Section 153A IPC - Deliberate & Malicious Intent Necessary; 'Disturb Public Tranquility' Does Not Mean Normal Law & Order Issues : Supreme Court

The Supreme Court interpreted the ingredients of the offence under Section 153A of the Indian Penal Code in the case Amish Devgan v Union of India.Interpreting Section 153A(b) of the Indian Penal Code, the Supreme Court has held that the term 'public tranquility' must be read in a restricted sense synonymous with public order and safety and not normal law and order issues that do not endanger the public interest at large.The bench comprising Justices AM Khanwilkar and Sanjiv Khanna observed thus in the judgment dismissing the writ petition filed by Journalist Amish Devgan seeking quashing of FIR lodged against him for his remarks against Sufi Saint Moinnuddin Chisthi.Section 153A(b) penalizes an act 'which is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities, and which disturbs or is likely to disturb the public tranquillity'. Taking note of the punishment of imprisonment of up to three years prescribed therein, the court observed:"It cannot be given the widest meaning so as to fall foul of the requirement of reasonableness which is a constitutional mandate. Clause (b) of Section 153A, therefore, has to be read accordingly to satisfy the constitutional mandate. We would interpret the words 'public tranquillity' in clause (b) would mean ordre publique a French term that means absence of insurrection, riot, turbulence or crimes of violence and would also include all acts which will endanger the security of the State, but not acts which disturb only serenity, and are covered by the third and widest circle of law and order(Paragraph 64). The court also added that 'Public order' also includes acts of local significance embracing a variety of conduct destroying or menacing public order. The bench observed:"Public Order in clause (2) to Article 19 nor the statutory provisions make any distinction between the majority and minority groups with reference to the population of the particular area though as we have noted above this may be of some relevance. When we accept the principle of local significance, as a sequitur we must also accept that majority and minority groups could have, in a given case, reference to a local area."Intention necessaryThe bench noted the Calcutta High Court view ( in P.K. Chakravarty v. The King ) that the intention as to whether or not the person accused was promoting enmity is to be collected from the internal evidence of the words themselves, but this is not to say that other evidence cannot be looked into. It said:"Likewise, while examining the question of likelihood to promote ill feelings the facts and circumstances of that time must be taken into account. Something must be known of the kind of people to whom the words are addressed. Words will be generally decisive, especially in those cases where the intention is expressly declared if the words used naturally, clearly or indubitably have such tendency. Then, such intention can be presumed as it is the natural result of the words used. However, the words used and their true meaning are never more than evidence of intention, and it is the real intention of the person charged that is the test. Similarly, the Lahore High Court in Devi Sharan Sharma had observed that intention can be deduced from internal evidence of the words as well as the general policy of the paper in which the concerned article was published, consideration of the person for whom it was written and the state of feeling between the two communities involved. In case the words used in the article are likely to produce hatred, they must be presumed to be intended to have that effect unless the contrary is shown.The court noted that the Bombay High Court in Gopal Vinayak Godse v. Union of India has observed that the intention to promote enmity or hatred is not a necessary ingredient of the offence and that it is enough to show that the language of the writing is of the nature calculated to promote feelings of enmity or hatred, for a person must be presumed to intend the natural consequences of his act. In this context, the court said: "The view expressed by the Bombay High Court in Gopal Vinayak Godse lays considerable emphasis on the words itself, but the view expressed in P.K. Chakravarthy and Devki Sharma take a much broader and a wider picture which, in our opinion, would be the right way to examine whether an offence under Section 153A, clauses (a) and (b) had been committed. The ordinary reasonable meaning of the matter complained of may be either the literal meaning of the published matter or what is implied in that matter or what is inferred from it. A particular imputation is capable of being conveyed means and implies it is reasonably so capable and should not be strained, forced or subjected to utterly unreasonable interpretation"(Paragraph 62)"We would also hold that deliberate and malicious intent is necessary and can be gathered from the words itself satisfying the test of top ...

Section 153A IPC - Deliberate & Malicious Intent Necessary; 'Disturb Public Tranquility' Does Not Mean Normal Law & Order Issues : Supreme Court

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Question of intent would be relevant for offences under Section 153A, 295A IPC.

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