The Allahabad High Court has held that words such as “die” or “go and die”, said by a husband to his wife, do not by themselves amount to instigating her to commit suicide.

It held that such words must be read in their setting: the way and occasion on which they were said, the conduct around them, how close they stood to the suicide, and whether they were meant to push her to take her own life.

Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 punishes whoever abets the commission of suicide. The Court held that it must be read with Section 107 IPC, which recognises three modes of abetment: instigation, conspiracy followed by an act or illegal omission, and intentional aid.

Acquitting a man sentenced to seven years' rigorous imprisonment over the suicide of his wife of about twenty years, Justice Zafeer Ahmad held,

“An expression such as “die” or “go and die”, even if proved to have been uttered, cannot invariably be treated as an act of instigation. The Court must examine the surrounding circumstances, the manner in which the words were uttered, the occasion, the conduct preceding and following the utterance, its proximity to the suicide, and whether the utterance, viewed objectively, was intended to provoke or encourage the deceased to take her own life. Criminal law makes it clear that the law does not treat every angry, abusive or emotionally charged utterance as instigation within Section 107 IPC.”

The brother of the deceased reported to the police on 15.09.2023 that his sister had been married to the appellant for about 20 years, that the couple had no children, and that he harassed her on that count, telling her to hang herself or jump into the river. She was found dead by hanging on the intervening night of 09/10.09.2023. The Sessions Judge, Barabanki convicted the appellant on 09.03.2025 and sentenced him to seven years' rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 20,000/-.

Examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the appellant stated that his wife had long been suffering from tuberculosis, that he had been getting her treated, and that she became depressed when she did not recover.

In appeal, it was argued that the prosecution witnesses were all close relatives of the deceased, that their evidence was inconsistent and marked by material omissions, that the FIR was delayed, and that the trial court had identified no act of abetment. Reliance was placed on Prakash v. State of Maharashtra and Arnab Manoranjan Goswami v. State of Maharashtra. The A.G.A. opposed the appeal, submitting that the witnesses consistently established harassment on account of the deceased's childlessness and physical condition.

Holding that discord and even blameworthy conduct in a marriage do not automatically become abetment of suicide, the Court observed

“General allegations of taunting or discord, without reliable evidence of the nature, continuity and proximity of the alleged conduct, cannot be elevated into proof of criminal harassment merely because the deceased subsequently committed suicide.”

On the evidence, the Court observed that the allegation of grave harassment over a twenty-year marriage was unsupported by any contemporaneous complaint, letter, report or medical record. PW-1 admitted that he had not told the police of the call of 08.09.2023 in which the deceased allegedly complained of being beaten and told to die, nor of the appellant's call saying she was missing, omissions which, the Court held, diminished the weight of allegations later projected as the immediate cause of the suicide.

The Investigating Officer deposed that the appellant himself gave the first information of the death and that no villager at the inquest attributed the suicide to harassment, though both families were there. The post-mortem disclosed no injury but the ligature mark, which the Court held did not support the allegation of repeated beating. PW-2 deposed that the deceased was ill and being treated by the appellant, while PW-3 and PW-4 claimed no knowledge of it.

Faulting the trial court for stopping at the fact of suicide and the allegations of harassment, without identifying any act of instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid, the Court held

“The omission is particularly material here because suicide is not synonymous with abetment of suicide. The former establishes the occurrence, the latter requires proof of the accused's legally culpable participation in bringing about that occurrence.”

Holding that the trial court had committed a fundamental error in law and that the evidence created a reasonable doubt, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence and acquitted the appellant, directing his release forthwith on furnishing bonds under Section 437-A Cr.P.C.