The Supreme Court on Thursday (July 9) ruled that a school official who receives a direct complaint of sexual assault from a child cannot avoid criminal liability of reporting the incident to authorities by conducting a private "verification" and concluding that "nothing had happened."

The Court said that failure to report the incident under Section 19 of the Prevention of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (“POCSO Act”) would attract a criminal liability under Section 21 of the POCSO Act, involving punishment with imprisonment up to six months or fine or with both.

A bench of Justice Manoj Misra and Justice K.V. Viswanathan set aside the discharge of a school headmistress who allegedly suppressed an 8-year-old student's complaint of rape by a senior student, observing that the phrase "has knowledge that such an offence has been committed" under Section 19(1) of the POCSO Act must be interpreted purposively to include awareness based on credible information received directly from the victim.

"When a child victim reports to a person that he or she has been subjected to an offence... it could safely be concluded that the person to whom such information is provided by the child victim has knowledge that such an offence has been committed," the Court observed.

The Court further observed: "to serve the avowed purpose of the POCSO Act, the phrase 'has knowledge that such an offence has been committed'... would have to be construed as to include awareness based on the receipt of credible information with regard to commission of an offence punishable under the Act."

Background

The appellant, mother of an 8-year-old victim, challenged the discharge of the school authorities, including the headmistress, principal, teachers, and hostel warden, by the Trial Court and Gauhati High Court. Her daughter had alleged sexual assault by a Class VIII student, reporting it to her sister, the Head Girl, and ultimately to the Headmistress.

Instead of reporting the matter to the police as required under Section 19(1) of the POCSO Act, the headmistress conducted her own "verification", examining the child, observing redness and swelling, questioning the accused who denied it, and monitoring the children for days. Concluding "nothing had happened," she allegedly suppressed the incident and instructed students not to disclose it.

Both the Trial Court and the High Court had discharged the accused on the ground that they lacked "knowledge" or "reason to believe" that an offence had occurred, since their own verification exercise did not reveal any conclusive evidence, and the subsequent medical report showed no signs of sexual assault.

Aggrieved by the discharge order, the victim's mother moved to the Supreme Court.

Decision

Setting aside the concurrent findings of the courts below, the judgment authored by Justice Misra noted that the discharge order was passed on erroneous application of law, by solely relying on the school's verification of the victim's private parts, to deny any incident of a sexual assault on her.

The Court said that at the stage of hearing the discharge application, they had conducted a "mini-trial" by weighing the defence's arguments instead of only looking at the prosecution's prima facie case.

"The test... is whether the materials forming part of the police report if taken at their face value have sufficient probative value to create a grave suspicion that the accused to be charged has committed that offence.”, the Court observed.

Construction of phrase 'Knowledge that such an offence has been committed' used in Section 19(1) of POCSO Act

The Court rejected the High Court's narrow interpretation of the phrase 'Knowledge that such an offence has been committed' under Section 19(1) of the POCSO Act, that equated "knowledge" with certainty or independent verification.

The Court noted that sexual offences against children are rarely committed in public gaze, and relying on direct evidence to determine "knowledge" would render the reporting mechanism useless. The Act's objective is to protect children and ensure prompt reporting to secure evidence and prevent further harm.

“The phrase “has knowledge that such an offence has been committed” is not limited to direct knowledge of the commission of the offence, but would include awareness of its commission based on direct information received from the victim, in our view, the person who received information about its commission from the victim could be said to have knowledge that such an offence has been committed. The defence that an effort was made to ascertain the truth and in absence of signs of sexual assault, report was not made is not acceptable, at this stage, to stifle a prosecution under Section 21 of the POCSO Act. More so, when the Act does not contemplate any such exercise. Besides, in our view, an investigation to ascertain whether such an incident has actually occurred or not must take place after reporting of the incident and not before, as such an exercise would defeat the very purpose for which the POCSO Act has been enacted. Otherwise also, if investigative exercise is carried out by a person before reporting the incident, the signs of such an offence may disappear, resulting in the accused going scotfree. Prompt reporting of the incident is a sine qua non for effective implementation of the Act. This position is clear from the provisions of sub-section (6) of Section 19 and Section 27 of the POCSO Act.”, the Court observed.

“…the phrase “has knowledge that such an offence has been committed”, as used in sub-section (1) of Section 19, would have to be construed as to include awareness based on the receipt of credible information with regard to commission of an offence punishable under the Act. And where such information is received directly from the victim, who is capable of communicating/ reporting/ informing, it will be deemed credible.”, the court added.

Why Was Trial Only Restored Against School Headmistress?

The Court directed the restoration of the trial against only the school headmistress, not other school authorities, such as the principal, teachers, and hostel warden, because she was the one who had the direct knowledge of the incident and had received information about it directly from the victim.

“…those who had no direct knowledge of the incident and had not received information about it directly from the victim, cannot be considered part of the criminal conspiracy.”, the Court noted for other school managerial persons, while upholding their discharge.

“…the victim had imparted information about the incident to as many as four persons, namely, her elder sister; her friend (C T); the Head Girl (YS); and Miss Linda Sema. Admittedly, the victim's sister; the victim's friend and the Head Girl were minors and therefore, a child within the meaning of section 2(b) of the POCSO Act. Subsection (3) of Section 21 provides that provisions of subsection (1) of Section 21 shall not apply to a child under the Act. In such circumstances, the victim's sister; victim's friend; and the Head Girl of the institution are not liable to be prosecuted for an offence punishable under Section 21 read with Section 19(1) of the POCSO Act.”, the Court observed.

The appeal was partly allowed.

Cause Title: AAA VERSUS LINDA SEMA & ORS.

Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 659

Click here to download judgment

Appearance:

For Petitioner(s) :Mr. Jitendra Mohan Sharma, Sr. Adv. Mr. Rajiv Mangla, AOR Ms. Monika, Adv. Mr. Hrithik Jarodia, Adv. Mr. Amrit Pradhan, Adv. Mr. Akshat Sharma, Adv.

For Respondent(s) : Mr. Satya Kam Sharma , AOR Ms. Jaikriti S. Jadeja, AOR Mr. Shivang Goel, Adv. Mr. Ishaan Aggarwal, Adv. Mr. Ojas Mittal, Adv.