Proviso To Order VI Rule 17 CPC Not Strictly Applicable To Amendment Of Grounds In Revision Or Appellate Proceedings: Allahabad High Court
Upasna Agrawal
2 April 2026 11:51 AM IST

The Allahabad High Court has held that the Proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC, which bars amendment in a suit after commencement of trial, is not strictly applicable to amendment of grounds in revision or appellate proceedings.
Order VI Rule 17 provides for amendment to pleadings. The proviso to Rule 17 provides that no amendment can be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the Court concludes that such grounds could not have been raised even with due diligence before commencement of trial.
Dr. Justice Yogendra Kumar Srivastava held,
“The legal position that emerges is that while the principles underlying Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 may, in an appropriate case, be invoked by analogy, the proviso thereto cannot be applied in a rigid, literal or mechanical manner to amendment of grounds in appellate or revisional proceedings. The said proviso is engrafted in the context of amendment of pleadings in a suit and is intended to regulate the course of trial by preventing belated alterations after commencement of evidence. Its application is, therefore, structurally and contextually confined to proceedings where a "trial", in the strict sense known to civil procedure, takes place.”
Petitioner approached the High Court against rejection of its application seeking amendment in the revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The amendment was rejected on grounds of being highly belated and that the petitioner had not been diligent in raising the grounds raised in amendment. It was also recorded in the order that the amendment was prejudicial to the opposite party and was hit by proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC.
Justice Srivastava observed that it was necessary to see whether the proviso restricted amendments in appellate and revision proceedings as well.
The Court observed that Order VI referred to pleadings in a civil suit and the aforesaid proviso was enacted to ensure that no amendment could be made to such pleadings at a belated stage to prejudice the other side. It held that such a proviso was added to curb the dilatory tactics and ensure speedy conclusion of trial.
It held that proceedings in revision are not akin to a trial where evidence is led but a scrutiny of the records of the Trial Court. It held that the restriction by the proviso on “commencement of the trial” does not fit in the revisional jurisdiction.
The Court held that in appellate and revisional proceedings questions of law which go to the root of the matter can be raised at any stage and will not be barred solely because they were not raised at an earlier stage. However, it held that only grounds where pure questions of law have been raised can be allowed to be amended at any stage, but amendment involving facts cannot be allowed especially in revisional proceedings where the Court is confined to facts on record before the Court below.
“Consequently, an application seeking amendment of grounds in a revision cannot be rejected solely on the ground of absence of due diligence. At the same time, such applications are not to be allowed as a matter of course; the Court must scrutinise whether the proposed grounds are bona fide, whether they raise pure questions of law arising from the record, or whether they seek to introduce new factual pleas, displace admissions, or cause prejudice to the opposite party. It is these broader considerations, and not the rigid application of the proviso, which must guide the exercise of discretion in such matters.”
Applying the aforesaid law, the Court held that amendment sought by the petitioner in the revision included mixed questions of law and facts and would also requiring opening of the entire factual matrix which could not be done in revision proceedings.
“The conduct of the petitioner in seeking to introduce similar pleas earlier, which were rejected up to the revisional stage, further indicates that the present application is not bona fide but is an attempt to circumvent earlier orders and to delay the final adjudication. In such circumstances, even though the concept of "due diligence" as contained in the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC may not strictly apply, the absence of due diligence assumes relevance as an indicator of lack of bona fides and an abuse of the process of the Court.”
Accordingly, the Court dismissed the petition against the rejection of the amendment application.
Case Title: Smt. Munni Devi v. Smt. Shashikala Pandey
