Changing Dimensions Of S.125 Of Crpc – An Analysis Through Recent Judicial Pronouncements

It is indisputable that the application of S.125 of Code of Criminal Procedure would arise, when a man neglects or refrains from fulfilling his filial duty in terms of financial support towards his wife or children or his parents. Over time, the provision has acquired a distinct social welfare character through consistent judicial interpretation, positioning it as an important instrument for advancing substantive justice, especially by safeguarding the interests of vulnerable communities in the society including women, children and senior citizens. Sections 125 to 128 of Chapter IX of Cr.PC deal with maintenance provisions, which are secular in nature. In fact, the Section itself demands a balanced approach while passing an Order, by upholding its fundamental principle with the emotional needs of the parties involved. A mere 'emotional order' ignoring the basic principles of the section would not suffice for the very purpose of the provision.

The remedy provided under S.125 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1963 is of a civil nature. It is a beneficial provision intended for providing a quick and effective remedy for maintenance to dependents who are unable to maintain themselves. S.125 empowers a Magistrate to order a person, who is usually a husband or son to provide monthly maintenance to:

His wife (including a divorced wife not remarried),

Minor children (legitimate or illegitimate),

Major children who are infirm,

Father or mother.

As per the Section, maintenance may be granted upon proof of neglect or refusal to maintain, and the Magistrate may order a monthly allowance based on the person's financial capacity. Also, non-compliance of the provision can lead to imprisonment for up to one month or until payment is made.

Changing Dimensions – Extension of benefits of S.125

It is pertinent to note that over time, judicial interpretation by the Supreme Court and various High Courts has considerably broadened the scope of the term “wife” under Section 125 CrPC. At present, it encompasses a woman who has been divorced by a husband or who has obtained a divorce from her husband and has not remarried. Also, even if a woman does not have the legal status of a wife, she is brought within the inclusive definition of 'wife' in order to maintain consistency with the object of the statutory provision. However, a second wife whose marriage is void on account of survival of the first marriage would not be a legally wedded wife, and therefore would not be entitled to maintenance under this provision^[2]. In Bhagwandas v.Panpati Shah, the High Court by analysing the provision, pronounced that the court ensures a man cannot evade maintenance obligations by concealing his first marriage^[3]. The Court also observed that concealment of a subsisting marriage cannot be used as a shield to defeat a woman's claim for maintenance, particularly when the relationship and neglect are established. In arriving at this conclusion, the High Court placed reliance on settled Supreme Court decisions, including Vimala v. Veeraswamy K^[4], wherein it was held that the burden of proving a subsisting earlier marriage lies on the husband. The Court also drew support from Chanmuniya v. Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha^[5], which emphasised that a woman in a domestic relationship should not be denied relief merely on technicalities of marital status. Recently in Rina Kumari v. Dinesh Kumar Mahto^[6], the Apex Court pronounced that just because a husband is armed with a decree for restitution of conjugal rights, that would not deprive the wife from receiving maintenance under S.125 of CrPC from her husband. This position was made clear in an earlier decision, Amrita Singh v. Ratan Singh^[7]. Here, the Supreme Court found that the wife's refusal to reside with her husband was justified due to cruelty and persistent dowry demands. The wife had been compelled to leave the matrimonial home, and the husband was subsequently convicted under Section 498-A IPC. In such circumstances, the Court held that the wife was entitled to maintenance notwithstanding the marital discord.

The most profound changes were brought to the maintenance proceedings in India through the Supreme Court decision, Rajnesh v. Neha^[8] which established a uniform rule that maintenance must be awarded from the date of filing the application. Beyond this core principle, the judgment provided comprehensive guidelines on various aspects of maintenance proceedings, including overlapping jurisdictions, affidavit disclosure requirements, criteria for determining quantum, and enforcement mechanisms. In this case, Supreme Court observed that maintenance should ordinarily be awarded from the date of filing of the application, as the financial hardship of the dependent wife commences upon separation. The Court also recognised that lack of immediate financial support adversely affects the ability of the wife to sustain herself and to effectively participate in legal proceedings. The Court emphasised that maintenance laws are social welfare measures intended to prevent destitution and economic insecurity. Any interpretation that delays or dilutes such relief would defeat the very object of Section 125 CrPC.

The Supreme Court has consistently held that the right to maintenance under Section 125 CrPC is a continuing right and cannot be defeated by rigid contractual or technical interpretations. In Bhuwan Mohan Singh v. Meena, the Supreme Court held that the object of the provision is to prevent destitution and ensure dignity^[9]. The Apex Court also emphasised that maintenance laws must be interpreted purposively to advance social justice^[10]. In Shamima Farooqui v. Shahid Khan^[11], the Apex Court cautioned that obligation of the husband under S.125(1) of CrPC is on the higher pedestal when the question of maintenance of wife and children arises and inadequate maintenance defeats the very object of Section 125 CrPC. In the recent decision of the Kerala High Court in Sheela George v. V.M Alexander^[12], the Court made it clear that a divorced wife who had earlier given up her right to maintenance can still claim it later, if her circumstances change and she is unable to support herself. In short, a wife who voluntarily relinquished her right to maintenance is not precluded from seeking it at a later stage if there is a change in circumstances. The Court clarified that the wife was entitled to claim maintenance from the husband, notwithstanding the terms of the earlier compromise agreement, either under S. 37 of the Divorce Act or under S. 125 of the CrPC provided she was unable to maintain herself during the relevant period. In Abhilasha v. Parkash^[13], the Supreme Court elucidated that under Section 125(1)(c) CrPC, an unmarried daughter who has attained majority is entitled to maintenance only if she is unable to maintain herself due to a physical or mental abnormality or injury. The Court held that maintenance to an unmarried daughter is not automatic and is permissible only in cases where such incapacity is established.

In various decisions, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the expression “unable to maintain herself” under Section 125 CrPC does not mean absolute destitution. In Anju Garg v. Deepak Kumar Garg^[14], the Supreme Court observed that wife is entitled to maintenance if she lacks sufficient means to support herself with dignity and in a manner consistent with the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage and the provision itself is a measure of social justice, enacted to protect destitute wives and children^[15].It has been emphasised by the Kerala High Court in the recent judgment,(Binsi & Anr v. Sandeep Chandran)^[16], that questions relating to mental health assessments are ordinarily irrelevant for deciding maintenance claims, unless incapacity is directly in issue under the statute. Similarly in Jayaprakash EP v. Sheney & Another;^[17], the High Court observed that a wife holding temporary job not a ground for denying maintenance and she is entitled to same standard of living as during marriage. Hence, the Courts consistently held that what is material is whether the claimant woman is able to maintain herself in a manner consistent with the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage.

The aforementioned Court observations collectively depict clear judicial shift from rigid technicalities to a more humane and purposive approach in maintenance matters. It is discernible that Courts today focus less on formal marital labels and more on the real question: whether the woman has been neglected and is unable to sustain herself with dignity. This evolving interpretation ensures that Section 125 CrPC remains a living provision, responsive to social realities rather than confined to narrow legal definition.

Extension to Children and the Judicial Approach

Section 125(1)(b) CrPC entitles both legitimate and illegitimate minor children to claim maintenance if they are unable to maintain themselves. The provision also extends protection to children who attained majority and suffer from physical or mental disability and are incapable of self-support. The Supreme Court has consistently held that a father's obligation to maintain his children is absolute and cannot be defeated by disputes relating to legitimacy or marital status. In Bharatha Matha v. R. Vijaya Renganathan ^[18], the Supreme Court emphasized that a child born of void or voidable marriage is entitled to claim share in self-acquired properties, if any. This approach reflects the Court's emphasis on child's welfare, rather than the marital status of the parents.

Parental Rights and the Need for Elder Care

Section 125(1)(d) recognises the right of aged parents (father or mother) to claim maintenance from their children, if unable to maintain themselves. Indian courts have stressed that maintenance is not merely a moral obligation but a legal duty of the child. In Kirtikant D. Vadodaria v. State of Gujarat^[19], the Supreme Court upheld this principle stating that; the Object of the S.125 of the Code is to give social justice to the woman, child and infirm parents etc. and to prevent destitution and vagrancy by compelling those who can support those who are unable to support themselves but have a moral claim for support. Also observed that a childless stepmother may claim maintenance from her step-son provided she is widow or her husband, if living, is also incapable of supporting and maintaining her. Hence, it is clear that S.125 also serves as a critical tool for safeguarding elderly citizens, particularly in the face of growing neglect and nuclear family setups.

Practical Impediments in the Enforcement of Maintenance Laws

The jurisprudence surrounding Section 125 CrPC is steadily evolving to reflect constitutional ideals of equity, dignity, and social justice. The provision has expanded from a basic relief measure to a comprehensive social welfare tool ensuring sustenance of those neglected, be it a deserted wife, an incapacitated child, or elderly parents. With landmark rulings like Rajnesh v. Neha bringing uniformity and enforcement clarity, the section now plays a pivotal role in empowering the vulnerable. However, from a practitioner's standpoint, it is evident that the guidelines laid down in Rajnesh v. Neha are not being uniformly implemented across courts. In numerous maintenance proceedings, applications are often filed without adequate disclosure of the parties' income, assets, or financial liabilities, thereby impeding a fair assessment of the quantum of maintenance. As a result, genuine claims risk being undervalued, while in certain instances, one party may gain undue advantage over the other. Moreover, in practice, execution of maintenance orders remains one of the most daunting stages. Even after a favourable order, recovery of arrears is delayed due to procedural bottlenecks, non-cooperation of parties, or lack of stringent enforcement mechanisms. This dilutes the very object of Section 125, which aims at providing immediate relief to the parties. Another persistent issue is the overlapping jurisdiction between various forums such as the Family Court, Magistrate Court, and proceedings under personal laws or the Domestic Violence Act. This multiplicity of proceedings often leads to conflicting orders, forum shopping, and undue hardship for the litigants, particularly women from economically weaker sections who cannot afford prolonged litigation. Therefore, this highlights a pressing need for comprehensive and codified maintenance legislation that ensures procedural consistency, transparency, and equitable relief particularly to destitute women and children who continue to navigate the complexities of the legal system in pursuit of justice.

…………………………… ↑

2023:MPH:20393. ↑

X v. State of Maharashtra, 2023:BHC-AS37561. ↑

1991 INSC 80 ↑

Civil Appeal No.8866/2010 (arising out of SLP(Civil) no.15071 of 2009) decided by Supreme Court on 7/10/2010 - Reportable. ↑2025 LiveLaw (SC) 47. ↑

Criminal Appeal No. 944 OF 2017(Daily Order) decided by Supreme Court on 18/4/2017. ↑

2020 INSC 631. ↑

Supreme Court Judgment dt. 15.7.2014; Criminal Appeal No.1331/2014; Arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 1565/2013 – Reportable. ↑

Ibid. ↑

Supreme Court Judgment dt. 06.04.2015; Criminal Appeal Nos.564-565 of 2015 [Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 6380-6381 of 2014] – Reportable.

2025:KER:37581. ↑

2020 INSC 546; para 12. ↑

2022 LiveLaw (SC) 805 ↑

Referred to SC decision, Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai - Criminal Appeal No. 1627 of 2007 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.4379 of 2006) – Supreme Court Judgment dt. 27.11.2007. ↑

2025:KER:37281 ↑

2025:KER:5702 ↑

2010 INSC 328. ↑

1996 INSC 585. ↑

(Author Is An Advocate Practicing At High Court Of Kerala)

Views Are Personal