Mere Administrative Exigency Or Convenience Can't Be Ground To Invoke Urgency Clause Under Land Acquisition Act: Allahabad High Court

The Allahabad High Court has held that mere administrative exigency or convenience cannot be a ground to invoke urgency clause under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It held that there must be some real and demonstrable urgency which must be recorded with reasons in the notification for invocation of Section 17 of the Act.

The bench of Justice Sangeeta Chandra and Justice Brij Raj Singh held,

“Mere administrative exigency or convenience, howsoever pressing, does not meet the statutory threshold of urgency envisaged under Section 17. Moreover, the satisfaction of the appropriate Government must be based on objective material and due application of mind. A mechanical recital of urgency in the notification, without supporting reasons or contemporaneous record, is bad in law. Non-application of mind vitiates the invocation of Section 17.”

Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 empowers the State Government to take possession of any land after 15 days of publication of notice in case of urgency. It also provides that 80% payment must be made by the Collector before taking possession under this provision provided there is any contingency as prescribed under Section 31(2) of the Act. It also provides for dispensation of the mandatory requirement of hearing objections under Section 5-A of the Act.

Petitioner approached the Court challenging the acquisition of their land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on grounds that the urgency clause was wrongly invoked. it was further pleaded that despite being in continuous possession of the land, the petitioner was wrongly dispossessed by the Authority by carrying out illegal auction proceedings during the pendency of the writ petition challenging the auction and without paying any compensation to the petitioner.

Amongst others, the question before the Court was “Whether the invocation of the urgency clause under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and the consequent dispensation of enquiry under Section 5-A, was justified in the facts and circumstances of the case?”

The Court observed that since the power under Section 17 is an exception to the general rule of acquisition, it must be sparingly used, in cases where genuine, real and demonstrable urgency exist.

“Such power being exceptional in nature and having the effect of depriving the landholder of the valuable and substantive right of objection, its scope is necessarily narrow and circumscribed. The invocation of Section 17, therefore, cannot be justified as a matter of course or administrative expediency and is required to be strictly construed and sparingly exercised.”

Perusing the notification for invocation of Section 17, the Court observed that there was no real urgency shown other than the reason that delayed acquisition will delay the development of residential project.

“Such reasoning merely reflects administrative convenience and apprehension of project delay, which are routine features in almost every development activity. These grounds are vague and general in nature and do not disclose any extraordinary or emergent circumstance warranting dispensation of the statutory safeguard under Section 5-A. There is no material to show that even the short period required to conduct an enquiry under Section 5-A would frustrate or defeat the declared public purpose.”

The Court held that the satisfaction recorded in the notification was mechanical as there was no unforeseen or compelling situation to invoke urgency. It held that mere administrative convenience cannot be grounds to invoke Section 17.

Accordingly, it was held that the acquisition by invocation of Section 17 was arbitrary and unconstitutional.

Declaring the auction proceedings as invalid due to procedural lapses and arbitrary change in use of land and fixation of prices for the land, the Court held that,

“Article 300-A of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of property except by authority of law. The expression “authority of law” requires that the State strictly follow the procedure prescribed under the statute, and that the power of acquisition be exercised fairly, legally, and in accordance with all mandatory provisions. Dispensing with the right of objection under Section 5-A casually or without genuine urgency is neither fair nor lawful, and mechanical or arbitrary exercise of power cannot satisfy constitutional requirements.”

Amongst others, reliance was placed on Om Prakash & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors., wherein the Supreme Court held that planned development does not automatically justify invocation of urgency provision for acquisition of land. It held that right of landowners to object to acquisition proceedings under Section 5-A cannot be bypassed in absence of any demonstrable urgency.

Noting that there was no sign of any development of residential scheme nor was there any material to show development would take place in near future, the Court held,

“The invocation of the urgency clause, in the absence of any immediate or compelling necessity, demonstrates non-application of mind and lack of sufficient cause. The power under the urgency provisions, being extraordinary in nature and resulting in deprivation of the valuable right under Section 5-A, could not have been exercised in a routine or mechanical manner.”

It held that power under Section 17(4) regarding dispensation of hearing was a discretionary power to be exercised with due care. Further, it held that there was violation of Section 17(3-A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 which provides for 80% payment before taking possession under Section 17. It held that since due procedure was not followed, the Raebareli Development Authority had violated Article 14 and Article 300-A of the Constitution of India.

Accordingly, the Court set aside the auction proceedings as well as the acquisition proceedings and directed that the land be restored to the petitioner after deposit of money as per Section 17 of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973.

Case Title: Mata Baksh Singh v. State of U.P. through Secy Nagar Vikas Department and 3 Others

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