The Supreme Court has recently held that the period of 120 days prescribed under Section 74 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 for filing an appeal before the High Court is inflexible and rigid, and that the delay beyond it cannot be condoned.

A bench of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Sheel Nagu ruled so while dismissing a special leave petition filed by the Rajasthan Housing Board. It also expressed reservations about the recent decision in Deputy Commissioner and Special Land Acquisition Officer v SV Global Mill Limited, which had held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to such appeals. However, the bench declined to refer the decision to a larger bench.

The Rajasthan Housing Board challenged the High Court's judgment dismissing its petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. The petition challenged two orders of the Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authority (LARRA), Jaipur. One is of May 2025, allowing the reference sought by the first respondent under Section 64 of the 2013 Act, and the other is of September 2025 making a minor modification in favour of the first respondent while allowing its review petition.

The Rajasthan High Court had dismissed the petition as not maintainable considering that remedy under Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act. It further held that even if the petition was treated as an appeal, the proviso to Section 74 would apply, since no appeal presented 60 days beyond the prescribed 60-day limitation could be entertained, and hence, the right to maintain an appeal stood foreclosed.

Aggrieved by the High Court's ruling, the Board approached before the Supreme Court.

Before the Supreme Court, the Board relied on SV Global Mill Limited contending that the 60-day period in the proviso to Section 74 had been held not to be mandatory and does not stop High Courts from condoning delay beyond it if sufficient cause is shown. It was argued that the decision brought about a “radical shift in judicial thinking,” and sought liberty to approach the appellate forum with an application for condonation of delay. On this, the bench recorded that it had expressed reservation on whether SV Global Mill Limited is correct law with the efficacy of a binding precedent. However, it declined to refer it to a larger bench.

The Court stated that a reference was not needed, as the ratio of SV Global Mill Limited did not apply to the facts. At the same time, it said it wished to “briefly observe why in our opinion such precedent does not commend our acceptance.”

The bench pointed to several enactments, including the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, (SEBI), 1992; the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA), 1999; Prevention of Money Laundering Act, (PMLA), 2002; the Electricity Act, the Companies Act and the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), 2016;, which prescribe limitation periods with built-in outer limits. Phrases like “but not thereafter” or “not exceeding” have been uniformly held to be a legislative command beyond which courts cannot condone delay. The Court said the law has been consistently laid down that “each enactment is a code in itself,” and beyond the maximum condonable period no time-barred appeal can be entertained with the aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

It held that the language of Section 74(1) of the 2013 Act is in pari materia with these provisions, and that SV Global Mill Limited “does not accord with the precedents dealing with similar provisions as to limitation.”

The bench observed that the decision renders the proviso to Section 74(1) otiose, holding as follows:

“As a sequel, the outer limit of 120 days that the section prescribes is denuded of all its meaning. The net effect is that a parliamentary prescription stands altered by a judicial interpretation, giving impetus to belated appeals under Section 74 of the 2013 Act being filed and to the plea that any delay, howsoever inordinate, be condoned. On a bare textual reading of sub-section (1) of Section 74 of the 2013 Act, it is manifest that the legislature did not intend condonation of delay beyond the period of 120 days and thus, impliedly, if not expressly, excluded applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Had a contrary intention been contemplated, the legislature would have employed appropriate language to convey the same.”

The bench further referred to Hukumdev Narain Yadav v Lal Narain Mishra, which held that even where a special law does not expressly exclude Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, courts may examine whether the nature of those provisions or the subject matter and scheme of the special law excludes their operation.

It further noted that Hukumdev Narain Yadav differed with SV Global Mill Limited on the ground that it dealt with an election dispute, observing as follows:

“In our view, the nature of the dispute and/or the subject matter of the statute from which the lis originates is irrelevant while interpreting sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act. What is relevant is the scheme of the statute under consideration, in light of the principle of law settled by the larger Bench. The test would be, whether in the absence of express exclusion, application of the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act can be excluded by necessary implication or not? To construe sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act only if there is an express exclusion would run contrary to the view taken by the larger Bench.”

It also observed that applying Section 5 to Section 74(1) on the premise that the 2013 Act is beneficial legislation “would occasion reverse prejudice,” since State and acquiring bodies would also become entitled to seek condonation of inordinate delay, “much to the prejudice and detriment of the landowners,” and such an interpretation must be avoided.

The Court held that the proviso to Section 74(1) is “in the nature of a special in-built provision akin to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, permitting condonation of delay subject, however, to a statutory cap.” It stated that Section 74(1) “admits of no ambiguity and is incapable of two constructions,” and therefore, “no further condonation outside the second phase of time-limit of 60 days is permissible.”

Relying on CST v Parson Tools and Plants, the bench said that courts cannot supply a legislative omission under the guise of interpretation. It added that the converse principle also applies where the legislature has consciously engrafted in a later statute what was absent in an earlier one, courts cannot undo that choice.

Perusing Section 74 with Section 54 of the former Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and the scheme of the 2013 Act, the Court held as follows:

“We have no hesitation in holding that the period of 120 days in Section 74 is inflexible and rigid and cannot be read in a manner so as to permit any aggrieved person to approach the relevant high court with an appeal which is barred even by a single day's delay. Even this Court in exercise of its power under Article 142 cannot condone the delay although, in a fit and proper case, a party may seek exemption from application of the laws of limitation.”

With regards to the plea for a reference, the Court said it was “not an available option.” Given the uniform interpretation of pari materia provisions by several Benches in a long line of decisions, and the doctrine of stare decisis, SV Global Mill Limited “ought not to have placed a discordant construction” on Section 74(1). Instead, since consistent views of the Court and the long-standing ratio of Hukumdev Narain Yadav were being departed from, it “could have itself referred the matter for consideration by a larger Bench.” Being bound by the doctrine of precedents laid down by larger Benches, the Court declined a reference.

Even assuming that SV Global Mill Limited lays down the law correctly, the Court held that its ratio was inapplicable here, as the Board did not file a time-barred appeal under Section 74.

“Having failed/neglected/omitted to avail the appellate remedy either within the maximum condonable period or even thereafter, seeking condonation of delay by applying under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the High Court in our opinion was perfectly justified in spurning the challenge. There is, thus, no ground to cause interference with such reasoned decision of the High Court,” the Supreme Court held.

Appearance:

For Petitioner: Mr. Anuj Bhandari, AOR; Ms. Jahanvi Bharadwaj, Adv.; Ms. Ishu Bhardwaj, Adv.