UAPA | 'Terrorist Act' Not Confined To Conventional Violence; Includes Conspiracy To Disrupt Essential Supplies Through Any Means : Supreme Court

The Supreme Court today denied bail to Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam in the Delhi riots larger conspiracy on the grounds that prima facie, they were the architects of the alleged conspiracy. It granted bail to the other five accused persons-Gulfisha Fatima, Meeran Haider, Shifa Ur Rehman, Mohd Saleem Khan and Shadab Ahmad, reasoning that their roles were merely facilitative in nature.In its judgment delivered by a Bench comprising Justice Aravind Kumar and Justice N.V. Anjaria, the Court interpreted Section 15 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, to encompass forms of violence that threaten the sovereignty and security of the nation, even where such acts destabilise civic life and societal functioning without immediate physical violence.The judgment authored by Justice Kumar reasoned that Section 15 is not restricted to only a conventional form of violence that intends to threaten or be likely to threaten the unity, integrity, security, including economic security or sovereignty of India, or with the intent to strike terror in people or any section thereof.Section 15 is not confined to the use of bombs, explosives, firearms or other conventional weapons alone. It would include other means by use of the expression "by any other means of whatever nature.""The means by which such acts may be committed are not confined to the use of bombs, explosives, firearms, or other conventional weapons alone. Parliament has consciously employed the expression “by any other means of whatever nature”, which expression cannot be rendered otiose. The statutory emphasis is thus not solely on the instrumentality employed, but on the design, intent, and effect of the act. To construe Section 15 as limited only to conventional modes of violence would be to unduly narrow the provision, contrary to its plain language."It further reasoned that the consequence contemplated under Section 15 includes acts such as disrupting economic supplies or essential services, and these do not necessarily have to be necessarily accompanied by immediate physical violence, as in the case of a conventional form of violence. The alleged calls made by the accused persons to hold "chakka jams" across vital parts of the city to cut essential supplies was thus construed as conspiracy to commit 'terrorist act' through 'other means'. "The consequences contemplated under Section 15 further illuminate the legislative understanding of terrorism. Apart from death or destruction of property, the provision expressly encompasses acts which disrupt supplies or services essential to the life of the community, as well as acts which threaten the economic security of the nation. This reflects Parliament's recognition that threats to sovereignty and security may arise through conduct that destabilises civic life or societal functioning, even in the absence of immediate physical violence."It further states that a terrorist act can either be committed under Section 15 or under Section 15 read with Section 18, the latter involving a conspiracy as acts preparatory to the commission of the terrorist act. Adding to this, the Court stated that the statutory scheme therefore contemplates that a terrorist act may involve multiple actors performing different roles towards a common unlawful objective."Read together, Sections 15 and 18 disclose a legislative design wherein Section 15 defines the nature of acts which Parliament has characterised as terrorist acts, while Section 18 ensures that criminal liability is not confined only to the final execution, but extends to those who contribute to the commission of such acts through planning, coordination, mobilisation, or other forms of concerted action. Whether particular conduct ultimately attracts Section 15 directly, or Section 18 read with Section 15, depends upon the role attributed and the statutory ingredients alleged to be satisfied."The Court found that there are reasonable grounds of believing that Sharjeel Imam and Umar Khalid's conduct bears a prima facie nexus to a terrorist act as defined under Section 15 as direct participants in orchestrating the conspiracy through speeches, chakka jams, etc.Case Details:1. UMAR KHALID v. STATE OF NCT OF DELHI|SLP(Crl) No. 14165/20252. GULFISHA FATIMA v STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI )|SLP(Crl) No. 13988/20253. SHARJEEL IMAM v THE STATE NCT OF DELHI|SLP(Crl) No. 14030/20254. MEERAN HAIDER v. THE STATE NCT OF DELHI | SLP(Crl) No./14132/20255. SHIFA UR REHMAN v STATE OF NATIONAL CAPITAL TERRITORY|SLP(Crl) No. 14859/20256. MOHD SALEEM KHAN v STATE OF NCT OF DELHI|SLP(Crl) No. 15335/20257. SHADAB AHMED v STATE OF NCT OF DELHI|SLP(Crl) No. 17055/2025Click here to read the judgmentCitation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 1Other reports about the judgment can be read here.

UAPA | 'Terrorist Act' Not Confined To Conventional Violence; Includes Conspiracy To Disrupt Essential Supplies Through Any Means : Supreme Court

Gursimran Kaur Bakshi

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