Supreme Court Quarterly Digest 2026 - Constitutional Law [July To September]

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Constitution of India - Supreme Court Quarterly Digest July - September 202

Constitution of India — Public Health & Regulatory Governance — Hooch Tragedies — Preventive Guidelines for States & Union Territories - Striking down excessive subordinate legislation does not diminish the State's duty to control toxic substances - The Supreme Court laid down 15 comprehensive guidelines for States/UTs to check spurious liquor tragedies, including multi-departmental coordination, tracking industrial solvents, dedicating exclusive tankers with tamper-evident seals, mandatory stock reconciliation, and establishing specialized medical disaster management cells and de-addiction facilities. [Relied on K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9 J.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1; Mahalakshmi Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, (2009) 16 SCC 569; Vasu Dev Singh v. Union of India, (2006) 12 SCC 753; Paras 65–67] Balaji Formalin Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 954 : 2026 INSC 1009

Constitution of India, 1950 — Subordinate Judiciary — Judicial Service Rules — Recruitment to the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division) — Eligibility Criteria — Requirement of 3 years' practice at the Bar — Modification/Review of Judgment dated 20.05.2025 — Transitional Scheme vs. Post-Transitional Scheme - Key Holdings & Scheme Framed By Majority – i. Transitional Period (For advertisements/notifications issued after 20.05.2025 up to 31.03.2027) - Deemed Practice Exemption - All law graduates are eligible to apply without having to satisfy the 3-year actual bar practice requirement. Candidates are deemed to have completed one year of active practice, and no separate Certificate of Practice is required for this deemed period - Two-Year Training & Clerkship Model - Selected candidates shall be designated as "Trainee Judicial Officers"and must complete - Compulsory 1 year of intensive training at the State Judicial Academy (treated as equivalent to 1 year of practice at the Bar) with fixed emoluments equal to half the salary of a Judicial Magistrate First Class - Compulsory 1 year of structured Law Clerkship (6 months under a Principal District/District and Sessions Judge or Higher Judicial Service Member, and 6 months under a sitting High Court Judge), also treated as equivalent to 1 year of practice at the Bar - Confirmation: Trainee Judicial Officers shall be appointed to regular cadres carrying full pay scales only upon a satisfactory, reasoned evaluation report submitted by the supervising High Court Judge - ii. Post-Transitional Period (For advertisements/notifications issued on or after 01.04.2027) - 1-Year Actual Practice Mandatory: Candidates must possess at least 1 year of actual practice in the District Courts, verified through a Certificate of Practice showing recorded presence and participation in effective judicial proceedings - Subsequent Training: Selected candidates must undergo 1 year of institutional training at the State Judicial Academy, followed by 6 months of Law Clerkship in District Courts and 6 months of Law Clerkship under a sitting High Court Judge - iii. Higher Legal Education Not Countable as Practice - The duration spent pursuing higher legal education (LL.M., etc.) cannot be counted towards the mandatory practice requirement, as it does not foster the requisite familiarity with courtroom processes and practical court functioning - iv. Operation & Review of the Scheme - The scheme shall operate for five years, following which empirical data regarding its efficacy, recruitment quality, and officer performance shall be placed before the Supreme Court for reconsideration. [Relied on Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 481; All India Judges Association v. Union of India (Judgment under Review / 6th AIJA Case), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1184; Paras 58–80] Bhumika Trust v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 841 : 2026 INSC 904

Constitution of India — Social Justice & Constitutional Morality — Witch-Hunting — Practice Derogatory to Dignity of Women - Witch-hunting is a deeply rooted social malady driven by superstition, prejudice, and irrational fear, where vulnerable women are targeted as scapegoats and subjected to extreme brutality and ostracization - Such derogatory practices strike at the root of constitutional morality, human dignity, equality, and scientific temperament envisioned by the Constitution of India; reason must prevail as a bulwark against collective irrationality. [Paras 31-38] Balku Oram v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 802 : 2026 INSC 852

Constitution of India – Knowledge as a Pre-requisite for Suppressio Veri / Suggestio Falsi: Knowledge of a fact is a necessary pre-requisite for its non-disclosure - The concept of suppression presupposes awareness of that which is suppressed; a person cannot be said to have withheld or concealed something of which they had no knowledge in the first place - Where the very existence of a criminal antecedent is not shown to have been within the candidate's knowledge at the relevant time (substantiated by cogent material such as character certificates, lack of summons/arrest, and subsequent deletion of name after investigation), the candidate cannot be held guilty of suppression or supplying false information - the onus lies upon the candidate to substantiate the claim of bona fide ignorance with reliable material, and a bare plea of ignorance will not suffice - Termination is not an automatic consequence of the mere existence/disclosure of criminal antecedents. An employer must not act mechanically and must evaluate the candidate's suitability rather than passing an order of termination without applying its mind to the nature of the post, the gravity of the offence, and the final outcome of the case. [Paras 20–34] Shatrughn Yadav v. Fertilizers and Chemicals Travancore Ltd. (F.A.C.T.), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 789 : 2026 INSC 829

Constitution of India — Compensation — Stray Cattle Attack/Accidents — Quantum Determination & Pre-2020 Ambiguity - While the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 principles cannot be applied as a universal rule in every non-vehicular stray animal accident case, claimants facing pre-2020 incidents (prior to quantified statutory schemes like the Punjab Bye-Laws, 2020/2023) are entitled to an equitable lump-sum compensation evaluated on the specific attending facts of the case - Considering the prolonged litigation and severe injuries sustained, the Supreme Court awarded a lump sum compensation of ₹15,000,000 (Rupees Fifteen Lakhs) to the appellant. [Para 21-25] Nisha v. Municipal Council Sangrur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 746 : 2026 INSC 774

Constitution of India — Directives / Guidelines Issued to Centre and States on Stray Bovines - Implementation of Laws - All States must strictly implement their respective cattle preservation, protection, and stray control statutes in letter and spirit - Compensation Mechanism - Centre and States/UTs are advised to frame rules or enact necessary amendments to establish a clear mechanism for awarding compensation in accidents caused by bovines/cattle (covering both pedestrian and vehicular accidents) - Mandatory Tagging: Tagging of all animals must be mandated with a 12-digit code to enable digital tracking, link to health/vaccination records, and identify owners who abandon them - Regulated Abandonment / Safe Transfer - Owners choosing to let go of cattle after their economic utility diminishes must ensure safe transfer to recognized shelters/gaushalas, accompanied by an official receipt and database updates - Nodal Officers - Corporations/Departments must depute dedicated Nodal Officers to oversee tagging, digitization of records, and smooth operation of animal shelters. [Paras 19 - 26] Nisha v. Municipal Council Sangrur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 746 : 2026 INSC 774

Constitution of India, 1950 — Interpretation of "Rights and Safeguards" - Under Article 338(5)(b), the duty of the NCSC to inquire into specific complaints regarding the deprivation of "rights and safeguards" does not confer an independent enforcement mechanism - The words "rights and safeguards" must be read together as a bundle - The provision of safeguards is a function of the Legislature, and the NCSC's role is merely to monitor, evaluate, record factual findings, and make recommendations to the Union or State Government for effective implementation - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgment and held that the directions issued by the NCSC demanding the employer to pay service arrears to the employee within 30 days were beyond its constitutional powers and non-est in law. [Relied on All India Indian Overseas Bank SC and ST Employees' Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 6 SCC 606; Collector v. Ajit Jogi, (2011) 10 SCC 357; Bhabani Prasad Jena v. Orissa State Commission for Women, (2010) 8 SCC 633; Paras 9-14] Mumbai Port Authority v. National Commission For Scheduled Caste, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 729 : 2026 INSC 755

Constitution of India, 1950 — Limited Scope of Civil Court Powers - The powers of a civil court granted to the NCSC under Article 338(8) are limited strictly to procedural matters required for facilitating an investigation or inquiry (e.g., summoning persons, discovery of documents, receiving evidence on affidavits) - The use of the word "namely" in Article 338(8) underscores the restricted scope of these powers - Such procedural powers do not convert the NCSC into a civil court, nor do they grant it the authority to pass final adjudicatory orders, issue temporary or permanent injunctions, or grant binding reliefs. [Paras 9 – 11] Mumbai Port Authority v. National Commission For Scheduled Caste, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 729 : 2026 INSC 755

Constitution of India, 1950 - Denial of Fair Trial vs. Consequence of Acquittal - Denial of legal representation does not invariably operate as an automatic passport to acquittal - Courts must balance the accused's constitutional entitlement to a fair trial against the nature and gravity of the offence, its societal impact, and the overarching demands of public justice - Where a trial stands constitutionally infirmed due to the complete lack of effective legal assistance, a de-novo trial is the only legally permissible remedy to restore procedural fairness while ensuring justice is carried to its logical conclusion - Held, that the Appellant (Accused No. 9), facing charges under Section 302 IPC and explosive offences carrying the death penalty, remained effectively unrepresented throughout the recording of prosecution evidence, cross-examining 81 witnesses on his own without any amicus curiae or legal aid - Such a hasty and stage-managed trial violates the baseline principle of "judicial calm" - In view of the grave nature of the Samleti bus bomb blast (claiming 14 lives), an outright acquittal is inappropriate; hence, the conviction is set aside and a de-novo trial is ordered before a designated Special Court. [Relied on Mohd. Hussain v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2012) 9 SCC 408; Naveen v. State of M.P., (2023) 17 SCC 381; Suk Das v. UT of Arunachal Pradesh, (1986) 2 SCC 401; Paras 23- 36] Abdul Hameed v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 700 : 2026 INSC 734

Constitution of India, 1950 - Principles of Natural Justice – Audi Alteram Partem – Ex-Parte Orders Impacting Civil Rights – Held: The opportunity of being heard lies at the very heart of procedural fairness, ensuring that no one is condemned or adversely affected without being given an opportunity to present their case - The non-observance of natural justice is itself a prejudice to any person who has been denied justice - When a High Court proceeds to decide a writ petition ex-parte and dispenses with service of notice to the affected party whose ownership, possession, and rights over the suit schedule property are directly impacted, it results in a clear violation of the doctrine of audi alteram partem - Such parties are not merely proper parties but necessary ones to effectively adjudicate the dispute. [Relied on State of U.P. v. Sudhir Kumar Singh, (2021) 19 SCC 706; Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v. ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV), (2025) 4 SCC 641; Madhyamam Broadcasting Ltd. v. Union of India, (2023) 13 SCC 401; Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P., (2025) 7 SCC 545; Paras 15 - 18] Basamma v. Goparappa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 690 : 2026 INSC 712

Article 14 - Equality before law

Sections 235(2) & 354(3) Cr.P.C. – Constitution of India; Articles 14 & 21 – Sentencing Principles – Same-Day Sentencing – Aggravating vs. Mitigating Circumstances – Intermediate Sentence of Natural Life Imprisonment without Remission – Held - (i) Imposing the death sentence on the same day as conviction violates Section 235(2) CrPC as expounded in Allaudin Mian - the sentencing court must provide an effective opportunity to place individualised mitigating circumstances on record; (ii) The High Court's formulation evaluating the "crime test at 100% and criminal test at 0%" is legally flawed - the criminal test can almost never be zero, and sentencing courts cannot ignore the circumstances of the offender; (iii) Although "instrumental silencing" (murdering a child victim to destroy evidence and suppress the rape) is an aggravating circumstance of the highest order, it relates to the crime and does not automatically establish that the criminal is beyond reformation - The State failed to discharge its burden of proving that the accused was incorrigible - The convict had no prior criminal antecedents, suffered severe childhood deprivation, maintained unblemished prison conduct over eight years, and showed no psychiatric disorder; (iv) Applying the Sriharan doctrine, life imprisonment for the remainder of natural life without remission serves as an adequate and severe intermediate punishment to meet the ends of justice while keeping the possibility of reform intact - Death penalty commuted to life imprisonment for the remainder of natural life without remission. [Relied On Allaudin Mian v. State of Bihar, (1989) 3 SCC 5; Mohd. Mannan v. State of Bihar, (2019) 16 SCC 584; Manoj v. State of M.P., (2023) 2 SCC 353; Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684; Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983) 3 SCC 470; Shankar Kisanrao Khade v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 5 SCC 546; Union of India v. V. Sriharan, (2016) 7 SCC 1; Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 12 SCC 460; Lochan Shrivas v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 15 SCC 401; Irappa Siddappa Murgannavar v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 2 SCC 801; Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India, 2025 INSC 1043; Paras 148, 149, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 167, 182, 184, 187, 188, 190, 191, 192, 195, 198, 201, 202, 203] Waris v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 986 : 2026 INSC 1050

Constitution of India — Articles 14, 19(1)(g), and 19(6) — Maharashtra Poisons Rules, 1972 — Rules 18A and 18B (inserted vide 2011 Amendment) — Subordinate Legislation — Methanol Regulation — Mandatory Addition of Denaturants (Bitterant & Colourant) — Restricting Purchase to Form A Licensees & Confiscation — Manifest Arbitrariness & Proportionality Test - Rules 18A and 18B of the Maharashtra Poisons Rules, 1972, mandating the compulsory mixing of a colourant (methylene carmine) and a bitterant (denatonium saccharide) in methanol prior to sale to non-drug manufacturers, restricting purchases solely to Form A licensees, and prescribing confiscation for possession without a Form A licence, are manifestly arbitrary, disproportionate, and unconstitutional - Sub-rule (1) of Rule 18A errs in conflating sellers with consumers, excluding legitimate industrial consumers holding Form B permits from procuring essential raw material - Sub-rule (2) imposes severe, destructive burdens on downstream industries (rendering methanol unusable in paints, resins, laminates, and life-saving drug catalysts) while serving merely a speculative chance of visual/taste identification without remedying illicit diversion, pilferage, or masking of hooch in unregulated channels - The rules fail all four prongs of the proportionality doctrine (K.S. Puttaswamy) and violate Articles 14 and 19(1)(g). [Paras 23–25, 29–37, 40–51, 53–68] Balaji Formalin Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 954 : 2026 INSC 1009

Banking Regulation Act, 1949 — Section 35-A — Indian Contract Act, 1872 — Constitution of India — Articles 14, 21, and 226 — Hypothecation - Where possession of a commercial vehicle was forcibly taken at 1:00 a.m. by breaking the steering lock without mandatory 7-day prior notice and without a signed inventory/possession memorandum, the action constitutes unlawful and arbitrary seizure bearing the mark of "goonda-ism" expressly condemned by the Supreme Court - Depriving a small transporter of his sole means of livelihood in such an arbitrary manner violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India - Dismissal of the writ petition by the High Court solely on the ground of delay without examining the illegalities and subsequent traffic challans issued against the borrower was erroneous - The Supreme Court directed the financer to close both loan accounts, refund the vehicle's sale proceeds of Rs. 4,50,000/- with 6% interest per annum, and awarded compensation of Rs. 10,00,000/- to the borrower for loss of livelihood and mental agony, along with Rs. 50,000/- costs - RBI directed to take effective steps to secure genuine compliance with Fair Practices Code guidelines. [Relied on ICICI Bank Ltd. v. Prakash Kaur and Ors., (2007) 2 SCC 711; Orix Auto Finance (India) Ltd. v. Jagmander Singh and Anr., (2006) 2 SCC 598; Sundaram Finance Limited and Anr. v. T. Thankam, (2015) 14 SCC 444; Paras 15-19, 21–32] Hari Dutta Sharma v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 942 : 2026 INSC 998

Administrative Law & Service Law – Deputation / NOC for National Sports Assignments – Exercise of Administrative Discretion – Article 14 of the Constitution – Duty of Timely Consideration - Although a government employee or a borrowing sports federation does not possess an absolute or vested right to claim deputation, relieving, or foreign travel permission, the absence of an absolute right cannot be equated with the absence of a right to a fair, reasonable, non-arbitrary, and timely consideration of a request - Administrative discretion must be exercised on relevant considerations, excluding extraneous ones, and within a reasonable timeframe - Where an assignment involves representing or coaching the Indian National Team at time-sensitive international events (such as the Asian Games or World Cups), delay itself defeats the object of the power exercised - A belated rejection order passed after an international event has already concluded cannot retrospectively cure prolonged executive inaction. [Paras 21–32] Indian Kayaking and Canoeing Association v. Union Territory of J&K, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 922 : 2026 INSC 981

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 — Section 2(j) — Constitution of India, Articles 14, 38, 39, and 43 — Per Joymalya Bagchi, J. - Sovereign Functions Exception — Government Welfare Schemes and Bottom-rung Employees - A blanket exclusion of government welfare departments and schemes from Section 2(j) is unconstitutional and offensive to the equality code under Article 14. A gardener, driver, clerk, or maintenance employee does not perform a different species of physical or operational labour simply because their payslip bears the seal of the State - The sovereign functions exemption must strictly remain confined to the inalienable, non-justiciable core of Statehood (such as defense, foreign affairs, coinage, administration of justice, and legislative enactment) - Extending "sovereign immunity" to developmental or socio-economic welfare schemes strikes hardest at vulnerable daily-rated and precarious workers who most require industrial protection - The Triple Test laid down in Bangalore Water Supply embodies the constitutional vision of social justice and correctly brings such employment within the statutory shield. [Relied On: Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213; Corporation of the City of Nagpur v. Its Employees, AIR 1960 SC 675; Chief Conservator of Forests v. Jagannath Maruti Kondhare, (1996) 2 SCC 293]. State of U.P. v. Jai Bir Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 848 : 2026 INSC 897

Constitution of India — Article 14 — Differential Modes of Execution Under Ordinary Criminal Law vs. Military Law — Army Act, 1950, Air Force Act, 1950, and Navy Act, 1957 - The argument that permitting execution by shooting as an alternative mode under special military enactments amounts to hostile discrimination under Article 14 against civilian convicts executed solely by hanging under CrPC/BNSS was rejected - Military statutes operate in a distinct field governing a separate class of persons subject to military discipline and necessity, and cannot serve as a benchmark to assess the constitutional validity of procedures governing civilian convictions. [Paras 55, 56] Rishi Malhotra v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 823 : 2026 INSC 873

Section 354(5) CrPC [Corresponding to Section 393(5) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)] — Mode of Execution of Death Sentence by Hanging — Constitutional Validity — Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India — Challenge to Hanging as the Sole Method of Execution - Writ petition under Article 32 seeking declaration of Section 354(5) CrPC / Section 393(5) BNSS as ultra vires Articles 14 and 21 on the ground that execution by hanging is barbaric, cruel, and inhumane, and seeking declaration that the right to die by a dignified procedure is a fundamental right - Dismissing the petition, held - The constitutional validity of Section 354(5) CrPC was conclusively settled by a three-Judge Bench in Deena v. Union of India and subsequently approved by a Constitution Bench in Shashi Nayar (Smt) v. Union of India (1992) 1 SCC 96 - The doctrine of stare decisis mandates that a smaller bench should not depart from the ratio of a larger bench that has stood for over four decades unless it is shown to have lost efficacy due to significant constitutional developments, legislative amendments, or cogent scientific/empirical evidence - The petitioners failed to demonstrate, by any unimpeachable evidence, even a single instance of a botched execution in India under the existing framework - The 187th Report of the Law Commission (2003) is merely recommendatory, and Parliament consciously retained hanging under Section 393(5) of the BNSS, 2023 - No compelling case made out to refer the matter to a larger Bench. [Paras 48–51, 60–63] Rishi Malhotra v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 823 : 2026 INSC 873

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Sections 16, 18, 31(8), 37(2) – Pre-deposit condition in arbitration clause – Validity and constitutionality under Article 14 of the Constitution of India and Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 – Correctness of 3-Judge Bench decision in S.K. Jain v. State of Haryana – Reference to Larger Bench - Doubting the correctness of the three-Judge Bench decision in S.K. Jain v. State of Haryana, (2009) 4 SCC 357 (which upheld a pre-deposit condition requiring a contractor alone to deposit security prior to arbitration as a valid mechanism to prevent frivolous claims), a two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court has referred the matter to the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India for constitution of a larger Bench – The Supreme Court observed that an arbitration clause cannot impose pre-deposit conditions so onerous as to render the right to sue, at the threshold, illusory or nugatory - A requirement mandating the deposit of a substantial percentage of the claim amount prior to arbitration inevitably suppresses claims, deters recourse to alternative dispute resolution (ADR), and defeats the objective of declogging the court system - Although a two-Judge Bench in ICOMM Tele Ltd. v. Punjab State Water Supply, (2019) 4 SCC 401 struck down a 10% pre-deposit condition as arbitrary under Article 14, and subsequent decisions in Lombardi Engineering Ltd. v. Uttarakhand Jal Vidyut Nigam Ltd., (2024) 4 SCC 341 and the Constitution Bench in Central Organisation for Railway Electrification (CORE) v. M/s ECI-SPIC-SMO-MCML (JV), (2025) 4 SCC 641 reiterated that party autonomy cannot violate fundamental rights or principles of non-arbitrariness, Lombardi Engineering had held there was no conflict between S.K. Jain and ICOMM Tele as the clauses were materially distinct - Mindful of judicial discipline, the Court held that being a two-Judge Bench, it could neither declare the 3-Judge Bench ruling in S.K. Jain to be sub silentio or bad in law, nor override it directly - Following the principles laid down in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 2 SCC 673 and Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal, (2025) 6 SCC 1, the Bench framed questions on whether one-sided pre-deposit conditions violate Section 18 of the Arbitration Act, Section 28 of the Contract Act, and Article 14 of the Constitution, and referred the issue to the CJI to consider listing before a larger Bench. [Relied on ICOMM Tele Ltd. v. Punjab State Water Supply and Sewerage Board & Anr., (2019) 4 SCC 401; Lombardi Engineering Ltd. v. Uttarakhand Jal Vidyut Nigam Ltd., (2024) 4 SCC 341; Central Organisation for Railway Electrification (CORE) v. M/s ECI-SPIC-SMO-MCML (JV), (2025) 4 SCC 641; Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal & Ors., (2025) 6 SCC 1; Paras 20-32] Santosh Associate v. Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 818 : 2026 INSC 872

Constitution of India, 1950 — Articles 14, 16, and 32 — Service Law — Pay Fixation & Parity — Central Government Industrial Tribunals-cum-Labour Courts (CGIT-cum-LCs) — Re-employed Judicial Officers — Claim for 6th Central Pay Commission (CPC) Pay Scales at par with other Central Tribunals vs. Pay Scales applicable to District Judiciary based on Justice E. Padmanabhan Committee / Shetty Commission Recommendations — Permissibility of reasonable classification — Scope of Judicial Review - Petitioners, retired judicial officers appointed on a re-employment basis as Presiding Officers of Central Government Industrial Tribunals-cum-Labour Courts (CGIT-cum-LCs), challenged the denial of 6th CPC pay scales and their equation with the District Judiciary for pay fixation – Held - Classification of re-employed pensioners as a distinct class for pay fixation is valid and does not violate Articles 14 or 16 of the Constitution - Upon re-employment after superannuation, such officers cease to be homogeneous vis-à-vis regular government employees and are governed by a special scheme under the Central Civil Services (Fixation of Pay of Re-employed Pensioners) Orders, 1986 - The determination of pay structures and equation of posts is an executive function based on expert body recommendations (such as the Shetty Commission and Justice E. Padmanabhan Committee) - The Industrial Tribunals/Labour Courts in which petitioners are appointed are established within the State; thus, equating their pay scale with that of the District Judiciary carries a rational and intelligible differentia and is free from arbitrariness - Judicial review in pay fixation is limited and courts must refrain from interfering with the executive domain unless patent arbitrariness, malafides, or apparent anomalies are demonstrated. [Relied on State of U.P. and Others v. J.P. Chaurasia and Others, (1989) 1 SCC 121; Union of India v. Dineshan K.K., (2008) 1 SCC 586; Union of India v. Indian Navy Civilian Design Officers Association and Another, (2023) 19 SCC 482; Union of India v. T.V.L.N. Mallikarjuna Rao, (2015) 3 SCC 653; Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of India, 1950 SCC 833; Paras 5 - 6] R.K. Yadav v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 801 : 2026 INSC 848

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 498A — Applicability to Live-In Relationships — "Relationship in the Nature of Marriage" — Purposive Interpretation — Fundamental Rights — Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution of India – i. Applicability of Section 498A IPC to Live-In Relationships - Held, Section 498A IPC applies to "live-in relationships" that qualify as "relationships in the nature of marriage," provided that the intent to marry is established as an intrinsic element - Giving a restrictive or purely literal interpretation to the word "husband" to exclude live-in partners would defeat the social, reformative, and protective legislative objective of the provision – ii. Constitutional Imperative (Article 14) - Creating a distinction between a legally wedded wife and a female partner in a relationship in the nature of marriage for protection against domestic cruelty lacks any rational nexus with the legislative objective of curbing domestic abuse - Differentiating solely on the basis of formal ceremonial marriage violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India – iii. Individual Choice and Autonomy (Article 21) - The right to choose a life partner is an intrinsic facet of individual autonomy and dignity under Article 21, encompassing spatial and associational privacy - The protection of criminal law against household cruelty cannot depend on whether a woman has formally solemnized her union – iv. Distinction between Civil Protection (DV Act) and Criminal Remedy (Section 498A IPC) - Civil protection under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act) is insufficient by itself, as civil/monetary consequences cannot substitute for the deterrent effect of criminal law. [Paras 12-23] Lokesh B.H. v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 753 : 2026 INSC 784

Constitution of India — Article 14 — Non-Arbitrariness, Equality, and Fairness in Executive Actions — Denial of Refund for Unutilized Additional FSI Premium — Arbitrary Classification - The refusal of the State/Town Planning Authorities to refund the premium paid for unutilized additional Floor Space Index (FSI) for a residential/group housing project on the ground that statutory regulations only permit refund for specific categories (such as educational institutions, medical institutions, and star category hotels) or specific regions (such as Mumbai) is patently arbitrary, discriminatory, and violative of Article 14 - The principle of non-arbitrariness and duty to act fairly, justly, and reasonably under Article 14 pervades every State action, including executive decisions and contractual/regulatory matters. [Paras 11–18] Prasad Pandurang Tapkir v. Assistant Director of Town Planning, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 731 : 2026 INSC 683

Article 19 - Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc.

Constitutional Law — Cooperative Federalism and Article 19(1)(g) — Delay in Processing Applications as Unwritten Ban - Both the Union and the State are constitutional duty-bearers obligated by principles of cooperative federalism to enforce regulations harmoniously and ensure that citizens can pursue their fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(g) subject only to reasonable restrictions - Where the State Verifying Authority kept 226 out of 257 Access Pass applications pending without timely verification, such administrative lethargy virtually amounted to an impermissible "unwritten ban" - The State was directed to process and clear verification applications in an effective and time-bound manner, and notify transit channels under Rules 15(5) and 15(6) of the 2020 Rules for vessels transiting to the EEZ. [Relied on Union of India and Anr. v. Mohit Minerals Private Ltd., (2022) 10 SCC 700; State of Kerala v. Joseph Antony, (1994) 1 SCC 301; Kerala Swathanthra Malaya Thozhilali Federation and Others v. Kerala Trawlnet Boat Operators' Association and Others, (1994) 5 SCC 28; Paras 15-17] Fisherman Care v. Government of India Department of Animal Husbandry, Dairying and Fisheries, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 888 : 2026 INSC 937

Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990 (Chhattisgarh) — Section 5(a) & 5(b) — Inapplicability of Grounds — Subjective Satisfaction Must Rest on Objective Material – Held that invocations of Section 5(b) require reasonable grounds to believe that the person is engaged or about to engage in offences involving force or violence, or specified offences under Chapters XII, XVI, or XVII of the IPC (or Sections 506/509 IPC) - Allegations of circulating offensive social media videos affecting religion (corresponding to Chapter XV IPC) do not satisfy the statutory threshold of Section 5(b) - Even under Section 5(a), an order of externment seriously infringes upon fundamental freedoms guaranteed under Article 19(1)(d) of the Constitution and cannot be passed routinely, on mere ipse dixit, or solely because criminal cases are registered - The competent authority must arrive at a bona fide subjective satisfaction based on objective materials disclosing a discernible nexus to the apprehending mischief - An order lacking demonstrable reasons or objective material cannot pass muster. [Relied on Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, (1974) 2 SCC 121; Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v. Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 95; Deepak v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 14 SCC 707; Paras 29 - 34] Vijay Kumar Rajpoot @ Vijju v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 872 : 2026 INSC 926

Article 20 - Protection in respect of conviction for offences

Section 300 Cr.P.C. – Criminal Jurisprudence – Victimology – Protection Against Double Jeopardy – Constitution of India, Article 20(2) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 300 – Scope of fresh SIT investigation post-acquittal - Held, criminal jurisprudence places paramount emphasis on victimology, recognizing that an offence is one against society at large, casting an onerous duty on the State to bring real culprits to book - While injustice to a falsely prosecuted person can be compensated, injustice to a brutally raped and murdered victim can never be compensated if the real perpetrators escape justice due to institutional failure - where the originally prosecuted accused has undergone full trial and stands acquitted on merits, he is fully cloaked with the constitutional protection of Article 20(2) and Section 300 Cr.P.C. and cannot be subjected to further investigation or prosecution - An SIT composed of fresh independent officers must carry out the de novo probe untainted by earlier investigations. [Relied on Kashmeri Devi v. Delhi Admn., 1988 Supp SCC 482; Bharati Tamang v. Union of India, (2013) 15 SCC 578; Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 4 SCC 158; Pooja Pal v. Union of India, (2016) 3 SCC 135; Dharam Pal v. State of Haryana, (2016) 4 SCC 160; Paras 56-61] Kusumavati Gowda v. Government of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 970 : 2026 INSC 1030

Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 — Section 70 — Summons — Status of a Summoned Person - Mere issuance of summons under Section 70 of the CGST Act does not per se make the person summoned an accused - The prohibitive sweep of Article 20(3) of the Constitution does not go back to the stage of interrogation, and in the absence of an order under Section 69, there can be no apprehension of arrest to maintain an application for anticipatory bail. [Relied on Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India, (2025) 6 SCC 545; Deepak Mahajan, (1994) 3 SCC 440; Poolpandi v. CCE, (1992) 3 SCC 259; Dukhishyam Benupani v. Arun Kumar Bajoria, (1998) 1 SCC 52; Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 5 SCC 1; Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248; Paras 15-22] Union of India v. Sunil Biyani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 797 : 2026 INSC 849

Constitution of India – Article 20(1) – General Clauses Act, 1897 – Definition of "Offence" – Ex Post Facto Law and Legality - Reiterating the maxim nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege (no crime or punishment without a penal law), the Court observed that Article 20(1) bars conviction unless there is a violation of a "law in force" at the time of commission of the act - Under criminal jurisprudence, an "offence" means an act or omission made punishable by law - In the absence of an offence created within the four corners of the U.P. Act itself, an individual cannot be subjected to trial or enhanced penal exposure merely based on an administrative Gang Chart. [Paras 36 – 52]. Shiv Pratap Singh @ Chinu v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 836 : 2026 INSC 894

Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (Uttar Pradesh) – Sections 2(b), 2(c), 3, 7, 23 – Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Rules, 2021 – Constitution of India, Article 20(1) – General Clauses Act, 1897, Section 3(38) – Absence of substantive offence – Principle of Nulla Poena Sine Lege – Punishment for mere status – Subordinate legislation cannot create an offence - The Supreme Court held that the U.P. Gangsters Act, 1986 is "stillborn" as it completely fails to create a substantive crime or penalise any specific act or omission - The enactment merely provides definitions of 'gang' and 'gangster' under Section 2 and directly prescribes punishment under Section 3 without defining an actionable offence - Indulgence in activities under Section 2(b)(i) to (xxv) is already penalised under independent penal statutes, and the Act impermissibly punishes a person for their executive-determined "status" rather than an actus reus created by the statute - The subordinate Rules of 2021, by prescribing a Gang Chart procedure to determine such status, exceed the rule-making powers under Section 23 of the Act - Creation of an offence is an essential legislative function that cannot be delegated to executive ipse dixit. [Paras 21- 59]. Shiv Pratap Singh @ Chinu v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 836 : 2026 INSC 894

Article 21 - Protection of life and personal liberty

Sections 391 & 367 Cr.P.C. – Constitution of India; Article 21 – Legal aid counsel appointed on the very date when the star witness was examined and cross-examined in a capital case – Held - Appointing a legal aid counsel and recording the complete deposition of the key prosecution witness on the self-same day without providing adequate opportunity to prepare violates the standard of effective legal assistance and meaningful cross-examination guaranteed under Article 21 - this infirmity stood adequately cured when the Supreme Court invoked Section 391 read with Section 367 CrPC to direct a curative further cross-examination of the witness through counsel of the accused's choice with the complete record furnished in advance - Her testimony must be appreciated by reading together her original deposition and the further cross-examination. [Paras 4, 14, 15, 23, 24, 25, 26] Waris v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 986 : 2026 INSC 1050

Constitution of India – Articles 21, 226, 227 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 173(8), Section 482 – Rape and Murder of minor – Botched and tainted investigation resulting in full acquittal – Inherent & Constitutional Power to order Reinvestigation / De Novo Investigation - Held, although normally only 'further investigation' can be directed under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. upon submission of a final report under Section 173(2), Constitutional Courts possess the dynamic and uncurtailable power under Article 226/227 and Section 482 Cr.P.C. to order a fresh or de novo investigation by an independent agency or Special Investigation Team (SIT) where the investigation was tainted, biased, sham, or conducted to shield real culprits - A fair investigation is as fundamental a facet of Article 21 as a fair trial - Where a trial culminates in the acquittal of a wrongly accused person due to lack of evidence, it underscores that the real perpetrators remain unapprehended - The refusal of the High Court to direct reinvestigation on the premise that evidence lost during the "golden hour" cannot be collected was erroneous, especially when key physical evidence (intact clothes bearing foreign male hair samples for DNA comparison) and material witnesses remain readily available. [Paras 25, 26, 46 - 61] Kusumavati Gowda v. Government of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 970 : 2026 INSC 1030

Constitution of India — Article 21 and Article 47 — Right to Health as part of Right to Life — State's affirmative duty to protect public health — Front-of-Package Labelling ("FoPL") on packaged food - The right to life guaranteed under Article 21 encompasses the right to health, casting a positive duty upon the State under Article 47 to take affirmative steps to safeguard public health and protect consumers especially growing children from the scientifically substantiated perils of foods High in Fat, Sugar, or Salt (HFSS) and Ultra-Processed Foods (UPF) - Prompt, clear, and consumer-friendly Front-of-Package Labelling (FoPL) is vital to enable informed consumer choice and encourage product reformulation. [Paras 28-38] 3S and Our Health Society v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 926 : 2026 INSC 988

Constitution of India — Article 21 — Death Penalty — Alternative Modes of Execution — Lethal Injection vs. Hanging – noted that contention that intravenous lethal injection is a demonstrably superior, scientific, and painless alternative to hanging was rejected - Referring to Deena v. Union of India, the Supreme Court reiterated that comparative analysis of alternatives (electrocution, lethal gas, shooting, and lethal injection) showed no distinct or demonstrable advantage over hanging - material placed on record revealed that lethal injection in jurisdictions like the United States has been plagued with systemic issues and numerous botched executions - In the absence of unimpeachable empirical evidence establishing that lethal injection or another method is more humane, the statutory prescription cannot be invalidated. [Paras 53 - 62] Rishi Malhotra v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 823 : 2026 INSC 873

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Section 37 — Commercial Quantity — Grant of Bail to Foreign Nationals — Mandatory Twin Conditions — Article 21 & Incarceration - Right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution is not exercised in isolation from statutory rigours; in cases involving commercial quantities under special enactments such as the NDPS Act, the Article 21 right must be exercised within the framework of Section 37 and cannot be pressed into service solely on the ground of delay to override the twin statutory conditions - The High Court erred in granting bail to a foreign national solely on grounds of prolonged incarceration (2.5 years) and reliance on Tofan Singh without recording mandatory satisfaction under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) that there were reasonable grounds to believe he was not guilty and unlikely to commit an offence while on bail. [Paras 11-14] Union of India v. Chidiebere Kingsley Nawchara, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 817 : 2026 INSC 870

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 21, Article 32, and Article 226 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 176 and Section 154 — Custodial Death — Failure to register FIR and investigate — Award of interim compensation — Transfer of investigation to Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) - Custodial Violence and Statutory Inaction - Deceased was arrested for an excise offence carrying a maximum sentence of 3 years and subsequently died in judicial/police custody - Judicial Magistrate First Class conducted an inquiry under Section 176 CrPC and reported that the death resulted from complications arising from a blunt-force head injury, with post-mortem showing multiple antemortem injuries - Despite the inquiry report and the High Court holding that the deceased died due to custodial violence, the State authorities (including DGP and Jail Authorities) failed to register an FIR or initiate an investigation, taking the stance that the judicial inquiry report had not been formally received by police officials - Held: that the stance of "blissful ignorance" and inaction taken by the senior State authorities is reprehensible, sacrilegious, and amounts to an attempt to cover up custodial violence. [Paras 5–7, 14–17] Lahra Bai Tamre v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 794 : 2026 INSC 840

Constitution of India – Article 21 – Safegards Against Custodial Torture – The investigating agency is bound by the inherent constitutional safeguards under Article 21 to ensure that the accused is not subjected to any threat, inducement, coercion, physical assault, or third-degree methods during custodial interrogation - Named investigating officials and jail authorities remain jointly and severally responsible for the safety and physical well-being of the accused. [Paras 20-25] State of Andhra Pradesh v. Suda Suresh Veera Venkata Naga Raju, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 722 : 2026 INSC 744

Constitution of India — Article 21 — Right to a Speedy Trial — Quashing of Delayed Prosecution — The right to a speedy trial is an implicit fundamental right guaranteed under the fair, just, and reasonable procedure of Article 21 of the Constitution, extending to all stages of criminal proceedings including investigation, inquiry, and trial - While systemic delays must be analyzed using a balancing test, a chronicle of persistent, unexplained inaction and lack of ordinary diligence solely attributable to the prosecution violates this right - Keeping an accused in a state of "suspended animation" indefinitely, where 23 years have elapsed since the institution of the complaint and over three decades since the transaction without the trial progressing beyond the stage of service of summons is wholly incompatible with Article 21, warranting the quashing of the criminal proceedings. [Relied On Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225; P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka (2002) 4 SCC 578; Kailash Chandra Kapri v. State of Uttar Pradesh 2026 SCC OnLine SC 858; Paras 25 - 27, 29, 30 – 34] Standard Chartered Bank v. Enforcement Officer Ministry of Home Affairs, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 701 : 2026 INSC 727

Constitution of India, 1950 - Articles 21 & 22 – Right to a Fair Trial & Effective Legal Representation - Paramount importance of substantive constitutional guarantees in criminal jurisprudence, particularly in cases involving offences that shock the collective conscience of society - The right to a fair trial encompasses a real, meaningful, and impartial opportunity to defend, which includes effective representation by a counsel of choice or competent legal aid at State expense - The constitutional obligation of the Court is to ensure real and meaningful representation rather than a mere ritualistic or illusory physical presence - Facing a complex trial carrying capital punishment without legal assistance fundamentally vitiates the criminal justice process. Abdul Hameed v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 700 : 2026 INSC 734

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 21 and Article 32 – Prisons and Inmates – Incarceration of Elderly and Terminally Ill Prisoners – Right to Live with Dignity - Writ petition filed by NALSA under Article 32 raising systemic concerns over the continued confinement of convicted/undertrial prisoners of advanced age (above 70 years) and those who are terminally ill – i. Suspension of Rights Denied - The Supreme Court observed that prisons are instruments of lawful confinement but not spaces where constitutional values are suspended - The guarantees of dignity, fairness, and humane treatment continue to operate with full force even behind prison walls - Prolonged detention under conditions of severe physical suffering and inadequate medical care results in the erosion of human dignity, converting lawful punishment into cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment – ii. Locus Standi of NALSA - NALSA has the requisite locus standi to maintain public interest/social justice litigation to espouse the collective constitutional rights of vulnerable and marginalized sections under Section 4(d) of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 - iii. Federal Competence vs. Judicial Restraint - While "prisons and persons detained therein" falls exclusively under the legislative domain of States (Schedule VII, List II), the Court holds that constitutional restraint cannot equate to constitutional abdication where persistent or systemic violations of fundamental rights occur. [Relied on National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India & Ors. (2014) 5 SCC 348; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248; Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (1978) 4 SCC 494; Dr. P. Varavara Rao v. National Investigation Agency (2022 SCC OnLine SC 1004); Paras 17-38] National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 684 : 2026 INSC 713

Article 22 - Protection against arrest and detention in certain cases

Constitution of India — Article 22(1), Article 22(2), and Article 21 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 50, Section 57, and Section 167 — Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — Section 47 and Section 58 — Arrest and Re-arrest — Violation of Fundamental Safeguards against Arrest — Procedure and Judicial Imprimatur Required for Re-arrest — Public Law Remedy – i. Mandatory Nature of Written Grounds of Arrest under Article 22(1) - The requirement to communicate grounds of arrest under Article 22(1) of the Constitution and Section 50 CrPC (Section 47 BNSS) is a mandatory, binding constitutional safeguard and not a mere procedural formality - The grounds must be communicated in writing in a language understood by the arrestee - Any infringement vitiates the arrest and subsequent remand, entitling the arrestee to immediate release - Procedural lapses in furnishing grounds of arrest do not fall under a prejudice-oriented test; when there is a constitutional violation, the question of demonstrable prejudice does not arise - When released for violation of Article 22(1), the accused is not enlarged on bail, but released from illegal and unconstitutional detention; ii. Mandatory Production within 24 Hours under Article 22(2) - The constitutional mandate under Article 22(2) and Section 57 CrPC (Section 58 BNSS) requiring production of an arrestee before the nearest Magistrate within 24 hours (excluding journey time) must be strictly and scrupulously observed - Detention beyond 24 hours without magisterial authorization is unconstitutional and unlawful, rendering the arrest otiose and vitiated, which infringes both Article 22(2) and Article 21. [Paras 20-33] Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 967 : 2026 INSC 1022

Constitution of India — Procedure for Re-arrest / Fresh Custody Following Release for Breach of Article 22(1) and Article 22(2) - An accused who has suffered a breach of Article 22(1) or Article 22(2) does not enjoy a blanket permanent immunity from re-arrest - the investigating agency cannot automatically re-arrest the accused by executive fiat - Re-arrest requires prior judicial sanction/imprimatur; i. The investigating agency must file a formal application for custody before the concerned Magistrate setting forth the reasons and necessity for re-arrest and custodial interrogation, accompanied by an explanation for the initial default; ii. Such application can be moved only after furnishing the written grounds of arrest to the accused; iii. To eliminate foul play or collusion, the application must bear the prior endorsement of the immediate superior authority; iv. On the administrative side, the superior authority must transfer the investigation to another officer and initiate departmental/disciplinary proceedings against the erring officer(s); v. The Magistrate shall decide the application expeditiously, preferably within one week, adhering to principles of natural justice, and may grant custody only upon being satisfied with the bona fides of the explanation and the genuine necessity for re-arrest; vi. The same procedure applies mutatis mutandis to breaches under Article 22(2). [Paras 24 - 38] Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 967 : 2026 INSC 1022

Article 30 - Right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions

Constitutional Law — Article 30(1) & Article 16 — Minority Rights Vs. Public Exchequer Accountability - Minority educational institutions do not possess an absolute right under Article 30(1) of the Constitution to burden the public exchequer through a completely non-competitive, opaque selection process - Government aid without financial accountability is constitutionally unsustainable - Clause 6 of Notification-I, which permitted a "10% Management Quota" for appointments without wide public advertisements, is unconstitutional and an anti-thesis to the mandate of equality and equal opportunity enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. [Para 35-39] Najma Khatun v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 667 : 2026 INSC 691

Article 32 - Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part

Constitution of India — Article 32 — Maintainability of Writ Petition challenging Executed Clemency/Remission Powers - Exercise of Clemency Powers — Judicial Review vs. Judicial Appeal - When the President under Article 72 or the Governor under Article 161 has exercised the constitutional power of clemency/remission modifying a sentence, the Supreme Court cannot sit in appeal over such executive decision under Article 32 - The constitutional powers under Articles 72/161 are separate, distinct, and unaffected by statutory powers under Section 432 CrPC - The scope of judicial review of clemency orders passed by the President or Governor is extremely limited and constrained only to grounds such as non-application of mind, mala fides, extraneous considerations, exclusion of relevant material, or absolute arbitrariness - In the absence of such established grounds, a petition under Article 32 seeking further modification of a clemency order passed by the President/Governor is misdirected and not maintainable. [Relied on Union of India v. V. Sriharan (2016) 7 SCC 1; Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka (2008) 13 SCC 767; Epuru Sudhakar v. Govt. of A.P. (2006) 8 SCC 161; Maru Ram v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 107; Kehar Singh v. Union of India (1989) 1 SCC 204; Paras 6 – 18] Ramasrey @ Fakkad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 736 : 2026 INSC 764

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 32 — Writ Petition seeking quashing or alternative clubbing/consolidation of multiple FIRs registered across different States — Cyber Fraud — Maintainability of Article 32 petition for quashing criminal proceedings — Relegation to alternative statutory remedies - Maintainability & Relegation under Article 32 - While a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution to quash an FIR is maintainable, the Supreme Court reiterated that it is an extraordinary remedy to be exercised sparingly - As a matter of self-imposed discipline and orderly procedure, an aggrieved party must ordinarily first approach the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution or Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Direct invocation of Article 32 is discouraged unless the facts disclose a palpable violation of fundamental rights or other exceptional, exigent circumstances. [Relied On Arnab Ranjan Goswami v. Union of India (2020) 14 SCC 12; Vinod Dua v. Union of India (2023) 14 SCC 286; Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State of U.P. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2265; Paras 8, 9]. Rutvij Bhagat Singh Wakhare v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 716 : 2026 INSC 740

Article 48 - Organisation of agriculture and animal husbandry

Constitution of India — Articles 48 & 51-A(g) — Animal Welfare — Stray Cattle Menace & Compassion for Living Creatures - Directive Principles of State Policy (Article 48) impose a duty on the State to organize agriculture/animal husbandry and prevent cattle slaughter - Under Article 51-A(g), it is the fundamental duty of every citizen to have compassion for living creatures, which in its wider fold embraces cattle spoken of in Article 48 - Stray cattle roaming on public roads cause severe accidents leading to human casualties and unnecessary pain and suffering to animals. [Relied on State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat, (2005) 8 SCC 534; Animal Welfare Board of India v. Union of India, (2023) 9 SCC 322; Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar, 1958 SCC OnLine SC 176; Paras 11-16] Nisha v. Municipal Council Sangrur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 746 : 2026 INSC 774

Article 136 - Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 136 – Special Leave Appeal – Scope of Interference with Concurrent Findings of Fact: The Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the trial court and the High Court unless the findings are shown to suffer from patent perversity or absurdity. [Relied on Balak Ram v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1975) 3 SCC 219; Paras 24 - 51] Kashmir Ram @ Pappi v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 804 : 2026 INSC 854

Constitution of India — Article 136 — Scope of Interference with Concurrent Findings of Fact - Powers under Article 136 are wide and plenary, but the Supreme Court does not reappraise evidence or interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by courts below unless the findings are manifestly perverse, unsupportable from record, vitiated by error of law/procedure, or where the decision shocks the conscience of the Court. [Relied on Shahaja alias Shahajan Ismail Mohd. Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 12 SCC 558; Balak Ram v. State of U.P., (1975) 3 SCC 219; Paras 15-25] Balku Oram v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 802 : 2026 INSC 852

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 136 — Scope of Interference with High Court Order of Acquittal - Scope of Appellate Restraint - The Supreme Court will not interfere under Article 136 with a High Court judgment of acquittal unless it is shown to be perverse, manifestly illegal, or productive of a gross miscarriage of justice. If the view taken by the High Court in acquitting the accused is a reasonable and possible view based on material on record, it cannot be substituted merely because another view of the evidence might be possible - While defects in investigation alone do not warrant acquittal if substantive evidence is credible, where substantive ocular testimony is itself infirm and compromised by unsealed/tampered case property and unexplained FIR discrepancies, the benefit of such investigative lapses enures to the accused. [Relied on Himmat Sukhadeo Wahurwagh and Others v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 6 SCC 712; Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar and Another, 2026 INSC 735; Eknath Ganpat Aher and Others v. State of Maharashtra and Others, (2010) 6 SCC 519; Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Others v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149; Paras 23 – 46] Nirmala Bai Devidas Chavhan v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 779 : 2026 INSC 787

Constitution of India – Article 136 – Interference with Concurrent Findings of Fact: The Supreme Court emphasizes that while its powers under Article 136 are expansive, it will not readily disrupt concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court and the High Court unless the findings are demonstrated to be manifestly perverse, legally unsustainable, or shocking to the conscience of the Court. [Relied on Ganga Kumar Srivastava v. State of Bihar (2005) 6 SCC 211] Mehboob Shah v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 705 : 2026 INSC 729

Article 141 - Law declared by Supreme Court to be binding on all courts

Constitution of India — Article 141 — Retrospective operation of Supreme Court judgments — Declaration of Law — Subvention Scheme — Stoppage of subvention post-unconstitutionality of the Unni Krishnan scheme – Held - Unless a decision of the Supreme Court explicitly declares its application to be prospective, the law declared by the Court carries a retrospective effect - The subvention scheme formulated via interim orders during the pendency of the TMA Pai Foundation case ceased to exist on October 31, 2002, when the 11-Judge Bench declared the Unni Krishnan scheme unconstitutional - The subvention scheme obligated the Central Government to pay the subvention amount on an annual basis rather than as a lump sum for the entire course; hence, there existed no vested right for educational institutions to claim subvention amounts for the entire 5-year duration of a course for students admitted during or prior to the 2002–03 academic year once the scheme itself was declared unconstitutional. [Paras 10 - 12] Government of India v. Sri Devraj URS Medical College, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 766 : 2026 INSC 799

Service Law — Modified Assured Career Progression Scheme (MACPS) — Counts of Same Grade Pay Promotions — Railway Guard Cadre Structure - Modified Assured Career Progression Scheme (MACPS), Paragraphs 2, 5, and 8 — Railway Board Circulars (RBE No. 76/2011 and RBE No. 142/2012) — Entitlement to 2nd and 3rd financial upgradations to Grade Pay Rs. 4600 and Rs. 4800 — Counter-claim based on structural convergence of Grade Pay post-6th Central Pay Commission (CPC) - Key Rulings & Interpretations – i. Applicability of Paragraph 8 to the Guard Cadre - The Supreme Court held that Paragraph 8 of the MACPS strictly applies to the Railway Guard cadre - The movements across the distinct posts of Senior Goods Guard, Passenger Guard, Senior Passenger Guard, and Mail/Express Guard within the cadre constitute functional "promotions" under the relevant Recruitment Rules and Avenue Chart, despite carrying the identical compressed Grade Pay of Rs. 4200 in Pay Band PB-2 post the 6th CPC recommendations - A promotion does not cease to be a promotion merely because the employee's Grade Pay remains constant – ii. Exhaustion of MACPS Slots - An employee who has traversed the promotional hierarchy up to the terminal post of Mail/Express Guard is deemed to have earned three functional promotions (with the movement from Passenger Guard to Senior Passenger Guard ignored under Paragraph 5 due to direct merger of scales) - such an employee has exhausted all three financial upgradation slots available under the MACPS and cannot claim further financial upgradation to Grade Pay Rs. 4600 or Rs. 4800; iii. Financial Reality vs. Stagnation - The Supreme Court observed that promotions within the Guard cadre are not financially neutral - Each advancement involves a formal selection process, pay fixation, promotional increments, and an upward revision of basic pay that significantly enhances running-duty allowances and post-specific additional allowances - employees reaching the terminal post cannot be characterized as suffering from the "financial stagnation" the MACPS was designed to remedy; iv. Scope of Paragraph 5 (Transitional Adjustments) - The illustration appended to Paragraph 5 is a transitional provision regulating the treatment of pre-MACPS ACP-era promotions/upgradations up to 01.09.2008 - It does not override Paragraph 8 for the post-01.09.2008 MACPS operational period, nor does it mandate the total exclusion of structural promotional rungs when calculating future stagnation benefits; v. Binding Nature of Executive Clarifications - Departmental and executive clarifications issued by the Railway Board in consultation with the Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT), such as RBE No. 76/2011 and RBE No. 142/2012, are integral to the Scheme and binding on authorities. Financial upgradation under the MACPS cannot exceed the maximum Grade Pay ceiling attached to the highest promotional post in the respective hierarchy; vi. Precedential Value of Dismissals in Limine - A non-speaking dismissal of a Special Leave Petition (SLP), or an order keeping the question of law open, does not constitute a declaration of law under Article 141 of the Constitution of India and does not invoke the doctrine of merger. [Relied on Union of India and Others v. M.V. Mohanan Nair (2020) 5 SCC 421; Kunhayammed and Others v. State of Kerala and Another (2000) 6 SCC 359; Paras 36-65] Union of India v. Harbans Lal Verma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 712 : 2026 INSC 739

Article 142 - Enforcement of decrees and orders of the Supreme Court and orders as to discovery, etc.

Constitution of India — Article 142 — Inherent Powers — Direction for Independent Inquiry into Genuineness of Academic Degree - Even when declining to disturb the appointment of a candidate on a writ of quo warranto because he held the mandatory UGC-NET qualification, the Court cannot turn a blind eye to prima facie evidence demonstrating that an additional Ph.D. degree used to secure selection was forged or fabricated - In exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court directed the employing University to conduct a full-fledged departmental inquiry in accordance with the principles of natural justice, ensuring presence of original records and officials of the degree-awarding university - If the degree is found to be forged, the appointment will not be protected, and the authorities shall be at liberty to initiate criminal prosecution. [Relied on A.N. Shastri v. State of Punjab, (1998) Supp SCC 127; R.K. Jain v. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 119; B. Srinivasa Reddy v. Karnataka Urban Water Supply & Drainage Board Employees Association, (2006) 11 SCC 731; Paras 18–20] Annu Kumar v. Maharshi Dayanand University Rohtak, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 913 : 2026 INSC 968

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 142 — Invalidation of Scheduled Tribe Certificate — Protection of Pensionary and Retiral Dues — Scope of equitable relief - The appellant was appointed as Junior Engineer (Civil) in 1994 on the basis of a caste certificate certifying him as belonging to the "Tokre Koli" Scheduled Tribe and retired on superannuation on 30.06.2025 after more than three decades of service - The Scrutiny Committee invalidated and confiscated his caste certificate, and the High Court dismissed his writ petition relying on pre-constitutional family records showing the caste of his paternal ancestors as "Koli" - Affirming the findings of the Scrutiny Committee and the High Court on the invalidity of the caste claim, the Supreme Court considered the question of protecting his retiral benefits – The Supreme Court observed that while ordinarily an appointment obtained on the basis of an invalid caste certificate would not survive, in exceptional circumstances where equities of the case so warrant, the Supreme Court may exercise its power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to render complete justice - Taking note that the appellant had rendered more than 30 years of unblemished service until superannuation, and filed an affidavit stating that he has no children and no member of his family had derived any benefit from the invalidated certificate, the Court directed that the service rendered by the appellant from 21.10.1994 to 30.06.2025 shall stand protected for the limited purpose of computation and release of his retiral and pensionary benefits - It was explicitly clarified that such protection shall neither amount to validation/recognition of the caste claim nor entitle the appellant or his family to claim future benefits. [Relied on Chairman and Managing Director, Food Corporation of India & Ors. v. Jagdish Balaram Bahira & Ors., (2017) 8 SCC 670; R. Sundaram v. Tamil Nadu State Level Scrutiny Committee, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 287; Surekha Baljorsingh Thakur v. Caste Scrutiny Committee & Anr., Civil Appeal No. 4586 of 2024; Paras 11–16] Shirish Pandharinath Patil v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 898 : 2026 INSC 949

Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 14 – Civil Suit for Reinstatement – Constitution of India – Article 142 – Compensation in lieu of Reinstatement - A civil court, bound by the procedural rigours of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, cannot grant a decree for reinstatement in service in view of the bar contained in Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963; the remedy lies only in claiming damages - where a public servant was subjected to an illegal discharge solely due to pending criminal proceedings and denied procedural justice, the Supreme Court exercised its plenary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution to do complete justice by directing the State to pay lump-sum compensation of Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakh) in lieu of reinstatement. [Relied on Sushil Kumar Singhal v. Punjab National Bank, (2010) 8 SCC 573; Punjab Water Supply Sewerage Board v. Ram Sajivan, (2007) 9 SCC 86; DIG of Police v. P.R.K. Mohan, (1997) 11 SCC 571; Paras 24-27] Spo/Constable IRB Satpal Singh v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 845 : 2026 INSC 798

Constitution of India — Article 142 read with Article 21 — Guidelines & Comprehensive Directions for Grant of Bail to Foreign Nationals in NDPS Commercial Quantity Cases — Surety Verification and Regulatory Mechanism - To plug the systemic loophole and eliminate the rampant menace of fake/professional sureties used by foreign nationals to abscond, the Supreme Court exercised its plenary jurisdiction under Article 142 to issue binding mandatory directions and introduce standard Form-47A – i. Passport & Travel Restrictions - The passport of the foreign national accused must be mandatorily deposited with the jurisdictional Court - An application for release of passport for travel must be decided expeditiously, preferably within four weeks - Travel outside the country is restricted without prior permission – ii. FRRO Registration - The accused must register with the FRRO within one week of release and submit proof thereof in writing to the Court and IO - The FRRO/MHA shall create a dedicated portal for this purpose – iii. Two Solvent Sureties - The accused must furnish two solvent sureties of like amount; relaxable only upon recorded reasons by the Court – iv. Strict Verification Timelines - Verification of sureties and physical re-verification of the accused's Indian residential address must be completed within 3 working days prior to release on bail – v. Disclosure of Finances & Embassies - Accused must disclose income sources and bank details via affidavit within one week of release - The IO must formally communicate the accused's involvement to the relevant Embassy/Consulate – vi. Charge/Lien on Surety Property - A lien/charge equivalent to the surety bond amount shall be created on the surety's movable/immovable property, realizable in the event of forfeiture – vii. Centralised Database & Portal - Ministry of Law and Justice along with NIC to maintain a centralised database of accused persons and sureties - High Courts via their IT Committees directed to implement digital portals for authentication of financial and property credentials – viii. Accountability of Erring Officials - Departmental inquiries must be initiated against police, revenue, or court officials responsible for approving fake/fabricated sureties due to negligence or collusion – ix. Form-47A - Insertion and adoption of the specialised mandatory undertaking and surety verification format (Form-47A) under BNSS, 2023. [Relied on State of Punjab v. Sukhwinder Singh, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 671; Narcotics Control Bureau v. Mohit Aggarwal, (2022) 18 SCC 374; Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713; Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409; Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India, (2005) 5 SCC 665; Paras 28, 29] Union of India v. Chidiebere Kingsley Nawchara, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 817 : 2026 INSC 870

Administrative Law — Extraordinary Jurisdiction — Article 142 Powers - The invocation of extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to do complete justice is contextual and cannot be exercised mechanically - The Supreme Court will not invoke Article 142 to protect the services of irregularly or illegally appointed teachers at the cost of the students' future and the integrity of public employment streams. [Para 27-32] Najma Khatun v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 667 : 2026 INSC 691

Article 145 - Rules of Court, etc.

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Per Dipankar Datta, J., on behalf of himself and Ujjal Bhuyan, J. - Constitution of India — Article 145(5) — Jurisprudential Precedent and Bench References — Maintainability and Effect of Repeal - A Bench of lesser quorum cannot question the substantive soundness of a decision delivered by a larger Bench (Bangalore Water Supply, 7-Judges) merely because of divergent subsequent opinions - Doubting the correctness of an expansive interpretation that has settled industrial relations across the nation disrupts the bedrock principle of certainty - With the enforcement of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 on 21.11.2025 and the repeal of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, settled rights of workmen in pending legacy proceedings cannot be destabilized by rewriting or reading down Bangalore Water Supply under the guise of calibrating the Triple Test. [Relied on Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213; State (NCT of Delhi) v. BSK Realtors LLP, (2024) 7 SCC 370; Trimurthi Fragrances Pvt. Ltd. v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, (2024) 20 SCC 709]. State of U.P. v. Jai Bir Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 848 : 2026 INSC 897

Article 161 - Power of Governor to grant pardons, etc., and to suspend, remit or commute sentences in certain cases

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 161 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 432, 433 and 433-A – Remission Policy – Applicability and Inter-se Hierarchy of Constitutional vs. Statutory Remission Policies – The State of Haryana's 'Policy Regarding Release of Life Convicts 2002' (dated 12.04.2002) is a policy framed under the constitutional powers of the Governor under Article 161 of the Constitution, identical to the 1993 Policy - A subsequent statutory policy framed by the Executive under Sections 432 and 433 of the CrPC, such as the 2008 Premature Release Policy, cannot override or dilute the benefits of a prior constitutional policy under Article 161 - A statutory policy cannot supersede the constitutional power vested in the Governor. [Paras 9-16] Parveen Kumar @ Parveen Chauhan v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 648 : 2026 INSC 667

Article 166 - Conduct of business of the Government of a State

Administrative Law — Rules of Business under Article 166 of the Constitution — Financial Implication and Deemed Consent - A delegated legislation/notification enhancing royalty rates approved by the Chief Minister (who is also the Minister-in-Charge of Mining) cannot be invalidated for want of explicit approval from the Council of Ministers or formal concurrence from the Finance Department, especially when there is no evidence of disagreement by the Finance Minister - In matters involving the collective responsibility of the Council, where a decision is taken by the Chief Minister at the helm, a deemed consent of the Finance Minister can be inferred under the peculiar facts and circumstances. [Paras 51-63] State of Haryana v. Faridabad Gurgaon Minerals, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 673 : 2026 INSC 690

Article 171 - Composition of the Legislative Councils

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 171(3)(a) vs. Article 243-R — Representation of the People Act, 1950 — Section 27(2)(b) — Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 — Section 352(1)(b) — Electoral Rights of Nominated Members in Legislative Council Elections — Purpose of Local Authority Representation - Held: Nominated members of Town Panchayats/Municipalities do not possess the right to vote in elections to the State Legislative Council from a Local Authorities' Constituency - The constitutional distinction between elected representatives and nominated members under Article 243-R is clear and intentional - Nominated members are inducted for their expertise and hold a purely advisory role; they are expressly barred by the Proviso to Article 243-R from voting in the municipal bodies' own meetings - Allowing them to vote in Legislative Council elections would yield the anomalous and unreasonable consequence of granting them greater voting power in a constitutional legislative body than they possess within their own municipality - The expressions "members of municipalities" under Article 171(3)(a) and "every member" under Section 27(2)(b) of the 1950 Act must be contextually and harmoniously interpreted to apply only to those members who are elected representatives and possess active voting rights within their local authority - Inclusion of nominated members in such electoral rolls is unconstitutional and void ab initio. [Paras 30 – 38] Pranesh M.K. v. A.V. Gayathri, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 686 : 2026 INSC 716

Article 226 - Power of High Courts to issue certain writs

Constitution of India — Article 226 — Writ of Quo Warranto — Essential Requirements and Locus Standi — Scope of Inquiry - To seek and succeed in a proceeding for a writ of quo warranto, the petitioner (even if a stranger) must establish that an appointee lacks the mandatory statutory eligibility/qualifications for occupying a public office or suffers from a statutory disability/disqualification, and has consequently usurped the public office - The initial burden of proof lies heavily on the petitioner to produce unimpeachable evidence, following which the onus shifts to the appointer and appointee - A writ of quo warranto cannot be employed as a vehicle for the vindication of personal grievances by unsuccessful candidates who participated in the selection process and failed to qualify on merit - Where the appointee holds the minimum mandatory qualification (here, UGC-NET) and a Ph.D. degree was merely a desirable/alternative qualification under the applicable recruitment rules and UGC Regulations 2010, the appointee cannot be declared to have usurped the public office. [Paras 8, 9, 11–17] Annu Kumar v. Maharshi Dayanand University Rohtak, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 913 : 2026 INSC 968

Constitution of India — Article 226 — Maintainability of Writ Petition challenging Show Cause Notice — Exceptions - A writ petition directed merely against a show cause notice is ordinarily not maintainable where statutory alternative remedies exist - two narrow exceptions exist through which a writ court may entertain a challenge at the threshold - (i) want of jurisdiction (where the authority has no power in law to embark upon an inquiry, rendering the notice non est); and (ii) abuse of jurisdiction (i.e., mala fide exercise of jurisdiction) - Where the authority is competent under the statute and no mala fides are established, the notice cannot be quashed at inception merely on disputed questions of valuation. [Paras 10–12] Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. District Revenue Officer (Stamps), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 907 : 2026 INSC 963

Constitution of India, 1950 — Articles 226 & 227 — Scope of Certiorari Jurisdiction — Interference with Concurrent Findings of Fact — Error of Law Apparent on Face of Record — When Justified - A finding of fact recorded by a lower court, arbitrator, or tribunal without any supporting evidence or by ignoring material documentary evidence is perverse and amounts to an error of law apparent on the face of the record, making it amenable to judicial review and vulnerable to correction under a writ of certiorari - Certiorari jurisdiction is supervisory and not appellate in nature; the writ court will not re-appreciate evidence or correct a mere error of fact - if findings of fact are based on “no evidence”, or purely on surmises and conjectures, or where the overwhelming weight of evidence does not support the finding, such perversity constitutes an error of law entitling the High Court to issue a writ of certiorari and set aside concurrent orders. [Paras 12 - 15] Shri Prakash Narain Sharma v. Burmah Shell Co-Operative Housing Society, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 873 : 2026 INSC 927

Constitution of India — Article 226 — Alternative Statutory Remedy — Exhaustion of Remedies vs. Maintainability & Entertainability — Flagrant Violation of Natural Justice and Lack of Jurisdiction - The High Court dismissed the appellant's writ petition challenging the ex parte externment order on the ground of availability of an alternative statutory appellate remedy under Section 9 of the Adhiniyam – Held that the self-imposed restriction of exhausting an alternative statutory remedy does not bar the exercise of writ jurisdiction where the impugned order has been passed in flagrant breach of the principles of natural justice or without jurisdiction - Relegating the appellant to an appeal under Section 9 in the face of an egregious violation of mandatory statutory safeguards and total lack of review jurisdiction demonstrated an abject failure on the part of the High Court to exercise jurisdiction vested in it. [Paras 16-27] Vijay Kumar Rajpoot @ Vijju v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 872 : 2026 INSC 926

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 226 – Writ Jurisdiction – Mixed Questions of Law and Fact cannot be raised for the first time in a Writ Petition - While a pure question of law can be raised at any stage of the proceedings, a question of fact or a mixed question of law and fact requiring factual inquiry and investigation cannot be permitted to be agitated for the first time in a writ petition without laying a proper factual foundation in the pleadings before the subordinate authorities/tribunals - The High Court erred in remitting the matter to the DRT for a factual inquiry into the claim of exemption under Section 60(1)(ccc) CPC when no such plea or evidence was placed before the Recovery Officer or the DRT. [Relied on Greater Mohali Area Development Authority & Ors. v. Manju Jain & Ors., (2010) 9 SCC 157; Paras 30 - 46] Sheela Gehlot v. Mohini Hardayal Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 808 : 2026 INSC 863

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226 — Writ Jurisdiction — Maintainability in Electrocution Claims — Disputed Questions of Fact - Writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not an appropriate remedy to claim compensation for death or injury caused by electrocution where disputed questions of fact are involved - The High Court erred in entertaining writ petitions and awarding compensation by treating the occurrence as a matter of absolute liability and ignoring factual disputes relating to negligence, contributory negligence, compliance with statutory safety distances, and third-party liability - Where material facts are in dispute, parties must be relegated to civil courts or appropriate alternate forums. [Relied on Chairman, Grid Corpn. of Orissa Ltd. (Gridco) v. Sukamani Das, (1999) 7 SCC 298; Radha Krishan Industries v. State of H.P., (2021) 6 SCC 771; T.N. Cements Corpn. Ltd. v. Unicon Engineers, (2025) 4 SCC 1; Paras 8-16] Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation v. Rekha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 799 : 2026 INSC 847

Constitution of India – Article 226 – Maintainability of Writ Petition vs Alternative Remedy - The existence of an alternative remedy (such as raising a dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947) does not operate as an absolute bar to the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, particularly where the challenge is directly to the legality and validity of the order of termination itself. [Relied on Avtar Singh v. Union of India and Others, (2016) 8 SCC 471; Ravindra Kumar v. State of U.P. and Others, 2024 INSC 131; Umesh Chandra Yadav v. Inspector General and Chief Security Commissioner, Railway Protection Force, Northern Railway, New Delhi and Others, (2022) 14 SCC 244; Paras 18-25]. Shatrughn Yadav v. Fertilizers and Chemicals Travancore Ltd. (F.A.C.T.), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 789 : 2026 INSC 829

Constitution of India — Article 226 - Writ Jurisdiction — Pleadings and Proof — Distinction between Civil Procedure Code and Writ Petitions — Abstract questions of law requiring factual substantiation - Held: When an issue such as shortfalls in revenue vs. expenditure or claims of financial hardship ostensibly presents a point of law that must be substantiated by facts, the party asserting it in a writ petition must plead and prove such facts through evidence annexed directly to the writ petition or counter-affidavit - Unlike pleadings under the Code of Civil Procedure where only material facts are required to be pleaded, a writ petition or counter-affidavit must contain both facts and the evidence in proof thereof - In the absence of specific pleadings or proof showing that revenue generated fell short of expenses incurred, the Court will not entertain such claims. [Relied on P.V. George v. State of Kerala, (2007) 3 SCC 557; Bharat Singh and Others v. State of Haryana and Others, (1988) 4 SCC 534; Paras 6-13] Government of India v. Sri Devraj URS Medical College, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 766 : 2026 INSC 799

Constitution of India — Article 226 — Maintainability of Writ Petition — Disputed Questions of Fact — Efflux of Time & Remediless Claimants - Where a writ petition challenging non-payment of compensation for injuries/death caused by stray cattle was filed in 2010 and remitted after 15 years, the High Court's Division Bench erred in setting aside the Single Judge's award solely on the ground of “disputed questions of fact” and relegating the claimants to a Civil Court - The Supreme Court held that after such an extraordinary efflux of time, relegating the claimants to a civil suit would leave them completely remediless - On this short ground alone—i.e., the passage of time—the impugned High Court judgment warranted interference and adjudication on merits in the interest of justice. Nisha v. Municipal Council Sangrur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 746 : 2026 INSC 774

Constitution of India, 1950; Article 226 – Writ of Certiorari – Scope and Contours of Supervisory Jurisdiction – Held: While exercising extraordinary and certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court does not act as a Court of Appeal over findings of facts recorded by subordinate Courts or Tribunals - It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the subordinate court is based - Such writ jurisdiction may be invoked only in cases where there is an error of law, jurisdictional error, or patent illegality, but not to correct an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be - Once a competent Civil Court (First Appellate Court) arrives at a finding of fact upon independent examination and appreciation of pleadings and evidence, the High Court cannot set aside such findings under Article 226. [Relied on Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences v. Bikartan Das, (2023) 16 SCC 462; C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, (1954) 1 SCC 905; Paras 12 - 14] Basamma v. Goparappa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 690 : 2026 INSC 712

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226 — Maintainability of Writ Petition — Alternative Remedy under Election Law - Held: The rule requiring the exhaustion of alternative remedies is a rule of convenience and discretion, not a rule of law, and does not oust writ jurisdiction where the controversy involves a pure question of law - When the challenge is raised prior to the election and goes to the root of the composition/legality of the electoral college (inclusion of nominated members) rather than routine irregularities in the electoral roll or the conduct of the election process, a writ petition under Article 226 is fully maintainable - This is particularly true when the statutory remedy under Section 27 of the 1950 Act is illusory or ineffective. [Relied on Ramesh Mehta v. Sanwal Chand Singhvi, (2004) 5 SCC 409; Shelly Oberoi v. Office of Lieutenant Governor of Delhi, (2023) 5 SCC 41; Ram & Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana, (1985) 3 SCC 267; Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India, (2006) 7 SCC 1; Paras 23, 24, 25, 26, 40-49] Pranesh M.K. v. A.V. Gayathri, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 686 : 2026 INSC 716

Constitution of India – Article 226 – Writ Jurisdiction – Pleadings and Prayers – Mending/Moulding of Reliefs – Technicalities cannot trump substantive justice - The Single Judge of the High Court granted relief of reinstatement under Section 47 of the PwD Act, 1995, even though the respondent's writ petition skeletal pleadings and prayers were limited to claiming a 100% disability pension – Held that while High Courts must generally confine themselves to pleadings and prayers to prevent judicial overreach and surprise, this is not an inflexible rule - Article 226 is a reservoir of equity meant to reach injustice wherever it is found - Where the record clearly evinces a suitor's legal entitlement to wider relief, but less is claimed due to ignorance, bona fide mistake, or poor drafting, the Court may exercise its discretion to grant appropriate relief, especially when the opponent seeks to use procedural technicalities to shield its own statutory breach. [Paras 37 – 43] Union of India v. Bali Ram No. 850808321, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 668 : 2026 INSC 689

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226 — Maintainability of Writ Petition — Sector-wide Caution List — Nature of Function Test vs. Formal Character of Respondent — Held: A writ petition under Article 226 challenging the inclusion of a professional's name in the Indian Banks' Association (IBA) Caution List is maintainable - The High Court erred in dismissing the petition on the narrow ground that the IBA is not "State" within the meaning of Article 12 - The judicial focus has shifted from the formal character of the body to the nature of the function performed and the effect of the impugned action on legally protected rights - The maintenance of a sector-wide Caution List possesses a sufficient public law character and operates as an industry-wide adverse accreditation that directly impacts an advocate's fundamental right to practice a profession under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Ajay Vijh v. Indian Banks Association, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 656 : 2026 INSC 670

Article 227 - Power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court

Consumer Protection Act, 2019 — Section 58(3) — Reference on Difference of Opinion — Scope of Jurisdiction of Third Member / Referee Bench — High Court's Supervisory Jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution - Scope of Referee Member's Jurisdiction under Section 58(3) - the course to be adopted by a referee Bench/Member is to return the reference with answers to the points referred to the referring Bench to enable it to dispose of the matter based on the majority opinion - where the referring Bench did not delineate the specific point(s) of difference but formulated broad questions requiring examination of the entire evidence on merits, the referee member taking a common-sense approach to answer the reference and decide the appeal along the lines of the concurring companion member is not a jurisdictional illegality warranting interference under Article 227 of the Constitution - The objection as to the strict scope of reference in such circumstances is merely technical - When questions referred go to the very root of the complaint and are inseparable from the evidence on record, requiring a survey of the entire gamut of material and rival contentions, the referee member deciding the appeal on merits based on the majority opinion reflects a permissible common-sense approach. [Relied on State of Punjab v. Salil Sabhlok, (2013) 5 SCC 1; Paras 14-23]. Askari Hussain v. Dinesh Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 871 : 2026 INSC 929

Constitution of India - Article 227 — Supervisory Jurisdiction over Arbitral Tribunals — Narrow Band of Perversity/Patent Lack of Inherent Jurisdiction — A foray to the writ court under Article 227 against the dismissal of a Section 16 application by an arbitrator is permissible only if the order suffers from a patent lack of inherent jurisdiction - Such a patent lack must be so perverse that it stares one in the face and requires no argument whatsoever - Before entertaining such petitions, High Courts must record a prima facie finding regarding the patent lack of inherent jurisdiction after hearing the rival parties - In the absence of a manifest jurisdictional defect, interlocutory judicial interference is unwarranted and contrary to legislative policy. Manash Kamal Bezboruah v. Bokahola Tea Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 677 : 2026 INSC 701

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 16, Section 5, and Section 34 — Constitution of India — Article 227 — Maintainability of Revision Petition against Arbitral Tribunal's order rejecting jurisdictional challenge — Extent of Judicial Intervention — The High Court is not justified in entertaining a revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution against an order of the Arbitral Tribunal rejecting an application under Section 16 of the Act (seeking deletion from the array of parties as non-signatories) - The statutory scheme of the Act mandates minimal judicial interference during ongoing arbitral proceedings - The remedy against the rejection of a Section 16 application strictly lies under Section 34 of the Act after the pronouncement of the final award. Manash Kamal Bezboruah v. Bokahola Tea Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 677 : 2026 INSC 701

Article 243ZL - Supersession and suspension of board and interim management

Constitution of India, 1950 – Part IXB – Article 243ZL and Article 243ZT – Banking Regulation Act, 1949 – Section 36AAA(1), (2), (7) & Section 56 – Multi-State Co-operative Societies Act, 2002 – Supersession of Board of Directors of Multi-State Co-operative Bank – Six-month limitation under Article 243ZL(1) – Whether RBI's power of supersession under Section 36AAA of the BR Act is circumscribed by the six-month ceiling under Article 243ZL(1) – Held, No, the third proviso to Article 243ZL(1) explicitly states that in the case of a co-operative society carrying on the business of banking, the provisions of the BR Act "shall also apply" - The expression "shall also apply" is used in an additive and non-restrictive sense, incorporating the provisions of the BR Act into Part IXB of the Constitution by reference insofar as it relates to multi-State co-operative banks - The third proviso acts as an independent substantive legislative provision rather than a qualifying or restrictive clause - the fourth proviso to Article 243ZL(1), which extends supersession from six months to one year for banking co-operative societies, explicitly excludes a multi-State co-operative society carrying on the business of banking - An exclusion presupposes prior inclusion - the six-month ceiling on supersession under Article 243ZL(1) does not apply to multi-State co-operative banks, and the RBI retains statutory power under Section 36AAA(1) of the BR Act to supersede the Board of Directors for a period not exceeding five years in aggregate. [Paras 20-34] Sandeep S. Ghandat v. Reserve Bank of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 895 : 2026 INSC 955

Article 245 - Extent of laws made by Parliament and by the Legislatures of States

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Extra-Territorial Operation of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988: Under Article 245(2) of the Constitution of India, laws made by Parliament cannot be deemed invalid on the ground of extra-territorial operation - The legislative intent to give the MVA extra-territorial application for cross-border transit is evident from Section 139 (power to frame rules for taking vehicles outside India) and Section 149(3) (duty of insurers to satisfy foreign judgments from reciprocating countries) - the provisions of the MVA apply to the third-party claim regardless of whether the accident took place in India or Nepal. [Para 21-30] Oriental Insurance v. Durg Roadways, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 696 : 2026 INSC 722

Article 299 - Contracts

Constitution of India — Article 299 — Transactions executed in the name of the President of India — Effect on Stamp Duty Inquiries - The mere fact that the constitutional nomenclature of the President of India figures in an instrument of transfer as the transferor does not preclude an inquiry under Section 47-A into whether the consideration or market value has been truly set forth in the instrument - Instruments entered into in the exercise of the executive power of the Union are expressed in the name of the President and executed by authorised officers, but this does not render the question of true market value or fraudulent intention incapable of arising as a matter of law. [Relied on Ramesh Chand Bansal v. District Magistrate/Collector, (1999) 5 SCC 62; Shanti Bhushan v. State of U.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 489; Special Director v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse, (2004) 3 SCC 440; Union of India v. VICCO Laboratories, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 489; Para 12 - 23] Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. District Revenue Officer (Stamps), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 907 : 2026 INSC 963

Article 311 - Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State

Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 – Section 12 – Removal of disqualification attaching to conviction – Effect on Public Employment – Termination/Dismissal based on conviction – Scope of non-obstante clause - Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 does not obliterate or wash away a criminal conviction, nor does it preclude the employer from taking disciplinary action or removing a public servant based on the conduct leading to conviction - Release of a convict on probation is primarily intended for reformation and rehabilitation, but does not confer a right to continue in service - The words "shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law" in Section 12 refer to statutory disqualifications under other general or special enactments and do not override constitutional provisions, including the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution - an employee cannot claim reinstatement merely because the criminal court released them on probation or directed that the conviction would not affect their service career. [Paras 17-21] Spo/Constable IRB Satpal Singh v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 845 : 2026 INSC 798

Constitution of India – Article 311(2) – Protection of Civil Servants – Termination of Confirmed Employees Without Departmental Enquiry – Permissibility - The Supreme Court held that the termination of services of confirmed government servants through a simpliciter administrative order, without conducting a departmental enquiry, is a manifest violation of the procedural safeguards guaranteed under Article 311(2) of the Constitution – The Supreme Court emphasized that confirmation in service is not a mere administrative formality; it confers a substantive status carrying an enhanced security of tenure and constitutional protection - Even if an allegation exists that the initial appointments were irregular or illegal (e.g., made against vacancies in excess of those advertised), the protected status acquired by the civil servants cannot be undone by an administrative order bypassing the mandatory requirements of Article 311(2) - The holding of an inquiry remains the constitutional rule, and the executive cannot dispense with it at its convenience unless the case strictly falls within the narrowly tailored exceptions under the second proviso to Article 311(2). [Paras 14-21] Debashish Mohapatra v. District and Session Judge, Jagatsinghpur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 721 : 2026 INSC 743

Article 324 - Superintendence, direction and control of elections to be vested in an Election Commission

Election Law & Criminal Jurisprudence — Electoral Offences, Seizure of Black Money, and Withdrawal of Prosecutions — Comprehensive Directions issued to curb money power, streamline investigations, and regulate withdrawal of criminal cases filed during elections - Constitutional Role of Election Commission & Free/Fair Elections - Article 324 of the Constitution vests wide superintendence, direction, and control of elections in the Election Commission of India (ECI), which acts as a reservoir of residuary powers in unoccupied fields to ensure purity and transparency in the electoral process - Purity in elections and the rule of law are indispensable basic features of democracy. [Relied on: Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975 Supp SCC 1; Rameshwar Prasad (6) v. Union of India, (2006) 2 SCC 1; Union of India v. Assn. for Democratic Reforms, (2002) 5 SCC 294; Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr., (1978) 1 SCC 405; A.C. Jose v. Sivan Pillai, (1984) 2 SCC 656; Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India, (2023) 6 SCC 161; Kanwar Lal Gupta v. Amar Nath Chawla, (1975) 3 SCC 646; Ashok Shankarrao Chavan v. Madhavrao Kinhalkar, (2014) 7 SCC 99; Paras 8 - 12] State of Karnataka v. Prathik Parasrampuria, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 816 : 2026 INSC 868

Article 338 - National Commission for Scheduled Castes

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 338 — Powers and Functions of National Commission for Scheduled Castes (NCSC) — Nature of Orders / Directives — Recommendatory vs. Adjudicatory Powers — Scope of Civil Court Powers under Article 338(8) - The Supreme Court reiterated that the National Commission for Scheduled Castes (NCSC) established under Article 338 of the Constitution of India is a constitutional body with a recommendatory and advisory role, but it does not possess adjudicatory powers - The NCSC cannot take over the functions of a court or an adjudicatory tribunal to pass mandatory orders or grant consequential service benefits such as directing the payment of arrears. Mumbai Port Authority v. National Commission For Scheduled Caste, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 729 : 2026 INSC 755

Fifth Schedule

Civil Courts Act, 1972 (Andhra Pradesh, Act 19 of 1972) – Sections 1(3), 2(a), 3 – Constitution of India – Fifth Schedule, Article 14, Article 244(1) – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 9 – Scheduled Districts Act, 1874 – Andhra Pradesh Agency Rules, 1924 – Jurisdiction of Civil Courts in Scheduled Areas – Civil disputes exclusively between Non-Tribal parties - The Supreme Court held that the ordinary Civil Courts have the requisite jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to entertain and adjudicate civil disputes (such as partition and succession) concerning properties located in Scheduled Areas, provided that the dispute is exclusively between non-tribal parties and involves no tribal interest or fetters - The salutary purpose and constitutional objective of establishing Scheduled Areas under the Fifth Schedule and continuing Agency Courts under the Andhra Pradesh Agency Rules, 1924 is to safeguard indigenous tribal communities, protect their lands from exploitation, and preserve their age-old customs and autonomy - Subjecting non-tribal persons to special agency procedures for disputes solely amongst themselves bears no rational nexus to the objective sought to be achieved, which is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution - Merely because a parcel of land falls within a geographically notified 'Scheduled Area', it cannot attract the blanket exclusion of Civil Courts if all parties involved are non-tribals - If even one party to the dispute is a tribal residing in the Scheduled Area, the Agency Courts alone will retain jurisdiction - The restoration of Civil Court jurisdiction for disputes involving exclusively non-tribal parties applies to pending cases and those arising in the future. [Paras 10-15] Mukkera Venkata Ratnam v. Vantasala China Venkateswarlu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 772 : 2026 INSC 810

Seventh Schedule

Constitution of India, 1950 — Seventh Schedule, List I Entry 57 and List II Entry 21 — Division of Legislative and Executive Powers — EEZ and Territorial Waters - The regulatory domains governing maritime fishing are distinctly bifurcated. While Entry 57 of List I grants the Parliament legislative competence (and the Union executive power) to regulate fishing and fisheries beyond territorial waters (in the EEZ), Entry 21 of List II vests the State Legislature and State Executive with authority to regulate fisheries within territorial waters - These powers are co-equal and autonomous in their respective spheres, with no direct conflict between the Union's Sustainable Harnessing of Fisheries in the Exclusive Economic Zone Rules, 2025 and the Tamil Nadu Marine Fishing Regulation Rules, 2020. [Para 14] Fisherman Care v. Government of India Department of Animal Husbandry, Dairying and Fisheries, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 888 : 2026 INSC 937

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Section 22 – Applicability to Agricultural Land – Preferential Right of Co-heirs – Constitutional Validity and Legislative Competence of Parliament – Held The preferential right given to a Class-I Hindu heir under Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (HSA) is fully applicable even if the immovable property in question is agricultural land - Key Legal Principles – i. Nature of the Right - The right of pre-emption under Section 22 of the HSA is, in its pith and substance, an incident of succession and not a regulation of transfer simpliciter - It is intrinsically and inseparably linked to succession among Class-I heirs, acting as a qualification placed by Parliament so that family properties are retained within the family - The right lives and dies with the succession relationship and cannot be invoked by strangers, tenants, or distant blood relations; ii. Legislative Competence of Parliament - Parliament possesses complete legislative competence to enact Section 22 of the HSA regarding agricultural land under Entry 5 of List III (Concurrent List) of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution - Unlike Item 7 of the Concurrent List under the Government of India Act, 1935 (which expressly excluded agricultural land), the framers of the Constitution deliberately omitted the exclusionary clause from Entry 5 of List III - Entry 5 is unqualified and covers intestacy and succession to all forms of property; iii. Doctrine of Pith and Substance - Applying the doctrine of pith and substance, the dominant character of Section 22 falls squarely within Entry 5 of List III (Succession) - It does not regulate the formalities or conditions of a transfer under Entry 6 of List III ("transfer of property other than agricultural land") or Entry 18 of List II - The mere fact that a proposed transfer triggers the right does not alter its fundamental character as a succession provision; iv. Distinction between Atam Prakash and Babu Ram - There is no conflict between the rulings in Atam Prakash v. State of Haryana (1986) and Babu Ram v. Santokh Singh (2019); Atam Prakash struck down Section 15 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, because the wide array of entitled relatives (including tenants and co-sharers without succession ties) violated Article 14 by lacking a reasonable classification based on agnatic succession - Section 22 of the HSA restricts its scope exclusively to Class-I co-heirs inheriting from a common intestate - Atam Prakash dealt with consanguinity-based pre-emption under a different statutory context and did not strike down the concept of pre-emption itself, nor did it consider Section 22 of HSA – held that where a petition under Section 22 of the HSA is instituted prior to the actual execution of a sale deed to a third party, it perfectly satisfies the requirement that the right of pre-emption applies to an alienation that is "about to happen" - There is no subsequent legal requirement for the plaintiff to challenge the completed sale deed separately, as the transaction was carried out in the teeth of an active, pending enforcement of a preferential right. [Relied on Babu Ram v. Santokh Singh, (2019) 14 SCC 162; Vaijanath v. Guramma, (1999) 1 SCC 292; Bishan Singh v. Khazan Singh, 1958 SCC OnLine SC 88; Paras Paras 7-13] Mahinder v. Puran Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 675 : 2026 INSC 698

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