The narrative that the protection of personality rights is confined to the celebrities warrants reconsideration. While personality rights may historically have emerged to protect the commercial value associated with celebrity identities but today the harm can be caused to any person due to impersonations by AI irrespective of him being a famous or renowned personality. Resolving this debate requires answering, firstly, the jurisprudential foundations of personality rights and the theoretical basis for protecting an individual's name, image, voice, and likeness; secondly, whether AI-driven replication of voices, images, and likenesses necessitates extending personality-rights protection to ordinary individuals; thirdly, whether the personality rights extend to protect from fair criticism and lastly, whether existing legal frameworks are capable of addressing the emerging question of ownership and control over an individual's digital self.?

Personality Rights Before Rajagopal: The Hegelian Foundation

Personality-rights discourse in India is often traced to the Supreme Court's decision in R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, court provided a reasoning that is relatable in the recent times when it comes to publishing one's name and likeness without consent. The court recognised that the unauthorised use of a person's name, likeness, or life story constitutes an invasion of privacy. While Rajagopal undoubtedly marks a significant moment in the judicial recognition of personality interests, it is necessary to understand the reasoning and the origin from where this protection came in the first place.

The answer to that question predates modern constitutional jurisprudence by centuries. Long before courts recognised privacy and publicity rights, Hegel's Philosophy of Right provided a philosophical basis for protecting attributes that constitute an individual's identity. According to Hegel, unlike labour-based theories that justify rights through effort and economic investment, Hegel viewed certain external manifestations as integral to the development and expression of individual personality.

With this in mind, Justin Hughes argues that a person's “persona”, consisting of body features, mannerisms and personal history, serves as a “receptacle for personality” and therefore merits legal protection regardless of whether it is a product of labour. This insight is especially relevant in the context of personality rights. A person's name, image, voice, likeness, and other identifying characteristics are not simply commercial assets; they constitute the means through which identity is expressed and recognised in society. Consequently, the unauthorized appropriation of these attributes interferes not only with economic interests but also with the individual's control over the external manifestation of their personality. The emergence of AI-generated clones and digital replicas further exposes the limitations of a publicity-centric approach.

Does Personality Rights Extend to Protection from Criticism?

Recently, the court has granted personality rights protection to big celebrities like Amitabh Bachchan, Anil Kapoor, Varun Dhawan, and even to Journalist Sudhir Choudhary, and MP Shashi Tharoor. The court observed “while there is no doubt that free speech about a person in the form of satire and writings is protected, as also criticism which can be genuine, however, when the same crosses the line and results in tarnishement or jeopardising the individual's personality and elements associated with the individual, the same would be illegal.”

However, a similar claim by Raghav Chadha was met with judicial reluctance while regarding it a mere criticism. Interestingly, if personality rights derive their legitimacy from the very concept of personhood, as Hegelian Rights theory suggests, one would expect the law to protect identity irrespective of whether the impugned act causes commercial harm or reputational harm. Contemporary Indian jurisprudence, however, appears to draw a distinction between protection of personality and protection against criticism.

This distinction was recently highlighted in Raghav Chadha v. Ashok Kumar John Doe & Ors., where the Delhi High Court declined to treat criticism of a political decision as a personality-rights violation. The Court noted, "Unlike other judgments, here it's just criticism taken on decisions taken by you in political arena...It is a comment by a person criticizing a political decision,” Therefore, mere criticism cannot be said to be an encroachment on the personality rights of a person, rather it is the misleading and AI-generated videos which causes the infringement upon the personality rights in its true sense.

Existing Legal Frameworks and Suggestions

Unlike conventional infringements, synthetic identities (such as AI clones) can imitate, interact, and even speak on behalf of an individual, blurring the minor distinction between representation and replication. This raises a crucial question: are existing legal frameworks equipped to protect an individual's digital self?

At present, constitutional guarantees under Article 21 safeguard dignity, privacy, and autonomy; personality-rights jurisprudence protects against certain forms of unauthorized identity appropriation; and recent regulatory developments, including the 2026 amendment to the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, seek to address harms arising from synthetically generated information and non-consensual digital imitation. The section 319 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, penalises cheating by personation and identity-based deception, particularly where impersonation is used to induce delivery of property or cause wrongful loss.

However, these frameworks primarily address impersonation when it is used as a means to commit another offence, such as fraud or cheating. However, the unauthorized replication of an individual's identity can itself inflict dignitary, reputational, and psychological harm, even in the absence of any accompanying crime. The law must therefore evolve to recognise identity appropriation, whether through artificial intelligence or other technological means, as an independent legal wrong capable of attracting civil and, where appropriate, criminal liability. Moreover, this framework is largely reactive focusing on privacy violations, reputational injury, content moderation, or fraudulent impersonation, rather than recognising an individual's independent interest in controlling the digital manifestations of their identity.

Recent international developments further illustrate this shift. In late 2025, Denmark framed a policy aimed at granting individuals' greater control over their facial likeness and voice in response to AI-generated deepfakes. Although the policy is framed primarily through copyright mechanisms, the proposal reflects a broader recognition that certain aspects of identity warrant protection against unauthorized digital replication.

Meanwhile, the critics argue that granting exclusive rights over facial features may chill satire, journalism, artistic expression, and legitimate public discourse. While these concerns are legitimate, they do not undermine the need for broader protection. The challenge lies in distinguishing between criticism, parody, or public commentary, on the one hand, and unauthorized replication of identity, on the other. Inspiration can be drawn from the recent case of Raghav Chadha where judicial reluctance was seen citing the criticism exception.

The contemporary personality rights protection under the IP jurisprudence increasingly associates the protection of identity with its commercial value. Courts often incline to protect names, images, voices, and likenesses when they are monetised through endorsements, merchandise, or unauthorized commercial exploitation. Such an approach, however, risks reducing personality rights to little more than publicity rights and, in the process, commodifying identity itself.

As the core argument, the philosophical foundation of personality rights lies not in market value but in personhood. Drawing from Hegelian personality theory, an individual's digital presence also constitutes an external manifestation of the self through which his personality is expressed and recognised. Consequently, the legitimacy of personality rights should not depend upon commercial goodwill or celebrity status; rather, these rights should be understood as flowing from the constitutional guarantees of dignity, autonomy, and privacy under Article 21, and therefore be available to every individual.

India need not adopt Denmark's approach in its entirety. Treating faces and voices as copyrightable subject matter may create difficult free-speech concerns. However, the underlying recognition that identity deserves protection beyond commercial exploitation remains significant.

Indian law should be more than the view that identity harms are just fraud, cheating or defamation. The use of AI technologies to impersonate an individual without authorisation should itself constitute a civil wrong and incur statutory liability in serious cases. Such an approach would make personality rights meaningful not only for celebrities but for every individual in the digital age because the focus of the personality rights would shift from commodification of identity to protection of personhood.

Ultimately, the future of personality rights lies not in the commodification of identity but in the recognition of every individual's right to control not only their physical self but also their digital self.

Views are personal.