The Supreme Court on Thursday witnessed a discussion on whether writ petitions before constitutional courts ought to be categorised as "civil" and "criminal", with Justice Dipankar Datta observing that, ideally, all such matters should simply be classified as writ petitions, while acknowledging that the nature of the subject matter may have consequences for the maintainability of an intra-court appeal.

The discussion arose during the hearing of Directorate of Enforcement v. Meghraj Singh, when Solicitor General Tushar Mehta referred to a recent order of the Rajasthan High Court concerning the practice of registering matters as "criminal writ petitions".

The Solicitor General referred to the Rajasthan High Court's judgment in Jiya & Ors v. Government of Rajasthan, where a Division Bench had directed the Registry not to register cases as "criminal writ petitions", observing that there was no such concept under the Constitution.

Mehta submitted that the Rajasthan High Court's approach was contrary to the Supreme Court's judgment in Ram Kishan Fauji v. State of Haryana (2017), and sought liberty to challenge the order before the Supreme Court. He pointed out that the High Court Rules allowed the classification of civil and criminal writ petitions.

"Rules provide, I will show. This is in teeth with a binding judgment of mylords in Ram Kishan Fauji v. State of Haryana (2017)... I will file an SLP challenging this order; otherwise, the Registry is under an obligation," the Solicitor General submitted.

Justice Datta said he "partly agrees" and "partly disagrees" with the Rajasthan High Court's approach.

The Judge indicated that, as a matter of principle, writ petitions need not be separately classified as civil or criminal merely because the subject matter concerns a criminal proceeding.

"Which is the part with which I agree, all writ petitions should be categorised as writ petitions, whether civil or criminal. If the subject matter touches the criminal aspect, definitely Ram Kishan Fauji will apply," Justice Datta observed.

The Judge, however, questioned the Rajasthan High Court's jurisdiction to direct its Registry not to follow a classification contained in its own Rules.

"Where the Division Bench, by passing this order, goes wrong is this: the Rajasthan High Court has its own Rules. Under its Rules, it must have been classified as civil or criminal. Unless the Rule is challenged, how does the High Court have the jurisdiction?" Justice Datta asked.

Justice Datta also commented that the Supreme Court itself often departs from its own Rules, and the High Court may be following that example.

"At the same time, the reason is us. Our Supreme Court Rules provide don't condone delay without notice to other side. What do we do? Why have we framed the Rules? Let them follow their own Rules. Supreme Court will break its own Rules, and it will not follow those Rules because it's final. There is no question of framing those Rules. It has percolated to the High Court that since the Supreme Court can condone delay ex parte, why can't we as we are also constitutional courts? We are also subject to the laws, we are not above law."

What is 'Ram Kishan Fauji' Judgment?

In that 2017 judgment, a three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court considered whether a Letters Patent Appeal could be maintained against a Single Judge's order passed under Article 226 in a matter concerning criminal proceedings.

The Court held that the question cannot be decided merely by looking at whether the Single Judge invoked Article 226 or Section 482 CrPC. What matters is the nature of the proceeding and the relief sought.

In Ram Kishan Fauji, the Single Judge had quashed a Lokayukta recommendation which had led to registration of an FIR and criminal investigation. The Supreme Court held that the proceeding was, in substance, concerned with criminal jurisdiction. Consequently, the bar against intra-court appeals in matters involving criminal jurisdiction applied, even though the Single Judge had exercised power under Article 226.

The Court had specifically rejected the argument that invoking Article 226 automatically made the proceeding a civil proceeding. It held that "criminal jurisdiction" for the purposes of the Letters Patent has to be understood broadly, encompassing the initiation and consequences of criminal proceedings.

Case Details: Directorate of Enforcement v. Meghraj Singh, SLP(Crl) No. 16835/2026.