Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - Supreme Court Half Yearly Digest Jan - Jun, 2026

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – No Condonation of Re-filing Delay Beyond 28 Days for IBC Appeals - While the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 (SCR) allow a 28-day window for curing defects and permit discretionary condonation of re-filing delay for general laws, this relaxation cannot override the express statutory edict of the IBC - An appeal under Section 62 must be defect-free to be considered validly instituted within the limitation period - Litigants cannot circumvent the rigorous timelines of the IBC by filing a defective appeal as a device to save limitation and curing defects at leisure - Once the 60-day statutory window under the IBC and the 28-day curing window under the SCR close, the right to appeal stands frozen and extinguished – Supreme Court has no power to condone any re-filing delay beyond the permissible 28 days for an appeal under Section 62 of the IBC. [Paras 15 - 25] CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary v. Adani Infrastructure and Developers, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 611 : 2026 INSC 629

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – No Differentiated Threshold for Neutral Officers / Liquidators - Serial Indulgence Impermissible – Noted that the fact that the appellant is a neutral officer (Liquidator) acting for the benefit of stakeholders does not permit the Supreme Court to invoke its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution to dilute or override the express statutory timeframes of the IBC - The statute does not carve out a separate threshold or relaxation for such officers - A litigant who has previously secured a liberal construction of "sufficient cause" and condonation of re-filing delay at an earlier appellate stage (e.g., under Section 61 before the NCLAT) cannot claim a similar exercise of judicial discretion automatically at successive appellate stages - The discipline of limitation under the IBC does not countenance serial condonations of delay, as it would defeat the legislative objective of expedition and finality. [Relied on Mobilox Innovations (P) Ltd. v. Kirusa Software (P) Ltd. (2018) 1 SCC 353; Kalparaj Dharamshi v. Kotak Investment Advisors Limited (2021) 10 SCC 401; Saturn Ventures and Advisors Pvt. Limited v. S. Gopalakrishnan (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2484); Distinguished from CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary v. Adani Infrastructure & Developers (P) Ltd. (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1406); Paras 19-24] CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary v. Adani Infrastructure and Developers, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 611 : 2026 INSC 629

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 62 – Supreme Court Rules, 2013 – Order VIII Rule 6(3) & (4) – Condonation of Delay in Filing and Re-filing Appeal – Insurmountable Jurisdictional Bar - Strict Timelines under IBC Prevail over Procedural Rules - The statutory scheme of limitation under the IBC is strict and time-bound - An appeal under Section 62 of the IBC must be presented within 45 days, with an extendable grace period of only 15 days upon showing sufficient cause - The absolute statutory outer limit is 60 days, beyond which the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to condone filing delay ceases entirely. [Para 20-25] CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary v. Adani Infrastructure and Developers, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 611 : 2026 INSC 629

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 33(2) & Section 62 – Withdrawal or Modification of Resolution Plan – Approving and Reprobating Conditions in Letter of Intent (LoI) – Forfeiture of Earnest Money Deposit (EMD) – Commercial Wisdom of the Committee of Creditors (CoC) – Supreme Court held the following – i. No Scope for Reneging After CoC Approval - Once a Resolution Plan is approved by the CoC, the Successful Resolution Applicant (SRA) is precluded from raising grievances regarding conditions in the Letter of Intent (LoI) that were already within their knowledge and expressly agreed upon during CoC meetings. A submitted resolution plan is binding and irrevocable between the CoC and the SRA; ii. Artifices to Delay/Modify Plan Prohibited - SRAs cannot employ clever ploys or indirect attempts (subterfuges) to back out of a CoC-approved plan by characterizing standard legal contingencies in an LoI as "conditionalities" - Such actions threaten to crumble the statutory architecture of the IBC; iii. Legality of EMD Forfeiture - Forfeiture of the Earnest Money Deposit (EMD) is fully justified under the Request For Resolution Plan (RFRP) if the SRA fails to submit the required performance bank guarantee within the stipulated time or non-complies with the resolution process; iv. Paramountcy of CoC's Decision to Liquidate - The decision of the CoC to liquidate the Corporate Debtor prior to the confirmation of the resolution plan especially when the SRA defaults or vacillates is a business decision taken in its commercial wisdom and is not amenable to judicial review. [Relied on Ebix Singapore Private Limited vs. Committee of Creditors of Educomp Solutions Limited and Another (2022) 2 SCC 401; Chairman, State Bank of India and Another v. M.J. James (2022) 2 SCC 301; Nagubai Ammal and Others v. B. Shama Rao and Others (1956) 1 SCC 698; Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corporation and Another v. Diamond & Gem Development Corporation Limited and Another (2013) 5 SCC 470; Manish Kumar v. Union of India (2021) 5 SCC 1; Paras 26-42] Sanjay Dave v. Andhra Bank, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 562 : 2026 INSC 580

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 138 & Section 141 — Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Part III (Sections 96, 101, 124, 128) — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Section 357) / Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (Section 395) — Interplay between Individual Moratorium and Cheque Bounce Proceedings - Core Principles Enunciated by Supreme Court - i. Predominantly Criminal Character of Section 138 - Although arising out of an inherently civil dispute or transaction, the "deeming fiction" under Section 138 of the NI Act attaches strict criminal liability as a measure of public policy and deterrence to maintain commercial integrity. It cannot be treated on par with a mere civil recovery mechanism; ii. Tiered/Bifurcated Approach to Section 138 - Proceedings under Section 138 must be bifurcated into two tiers - Tier-I (Criminal Aspect) which is mandatory and results in personal criminal liability (imprisonment or fine); and Tier-II (Compensatory Aspect) which is a discretionary exercise of power under Section 357 CrPC / Section 395 BNSS aimed at victim reparation; iii. Inapplicability of Moratorium on Criminal Aspect (Tier-I) - The interim moratorium under Section 96 and statutory moratorium under Section 101 of the IBC (Part III) do not stay the criminal aspect of Section 138 proceedings - Liability to pay a fine is an "excluded debt" under Section 79(15)(a) of the IBC, and the moratorium cannot be used to evade personal criminal accountability; iv. Applicability of Moratorium on Compensatory Aspect (Tier-II) - The moratorium provisions under Part III of the IBC apply strictly to the compensatory aspect of Section 138 - If a criminal court adjudicates that compensation is payable, the recovery and enforcement of such compensation against the debtor or his property must be temporarily halted during the moratorium period to prevent the depletion of the asset pool and allow breathing space; v. Vicarious Liability of Directors Undergoing Personal Insolvency - Where a corporate entity cannot be proceeded against due to a legal snag, the personal criminal liability of its Directors under Section 141 survives - if such a Director is undergoing personal insolvency or bankruptcy under Part III of the IBC, the expression "any debt" under Sections 96 and 101 is broad enough to include the statutory compensatory liability shifted onto him - while the criminal trial against the Director continues, the recovery of any ordered compensation from him or his properties remains stayed under Sections 96, 101, 124, and 128 of the IBC - Finding a deep-seated systemic conflict between the literal procedural mechanisms and the overarching social objective of penal deterrence under the NI Act, the Division Bench referred the matter to the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India for constitution of a three-judge Bench to conclusively determine the precise penal orientation of Section 138 and the exact extent of moratorium protections applicable over it. [Relied on P. Mohanraj v. Shah Bros. Ispat (P) Ltd., (2021) 6 SCC 258; Rakesh Bhanot v. Gurdas Agro Private Limited, (2025) 6 SCC 781; Ajay Kumar Radheshyam Goenka v. Tourism Finance Corporation of India Ltd., (2023) 10 SCC 545; Saranga Anilkumar Aggarwal v. Bhavesh Dhirajlal Sheth, (2025) 4 SCC 629; Paras 141-185, 186 - 211] Dineshchand Surana v. UCO Bank, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 555 : 2026 INSC 579

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - Section 61(2) Proviso – Appeal before NCLAT – Limitation and Mandatory Requirement of Certified Copy – Appeal filed/refiled without a certified copy of the impugned order or an accompanying application for exemption from filing the same is a "wholly incompetent appeal" and not a mere defective appeal - Filing an application for a certified copy is an essential indicator of the litigant's diligence under the strict timelines of the Code. [Paras 6 - 10] Angelwoods Apartment Allottees Association v. M. Lalitha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 491 : 2026 INSC 479

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 7 - Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) - Recovery Mechanism - Abuse of Process - The Code operates as a collective insolvency resolution mechanism and not as a forum for the adjudication of individual contractual claims - Where the object behind the invocation of the Code is to compel payment rather than to address genuine financial distress, such invocation amounts to an abuse of process - The Code must not be used as a tool for coercion and debt recovery by individual creditors. Dhanlaxmi Bank v. Mohammed Javed Sultan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 480 : 2026 INSC 460

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 7 - Financial Debt and Default - Intertwined Contractual Obligations - In a case where a loan was disbursed directly to a Builder under a quadripartite agreement, the Bank's disbursement is intrinsically linked to the performance of the Builder's obligations - When the dispute is predominantly contractual in character involving competing claims relating to the transfer of property and is already being adjudicated before the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT), it does not constitute a straightforward financial debt-default scenario warranting initiation of CIRP - Permitting invocation of the Code in such instances would amount to converting insolvency proceedings into a coercive mechanism for recovery, which is impermissible. [Relied on Innovative Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank & Anr. (2018) 1 SCC 407; Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. (2019) 8 SCC 416; Glas Trust Company LLC v. BYJU Raveendran & Ors. (2025) 3 SCC 625; Anjani Technoplast Ltd v. Shubh Gautam 2026 INSC 410 Paras 8-12] Dhanlaxmi Bank v. Mohammed Javed Sultan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 480 : 2026 INSC 460

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Project-Specific CIRP and Corporate Veil in Real Estate — Restoration of Resolution Plans — Appeals filed against the NCLAT judgment which had set aside NCLT orders approving project-specific resolution plans for Earth Infrastructures Limited (Corporate Debtor/Holding Company) - NCLAT had held that the project lands belonged to the subsidiary companies (lessees from GNIDA) and could not be treated as assets of the holding company under the Code - Supreme Court held: This was an eminently fit case for lifting the corporate veil as the holding company (EIL) was the main driving force in the development of the projects and payment of dues, while the subsidiaries were merely a front - The Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority (GNIDA) contributed greatly to the imbroglio through persistent inaction, ineptitude, and failure to monitor the projects despite being fully aware of the facts and the CIRP proceedings - GNIDA is disentitled from levying penal interest, penal charges, or time-extension penalties - To secure the completion of stalled real estate projects and protect innocent homebuyers, the project-specific resolution plans stand restored. GNIDA is directed to recalculate its dues strictly on principal amounts and communicate them to the resolution applicants, who shall clear the dues on their own over 24 months without burdening the homebuyers. [Paras 56 – 68] Alpha Corp Development v. Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 460 : 2026 INSC 449

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Section 25A(3A) — Representation of Class of Financial Creditors — Minority dissentient homebuyers challenging the resolution plan - Held, once an authorized representative casts a vote on behalf of a class of financial creditors (like homebuyers) based on a vote of more than 50% of the voting share of those who voted, it is not open to individual minority homebuyers to raise a separate voice of dissent against the majority vote. They must sail with the majority - Appeals filed with a delay of 34 days - Held, Section 62(2) empowers the Supreme Court to condone delay in filing an appeal up to 15 days but not more - The appeals are clearly barred by time and cannot be entertained. [Relied on Indiabulls Asset Reconstruction Company Limited vs. Ram Kishore Arora and others, AIR 2023 SC 2273; Mansi Brar Fernandes vs. Shubha Sharma and another, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1972; Life Insurance Corporation of India vs. Escorts Ltd. and others, (1986) 1 SCC 264; ArcelorMittal India Private Limited vs. Satish Kumar Gupta and others, (2019) 2 SCC 1; RPS Infrastructure Limited vs. Mukul Kumar and another, (2023) 10 SCC 718; Noida Entrepreneurs Association vs. Noida and others, (2011) 6 SCC 508; Paras 30, 31, 55-60, 65-76] Alpha Corp Development v. Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 460 : 2026 INSC 449

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) - Section 7 and Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 – Period of Limitation and Date of Default - The period of limitation for filing an application under Section 7 of the Code is three years and is strictly governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 - The right to apply accrues on the date of default, which is the date when the corporate debtor's account is classified as a Non-Performing Asset (NPA), and not from any subsequent recovery proceedings. [Relied On: Babulal Vardharji Gurjar v. Veer Gurjar, (2020) 15 SCC 1; Para 13] Shankar Khandelwal v. Omkara Asset Reconstruction Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 438 : 2026 INSC 429

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Non-Disclosure of Guarantee in Financial Statements - Mere non-disclosure of a corporate guarantee in the financial statements or annual reports of the Corporate Debtor cannot deprive the beneficiary lenders from asserting their claim on the basis of such a guarantee - At the very highest, such an omission can only be treated as a default committed by the Corporate Debtor under company law, but it cannot legitimately defeat the recognition of a financial debt or status of a financial creditor under the Code. [Para 25] State Bank of India v. Doha Bank Q.P.S.C., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 434 : 2026 INSC 423

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Production of Documents at Appellate Stage - An appeal is a continuation of the original proceeding - Documents relevant to deciding the lis (dispute)—such as corporate guarantees can be produced at the appellate stage before the NCLAT - Merely because such documents were not produced before the NCLT does not allow for any adverse inference to be drawn regarding their genuineness, provided their execution is otherwise established. [Para 27] State Bank of India v. Doha Bank Q.P.S.C., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 434 : 2026 INSC 423

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 5(8) – Financial Debt – Corporate Guarantee - A liability arising from a corporate guarantee squarely falls within the ambit of "financial debt" under Section 5(8) of the Code - The amount of any liability in respect of a guarantee for money borrowed against the payment of interest constitutes a financial debt, making the beneficiary lenders eligible to be recognized as "financial creditors" - A guarantor incurs a coextensive liability with that of the principal borrower, which is fully enforceable in law. [Paras 22 – 31] State Bank of India v. Doha Bank Q.P.S.C., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 434 : 2026 INSC 423

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 62 – Interference with Concurrent Findings - While the Supreme Court does not routinely re-appreciate facts when the NCLT and NCLAT have recorded concurrent findings, an exception is carved out where the findings of fact are shown to be glaringly and manifestly perverse - Where the tribunals reject valid claims of a consortium of lenders by misinterpreting asset classification norms or ignoring established statutory verifications, the findings warrant interference under Section 62. [Relied on Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 and Stamp Act, 1899, IN RE, (2024) 6 SCC 1; Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. Dilip Construction Company, (1969) 1 SCC 597; China Development Bank v. Doha Bank Q.P.S.C. & Ors., (2025) 7 SCC 729; Para 15 - 26, 30] State Bank of India v. Doha Bank Q.P.S.C., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 434 : 2026 INSC 423

Stamp Act, 1899 / Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 – Insufficient Stamping – Effect on Insolvency Claims - The defect of insufficient stamping of a document is curable in nature and does not go to the root of the validity of the instrument or render it void or unenforceable - The Stamp Act is a fiscal measure enacted to secure revenue for the State and is not intended to be used as a weapon by a litigant to defeat the cause of opponents - an insolvency claim cannot be rejected or negated merely because the underlying corporate guarantee is alleged to be insufficiently stamped or lacks payment under a specific state stamp legislation when executed in another jurisdiction. [Paras 28 - 32] State Bank of India v. Doha Bank Q.P.S.C., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 434 : 2026 INSC 423

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 – General Rule on Fresh Cause of Action vs. Contextual Misuse— While a judgment or decree for money in favor of a financial creditor gives rise to a fresh cause of action to initiate proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC, this principle does not operate in a vacuum - Every decree-holder who happens to be a financial creditor is not entitled, as a matter of right, to invoke the insolvency process in preference to execution - Whether the invocation of the IBC amounts to a misuse of the process or a recovery mechanism must be contextually examined based on the unique facts of each case. [Relied on Swiss Ribbons (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 4 SCC 17; Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 8 SCC 416; GLAS Trust Co. LLC v. BYJU Raveendran, (2025) 3 SCC 625; Tottempudi Salalith v. State Bank of India, (2024) 1 SCC 24; Para 31-33] Anjani Technoplast Ltd. v. Shubh Gautam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 418 : 2026 INSC 410

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 vs. Civil Court Decree Execution – Primary Objective of the IBC vs. Debt Recovery Mechanism — The primary focus of the IBC is to ensure the revival and continuation of the corporate debtor as a going concern, protecting it from its own management and liquidation - It is a beneficial legislation and not a debt recovery mechanism for individual creditors seeking to enforce money decrees - Initiating the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) purely to secure payment of individual dues, bypassing established civil execution remedies against a solvent and functioning company, constitutes an abuse of the process - The insolvency jurisdiction under the IBC is not designed to resolve intense disputes regarding the computation or quantum of a decretal amount. [Paras 19, 21 - 33] Anjani Technoplast Ltd. v. Shubh Gautam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 418 : 2026 INSC 410

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - The Supreme Court expressed serious concern over inordinate delays by the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) in approving resolution plans under the IBC, terming the delay of nearly two years in the present case as “very unfortunate”. The Court observed that once a resolution plan is approved by the Committee of Creditors (CoC), it is incumbent upon the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) to consider and approve the same in a timely manner. Prolonged inaction frustrates the core objective of the IBC of achieving time-bound completion of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP). AVJ Heights Apartment Owners Association v. IIFL Finance, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 392

Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (SICA) – Repeal and Abatement of Proceedings – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) – Section 252 and Eighth Schedule – Noted that after the repeal of SICA on 01.12.2016, any appeal pending before the AAIFR stood abated - Companies were granted a 180-day window to approach the NCLT under the IBC - Where Jaipur Udyog Ltd. (JUL) and Gannon Dunkerley & Co. Ltd. (GDCL) failed to file any reference before the NCLT within the prescribed period, the appeal pending before the AAIFR abated, and the BIFR's recommendation for winding up of the company stood revived. [Paras 173–174] Bhartiya Mazdoor Sangh, v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 373 : 2026 INSC 364

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 9 – Initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) by Operational Creditor – Pre-existing Dispute – Plausible Contentions – The Supreme Court set aside the NCLAT judgment that had admitted a Section 9 application, holding that the NCLAT erroneously delved into the merits of the dispute rather than merely checking for its existence - Supreme Court found clear evidence of a pre-existing dispute regarding defective supplies and the need for reconciliation of accounts, which dated back to written correspondence from December 2020, long before the demand notice issued in November 2021. GLS Films Industries v. Chemical Suppliers, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : 2026 INSC 344

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Reconciliation of Accounts – Supreme Court emphasized that when there is a lack of clarity regarding the amount due and parties have called for reconciliation based on losses from defective supplies, such a situation supports the existence of a dispute - Noted that the respondent's own confusion demanding ₹4.60 crore and later "correcting" it to ₹2.92 crore after the demand notice manifested a lack of consensus on the liability. [Relied on Mobilox Innovations Private Limited vs. Kirusa Software Private Limited (2018) 1 SCC 353; Sabarmati Gas Limited vs. Shah Alloys Limited (2023) 3 SCC 229; Paras 17-21] GLS Films Industries v. Chemical Suppliers, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : 2026 INSC 344

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Scope of Adjudicating Authority's Inquiry – Summary Jurisdiction – Reaffirming the legal position, the Court stated that for the purpose of Section 9, the Adjudicating Authority only needs to satisfy itself that a "plausible" dispute exists which is not "spurious, hypothetical or illusory" - It is not required to determine whether the defence is likely to succeed or to examine the merits of the dispute beyond identifying a non-feeble legal argument. GLS Films Industries v. Chemical Suppliers, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : 2026 INSC 344

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 30(2)(e) – Eligibility of Resolution Applicant – A Resolution Professional (RP) must ensure a resolution plan does not contravene any law, including the MSCS Act - Where an MSCS seeks to acquire a Corporate Debtor (CD), it must satisfy the threshold that the CD is either a subsidiary or operates in the same line of business as defined in the MSCS's charter documents - The "same line of business" refers to a substantive sameness or close nexus in core economic activities, not remote or incidental connections - Revenue generated or profit/loss incurred is irrelevant to this determination; the inquiry is strictly governed by the approved bye-laws - Mere reproduction of the statutory language of Section 64(d) in the investment clause of the bye-laws (Clause 52) does not suffice if the core Object Clause (Clause 5) is not correspondingly amended to include the specific line of business of the target institution. [Paras 33-50] Nirmal Ujjwal Credit Co-Operative Society Ltd. v. Ravi Sethia, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 357 : 2026 INSC 338

Fabrication and Fraud – Conduct of Petitioner – Supreme Court noted the inclusion of "GST" in an allotment agreement purportedly dated 15.04.2015, whereas GST was only introduced in 2017 - Held, such an inclusion is not a clerical error but points directly at the fabrication of documents to derive commercial benefits - Further, the petitioner engaged in "double allotment" and created third-party rights using fabricated stamp papers – Following the initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP), the petitioner siphoned off approximately Rs. 74 Crores to entities controlled by his immediate family members (wife, daughter, and sons) - Held, such conduct during a moratorium is ex-facie impermissible and lends credence to allegations of committing similar offences while on bail - Due to intentional and established violations of bail conditions, the Court ordered the forfeiture of the entire Rs. 50 Crore deposit along with accrued interest - Rs. 5 Crores was directed to be transmitted to NALSA, and the remainder to the Interim Resolution Professional (IRP) for IBC proceedings. [Relied on Ashok Dhankad v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1690; Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Col. Gautam Mullick and Ors, Civil Appeal Nos. 13779 and 13812 of 2025; P. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2022) 15 SCC 211; Daulat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349; Paras 65-80, 122-128] Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Government of NCT of Delhi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 316 : 2026 INSC 310

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 14 — Moratorium — Appropriation of Security Deposit against pre-CIRP dues — Held: The appropriation of a cash security deposit available with a creditor after the initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) towards dues that arose prior to the CIRP is impermissible and contrary to the moratorium imposed under Section 14 of the IBC - Such a deposit remains the property of the Corporate Debtor until a valid adjustment is made - While payments for maintaining the supply of goods and services during the moratorium period (post-CIRP) to keep the Corporate Debtor as a going concern are permissible under Section 14(2A), the recovery of pre-CIRP dues must strictly follow the claim procedure envisaged in the IBC. Central Transmission Utility of India v. Sumit Binani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 289 : 2026 INSC 284

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Set-off in CIRP — Pari Passu Principle — Held - The principle of insolvency set-off as permitted in liquidation regulations cannot be applied to CIRP - Set-off of dues payable by the Corporate Debtor for a period prior to the commencement of the CIRP cannot be made from dues (or assets) payable to or belonging to the Corporate Debtor post the commencement of the CIRP - Allowing such a set-off would mitigate against the pari passu principle essential to the scheme of the IBC. [Relied on Bharti Airtel Ltd. v. Aircel Ltd. & Dishnet Wireless Ltd. (Resolution Professional), (2024) 4 SCC 668; Paras 15-25] Central Transmission Utility of India v. Sumit Binani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 289 : 2026 INSC 284

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 12A – Recall of Order – Maintainability – Commercial Wisdom of CoC - The Supreme Court dismissed a Miscellaneous Application (MA) seeking to recall a prior order dated 25.02.2025 that had dismissed a Special Leave Petition (SLP) - The applicant sought recall based on subsequent events, specifically a settlement reached under Section 12A of the IBC and the withdrawal of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) - Supreme Court reiterated that the decision to accept a settlement or a commercial course of action under Section 12A falls within the "collective commercial wisdom" of the Committee of Creditors (CoC) - held that a higher offer by an applicant does not, by itself, provide a ground to unsettle steps taken within the insolvency framework or to reopen the dismissal of an SLP. Lamba Exports Pvt. Ltd. v. Dhir Global Industries Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 286 : 2026 INSC 275

Practice and Procedure – Miscellaneous Application for Recall – An application for recall of an order dismissing an SLP cannot be used as a "second innings" to litigate issues that were not part of the original proceedings - noted that the original SLP arose from a suit for specific performance, whereas the MA attempted to introduce new grievances related to separate insolvency proceedings - While fraud can vitiate proceedings, such a claim must be proven and cannot be invoked on mere assertion. [Paras 10-15] Lamba Exports Pvt. Ltd. v. Dhir Global Industries Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 286 : 2026 INSC 275

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 31(1) — Arbitral Proceedings — Counterclaim vs. Set-off — 'Clean Slate' Principle — Whether a respondent can raise a plea of set-off in arbitration proceedings after the approval of a Resolution Plan, even if its counterclaim was not part of the plan and stands extinguished - Held, that once a Resolution Plan is approved under Section 31(1) of the IBC, all claims not included in the plan stand extinguished - a respondent cannot seek any affirmative relief through a counterclaim that was not part of the approved plan - if the specific terms of the Resolution Plan only bar payments or settlements and do not expressly or impliedly exclude the plea of set-off as a defense, such a plea can be raised to defend against the appellant's claim - The plea of set-off is permitted only as a defensive tool to prevent the appellant from succeeding entirely or in part - If the amount due to the respondent exceeds the amount awarded to the appellant, the surplus is not recoverable. If the appellant's proceedings are withdrawn, the counterclaim/set-off defense fails. [Relied on Ghanashyam Mishra & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. (2021) 9 SCC 657; Bharti Airtel Ltd. v. Aircel Ltd. & Dishnet Wireless Ltd. (Resolution Professional) (2024) 4 SCC 668; Paras 21-27] Ujaas Energy Ltd. v. West Bengal Power Development Corporation Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 272 : 2026 INSC 268 : AIR 2026 SC 1541

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Resolution Plan — Modification vs. Clarification — Clarifications that reaffirm existing terms of a Resolution Plan—such as confirming the treatment of Bank Guarantees or the Net Present Value (NPV) of deferred payments—do not amount to an unauthorized enhancement or modification of a commercial offer after the conclusion of negotiations. Torrent Power v. Ashish Arjunkumar Rathi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 207 : 2026 INSC 206 : AIR 2026 SC 1347

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 61(3)(ii) — Material Irregularity — Seeking clarifications from resolution applicants by the Resolution Professional (RP) under the specific instructions of the CoC does not constitute "material irregularity." - The RP acts as a communicator for the CoC's queries to ensure a comprehensive evaluation of the feasibility and viability of resolution plans - Such conduct does not amount to an independent or unilateral modification of the process by the RP. Torrent Power v. Ashish Arjunkumar Rathi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 207 : 2026 INSC 206 : AIR 2026 SC 1347

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Sections 30(2), 31, 61(3), and 62 — Doctrine of Commercial Wisdom — Scope of Judicial Review — The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors (CoC) is paramount and non-justiciable - The Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) and Appellate Authority (NCLAT) have limited jurisdiction to interfere with the CoC's decision, restricted strictly to ensuring compliance with statutory requirements under Section 30(2) and identifying material irregularities under Section 61(3) – Held that courts cannot act as courts of equity or substitute their commercial assessment for that of the CoC, which comprises financial creditors who bear the economic consequences of the corporate debtor's failure. Torrent Power v. Ashish Arjunkumar Rathi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 207 : 2026 INSC 206 : AIR 2026 SC 1347

Economic Policy and Legislative Intent — Excessive Judicial Review — Supreme Court cautioned against the strategic use of litigation by unsuccessful resolution applicants to delay the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP). Excessive judicial scrutiny beyond narrow statutory boundaries leads to value destruction, erodes the going-concern status of the Corporate Debtor, and discourages future bidders by introducing legal uncertainty - The IBC prioritizes speed, finality, and predictability to ensure efficient resource allocation in the economy. [Relied on Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited vs. Satish Kumar Gupta, (2020) 8 SCC 531; Kalyani Transco vs. Bhushan Power & Steel Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2093; Swiss Ribbons Private Ltd. vs. Union of India, (2019) 4 SCC 17; Pratap Technocrats Private Ltd. vs. Monitoring Committee of Reliance Infratel Limited, (2021) 10 SCC 623; Paras 7-14] Torrent Power v. Ashish Arjunkumar Rathi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 207 : 2026 INSC 206 : AIR 2026 SC 1347

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Sections 7, 60(2), and 60(3) – Simultaneous Proceedings – Maintainability of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) against Principal Debtor and Corporate Guarantor – Held: Simultaneous proceedings for CIRP under the IBC against both the principal debtor and its corporate guarantor (or vice-versa) are maintainable - The liability of a surety is co-extensive with that of the principal debtor under Section 128 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 - The IBC permits separate or simultaneous proceedings to be initiated by a financial creditor against both entities. ICICI Bank v, Era Infrastructure, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 203 : 2026 INSC 201 : AIR 2026 SC 1371

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Discretion of Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) – Section 7 vs. Section 9 – Held: The use of the word "may" in Section 7(5)(a) confers a degree of discretion upon the NCLT to admit a financial creditor's application, whereas "shall" in Section 9(5)(a) for operational creditors is mandatory - this discretion must be exercised reasonably and not arbitrarily – Noted that the NCLT should admit a Section 7 application upon satisfaction of financial debt and default, unless there are "good reasons" to the contrary. [Relied on BRS Ventures Investments Ltd. v. SREI Infrastructure Finance Ltd. & Anr. (2025) 1 SCC 456; Maitreya Doshi v. Anand Rathi Global Finance Ltd. (2023) 17 SCC 606; Axis Bank Ltd. v. Vidarbha Industries Power Ltd. (2022) 8 SCC 352; Paras 77-104] ICICI Bank v, Era Infrastructure, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 203 : 2026 INSC 201 : AIR 2026 SC 1371

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Doctrine of Election – Applicability to IBC Claims – Held: The doctrine of election is not attracted in the context of filing claims against both the debtor and the guarantor - Restricting a creditor to elect between the two would defeat the purpose of a guarantee and potentially lead to the loss of rights under the "clean slate" principle if the full debt is not claimed in a concluding CIRP - There is no statutory proscription in the IBC against filing such simultaneous claims. ICICI Bank v, Era Infrastructure, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 203 : 2026 INSC 201 : AIR 2026 SC 1371

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Double Enrichment – Safeguards under 2016 Regulations – Held: While concerns regarding double enrichment (recovering more than the total debt) are well-founded, they do not justify a bar on simultaneous proceedings - Sufficient safeguards exist in Regulation 12A (obligation of the creditor to update claims upon partial satisfaction from any source) and Regulation 14 (duty of the Resolution Professional to revise admitted claim amounts based on new information) of the IBBI (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016. ICICI Bank v, Era Infrastructure, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 203 : 2026 INSC 201 : AIR 2026 SC 1371

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Sections 14, 36, 60(5), and 238 – Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 – Sections 24 and 27 – Jurisdiction of NCLT/NCLAT over Benami Proceedings – Held: The National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) do not have the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the legality or validity of provisional attachment orders or confiscation proceedings initiated under the Benami Act - Such proceedings fall within the realm of public law and sovereign functions of the State, which are distinct from private proprietary disputes or debt recovery actions. S. Rajendran v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 199 : 2026 INSC 187 : AIR 2026 SC 1323

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Liquidation Estate and Beneficial Ownership – Section 36 IBC – Held: Only assets beneficially owned by the corporate debtor form part of the liquidation estate - Since a benamidar (the corporate debtor in this case) possesses no beneficial interest and holds property in a fiduciary capacity, such property is expressly excluded from the liquidation estate under Section 36(4)(a)(i) and cannot be distributed to creditors. S. Rajendran v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 199 : 2026 INSC 187 : AIR 2026 SC 1323

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Moratorium – Section 14 IBC – Scope – Held: The moratorium under Section 14 is intended to protect the corporate debtor from "creditor actions" for debt recovery -It does not act as an automated stay against sovereign in rem proceedings initiated for the attachment or confiscation of property under penal statutes like the Benami Act - The protection under Section 32A is "event-based" and only triggered upon the approval of a resolution plan or a liquidation sale to an unconnected third party -It does not validate a defective title or retrospectively convert benami property into assets of the corporate debtor during the pendency of proceedings. [Relied on Embassy Property Developments (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka (2020) 13 SCC 308; State Bank of India v. Union of India (2026 INSC 153); Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Amit Gupta (2021) 7 SCC 209; Controller of Estate Duty, Lucknow v. Aloke Mitra (1981) 2 SCC 121; Paras 13-24] S. Rajendran v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 199 : 2026 INSC 187 : AIR 2026 SC 1323

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Interaction between IBC and Benami Act – Overriding Effect – Held: While the IBC is a later and special enactment, it does not displace the statutory mechanism of the Benami Act regarding the determination of "tainted" assets - The "residuary jurisdiction" of the NCLT under Section 60(5) cannot be used to "short-circuit" the specialized adjudicatory hierarchy (Adjudicating Authority, Appellate Tribunal, and High Court) established under the Benami Act. S. Rajendran v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 199 : 2026 INSC 187 : AIR 2026 SC 1323

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Section 7 — Initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) — Admissibility of Application — Existence of Debt and Default — The Supreme Court set aside the concurrent findings of the NCLT and NCLAT which had refused to initiate CIRP against the Corporate Debtor - held that for admission of an application under Section 7, the adjudicating authority is only required to examine and satisfy itself that a financial debt exists and there is a default in relation thereto - The concept of a "pre-existing dispute," relevant for operational creditors under Section 9, has no bearing on applications filed by financial creditors under Section 7. [Para 12] Catalyst Trusteeship Ltd. v. Ecstasy Realty Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 192 : 2026 INSC 186 : AIR 2026 SC 1311

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Debenture Trust Deed (DTD) — Modification of Terms — Procedure for Restructuring — Supreme Court observed that the Corporate Debtor's claim of an existing moratorium was based on unilateral e-mail exchanges with only one debenture holder (ECLF) – Held that such negotiations could not bind other debenture holders or the Debenture Trustee in the absence of express authorization - Any modification, amendment, or waiver of the DTD terms must strictly adhere to the procedure prescribed within the deed itself—specifically requiring a "Special Resolution" passed by a three-fourths majority of debenture holders and a written document signed by all parties. [Paras 13-15, 18] Catalyst Trusteeship Ltd. v. Ecstasy Realty Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 192 : 2026 INSC 186 : AIR 2026 SC 1311

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Concurrent Findings — Scope of Interference by Supreme Court — While the Supreme Court ordinarily does not reappreciate facts where the NCLT and NCLAT have recorded concurrent findings, an exception exists when the perversity of such findings is clearly established – Noted that the NCLT and NCLAT erred by ignoring binding contractual terms of the DTD based on "surmises, conjectures and assumptions"- Appeal allowed. [Relied on Innoventive Industries Limited vs. ICICI Bank and another (2018) 1 SCC 407; Indus Biotech Private Limited vs. Kotak India Venture (Offshore) Fund and others (2021) 6 SCC 436; Para 18-22] Catalyst Trusteeship Ltd. v. Ecstasy Realty Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 192 : 2026 INSC 186 : AIR 2026 SC 1311

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 vs. Companies Act, 1956 – Sections 391-394 – Overriding effect of IBC – Redundancy of Scheme of Arrangement (SOA) due to gross delay – The Supreme Court held that proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC cannot be stalled on the grounds of "judicial discipline" due to a pending Scheme of Arrangement under the Companies Act, especially when such a scheme has become defunct and inoperative due to a decade-long delay and non-compliance with statutory timelines - Noted that the IBC is a special statute aimed at the revival of companies, and its provisions prevail over inconsistent provisions in other laws by virtue of Section 238. Omkara Assets Reconstruction v. Amit Chaturvedi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 191 : 2026 INSC 189 : AIR 2026 SC 1205

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 7(2) and 7(5)(b) — Adherence to Form — An application under Section 7 is not liable to be rejected for insignificant omissions or technical errors if it is substantially in conformity with Form 1and discloses the essential ingredients: (a) applicant is a financial creditor, (b) existence of a financial debt, (c) occurrence of default, and (d) default meets the threshold under Section 4 - The Adjudicating Authority may allow the rectification of applications and the filing of additional documents at any time before the final order. B. Prashanth Hegde v. State Bank of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 156 : 2026 INSC 155

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 7 — Effect of Counterclaims and Criminal Proceedings — Mere pendency of a counterclaim for damages or the institution of criminal proceedings against the officials of a Financial Creditor does not bar the initiation of CIRP - Such proceedings have no bearing on the existence of the financial debt or the right of the creditor to invoke IBC – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Asset Reconstruction Company (India) Ltd. v. Bishal Jaiswal & Anr. (2021) 6 SCC 366; Dena Bank v. C. Shivakumar Reddy (2021) 10 SCC 330; M. Suresh Kumar Reddy v. Canara Bank (2023) 8 SCC 387; Paras 31, 37-40, 45-51, 54, 55] B. Prashanth Hegde v. State Bank of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 156 : 2026 INSC 155

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 7 — Limitation Act, 1963; Section 18 and Article 137 — Acknowledgement of Debt — The Supreme Court upheld the NCLAT's finding that a Section 7 application was within limitation despite the initial default occurring years prior - held that entry of debt in the Corporate Debtor's (CD) balance sheets serves as a valid acknowledgement under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963, provided it is signed by a director (who acts as an agent of the company) – Noted that how a bank classifies its debt for asset classification (NPA) under RBI norms is not a determining factor for the starting point of limitation if the debt is subsequently restructured and acknowledged in fresh agreements. B. Prashanth Hegde v. State Bank of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 156 : 2026 INSC 155

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Sections 18(f) and 36(4) – Applicability to Spectrum – Ownership vs. Right to Use – Held, Spectrum allocated to Telecom Service Providers (TSPs) cannot be subjected to proceedings under the IBC - While spectrum may be recorded as an "intangible asset" in the TSPs' books of account for accounting purposes in compliance with AS 26 and Ind AS 38, such recognition is not determinative of ownership - The IBC explicitly excludes assets owned by a third party but held by the corporate debtor under contractual arrangements from the insolvency/liquidation estate - Since the Union of India retains exclusive privilege and ownership over spectrum as a trustee for the public, the TSPs hold only a limited, conditional, and revocable "right to use". [Paras 60, 61, 63, 69] State Bank of India v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 152 : 2026 INSC 153

Interpretation of Statutes - Statutory Interpretation – Harmonious Construction – Conflict between IBC and Telecommunication Laws – Where two special statutes contain non-obstante clauses, the court must analyze the dominant purpose of each - The IBC focuses on the reorganization of the corporate debtor, whereas the Telegraph Act, Wireless Telegraphy Act, and TRAI Act form an exhaustive code for the telecom sector - The IBC cannot be permitted to make inroads into the telecom sector to restructure rights and liabilities arising from the administration of spectrum, which falls under the exclusive legal province of the Union and the Regulator. [Relied on Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, (2012) 3 SCC 1; Natural Resources Allocation, In Re, Special Reference No. 1 of 2012, (2012) 10 SCC 1; Embassy Property Developments (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2020) 13 SCC 308; Union of India v. Association of Unified Telecom Service Providers of India, (2011) 10 SCC 543; Swiss Ribbons (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 4 SCC 17; Paras 64, 66, 67] State Bank of India v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 152 : 2026 INSC 153

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 – Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) – Real Estate Projects – Role of Third-Party Entities – National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) Jurisdiction – Article 142 of the Constitution of India – The Supreme Court upheld the NCLAT's direction to engage NBCC India Ltd., a Government of India entity, to complete 16 stalled residential projects of M/s. Supertech Limited - held that the primary consideration in insolvency proceedings involving real estate companies is to protect the interests of home buyers who have waited decades for shelter - Claims of secured creditors, operational creditors, and land authorities (Noida, Greater Noida, and Yamuna Expressway) are, for the time being, considered secondary to the delivery of units with basic amenities – Held that such an equitable mechanism, aimed at completing construction on a "war footing," does not violate the IBC and warrants protection under the umbrella of Article 142 of the Constitution. Apex Heights Pvt. Ltd. v. Ram Kishor Arora, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 142

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Key Directions issued by the Supreme Court – i. Engagement of NBCC: NBCC is directed to complete the pending projects within stipulated timelines using its own resources and 70% of project receivables; ii. Protection for Home Buyers: Existing allottees shall not be subjected to any cost escalation beyond the original Builder Buyer Agreements; iii. Administrative Oversight: Constitution of an Apex Court Committee and Project-wise Court Committees to monitor progress and approve fund transfers between projects; iv. No Judicial Interference: No Court or Tribunal shall pass interim orders stopping projects commenced by NBCC; any grievances must be brought directly to the Supreme Court; v. Appointment of Amicus Curiae: Mr. Rajiv Jain, Senior Counsel, and Mr. Amarendra Kumar are appointed as Amicus Curiae to assist the Tribunal and monitor ongoing projects. [Paras 15-22] Apex Heights Pvt. Ltd. v. Ram Kishor Arora, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 142

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 14 — Moratorium vs. Arbitral Continuity — Noted that the High Court erred in nullifying arbitral orders passed during a moratorium period while exercising jurisdiction under the Arbitration Act - The Supreme Court used its powers under Article 142 to declare transactions (sale of flats) made pursuant to such arbitral orders as lawfully valid to protect third-party homebuyer rights. [Relied on Yashwith Constructions Pvt. Ltd. v. Simplex Concrete Piles India Ltd. & Anr. (2006) 6 SCC 204; Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 & Stamp Act, 1899, In re, (2024) 6 SCC 1; Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. Bihar Rajya Pul Nirman Nigam Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2578; Official Trustee v. Sachindra Nath Chatterjee, 1968 SCC Online SC 103; Paras 28-47] Ankhim Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Zaveri Construction Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 133 : 2026 INSC 137 : AIR 2026 SC 1042

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 15(2), 15(3), and 15(4) — Substitution of Arbitrator — Validity of prior proceedings — The Supreme Court held that while appointing a substitute arbitrator under Section 15(2), the High Court cannot declare proceedings undertaken by the previous tribunal as a "nullity" on the grounds of an IBC moratorium - Held that Section 15 is a mechanism to preserve continuity; prior proceedings remain valid unless the parties agree otherwise or the substitute tribunal, in its discretion, decides to repeat hearings. Ankhim Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Zaveri Construction Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 133 : 2026 INSC 137 : AIR 2026 SC 1042

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 – Maintainability of Joint Petition – Multi-Corporate Entities – Threshold Requirement – Supreme Court upheld the maintainability of a single Section 7 application against two separate corporate entities (Grand Venezia Ltd. and Bhasin Ltd.) where they were found to be "intrinsically linked" in the construction and implementation of a real estate project -Noted that interlinkage of related corporate debtors is beneficial for value maximization and for continuing companies as going concerns. [Para 11 - 16, 20 - 26] Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Col. Gautam Mullick, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 100 : 2026 INSC 104 : AIR 2026 SC 818

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7(1) Second Proviso – Threshold of 100 Allottees – Relevant Date for Calculation – The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the crucial date for ascertaining whether the minimum threshold of 100 allottees (or 10% of total allottees) is met is the date of filing of the petition, and not the date of its admission or hearing - Any subsequent settlements or withdrawals during the pendency of the proceedings do not render the petition non-maintainable if the threshold was met at the time of presentation. [Para 9, 21] Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Col. Gautam Mullick, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 100 : 2026 INSC 104 : AIR 2026 SC 818

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Real Estate Project – Default in Possession – Completion Certificate – Where a developer fails to obtain a final completion certificate and fails to execute tripartite sublease deeds as required by the lessor (UPSIDA), physical delivery of possession without such legal formalities has no legal import - The existence of a financial debt and default is established when units are not made ready or delivered in a fit state for occupation despite payment of consideration. [Relied on Manish Kumar vs. Union of India (2021) 5 SCC 1; Surendra Trading Company vs. Juggilal Kamlapat Jute Mills Company Limited (2017) 16 SCC 143; Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited vs. Sachet Infrastructure Private Limited (2019) SCC OnLine NCLAT 592; Paras 31 - 37] Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Col. Gautam Mullick, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 100 : 2026 INSC 104 : AIR 2026 SC 818

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Sections 31, 43, and 45 – Modification of Resolution Plan – Avoidance Transactions – Noted that the NCLT cannot, while adjudicating a miscellaneous application, grant rights to a Successful Resolution Applicant (SRA) that are better than or different from those recognized in the Committee of Creditors (CoC) approved Resolution Plan - Any such declaration amounts to an impermissible modification of the approved plan - the NCLT cannot suo motu or "by a sidewind" neutralize transactions as preferential (Section 43) or undervalued (Section 45) without a formal application by the Resolution Professional (or under Section 47 by a creditor) and without providing the affected party clear notice and a fair opportunity to respond - Such summary findings are perverse and violate principles of natural justice. Gloster Cables Ltd. v. Fort Gloster Industries Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 80 : 2026 INSC 81 : AIR 2026 SC 748

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 60(5)(c) – Jurisdiction of Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) – Declaration of Title to Assets – Held, the NCLT cannot exercise its residuary jurisdiction under Section 60(5)(c) to adjudicate upon complex disputes of title to property (such as trademarks) that are dehors the insolvency proceedings - The nexus with the insolvency of the Corporate Debtor must exist for the NCLT to exercise power under this section – Noted that in the present case, where the approved Resolution Plan itself recognized rival claims and "beliefs" regarding the ownership of the "Gloster" trademark rather than an undisputed assertion of title, the NCLT exceeded its jurisdiction by recorded a finding that the trademark was an asset of the Corporate Debtor. Gloster Cables Ltd. v. Fort Gloster Industries Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 80 : 2026 INSC 81 : AIR 2026 SC 748

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 – Locus Standi of Homebuyer Societies – Held, a society or Resident Welfare Association (RWA) does not possess locus standi to intervene in Section 7 proceedings at the pre-admission stage - At this stage, proceedings are in personam between the applicant creditor and the corporate debtor - While individual allottees are "financial creditors" under the Explanation to Section 5(8)(f), this status does not automatically extend to a society unless it is a creditor in its own right or a statutorily recognized authorized representative. [Para 13] Elegna Co-Op. Housing and Commercial Society v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 51 : 2026 INSC 58

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 – Admission of CIRP – Mandatory Nature – Discretion of Adjudicating Authority – Supreme Court issued a set of directions regarding the functioning of the Committee of Creditors (CoC) under the Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, noting that while the commercial wisdom of the CoC is paramount, such power must be exercised with responsibility, transparency and proper application of mind, particularly in real estate insolvencies where homebuyers' interests are deeply involved - Held, the inquiry under Section 7(5)(a) is confined strictly to the determination of debt and default - Once the Adjudicating Authority is satisfied that a financial debt exists and a default has occurred, it must admit the application unless it is incomplete - Considerations such as project viability, business status (going concern), stage of completion, or perceived prejudice to homebuyers are extraneous and irrelevant at the admission stage. [Para 12] Elegna Co-Op. Housing and Commercial Society v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 51 : 2026 INSC 58

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Object of Code – Resolution vs. Recovery – The fundamental object of the IBC is resolution and revival, not mere recovery - the concept of revival does not exclude recovery altogether; it only excludes the abuse of insolvency as a pressure tactic - Alternative remedies under SARFAESI or RERA remain available, but the presence of such recovery proceedings does not bar the initiation of CIRP under Section 7. [Para 10, 12] Elegna Co-Op. Housing and Commercial Society v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 51 : 2026 INSC 58

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Protection of Homebuyers – Specific Directions – To ensure transparency and safeguard homebuyer interests during CIRP - issued mandatory directions: (i) The Information Memorandum must disclose comprehensive details of all allottees; (ii) The CoC must record specific written reasons if they find it not viable to approve handover of possession under Regulation 4E; and (iii) Any recommendation for liquidation must be accompanied by a reasoned justification. [Relied on Innoventive Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank (2018) 1 SCC 407; Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd v. Union of India (2019) 8 SCC 416; GLAS Trust Co. LLC v. BYJU Raveendran (2025) 3 SCC 625; Swiss Ribbons (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (2019) 4 SCC 17; Para 15] Elegna Co-Op. Housing and Commercial Society v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 51 : 2026 INSC 58

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 14 – Moratorium – Liability of Natural Persons – While a moratorium under Section 14 shields the corporate debtor, it does not extend to its directors or promoters - the mere absence of a moratorium-related bar does not automatically make directors liable in execution proceedings unless their independent liability was established during the adjudicatory process - A company is a distinct legal entity from its shareholders and directors - The doctrine of "piercing the corporate veil" is an exceptional measure that requires specific pleadings and a determination of fraud or dishonest misuse of the corporate personality, which cannot be introduced for the first time at the execution stage. [Relied on Rajbir v. Suraj Bhan (2022) 14 SCC 609; Electronics Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Secy., Revenue Deptt., Govt. of A.P. (1999) 4 SCC 458; Paras 11-20] Ansal Crown Heights Flat Buyers Association v. Ansal Crown Infrabuild Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 40 : 2026 INSC 51

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - Extinguishment of Debt under Resolution Plan - The approval of a Resolution Plan under Section 31 of the IBC does not ipso facto result in the extinguishment of the entire debt against third-party sureties or security providers unless expressly provided for in the plan - Where a Resolution Plan (specifically Clause 3.2(ix) in this case) explicitly reserves the rights of financial creditors to proceed against third parties or promoters for the "unsustainable debt" portion, the discharge of the Corporate Debtor does not bar claims against such third-party security providers – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Lalit Kumar Jain v. Union of India (2021) 9 SCC 321; Paras 23-25] UV Asset Reconstruction Company v. Electrosteel Castings, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 33 : 2026 INSC 14 : AIR 2026 SC 439

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 7 and Section 31 — Contract Act, 1872; Section 126 — "See to it" Guarantee — Distinction between an Undertaking to Infuse Funds and a Contract of Guarantee — Extinguishment of Debt against Third-Party Sureties - Contract of Guarantee vs. Deed of Undertaking - A "Deed of Undertaking" requiring a promoter to arrange for the infusion of funds into the borrower to comply with financial covenants does not, by itself, constitute a contract of guarantee under Section 126 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 - To constitute a guarantee, there must be a direct and unambiguous promise to the creditor to perform the promise or discharge the liability of the third person in case of default - An obligation to facilitate the borrower's compliance with covenants is not equivalent to a promise to discharge the borrower's liability to the lender. [Para 20-22] UV Asset Reconstruction Company v. Electrosteel Castings, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 33 : 2026 INSC 14 : AIR 2026 SC 439