The Allahabad High Court has held that the removal of a court employee over a single incident outside working hours, after more than two decades of service and in the absence of any earlier adverse record, was shockingly disproportionate.

The Court set aside the penalty while leaving the findings of misconduct undisturbed.

It also held that Rule 7(4) of the Uttar Pradesh Subordinate Courts Staff (Punishment and Appeals) Rules, 1976 obliges the appellate authority to apply its mind independently to the quantum of penalty, and that a bare conclusion that the misconduct was gross does not satisfy that requirement.

Justice Garima Prashad held,

“Discipline and restraint are expected of every court employee, and the proved conduct deserved punishment. Removal, however, ended the petitioner's service and pensionary protection after more than two decades of service. In these facts, removal is unduly harsh and shockingly disproportionate to the misconduct proved.”

The petitioner joined service in 1977 on a Class IV post and, on promotion, was working as Deputy Nazir in the court of the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Purwa, Unnao. Four charges were served on him in 1997 over an incident said to have taken place at about 9:00 p.m. on 23.11.1994 near the residence of the then Munsif Magistrate at Purwa. He was alleged to have misbehaved with a Home Guard, to have come to the judicial officer's residence intoxicated and abused him, and to have been picked up by the patrolling police and detained overnight under Section 34 of the Police Act.

The inquiry officer held the charge concerning the Home Guard not proved and found the remaining three proved. The District Judge removed the petitioner from service on 21.12.1998 and the Inspecting Judge dismissed his departmental appeal on 01.12.1999. The petitioner died on 07.04.2006 during the pendency of the writ petition and his legal heirs were substituted.

It was argued for the petitioner that the inquiry rested on documents never proved, neither the doctor said to have examined him nor the police officer who prepared the record having entered the witness box, and that once the first charge failed the rest could not independently survive.

The respondents submitted that a writ court cannot sit as a second departmental appellate authority to reassess the evidence.

The Court found no fault with the inquiry, in which six witnesses were examined and cross-examined by the petitioner. On the two officers who were not produced, it observed,

“These were relevant witnesses, but their absence was not fatal to the inquiry. In their absence, the medical and police papers cannot be considered. However, even without those papers, the oral evidence and the petitioner's admissions remained on record.”

It declined to accept that the collapse of the first charge carried the rest with it, holding that the charges concerned distinct acts and that the inquiry officer had considered each separately. The disciplinary order was found to disclose due application of mind. However, the appellate order was not.

“The appellate order, however, merely states that the record was examined and that removal was supported by cogent reasons. It does not deal with the failure of charge no. 1 or the limited nature of the remaining charges. Nor does it consider the petitioner's length of service, the absence of an earlier adverse record or whether removal was excessive.”

On the penalty, the Court noted that the proved charges arose from one occurrence outside ordinary working hours and that no physical injury, loss to the establishment or criminal conviction had followed from it.

Although a disproportionate penalty would ordinarily be remitted to the disciplinary or appellate authority, the Court held this an exceptional case for moulding the relief. More than three decades had passed since the occurrence, and a remand would only revive an appeal the petitioner could no longer pursue himself, observed the Court.

Partly allowing the petition, the Court set aside the removal order and the appellate order to the extent of the penalty and directed that the petitioner be treated as having continued in service from 21.12.1998 until his death on 07.04.2006 solely for continuity of service, pay fixation, terminal benefits and pension. Since no service was rendered after the removal and the misconduct stood sustained, the legal heirs were held entitled to twenty-five per cent of the back wages.

His widow was held entitled to family pension from 07.04.2006 with the entire admissible arrears, without reduction on account of that restriction, and the respondents were directed to release all other terminal and death-cum-retirement benefits on the basis of notional continuity within three months. The prayer for compassionate appointment was rejected in view of the long lapse of time.