurice W. Innis v. Lily Kazrooni @ Lily Arif Shaikh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 395 : 2026 INSC 340

Execution of Compromise Decree – Identity of Property – Held: Where a compromise decree clearly describes the portions of land falling into the shares of the parties, there is no dispute regarding identity - The Executing Court must strictly conform to the decree and ensure both parties fulfill their reciprocal obligations in pith and substance. [Relied on Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman and Ors. (1970) 1 SCC 670; Sunder Dass v. Ram Prakash (1977) 2 SCC 662; Jai Narain Ram Lundia v. Kedar Nath Khetan and Ors. (1956) 1 SCC 75; Paras 27 – 30] Maurice W. Innis v. Lily Kazrooni @ Lily Arif Shaikh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 395 : 2026 INSC 340

Section 96 - Appeal from original decree

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 96 vs. Order IX Rule XIII – Distinct Jurisdictions – The scope of proceedings under Section 96 and Order IX Rule XIII CPC are distinct - Order IX Rule XIII confers a wider jurisdiction, allowing an applicant to demonstrate "sufficient cause" for non-appearance and seek the setting aside of an ex parte decree, even after the dismissal of an appeal – Appeal allowed. Deepesh Maheswari v. Renu Maheswari, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 317 : 2026 INSC 306

Section 100 - Second Appeal

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC – Reversal of Concurrent Decrees on Irrelevant Considerations – Substitution of Relief Without Prayer or Consent – Permissibility – Held that the High Court cannot set aside a concurrent decree for mandatory injunction and compel the plaintiffs to accept monetary compensation in the absence of any prayer for damages/compensation made by the plaintiff or consent given by their legal heirs - The High Court committed a grave error by reversing the well-reasoned decrees of the Trial Court and first Appellate Court to direct the Executing Court to assess the value of an illegal construction for monetary compensation - Such a course is entirely unsupported by Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, because once a decree is set aside, no executable decree remains in the field for the Executing Court to act upon - a Second Appeal cannot be disposed of by answering hypothetical questions in favor of the defendants without properly formulating and adjudicating actual substantial questions of law under Section 100 CPC - Impugned judgments set aside, and matters remanded to the High Court for fresh, expeditious disposal on merits - the Supreme Court explicitly held that modifying decrees and awarding monetary compensation without entering into the merits of the controversy or framing substantial questions of law is legally impermissible - The High Court's failure to adhere to this binding historical remand order in the same case structure forms the primary basis of the current reversal. [Relied on Rajat Kumar & Ors. v. S D Adarsh Jain Kanya Maha Vidyalaya Sadhaura & Ors. (Civil Appeal Nos. 8203 of 2013 and 8281 of 2013; Paras 5, 6] Rajat Kumar v. S.D. Adarsh Jain Kanya Maha Vidyalaya Sadhaura, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 637 : 2026 INSC 648

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 100 – Second Appeal – Scope of interference with concurrent findings –High Court is not justified in interfering with concurrent findings of fact unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or suffering from material illegality or misreading of evidence - Merely because another possible view may arise from the same material on record does not justify interference under Section 100 CPC – noted that to emphasize that where two inferences are possible from a set of circumstances, the one drawn by the lower appellate court is binding on the High Court in second appeal. [Relied on Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar (1999) 3 SCC 722] A. Shahul Hameed v. N. Malligarjuna, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 604 : 2026 INSC 573

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Section 100 — Scope of Second Appeal — Interference with Findings of Fact - Findings of fact, howsoever erroneous or wrong, cannot be reopened, disturbed, or interfered with by the High Court in a second appeal under Section 100 CPC in the absence of a substantial question of law or a clear error of law, unless the findings stand completely vitiated for want of perversity. [Paras 30, 31-35] Russi Fisheries v. Bhavna Seth, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 402 : 2026 INSC 339

Section 100 CPC — Second Appeal — Interference with concurrent findings — Held that the High Court is justified in interfering with concurrent findings of fact in a second appeal if such findings are found to be perverse, contrary to the statutory framework, or based on a misapplication of settled legal principles - The absence of cogent evidence regarding the exact location and measurements of the disputed property renders a decree for mandatory injunction legally unsustainable - A suit filed by partners of an unregistered firm for the protection of property rights (common law action) rather than the enforcement of a contractual right is maintainable and not barred by Section 69. [Relied on Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) by LRs and Others, (2008) 4 SCC 594; Para 13, 24 - 27] Sanjay Paliwal v. Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 54 : 2026 INSC 61

Section 100 CPC – Second Appeal – Scope of Interference with Concurrent Findings of Fact – Possession and Injunction – The Supreme Court set aside a High Court judgment that had dismissed a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction despite concurrent findings of possession in favor of the appellant by the Trial Court and First Appellate Court – Noted that the High Court failed to frame a specific substantial question of law regarding the correctness or validity of the findings on possession returned by the lower courts - The Supreme Court held that interference with concurrent findings of fact under Section 100 CPC is permissible only on limited grounds, such as perversity, misreading of evidence, or consideration of inadmissible evidence. P. Elaiyappan v. Natarajan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 219

Sections 100 and 103 CPC – Jurisdiction of High Court in Second Appeal – Interference with Findings of Fact – Held that the High Court generally does not disturb findings of fact, it is well within its jurisdiction to interfere if such findings are perverse, based on no evidence, founded on conjectures, or result from a misconstruction of documents/inadmissible evidence - Relying on a photocopy (no evidence) to accept the existence of a power to alienate is an error of law that the High Court may rightly correct - Courts should not, by themselves, compare disputed signatures without the assistance of an expert, especially when the signatures used for comparison are not admitted signatures – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Smt. J. Yashoda v. K. Shobha Rani (2007) 5 SCC 730; Jagmail Singh v. Karamjit Singh (2020) 5 SCC 178; O. Bharathan v. K. Sudhakaran (1996) 2 SCC 70; Para 23] Tharammel Peethambaran v. T. Ushakrishnan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 128 : 2026 INSC 134 : AIR 2026 SC 938

Section 114 - Review

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 114 & Order XLVII Rule 1 — Scope of Review — A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be an "appeal in disguise" - An error on the face of the record must be self-evident and strike the court immediately, without requiring a long-drawn process of reasoning where two opinions are conceivable - Perceived career insecurity or difficulties faced by teachers do not constitute a palpable error on the face of the record warranting a review of the final judgment. [Relied on Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. State (UT of Delhi), (1980) 2 SCC 167; Bharti Airtel Ltd. v. A.S. Raghavendra, (2024) 6 SCC 418; Anjuman Ishaat-e-Taleem Trust v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1912; State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO, (2005) 3 SCC 752; Paras 15-34] State of UP v. Anjuman Ishaat-E-Taleem Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 568 : 2026 INSC 597

Section 115. Revision

Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Remedy for Legal Representatives – Held that the appropriate statutory relief for a legal representative aggrieved by and seeking to challenge an arbitral award lies exclusively under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and not via a revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution or Section 115 of the CPC. V.K. John v. S. Mukanchand Bothra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 398 : 2026 INSC 393 : AIR 2026 SC 2041

Section 151 - Saving of inherent powers of Court

Sections 151 and 152 CPC – Scope of "Clarification" vs. Substantive Modification – High Courts cannot make substantive changes to the quantum of compensation or redistribute liability under the guise of a "clarification" application - Section 152 CPC is strictly confined to correcting clerical or arithmetical mistakes arising from accidental slips - Any modification affecting substantive rights amounts to a review in substance and must meet the requirements of Order XLVII CPC. Reliance General Insurance v. Kanika, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 196 : 2026 INSC 188 : AIR 2026 SC 1188

Order I - Parties to Suits

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Impleadment of Parties – Necessary and Proper Party – Article 226 of the Constitution of India – Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Appeal against High Court order dismissing impleadment application in a writ petition challenging the Punjab Unified Building Rules, 2025 – Appellant sought impleadment as municipal authorities relied on an interim stay in said writ petition to reject Appellant's building plans and initiate demolition – Held: A person directly and demonstrably affected by an interim order cannot be shut out of proceedings merely because they were not an original party to the principal challenge - The Appellant is at least a "proper party" whose presence enables the Court to effectively adjudicate the consequences of its own interim order. Procedural exclusion of a party facing immediate civil consequences (demolition and refusal of statutory benefits) is unsustainable - High Court's order set aside; Appellant impleaded as a party respondent. Chopra Hotels v. Harbinder Singh Sekhon, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 352 : 2026 INSC 335

Order I Rule 10 - Suit in name of wrong plaintiff.

Order I Rule 10 CPC – Dominus Litis – Joinder of Parties – Noted that the petitioner is dominus litis and has the right to decide who to join as a party - The Registry cannot make inroads into judicial domains by questioning why a particular party was arrayed as a respondent - If unnecessary parties are joined, Supreme Court can delete them under Order I Rule 10 CPC or deal with it judicially if done with ill-motive - Supreme Court observed with "pain" that there was an "abandonment of its judicial role by the High Court" in rejecting the petition in such an unjust manner – Appeal allowed. [Paras 7-13] Sri Mukund Maheswar v. Axis Bank Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 82 : 2026 INSC 84

Order I Rule 10 CPC – Impleadment of Parties – Necessary vs. Proper Party – Dominus Litis – Suit for recovery of service charges – Twin Tests for Necessary Party – Held: A plaintiff is the dominus litis and cannot be compelled to add a third person as a defendant against their wishes unless that person is a necessary party without whom no effective decree can be passed - In a suit for recovery of service charges against a partnership firm, a third-party company claiming to be a "successor" is not a necessary party if the plaintiff seeks no relief against them and the original firm continues to exist- Held: To be a "necessary party," two tests must be satisfied: (1) there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the controversies involved; and (2) no effective decree can be passed in their absence - A "proper party" is one whose presence enables the court to adjudicate completely, even if no decree is made against them. Nak Engineering Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Tarun Keshrichand Shah, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 5 : 2026 INSC 8

Order II Rule 2 - Suit to include the whole claim

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order II Rule 2 — Identity of Cause of Action — Supreme Court held that Suit-II was barred because the foundational facts regarding the property dispute were identical to Suit-I - Since the plaintiff was aware of the defendant's adverse claim of ownership during Suit-I but omitted to seek a declaration of title without obtaining the court's leave, she was precluded from seeking that omitted relief in a subsequent suit. Channappa v. Parvatewwa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 354 : 2026 INSC 343

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order II Rule 2 – Tests for Applicability – To invoke the bar under Order II Rule 2, the defendant must satisfactorily establish that: (i) the subsequent suit is in respect of the same cause of action as the previous suit; (ii) the plaintiff was entitled to more than one relief for that cause of action; and (iii) the plaintiff omitted to sue for such relief in the earlier suit without the leave of the Court - The technical bar cannot be presumed based on inferential reasoning. [Relied on Mohammad Khalil Khan vs. Mahbub Ali Mian, 1948 SCC OnLine PC 44; Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd. vs. Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited, 2025 SCC OnLine 82; T. Arivandandam vs. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467; Paras 6-8] S. Valliammai v. S. Ramanathan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : 2026 INSC 372

Order VI Rule 1 - Pleading.

Civil Procedure – Pleadings vs. Proof – Scope of Summary Facts - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order VI Rules 1 & 2 – Distinction between facta probanda (material facts to be proved) and facta probantia (facts/evidence by which they are proved) – Pleadings must contain only facta probandaand not facta probantia – In an eviction suit, the plaintiff is required to plead and prove the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship and the statutory grounds for eviction – Specific documents like share certificates, internal family understandings, or detailed requirements of the family constitute evidence (facta probantia) to establish the material facts and are not required to be set out verbatim in the plaint itself – Both tests of pleading and proof stand satisfied if the essential elements of the cause of action are present in the plaint and substantiated through evidence. [Paras 28, 31-34, 36, 40] Marietta D' Silva v. Rudolf Clothan Lacerda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 503 : 2026 INSC 496

Order VI Rule 4 - Particulars to be given where necessary.

Order VI Rule 4 CPC – Pleading Standards – Rule Against "Clever Drafting" – A party alleging that a registered Deed is a sham must satisfy a rigorous standard of pleading by providing clear, cogent, and convincing averments with material particulars - Adopting a test akin to Order VI Rule 4 of the CPC, Supreme Court held that "clever drafting" creating an illusion of a cause of action is impermissible - Mere suspicion or nebulous averments without material particulars are insufficient to dislodge the presumption under Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. [Paras 34, 35] Hemalatha v. Tukaram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 79 : 2026 INSC 82

Order VI Rule 17 - Amendment of pleadings.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order VI Rule 17 — Amendment of Plaint — Bonafide Need of Landlord — Death of Landlord during Appeal — Power of Court to examine merits at the stage of amendment — Held: Whether an amendment should be allowed is not dependent on whether the case proposed to be set up will eventually succeed at the trial - While determining the permissibility of an amendment, the Court cannot go into the merits/demerits of the case - The factual truth of the subsequent pleadings is a matter to be considered on the merits of the claim and not at the stage of amendment. [Paras 15-18] Vinay Raghunath Deshmukh v. Natwarlal Shamji Gada, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 424 : 2026 INSC 416

Order VII Rule 7 - Relief to be specifically stated

Order VII Rule 7 and Order VI Rule 17 CPC – Pleadings and Reliefs – Multiple reliefs and defective prayers –Rejection of a writ petition because multiple reliefs were claimed in a single prayer is "perhaps, unprecedented" - If a prayer is defective or does not conform to Writ Rules, the High Court should permit amendments under principles of Order VI Rule 17 CPC or mould the relief - A claim cannot be dismissed simply because a suitor claims a wider relief than they are entitled to; the court remains free to grant a lesser relief. Sri Mukund Maheswar v. Axis Bank Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 82 : 2026 INSC 84

Order VII Rule 11 - Rejection of plaint

Order VII Rule 11 and Order VI Rule 16 — Supervisory Jurisdiction vs. Statutory Remedy — The Supreme Court held that the High Court cannot invoke its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 to strike off a plaint when a specific statutory remedy for rejection of the plaint exists under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC - The existence of an alternative remedy under the CPC acts as a "near total bar" against the exercise of powers under Article 227 - Noted that Order VI Rule 16, which pertains to striking out specific "pleadings" (parts or sections), cannot be utilized as a tool to strike down an entire plaint - Supervisory power is intended to keep subordinate courts within their bounds, not to serve as an "appeal in disguise" or to circumvent statutory law - Key Principles held – i. Alternative Remedy as a Bar - Where a specific remedy is provided under the CPC, the High Court should, as a matter of discipline and prudence, desist from exercising its power of superintendence; ii. Factual Inquiry - Rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 often requires factual inquiries (e.g., disclosure of cause of action, valuation disputes) which are inappropriate for summary determination under Article 227; iii. Scope of Order VI Rule 16 - This provision is for removing unnecessary, scandalous, or vexatious matters within a pleading, not for the wholesale dismissal of a suit – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Shalini Shyam Shetty vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil (2010) 8 SCC 32; Virudhunagar Hindu Nadargal Dharma Paribalana Sabai vs. Tuticorin Educational Society (2019) 9 SCC 538; Radhey Shyam vs. Chhabi Nath (2015) 5 SCC 423; State vs. Navjot Sandhu (2003) 6 SCC 641; Paras 6-11] P. Suresh v. D. Kalaivani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 116 : 2026 INSC 121

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order VII Rule 11 – Rejection of Plaint – Duty of Court at the threshold – Clever Drafting and Fictional Cause of Action – Admission of a plaint is not an automatic or mechanical process - The trial Court has a bounden duty to scrutinize the averments of the plaint in conjunction with the relied-upon documents to determine whether it discloses a real cause of action or if it is barred by law - Litigants cannot circumvent statutory prohibitions by clever drafting or artful pleadings that create a surreal or illusory cause of action - When clever drafting veils an implied bar under law, the Court must lift the veil, expose the bar, and nip the sham litigation in the bud at the earliest stage, without necessarily waiting for the defendant to enter appearance or seek rejection. [Paras 8, 9, 26 - 29] Manjula v. D.A. Srinivas, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 478 : 2026 INSC 465

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order VII Rule 11 — Scope of Inquiry — Excessive Relief — Plaint Averments — For the purpose of deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11, only the averments in the plaint are to be taken as correct, and external defense materials or written statements cannot be considered - A plaint cannot be rejected at the threshold merely because the plaintiffs have claimed a larger or excessive relief (such as partitioning the entire estate rather than just the father's share) than what they may ultimately be entitled to after a trial. [Relied on Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Deorajin Debi, AIR 1960 SC 941; Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. v. Owners & Parties, Vessel M.V. Fortune Express, (2006) 3 SCC 100; Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma, (2020) 9 SCC 1; Paras 31-58] B.S. Lalitha v. Bhuvanesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 506 : 2026 INSC 499

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order VII Rule 11(d) read with Section 11 — Rejection of Plaint — Interlocutory Res Judicata — Multiple Applications under Order VII Rule 11 — The legal representatives of a defendant filed a second application seeking rejection of the plaint, asserting a 'change in law' - The Supreme Court held that the second application was barred by the principle of res judicata since the identical issue had been directly and substantially raised, heard, and decided on merits against the defendants by the High Court in an earlier round of proceedings, which had attained finality - A party cannot circumvent the finality of an adverse order by re-framing the same challenge under a different sub-clause or procedural provision. [Paras 35-70] B.S. Lalitha v. Bhuvanesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 506 : 2026 INSC 499

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order VII Rule 11(a) – Order VII Rule 11(a), (b), and (c) — Rejection of Plaint — Cause of Action — Mini-trial — Undervaluation — Deficit Court Fees — Mandatory Opportunity to Cure Defect - Plaint disclosing a live and subsisting commercial dispute cannot be rejected at the threshold – Court cannot conduct a mini-trial to assess the enforceability of an unsigned document at this stage - The High Court erred in rejecting the plaint by undertaking a detailed examination of the enforceability of an unsigned Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) - At the stage of Order VII Rule 11, the Court must take the averments in the plaint in their entirety, along with the documents relied upon, to be true - It cannot test their correctness, weigh them against the defense, or assess the probability of success - Whether an unsigned MoA constitutes a concluded contract or is unenforceable for want of signatures is a matter falling squarely within the domain of trial. [Paras 18, 22 - 27 Marg Ltd. v. Sushil Lalwani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 409 : 2026 INSC 402

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order VII Rule 11(b) & (c) – Rejection of a plaint for undervaluation or deficit court fee is not automatic – Statutory obligation on Courts to first afford an opportunity to the plaintiff to rectify the defect - The procedural mandate under clauses (b) and (c) of Order VII Rule 11 introduces a conditional, two-step process - The Court must first form an opinion regarding the insufficiency of the valuation or court fee, determine the correct valuation, and specify a timeframe for the plaintiff to correct it - Outright rejection of a plaint without providing a substantive opportunity to cure the defect is a manifest error of law - Deficiency in court fees does not render the suit non-maintainable at the threshold; it is a curable defect. [Relied on Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) & Ors. (2020) 7 SCC 366; Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi 1986 Supp SCC 315; Paras 30-35] Marg Ltd. v. Sushil Lalwani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 409 : 2026 INSC 402

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order VII Rule 11(d) – Statement in the Plaint – For the purpose of deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11(d), the Court must only look at the "statement in the plaint," which includes a meaningful reading of the averments and the documents appended thereto - The written statement or any other materials produced by the defendant are wholly irrelevant at this stage. Valliammai v. S. Ramanathan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : 2026 INSC 372

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order VII Rule 11(d) vs. Order II Rule 2 – Rejection of Plaint – Distinction between "Bar to Sue" and "Suit Barred by Law" – The Supreme Court held that the application of Order II Rule 2 (relinquishment of part of claim or omission to sue for one of several reliefs) cannot be a ground for rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) - While Order VII Rule 11(d) applies when a suit is barred by an express or implied law (e.g., Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act), Order II Rule 2 pertains to the "right to sue" for specific claims or reliefs - A plea under Order II Rule 2 must be established by the defendant through evidence, requiring a comparative analysis of the plaints in the former and subsequent suits to determine identity of the cause of action. Valliammai v. S. Ramanathan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : 2026 INSC 372

Order VII Rule 11 – Rejection of Plaint – Where a property is neither notified in the official list of auqaf nor registered with the Waqf Board, a suit for injunction simpliciter regarding such property cannot be entertained by the Waqf Tribunal – noted that the plaint is liable to be rejected as the Tribunal lacks the mandatory statutory requirement to adjudicate the property's status – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ramesh Gobindram v. Sugra Humayun Mirza Wakf (2010) 8 SCC 726; Paras 20-50] Habib Alladin v. Mohammed Ahmed, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 88 : 2026 INSC 90

Order VIII Rule 9 - Subsequent pleadings

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order VIII-A – Key Issues – i. Whether a "Corporate Guarantee" issued by a charterer (Defendant No. 1) to a ship repairer (Plaintiff) to pay outstanding dues from freight amounts constitutes a valid, independent guarantee under Section 126 of the Contract Act; ii. Whether a bank is liable to indemnify its customer under third-party procedure when it erroneously remits funds to the wrong party contrary to express customer instructions – Held that the "Corporate Guarantee" (Exhibit P11) and related communications (Exhibit P10) constituted a valid, independent contract of guarantee under Section 126 of the Contract Act - It was not merely a freight-sharing arrangement as contended by the Appellant – Noted that a guarantee is a voluntary act of taking up the burden of a third party who failed to make payment - Under Section 128, the liability of the surety is co-extensive with that of the principal debtor - The creditor is entitled to proceed against the surety without first exhausting remedies against the principal debtor. [Paras 21-25] Canara Bank Overseas Branch v. Archean Industries Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 252 : 2026 INSC 247 : AIR 2026 SC 1566

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order VIII Rule 9 - A defendant cannot be permitted to radically alter or retract her stand in a civil suit by filing an additional written statement under Order VIII Rule 9 CPC after the commencement of trial, particularly when the new plea is wholly inconsistent with the original defence. A party cannot, under the garb of an additional written statement, introduce a completely contradictory case to achieve what is otherwise barred by the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC (amendment of pleadings after trial has begun). Such an attempt amounts to an abuse of process of court and is impermissible under Order VI Rule 7 CPC, which prohibits a party from raising allegations inconsistent with its previous pleadings except by way of amendment. Mondira Ghosh v. Chaitali Ghosh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 579 : 2026 INSC 545

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order VIII Rule 9 - The plaintiff filed a suit for declaration of unlawful possession and eviction. In her original written statement, the defendant claimed to be a bona fide co-sharer. After framing of issues and extensive cross-examination of the plaintiff's witness, the defendant sought to file an additional written statement along with a counterclaim, claiming instead that she was a tenant under the plaintiff. The Trial Court rejected the application. The High Court, however, permitted filing of the additional written statement (subject to costs) while rejecting the counterclaim. Allowing the plaintiff's appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and restored the Trial Court's rejection. The Court held that the defendant's attempt was a clear volte-face and a belated attempt to overcome the statutory embargo on amendments after trial had commenced. The filing of such an application at an advanced stage of the trial was held to be a clear abuse of process. Mondira Ghosh v. Chaitali Ghosh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 579 : 2026 INSC 545

Order IX Rule 13 - Setting aside decree ex parte against defendant

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order IX Rule XIII – Application to set aside ex parte decree – Minority of Appellant – Sufficient Cause – The Supreme Court set aside the concurrent rejection of an application under Order IX Rule XIII CPC filed by a minor (Appellant No. 1) - held that a minor, being legally incapacitated, cannot be expected to respond to a public notice or initiate legal proceedings independently - The failure of the respondents to ensure the appointment of a lawful guardian for a known minor legal heir, coupled with material misstatements regarding the widow's identity, vitiated the original proceedings for a succession certificate. [Paras 7, 8, 9] Deepesh Maheswari v. Renu Maheswari, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 317 : 2026 INSC 306

Order XII Rule 6 - Judgment on admissions.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order XII Rule 6 – Judgment on Admission – Admissions made outside pleadings, including in criminal proceedings, can form basis for decree - Held, a judgment under Order XII Rule 6 CPC can be passed on the basis of an admission made by a party even outside the pleadings, provided the admission is clear, unequivocal and in writing or oral. There is no bar under the Code restricting such admissions to only those made in the pleadings. Sheikh Abedin v. Iqbal Ahmed, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 483

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order XII Rule 6 – Judgment on Admission – The appellant-defendant had admitted in a complaint leading to registration of an FIR that he was merely a caretaker of the suit property owned by the respondent-plaintiff. Relying upon this admission, the Trial Court decreed the suit for mandatory injunction directing the defendant to vacate the premises. The First Appellate Court and the High Court upheld the decree. The defendant contended before the Supreme Court that an admission made in criminal proceedings could not be relied upon for passing judgment under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. Held: Dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court clarified that admissions, wherever made, if clear and unequivocal, can be the foundation for a decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. The Court reiterated that the object of the provision is to enable a party to obtain speedy justice on the basis of admissions made by the opposite party. [Relied on : Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. vs. United Bank of India, (2000) 7 SCC 120] Sheikh Abedin v. Iqbal Ahmed, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 483

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order XII Rule 6 – Judgment on Admission – Requirements of clear, unequivocal and unconditional Admission - Held, a decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC can be passed only where the admission by the defendant is clear, categorical, unconditional and unequivocal. A mere reference to statements or inconsistencies does not amount to an admission sufficient for granting judgment on admission when disputed questions of fact exist which require adjudication in a full-fledged trial. Pushpa v. Dayawati, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 610 : 2026 INSC 603

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order XII Rule 6 – Judgment on Admission – Key principles laid down: 1. Every statement made by a party in the pleadings does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to a decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. The admission must be unambiguous and must clearly establish the liability of the defendant towards the plaintiff. 2. Pleadings cannot be read in a piecemeal manner; they must be construed holistically. 3. Disputed questions of fact cannot be resolved by way of judgment on admission. 4. Revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC is limited and cannot be exercised by the High Court to substitute its own interpretation of the written statement merely because another view is possible, in the absence of jurisdictional error or material irregularity. Pushpa v. Dayawati, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 610 : 2026 INSC 603

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order XII Rule 6 – Judgment on Admission – In a dispute relating to distribution of sale proceeds of a jointly owned agricultural property sold for ₹15.31 crore, the plaintiff sought a decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC against defendant No.3 for recovery of ₹44,79,167/- on the basis of an alleged admission in the written statement that each co-owner had received ₹3 crore under a family settlement. The District Court rejected the application, holding that the matter required trial. The High Court allowed the revision and decreed the suit. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and restored the District Court's order, holding that there was no clear, unconditional admission of liability by defendant No.3, and the issues involved disputed questions of fact which could only be decided after full trial. Pushpa v. Dayawati, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 610 : 2026 INSC 603

Order XIII Rule 3. Rejection of irrelevant or inadmissible documents.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) – Order XXIII Rule 3 – Enforcement of Private Award in Pending Suit – Absolute Necessity of Post-Award Consent - The proviso to Section 47 acts as a limited saving mechanism for an award 'otherwise obtained' (i.e., outside the regular provisions of the 1940 Act or during the pendency of a suit without court intervention) - Such an award cannot proprio vigore (of its own force) be enforced, set up as a valid defense, or used to non-suit a plaintiff - It can only be taken into consideration by the court as a compromise or adjustment of the suit under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the CPC if allinterested parties explicitly give their mutual consent after the award has been made - This post-award consent is a strict sine qua non - In the absence of an express or implied post-award consent by a party to treat the award as a compromise, the court has no jurisdiction to enforce it or non-suit the parties on its basis, and must instead proceed to decide the suit on its independent merits. [Relied on Naraindas v. Vallabhdas & Ors., (1971) 3 SCC 642; Paras 49-69] Ashok v. Padam Chand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 570 : 2026 INSC 591

Order XIII-A Rule 3 — Grounds for Summary Judgment

Commercial Courts Act, 2015 — Schedule — Insertion of Order XIII-A to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Summary Judgment — Scope, Principles, and Guidelines — Held - The emergence of summary judgment under Indian procedural law represents a significant shift steering litigation toward factual certainty and judicial efficiency - Rule 3 of Order XIII-A empowers the Court to grant a summary judgment against a party if they have no "real prospect" of successfully succeeding on or defending the claim, and there is no other compelling reason why the matter should go to trial - A "real prospect of success" postulates a likelihood that is real and substantial, as opposed to being merely fanciful or speculative - While the Court should not conduct a "mini-trial" at this threshold stage, it is not required to take everything at face value and must assess the evidence actually available alongside the evidence that can reasonably be expected to be led at trial - Summary judgment is an exceptional power that cuts short the trial process and ought to be exercised when oral evidence and a full trial would serve no real purpose. [Paras 36, 43, 51 – 59] Reliance Eminent Trading v. Delhi Development Authority, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 442 : 2026 INSC 436

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XIII-A Rule 3 — Limitation — Adjudication of Mixed Questions of Law and Fact via Summary Judgment — Held - Although limitation is ordinarily a mixed question of law and fact when foundational facts are contested, the Court can decisively address and determine the issue of limitation at the summary judgment stage if it rests on admitted and undisputed material on record - Forcing a matter to proceed to a full-fledged trial despite absolute clarity of the material on record contradicts the principle of proportionality and needlessly prolongs ripe litigation. [Relied on Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. v. K. S. Infraspace LLP and Another, (2020) 15 SCC 585; Swain v. Hillman, [2001] 1 All ER 91 (England and Wales Court of Appeal); Paras 60-65, 75, 76] Reliance Eminent Trading v. Delhi Development Authority, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 442 : 2026 INSC 436

Order XIV - Settlement of Issues

Code Civil Procedure, 1908 – Prejudice caused by non-framing of issues – Specific Performance – Lack of Title – Held: The omission to frame issues can vitiate a trial if it causes prejudice to the parties - The test for prejudice is whether the parties had knowledge that a particular question was in issue and had the opportunity to lead evidence on it - In the present case, the trial court dismissed a suit for specific performance on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove the defendant's title, despite no such issue being framed or pleaded - Since the appellant was never put to notice or given an opportunity to lead evidence on the question of title, the non-framing of issues caused significant prejudice - Held: To succeed in a suit for specific performance, the plaintiff must prove: (i) the existence of a valid contract; (ii) a breach of contract by the defendant; and (iii) the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform their part of the contract. [Relied on Balraj Taneja and Another v. Sunil Madan and Another (1999) 8 SCC 396; Paras 21-33] Pramod Shroff v. Mohan Singh Chopra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 384 : 2026 INSC 378

Order XV Rule 5 - Case Management hearings during trial

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XV Rule 5 — First Date of Hearing — Determination of — Held, the expression 'first date of hearing' is not a mere formal date or any earlier date fixed for procedural purposes - It has to be understood as the date when the Court proposes to apply its mind to determine the points in controversy between the parties and to frame issues, if necessary - In the absence of a clear determination of such a date, the very foundation for invoking Order XV Rule 5 CPC becomes uncertain - Held, rules of procedure are made to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it - Construction of a rule of procedure which promotes justice and prevents miscarriage has to be preferred - Procedural law is the handmaid of justice and not its mistress. [Relied on Bimal Chand Jain v. Sri Gopal Agarwal, (1981) 3 SCC 486; Santosh Mehta v. Om Prakash, (1980) 3 SCC 610; Siraj Ahmad Siddiqui v. Prem Nath Kapoor, (1993) 4 SCC 406; Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India, (2005) 6 SCC 344; Paras 16-28] Dharmendra Kalra v. Kulvinder Singh Bhatia, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 509 : 2026 INSC 492

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XV Rule 5 — Striking off defence for non-deposit of rent — Discretionary vs. Mandatory nature — Held, the power to strike off the defence under Order XV Rule 5 CPC, though couched in mandatory terms, is not to be exercised mechanically - It is in the nature of a penalty and carries a serious responsibility - Supreme Court must consider whether there has been substantial compliance and whether the default is wilful, deliberate, or contumacious, rather than resorting to it as a routine visitation of a punitive extreme. [Paras 16, 17] Dharmendra Kalra v. Kulvinder Singh Bhatia, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 509 : 2026 INSC 492

Order XIX - Affidavits

Civil Procedure Code, 1908; Order XIX– Whether an affidavit constitutes 'evidence' – An affidavit does not fall within the definition of "evidence" under Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - It can only be treated as evidence if the Court passes a specific order for sufficient reasons under Order XIX of the CPC - In the absence of an opportunity for cross-examination, or where the circumstances surrounding the filing of such affidavits appear suspicious or self-created prior to the submission of pleadings, they cannot be relied upon to determine factual situations or invalidate a proved document - It is a settled proposition of law that mutation entries in revenue records do not confer, create, or extinguish title over immovable property. Such entries are effected purely for fiscal purposes to enable the State to realize land revenue from the person recorded therein. [Relied on Meena Pradhan and Others v. Kamla Pradhan and Another, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1198; H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma and Others, 1958 SCC OnLine SC 31; Balwant Singh and Another v. Daulat Singh (Dead) By LRs. and Others, (1997) 7 SCC 137; Rabindra Nath Mukherjee and Another v. Panchanan Banerjee (Dead) by LRs and Others, (1995) 4 SCC 459; Ram Piari v. Bhagwant and Ors., (1990) 3 SCC 364; Para 31-38] Parvathi Nairthi v. Laxmi Nairthy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 528 : 2026 INSC 521

Order XXI - Execution of Decrees and Orders

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Order 21 — Execution of Decrees - Starting point of limitation when an appeal is dismissed in default — The Supreme Court held that the dismissal of an appeal, even if for non-prosecution or on preliminary grounds like limitation, resets the limitation clock for execution proceedings - While a decree remains enforceable if not stayed during the pendency of an appeal, the dismissal of such an appeal confirms the Trial Court's decree and provides a fresh starting point of 12 years for execution under Article 136 - Supreme Court emphasized that an appeal is a continuation of the suit; therefore, a decree does not attain absolute finality until the appeal is disposed of. Gajanan v. Pralhad, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 341

Order XXI Rule 35 - Decree for immovable property

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXI Rules 35, 97, 98, 101, and 102 – Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 19(b) – The Supreme Court reaffirmed that a purchaser who acquires property during the pendency of litigation, as a transferee pendente lite, has no right to obstruct the execution of the decree and remains bound by the outcome of the proceedings, holding the transfer strictly subservient to the decree - Key findings held i. Doctrine of Lis Pendens and Transferee Pendente Lite: The principle of lis pendens enshrined in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, is based on equity, good conscience, justice, and public policy - A transferee pendente lite is bound by the ultimate decree of the court, irrespective of whether they had notice of the pending suit or acted in good faith; ii. Registration of Lis Pendens (Bombay Amendment): Under the Maharashtra amendment to Section 52, once a notice of lis pendens is registered, the property cannot be transferred or dealt with so as to affect the rights of any party under a subsequent decree - The lack of knowledge of the proceedings is not a valid defense against the application of this doctrine; iii. Execution against Obstructionists: In execution proceedings for the delivery of immovable property, the Executing Court has the mandate under Order XXI Rule 97 and Rule 98 CPC to remove any person bound by the decree, including a transferee pendente lite, who resists or obstructs possession; iv. Adjudication of Rights in Execution: All questions relating to the right, title, or interest of an obstructionist arising under Order XXI Rule 97 must be determined by the Executing Court under Rule 101 and not by a separate suit - For transferees pendente lite, their title is subservient to the decree and is effectively extinguished by the court-executed sale deed; v. Interplay between Specific Relief Act and Transfer of Property Act: While Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act protects subsequent transferees for value without notice at a stage prior to the institution of a suit, it must give way to Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act once a suit is instituted – Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Celir LLP v. Somati Prasad Bafna (2024 SCC Online SC 3727); Sanjay Verma v. Manik Roy (2006) 13 SCC 608; Guruswamy Nadar v. P. Lakshmi Ammal (2008) 5 SCC 796; Jayaram Mudaliar v. Ayyaswami (1972) 2 SCC 200; Danesh Singh v. Har Pyari (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2805); Paras 41-64] Alka Shrirang Chavan v. Hemchandra Rajaram Bhonsale, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 44 : 2026 INSC 52

Order XXI Rule 58 - Adjudication of claims to, or objections to attachment, of property.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXI Rule 58 and Rule 102 – Execution of Arbitral Award – Transferee Pendente Lite – The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a claim petition filed by a third-party purchaser who acquired property after an arbitral award (money decree) was passed against the vendor – held that an arbitral award is a "deemed decree" enforceable under Section 36 of the 1996 Act - Under Order XXI Rule 102 CPC, the protections for bona fide claimants do not extend to a transferee pendente lite—defined as one to whom property is transferred after the institution of the suit/proceeding. R. Savithri Naidu v. Cotton Corporation of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 151 : 2026 INSC 150 : AIR 2026 SC 913

Order XXII Rule 2 - Procedure where one of several plaintiffs or defendants dies and right to sue survives.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order XXII Rules 2 & 4 — Indian Succession Act, 1925 — Section 306 — Medical Negligence — Death of the Doctor/Opposite Party pending proceedings — Survivability of claims against Legal Heirs — The Supreme Court held that upon the death of an alleged medically negligent doctor during the pendency of a consumer dispute (including at the appellate/revisional stage), their legal heirs can be impleaded and brought on record - the continuation of the "right to sue" under Order XXII of the CPC is fundamentally governed by the substantive law enshrined in Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 - When adjudicating claims under the first exception to Section 306 of the 1925 Act, purely personal injury claims (such as damages for pain, suffering, or loss of reputation) lapse and abate with the death of the doctor - Conversely, distinct claims for pecuniary loss or economic damages that affect or are maintainable against the estate of the deceased doctor survive - The Consumer Commissions are duty-bound to first adjudicate the negligence aspect of the deceased doctor before recovering surviving estate-linked claims. [Relied on M. Veerappa Vs. Evelyn Sequeira, (1988) 1 SCC 556; Melepurath Sankunni Ezhuthassan Vs. Thekittil Geopalankutty Nair, (1986) 1 SCC 118; Vinayak Purshottam Dube Vs. Jayashree Padamkar Bhat, (2024) 9 SCC 398; Paras 55-71] Kumud Lall v. Suresh Chandra Roy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 454 : 2026 INSC 443

Order XXII Rule 4 - Procedure in case of death of one of several defendants or of sole defendant

Order XXII Rule 4 – Abatement of Appeal – Substantial Representation of Estate – Suit for Specific Performance – Appeal does not abate if the estate of the deceased party is sufficiently represented by other legal heirs already on record - In the present case, while the vendor (Kishorilal) died during the appeal, all his four legal heirs were initially substituted - Upon the death of one of those heirs (Murarilal), the appeal could not be declared to have abated because the remaining three heirs and the lis pendens transferees (who held the title) remained on record, ensuring the estate was sufficiently represented. [Paras 30 - 40] Kishorilal v. Gopal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 39 : 2026 INSC 48

Order XXIII Rule 1 - Withdrawal of suit or abandonment of part of claim.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Order 23 Rule 1 — Maintainability of fresh application for appointment of an arbitrator — Abandonment of proceedings - The Supreme Court held that the principles of Order 23 Rule 1 of the CPC, which prohibit the institution of fresh proceedings on the same cause of action without seeking leave of the court, apply to proceedings under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. A litigant who has effectively abandoned previous arbitration proceedings or withdrawn an application without liberty to file afresh is barred from seeking a subsequent appointment of an arbitrator for the same cause of action. The Court emphasized that this bar is founded on Public Policy to prevent the abuse of the process of law. In the present case, the respondent's refusal to participate in the initial arbitral proceedings constituted abandonment. Furthermore, the dismissal of a third-party appeal regarding the underlying property did not create a "fresh cause of action" for the respondent, as the internal dispute between the parties was not the subject matter of that appeal. [Relied on HPCL Bio-Fuels Ltd. v. Shahaji Bhanudas Bhad; 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3190; Paras 15-19] Rajiv Gaddh v. Subodh Parkash, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 310 : 2026 INSC 302 : AIR 2026 SC 1701

Order XXIII Rule 3 - Compromise of suit

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Execution of Compromise Decree — Power of Executing Court — Statutory vs. Equitable Valuation - An Executing Court cannot travel beyond the decree or substitute strict statutory valuation rules with general notions of fairness or sympathy - where parties have consensually agreed to a statutory benchmark (Guideline Value) via a compromise decree, the Judgment Debtor cannot later contest the calculation by attempting to re-classify the nature of the land to minimize compensation. [Paras 21 - 39] Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises Ltd. v. B. Gurappa Naidu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 445 : 2026 INSC 434

Order XXI Rule 95 - Delivery of property in occupancy of judgment-debtor

Order 21 Rule 95 CPC - Possession of Auction Purchaser – Supreme Court observed that while Order 21 Rule 95 CPC provides a procedure for an auction purchaser to take possession, if the purchaser actually gains possession and maintains it on the date of the suit's institution, they cannot be denied an injunction against a party with no title who seeks to interfere - Even if a specific issue on possession was not formally framed by the Trial Court, since the parties went to trial fully aware that the issue was central and led evidence accordingly, they cannot later claim prejudice - Held – The High Court erred by not considering the extensive documentary evidence (e.g., revenue records, factory registrations, tax payments) relied upon by the First Appellate Court to establish the appellant's possession - The matter was remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration within the scope of Section 100 CPC. [Relied on Nagubai Ammal and Others v. B. Shama Rao & Ors., (1956) 1 SCC 698; B. Arvind Kumar v. Govt. of India & Ors., (2007) 5 SCC 745; Paras 19-25] P. Elaiyappan v. Natarajan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 219

Order XXI Rule 97 - Resistance or obstruction to possession of immovable property

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXI, Rules 97, 98, 99, and 101 – Execution Proceedings – Objection by Third Party / Family Member – Deliberate attempt to stall recovery – Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that had permitted the mother of a Judgment Debtor (JD) to lead evidence to prove her claim of a share in a joint family property - Key Findings – i. Complete Code for Disputes - Order XXI, Rules 97, 98, 99, and 101 of the CPC constitute a complete code for resolving all execution-related disputes raised by a third party interested in the suit property without requiring a separate suit; ii. Feigned Ignorance and Delay - The objector (the mother) was a Director in the co-defendant Private Limited Company along with her son (the JD) - Supreme Court observed that she could not feign ignorance of the suit or the execution proceedings, especially when an attachment notice was conspicuously affixed to the property in 2017 where she claimed to reside - Filing an objection nine years into execution proceedings only when dispossession is threatened constitutes a deliberate attempt to stall recovery; iii. Lack of Prima Facie Basis - Speculative claims of co-ownership or purchases made from a "joint family business nucleus" cannot be entertained to lead evidence when structural facts and prior individual property transactions by the family members clearly contradict the claim. [Paras 5-8] Challani Ginning and Pressing Factory v. Kamal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 444 : 2026 INSC 426

Order XXI Rules 97-101 – Execution of Decree – Obstruction by Third Party – Abuse of Process – Re-litigation – Res Judicata – Appellants obtained a decree for specific performance and initiated execution - Respondents 1-3 (third parties) filed objections under Order XXI Rules 99-101 claiming independent title - During the pendency of the specific performance suit, the appellants had also filed separate suits against the same respondents for injunction/possession but allowed those suits to be dismissed for default and failed to restore them - Held: The appellants, having abandoned their earlier independent suits against the respondents for the same subject matter without seeking liberty to file afresh, are precluded from contesting the respondents' rights in execution proceedings - To permit the appellants to reap the benefits of the decree against these respondents through execution, after having failed to pursue direct legal remedies against them, would amount to an abuse of the process of the court and "re-litigation" - The principle of nemo debet bis vexari (no one should be twice troubled for the same cause) applies. [Paras 32-54] Sharada Sanghi v. Asha Agarwal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 299 : 2026 INSC 292

Order XLI Rule 25 - Where Appellate Court may frame issues and refer them for trial to Court whose decree appealed from.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XLI Rule 25 — Power of Appellate Court to frame issues and refer them for trial — Held: Even if the Trial Court did not omit to frame or try the issue originally, the Appellate Court can always exercise power under Order XLI Rule 25 to frame an issue to determine any question of fact which appears essential to the right decision of the suit upon the merits based on subsequent events (such as the amendment of the plaint). [Relied on Raj Kumar Bhatia Vs. Subhash Chander Bhatia, 2017 INSC 1240; Sadhna Lodh v. National Insurance Company, (2003) 3 SCC 524; Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu Vs. The Motor & General Traders, 1975 INSC 75; Para 18] Vinay Raghunath Deshmukh v. Natwarlal Shamji Gada, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 424 : 2026 INSC 416

Order XLI Rule 27 - Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court

Order XLI Rule 27 CPC — Exercise of Judicial Discretion — Noted that power to allow additional evidence is discretionary and must be used sparingly to remove a lacuna in the evidence, not to allow a party to fill gaps in their case at their "leisure or sweet will." - If the Appellate Court can pronounce a satisfactory and reasoned judgment based on the existing record, the provision has no application. [Para 11] Gobind Singh v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 221 : 2026 INSC 211 : AIR 2026 SC 1303

Order XLI Rule 27 CPC — Production of Additional Evidence in Appellate Court — Scope and Conditions Precedent — The Supreme Court reaffirmed that parties to an appeal are not entitled to produce additional evidence as a matter of right - The provision is couched in negative terms and applies only in three specific contingencies: (a) refusal by the trial court to admit evidence that ought to have been admitted; (aa) the party establishing that despite due diligence, such evidence was not within their knowledge or could not be produced at the trial stage; or (b) the Appellate Court itself requiring the evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. Gobind Singh v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 221 : 2026 INSC 211 : AIR 2026 SC 1303

Order XLI Rule 31 - Contents, date and signature of judgment.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 - Compliance with Appellate Judgment Requisites – Order XLI Rule 31 – Effect of framing general points for determination – Strict technical interpretation of Order XLI Rule 31 of CPC should not compromise substantial justice - Total or partial non-compliance with the requirement to frame specific points for determination does not automatically vitiate an appellate judgment or render it void - If a perusal of the judgment demonstrates that the First Appellate Court made an honest endeavor to appraise the rival contentions, thoroughly scrutinized the entire evidence on record, and provided well-supported reasons for its conclusions, there is substantial compliance with the law. [Paras 36, 37] Parvathi Nairthi v. Laxmi Nairthy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 528 : 2026 INSC 521

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Order XLI Rule 31 – Requirement of framing points for determination by the First Appellate Court – Nature of compliance – Held, compliance with Order XLI Rule 31 is mandatory, and the appellate court must formulate points for determination and record findings thereon supported by reasons - the requirement is one of substantial compliance and not one of mere technical formality - The substance of the judgment and the manner in which the appellate court has dealt with the controversy are of greater significance than the form in which points are framed - Where the First Appellate Court has undertaken a detailed reappreciation of oral and documentary evidence and recorded independent findings while reversing the trial court decree, the judgment is not liable to be set aside solely on the ground of non-compliance with the form of Order XLI Rule 31. [Paras 40, 41, 42] Mallika v. R. Nallathambi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 534 : 2026 INSC 529