The Examined Judge
Biswajit Mohapatra
20 Nov 2026 8:00 PM IST

What the judiciary owes the litigant is not merely a decision, but one that is factually structured, legally sustainable and socially justified. Yet the discourse on Indian courts is almost wholly about quantity: crores of pending cases, years of delay, vacant posts, disposal rates. In that noise, quality is the first casualty. A recent turn in the design of judicial careers, towards promotion by examination, deserves to be watched in that light. Its intentions are sound. What it may produce in the next generation of judges is the cause of this apprehension.
In All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 601, the Supreme Court restored the quota for promotion to the District Judge cadre through the Limited Departmental Competitive Examination to 25 per cent, and reduced the qualifying service to three years as Civil Judge (Senior Division), with seven years of total service. It also reserved 10 per cent of Senior Division posts for an accelerated examination open to Civil Judges (Junior Division) with three years of service. The Court's concern was genuine. Where every officer reaches the higher cadre in the ordinary course of time, there is little incentive to excel. The merit channel was meant to restore that incentive.
The ladder that emerges is one of examination at entry, examination again around the third year, and examination once more around the seventh. A Civil Judge (Junior Division), however, is a Class I officer from the first day of service, a status earned through one of the most demanding competitive examinations in the country. Yet among the Class I civil services, the judiciary now stands almost alone in making competitive examination a route of promotion. Officers of the All India Services and the Central Group A services rise through Departmental Promotion Committees, on the strength of appraisal reports, vigilance clearance and empanelment. Scientific services assess their officers by peer review of the work actually done, and allow the able to rise faster on that basis. None of them asks a mid-career officer to return to the examination hall to prove fitness for higher office. These services appear to have settled on a simple principle: once an officer has been selected on knowledge, advancement should rest on performance. One wonders why the judiciary, where performance is most visible in every judgment delivered, should be the one to depart from it.
Consider an officer who joins the Bench at 26. The first years of a judge's life are the years in which judging is learnt: how to frame issues, control a trial, weigh contradictory evidence, write a reasoned judgment that survives appeal, and acquire depth in precedent. These skills come only from doing difficult cases, slowly and with care. But the officer now knows that the next step depends on an examination about three years away, and time becomes the scarcest resource. The temptation is to keep the docket moving at the least intellectual cost: compromises recorded, acquittals where witnesses have turned hostile, routine orders, and contested trials quietly deferred. The disposal figures stay respectable, while the best hours of the day are devoted to preparation. Having succeeded once, the officer may well repeat the method for the next examination. By 33 or 35, the same officer could be an Additional District Judge presiding over sessions trials and matters of life and liberty. What began as a tactic may by then have settled into a judicial temperament.
The next aspiration is the High Court. There is no examination at this stage, and worth must be shown through work. Even here, the same streak is likely to continue. A bold judgment invites scrutiny from the superior courts and the Bar, and to an aspiring candidate scrutiny is a risk. The safer course remains easy disposals, non-controversial administration, and a record of numerous disposals, unblemished but unremarkable.
The concern is not merely that individual officers lose time. It is that the system, at every stage, may come to select for a particular kind of judge. Officers who give the docket first claim on their time fall behind in the race; officers who give the examination first claim move ahead of their seniors. Over a decade, the higher judiciary may be filled disproportionately by the second kind. This risks turning the logic of judicial work upside down. In a court system where pendency is the defining concern, the docket becomes an obstacle to advancement rather than the path to it. And the quality of the judgment, which is the condition precedent of the judicial office, quietly pays the price. There is a further cost. A service in which every officer is perpetually competing with every other may slowly lose its fraternity. The junior who overtakes the senior through an examination, and the senior who must now serve under the junior, may both find the bonds of collegiality and hierarchical discipline strained by a constant rat race.
It may be argued, in answer, that pure seniority promotes mediocrity. It can. Under seniority alone, an able officer and an indifferent one rise at the same pace. But if appraisal is weak, the remedy would seem to lie in better appraisal, not in a written paper; one blunt instrument replaced by another may not produce merit. Nor can it be said that the examinations have introduced risk-aversion into the system. Fear of inspection, scrutiny by the appellate forum and complaints is old. The difference is that seniority treated the cautious and the courageous alike, while an examination-based system may reward caution and hasten it. The examinations may not have created the tendency, but they may well come to select for it. The argument that preparation makes a better-read judge is not a complete answer either. Legal knowledge is already tested at entry, and judicial academies exist to keep it current. The gain is uncertain; the diversion of judicial time is not, and it often recurs over several attempts.
It may further be said that the examinations already take account of service records and judgments. In many States they do, through confidential reports, disposal figures and a few judgments submitted by the officer. But these components often carry a minor share of the marks, while the written papers decide the merit list. The viva, for its part, allows a few minutes of conversation to outweigh years of work on the bench, and tends to judge by impression, though the candidate is not a newcomer seeking entry but an officer who has been part of the system for years.
Nor are the remaining components free of difficulty. The confidential report, the very instrument meant to record an officer's worth, is itself an imperfect measure: in practice, a high assessment is rare, and the considerations on which it is awarded are not always tied to the quality of judicial work. Disposal, likewise, is counted in units irrespective of its quality and outcome.
The assessment of judgments, too, becomes subjective when it rests on a few selected ones, and says little about the general working pattern of an officer across a lengthy career. Even a fair assessment would capture only part of the picture. A judgment is a glimpse of judicial action, not the whole of it. It is the numerous orders passed and the steps taken across the lifetime of a litigation that reveal a judge's approach to a case as a whole: whether interim relief was considered with care, whether a trial was controlled or allowed to drift, whether the vulnerable party was heard. These reveal the officer's sensitivity, or insensitivity, to the cause of justice, and no examination, report or selected judgment brings them into view. The work of the judge, which ought to be the measure, thus remains at the margins of the very process meant to reward it.
The judiciary does not need judges who are good at examinations. It needs judges who are good at judging, and who do not shrink from the difficult case. It is a duty cast upon the judge by society through the Constitution. The fear is that repeated examinations may, over time, reward skill in the examination hall over courage in the courtroom. Merit, for a judge, lives in the courtroom and in the judicial action. If it is to be rewarded, perhaps those judicial actions themselves are the place to look.
When an officer chooses to handle cases only so as to remain safe in career prospects, steering clear of the sensitive and the complex, it strikes at the foundation of the judicial system. It must be said, with some regret, that there are signs the system may already have begun to take this shape, for the criteria by which officers are assessed have long tended to reward the safe over the sensitive and quantity over quality. If that choice continues to go unnoticed, it will appear that the system itself has yielded to individual interest. The examination pattern does not begin this drift; it threatens to expedite it. With the passage of time, officers of such priorities may come to form the majority, and the example they set may become the example new entrants follow.
Some lasting questions remain. Why should any judge place his career at peril for a system that does not acknowledge the risk? What kind of judge will preside over the sessions courts a decade from now? Will the docket be seen as the path to advancement or as an obstacle to it? And if quality remains the first casualty for a generation, who will notice its absence, and when? Such questions are seldom asked; if ever they are, time alone will tell whether the examined judge has also remained the brave one.
Views are personal.

